aAccording to Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 an accomplice shall be a competent witness

against an accused; and convict ion is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.

Accomplice – Mr. Keefe and Mr. Bancroft

According to State v. Ocurli, AIR 1957 All. 53; Chanda v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Nag.143

An accomplice is one concerned with another, or in others, in the commission of a crime. It includes all
particeps criminis (partners in crime). In other words, an accomplice is one who is a guilty associate in
crime or one who is in such a relation to the criminal act that he can be jointly prosecuted with the
primary accused.1

Introduce Mr. Keefe

CCTV footages provide proof that Mr. Keefe had swapped the two materials at the Italian Airport (proof
that he is an accomplice)

Corroboration of evidence of a witness is required when his evidence is not wholly reliable.2

Our case the confessions of Mr. Keefe and Mr. Bancroft aren’t wholly reliable, but the corroborative
evidence for the confessions is that SIT report Para 36.

Corroboration doesn’t mean that every detail given by the accomplice must be corroborated by the independent
witnesses. All that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of
the accomplice is true and it is safe to rely on. Corroboration need not be by direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime, it is sufficient even though it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.

(the Bank transfer details can be used here)

The court held that even if the court doesn’t prosecute a witness and uses his evidence only as an
accomplice, it is perfectly legal. The evidence of such witness subject to the usual caution is admissible
evidence. The contention that his evidence would be inadmissible because he has not granted pardon or
has not been made accused is of no consequence3

Section 133 lays down that an accomplice is a competent witness and a convection based on the sole
testimony of an accomplice is not illegal.

So far as the question about the conviction based on the testimony of the accomplice is concerned the
law is settled and it is established rule of prudence that the testimony of the accomplice, if it is thought

1
According to State v. Ocurli, AIR 1957 All. 53; Chanda v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Nag.143

2
C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 608 at pp. 612-613; Per Justice Chandramali Kr. Prasad.
3
Chandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 2011 SC 1594 at p. 1616
reliable as a whole, conviction could only be based if it is corroborated by independent evidence either
direct or circumstantial connecting the accused with the crime

Mr. Keefe Mr. Bancroft are PRINCIPAL OF THE FIRST DEGREE

Section 114 – Court may presume existence of certain facts which it thinks likely to have happened,
regard being had to the common course o natural events, human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case

The Court may presume—

(b) that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;

An accomplice when pardoned under section 306 of Cr.P.C., becomes a government witness. If on the evidence of
an accomplice only, the accused is convicted, his conviction is not illegal but as a rule of prudence, ordinary the court
requires corroboration of his evidence under section 144 Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act

Page 635 last 2 paras can be our arguments

For the government we prove that Mr. Keefe and Mr. Bancoft as accomplice

For Nixon we prove that Mr. Keefe and Mr. Bancoft are co-accused

The approvers’, of a pardon, evidence is looked upon with great suspicion. But if found trustworthy it can bedecisive
in securing conviction4

An approver bargains his immunity so he must prove his worthiness for

credibility in court. This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves
him in the crime and appears intrinsically to be natural and probable
catalogue of events that had taken place, secondly, when the hurdle is
crossed the story given by the approver so far as the accused on trial is
concerned must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a
conclusive of guilt beyond reasonable doubt5

4
Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggo, AIR 2001 SC 2734
5
Ravindra Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1956 SC 856
This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves him in the crime
and appears intrinsically to be natural and probable catalogue of events
that had taken place ( I DONT SEE ANYWAY THAT WE CAN PROVE
THIS WRONG)

secondly, when the hurdle is crossed the story given by the approver so far
as the accused on trial is concerned must implicate him in such a manner
as to give rise to a conclusive of guilt beyond reasonable doubt ( HERE WE
CAN FORM ARGUMENTS FOR BOTH SIDE – BY PLAYING WITH
WORDS)

It was held hat “an approver is undoubtedly a competent witness under the evidence act. But
the appreciation of his evidence has to satisfy a double test. (10 His evidence must show that
he is a reliable witness and this is a test which is common to all witnesses, if this test is satisfied
the second test, (2) the approver’s evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. This test is
special to cases of weak or tainted evidences.6

Pg 640

Nixon’s argument - point 3 ( read)

Too hard to prove???

What the law requires in the case of an accomplice’s evidence is that

There should be such corroboration of the material parts of the story connecting the accused
with the crime as to satisfy reasonable minds, that the approver can be regarded as a truthful
witness. (GOVEREMENT CAN USE THIS AS THE CONFESSION DOES LINK NIXON TO THE
CRIME)

The corroboration needs not be direct evidence of his connection with the crime it will be
sufficient and the nature of corroboration will depend on and vary with the circumstances of
each case7(GOVEREMENT CAN USE THIS AS THE CONFESSION DOES LINK NIXON TO
THE CRIME) ( THE CORROBORATION IN THIS CASE BEING THAT AS
AFOREMENTIONED, SHARES INVESTMENT AND CALL RECORDS)

► Interpretation.—Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act envisages that when more than
one persons are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of such

6
Tribhuwan Nath v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 450
7
K.K Jadava v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 82
persons if found to affect the maker and some other of such persons and stands sufficiently
proved, the court can take into consideration such confession as against such other person as
well as against the person who made such confession. This is what exactly seems to have been
done by the learned trial judge, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Jaspal Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 586.

► Confession of persons not co-accused.—A confessional statement is relevant only

and only if the author of confessional statement himself is an accused in a case where the
confessional statement is being proved. For such admissibility it is imperative that the person
making the confession besides implicating himself, also implicates others who are being jointly
tried with him. In that situation alone is, such a confessional statement relevant even against the
others who are accused/implicated. Hence, where authors of confessional statements are
arrayed as the accused in a particular case confessional statements made by them are
inadmissible as confessional statements, State of Maharashtra v. Kamal Ahmed Mohammed
Vakil Ansari, (2013) 12 SCC 17 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 202.

► Confession of co-accused.—Although confession of co-accused is not substantive

evidence, it can be relied on if it is voluntary and properly recorded and other evidence
sufficiently supports the prosecution case and if the confession has no non-corroborative factor
and no serious contradictions, Mohd. Jamiludin Nasir v. State of W.B., (2014) 7 SCC 443 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 230.

As a result of provisions contained in Section 30, confession has no doubt to be regarded as

amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by court is evidence;
circumstances which are considered by court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in
that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic
sense because of provisions of Section 30, fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by
Section 3. Result, therefore is, that in dealing with a case against an accused person, court
cannot start with confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced
by prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to quality and effect of said
evidence, then it is permissible to turn to confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. Law so
laid down has always been followed except in cases where there is a specific provision in law
making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused, Surinder Kumar
Khanna v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2018) 8 SCC 271.