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T he concept o f logical consequence is one o f those whose intro*

duction in to the field o f strict form al investigation was n ot a
m atter o f arbitrary decision on the part o f this or that investi­
gator; in defining this concept, efforts were m ade to adhere to
the com m on usage o f the language o f everyday life. B u t these
efforts have been confronted with the difficulties which usually
present them selves in such oases. W ith respect to the clarity
o f its content the com m on concept o f oonsequence is in no w ay
superior to other ooncepts o f everyday language. Its extension
is not sharply bounded and its usage fluctuates. A n y attem pt
to bring into harm ony all possible vague, sometim es contra­
dictory, tendencies whioh are connected with the use o f this
concept, is certainly doom ed to failure. W e must reconcile our­
selves from the start to the fa ct that every precise definition o f
this concept will show arbitrary features to a greater or less
E ven until recently m any logicians believed that they had
succeeded, b y means o f a relatively meagre stock o f concepts,
in grasping alm ost exactly the oontent o f the com m on concept
o f consequence, or rather in defining a new concept which coin­
cided in extent with the com m on one. Such a belief could easily
arise am idst the new achievem ents o f the m ethodology o f de­
ductive science. Thanks to the progress o f m athem atical logio
we have learnt, during the course o f recent decades, how to
present m athem atical disciplines in the shape o f form alized
deductive theories. In these theories, as is w ell known, the
f B ibxjogbaphioax N ote . This is a summary of an address given at the
International Congress of Soientifio Philosophy in Paris, 1935. The article
first appeared in print in Polish under the title ‘ O pojoiu wynikania logics-
nego* in Przeglqd Filozoflczny, vol. 89 (1936), pp. 68-68, and then in German
under the title ‘ tlber den Begriff der logisohen Folgerung’, Aetes du Oongrit
International de PhUoeophio Soiantiftque, vol. 7 (Aotualitis Scientifiques et
Industrielles, vol. 894), Paris, 1936, pp. 1-11.

p roof o f every theorem reduces to single or repeated application

o f some simple rules o f inference— suoh as the rules o f substitu­
tion and detachm ent. These rules tell us what transformations
o f a purely structural kind (i.e. transformations in which only
the external structure o f sentences is involved) are to be per­
form ed upon the axiom s or theorems already proved in the
theory, in order that the sentences obtained as a result o f such
transform ations m ay themselves be regarded as proved. L ogi­
cians thought that these few rules o f inference exhausted the
content o f the concept o f consequence. W henever a sentence
follow s from others, it can be obtained from them— so it was
thought— in more or less com plicated ways b y means o f the
transform ations prescribed b y the rules. In order to defend this
view against sceptics who doubted whether the concept o f conse­
quence when form alized in this w ay really coincided in extent
with the com m on one, the logicians were able to bring forward
a w eighty argument: the fact that they had actually succeeded
in reproducing in the shape o f form alized proofs all the exact
reasonings which had ever been carried out in mathematics.
Nevertheless we know today that the scepticism was quite
justified and that the view sketched above cannot be main­
tained. Some years ago I gave a quite elem entary example o f
a theory which shows the follow ing peculiarity: among its
theorems there occur such sentences as:
A 0. 0 possesses the given property P ,
A v 1 possesses the given property P ,
and, in general, all particular sentences o f the form
A n. n possesses the given property P ,
where V represents any sym bol which denotes a natural number
in a given (e.g. decim al) number system . On the other hand the
universal sentence:
A . Every natural number possesses the given property P ,
cannot be proved on the basis o f the theory in question b y means
o f the norm al rules o f inference .1 This fact seems to me to speak
1 For a detailed description of a theory with this peculiarity see I X ; for
the discussion of the closely related rule of infinite induction see V III, pp. 258 ff.

for itself. I t shows that the form alized concept o f consequence,

as it is generally used b y mathematical logicians, b y no means
coincides with the com m on concept. Y et intuitively it seems
certain that the universal sentence A follows in the usual sense
from the totality o f particular sentences A Qi A v „>, A n>.... P ro­
vided all these sentences are true, the sentence A must also be
In connexion with situations o f the kind just described it has
proved to be possible to form ulate new rules o f inference which
do not differ from the old ones in their logical structure, are
intuitively equally infallible, i.e. always lead from true sentences
to true sentences, but cannot be reduced to the old rules. An
exam ple o f such a. rule is the so-called rule o f infinite induction
according to which the sentence A can be regarded as proved
provided all the sentences A 0, A v ..., A n,... have been proved
(the sym bols ‘A 0’ , (A ±\ etc., being used in the same sense as
previously). B ut this rule, on account o f its infinitistic nature,
is in essential respects different from the old rules. It can only
be applied in the construction o f a theory if we have first suc­
ceeded in proving infinitely m any sentences o f this theory— a
state o f affairs which is never realized in practice. But this
defect can easily be overcom e b y means o f a certain m odifica­
tion o f the new rule. For this purpose we consider the sentence
B which asserts that all the sentences A 0i A lf..., A nt... are
provable on the basis o f the rules o f inference hitherto used
(not that they have actually been proved). W e then set up
the follow ing rule: if the sentence B is proved, then the corre­
sponding sentence A can be accepted as proved. But here
it m ight still be objected that the sentence B is not at all a
sentence o f the theory under construction, but belongs to the
so-called m etatheory (i.e. the theory of the theory discussed)
and that in consequence a practical application o f the rule in
question will always require a transition from the theory to the
m etatheory .1 In order to avoid this objection we shall restrict

1 For the concept of metatheory and the problem of the interpretation of a

metatheory in the corresponding theory see article V H I, pp. 167 ff., 184, and
247 ff.

consideration to those deductive theories in which the arith­

m etic o f natural numbers can be developed, and observe that
in every such theory all the concepts and sentences o f the
corresponding m etatheory can be interpreted (since a one-one
correspondence can be established betwreen expressions o f a
language and natural num bers ).1 W e can replace in the rule
discussed the sentence B b y the sentence B\ which is the arith­
m etical interpretation o f 2?. In this w ay we reach a rule which
does n ot deviate essentially from the rules o f inference, either
in the conditions o f its applicability or in the nature o f the
concepts involved in its form ulation or, finally, in its intuitive
infallibility (although it is considerably m ore com plicated).
N ow it is possible to state other rules o f like nature, and even
as m any o f them as we please. A ctually it suffices in fact to
notice that the rule last form ulated is essentially dependent
upon the extension o f the concept ‘sentence provable on the
basis o f the rules hitherto used\ B ut when we adopt this rule
we thereby widen the extension o f this concept. Then, for the
widened extension we can set up a new, analogous rule, and
so on ad infinitum . I t w ould be interesting to investigate
whether there are any objective reasons for assigning a special
position to the rules ordinarily used.
The conjecture now suggests itself that we can finally succeed
in grasping the full intuitive content o f the concept o f conse­
quence b y the m ethod sketched above, i.e. b y supplem enting
the rules o f inference used in the construction o f deductive
theories- B y m aking use o f the results o f K . G odel2 we can
show that this conjecture is untenable. In every deductive
theory (apart from certain theories o f a particularly elem entary
nature), however m uch we supplem ent the ordinary rules o f
inference b y new purely structural rules, it is possible to con­
struct sentences which follow , in the usual sense, from the
theorem s o f this theory, but which nevertheless cannot be
proved in this theory on the basis o f the accepted rules o f
1 For the concept of metatheory and the problem of the interpretation of a
metatheory in the eorrosponding theory see article V III. pp. 167 £f., 184, and
247 ff.
* Cf. G<>dei, K . (22), especially pp. 190 f.

inference ,1 In order to obtain the proper concept o f consequence,

which is close in essentials to the com m on concept, we must
resort to quite different m ethods and apply quite different con­
ceptual apparatus in defining it. It is perhaps not superfluous
to point out in advance that— in com parison with the new—-the
old ooncept o f consequence as com m only used by mathematical
logicians in no w ay loses its im portance. This ooncept will
probably always bare a decisive significance for the practical
construction o f deductive theories, as an instrum ent which
allows us to prove or disprove particular sentences o f these
theories. It seems, however, that in considerations o f a general
theoretical nature the proper concept o f consequence must be
placed in the foreground .3
The first attem pt to form ulate a precise definition o f the
proper concept o f consequence was that o f R , Catnap .3 B ut this
1 In order to anticipate possible objections the range of application of the
result jost formulated should be determined more exac Jy and the logical nature
o f the rules o f inference exhibited more clear]^ , iu yartioulftr it should be
exactly explained what is meant by the structural character of those rules.
* An opposition between the two concept i i question is clearly pointed cut-
in article IX , pp. 2fl3 ff. Nevertheless, in contrast tc m y present standpoint,
I have there expressed myself in a decidedly negative manner about the possi­
bility of setting up an exact formal definition lor the proper concept of conse­
quence. My position at that time is explained by the fact that, when I was
writing the article mentioned, I wishtr.i tc any means of construction
which went beyond the theory of logical types tu any of its classical forms;
but it can be shown that it is impossible to define the proper concept of
consequence adequately whilst using exclusively the means admissible in the
classical theory of types; unless we should thus limit our considerations
solely to formalized language? of au elementary and fragmentary character (to
be exact, to the so-called languages of Unite order; of. article V III, especially
pp. 268 if.). In his extremely interesting book, Carnap, K. (10), the term
{logical) derivatioti or dericabiUty Ls applied to old ooncept of consequence
as commonly used in the construction cf deductive theories, in order to distin­
guish it from the concept of eof*$eqvmce as the proper concept. The opposition
between the two concepts is extended by Carnap to the most diverse derived
conoepts (*f-concepts'' and *Sk~c<jrxej)ts\ cf. pp. 88 ff., and 124 ff.); he tlso
emphasizes— to my mind correctly— the importance of the proper concord of
consequence and the concepts derived from it, for general theoretical discus­
sions (cf. e.g. p. 128).
* Cf. Carnap, R. (10), pp. 88 £, and Carnap, R. (11) especially p. 181.
In the first of these works there is yet another definition of consequence which
is adapted to a formalized language of an elementary character. This definition
is not considered here because it cannot be applied to languages of a more com­
plicated logical structure. Carnap attempts to define the concept of logical conse­
quence not only for special languages, but also within the framework of what he
calls *general syntax \ We shall have more to say about this on p. 416, note 1.

attem pt is connected rather closely w ith the particular proper­

ties o f the form alized language which was chosen as the subject
o f investigation. The definition proposed by Carnap can be
form ulated as follow s:
The sentence X follow s logically from the sentences of the class
K if and only if the class consisting of all the sentences of K and
of the negation of X is contradictory.
The decisive element o f the above definition obviously is the
concept 'con tradictory', Carnap s definition o f this concept is
too com plicated and special to be reproduced here w ithout long
and troublesom e explanations .1
I should like to sketch here a general m ethod which, it seems
to me, enables us to construct an adequate definition o f the
concept o f consequence for a com prehensive class o f form alized
languages, I emphasize, however, that the proposed treatm ent
o f the concept o f consequence makes no very high elaim to
com plete originality. The ideas involved in this treatm ent will
certainly seem to be something well known, or even something
o f his own, to m any a logician who has given close attention to
the concept o f consequence and has tried to characterize it
more precisely. Nevertheless it seems to me that only the
m ethods which have been developed in recent years for the
establishment o f scientific semantics, and the concept's defined
with their aid, allow us to present these ideas in an exact form .2
Certain considerations o f an intuitive nature will form our
starting-point. Consider any class K o f sentences and a- sentence
X which follow s from the sentences o f this class. From an in­
tuitive standpoint it can never happen that both the class K
consists only o f true sentences and the sentence X is false.
M oreover, since we are concerned here with the concept o f
logical, i.e. formal, consequence, and thus with a relation which is
to be uniquely determ ined b y the form o f the sentences between
which it holds, this relation cannot be influenced in any way by
em pirical knowledge, and in particular b y knowledge o f the
1 See footnote 3 on p. 413.
* The methods and concepts of semantics and especially the concepts of
truth and satisfaction are discussed in detail in article V II I ; Bee also article X V .

objects to which the sentence X or the sentences o f the class

K refer. The consequence relation cannot be affected b y re­
placing the designations o f the objeots referred to in these
sentences b y the designations o f any other objects. The two
circumstances just indicated, which seem to be very charac­
teristic and essential for the proper concept o f consequence, m ay
be join tly expressed in the follow ing statem ent:

(F) If, in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X , the
constants—apart from purely logical constants—are replaced by
any other constants (like signs being everywhere replaced by like
signs), and if we denote the class of sentences thus obtained from
K by iK ri, and the sentence obtained from X by 6X'\ then the
sentence X ' must be true provided only that all sentences of the
class K f are true.
[F or the sake o f sim plifying the discussion certain incidental
com plications are disregarded, both here and in what follow s.
They are connected partly with the theory o f logical types, and
partly with the necessity o f eliminating any defined signs which
m ay possibly occur in the sentences concerned, i.e. o f replacing
them by prim itive signs.]
In the statem ent (F ) we have obtained a necessary condition
for the sentence X to be a consequenoe o f the class K . The
question now arises whether this condition is also sufficient.
I f this question were to be answered in the affirmative, the
problem o f form ulating an adequate definition o f the concept
o f consequence w ould be solved affirm atively. The only diffi­
culty would be connected with the term ‘true’ which occurs in
the condition ( F ). B ut this term can be exactly and adequately
defined in sem antics .1
U nfortunately the situation is not so favourable. I t m ay, and
it does, happen— it is not difficult to show this b y considering
special form alized languages— that the sentence X does not
follow in the ordinary sense from the sentences o f the class K
although the condition ( F ) is satisfied. This condition m ay in
fa ct be satisfied only because the language with which we are
1 See footnote 2 on p. 414.

dealing does not possess a sufficient stock o f extra-logical con­

stants. The condition (F ) could be regarded as sufficient for
the sentence X to follow from the class K only if the designations
o f all possible objects occurred in the language in question. This
assum ption, how ever, is fictitious and can never be realized .1
W e m ust therefore look for some means o f expressing the in­
tentions o f the condition (F ) which will be com pletely inde­
pendent o f that fictitious assum ption.
Such a means is provided by semantics. Among the funda­
mental concepts o f semantics we have the concept o f the satis­
faction of a sentential function by single objects or by a sequence
<5f objects. It would be superfluous to give here a precise ex­
planation o f the content o f this concept. The intuitive meaning
o f such phrases ae: John and Peter satisfy the condition 'X and
7 are brothers’, or the triple of numbers 2, 3, and 5 satisfies the
equation :£C-fy = z\ can give rise to no doubts. The concept o f
satisfaction—like other semantical concepts—must always be
relativized to some particular language. The details o f its pre­
cise definition depend on the structure o f this language. Never­
theless, a general method can be developed which enables us to
construct such definitions for a comprehensive class o f forma­
lized languages. Unfortunately, for technical reasons, it would
be impossible to sketch this method here even in its general
One o f the concepts which can be defined in terms o f the
concept o f satisfaction is the concept o f model. L et us assume
that in the language we are considering certain variables corre­
spond to every extra-logical constant, and in such a w ay that
every sentence becom es a sentential function if the constants
in it are replaced b y the corresponding variables. L et L be any
class o f sentences. W e replace all extra-logical constants which
1 These last remarks constitute a criticism of some earlier attempts to
define the concept of formal consequence. They concern, in particular, Car­
nap’s definitions of logical consequence and a series of derivative concepts
(L-consequences and L-conoepts, of. Carnap, R . (10), pp. 137 & ). These defini­
tions, in so far ae they are set up on the basis of ‘general syntax’, seem to me
to be materially inadequate, just because the defined concepts depend essen-
tially, in their extension, on the richness of the language investigated.
* See footnote 2 on p. 414.

ocour in the sentences belonging to L by corresponding variables,

like constants being replaced b y like variables, and unlike b y
unlike. In this w ay we obtain a class & o f sentential functions.
A n arbitrary sequence o f objects whioh satisfies every sentential
function o f the class L r w ill be called a model or realization of
the class L of sentences (in ju st this sense one usually speaks o f
m odels o f an axiom system o f a deductive theory). If, in parti­
cular, the class L consists o f a single sentence X , we shall also
call the m odel o f the class L the model of the sentence X .
In term s o f these concepts we can define the concept o f logical
consequence as follow s:

The sentence X follows fisca lly from the. sentences of the class
K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the
sentence X .t
I t seems to me that everyone who understands the content
o f the above definition must adm it that it agrees quite well
with com m on usage. This becom es still clearer from its various
consequences. In particular, it can be proved, on the basis o f
this definition, that every consequence o f true sentences must
be true, and also that the consequence relation which holds
between given sentences is com pletely independent o f the sense
o f the extra-logical constants which occur in these sentences.
In brief, it can be shown that the condition (F ) form ulated
above is necessary if the sentence X is to follow from the sen­
tences o f the class K . On the other hand, this condition is in
general not sufficient, since the concept o f consequence here
defined (in agreement with the standpoint we have taken) is-
independent o f the richness in concepts o f the language being
Finally, it is not difficult to reconcile the proposed definition
with that o f Carnap. F or we can agree to call a class o f sentences

t After the original of this paper had appeared in print, K . Scholz in his
article ‘ Die Wistenschaftslehxe Bc-lzanos, Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung’,
AbhancUungen der Fri&s'schen Schule, new series, vol. 6, pp. $99-472 (see in
particular p. 472, footnote 58) pointed out a far-reaching analogy between this
definition of consequence and the one suggested by B. Bolzano about a
hundred years earlier.

contradictory i f it possesses no m odel. A nalogously, a class o f

sentences can be called analytical i f every sequence o f objects
is a m odel o f it. B oth o f these ooncepts can be related not only
t o classes o f sentences but also to single sentences. L et us
assume further that, in the language with which we are dealing,
for every sentence X there exists a negation o f this sentence,
i.e. a sentence 7 which has as a m odel those and only those
sequences o f objeots which are n ot m odels o f the sentence X
(this assum ption is rather essential for Carnap’s construction).
On the basis o f all these conventions and assum ptions it is easy
to prove the equivalence o f (he iwo definitions. W e can also show
— ju st as does Carnap— that those and only those sentences are
analytical w hich follow from every class o f sentences (in parti­
cular from the em pty class), and those and on ly those are
oontradiotory from whioh every sentence follow s .1
I am not at all o f the opinion that in the result o f the above
discussion the problem o f a m aterially adequate definition o f
the concept o f consequence has been com pletely solved. On the
contrary, I still see several open questions, on ly one o f whioh—
perhaps the m ost im portant— I shall point out here.
U nderlying our whole construction is the division o f all terms
o f the language discussed in to logical and extra-logical. This
division is certainly n ot quite arbitrary. If, for exam ple, we
were to include am ong the extra-logioal signs the im plication
sign, or the universal quantifier, then our definition o f the con ­
cept o f consequence w ould lead to results which obviously
contradict ordinary usage. On the other hand, no objective
grounds are know n to m e whioh perm it us to draw a sharp

1 Cf. Carnap, B . (10), pp. 135 ff., especially Tbs. 52.7 and 62.8; Carnap, B .
(11), p. 182, Ths. 10 and 11. Incidentally I should like to remark that the
definition of the concept of oonsequence hare proposed does not exceed the
limits of syntax in Carnap's conception (cf. Carnap, R. (10), pp. 6 £f.). Ad­
mittedly the general concept of satisfaction (or of model) does not belong to
syntax; but we use only a special case of this oonoept— the satisfaction of
sentential funotions whioh contain no extra-logioal constants, and this special
case can be characterized using only general logical and specifio syntactical
eonoepts. Between the general concept of satisfaction and the special case of
this concept used here approximately the same relation holds as between the
semantical concept of true sentence and the syntactical oonoept of analytical

boundary between the tw o groups o f terms. It seems to be

possible to include am ong logical terms some which are usually
regarded b y logicians as extra-logical without running into
consequences whioh stand in sharp contrast to ordinary usage.
In the extrem e case we could regard all terms o f the language
as logical. The concept o f formal consequence w ould then co ­
incide with that o f material consequence. The sentence X w ould
in this case follow from the class K o f sentences if either X were
true or at least one sentence o f the class K were false .1
In order to see the im portance o f this problem for certain
general philosophical views it suffices to note that the division
o f terms into logical and extra-logical also plays an essential
part in clarifying the concept ‘analytical*. B ut according to
m any logicians this last concept is to be regarded as the exact
form al correlate o f the concept o f tautology (i.e. o f a statem ent

1 It will perhaps be instructive to juxtapose the three concepts; 1deriva-

bility* (of. p. 413, note 2), ‘ formal consequence\ and ‘ material consequence\
for the special case when the class K , from whioh the given sentence X follows,
consists of only a finite number of sentences: Ylt Y&..., Yn. Let us denote
by the Bymbol 'Z* the conditional sentence (the implication) whose antecedent
is the conjunction of the sentences Ylt Yn and whose consequent is the
sentence X . The following equivalences can then be established i
the sentence X is (logically) derivablefrom the sentences of the class K if and only
if the sentence Z is logically provable (i.e. derivable from the axioms of logic) ;
the sentence X follows formally from the sentences of the class K if and only if
the sentence Z is analytical;
the sentence X follows materially from the sentences of the class K if and only if
the sentence Z is true.
Of the three equivalences only the first can arouse certain objections; of.
article X H , pp. 342-64, especially 346. In connexion with these equivalences
cf. also Ajdukiewicz, EL. (2), p. 19, and (4), pp. 14 and 42.
In view of the analogy indicated between the several variants of the con*
cept of consequence, the question presents itself whether it would not be useful
to introduce, in addition to the special concepts, a general concept of a relative
character, and indeed the concept of consequence with respect to a class L of
sentences. I f we make use again of the previous notation (limiting ourselves
to the case when the class K is finite), we can define this concept as follows:
the sentence X follows from the sentences of the doss K with respect to the
class L of sentences if and only if ike sentence Z belongs to the class L.
On the basis of this definition, derivability would ooineide with consequence
with respect to the class of all logically provable sentences, formal consequences
would be consequences with respect to the class of aQ analytical sentences, and
material consequences those with respect to the class of all true sentences.

which ‘says nothing about reality’ ), a concept which to me

personally seems rather vague, but which has been o f funda­
m ental im portance for the philosophical discussions o f L. W itt­
genstein and the whole Vienna Circle .1
Further research will doubtless greatly clarify the problem
which interests us. Perhaps it w ill be possible to find im portant
objective arguments which w ill enable us to ju stify the tradi­
tional boundary between logical and extra-logical expressions.
B ut I also consider it to be quite possible that investigations
will bring no positive results in this direction, so that we shall
be com pelled to regard such concepts as ‘logical consequence’ ,
‘analytical statem ent’, ‘and ‘tau tology’ as relative concepts
which must, on each occasion, be related to a definite, although
in greater or less degree arbitrary, division o f terms into logical
and extra-logical. The fluctuation in the com m on usage o f the
concept o f consequence w ould— in part at least— be quite
naturally reflected in such a com pulsory situation.
1 Cf. Wittgenstein, L. (91), Carnap, R. (10), pp. 37-40.
I s this article I shall point out certain form al connexions between
the sentential calculus and topology (as well as some other
m athem atical theories). I am concerned in the first place with
a topological interpretation o f tw o systems o f the sentential
calculus, nam ely the ordinary (tw o-valued) and the intuitionistic
(B rouw er-H eyting) system . W ith every sentence o f the sen­
tential calculus we correlate, in one-one fashion, a sentence 21*
o f topology in such a w ay that 21 is provable in the tw o-valued
calculus if and only if 2lx holds in every topological space. An
analogous correlation is set up for the intuitionistic calculus.
The present discussion seems to me to have a certain interest
not only from the purely form al point o f view ; it also throws
an interesting light on the content relations between the two
system s o f the sentential calculus and the intuitions underlying
these systems.
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings I should like to
emphasize that I have not attem pted to adapt the m ethods o f
reasoning used in this article to the requirem ents o f intuitionistic
logic .1 F or valuable help in com pleting this work I am indebted
to Professor A, M ostowski.
1 Most results o f this article were obtained in the year 1935. The connexion
between the intuitionistic calculus and Boolean algebra (or the theory of
deductive eystems, see § 5) was discovered by me still earlier, namely in 1931.
Some remarks to this effect can be found in article X II of the present book and
in Tarski, A. (80). Only after completing this paper did I become acquainted
with the work, then newly published, of Stone, M. H. (70). Ir- spite of an
entirely different view of Brouwerian logic there is certainly some connexion
between particular results o f the two works, as can easily be seen comparing
Stone’s Th. 7, p. 22, and my Th. 4.11. In their mathematical content these
two theorems are closely related. But this does not at all apply to the two
works as wholes. In particular, Th. 4.24, in which I see the kernel of this paper,
tends in quite a different direction from Stone’s considerations.
t B ibliographical N ote . This article is the text of an address given by
the author on 30 September 1937 to the Third Polish Mathematical Congress in
Warsaw (see Annales de la Societi polonaise ds matkernatiexie, vol. 16 (1937),
p. 192). The article first appeared under the title ‘ Der Aussagenkalkul und die
Topologie’ , in Fundamenta Mathematical, vol. 31 (1928), pp. 103-34.

§ 1. T h e T w o -v a l u e d and the I n t u it io n ist ic S e n t e n t ia l

Calcu lu s

As is well known, the m ost elem entary part o f m athem atical

logic is the sentential calculus. In the expressions o f the sen­
tential calculus variables o f only one kind occur, nam ely senten­
tial variables, which represent whole sentences. As sentential
variables the letters ‘ X T ’ , will be used. In addition to
the variables, four constants occur in the sentential calculus:
the implication sign the disjunction sign *v the conjunc­
tion sign ‘ a ’ , and the negation sign ‘ -v. ’ (a fifth constant, the
equivalence sign ‘o ’ , will not be in volved here).
A rbitrary expressions which are com posed o f sentential
variables, the four constants m entioned, and possibly brackets,
w ill be denoted b y the letters ‘ 31’ , ‘ S ’ , . It is assumed that
the sentential variables are ordered in an (infinite) sequence with
distinct term s: 5B1( SS2,..., $»>••• • The sym bols MS-*- ® ’ , ‘ 31V SB’ ,
and ‘91A 83’ denote the implication, the disjunction, and the
conjunction o f Sff and SB respectively, that is the com pound ex ­
pressions which are form ed when Sit and SB are com bined b y the
corresponding constant ‘ v ’ , or *A ’ . Analogously the
negation o f Sit is denoted b y ‘ -vSJT.1
In addition to the signs just listed the usual set-theoretioal
sym bolism will be used.
The only expressions o f the sentential calculus with which we
shall deal will be sentences:

D efin ition 1.1. An expression 21 is called a sentential func­

tion, or (for shyrt) a sentence, if 3t belongs to every system which
(i) contains all sentential variables among its elements, (ii) is closed
under the operations of forming implications, disjunctions, con­
junctions, and negations; in other words, the system of all
sentences is the smallest system which has the properties (i)
and (ii).

1 In principle we thus use the signs \ * V \ ‘ A \ and * * in two senses:

in the logical and in the metalogical sense* In practice only the second sense is
involved* In }§ 4 and £ yet another, quite different sense will be given to these

In the system o f all sentences two subsystems are distin­

guished: the provable sentences o f the two-valued calculus and
those o f the intuitionistic calculus.
D efin itio n 1.2. The sentence 21 is called an axiom o f the tw o­
valued calculus, or o f the intuitionistic calculus, if there are
sentences S , G, and £> such that 21 satisfies one of the following
formulas (i)-(x ) in the first case, or one of the formulas (i)-(ix ) and
(xi) in the second case:
(i) 21= 3 -> (G -> 3 ),
(ii) 21 =
(iii) 2 l= 3 -* (3 v G ),
(iv) 21 = G -* (23 VG),
(v) 21= ( 3 -*2>)->{(<E-► 3 ) -* [(» V < £ )-► »]},
(vi) 2t = ( 3 A G) -► 3 ,
(vii) 21 = (3 A G) -* G,
(viii) 21= (D -* 3 )-► {($ -* G )- * [ $ - * ( 3 A G)]},
(ix) 21= 3 - > ( 3 - * G),
(x) 21 = ( ^ 3 - » 3 ) - * S ,
(xi) 21= ( 3 - * ^ 3 ) - * ^ 3 1
D efintiton 1.3. I f 21, 3 , and G are three sentences and if
21 = 3 -* G, then G is said to be the result o f the detachment
o f the sentence 3 from the sentence 21.
D efin itio n 1.4. The system of provable sentences o f the
two-valued calculus is the smallest system of sentences which con­
tains all the axioms o f the two-valued calculus and is closed under
the operation of detachment. The system of provable sentences
o f the intuitionistic calculus is the smallest system which contains
all the axioms of the intuitionistic calculus and is closed under
the same operation *
It is known that from these definitions the following two
theorems are derivable:
1 Cf. similar axiom systems: for the two-valued calculus in Hilbert, D. and
Bemays, P. (31) and for the intuitionist calculus in Gontzen, G. (18)* An axiom
system for the intuitionistic calculus was first given in Heyting, A. (28). The
problem of the mutual independence of the axioms (or, more exactly, axiom-
schemata) of 1.2 is not here discussed.
8 The operation of substitution need not be considered in 1.4 since the
axiom system defined in 1.2 is already closed under this operation.

T heorem 1.5. 3ft £ (but not conversely: if, e.£., 35 is a sen­

tential variable, tfAen 93V -v- 93 ami -v 23V ^ -v 93 belong to 3#
but not to 3ft).

T heorem 1.6. For every sentence 91thefollowing conditions are

equivalent: (i) 91e 3ft* (ii) ^"^91 e 3ft> (iii) ^91 e 3ft.1
An exact proof o f these theorems (as well as of all the results
given below) must of course be based upon a suitable axiom-
system for the meta-sentential calculus and not only upon the
definitions of the notions involved. But it would be superfluous
here to formulate such an axiom system explicitly.2

§ 2. T he Ma t r ix M ethod
The definitions in § I afford no criterion that would enable
us to decide in each particular case whether a giv^en sentence 21
is provable in the two-valued or in the intuitionistic calculus.
Such a criterion is provided by the so-called ^matrix method.3

D e f in it io n Let there be given a set Hr of arbitrary

2 .1 .
elements, an dement A e ■#', three binary operations »->, , and
Jo, and a unary operation It is assumed that iF* is closed
under these operations and that the following holds:
if Y e iT and A *-> F — A, then Y — A.
Under these assumptions, the ordered sextuple
M= [iT, A , »->, cp . j* , nJ]
is called a (normal logical) matrix.
Note 2.2. I f M= , A, »->, T, th, ~ ] is a matrix, then iT
is sometimes called the value system, A the designated element,
and *-►, T , Jb , ^ the fundamental operations (first, second, etc.)
of M.
1 The first part of Th. 1.5 follows easily from 1.2-1.4 (it suffices to show that
every sentence 91 of the form 1.2 (xi) belongs to For the second part of.
Heyting, A. (28), p. 56. Th. 1.6 was stated in Glivenko, T. (19).
2 In this connexion see V III, p. 173, IX , p. 282.
3 Cf. IV, p. 41. The concept of matrix i3 there rather more widely con­
ceived than here, since matrices with more than one designated element are also
considered (cf. 2.1, 2.2).

2.3. Two matrices Mx = .[iT l9 A 19 *->A, cpv cA>i,

D e f in it io n
and M2 = [ ^ , J.2, »+2, ^ 2? cb2> ^ 2] are said t° isom orphic
if there is a function F which maps on in a one-one
fashion and satisfies the following formulas: F(Af) = A 2)
F ( X *+x 7 ) - 7 (X ) ~ 2 F(Y), F ( X t . 7 ) = F(X) t 2 7 (7 ),
7 (X dhi 7 ) - 7 (Z ) db2 7 (7 ), and 7 ( ~ t X ) = ~ 2Z (X ) for
aU X , 7 e
C orollary 2.4, Every matrix M is isomorphic with itself; if
M2 is isomorphic with M2, then M2 is isomorphic icith M-^* if MA is
isomorphic with M2 and M2 is isomorphic with M3, then is iso­
morphic with M3. [By 2.3]

2.5* Let M = \ ifr \ A ,

D e f in it io n <L , ~ ] 6 e a matrix and
21a sentence. The following formulas define (recursively) a function
7$tMwhich correlates an element
>M(Xlv..,Xn,...)e ^
with every infinite sequence of elements X v ..., X n,.,. g If/'\
(i) 7*-M(X l5...,X n,...) = X p if 21 = ©p (p = 1, 2,...).
(ii) 72lM(X l5..,JX n,...)

i / 21 — © -> £ (where © and £ are any sentences).

(iii), (iv) analogously for the operations T and v , or db and A .
(v ) Z ^^X ^ .... X n,...) = ~ 7 ^ M(X lf..., X w,...) if 2{ — ©
(where S is any sentence).
T7csay tfiesentence 21is satisfied by £Ae matrix M, in symbols
21 6 C(M). i f Z «fM(X lf..., X *,...) = 4 /o r aB ^ ..... X n,... e

iVo^e 2.6. It is sometimes said that a matrix M is adequate for

the system S of sentences if ffi(M) = 6 .
2.7. I f the matrices
Co r o t j a r y and M2are isomorphic, then
®(MX) - ®(M2). “ [By 2.1 2.3, 2.5]
1 In the formulation of 2.5, we could use functions with finitely many
variables, but that would create certain technical difficulties in our further
considerations. Another, although equivalent, definition of the set <s(M) was
given in IV .
42C S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y X V II, § 2

D e f in it io n 2 . 8.
M = [ i f , A , *■>, T , Jo, ~ ] and Mx = [ ify, A , »-*•, T , J>,
aretwomatrices a n d ifif £ s IT , then Mxi,s called a subm atrix 0/ M.
I f M is any matrix and Mx is a submairix of
Co b o l la e y 2.9.
M, then ®(M) £ «(M X). [B y 2 . 1, 2.5, 2 . 8]
2 . 10. We denote by ZK the ordered sextuple
D e f in it io n
[ i f , 1, *-*, Jo, where i f = ( 0 , l), x = l-x -\ -x .y ,
s ! T y = x-\-y—x .y ,x J o y ~ x .y ,a n d ~ x = 1—xfor aUx,y e i f .
The follow ing result is well known:
T h e o r e m 2.11. ZK is a matrix and ®(ZK) = 3 ft .1
F or the system 3 ft there is, in contrast to 3 ft. no adequate
m atrix with a finite value system .2 W e can, however, con­
struct an infinite sequence o f m atrioes IK*,..., iK „,... with finite
value system s such that JX ®(IKn) = 3 ft. W e shall now de-
scribe the construction o f this sequenoe .8
Let M — [#^ , B, »-*, t , JU,
D e f in it io n 2 . 12. be a matrix
and A any element which does not belong to if* We put:
(i) i f * = if+ {A }\
(ii) l H * r = I n 7 if X t Y e i f and X +*Y B;
X *+ *Y — A if X , Y e i f and X ++ Y =* B; X *+ *A ~ A for
X e i f * ; A *+*Y * 7 for Y e i f * ;
(iii) X y *Y = X r Y f o r X , Y e i f ; Z r * A = A r * Z = A
for Z e i f * ;
(iv) X L * 7 = X j * Y for X , Y e i f ; Z ^ * A = A<L*Z =-- Z
for Z e H r*;
(v) ~ * X = ~ X if X e i f and ~ X j* B; ~ * X — A if
X e i f and ~-5T = B; r*J*A — ■ —‘B.
The ordered sextuple [ i f *, A , »-**, T * , Jo *, <--'*] is denoted
by M*.
1 2.11 easily results from the well-known theorem according to which the
system 3& is complete. The first completeness proof for is due to Poet, E.
(60), pp. 180
3 Cf. Gddel, K , (23), p. 40.
4 This result is due to Jaskowski, S, (36). (Our account deviates only in in­
essentials from that of Jankowski. The operation T of Ja&kcwski is replaced
by the operation * defined in 2.12, which serves the same purpose.)

Note 2.13. The operation on matrices just defined is not

unambiguous beoause its result depends on the choice o f the
element A. This fact does not affect the subsequent considera­
tions because all matrices whioh can be obtained from the given
matrix M by means o f the operation * are isomorphic with one
another. The ambiguity o f ‘M*’ is, moreover, avoidable by
constructing a set-theoretical function F which correlates an
element F ( i f ) non-e i f with every system i f , and then replacing
'A ’ in 2.12 by *F ( i f y (certain difficulties which may arise in
connexion with the theory o f logical types will here be ignored).
2.14. J/M is a matrix, then M* is also a matrix and
Co b o lla b y
£ ®(M); if the matricea Mx and Ma are isomorphic, then
M* and M* are also isomorphic. [By 2.1, 2.3, 2.6, 2.12]
D e f in it io n 2.15. Let n be a natural number and
M = [ i f , A , »-*, T , Jo,

a matrix. We put:
(i) i f n = the system of ordered n-tuples [X lv .., X n] with
X t , . . . , Xn Gi f ;
(ii) A n — [X j,..., X n], where X x — ... — X n = A ;
(Hi) [X » ,...,X J » » [ 7 x,...,Yn] = [X x » Y x,...,Xn » Y n]for
X x,..., X n, !F],..., Yn g ;
(iv), (v) analogously for T and ;
(vi) [X x,..., X n] — [ ~ X 1,..., ~ X n] for X x,...,Xn g i f .
[ i f n, A n, cA, ” , ^ n] is called the ?ith power of the matrix
M and is denoted by ‘ Mn’ .
2.16. I f n is a natural number and M is a matrix,
Co b o l la b y
then Mn is also a matrix and we have ®(Mn) — G(M); if Mx and
Ma are isomorphic matrices, then MjJ and Ma are also isomorphic.
[B y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2.5, 2,15]

D e f in it io n 2.17. IKX = ZK, IKn+1 = ((IKn)n)* for every

natural number n.
On the basis of this definition the following theorem can be

T heorem 2 .IS. In order that 2 I e 3 it , it is necessary and

sufficient that 21 e G(IKn)/or every natural number n; in other words

n « ( ik j -
Note 2.19. It is known that this theorem can be improved:
with every sentence 21 a well-determined natural number can
be correlated (depending exclusively on the structure of this
sentence) such that the formulas 2Ie©(IKrJ and 21 e are
The decision criterion mentioned at the beginning of this sec­
tion is provided by 2.11 for the system 3 & and by 2.IB in its
improved form just mentioned for the system

§ 3. T opological Spaces 3
We first recall some familiar topological concepts:
D e f in it io n3.1. A non-empty set 8 is called a topological space
(with fundamental operation ~), if the follovnng conditions arc
(i) if X c S, then X = X c S;
(ii) if X c S and X consists of at most one dement, then X = X\
(iii) i f X c= S and ¥ c S, then X + Y = X + 7 .
Note 3.2. Let S he a topological space and A a non-empty
subset ot S. We now define an operation ~~'A) relative to A by
the formuia X U} A . X for every X c A . On the basis of
3.1 it can then easily be shown that A is a topological spa.ee with
the fundamental operation ~(A'}: such a space is called a sub­
space of S.
D efin itio n 3.3. I f 8 is a topological space, , a set X is said to
be open (in S), in symbols X e 0(8), if X = S—8 —X.
D efin itio n 3.4. A subset X of a topological space 8 is said to
be dense (in 8) if X = 8 .
1 See p. 420, note X
3 Another decision criterion for the intuitionistic calculus was given in
Gentzen, G. (18).
3 For what follows ei\ Kuratowski, C. (41), in particular pp. 15 ff., 38, 40,
82 f., 95, and 101 ff.

D efin ition 3.5. The topological space 8 is said to be isolated

if x non-e $ —{#}, and dense-in-itself if x e S—{x}for every x e S.
Corollary 3.6. A topological space 8 is isolated if arid only if
X = X for every X £ 8. [By 3.1, 3.5]
D efin ition 3.7. A topological space S is called norm al if,
for any two sets X x ^ 8 and X 2 ^ 8 such that X x. X 2 == 0, there
exist two disjoint sets Yx, Y2 e (9(8) such that, X x s Yx and X 2 S Y2.
D efin ition 3.8. We say thaJt the topological space 8 is a space
with a countable basis if there is an infinite sequence of non-empty
sets X x,.t., e @(S) such that every non-empty set Y s (9(8}
can be represented in the form T ~ (where
il3..., in9... is a sequence of natural numbers).
For later applications we shall distinguish another special
class of topological spaces:
3.9. A topological space 8 is called an S'-space if ii
D e f in it io n
satisfies the following condition:
For every natural number n and every non-empty set A f= (9(8).
there exist non-empty, pair-wise disjoint sets
B n e (9(8)
for which
(i) I?i + . . . + l ?n S A and B x+ . . . + B n # A,
(ii) A —(Bx-\-...A-Bn) 3 A —A,
(iii) B x. ..... Bn S A —
T heorem 3.10. Every normal and dense-in-itself topological
space 8 with a countable basis is an E-space.
Proof.1 Aceording to 3.8 there exists an infinite sequence of
sets < v ~ , Ck,... with the following properties:
(1) the sets Cx...., Gkt... are open and non-empty,
(2) every open and non-empty set X can be represented in the form
x = cr<I+ —+c<fc+ —•
Since, by hypothesis, the space 8 is normal and dense-in-itself,
1 Originally I had proved the theorem for the Euclidean straight line (and
its subspaces dense-in-theroselves). I am indebted to Professor S. Eilenberg
for the general proof.

we easily obtain from (2), b y means o f 3.5 and 3.7,

(3) for every non-empty set X e 0(8) there exists a set Ok such that
@k £ X and Ck ^ X .
W e now consider any natural num ber n and a set A for which
(4) A e 0(8) and A ^ 0 ;
we shall construct sets Bv ..., Bn whioh satisfy the follow ing
(5) B ,,..., Bn are open, non-enypty, and pair-wise disjoint',
(6 ) Bi-\-...-{-Bn c A a n d B x-\-...+B n ^ A ',
(7) A — (JBj-J-... 4 *Bn) 2 A —A ",
( 8) S j . ..., B n 2 A — (jB1-f-...-|-JBn).
W e carry this out first for the case » = 1 ; that is to say we
construct a set B such that
(9) B e 0(8), B 0 , B £ A , and B ^ A,
(10) A —B 2 S.— A and B 2 A — B.
A Bet B o f this kind is most easily obtained in the following way.
W e consider the sets A k = Ck.(A—A) and choose from each
such set (if it is not empty) a point ak, let D = {d j,...,
I t is easy to see that J5 2 A —A (for otherwise, according to ( 2 ),
there w ould be for X = 8 —D a set C* S S—B c S—D, having
an elem ent in com m on w ith A —A, and this w ould contradict
the definition o f D). The set D is at m ost denum erable and not
empty (apart from the trivial case A —A = 0 ). W e order the
elem ents o f D in an infinite sequence dx,..., dk)... in such a way
that in this sequence every elem ent x e D occurs either only
once or infinitely m any tim es, according to whether x e D —{x)
or not. M oreover, since 8 is a norm al space w ith a countable
basis it is metricizable: with every pair o f points x , y e S a real
num ber \x— y\ can be correlated, the so-called distance between
x and y, in such a w ay that the follow ing conditions are satisfied:
(i) for aU x , y e S the formulas \x—y\ — 0 and x — y are
(ii) |x —y\-{- \x—z\ > \y—z\ for x , y , z e S;
(iii) if X £ S, then x e X if and only if for every r > 0 there is
an dement y e X with \x— y\ < r.

N ow , b y (iii), since D £ A , for every x e D there are points

y e A whioh lie as near to * as w e please. A ccordingly, we can
choose for every natural h a poin t ek e A w ith
I**—«*l < l/*»
and we put B — e*,...}; it can be shown w ithout diffi­
culty that B satisfies form ulas (9) and ( 10) (the fa ct that & is
dense-in-itself plays an essential part in this).
The case n — l has thus been dealt with. W e turn now to
the general case, m aking use o f the set B just uennad.
W e first pu t, for every X £ 8,
(11) X+ =
Prom (11), 3.1, and 3.3, w e easily obtain the follow ing rules
for calculating w ith the operation +:
(12) (X +)+ — X+ e <D(S) for every X £ S-,
(13) X £ X+ and X =* X * for every X e ^ ( jS);
(14) if X e 0{8), T s S and X s T , then X s
(15) if X 1+ . . . + X n £ 8 and the sets X ^ ..., X H are pair-wise
disjoint, then (X 1-K » -i-X * )+ = ,
Further, we define b y recursion an infinite sequence o f sets

(16) Gx = ( 7 j, where k is the smallest natural number for which

Ck £ B and Gk =£ B\
(17) Ol+l - - C£ where k is the smallest natural- number for which
Gk £ B — f l f h Z + G , and Gk ■-/. B -G ^ fZ T -%
On iho basis o f ( 1), (3), ( 9 ), ( 12), and (13) it is u e s i shown
(by means o f an easy induction) that, b y (16) and (17) a set G>
is aotually correlated w ith every natural number l and also that
these sets Gx satisfy the follow ing conditions:
(18) G, is open, non-empty, and such that G f *= £ o*, £ B for
every l;
(19) the sets Gls..., Gt,... (and hence also the secs (2X,..., (?/,...) are
pair-wise disjoint.
L et G s»s B — Gr14 - ...+ ( ? j+ .... In view o f (9) we have C e G{8).
I f G were n ot em pty, then b y (9) there w ould be a number

k for which Ck ^ C and Ck ^ C . W e should then a fortiori have

Ck c B — and Gk ^ B~~G1+ ... + Ql for every l, and
we could infer from that by (16) and (17) that Ck is identical
w ith one o f the Gh whence, in consequence o f ( 1) and (13),
C* = G, £ B - G
The set G, must thus be em pty, in contradiction to (18). Con­
sequently C ~ 0 , i.e. B £ (vr r ~ ..-f &r'r • A ccordingly, by
( 10) we have i f £ cl B c =Gxy - G r I -.... O ntheother
hand, from : lh ; aad (9) we get
fr^-j-... -f- ... £1 B S/ A.
so that finally
( 20) j - g; .
W e shall now show the follow ing.
(21) I f X c 5;!iS‘b X c A , and X non- c; ' J , +
there exist infinitely many numbers l for which X .0 , ^ 0.
F or this purpose we consider an open set X £ A which has
elements in com m on with only a fixate num ber o f sets G,. There
is thus an lX} such that X . G-. =~ 0 for every l > Z0. The set
Y = X — 6V r has then no elem ent in com m on with the
whole sum (?1+ ..-4-0^,-}-... . Since in addition Y e $ ( 8 ) , we
also have —- r ^ 0+ ... =— 0 ; thus. on account o f ( 20),
Y ,A —- 0 a ad j fortiori Y ,A ~ 0 . On the other hand.
f c l c i ;

consequent s/ o, i.e, X ^ 6S4 ...4 From this, by means

of (14), (15 / 4 9}. we obtain
X 4 — Gx + ...+<?£,
whence, in view of (18),
X 4 <?*+...+ (A £ + *
We have thus- shown that every open set X 4* A, which has
elements In common with only finiSSy many secs Gh is included
in Gi+...~H-o * Hence by contraposition we obtain (21),
(22) GPl..... Cw ... be those sets of the sequence Cy,..., Gk.... which are
included in A but not in # !+ ... + #*4“ — *

The set Gv ..., m ay be divided into n system s o f sets

u f x,..., in such a w ay that the follow ing conditions are satis­
(23) = {GXi-* >
(24) the systems are non-empty and pair-wise disjoint;
(26) for every set CPk. k = 1, 2 ,..., awd! /o r every number j }
l j ?C n, there is a set X such that
CPk. X # 0 .
T o prove this we apply the follow ing procedure. In view o f ( 1),
( 22) , and ( 21), there certainly exist n sets G^,..., G^ which have
no elements in com m on with GPl. W e include in the system
the sets 1 < j < n, Sim ilarly, there exist n sets Oti n.
w hich are distinct from G^,..., Gln and have no elem ent in com ­
m on w ith CPi: the set , 1 < j < n, is again included in
This procedure can obviously be continued w ithout end. The
sets Gt possibly then remaining are subsequent]y arbitrarily in ­
cluded in. the system s (e.g. all m ay be included in
the system ^ x).
W e now put

(26) Bj = 2 i /o r j = 1, 2,..., n.
From (18), (19), (23), (24), and (26) it is seen at once that the
sets 2^ ,,.., Bn just defined satisfy the condition (6 ). B y (IS).
(23) , and (26) we have ■ # * + „ . — Gj1- f ^ B and
consequently A — (1 ?!+ ... ~r~Bn) 5 A —B. H ence b y means o f (9)
and ( 10) we obtain ( 6) and (7). Finally, let us suppose that the
form ula B} 2 A — ...+ i ? n) does not hold for a given
j , 1 < j < n. W e thus have

A - B j n o n - ^ B x-\-...+B n = 6 ^ + ...+ G^+...,

whence, b y virtue o f (4), A —Bi is open. B y means o f ( 2 ) and

( 22) we infer from this the existence o f a set CPkwhich is included
in A —JBy and has no elem ent in com m on with B3, B ut this is in
obvious contradiction to (26) and (26). A ccordingly, our supposi
tion is refuted and ( 8) holds.

W e have thus constructed (for every natural n and every non­

em pty open set A ) sets Bv ..., Bn w hich satisfy the conditions
(5 )-(8 ). H ence, b y 3.9, $ is an J?-space, w hich was to be proved.
Note 3.11. It is clear from 3.10 that the E uclidean spaces (of
an y num ber o f dim ensions) belong to the jEJ-spaces. A lso, every
subspace o f a Euclidean space w hich is dense-in-itself is an E-

§ 4. T opological I n terpretatio n op th e T w o -valu ed and

W e now define, for subsets o f an arbitrary topological space,
four operations w hich we denote b y the same sym bols as were
used for the operations on sentences whioh were discussed at the
beginning o f § 1.
D e f in it io n 4.1. I f S i* a topological space, we put, for all sets
(i) X - + Y «= 8 - X ^ Y ,
(ii) X v Y — X + Y (the ordinary set-theoretical sum),
(iii) I a Y — X .Y (the ordinary set-theoretical product),
(iv) ^X » X 0 (= 8 - X ) .
C o r o llar y 4.2. (i) I f S is a topological space, X £ 8 and
Y £ 8, then X - + Y , e 0 (5 ), and in fact X -^ Y is the largest
open set Z for which X .Z £ T, and - v l is the largest open set
disjoint from X .
(ii) I f in addition X , Y e <9(8)thenwe alsohaveX V i e 0(S)and
X a Y e 0(8), and in fact I v 7 is the smallest open set which
includes X and Y, and X A Y is the largest open set which is in­
cluded in X and Y. [B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.1]
Co r o llar y 4.3.I f 8 is a topological space, X £ 8 and Y £ 8,
then X -> Y — 8 if and only if X £ Y ; in particular S - + Y = 8
if and only i f Y — 8. [B y 3.1, 4.1 (i)]
C orollary 4.4. I f 8 is a topological space and X £ 8, then
X is dense in 8 if and only if -v -v-X = 8. [B y 3 .1 ,3 .4 ,4 .1 (iv)]
D efin itio n 4.5. The ordered sextuple [0 (5 ), 8, v , A,
where 8 is a topological space, is denoted by 0 (5 ).

T h eorem 4.6. For every topological space 8, O(S) is a matrix.

[B y 2 . 1, 3.1, 3.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5]

The m atrix 0(8), like every other m atrix, uniquely determines

a system o f sentences, nam ely <E(0(8)). W e shall investigate the
relation o f this system to the system s 3 ft and 3 ft in detail.
L emma 4.7. I f 8 is a topological space and SP (<S, 0), then
M — \$P, 8, v , A, is a evJbmatiix of 0 ( 8 ) which is iso­
morphic with ZK.
The p ro o f (b y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2 . 8, 2. 10, 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1) presents no
T heobem 4.8. For every topological space 8 we have
® ( 0 (fif)) s 3 ft.
[B y 2.7, 2.9, 2 .1 1 ,4 .7 ]

L emma 4.9. I f 8 is any topological space and 91 on axiom of the

intuitionistic sentential calculus, then 91 e ® ( 0 (8)).
Proof. In accordance w ith 1.2 it is necessary to distinguish
in the p ro o f ten cases according to the form o f the axiom 91.
Sinoe the m ethod o f arguing is in all oases nearly the same,
we shall consider only one case in detail, say 1.2 (ix).
L et then
( ) 21 — ^- 93-> (© -* $ ),
where © and <£ are any sentences. W e construct in accordance
w ith 2.6 (and w ith the help o f 4.5, 4.6) the functions F^,o<s>>
Fse.om> ^ c,o <sy W e consider further an arbitrary sequence o f
sets X j,..., X n,... e 0(8) and put

( 2) F%,o(S)(X ^,..., X M,,..) = X , -^8 ,o(<s)(Xi,..*, X n,...) — X ,

B y 2.5 (ii), (v),£rom ( 1) and (2) we obtain X = ->• (F - » Z),

whence, b y 4.1 (i), (iv),

(3) X = ( S - 7 ) -r (Y -*■ Z) — S - ( S - Y ) - ( S - Y - Z ) .

Since, b y virtue o f 3.1 (iii), Y ~ Z Y and consequently


S—Y c S—Y —Z , it results from (3) and 3.1 (ii) that X = 8.

B y ( 2) we thus have
F k,o(£)(-^i>*••> = S for all X n9... & ${&)•
H ence, b y 2.5, we obtain 91 e ® ( 0 (S))9 q.e.d.
L em m a 4.10. Let S be any topological space and 31, 93, ® three
sentences such that 91 = 93 -*> ®. I f 91, 23 e ® ( 0 ($ )), aiteo
® e ® ( 0 ($ )); in other words, the system ® ( 0 (# )) is cZosed wnder
tfAe operation of detachment.
Proof. In accordance with 2.5 (and with the help o f 4.5, 4.6)
we construct the functions F%oiS), F%0{S)9 and F$tQ(ig); we
then have, for all sets X l9..., X n,... e @(S)9
( 1)
^ FfB,o(S)(Xl9: ; X n,..>) -> F€%0(S)(Xl9.>.9x n,...),
and, since 91, 93 e ® (0 ($ )),
(2) %n9...) = S — F#t0(S)(Xl9...9X n,..) .
B y virtue o f 4.3 the form ulas ( 1) and ( 2 ) yield
-^ ip ***) ^ & f w -*£«>••• g &{S)9
whence, b y 2.5, (£ <=® (0 ($ )). The system ® (0 (S)) is thus closed
under the operation o f detachm ent (cf. 1.3), q.e.d.
T heorem t,11. F o r e v e r y to p o lo g ic a l s p a c e S w e have

35t c ® ( 0 (S)).
[B y 1.4, 4.9, 4.10]
T heorem 4.12. For every topological space S and every sen­
tence 91 the conditions 91 e 3$t cwd ^ ^91 e ® ( 0 (£ )) are equiva­
lent. [B y 1.6 , 4.8, 4.11]
In view o f Ths. 4.8 and 4.11, the double inclusion
35t £ ® (0 ($ )) £ 3*t holds for every topological space S. W e
shall now show that there exist spaces 8 for which (£(0(S)) = 3&
and also spaces S for whioh ® ( 0 ($ )) = 351. In fa ct the first
equality holds if and only if S is an isolated (and thus, so to
speak, a degenerate) space. The second holds for all i?-spaces,
and thus in particular for all norm al spaces which are dense-
in-them selves and have a countable basis (cf. 3.9-3.11).

L em m a 4.13. Let 8 be a topological space. In order that every

sentence 21 of the form 3 1 = (-v-23 -> 23) 23 (where 23 is any
sentence) should belong to (£(0(8)), it is necessary and sufficient
that S be isolated.
Proof. I f 8 is an isolated space, we easily obtain from 3.6 and
4.1 (i), (iv) the form ula ( ^ 1 -*> X ) X = S for every X £ S,
and hence b y means o f 2.6, 4.5, and 4.6 (just as in the p roof
o f 4.9) we conclude that every sentence 2 1 = (-v-23 23) -> 23
belongs to (£(0(8)).
Suppose now , conversely, that (£(0(8)) contains all sentences
21 = ('v®->»)-► 33.
B y 1.1 we can, in particular, assume that 23 is a sentential
variable, say S = 93x. A ccording to 2.6 and on account o f 4.5,
4.6 we then have for every sequence o f open sets X x,..., X n...

and F^>0{S)(X1,..., X n,...) = (^-Xx ->■ X x) -> X v

Since 21 e (£(0 (<S)), we obtain
( ^ X 1- r X l) - + X l = S,
whence, on account o f 4.3, ( X x -> X x) £ X x and further, b y
virtue o f 3.1 and 4.1, 8 —8 —X x £ X x for every X x e 0(S).
If, in particular, x is an elem ent o f 8, we conclude from 3.1 and
3.3 that 8 —{x} e 0{S ) ; consequently

8 - 8 - 8 ^ { x } £ S-{x},

and therefore S—S—{r } 2 {x}\ from this we see at once that

8 —{* } # S and 8 —{a:} = 8 —{*}. W e thus have
xn on -e S — {x} for every x e 8;
bu t this means that the space 8 is isolated (cf. 3.6). Lemma
4.13 thus bolds in both directions.
T heorem 4.14. Let S be a topological space. In order that
® (0 (S)) = 3& , it is necessary and sufficient that 8 be isolated.
Proof. L et 8 be an isolated space. Then, according to 1.2 ,
4.9, and 4.13, © (O (8)) contains all axiom s o f the tw o-valued
438 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AN D TO P O LO G Y 2001, § 4

sentential calculus and, b y 4.10, is d osed under the operation

o f detachm ent. Consequently, b y 1.4 W6 have

3* s *(om,
whence, on account o f 4.8, <E(0(8)) *= If> conversely, this
latter equality is satisfied, then the system <E(0(iS)) contains
in particular all sentences 91 o f the form 91— ( ^ 93 93) -> 93
(cf. 1.2 (x) and 1.4); in view o f 4.13 the space S is therefore
isolated, q.e.d.
B efore continuing we shall subject the operations -> and -a.
to a relativization (cf. 3.2).
I f 8 is a topological space and A £ 8, then
D e f in it io n 4.16.
for all sets X £ 8 and 7 £ 8 we put:
(i) 7 = A -X -7 ,

(ii) X = X 0 ( — A~~Xj\

Co r o llar y 4.16. I f 8 is a topological space, A £ 8, X £ 8,

and 7 £ 8 , then I - > F s i and -yX s A ; if moreover A e 0(8),
then X -> 7 , ^ X e 0(8). [B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.15]

Co b o l la r y 4.17. Let 8 be a topological space and A £ 8.

(i) I f X £ A and 7 £ 8, then we have X -*■ 7 — A if and
only if X £ 7 .
(ii) I f 7 £ A , then A - > 7 — A if and only if 7 — A .
(iii) X -*■ A = A for every I s i .
(iv) A -* Y = Y for every open set Y c A .
(v ) = A 0 = 0 and ^-0 = 0 0 — A.
[B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.15]

Co e o l la b y 4.18. I f 8 is a topological space, then

X->y = X -*7 and -v X = -wX
8 S

for all sets I s 8 and 7 £ S. [B y 4.1 (i), (iv), 4.16]

The follow ing lem m a is a generalization o f 4.7:

L emma 4.19. I f S is a topological space, A £ S, A ^ 0, and

ST — {A , 0}, then N = [3~, A , V , A , •*.] is a matrix which is
isomorphic with ZK .
[B y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2 . 10, 3.1, 4.1 (ii), (iii), 4.17 (iii), (y)]
L e m m a 4.20. Premisses:
(a) 8 is a topological space',
(fi) A , B e 0(8), B e A, B ^ A , T ^ B 2 I - A and B 2 A - B ;
(y) SP is a system of open sets X £ B ;
(S) if X , Y e ? and X - Y ^ 0 , then X - Y ^ S - B )
(e) M sb= [SP, B>-+> V , A , ~ ] is a matrix-,
(£) 3T « . SP+{A) and N = [3Tt A , v , A,
(i) 3 " is a system of open sets I s i ;
(ii) if X ,Y e3T and X —Y 0 , then X —Y 2 A —A ;
(iii) N is a matrix and N = M*.
Proof. A coording to the premisses (a) and (/?), and in view
o f 3.1, w e have B 2 B and B 2 A —B. whence B 2 A; and
since A 2 B, we get
( 1) A —B and A —A s B —B.
From (y) and ({) w e obtain at once the conclusion (i):
( 2) 3* is a system of open sets X £ A .
W e shall next prove the oonolusion (ii):
(3) if X ,Y e 3 " and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 A —A.
In fa ct, i f X —Y 0 , then Y # A b y (2) ; thus Y e SP on
account o f (£). I f also X e S P , then it follow s from (8) and ( 1) that
X -Y 2 B -B 2 A -A .
B ut, if X non- e SP, then X — A , and, if Y ^ B, then b y (y)
we have B —Y ^ 0 and hence b y (8) and (1) we obtain
X -Y 2 B -Y 2 B -B 2 A - A
(since B e SP b y virtue o f («) and 2. 1). F or X — A and Y = B
the form ula X —Y 2 A —A follow s directly from (/9). (3) thus
holds in all oases.
440 8 E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y XVU, § 4

The operation -> has the follow ing properties:

(4) if X ,Y e y , then either X -> Y — A or — X -+Y , according
to whether X -> Y — B or ^ B:
(5) X -> A — A for every l e J ;
( 6) A - > Y = Y for every Y e f .
If, in fact, X , Y e and X -*■ Y — B, then b y 4.17 (i) we have

I s f and X -» Y — A (since X £ B £ A on account o f (/5)

A _____
and (y)). B ut if X ->• Y = B — X —Y ^ B. then it follow s from

(8) that X —Y 2 B —B, and thus, in view o f ( 1), we have

A - X - Y £ A -(B -B ) = (A -B )+ B = B
and therefore A — X —Y £ B — X — Y ; on the other hand, since
A 2 B and henoe A — X —Y 2 B —X —Y. we dually get
A -X -Y = B -X -Y , i.e. X Y == X - > 7 .

In thiB w ay (4) is proved. (5) and ( 6) result im m ediately from

4.17 (iii), (iv), and (2).
From (2), b y 4.1 (ii), (iii), we also obtain
(7) Z\J A — A y Z — A and Z a A — A A Z — Z for every
Z ef.
The operation -v- satisfies the follow ing conditions:
(8) ^A “ 'v l? 0;
(9) if X e £?. then ^ 1 = 4 or — -^X, according to whether
= B or # B.
( 8) follow s directly from 4.17 (v). W ith the help o f 2.1 and
(«) we infer from ( 8) that 0 e ; in view o f this we put in
(4) 7 = 0 and b y means o f 4.15 (ii) we im m ediately obtain (9).
I f now we com pare the premisses (e), (£) and the form ulas
(4 )-(9 ) w ith 2.12 (i)-(v ), we see at once that
(10) N = M*,
whence, b y 2.14,
(11) N is a matrix.
W ith ( 2 ), (3), ( 10), and ( 11) the p roof is com plete.

L e m m a 4.21. Premisses:
(a) S is a topological space;
05) Bu ...,Bn e<9{8),Bx,...,Bnare non-empty, pair-un.se disjoint
sets, Bx-{- **.~\~Bn “ B and Bx. ... *Bn 2 5
(y) /o r = 1, 2,..., n, SPp is a system of open sets X £ Bp;
(8) if X , Y eSfp (p = 1, 2 ,..., n) and X —T ^ 0 , then
X = Y 2 Bp- B p ,
(e) M = [if''', A , »-», T , JL>, ~ ] is a matrix-,
(£) forp = 1 , 2 , . . . , M„ = [<5% V, A , ^ a matrix
and is isomorphic with M;
(>j) i f is the system of sets X = X x+ ...-| -X n, where
X xe X ti e S?n, and P = [$?, B , A , V , 'A -
x» £>
(i) Se' is a system of open sets X £ B-,
(ii) if X , Y e 6? and X - Y # 0 , then X ^ Y 2 B - B ;
(iii) P is a matrix and is isomorphic with M77.
Proof. The assertion (i), i.e.
( 1) 9 is a system of open sets X c B,
results easily from (j8), (y), and ( 77); since, b y 3.1 and 3.3, every
sum o f open sets is itself an open set.
In, order to prove (ii) we consider tw o arbitrary sets X ,Y e 9
such that X —Y ^ 0. B y ( 17),
X = X x+ . . . + X n and Y = T1+ ...+ Y n9
where X p, Yp e 9 p for p = 1, 2 ,..., n. Since, in view o f (y) and
{fi), we have X p s Bpi Yp ^ Bp and the sets Bn are pair­
wise disjoint we obviously have
x - y - ( z 1+ . . . + x j - ( i i + . . . + r n)
= ( x 1- r 1) + ...+ ( x n- r n);
if, therefore, X —Y ^ 0 , there m ust be aj>, 1 < p ^ n, such that
Xp—Yp # 0 . H ence b y (8) w e get X p—Yp 2 Bp—Bp and
consequently X —Y 2 Bp—Bp, because b y (a) and 3.1 (iii) '

z -r = z1-:r1-f...-fz„-r,,
442 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y XVH, § 4

But according to (fi)

Bp- B p 2 (Br-B)~-Bp = B - { B + B P) = B—B,
so that- finally X —T 2 B—B. Thus we have
(2) * f X ,7 e & a n d X -Y 0 then~X-F B -B .
We turn now to (iii) and in accordance with 2.15 (and making
use of 2.16 and (<?)) we construct the matrix
Mn =s [iFn, A n, *-+n, r n, Jb", <->].
By (i) (and 2.4), M is isomorphic with Mi,..., M„; hence by 2.3
there exist functions Flt..., Fn>which produce this isomorphism
and which in particular map iFonto Sv ..., Snin one-one fashion.
We now put
(3) F(U) = F1(U1)+ ...+ F n(Un)for U - {Uv ..., Un] elT*.
Since here FP(XJP) &Sfp (p = l , 2,...,n), whence by (iii)
Fp(Up) c B p, and the sets Blt...,Bn are pair-wise disjoint we
obtain, with the help of (17),
(4) the function F maps oFn onto £? in one-one fashion.
By means of 2.3, 2.15, and (/3) we conolude that
(6) F(A*) — Fx(A)-f- ...-}-Fn(A) — = B.
Further, let
(6) U « [Uv ..., Un.] g 1F Wand V — g tF*.
By 2.15, (6), (3), 2.3, (0, and 4.16 (i) we get
(7) F(U F) = F([Ux» Vv ..., Un~ Fn])

- % Flm + - + ( F n(un) f m )

= (B1- F 1{U1) - F 1{V1))+ ...+ (B n- F n(Un) - F n(Vn)).

For p ,q — 1 ,..., n and p =£ q, FP(UP) e Sfp, F^?') g SFv and
thus by (iii) and (ii) we have
Fp(Up) c Bp> Ffl(Fe) £ B „ Fp(Up).B a = Fp(Up) . F ^ ) =» 0;
since in addition Ba e 0(8), we also have
F,{UP) - F p(Vp).B t = 0.
XVn, § 4 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y 443

From this with the help o f (7) and 3.1 (iii) we obtain

(8) F ( l 7 ^ F ) = s (B1+ ...+ J 5 J -

- ( F 1(C71) - JF1(F1) + ...+ F n(C7n) - F n(Fn))

= 5 - ( F 1(C 4 )-F 1(F1) ) + ...+ ( F n(C7ft) - F n(FJ)

^ B - ( F 1(U1) + . . .+ F n{Un) ) - ( F 1(V{)+...+Fn( V ^

by virtue o f 4.16 (i), formulas (3), (6), and (8) yield
(9) F(U*+ *F ) « B - F ( V ) - F ( V ) - F(U) F(V) for aU
U , V e 1T*
In an analogous but more simple manner we obtain the

(10) F {U y »V) = F(U)VF(V)<mdF(U<k»V) - F (U ) a F(V)

fo rU ,V e1 T « ;
(11) F ( ~ nU) « - F(U) for U e #*».

B y means o f 2,1, 2.15, and 2.16 we infer from (4), (5), (9)—(11)
that B e S? and is dosed under V , A , -v ; hi view o f
(*))> (1)* aJid 4.17 (ii), P is thus a matrix. We also oondude—
again from (4), (6), (9), (10), (11)—that the matrices P and Mn
satisfy the conditions o f the definition 2.3; consequently we have
(12) P is a matrix isomorphic with Mn.
B y (1), (11), and (12), all the conclusions o f the lemma are

L em UA 4.22. Premisses:
(a) 8 is an E-space)
(ft) M is a matrix;
(y) for every non-empty Set Be 0(8) there is a system $P of open
sets X £ A with the following properties:
(Yi) if X, Y e S? and X —Y ^ 0* then X — Y 2 B —B;
(y*) M' *** [ y , B, V , A , ■+*] is a matrix which is isomor-
phic with M.

Conclusion: for every natural number n and every non-empty set

A e <P{S) there is a system 2T of open sets X £ A with the following
(i) if X , Y e f and X - Y ^ 0,then X - F A -A ;
(ii) N = \ST, A , V , A , -v ) is a matrix isomorphic with
(Mn)*. A
Proof. L et n be a natural num ber and A a non-em pty open set.
B y virtue o f 3.9 and in view o f (a) there exist set3 B lt..., Bn, w hich
satisfy the follow ing conditions:
( 1) Bx,...,B nare non-empty,pair-wise disjoint open sets;
( 2) = B £ A and B ^ A ;
(3) A ^ B sA -A ;
W B i ...... Bn 2 A —B.
From (2 )-(4 ) we easily obtain
(5) Bx ...... Bn 2 (A - A ) + ( A - B ) = A - B 2 B —B.
B y (jS) and (y) there exist system s o f sets SPX..... £Pn with the
follow ing properties:
( 6) for p = 1, 2 ,..., n,£Pp i s a system of open sets X 2 Bp ;
(7) if X , Y e SPp (p = 1, 2 ,..., n) and X —Y =£ 0, then
X = Y 2 Bp- B p;
(8) fo r p — 1, 2,..., n, Mp = \SPp, B p, - r , V , A , -y ] is a m a trix
Up Up
which is isomorphic with M.
L et us now pu t
(9) = [the system of sets X = . . . + X n, where

P = [ < ? ,£ , - + , V, A, - ] . ,

B y (a), (/?), ( 1), ( 2 ), and (5 )-(9 ) the premisses o f 4.21 are satis­
fied. Consequently we have
( 10) SP is a system of open sets X £ A ;
( 11) if X , Y e S* and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 B —B;
(12) P is a matrix which is isomorphic with Mn.
XVH , $ 4 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y 446

L et
(13) and N = A,->, v : A ,
A -cL
B y (a), (l)-(4 ), and (9)—(13), the premisses o f 4.20 hold. Conse­
(14) F is a system of open sets X Q A ;
(15) i f X , Y e J T and X - Y ^ 0, t h e n X - Y 2 A ~ A \
(16) N is a matrix and N = P*.
From (12) and (16) b y means o f 2.14 we obtain
(17) N is a matrix which is isomorphic with (M7*)*.
In view o f (14), (15), and (17) the p roof o f Lem m a 4.22 is
com plete.
L em m a 4.23. I f 8 is an E-space, then for every natural number
n the matrix 0 ( 8 ) contains a submatrix which is isomorphic
with IKn.
Proof. B y means o f an inductive procedure we shall establish
a logically stronger conclusion, nam ely
( 1) for every non-empty set A e d)(8) there is a system 3T of open
sets X c; A with the following properties:
(i) if X 9 Y e 3T and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 A —A;
(ii) N - [AT, A , - k V , A , -v-] is a matrix isomorphic with
jA a
In fa ct b y 2.17 and 4.19, ( 1) holds for n = 1. Assuming that
( 1) is satisfied for a given natural n we apply 4.22 (with M = IKn)
and w ith the help o f 2.17 we easily see that (1) also holds fo r n -j-l.
I f we now put A = 8 in ( 1) we at once obtain the conclusion o f
the lem m a from 2.8, 3.1, 3.2, 4.5, and 4.18.
T heobbm 4.24. I f 8 is an E-space, then G (Q (S )) = 3 ft.
Proof. B y 4.23 there is for every natural n a subm atrix Nn
w hich is isom orphic w ith IKn. N ow , if 31 e © ( 0 (# )), then b y 2.9
and 2.7 we have 31 e ® (N „) = ®(IKn) for n = 1, 2,... and con­
sequently, b y 2.18,31 e 3 ft. A ccordingly, © ( 0 ($ )) £ 3 ft; hence
b y 4.9 we at on ce obtain © (O (8)) = 3 ft, q.e.d.

Note 4.25. The follow ing theorem is easily established:

Let 8 be a topological space, A a non-empty open set £ 8,&~ the
system of open setsX s A , and N = [ ST, A , V, A, Then
N is a matrix and we have (£(0(8)) £ ®(N ). If, in particular,
« (N ) = 3 ft, then tt(0 (S )) = 3 ft.
From this we see that the converse o f Th. 4.24 does not h o ld ;
the form ula ® ( 0 (8)) — 3 ft applies, for exam ple, to all norm al
spaces w ith a countable basis, w hich include a non-em pty open
set that is dense-in-itself, and, m ore generally, to every space 8
w hich includes an open .E-spaoe (of. 3.2), independently o f
whether 8 itself is an .E-space.
On the other hand there are also spaces 8 such that the m atrix
0 ( 5 ) is adequate neither for the system 3 ft, nor for the system
3 ft, bu t for an interm ediate system . Exam ples can be found
b oth am ong norm al spaces with a countable basis and am ong
those whioh have no countable basis. F or instance, norm al spaces
are know n whioh are dense in them selves and satisfy the oondi-
titm if X e 0(8), then e 0(8).
F or every such space 8 the system (£(0(S)) is, b y 4.14, distinct
from 3 ft. I t is also easily shown that this system contains all
sentences 'll o f the form 31 = - v i B V 'v ^ S and consequently
oannot coincide w ith 3 ft (cf. 1.5). The problem o f setting up
an exact correlation between the topological properties o f a
space 8 and the logical (or rather m etaldgical) properties o f
the corresponding system (£(0(8)) is still b y n o means com ­
pletely solved.
W e shall now put Some o f the results obtained into a more
intuitive and m ore lucid form .
L et $ be a sentential function o f the sentential calculus in
Which, in addition to the constants ‘ v ’ , etc., the sentential
variables ‘X \ 'Y*, ‘Z\... ocour. W e give the expression 31 the
follow ing schem atic form :
31 = (<f>(X,Y,Z,...)\
N ow let uS suppose that the variables ‘ X\ ‘Y ’ , ‘Z\... do n ot
represent sentences bu t denote sets o f points o f a topological

space 8. W e give to the constants ‘v etc., the meaning

explained in 4.1. W ith this interpretation 21 is no longer a sen­
tential funotion, bu t a designatory function, which (exactly like
‘X ’ , T ’ ,..,) denotes a set o f the space 8. In view o f this we can
construct the follow ing sentences ^ and 21,:
2IX = ‘For any open sew X , Y, Z,... of the space 8 , the set
<f>(X, T, Z,...) is dense in 8 .’
21, = ‘For any open sets X , T, Z,... of the space 8,
<KX,Y,Z,...) = S ’ .
[S trictly speaking, 2lx and SC, are n ot sentences bu t sentential
functions, because free variables, e.g. ‘ 8 ’ , occur in them .]
W e now consider tw o expressions: 'Six holds (or is valid or is
satisfied) in the space S ’ and ‘ 21, holds in the space 8 ,’ The in­
tuitive m eaning o f these expressions seems to be com pletely
dear. Nevertheless, certain difficulties are encountered when
one tries to explain their m eaning in a strictly form al w ay .1 In
connexion w ith 2.5 the easiest w ay is to interpret the second
expression as being synonym ous w ith the expression: ‘21 is satis­
fied by the matrix 0 (8 )\ In order to construct a definition for
the first expression, we note that the sentence 2lx, b y virtue o f
4.4, adm its o f the follow ing equivalent transform ation:
‘For any open sets X , Y, Z,.,. of the space 8,
^^<j>(X,Y,Z,...)=-S’ .
H ence w e can say that the expression ‘ 2lx holds in the space
8 ’ means the same as ‘ -^-^21 is satisfied by the matrix 0(8)'.
On the basis o f these stipulations we obtain from 4.11,4.12, and
4.24 the follow ing form ulations:
First Principal Theorem. Let 21be a sentence of the sentential
calculus and 8 any topological space. The following conditions are
then equivalent'.
(i) 21 is provable in the two-valued calculus-,
(ii) 2lx holds in the space 8;
(iii) 2Ij holds in every topological space.
1 The oonoept of Yalidity (and of satisfiability) of a sentence belongs to
semantics. F op the problem o f an exact definition of this concept cf. article
VH 1 of the present work, in particular pp. 189 and 199.

Let S&bea sentence of the senten­

S econd P r in c ip a l T h e o b e m .
tial calculus and S any E-spate. The following conditions are
then equivalent:
(i) 91 is provable in the intuitionistic calculus \
(ii) 9l2 holds in the space 8\
(iii) 9l2 holds in every topological space.
Ths. 4.8 and 4.14 can also be brought into an analogous
In connexion with the second principal theorem it is worth
remembering that, in particular, all Euclidean spaces are 22-
spaces (of. 3.11).
With the theorems just stated, the decision criteria whioh
were mentioned in § 2 (cf. 2.19) can now be applied to topo­
logical sentences of the form 9IXor 9l2 (and even to somewhat
more extensive classes o f topological sentences). We are in a
position to decide, in each particular case, whether a sentence
of this form is generally valid in topology.
In conclusion it should be noted that the sentential calculus
can he interpreted in topology in various ways; the interpretation
discussed above is obviously not the only possible one. I f we
are dealing, for example, with the two-valued calculus, we
derive a quite trivial and in fact a general set-theoretical (not
especially topological) interpretation from 4.14; every set S can
in fact be made into an isolated topological space by putting
X = X for every c; 8 (cf. 3.6). A less trivial interpretation
of this calculus is obtained in the following way. We consider
the so-called regular oven sets of a topological space 8, i.e. sets
X cz 8 for which X — S-~S—X ; let &'(S) be the system of all
these sets. We define for the sets X, Y e @'(S) the operations
/., and *v- exactly as in 4.1, but we put

Iv T = S —S—X —Y
(X v Y is thus the smallest regular open set which includes X
and Jr). It can then be shown that the matrix
O '(S ) = [ 0 '( £ ) , 8, V A , -V]
XVn, $ 4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S A N D T O P O L O G Y 44«

is adequate for the system 3 ft -1 In view o f this we correlate

with the sentence
« = ‘<f>{X,Y,Z,.„y
the follow ing sentence:
= ‘ For any regular open sets X , Y, Z,... of the space 8,
<j>'(X,Y,Z,...) = S',
where ‘tf>'{X,Y,Z,...y is obtained from ‘<f>(X,Y,Z,...)’ b y re­
placing the sign ‘ v ’ b y the sign ‘ V I t then appears that
the first principal theorem remains valid if “Hy in it is replaced
by % ’•

§ 5. I n terpretatio n op the Sen ten tial Calculus in

B oolean A lg ebr a an d in R elated M ath em atical
T h eo ries ®
Generalized Boolean algebra is here regarded as a part o f
abstract algebra, nam ely as the theory o f B oolean rings:
D efin itio n 5.1. A set B with at least two elements is called a
B oolean ring {with the fundamental operations + and .) if the
following formulas hold for all elements x, y, z e R:
(i) x-yy, x . y e B ,
(ii) x - f (y -fz ) = (x -f y )+z,
(iii) x = y+{x+y),
(iv) x.ly.z) = {x.y).z,
(v) x.ty+z) — x .y + x .z,
(vi) x . y = y.x,
(vii) x .x = x.
1 This follows from the fact that the family 0'{B) together with the opera­
tions V \ A , and *v- satisfy the postulates of Boolean algebra. This fact was
noticed by me as far back as 1927, and was implicitly stated in Th. B of II,
where, however, a different terminology was used; cf. X I, p. 341, footnote 2.
Compare also Tarski, A . (81), Th. 7.23, p. 178, and footnote 25, p. 181, where
a reference to an earlier paper of von Neumann is given.
3 For varioiia topics discussed in this section see the following papers: article
X I of this book (the foundations of Boolean algebra, the concept of atom) ;
article X II of this book (the theory of deductive systems); Stone, M. H . (07)
(the relation of Boolean algebra to general abstract algebra and to the theory
of fields of sets); Stone, M. H . (68) (the relation of Boolean algebra to general
topology); Tarski, A . (80) (operations on Boolean-algebraic ideals).

Note 5 . 2* I t can be shown that form ulas (iii) and (vi) in 5.1
can be replaced b y the follow ing equivalent conditions:
(iii') there is an element u e R such that

x = y+u = u + y;

(v i') (y+z).x = y .x + z.x .

H ence we see that B oolean rings coincide with those rings
(in the sense o f abstract algebra) in which every element x
satisfies 5.1 (vii).

D e f in it io n 5.3. Let R b e a Boolean ring.

(i) We shall say that x is divisible b y y, or that y is a divisor o f
x , in symbols y\x (or x < y), if x, y e R and if there is a z e R
such that x = y.z.
(ii) We denote by 0 that element x e R which is divisible by every
The tw o sym bols ‘ |’ and ‘0 ’ can be defined in various other
(equivalent) ways.

5.4. The Boolean ring R is called atom istic or

D e f in it io n
atom less according to whether, for every element y e R distinct
from 0 , there are finitdy or infinitely many elements x >which are
divisible by y.
Note 5.5. E very elem ent y o f a Boolean ring R is called an
atom if there exist exactly tw o elements x which are divisible
b y y (in fact x = 0 and x = y). A ring R is atom istic if and
only if every elem ent y ^ O of R can be represented as a sum o f
a finite number o f atom s1;* R is atom less if and only if there are
n o atom s in R .

5.6. I f R is a Boolean ring, then a non-empty set

D e f in it io n
I ^ R is called an ideal, (in R), in symbols I e<f(R), if for any two
elements x and y of I their sum x + y is in I, and for every dement
y in I aU the elements x such that, y |x are in I .

1 In article X I of the present work the term 4atomistic ’ is used in a wider


D e f in it io n 6.7. IfRisaB<xdeanring,th&nforanyI, J e S { R )
we put
(i) y x-,

(ii) / V J = TT Xi
(Hi) l A J — I .J (the intersection of I and J):
(iv) ^ i = i-+{o} (= 2 x).
' M K I X X -W '
Prom 6.1, 5.6, and 5.7 we easily obtain
C o r o l l a r y 5 .8 . For every Boolean ring R we have
(i) {0}, R e J(R), and in fact {0} is the smallest and R the
largest ideal in R;
(ii) if I, J e*f(R) then I -> J , I v J , I A «/, - v / are ideaZs jR,
in fact I J is the largest ideal X for which I .X £ J and ^-1
the largest ideal X for which I .X = {0}, moreover, J V J is the
smallest ideal which includes I and J> finally IA J is the largest
ideal which is included in I and J ♦
D efin ition 5.9. The ordered sextuple [,/(2 ?), R, V , A , ^ ],
where R is a Boolean ringy is denoted by I(i?).
The follow ing well-known theorem exhibits a close form al
connexion between B oolean algebra and topology1:
T heorem 5.10. A normal topological space JBX, which satisfies
thefollowing conditions, can be correlated with every Boolean ring R :
(i) there is a function F which maps the system S(R) onto the
system &(RX) in such a way that the formulas
Ic:J and F{I)czF{J)
are equivalent for all / , J e*f(R) (in particular J^({0}) = 0 and
F(R) = B*);
(ii) R x is isolated if and only if R is atomistic;
(iii) R* is dense in itself if and only if R is atomless;
(iv) R x is a space with a countable basis if and only if R is
1 See Stone, M. H . (68).

T heorem 5.11. For every Boolean ring B, l(_R) is a matrix,

if B x is the topological space correlated with the ring B according to
6 . 10, then the matrices l(JS) and 0 ( B X) are isomorphic.
Proof. W e first show b y means o f 4.2 and 5.8 that the function
F , which b y 5.10 (i) maps the system l(J?) on to 0 (B X) in one-
one fashion, satisfies the follow ing form ulas:
F ( I -> J) = F(I) F{J), F ( I vJ) = F(I) v F{J),
F { I a J) = F ( I ) a F{J), and F (^ I)= ^ F (I)
for all I , J eJ'(B) (where the signs ‘ v ’ , eto., are to be
interpreted on the left-hand side o f each form ula in the sense o f
Boolean algebra, and on the right-hand side in the topological
sense). H ence we easily conclude, with the help o f 2. 1, 2.3,
4.5, 4.0, and 5.9, that I(B) is a m atrix and is in fa ct isom orphic
w ith 0 { B X), q.e.d.
W ith the help o f the last tw o theorems all the results o f § 4
can be oarried over to Boolean algebra:
T h e o r e m 5.12. For every Boolean ring B we have
3 ft £ « (l(i? )) c 351.
[B y 2.7, 4 .8 , 4.11, 5.11]
T heorem 5.13. For every Boolean ring B and every sentence 51
the conditions 51 e 3 ft and -v -a- 51 e ®(l(iJ)) are equivalent.
[B y 2.7, 4.12, 5.11 or 1. 6, 5.12]
T h e o r e m 5.14. Let B b e a Boolean ring. In order that
« ( !( * ) ) = ZSt
it is necessary and sufficient that B be atomistic.
[B y 2.7, 4.14, 5.10 (ii), 5.11]
T h e o r e m 5.15. I f B is an atomless Boolean ring, then
« ( !( £ ) ) = 3 ft.
[B y 2.7, 3.10, 4.24, 5.10 (iii), (iv), 5.11]
Note 5.16. N ote 4.25 can mutatis mutandis be applied to
Th. 5.15. The converse o f this theorem does not hold. The
form ula ®(l(B)) = 3 ft, applies for exam ple, to every denumer­
able B oolean ring B which, although not atomless itself, in­
cludes an atom less subring (i.e. an atomless ring B1 £ B with

the same fundam ental operations as B). On the other hand,

m any exam ples o f Boolean rings can be given for which neither
® (l(R)) = 3 & n or ® (l(i?)) = holds. T o such rings belong, in
particular, all infinite completely additive rings, i,e. Boolean rings
R which satisfy the follow ing condition:
for every set X c R there exists the greatest common divisor of
all elements x e X (i.e. an element y which is a common divisor of
all x e X and is divisible by every other common divisor of these
F or the com pletely additive rings R the follow ing property is
characteristic: = R holds for every I e*f(R)\ in
other words, the system ® (l(i?)) contains all sentences 31 o f the
form 3 1 = 'v ® V and cannot therefore be identical with
S it (cf. 1.5). On the other hand, as is easily shown, no infinite
com pletely additive ring R is atom istic, whence, b y virtue o f
5.14, «(»(H )) *£= 3 it.
Ths. 5.12-5.15 can be expressed in a form analogous to that
o f the first and second principal theorems o f § 4. In particular,
tw o sentences 31j and 3l2 o f Boolean algebra can be correlated
with every sentence 31 o f the sentential calculus in such a way
that 31 is respectively provable in the tw o-valued or in the in-
tuitionistic calculus if and only if 31xor 312holds for every Boolean
ring. From this we obtain a decision criterion for sentences o f
the form 3t2 or 3l2.
The remarks at the end o f § 4 regarding other possible inter­
pretations o f the sentential calculus can also be extended to
B oolean algebra. The regular open sets in that case are to be
replaced b y the ideals I which satisfy the form ula = J.
A ll these results hold not only for the form al system o f
Boolean algebra, bu t also for every realization o f this system .
The best known o f these realizations is the theory o f fields o f
sets, i.e. o f systems o f sets which are closed under the operations
o f addition and subtraction. E very field o f sets with at least
tw o elements is, as is easily seen, a Boolean ring with the so-
called sym m etric subtraction T © Y = ( X— X) and
the ordinary set-theoretical m ultiplication as the fundamental

operations. The sim plest exam ples o f special Boolean rings,

which were m entioned in 5.14-5.16, can be drawn directly from
the theory o f fields o f sets. E very field o f sets, for instance,
which consists o f all finite subsets o f a given (finite or infinite)
set is an exam ple o f an atom istic ring. In order to obtain a
denumerable atomless ring, we consider the set X o f positive
rational numbers x < 1 and form the field o f sets which consists
o f all sums o f finitely m any intervals £ X (the right-hand end­
point being included in the interval, but not the left-hand one).
As examples o f com pletely additive rings (in the sense o f 5.16) the
fields o f sets which consist o f all subsets o f a given set m ay serve.
Another im portant realization o f Boolean algebra is general
metamathematics, i.e. the theory of deductive systems.1
Finally, some o f the results obtained can be extended to a
m ore general theory, nam ely to the theory of lattices. In fact
we consider lattices in which the operation S o f infinite addition
(infinite join operation) is always perform able and in which
finite m ultiplication is distributive under both finite and infinite
addition .2 As examples o f such lattices the system o f all open
sets o f a topological space and the system o f all ideals o f a
Boolean ring m ay be m entioned. Let L be a lattice o f this type
with at least tw o different elements; we put
1 = S z, 0 = Sz (0 denoting the em pty set);
zeL zeo
x v y = x+y, xa y~x.y,
£->!/= S z, ^x —X 0
for all x, y e L. It then results that M(L) = [L, 1, v , A,
is a m atrix, and that Ths. 5.12 and 5.13 remain valid if *M(L)’
is substituted for M(J2) ’ in them . Ths. 5.14 and 5.15 can also be
carried over to the theory o f lattices. In this way we obtain an
interpretation o f the tw o-valued and o f the intuitionistic cal­
culus in the theory o f lattices.
1 See X II.
2 More generally, we could consider here arbitrary distributive lattices
(without infinite addition) in which for any elements x, y s L there is an ele­
ment z e L such that (i) x.z-\-y = y t and (ii) u + z = z whenever u e L and
x .u + y = y. Such lattices are intimately related to the so-called Brouwerian
algebras (or Brouwerian logics). Cf. Birkhoff, G. (7a) and McKinsey, J. C. C.
and Tarski, A . (53a).