Katon v Palanca, Jr.
matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
G.R. No. 151149. | September 7, 2004 | Panganiban, J. | Group 2
Petitioner: GEORGE KATON
Respondents: MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO
and JUAN FRESNILLO
Topic: Appeal from judgments or final orders of the RTC
Summary/How it got to the SC
1. Katon filed request with District Office of Bureau of Forestry in Puerto
Princesa for the re-classification from forest to agricultural land of a piece
of real property known as Sombrero Island; granted
2. Respondents respectively filed homestead patent applications for a portion
of the land; these were subsequently issued
3. Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original
certificates of title on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud.
Petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of
title issued in favor of the respondents as well as the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor.
4. Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses
and Counterclaim in due time.
5. [June 30, 1999] Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his
Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the
deceased, Respondent Gapilango.
6. [July 29, 1999] The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC
7. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for
being a third and prohibited motion.
8. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion
was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
9. CA: dismissed Complaint motu proprio pursuant to its residual prerogative
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Nature: Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing CA decision
Ratio: Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA. The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of
petitioners Complaint could not have been based on residual jurisdiction under Rule
41. Such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA
referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts
to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Sec 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and under authority of Sec 2 of Rule 1. The CA had the excepted
instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action. Jurisdiction over the subject
the character of the relief sought.
Doctrine: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of
action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be
dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been
elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases
appropriately ends useless litigations.
Facts
 August 2, 1963  Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau
of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of
real property known as Sombrero Island (approx. 18 hectares; Tagpait,
Aborlan, Palawan)
 The Bureau of Forestry District Office ordered the inspection, investigation
and survey of the land subject of the petitioners request for eventual
conversion or re-classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter
for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.
o Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator)
undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the
presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased)
and his cousin, Manuel Palanca, Jr.
o During survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but
there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by
petitioner and Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went
to the island from time to time to undertake development work
 The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably
endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office
in Manila for appropriate action.
o The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus
Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as
co-applicants of the petitioner.
 In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L.
Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was
no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and
released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
 Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had
been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified
available for disposition upon his request and at his instance.
o However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then land investigator of the District
Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the
request of respondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin,
for authority to survey on November 15, 1965.
o November 22  a second endorsement was issued by Palawan
District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to
survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents
consisting of 5 hectares each.
o December 10, 1965  Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was
issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador
to survey 10 hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents.
 December 23, 1990  Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead patent application
for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.
o November 8, 1996  resp Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares.
o June 8, 1972  Resp Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application
o March 3, 1977  Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 with an area
of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
 Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original
certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued
in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained
through fraud.
o Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested
for the reclassification of the island in dispute and that on or about
the time of such request, respondents Fresnillo, Palanca and
Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and introduced
numerous improvements.
o Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application
for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc
undertook the inspection and survey of the island.
 According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents
insist that they already had their respective occupancy and improvements on
the island.
 Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of
their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation
purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for
twenty years.
o Contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as
the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can
only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant
and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to
assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained
period of time.
 Petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original
certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain
portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor.
o Claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who
requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.
 Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim in due time.
o On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order
to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the
legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.
 The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its
Order dated July 29, 1999.
o Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order
was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17,
1999, for being a third and prohibited motion.
o In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the
denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Order.
CA: resolved the Petition for Certiorari based on the merits of the case
 While petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from
forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the
Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
o The annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the
reversion of the property to the State were matters between the
latter and the homestead grantee.
 Granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent
to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on
his right for almost 23 years from the time Palanca’s title had been issued.
 In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it
ruled on the merits of the case.
o It agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without
jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999
Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a
third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.
o Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the
challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members
with two justices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
 Prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance.
o First, petitioners action was brought 24 years after the issuance of
Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action
should have been taken within 10 years from the issuance of the
homestead certificate of title.
o Second, it appears from the submission of petitioner himself that
Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six
hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal
steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond
the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the
Civil Code.
Issues + Held
Is the CA correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not
raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition? – MOOT
 This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the
CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved
for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected
itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution.
 That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs
Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners issue moot.
 Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling
on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was
 in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
 The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, more so when
no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court.
Is the CA correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue
not raised in the Petition? – YES
 Petitioner submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed
the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
o According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the
trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly
exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such
powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
 Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of
trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Section 1 Rule 9
 Under Sec 1 Rule 9, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
o In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss
the claim or action.
 Gumabon v. Larin  The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally
limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules
or with any order of the court.
o Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
o Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section
3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
o Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when
it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. x x x.
Section 9 Rule 41 (Residual Jurisdiction)
 SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A party’s appeal by notice of
appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in
due time.
 In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
 In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over
the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
 In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal.
 The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal.
o This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the
parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to
the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.
o In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
 The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41.
o Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
o What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the
general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an
action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Sec 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Sec 2 of
Rule 1
 The CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental grounds directly bearing
on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and for prescription of the
action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.
 The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration
of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for
reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion?
o The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such
actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
 Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public
Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in
his stead may institute such an action.
 Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of
lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of action.
 o Section 2 of Rule 3 ordains that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has
no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which to
invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.
 Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for
annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for
being time-barred.
o A homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to
Palanca on February 21, 1977, while the Complaint was filed only on
October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years
from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive
period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.
 Palancas title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the
issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no
longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud.
o Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate Court  a certificate of title, issued
under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent,
is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration
proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, however, that the
land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
o Aldovino v. Alunan  when the plaintiffs own complaint shows
clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed
even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the
defendant.
 Gicano v. Gegato  "Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an
action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts
on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets
up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where
no statement thereof is found in the pleadings; or where a defendant has been
declared in default.
o What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the
lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the
plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."
 Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and
when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire
controversies before them to prevent future litigations.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231
is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action
and prescription. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.