0 оценок0% нашли этот документ полезным (0 голосов)

4 просмотров46 страницAlfred-Tarski---Logic,-Semantics,-Metamathematics.-Papers-from-1923-to-1938-Clarendon-Press-(1956)-419-464.pdf

© © All Rights Reserved

PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd

© All Rights Reserved

0 оценок0% нашли этот документ полезным (0 голосов)

4 просмотров46 страницAlfred-Tarski---Logic,-Semantics,-Metamathematics.-Papers-from-1923-to-1938-Clarendon-Press-(1956)-419-464.pdf

© All Rights Reserved

Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 46

ON THE CONCEPT OF L O G IC A L

CONSEQUENCEf

duction in to the field o f strict form al investigation was n ot a

m atter o f arbitrary decision on the part o f this or that investi

gator; in defining this concept, efforts were m ade to adhere to

the com m on usage o f the language o f everyday life. B u t these

efforts have been confronted with the difficulties which usually

present them selves in such oases. W ith respect to the clarity

o f its content the com m on concept o f oonsequence is in no w ay

superior to other ooncepts o f everyday language. Its extension

is not sharply bounded and its usage fluctuates. A n y attem pt

to bring into harm ony all possible vague, sometim es contra

dictory, tendencies whioh are connected with the use o f this

concept, is certainly doom ed to failure. W e must reconcile our

selves from the start to the fa ct that every precise definition o f

this concept will show arbitrary features to a greater or less

degree.

E ven until recently m any logicians believed that they had

succeeded, b y means o f a relatively meagre stock o f concepts,

in grasping alm ost exactly the oontent o f the com m on concept

o f consequence, or rather in defining a new concept which coin

cided in extent with the com m on one. Such a belief could easily

arise am idst the new achievem ents o f the m ethodology o f de

ductive science. Thanks to the progress o f m athem atical logio

we have learnt, during the course o f recent decades, how to

present m athem atical disciplines in the shape o f form alized

deductive theories. In these theories, as is w ell known, the

f B ibxjogbaphioax N ote . This is a summary of an address given at the

International Congress of Soientifio Philosophy in Paris, 1935. The article

first appeared in print in Polish under the title ‘ O pojoiu wynikania logics-

nego* in Przeglqd Filozoflczny, vol. 89 (1936), pp. 68-68, and then in German

under the title ‘ tlber den Begriff der logisohen Folgerung’, Aetes du Oongrit

International de PhUoeophio Soiantiftque, vol. 7 (Aotualitis Scientifiques et

Industrielles, vol. 894), Paris, 1936, pp. 1-11.

410 ON TH E CONCEPT OF LOG ICAL CONSEQUENCE XVI

o f some simple rules o f inference— suoh as the rules o f substitu

tion and detachm ent. These rules tell us what transformations

o f a purely structural kind (i.e. transformations in which only

the external structure o f sentences is involved) are to be per

form ed upon the axiom s or theorems already proved in the

theory, in order that the sentences obtained as a result o f such

transform ations m ay themselves be regarded as proved. L ogi

cians thought that these few rules o f inference exhausted the

content o f the concept o f consequence. W henever a sentence

follow s from others, it can be obtained from them— so it was

thought— in more or less com plicated ways b y means o f the

transform ations prescribed b y the rules. In order to defend this

view against sceptics who doubted whether the concept o f conse

quence when form alized in this w ay really coincided in extent

with the com m on one, the logicians were able to bring forward

a w eighty argument: the fact that they had actually succeeded

in reproducing in the shape o f form alized proofs all the exact

reasonings which had ever been carried out in mathematics.

Nevertheless we know today that the scepticism was quite

justified and that the view sketched above cannot be main

tained. Some years ago I gave a quite elem entary example o f

a theory which shows the follow ing peculiarity: among its

theorems there occur such sentences as:

A 0. 0 possesses the given property P ,

A v 1 possesses the given property P ,

and, in general, all particular sentences o f the form

A n. n possesses the given property P ,

where V represents any sym bol which denotes a natural number

in a given (e.g. decim al) number system . On the other hand the

universal sentence:

A . Every natural number possesses the given property P ,

cannot be proved on the basis o f the theory in question b y means

o f the norm al rules o f inference .1 This fact seems to me to speak

1 For a detailed description of a theory with this peculiarity see I X ; for

the discussion of the closely related rule of infinite induction see V III, pp. 258 ff.

XVI ON TH E CONCEPT OF LOG ICAL CONSEQUENCE 411

as it is generally used b y mathematical logicians, b y no means

coincides with the com m on concept. Y et intuitively it seems

certain that the universal sentence A follows in the usual sense

from the totality o f particular sentences A Qi A v „>, A n>.... P ro

vided all these sentences are true, the sentence A must also be

true.

In connexion with situations o f the kind just described it has

proved to be possible to form ulate new rules o f inference which

do not differ from the old ones in their logical structure, are

intuitively equally infallible, i.e. always lead from true sentences

to true sentences, but cannot be reduced to the old rules. An

exam ple o f such a. rule is the so-called rule o f infinite induction

according to which the sentence A can be regarded as proved

provided all the sentences A 0, A v ..., A n,... have been proved

(the sym bols ‘A 0’ , (A ±\ etc., being used in the same sense as

previously). B ut this rule, on account o f its infinitistic nature,

is in essential respects different from the old rules. It can only

be applied in the construction o f a theory if we have first suc

ceeded in proving infinitely m any sentences o f this theory— a

state o f affairs which is never realized in practice. But this

defect can easily be overcom e b y means o f a certain m odifica

tion o f the new rule. For this purpose we consider the sentence

B which asserts that all the sentences A 0i A lf..., A nt... are

provable on the basis o f the rules o f inference hitherto used

(not that they have actually been proved). W e then set up

the follow ing rule: if the sentence B is proved, then the corre

sponding sentence A can be accepted as proved. But here

it m ight still be objected that the sentence B is not at all a

sentence o f the theory under construction, but belongs to the

so-called m etatheory (i.e. the theory of the theory discussed)

and that in consequence a practical application o f the rule in

question will always require a transition from the theory to the

m etatheory .1 In order to avoid this objection we shall restrict

metatheory in the corresponding theory see article V H I, pp. 167 ff., 184, and

247 ff.

412 ON TH E CONCEPT OF LO G IC A L CONSEQUENCE XVI

m etic o f natural numbers can be developed, and observe that

in every such theory all the concepts and sentences o f the

corresponding m etatheory can be interpreted (since a one-one

correspondence can be established betwreen expressions o f a

language and natural num bers ).1 W e can replace in the rule

discussed the sentence B b y the sentence B\ which is the arith

m etical interpretation o f 2?. In this w ay we reach a rule which

does n ot deviate essentially from the rules o f inference, either

in the conditions o f its applicability or in the nature o f the

concepts involved in its form ulation or, finally, in its intuitive

infallibility (although it is considerably m ore com plicated).

N ow it is possible to state other rules o f like nature, and even

as m any o f them as we please. A ctually it suffices in fact to

notice that the rule last form ulated is essentially dependent

upon the extension o f the concept ‘sentence provable on the

basis o f the rules hitherto used\ B ut when we adopt this rule

we thereby widen the extension o f this concept. Then, for the

widened extension we can set up a new, analogous rule, and

so on ad infinitum . I t w ould be interesting to investigate

whether there are any objective reasons for assigning a special

position to the rules ordinarily used.

The conjecture now suggests itself that we can finally succeed

in grasping the full intuitive content o f the concept o f conse

quence b y the m ethod sketched above, i.e. b y supplem enting

the rules o f inference used in the construction o f deductive

theories- B y m aking use o f the results o f K . G odel2 we can

show that this conjecture is untenable. In every deductive

theory (apart from certain theories o f a particularly elem entary

nature), however m uch we supplem ent the ordinary rules o f

inference b y new purely structural rules, it is possible to con

struct sentences which follow , in the usual sense, from the

theorem s o f this theory, but which nevertheless cannot be

proved in this theory on the basis o f the accepted rules o f

1 For the concept of metatheory and the problem of the interpretation of a

metatheory in the eorrosponding theory see article V III. pp. 167 £f., 184, and

247 ff.

* Cf. G<>dei, K . (22), especially pp. 190 f.

XV I ON TH E CONCEPT OF LO G IC AL CONSEQUENCE 413

which is close in essentials to the com m on concept, we must

resort to quite different m ethods and apply quite different con

ceptual apparatus in defining it. It is perhaps not superfluous

to point out in advance that— in com parison with the new—-the

old ooncept o f consequence as com m only used by mathematical

logicians in no w ay loses its im portance. This ooncept will

probably always bare a decisive significance for the practical

construction o f deductive theories, as an instrum ent which

allows us to prove or disprove particular sentences o f these

theories. It seems, however, that in considerations o f a general

theoretical nature the proper concept o f consequence must be

placed in the foreground .3

The first attem pt to form ulate a precise definition o f the

proper concept o f consequence was that o f R , Catnap .3 B ut this

1 In order to anticipate possible objections the range of application of the

result jost formulated should be determined more exac Jy and the logical nature

o f the rules o f inference exhibited more clear]^ , iu yartioulftr it should be

exactly explained what is meant by the structural character of those rules.

* An opposition between the two concept i i question is clearly pointed cut-

in article IX , pp. 2fl3 ff. Nevertheless, in contrast tc m y present standpoint,

I have there expressed myself in a decidedly negative manner about the possi

bility of setting up an exact formal definition lor the proper concept of conse

quence. My position at that time is explained by the fact that, when I was

writing the article mentioned, I wishtr.i tc any means of construction

which went beyond the theory of logical types tu any of its classical forms;

but it can be shown that it is impossible to define the proper concept of

consequence adequately whilst using exclusively the means admissible in the

classical theory of types; unless we should thus limit our considerations

solely to formalized language? of au elementary and fragmentary character (to

be exact, to the so-called languages of Unite order; of. article V III, especially

pp. 268 if.). In his extremely interesting book, Carnap, K. (10), the term

{logical) derivatioti or dericabiUty Ls applied to old ooncept of consequence

as commonly used in the construction cf deductive theories, in order to distin

guish it from the concept of eof*$eqvmce as the proper concept. The opposition

between the two concepts is extended by Carnap to the most diverse derived

conoepts (*f-concepts'' and *Sk~c<jrxej)ts\ cf. pp. 88 ff., and 124 ff.); he tlso

emphasizes— to my mind correctly— the importance of the proper concord of

consequence and the concepts derived from it, for general theoretical discus

sions (cf. e.g. p. 128).

* Cf. Carnap, R. (10), pp. 88 £, and Carnap, R. (11) especially p. 181.

In the first of these works there is yet another definition of consequence which

is adapted to a formalized language of an elementary character. This definition

is not considered here because it cannot be applied to languages of a more com

plicated logical structure. Carnap attempts to define the concept of logical conse

quence not only for special languages, but also within the framework of what he

calls *general syntax \ We shall have more to say about this on p. 416, note 1.

414 ON TH E CONCEPT OF LOG ICAL CONSEQUENCE XVI

ties o f the form alized language which was chosen as the subject

o f investigation. The definition proposed by Carnap can be

form ulated as follow s:

The sentence X follow s logically from the sentences of the class

K if and only if the class consisting of all the sentences of K and

of the negation of X is contradictory.

The decisive element o f the above definition obviously is the

concept 'con tradictory', Carnap s definition o f this concept is

too com plicated and special to be reproduced here w ithout long

and troublesom e explanations .1

I should like to sketch here a general m ethod which, it seems

to me, enables us to construct an adequate definition o f the

concept o f consequence for a com prehensive class o f form alized

languages, I emphasize, however, that the proposed treatm ent

o f the concept o f consequence makes no very high elaim to

com plete originality. The ideas involved in this treatm ent will

certainly seem to be something well known, or even something

o f his own, to m any a logician who has given close attention to

the concept o f consequence and has tried to characterize it

more precisely. Nevertheless it seems to me that only the

m ethods which have been developed in recent years for the

establishment o f scientific semantics, and the concept's defined

with their aid, allow us to present these ideas in an exact form .2

Certain considerations o f an intuitive nature will form our

starting-point. Consider any class K o f sentences and a- sentence

X which follow s from the sentences o f this class. From an in

tuitive standpoint it can never happen that both the class K

consists only o f true sentences and the sentence X is false.

M oreover, since we are concerned here with the concept o f

logical, i.e. formal, consequence, and thus with a relation which is

to be uniquely determ ined b y the form o f the sentences between

which it holds, this relation cannot be influenced in any way by

em pirical knowledge, and in particular b y knowledge o f the

1 See footnote 3 on p. 413.

* The methods and concepts of semantics and especially the concepts of

truth and satisfaction are discussed in detail in article V II I ; Bee also article X V .

XV I ON TH E CONCEPT OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 415

K refer. The consequence relation cannot be affected b y re

placing the designations o f the objeots referred to in these

sentences b y the designations o f any other objects. The two

circumstances just indicated, which seem to be very charac

teristic and essential for the proper concept o f consequence, m ay

be join tly expressed in the follow ing statem ent:

(F) If, in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X , the

constants—apart from purely logical constants—are replaced by

any other constants (like signs being everywhere replaced by like

signs), and if we denote the class of sentences thus obtained from

K by iK ri, and the sentence obtained from X by 6X'\ then the

sentence X ' must be true provided only that all sentences of the

class K f are true.

[F or the sake o f sim plifying the discussion certain incidental

com plications are disregarded, both here and in what follow s.

They are connected partly with the theory o f logical types, and

partly with the necessity o f eliminating any defined signs which

m ay possibly occur in the sentences concerned, i.e. o f replacing

them by prim itive signs.]

In the statem ent (F ) we have obtained a necessary condition

for the sentence X to be a consequenoe o f the class K . The

question now arises whether this condition is also sufficient.

I f this question were to be answered in the affirmative, the

problem o f form ulating an adequate definition o f the concept

o f consequence w ould be solved affirm atively. The only diffi

culty would be connected with the term ‘true’ which occurs in

the condition ( F ). B ut this term can be exactly and adequately

defined in sem antics .1

U nfortunately the situation is not so favourable. I t m ay, and

it does, happen— it is not difficult to show this b y considering

special form alized languages— that the sentence X does not

follow in the ordinary sense from the sentences o f the class K

although the condition ( F ) is satisfied. This condition m ay in

fa ct be satisfied only because the language with which we are

1 See footnote 2 on p. 414.

41# ON T H E CONCEPT OF LOG ICAL CONSEQUENCE X V I

stants. The condition (F ) could be regarded as sufficient for

the sentence X to follow from the class K only if the designations

o f all possible objects occurred in the language in question. This

assum ption, how ever, is fictitious and can never be realized .1

W e m ust therefore look for some means o f expressing the in

tentions o f the condition (F ) which will be com pletely inde

pendent o f that fictitious assum ption.

Such a means is provided by semantics. Among the funda

mental concepts o f semantics we have the concept o f the satis

faction of a sentential function by single objects or by a sequence

<5f objects. It would be superfluous to give here a precise ex

planation o f the content o f this concept. The intuitive meaning

o f such phrases ae: John and Peter satisfy the condition 'X and

7 are brothers’, or the triple of numbers 2, 3, and 5 satisfies the

equation :£C-fy = z\ can give rise to no doubts. The concept o f

satisfaction—like other semantical concepts—must always be

relativized to some particular language. The details o f its pre

cise definition depend on the structure o f this language. Never

theless, a general method can be developed which enables us to

construct such definitions for a comprehensive class o f forma

lized languages. Unfortunately, for technical reasons, it would

be impossible to sketch this method here even in its general

outlines.*

One o f the concepts which can be defined in terms o f the

concept o f satisfaction is the concept o f model. L et us assume

that in the language we are considering certain variables corre

spond to every extra-logical constant, and in such a w ay that

every sentence becom es a sentential function if the constants

in it are replaced b y the corresponding variables. L et L be any

class o f sentences. W e replace all extra-logical constants which

1 These last remarks constitute a criticism of some earlier attempts to

define the concept of formal consequence. They concern, in particular, Car

nap’s definitions of logical consequence and a series of derivative concepts

(L-consequences and L-conoepts, of. Carnap, R . (10), pp. 137 & ). These defini

tions, in so far ae they are set up on the basis of ‘general syntax’, seem to me

to be materially inadequate, just because the defined concepts depend essen-

tially, in their extension, on the richness of the language investigated.

* See footnote 2 on p. 414.

XV I ON TH E CONCEPT OF LO G IC A L CONSEQ UENCE 417

like constants being replaced b y like variables, and unlike b y

unlike. In this w ay we obtain a class & o f sentential functions.

A n arbitrary sequence o f objects whioh satisfies every sentential

function o f the class L r w ill be called a model or realization of

the class L of sentences (in ju st this sense one usually speaks o f

m odels o f an axiom system o f a deductive theory). If, in parti

cular, the class L consists o f a single sentence X , we shall also

call the m odel o f the class L the model of the sentence X .

In term s o f these concepts we can define the concept o f logical

consequence as follow s:

The sentence X follows fisca lly from the. sentences of the class

K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the

sentence X .t

I t seems to me that everyone who understands the content

o f the above definition must adm it that it agrees quite well

with com m on usage. This becom es still clearer from its various

consequences. In particular, it can be proved, on the basis o f

this definition, that every consequence o f true sentences must

be true, and also that the consequence relation which holds

between given sentences is com pletely independent o f the sense

o f the extra-logical constants which occur in these sentences.

In brief, it can be shown that the condition (F ) form ulated

above is necessary if the sentence X is to follow from the sen

tences o f the class K . On the other hand, this condition is in

general not sufficient, since the concept o f consequence here

defined (in agreement with the standpoint we have taken) is-

independent o f the richness in concepts o f the language being

investigated.

Finally, it is not difficult to reconcile the proposed definition

with that o f Carnap. F or we can agree to call a class o f sentences

t After the original of this paper had appeared in print, K . Scholz in his

article ‘ Die Wistenschaftslehxe Bc-lzanos, Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung’,

AbhancUungen der Fri&s'schen Schule, new series, vol. 6, pp. $99-472 (see in

particular p. 472, footnote 58) pointed out a far-reaching analogy between this

definition of consequence and the one suggested by B. Bolzano about a

hundred years earlier.

418 ON TH E CONCEPT OP LO G IC AL CONSEQUENCE XVI

sentences can be called analytical i f every sequence o f objects

is a m odel o f it. B oth o f these ooncepts can be related not only

t o classes o f sentences but also to single sentences. L et us

assume further that, in the language with which we are dealing,

for every sentence X there exists a negation o f this sentence,

i.e. a sentence 7 which has as a m odel those and only those

sequences o f objeots which are n ot m odels o f the sentence X

(this assum ption is rather essential for Carnap’s construction).

On the basis o f all these conventions and assum ptions it is easy

to prove the equivalence o f (he iwo definitions. W e can also show

— ju st as does Carnap— that those and only those sentences are

analytical w hich follow from every class o f sentences (in parti

cular from the em pty class), and those and on ly those are

oontradiotory from whioh every sentence follow s .1

I am not at all o f the opinion that in the result o f the above

discussion the problem o f a m aterially adequate definition o f

the concept o f consequence has been com pletely solved. On the

contrary, I still see several open questions, on ly one o f whioh—

perhaps the m ost im portant— I shall point out here.

U nderlying our whole construction is the division o f all terms

o f the language discussed in to logical and extra-logical. This

division is certainly n ot quite arbitrary. If, for exam ple, we

were to include am ong the extra-logioal signs the im plication

sign, or the universal quantifier, then our definition o f the con

cept o f consequence w ould lead to results which obviously

contradict ordinary usage. On the other hand, no objective

grounds are know n to m e whioh perm it us to draw a sharp

1 Cf. Carnap, B . (10), pp. 135 ff., especially Tbs. 52.7 and 62.8; Carnap, B .

(11), p. 182, Ths. 10 and 11. Incidentally I should like to remark that the

definition of the concept of oonsequence hare proposed does not exceed the

limits of syntax in Carnap's conception (cf. Carnap, R. (10), pp. 6 £f.). Ad

mittedly the general concept of satisfaction (or of model) does not belong to

syntax; but we use only a special case of this oonoept— the satisfaction of

sentential funotions whioh contain no extra-logioal constants, and this special

case can be characterized using only general logical and specifio syntactical

eonoepts. Between the general concept of satisfaction and the special case of

this concept used here approximately the same relation holds as between the

semantical concept of true sentence and the syntactical oonoept of analytical

sentence.

X V I ON TH E CONCEPT OF LOG ICAL CONSEQUENCE 419

possible to include am ong logical terms some which are usually

regarded b y logicians as extra-logical without running into

consequences whioh stand in sharp contrast to ordinary usage.

In the extrem e case we could regard all terms o f the language

as logical. The concept o f formal consequence w ould then co

incide with that o f material consequence. The sentence X w ould

in this case follow from the class K o f sentences if either X were

true or at least one sentence o f the class K were false .1

In order to see the im portance o f this problem for certain

general philosophical views it suffices to note that the division

o f terms into logical and extra-logical also plays an essential

part in clarifying the concept ‘analytical*. B ut according to

m any logicians this last concept is to be regarded as the exact

form al correlate o f the concept o f tautology (i.e. o f a statem ent

bility* (of. p. 413, note 2), ‘ formal consequence\ and ‘ material consequence\

for the special case when the class K , from whioh the given sentence X follows,

consists of only a finite number of sentences: Ylt Y&..., Yn. Let us denote

by the Bymbol 'Z* the conditional sentence (the implication) whose antecedent

is the conjunction of the sentences Ylt Yn and whose consequent is the

sentence X . The following equivalences can then be established i

the sentence X is (logically) derivablefrom the sentences of the class K if and only

if the sentence Z is logically provable (i.e. derivable from the axioms of logic) ;

the sentence X follows formally from the sentences of the class K if and only if

the sentence Z is analytical;

the sentence X follows materially from the sentences of the class K if and only if

the sentence Z is true.

Of the three equivalences only the first can arouse certain objections; of.

article X H , pp. 342-64, especially 346. In connexion with these equivalences

cf. also Ajdukiewicz, EL. (2), p. 19, and (4), pp. 14 and 42.

In view of the analogy indicated between the several variants of the con*

cept of consequence, the question presents itself whether it would not be useful

to introduce, in addition to the special concepts, a general concept of a relative

character, and indeed the concept of consequence with respect to a class L of

sentences. I f we make use again of the previous notation (limiting ourselves

to the case when the class K is finite), we can define this concept as follows:

the sentence X follows from the sentences of the doss K with respect to the

class L of sentences if and only if ike sentence Z belongs to the class L.

On the basis of this definition, derivability would ooineide with consequence

with respect to the class of all logically provable sentences, formal consequences

would be consequences with respect to the class of aQ analytical sentences, and

material consequences those with respect to the class of all true sentences.

420 ON TH E CONCEPT OF LO G IC AL CONSEQUENCE XVI

personally seems rather vague, but which has been o f funda

m ental im portance for the philosophical discussions o f L. W itt

genstein and the whole Vienna Circle .1

Further research will doubtless greatly clarify the problem

which interests us. Perhaps it w ill be possible to find im portant

objective arguments which w ill enable us to ju stify the tradi

tional boundary between logical and extra-logical expressions.

B ut I also consider it to be quite possible that investigations

will bring no positive results in this direction, so that we shall

be com pelled to regard such concepts as ‘logical consequence’ ,

‘analytical statem ent’, ‘and ‘tau tology’ as relative concepts

which must, on each occasion, be related to a definite, although

in greater or less degree arbitrary, division o f terms into logical

and extra-logical. The fluctuation in the com m on usage o f the

concept o f consequence w ould— in part at least— be quite

naturally reflected in such a com pulsory situation.

1 Cf. Wittgenstein, L. (91), Carnap, R. (10), pp. 37-40.

XVII

SE N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AND

TOPOLOGYf

I s this article I shall point out certain form al connexions between

the sentential calculus and topology (as well as some other

m athem atical theories). I am concerned in the first place with

a topological interpretation o f tw o systems o f the sentential

calculus, nam ely the ordinary (tw o-valued) and the intuitionistic

(B rouw er-H eyting) system . W ith every sentence o f the sen

tential calculus we correlate, in one-one fashion, a sentence 21*

o f topology in such a w ay that 21 is provable in the tw o-valued

calculus if and only if 2lx holds in every topological space. An

analogous correlation is set up for the intuitionistic calculus.

The present discussion seems to me to have a certain interest

not only from the purely form al point o f view ; it also throws

an interesting light on the content relations between the two

system s o f the sentential calculus and the intuitions underlying

these systems.

In order to avoid possible misunderstandings I should like to

emphasize that I have not attem pted to adapt the m ethods o f

reasoning used in this article to the requirem ents o f intuitionistic

logic .1 F or valuable help in com pleting this work I am indebted

to Professor A, M ostowski.

1 Most results o f this article were obtained in the year 1935. The connexion

between the intuitionistic calculus and Boolean algebra (or the theory of

deductive eystems, see § 5) was discovered by me still earlier, namely in 1931.

Some remarks to this effect can be found in article X II of the present book and

in Tarski, A. (80). Only after completing this paper did I become acquainted

with the work, then newly published, of Stone, M. H. (70). Ir- spite of an

entirely different view of Brouwerian logic there is certainly some connexion

between particular results o f the two works, as can easily be seen comparing

Stone’s Th. 7, p. 22, and my Th. 4.11. In their mathematical content these

two theorems are closely related. But this does not at all apply to the two

works as wholes. In particular, Th. 4.24, in which I see the kernel of this paper,

tends in quite a different direction from Stone’s considerations.

t B ibliographical N ote . This article is the text of an address given by

the author on 30 September 1937 to the Third Polish Mathematical Congress in

Warsaw (see Annales de la Societi polonaise ds matkernatiexie, vol. 16 (1937),

p. 192). The article first appeared under the title ‘ Der Aussagenkalkul und die

Topologie’ , in Fundamenta Mathematical, vol. 31 (1928), pp. 103-34.

422 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TOPOLOG Y XVII, § 1

Calcu lu s

logic is the sentential calculus. In the expressions o f the sen

tential calculus variables o f only one kind occur, nam ely senten

tial variables, which represent whole sentences. As sentential

variables the letters ‘ X T ’ , will be used. In addition to

the variables, four constants occur in the sentential calculus:

the implication sign the disjunction sign *v the conjunc

tion sign ‘ a ’ , and the negation sign ‘ -v. ’ (a fifth constant, the

equivalence sign ‘o ’ , will not be in volved here).

A rbitrary expressions which are com posed o f sentential

variables, the four constants m entioned, and possibly brackets,

w ill be denoted b y the letters ‘ 31’ , ‘ S ’ , . It is assumed that

the sentential variables are ordered in an (infinite) sequence with

distinct term s: 5B1( SS2,..., $»>••• • The sym bols MS-*- ® ’ , ‘ 31V SB’ ,

and ‘91A 83’ denote the implication, the disjunction, and the

conjunction o f Sff and SB respectively, that is the com pound ex

pressions which are form ed when Sit and SB are com bined b y the

corresponding constant ‘ v ’ , or *A ’ . Analogously the

negation o f Sit is denoted b y ‘ -vSJT.1

In addition to the signs just listed the usual set-theoretioal

sym bolism will be used.

The only expressions o f the sentential calculus with which we

shall deal will be sentences:

tion, or (for shyrt) a sentence, if 3t belongs to every system which

(i) contains all sentential variables among its elements, (ii) is closed

under the operations of forming implications, disjunctions, con

junctions, and negations; in other words, the system of all

sentences is the smallest system which has the properties (i)

and (ii).

in the logical and in the metalogical sense* In practice only the second sense is

involved* In }§ 4 and £ yet another, quite different sense will be given to these

signs.

XVII, § 1 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS A N D TO P O LO G Y 423

guished: the provable sentences o f the two-valued calculus and

those o f the intuitionistic calculus.

D efin itio n 1.2. The sentence 21 is called an axiom o f the tw o

valued calculus, or o f the intuitionistic calculus, if there are

sentences S , G, and £> such that 21 satisfies one of the following

formulas (i)-(x ) in the first case, or one of the formulas (i)-(ix ) and

(xi) in the second case:

(i) 21= 3 -> (G -> 3 ),

(ii) 21 =

(iii) 2 l= 3 -* (3 v G ),

(iv) 21 = G -* (23 VG),

(v) 21= ( 3 -*2>)->{(<E-► 3 ) -* [(» V < £ )-► »]},

(vi) 2t = ( 3 A G) -► 3 ,

(vii) 21 = (3 A G) -* G,

(viii) 21= (D -* 3 )-► {($ -* G )- * [ $ - * ( 3 A G)]},

(ix) 21= 3 - > ( 3 - * G),

(x) 21 = ( ^ 3 - » 3 ) - * S ,

(xi) 21= ( 3 - * ^ 3 ) - * ^ 3 1

D efintiton 1.3. I f 21, 3 , and G are three sentences and if

21 = 3 -* G, then G is said to be the result o f the detachment

o f the sentence 3 from the sentence 21.

D efin itio n 1.4. The system of provable sentences o f the

two-valued calculus is the smallest system of sentences which con

tains all the axioms o f the two-valued calculus and is closed under

the operation of detachment. The system of provable sentences

o f the intuitionistic calculus is the smallest system which contains

all the axioms of the intuitionistic calculus and is closed under

the same operation *

It is known that from these definitions the following two

theorems are derivable:

1 Cf. similar axiom systems: for the two-valued calculus in Hilbert, D. and

Bemays, P. (31) and for the intuitionist calculus in Gontzen, G. (18)* An axiom

system for the intuitionistic calculus was first given in Heyting, A. (28). The

problem of the mutual independence of the axioms (or, more exactly, axiom-

schemata) of 1.2 is not here discussed.

8 The operation of substitution need not be considered in 1.4 since the

axiom system defined in 1.2 is already closed under this operation.

424 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y XVH , § 1

tential variable, tfAen 93V -v- 93 ami -v 23V ^ -v 93 belong to 3#

but not to 3ft).

equivalent: (i) 91e 3ft* (ii) ^"^91 e 3ft> (iii) ^91 e 3ft.1

An exact proof o f these theorems (as well as of all the results

given below) must of course be based upon a suitable axiom-

system for the meta-sentential calculus and not only upon the

definitions of the notions involved. But it would be superfluous

here to formulate such an axiom system explicitly.2

§ 2. T he Ma t r ix M ethod

The definitions in § I afford no criterion that would enable

us to decide in each particular case whether a giv^en sentence 21

is provable in the two-valued or in the intuitionistic calculus.

Such a criterion is provided by the so-called ^matrix method.3

2 .1 .

elements, an dement A e ■#', three binary operations »->, , and

Jo, and a unary operation It is assumed that iF* is closed

under these operations and that the following holds:

if Y e iT and A *-> F — A, then Y — A.

Under these assumptions, the ordered sextuple

M= [iT, A , »->, cp . j* , nJ]

is called a (normal logical) matrix.

Note 2.2. I f M= , A, »->, T, th, ~ ] is a matrix, then iT

is sometimes called the value system, A the designated element,

and *-►, T , Jb , ^ the fundamental operations (first, second, etc.)

of M.

1 The first part of Th. 1.5 follows easily from 1.2-1.4 (it suffices to show that

every sentence 91 of the form 1.2 (xi) belongs to For the second part of.

Heyting, A. (28), p. 56. Th. 1.6 was stated in Glivenko, T. (19).

2 In this connexion see V III, p. 173, IX , p. 282.

3 Cf. IV, p. 41. The concept of matrix i3 there rather more widely con

ceived than here, since matrices with more than one designated element are also

considered (cf. 2.1, 2.2).

XVH , § 2 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AN D TO P O LO G Y 426

D e f in it io n

and M2 = [ ^ , J.2, »+2, ^ 2? cb2> ^ 2] are said t° isom orphic

if there is a function F which maps on in a one-one

fashion and satisfies the following formulas: F(Af) = A 2)

F ( X *+x 7 ) - 7 (X ) ~ 2 F(Y), F ( X t . 7 ) = F(X) t 2 7 (7 ),

7 (X dhi 7 ) - 7 (Z ) db2 7 (7 ), and 7 ( ~ t X ) = ~ 2Z (X ) for

aU X , 7 e

C orollary 2.4, Every matrix M is isomorphic with itself; if

M2 is isomorphic with M2, then M2 is isomorphic icith M-^* if MA is

isomorphic with M2 and M2 is isomorphic with M3, then is iso

morphic with M3. [By 2.3]

D e f in it io n <L , ~ ] 6 e a matrix and

21a sentence. The following formulas define (recursively) a function

7$tMwhich correlates an element

7m

>M(Xlv..,Xn,...)e ^

with every infinite sequence of elements X v ..., X n,.,. g If/'\

(i) 7*-M(X l5...,X n,...) = X p if 21 = ©p (p = 1, 2,...).

(ii) 72lM(X l5..,JX n,...)

(iii), (iv) analogously for the operations T and v , or db and A .

(v ) Z ^^X ^ .... X n,...) = ~ 7 ^ M(X lf..., X w,...) if 2{ — ©

(where S is any sentence).

T7csay tfiesentence 21is satisfied by £Ae matrix M, in symbols

21 6 C(M). i f Z «fM(X lf..., X *,...) = 4 /o r aB ^ ..... X n,... e

the system S of sentences if ffi(M) = 6 .

2.7. I f the matrices

Co r o t j a r y and M2are isomorphic, then

®(MX) - ®(M2). “ [By 2.1 2.3, 2.5]

1 In the formulation of 2.5, we could use functions with finitely many

variables, but that would create certain technical difficulties in our further

considerations. Another, although equivalent, definition of the set <s(M) was

given in IV .

42C S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y X V II, § 2

If

D e f in it io n 2 . 8.

M = [ i f , A , *■>, T , Jo, ~ ] and Mx = [ ify, A , »-*•, T , J>,

aretwomatrices a n d ifif £ s IT , then Mxi,s called a subm atrix 0/ M.

I f M is any matrix and Mx is a submairix of

Co b o l la e y 2.9.

M, then ®(M) £ «(M X). [B y 2 . 1, 2.5, 2 . 8]

2 . 10. We denote by ZK the ordered sextuple

D e f in it io n

[ i f , 1, *-*, Jo, where i f = ( 0 , l), x = l-x -\ -x .y ,

s ! T y = x-\-y—x .y ,x J o y ~ x .y ,a n d ~ x = 1—xfor aUx,y e i f .

The follow ing result is well known:

T h e o r e m 2.11. ZK is a matrix and ®(ZK) = 3 ft .1

F or the system 3 ft there is, in contrast to 3 ft. no adequate

m atrix with a finite value system .2 W e can, however, con

struct an infinite sequence o f m atrioes IK*,..., iK „,... with finite

00

value system s such that JX ®(IKn) = 3 ft. W e shall now de-

1

scribe the construction o f this sequenoe .8

Let M — [#^ , B, »-*, t , JU,

D e f in it io n 2 . 12. be a matrix

and A any element which does not belong to if* We put:

(i) i f * = if+ {A }\

(ii) l H * r = I n 7 if X t Y e i f and X +*Y B;

X *+ *Y — A if X , Y e i f and X ++ Y =* B; X *+ *A ~ A for

X e i f * ; A *+*Y * 7 for Y e i f * ;

(iii) X y *Y = X r Y f o r X , Y e i f ; Z r * A = A r * Z = A

for Z e i f * ;

(iv) X L * 7 = X j * Y for X , Y e i f ; Z ^ * A = A<L*Z =-- Z

for Z e H r*;

(v) ~ * X = ~ X if X e i f and ~ X j* B; ~ * X — A if

X e i f and ~-5T = B; r*J*A — ■ —‘B.

The ordered sextuple [ i f *, A , »-**, T * , Jo *, <--'*] is denoted

by M*.

1 2.11 easily results from the well-known theorem according to which the

system 3& is complete. The first completeness proof for is due to Poet, E.

(60), pp. 180

3 Cf. Gddel, K , (23), p. 40.

4 This result is due to Jaskowski, S, (36). (Our account deviates only in in

essentials from that of Jankowski. The operation T of Ja&kcwski is replaced

by the operation * defined in 2.12, which serves the same purpose.)

X V n, f 2 SENTENTIAL CALCULUS AND TOPOLOGY 427

unambiguous beoause its result depends on the choice o f the

element A. This fact does not affect the subsequent considera

tions because all matrices whioh can be obtained from the given

matrix M by means o f the operation * are isomorphic with one

another. The ambiguity o f ‘M*’ is, moreover, avoidable by

constructing a set-theoretical function F which correlates an

element F ( i f ) non-e i f with every system i f , and then replacing

'A ’ in 2.12 by *F ( i f y (certain difficulties which may arise in

connexion with the theory o f logical types will here be ignored).

2.14. J/M is a matrix, then M* is also a matrix and

Co b o lla b y

£ ®(M); if the matricea Mx and Ma are isomorphic, then

M* and M* are also isomorphic. [By 2.1, 2.3, 2.6, 2.12]

D e f in it io n 2.15. Let n be a natural number and

M = [ i f , A , »-*, T , Jo,

a matrix. We put:

(i) i f n = the system of ordered n-tuples [X lv .., X n] with

X t , . . . , Xn Gi f ;

(ii) A n — [X j,..., X n], where X x — ... — X n = A ;

(Hi) [X » ,...,X J » » [ 7 x,...,Yn] = [X x » Y x,...,Xn » Y n]for

X x,..., X n, !F],..., Yn g ;

(iv), (v) analogously for T and ;

(vi) [X x,..., X n] — [ ~ X 1,..., ~ X n] for X x,...,Xn g i f .

[ i f n, A n, cA, ” , ^ n] is called the ?ith power of the matrix

M and is denoted by ‘ Mn’ .

2.16. I f n is a natural number and M is a matrix,

Co b o l la b y

then Mn is also a matrix and we have ®(Mn) — G(M); if Mx and

Ma are isomorphic matrices, then MjJ and Ma are also isomorphic.

[B y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2.5, 2,15]

natural number n.

On the basis of this definition the following theorem can be

proved:

428 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS A N D TO P O LO G Y XVII, § 2

sufficient that 21 e G(IKn)/or every natural number n; in other words

n « ( ik j -

n=-l

Note 2.19. It is known that this theorem can be improved:

with every sentence 21 a well-determined natural number can

be correlated (depending exclusively on the structure of this

sentence) such that the formulas 2Ie©(IKrJ and 21 e are

equivalent.1

The decision criterion mentioned at the beginning of this sec

tion is provided by 2.11 for the system 3 & and by 2.IB in its

improved form just mentioned for the system

§ 3. T opological Spaces 3

We first recall some familiar topological concepts:

D e f in it io n3.1. A non-empty set 8 is called a topological space

(with fundamental operation ~), if the follovnng conditions arc

satisfied:

(i) if X c S, then X = X c S;

(ii) if X c S and X consists of at most one dement, then X = X\

(iii) i f X c= S and ¥ c S, then X + Y = X + 7 .

Note 3.2. Let S he a topological space and A a non-empty

subset ot S. We now define an operation ~~'A) relative to A by

the formuia X U} A . X for every X c A . On the basis of

3.1 it can then easily be shown that A is a topological spa.ee with

the fundamental operation ~(A'}: such a space is called a sub

space of S.

D efin itio n 3.3. I f 8 is a topological space, , a set X is said to

be open (in S), in symbols X e 0(8), if X = S—8 —X.

D efin itio n 3.4. A subset X of a topological space 8 is said to

be dense (in 8) if X = 8 .

1 See p. 420, note X

3 Another decision criterion for the intuitionistic calculus was given in

Gentzen, G. (18).

3 For what follows ei\ Kuratowski, C. (41), in particular pp. 15 ff., 38, 40,

82 f., 95, and 101 ff.

X V n, § 8 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y 429

if x non-e $ —{#}, and dense-in-itself if x e S—{x}for every x e S.

Corollary 3.6. A topological space 8 is isolated if arid only if

X = X for every X £ 8. [By 3.1, 3.5]

D efin ition 3.7. A topological space S is called norm al if,

for any two sets X x ^ 8 and X 2 ^ 8 such that X x. X 2 == 0, there

exist two disjoint sets Yx, Y2 e (9(8) such that, X x s Yx and X 2 S Y2.

D efin ition 3.8. We say thaJt the topological space 8 is a space

with a countable basis if there is an infinite sequence of non-empty

sets X x,.t., e @(S) such that every non-empty set Y s (9(8}

can be represented in the form T ~ (where

il3..., in9... is a sequence of natural numbers).

For later applications we shall distinguish another special

class of topological spaces:

3.9. A topological space 8 is called an S'-space if ii

D e f in it io n

satisfies the following condition:

For every natural number n and every non-empty set A f= (9(8).

there exist non-empty, pair-wise disjoint sets

B n e (9(8)

for which

(i) I?i + . . . + l ?n S A and B x+ . . . + B n # A,

(ii) A —(Bx-\-...A-Bn) 3 A —A,

(iii) B x. ..... Bn S A —

T heorem 3.10. Every normal and dense-in-itself topological

space 8 with a countable basis is an E-space.

Proof.1 Aceording to 3.8 there exists an infinite sequence of

sets < v ~ , Ck,... with the following properties:

(1) the sets Cx...., Gkt... are open and non-empty,

(2) every open and non-empty set X can be represented in the form

x = cr<I+ —+c<fc+ —•

Since, by hypothesis, the space 8 is normal and dense-in-itself,

1 Originally I had proved the theorem for the Euclidean straight line (and

its subspaces dense-in-theroselves). I am indebted to Professor S. Eilenberg

for the general proof.

480 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y XVII, 5 3

(3) for every non-empty set X e 0(8) there exists a set Ok such that

@k £ X and Ck ^ X .

W e now consider any natural num ber n and a set A for which

(4) A e 0(8) and A ^ 0 ;

we shall construct sets Bv ..., Bn whioh satisfy the follow ing

conditions:

(5) B ,,..., Bn are open, non-enypty, and pair-wise disjoint',

(6 ) Bi-\-...-{-Bn c A a n d B x-\-...+B n ^ A ',

(7) A — (JBj-J-... 4 *Bn) 2 A —A ",

( 8) S j . ..., B n 2 A — (jB1-f-...-|-JBn).

W e carry this out first for the case » = 1 ; that is to say we

construct a set B such that

(9) B e 0(8), B 0 , B £ A , and B ^ A,

(10) A —B 2 S.— A and B 2 A — B.

A Bet B o f this kind is most easily obtained in the following way.

W e consider the sets A k = Ck.(A—A) and choose from each

such set (if it is not empty) a point ak, let D = {d j,...,

I t is easy to see that J5 2 A —A (for otherwise, according to ( 2 ),

there w ould be for X = 8 —D a set C* S S—B c S—D, having

an elem ent in com m on w ith A —A, and this w ould contradict

the definition o f D). The set D is at m ost denum erable and not

empty (apart from the trivial case A —A = 0 ). W e order the

elem ents o f D in an infinite sequence dx,..., dk)... in such a way

that in this sequence every elem ent x e D occurs either only

once or infinitely m any tim es, according to whether x e D —{x)

or not. M oreover, since 8 is a norm al space w ith a countable

basis it is metricizable: with every pair o f points x , y e S a real

num ber \x— y\ can be correlated, the so-called distance between

x and y, in such a w ay that the follow ing conditions are satisfied:

(i) for aU x , y e S the formulas \x—y\ — 0 and x — y are

equivalent-,

(ii) |x —y\-{- \x—z\ > \y—z\ for x , y , z e S;

(iii) if X £ S, then x e X if and only if for every r > 0 there is

an dement y e X with \x— y\ < r.

XVn, § 3 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S A N D TO P O LO G Y 431

y e A whioh lie as near to * as w e please. A ccordingly, we can

choose for every natural h a poin t ek e A w ith

I**—«*l < l/*»

and we put B — e*,...}; it can be shown w ithout diffi

culty that B satisfies form ulas (9) and ( 10) (the fa ct that & is

dense-in-itself plays an essential part in this).

The case n — l has thus been dealt with. W e turn now to

the general case, m aking use o f the set B just uennad.

W e first pu t, for every X £ 8,

(11) X+ =

Prom (11), 3.1, and 3.3, w e easily obtain the follow ing rules

for calculating w ith the operation +:

(12) (X +)+ — X+ e <D(S) for every X £ S-,

(13) X £ X+ and X =* X * for every X e ^ ( jS);

(14) if X e 0{8), T s S and X s T , then X s

(15) if X 1+ . . . + X n £ 8 and the sets X ^ ..., X H are pair-wise

disjoint, then (X 1-K » -i-X * )+ = ,

Further, we define b y recursion an infinite sequence o f sets

Ck £ B and Gk =£ B\

(17) Ol+l - - C£ where k is the smallest natural- number for which

Gk £ B — f l f h Z + G , and Gk ■-/. B -G ^ fZ T -%

On iho basis o f ( 1), (3), ( 9 ), ( 12), and (13) it is u e s i shown

(by means o f an easy induction) that, b y (16) and (17) a set G>

is aotually correlated w ith every natural number l and also that

these sets Gx satisfy the follow ing conditions:

(18) G, is open, non-empty, and such that G f *= £ o*, £ B for

every l;

(19) the sets Gls..., Gt,... (and hence also the secs (2X,..., (?/,...) are

pair-wise disjoint.

L et G s»s B — Gr14 - ...+ ( ? j+ .... In view o f (9) we have C e G{8).

I f G were n ot em pty, then b y (9) there w ould be a number

432 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TOPOLOG Y XVTL § 3

Ck c B — and Gk ^ B~~G1+ ... + Ql for every l, and

we could infer from that by (16) and (17) that Ck is identical

w ith one o f the Gh whence, in consequence o f ( 1) and (13),

C* = G, £ B - G

The set G, must thus be em pty, in contradiction to (18). Con

sequently C ~ 0 , i.e. B £ (vr r ~ ..-f &r'r • A ccordingly, by

( 10) we have i f £ cl B c =Gxy - G r I -.... O ntheother

hand, from : lh ; aad (9) we get

fr^-j-... -f- ... £1 B S/ A.

so that finally

( 20) j - g; .

W e shall now show the follow ing.

(21) I f X c 5;!iS‘b X c A , and X non- c; ' J , +

there exist infinitely many numbers l for which X .0 , ^ 0.

F or this purpose we consider an open set X £ A which has

elements in com m on with only a fixate num ber o f sets G,. There

is thus an lX} such that X . G-. =~ 0 for every l > Z0. The set

Y = X — 6V r has then no elem ent in com m on with the

whole sum (?1+ ..-4-0^,-}-... . Since in addition Y e $ ( 8 ) , we

also have —- r ^ 0+ ... =— 0 ; thus. on account o f ( 20),

Y ,A —- 0 a ad j fortiori Y ,A ~ 0 . On the other hand.

f c l c i ;

of (14), (15 / 4 9}. we obtain

X 4 — Gx + ...+<?£,

whence, in view of (18),

X 4 <?*+...+ (A £ + *

We have thus- shown that every open set X 4* A, which has

elements In common with only finiSSy many secs Gh is included

in Gi+...~H-o * Hence by contraposition we obtain (21),

Let

(22) GPl..... Cw ... be those sets of the sequence Cy,..., Gk.... which are

included in A but not in # !+ ... + #*4“ — *

XV H , § 3 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AN D TO P O LO G Y 433

u f x,..., in such a w ay that the follow ing conditions are satis

fied:

(23) = {GXi-* >

(24) the systems are non-empty and pair-wise disjoint;

(26) for every set CPk. k = 1, 2 ,..., awd! /o r every number j }

l j ?C n, there is a set X such that

CPk. X # 0 .

T o prove this we apply the follow ing procedure. In view o f ( 1),

( 22) , and ( 21), there certainly exist n sets G^,..., G^ which have

no elements in com m on with GPl. W e include in the system

the sets 1 < j < n, Sim ilarly, there exist n sets Oti n.

w hich are distinct from G^,..., Gln and have no elem ent in com

m on w ith CPi: the set , 1 < j < n, is again included in

This procedure can obviously be continued w ithout end. The

sets Gt possibly then remaining are subsequent]y arbitrarily in

cluded in. the system s (e.g. all m ay be included in

the system ^ x).

W e now put

(26) Bj = 2 i /o r j = 1, 2,..., n.

XeJT*

From (18), (19), (23), (24), and (26) it is seen at once that the

sets 2^ ,,.., Bn just defined satisfy the condition (6 ). B y (IS).

(23) , and (26) we have ■ # * + „ . — Gj1- f ^ B and

consequently A — (1 ?!+ ... ~r~Bn) 5 A —B. H ence b y means o f (9)

and ( 10) we obtain ( 6) and (7). Finally, let us suppose that the

form ula B} 2 A — ...+ i ? n) does not hold for a given

j , 1 < j < n. W e thus have

( 22) we infer from this the existence o f a set CPkwhich is included

in A —JBy and has no elem ent in com m on with B3, B ut this is in

obvious contradiction to (26) and (26). A ccordingly, our supposi

tion is refuted and ( 8) holds.

434 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS A N D TO P O LO G Y XVII, § 3

em pty open set A ) sets Bv ..., Bn w hich satisfy the conditions

(5 )-(8 ). H ence, b y 3.9, $ is an J?-space, w hich was to be proved.

Note 3.11. It is clear from 3.10 that the E uclidean spaces (of

an y num ber o f dim ensions) belong to the jEJ-spaces. A lso, every

subspace o f a Euclidean space w hich is dense-in-itself is an E-

apace.

op THE iN TU m O N ISTIO SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

W e now define, for subsets o f an arbitrary topological space,

four operations w hich we denote b y the same sym bols as were

used for the operations on sentences whioh were discussed at the

beginning o f § 1.

D e f in it io n 4.1. I f S i* a topological space, we put, for all sets

X<=8undYzS,

(i) X - + Y «= 8 - X ^ Y ,

(ii) X v Y — X + Y (the ordinary set-theoretical sum),

(iii) I a Y — X .Y (the ordinary set-theoretical product),

(iv) ^X » X 0 (= 8 - X ) .

C o r o llar y 4.2. (i) I f S is a topological space, X £ 8 and

Y £ 8, then X - + Y , e 0 (5 ), and in fact X -^ Y is the largest

open set Z for which X .Z £ T, and - v l is the largest open set

disjoint from X .

(ii) I f in addition X , Y e <9(8)thenwe alsohaveX V i e 0(S)and

X a Y e 0(8), and in fact I v 7 is the smallest open set which

includes X and Y, and X A Y is the largest open set which is in

cluded in X and Y. [B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.1]

Co r o llar y 4.3.I f 8 is a topological space, X £ 8 and Y £ 8,

then X -> Y — 8 if and only if X £ Y ; in particular S - + Y = 8

if and only i f Y — 8. [B y 3.1, 4.1 (i)]

C orollary 4.4. I f 8 is a topological space and X £ 8, then

X is dense in 8 if and only if -v -v-X = 8. [B y 3 .1 ,3 .4 ,4 .1 (iv)]

D efin itio n 4.5. The ordered sextuple [0 (5 ), 8, v , A,

where 8 is a topological space, is denoted by 0 (5 ).

3CVH. § 4 SENTENTIAL CALCULUS AND TOPOLOGY 43*

[B y 2 . 1, 3.1, 3.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5]

a system o f sentences, nam ely <E(0(8)). W e shall investigate the

relation o f this system to the system s 3 ft and 3 ft in detail.

L emma 4.7. I f 8 is a topological space and SP (<S, 0), then

M — \$P, 8, v , A, is a evJbmatiix of 0 ( 8 ) which is iso

morphic with ZK.

The p ro o f (b y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2 . 8, 2. 10, 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1) presents no

difficulties.

T heobem 4.8. For every topological space 8 we have

® ( 0 (fif)) s 3 ft.

[B y 2.7, 2.9, 2 .1 1 ,4 .7 ]

intuitionistic sentential calculus, then 91 e ® ( 0 (8)).

Proof. In accordance w ith 1.2 it is necessary to distinguish

in the p ro o f ten cases according to the form o f the axiom 91.

Sinoe the m ethod o f arguing is in all oases nearly the same,

we shall consider only one case in detail, say 1.2 (ix).

L et then

1

( ) 21 — ^- 93-> (© -* $ ),

where © and <£ are any sentences. W e construct in accordance

w ith 2.6 (and w ith the help o f 4.5, 4.6) the functions F^,o<s>>

Fse.om> ^ c,o <sy W e consider further an arbitrary sequence o f

sets X j,..., X n,... e 0(8) and put

whence, b y 4.1 (i), (iv),

(3) X = ( S - 7 ) -r (Y -*■ Z) — S - ( S - Y ) - ( S - Y - Z ) .

436 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y XVII, { 4

B y ( 2) we thus have

F k,o(£)(-^i>*••> = S for all X n9... & ${&)•

H ence, b y 2.5, we obtain 91 e ® ( 0 (S))9 q.e.d.

L em m a 4.10. Let S be any topological space and 31, 93, ® three

sentences such that 91 = 93 -*> ®. I f 91, 23 e ® ( 0 ($ )), aiteo

® e ® ( 0 ($ )); in other words, the system ® ( 0 (# )) is cZosed wnder

tfAe operation of detachment.

Proof. In accordance with 2.5 (and with the help o f 4.5, 4.6)

we construct the functions F%oiS), F%0{S)9 and F$tQ(ig); we

then have, for all sets X l9..., X n,... e @(S)9

( 1)

^ FfB,o(S)(Xl9: ; X n,..>) -> F€%0(S)(Xl9.>.9x n,...),

and, since 91, 93 e ® (0 ($ )),

(2) %n9...) = S — F#t0(S)(Xl9...9X n,..) .

B y virtue o f 4.3 the form ulas ( 1) and ( 2 ) yield

-^ ip ***) ^ & f w -*£«>••• g &{S)9

whence, b y 2.5, (£ <=® (0 ($ )). The system ® (0 (S)) is thus closed

under the operation o f detachm ent (cf. 1.3), q.e.d.

T heorem t,11. F o r e v e r y to p o lo g ic a l s p a c e S w e have

35t c ® ( 0 (S)).

[B y 1.4, 4.9, 4.10]

T heorem 4.12. For every topological space S and every sen

tence 91 the conditions 91 e 3$t cwd ^ ^91 e ® ( 0 (£ )) are equiva

lent. [B y 1.6 , 4.8, 4.11]

In view o f Ths. 4.8 and 4.11, the double inclusion

35t £ ® (0 ($ )) £ 3*t holds for every topological space S. W e

shall now show that there exist spaces 8 for which (£(0(S)) = 3&

and also spaces S for whioh ® ( 0 ($ )) = 351. In fa ct the first

equality holds if and only if S is an isolated (and thus, so to

speak, a degenerate) space. The second holds for all i?-spaces,

and thus in particular for all norm al spaces which are dense-

in-them selves and have a countable basis (cf. 3.9-3.11).

XVII, § 4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AND TO P O LO G Y 437

sentence 21 of the form 3 1 = (-v-23 -> 23) 23 (where 23 is any

sentence) should belong to (£(0(8)), it is necessary and sufficient

that S be isolated.

Proof. I f 8 is an isolated space, we easily obtain from 3.6 and

4.1 (i), (iv) the form ula ( ^ 1 -*> X ) X = S for every X £ S,

and hence b y means o f 2.6, 4.5, and 4.6 (just as in the p roof

o f 4.9) we conclude that every sentence 2 1 = (-v-23 23) -> 23

belongs to (£(0(8)).

Suppose now , conversely, that (£(0(8)) contains all sentences

21 = ('v®->»)-► 33.

B y 1.1 we can, in particular, assume that 23 is a sentential

variable, say S = 93x. A ccording to 2.6 and on account o f 4.5,

4.6 we then have for every sequence o f open sets X x,..., X n...

Since 21 e (£(0 (<S)), we obtain

( ^ X 1- r X l) - + X l = S,

whence, on account o f 4.3, ( X x -> X x) £ X x and further, b y

virtue o f 3.1 and 4.1, 8 —8 —X x £ X x for every X x e 0(S).

If, in particular, x is an elem ent o f 8, we conclude from 3.1 and

3.3 that 8 —{x} e 0{S ) ; consequently

8 - 8 - 8 ^ { x } £ S-{x},

8 —{* } # S and 8 —{a:} = 8 —{*}. W e thus have

xn on -e S — {x} for every x e 8;

bu t this means that the space 8 is isolated (cf. 3.6). Lemma

4.13 thus bolds in both directions.

T heorem 4.14. Let S be a topological space. In order that

® (0 (S)) = 3& , it is necessary and sufficient that 8 be isolated.

Proof. L et 8 be an isolated space. Then, according to 1.2 ,

4.9, and 4.13, © (O (8)) contains all axiom s o f the tw o-valued

438 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AN D TO P O LO G Y 2001, § 4

o f detachm ent. Consequently, b y 1.4 W6 have

3* s *(om,

whence, on account o f 4.8, <E(0(8)) *= If> conversely, this

latter equality is satisfied, then the system <E(0(iS)) contains

in particular all sentences 91 o f the form 91— ( ^ 93 93) -> 93

(cf. 1.2 (x) and 1.4); in view o f 4.13 the space S is therefore

isolated, q.e.d.

B efore continuing we shall subject the operations -> and -a.

to a relativization (cf. 3.2).

I f 8 is a topological space and A £ 8, then

D e f in it io n 4.16.

for all sets X £ 8 and 7 £ 8 we put:

(i) 7 = A -X -7 ,

(ii) X = X 0 ( — A~~Xj\

A A

and 7 £ 8 , then I - > F s i and -yX s A ; if moreover A e 0(8),

then X -> 7 , ^ X e 0(8). [B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.15]

(i) I f X £ A and 7 £ 8, then we have X -*■ 7 — A if and

only if X £ 7 .

(ii) I f 7 £ A , then A - > 7 — A if and only if 7 — A .

A

(iii) X -*■ A = A for every I s i .

Al

(iv) A -* Y = Y for every open set Y c A .

A

(v ) = A 0 = 0 and ^-0 = 0 0 — A.

A A A A

[B y 3.1, 3.3, 4.15]

X->y = X -*7 and -v X = -wX

8 S

The follow ing lem m a is a generalization o f 4.7:

XV n, §4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AN D TO P O LO G Y 439

ST — {A , 0}, then N = [3~, A , V , A , •*.] is a matrix which is

isomorphic with ZK .

[B y 2 . 1, 2.3, 2 . 10, 3.1, 4.1 (ii), (iii), 4.17 (iii), (y)]

L e m m a 4.20. Premisses:

(a) 8 is a topological space',

(fi) A , B e 0(8), B e A, B ^ A , T ^ B 2 I - A and B 2 A - B ;

(y) SP is a system of open sets X £ B ;

(S) if X , Y e ? and X - Y ^ 0 , then X - Y ^ S - B )

(e) M sb= [SP, B>-+> V , A , ~ ] is a matrix-,

(£) 3T « . SP+{A) and N = [3Tt A , v , A,

Conclusions:

(i) 3 " is a system of open sets I s i ;

(ii) if X ,Y e3T and X —Y 0 , then X —Y 2 A —A ;

(iii) N is a matrix and N = M*.

Proof. A coording to the premisses (a) and (/?), and in view

o f 3.1, w e have B 2 B and B 2 A —B. whence B 2 A; and

since A 2 B, we get

( 1) A —B and A —A s B —B.

From (y) and ({) w e obtain at once the conclusion (i):

( 2) 3* is a system of open sets X £ A .

W e shall next prove the oonolusion (ii):

(3) if X ,Y e 3 " and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 A —A.

In fa ct, i f X —Y 0 , then Y # A b y (2) ; thus Y e SP on

account o f (£). I f also X e S P , then it follow s from (8) and ( 1) that

X -Y 2 B -B 2 A -A .

B ut, if X non- e SP, then X — A , and, if Y ^ B, then b y (y)

we have B —Y ^ 0 and hence b y (8) and (1) we obtain

X -Y 2 B -Y 2 B -B 2 A - A

(since B e SP b y virtue o f («) and 2. 1). F or X — A and Y = B

the form ula X —Y 2 A —A follow s directly from (/9). (3) thus

holds in all oases.

440 8 E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y XVU, § 4

(4) if X ,Y e y , then either X -> Y — A or — X -+Y , according

A JB

to whether X -> Y — B or ^ B:

B

(5) X -> A — A for every l e J ;

( 6) A - > Y = Y for every Y e f .

A

If, in fact, X , Y e and X -*■ Y — B, then b y 4.17 (i) we have

jb

A _____

and (y)). B ut if X ->• Y = B — X —Y ^ B. then it follow s from

JB

A - X - Y £ A -(B -B ) = (A -B )+ B = B

and therefore A — X —Y £ B — X — Y ; on the other hand, since

A 2 B and henoe A — X —Y 2 B —X —Y. we dually get

A -X -Y = B -X -Y , i.e. X Y == X - > 7 .

A B

4.17 (iii), (iv), and (2).

From (2), b y 4.1 (ii), (iii), we also obtain

(7) Z\J A — A y Z — A and Z a A — A A Z — Z for every

Z ef.

The operation -v- satisfies the follow ing conditions:

(8) ^A “ 'v l? 0;

A B

(9) if X e £?. then ^ 1 = 4 or — -^X, according to whether

A JB

= B or # B.

B

( 8) follow s directly from 4.17 (v). W ith the help o f 2.1 and

(«) we infer from ( 8) that 0 e ; in view o f this we put in

(4) 7 = 0 and b y means o f 4.15 (ii) we im m ediately obtain (9).

I f now we com pare the premisses (e), (£) and the form ulas

(4 )-(9 ) w ith 2.12 (i)-(v ), we see at once that

(10) N = M*,

whence, b y 2.14,

(11) N is a matrix.

W ith ( 2 ), (3), ( 10), and ( 11) the p roof is com plete.

XVn, § 4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS A N D TO P O LO G Y 441

L e m m a 4.21. Premisses:

(a) S is a topological space;

05) Bu ...,Bn e<9{8),Bx,...,Bnare non-empty, pair-un.se disjoint

sets, Bx-{- **.~\~Bn “ B and Bx. ... *Bn 2 5

(y) /o r = 1, 2,..., n, SPp is a system of open sets X £ Bp;

(8) if X , Y eSfp (p = 1, 2 ,..., n) and X —T ^ 0 , then

X = Y 2 Bp- B p ,

(e) M = [if''', A , »-», T , JL>, ~ ] is a matrix-,

(£) forp = 1 , 2 , . . . , M„ = [<5% V, A , ^ a matrix

and is isomorphic with M;

(>j) i f is the system of sets X = X x+ ...-| -X n, where

X xe X ti e S?n, and P = [$?, B , A , V , 'A -

x» £>

Conclusions:

(i) Se' is a system of open sets X £ B-,

(ii) if X , Y e 6? and X - Y # 0 , then X ^ Y 2 B - B ;

(iii) P is a matrix and is isomorphic with M77.

Proof. The assertion (i), i.e.

( 1) 9 is a system of open sets X c B,

results easily from (j8), (y), and ( 77); since, b y 3.1 and 3.3, every

sum o f open sets is itself an open set.

In, order to prove (ii) we consider tw o arbitrary sets X ,Y e 9

such that X —Y ^ 0. B y ( 17),

X = X x+ . . . + X n and Y = T1+ ...+ Y n9

where X p, Yp e 9 p for p = 1, 2 ,..., n. Since, in view o f (y) and

{fi), we have X p s Bpi Yp ^ Bp and the sets Bn are pair

wise disjoint we obviously have

x - y - ( z 1+ . . . + x j - ( i i + . . . + r n)

= ( x 1- r 1) + ...+ ( x n- r n);

if, therefore, X —Y ^ 0 , there m ust be aj>, 1 < p ^ n, such that

Xp—Yp # 0 . H ence b y (8) w e get X p—Yp 2 Bp—Bp and

consequently X —Y 2 Bp—Bp, because b y (a) and 3.1 (iii) '

z -r = z1-:r1-f...-fz„-r,,

442 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y XVH, § 4

Bp- B p 2 (Br-B)~-Bp = B - { B + B P) = B—B,

so that- finally X —T 2 B—B. Thus we have

(2) * f X ,7 e & a n d X -Y 0 then~X-F B -B .

We turn now to (iii) and in accordance with 2.15 (and making

use of 2.16 and (<?)) we construct the matrix

Mn =s [iFn, A n, *-+n, r n, Jb", <->].

By (i) (and 2.4), M is isomorphic with Mi,..., M„; hence by 2.3

there exist functions Flt..., Fn>which produce this isomorphism

and which in particular map iFonto Sv ..., Snin one-one fashion.

We now put

(3) F(U) = F1(U1)+ ...+ F n(Un)for U - {Uv ..., Un] elT*.

Since here FP(XJP) &Sfp (p = l , 2,...,n), whence by (iii)

Fp(Up) c B p, and the sets Blt...,Bn are pair-wise disjoint we

obtain, with the help of (17),

(4) the function F maps oFn onto £? in one-one fashion.

By means of 2.3, 2.15, and (/3) we conolude that

(6) F(A*) — Fx(A)-f- ...-}-Fn(A) — = B.

Further, let

(6) U « [Uv ..., Un.] g 1F Wand V — g tF*.

By 2.15, (6), (3), 2.3, (0, and 4.16 (i) we get

(7) F(U F) = F([Ux» Vv ..., Un~ Fn])

- % Flm + - + ( F n(un) f m )

For p ,q — 1 ,..., n and p =£ q, FP(UP) e Sfp, F^?') g SFv and

thus by (iii) and (ii) we have

Fp(Up) c Bp> Ffl(Fe) £ B „ Fp(Up).B a = Fp(Up) . F ^ ) =» 0;

since in addition Ba e 0(8), we also have

F,{UP) - F p(Vp).B t = 0.

XVn, § 4 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y 443

From this with the help o f (7) and 3.1 (iii) we obtain

- ( F 1(C71) - JF1(F1) + ...+ F n(C7n) - F n(Fn))

by virtue o f 4.16 (i), formulas (3), (6), and (8) yield

(9) F(U*+ *F ) « B - F ( V ) - F ( V ) - F(U) F(V) for aU

U , V e 1T*

In an analogous but more simple manner we obtain the

formulas

fo rU ,V e1 T « ;

(11) F ( ~ nU) « - F(U) for U e #*».

B

B y means o f 2,1, 2.15, and 2.16 we infer from (4), (5), (9)—(11)

that B e S? and is dosed under V , A , -v ; hi view o f

B B

(*))> (1)* aJid 4.17 (ii), P is thus a matrix. We also oondude—

again from (4), (6), (9), (10), (11)—that the matrices P and Mn

satisfy the conditions o f the definition 2.3; consequently we have

(12) P is a matrix isomorphic with Mn.

B y (1), (11), and (12), all the conclusions o f the lemma are

satisfied.

L em UA 4.22. Premisses:

(a) 8 is an E-space)

(ft) M is a matrix;

(y) for every non-empty Set Be 0(8) there is a system $P of open

sets X £ A with the following properties:

(Yi) if X, Y e S? and X —Y ^ 0* then X — Y 2 B —B;

(y*) M' *** [ y , B, V , A , ■+*] is a matrix which is isomor-

Jo JB

phic with M.

444 8 E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AND T O P O LO G Y X V II, § 4

A e <P{S) there is a system 2T of open sets X £ A with the following

properties-.

(i) if X , Y e f and X - Y ^ 0,then X - F A -A ;

(ii) N = \ST, A , V , A , -v ) is a matrix isomorphic with

(Mn)*. A

Proof. L et n be a natural num ber and A a non-em pty open set.

B y virtue o f 3.9 and in view o f (a) there exist set3 B lt..., Bn, w hich

satisfy the follow ing conditions:

( 1) Bx,...,B nare non-empty,pair-wise disjoint open sets;

( 2) = B £ A and B ^ A ;

(3) A ^ B sA -A ;

W B i ...... Bn 2 A —B.

From (2 )-(4 ) we easily obtain

(5) Bx ...... Bn 2 (A - A ) + ( A - B ) = A - B 2 B —B.

B y (jS) and (y) there exist system s o f sets SPX..... £Pn with the

follow ing properties:

( 6) for p = 1, 2 ,..., n,£Pp i s a system of open sets X 2 Bp ;

(7) if X , Y e SPp (p = 1, 2 ,..., n) and X —Y =£ 0, then

X = Y 2 Bp- B p;

(8) fo r p — 1, 2,..., n, Mp = \SPp, B p, - r , V , A , -y ] is a m a trix

Up Up

which is isomorphic with M.

L et us now pu t

(9) = [the system of sets X = . . . + X n, where

P = [ < ? ,£ , - + , V, A, - ] . ,

B B

B y (a), (/?), ( 1), ( 2 ), and (5 )-(9 ) the premisses o f 4.21 are satis

fied. Consequently we have

( 10) SP is a system of open sets X £ A ;

( 11) if X , Y e S* and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 B —B;

(12) P is a matrix which is isomorphic with Mn.

XVH , $ 4 S E N T E N T IA L C A L C U L U S A N D T O P O L O G Y 446

L et

(13) and N = A,->, v : A ,

A -cL

B y (a), (l)-(4 ), and (9)—(13), the premisses o f 4.20 hold. Conse

quently,

(14) F is a system of open sets X Q A ;

(15) i f X , Y e J T and X - Y ^ 0, t h e n X - Y 2 A ~ A \

(16) N is a matrix and N = P*.

From (12) and (16) b y means o f 2.14 we obtain

(17) N is a matrix which is isomorphic with (M7*)*.

In view o f (14), (15), and (17) the p roof o f Lem m a 4.22 is

com plete.

L em m a 4.23. I f 8 is an E-space, then for every natural number

n the matrix 0 ( 8 ) contains a submatrix which is isomorphic

with IKn.

Proof. B y means o f an inductive procedure we shall establish

a logically stronger conclusion, nam ely

( 1) for every non-empty set A e d)(8) there is a system 3T of open

sets X c; A with the following properties:

(i) if X 9 Y e 3T and X —Y ^ 0, then X —Y 2 A —A;

(ii) N - [AT, A , - k V , A , -v-] is a matrix isomorphic with

jA a

IKn-

In fa ct b y 2.17 and 4.19, ( 1) holds for n = 1. Assuming that

( 1) is satisfied for a given natural n we apply 4.22 (with M = IKn)

and w ith the help o f 2.17 we easily see that (1) also holds fo r n -j-l.

I f we now put A = 8 in ( 1) we at once obtain the conclusion o f

the lem m a from 2.8, 3.1, 3.2, 4.5, and 4.18.

T heobbm 4.24. I f 8 is an E-space, then G (Q (S )) = 3 ft.

Proof. B y 4.23 there is for every natural n a subm atrix Nn

w hich is isom orphic w ith IKn. N ow , if 31 e © ( 0 (# )), then b y 2.9

and 2.7 we have 31 e ® (N „) = ®(IKn) for n = 1, 2,... and con

sequently, b y 2.18,31 e 3 ft. A ccordingly, © ( 0 ($ )) £ 3 ft; hence

b y 4.9 we at on ce obtain © (O (8)) = 3 ft, q.e.d.

446 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D T O P O L O G Y X V II, § 4

Let 8 be a topological space, A a non-empty open set £ 8,&~ the

system of open setsX s A , and N = [ ST, A , V, A, Then

A A

N is a matrix and we have (£(0(8)) £ ®(N ). If, in particular,

« (N ) = 3 ft, then tt(0 (S )) = 3 ft.

From this we see that the converse o f Th. 4.24 does not h o ld ;

the form ula ® ( 0 (8)) — 3 ft applies, for exam ple, to all norm al

spaces w ith a countable basis, w hich include a non-em pty open

set that is dense-in-itself, and, m ore generally, to every space 8

w hich includes an open .E-spaoe (of. 3.2), independently o f

whether 8 itself is an .E-space.

On the other hand there are also spaces 8 such that the m atrix

0 ( 5 ) is adequate neither for the system 3 ft, nor for the system

3 ft, bu t for an interm ediate system . Exam ples can be found

b oth am ong norm al spaces with a countable basis and am ong

those whioh have no countable basis. F or instance, norm al spaces

are know n whioh are dense in them selves and satisfy the oondi-

titm if X e 0(8), then e 0(8).

F or every such space 8 the system (£(0(S)) is, b y 4.14, distinct

from 3 ft. I t is also easily shown that this system contains all

sentences 'll o f the form 31 = - v i B V 'v ^ S and consequently

oannot coincide w ith 3 ft (cf. 1.5). The problem o f setting up

an exact correlation between the topological properties o f a

space 8 and the logical (or rather m etaldgical) properties o f

the corresponding system (£(0(8)) is still b y n o means com

pletely solved.

W e shall now put Some o f the results obtained into a more

intuitive and m ore lucid form .

L et $ be a sentential function o f the sentential calculus in

Which, in addition to the constants ‘ v ’ , etc., the sentential

variables ‘X \ 'Y*, ‘Z\... ocour. W e give the expression 31 the

follow ing schem atic form :

31 = (<f>(X,Y,Z,...)\

N ow let uS suppose that the variables ‘ X\ ‘Y ’ , ‘Z\... do n ot

represent sentences bu t denote sets o f points o f a topological

XVH . $ 4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S AND TO P O LO G Y 447

explained in 4.1. W ith this interpretation 21 is no longer a sen

tential funotion, bu t a designatory function, which (exactly like

‘X ’ , T ’ ,..,) denotes a set o f the space 8. In view o f this we can

construct the follow ing sentences ^ and 21,:

2IX = ‘For any open sew X , Y, Z,... of the space 8 , the set

<f>(X, T, Z,...) is dense in 8 .’

21, = ‘For any open sets X , T, Z,... of the space 8,

<KX,Y,Z,...) = S ’ .

[S trictly speaking, 2lx and SC, are n ot sentences bu t sentential

functions, because free variables, e.g. ‘ 8 ’ , occur in them .]

W e now consider tw o expressions: 'Six holds (or is valid or is

satisfied) in the space S ’ and ‘ 21, holds in the space 8 ,’ The in

tuitive m eaning o f these expressions seems to be com pletely

dear. Nevertheless, certain difficulties are encountered when

one tries to explain their m eaning in a strictly form al w ay .1 In

connexion w ith 2.5 the easiest w ay is to interpret the second

expression as being synonym ous w ith the expression: ‘21 is satis

fied by the matrix 0 (8 )\ In order to construct a definition for

the first expression, we note that the sentence 2lx, b y virtue o f

4.4, adm its o f the follow ing equivalent transform ation:

‘For any open sets X , Y, Z,.,. of the space 8,

^^<j>(X,Y,Z,...)=-S’ .

H ence w e can say that the expression ‘ 2lx holds in the space

8 ’ means the same as ‘ -^-^21 is satisfied by the matrix 0(8)'.

On the basis o f these stipulations we obtain from 4.11,4.12, and

4.24 the follow ing form ulations:

First Principal Theorem. Let 21be a sentence of the sentential

calculus and 8 any topological space. The following conditions are

then equivalent'.

(i) 21 is provable in the two-valued calculus-,

(ii) 2lx holds in the space 8;

(iii) 2Ij holds in every topological space.

1 The oonoept of Yalidity (and of satisfiability) of a sentence belongs to

semantics. F op the problem o f an exact definition of this concept cf. article

VH 1 of the present work, in particular pp. 189 and 199.

448 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S A N D TO P O LO G Y XVH , § 4

S econd P r in c ip a l T h e o b e m .

tial calculus and S any E-spate. The following conditions are

then equivalent:

(i) 91 is provable in the intuitionistic calculus \

(ii) 9l2 holds in the space 8\

(iii) 9l2 holds in every topological space.

Ths. 4.8 and 4.14 can also be brought into an analogous

form

In connexion with the second principal theorem it is worth

remembering that, in particular, all Euclidean spaces are 22-

spaces (of. 3.11).

With the theorems just stated, the decision criteria whioh

were mentioned in § 2 (cf. 2.19) can now be applied to topo

logical sentences of the form 9IXor 9l2 (and even to somewhat

more extensive classes o f topological sentences). We are in a

position to decide, in each particular case, whether a sentence

of this form is generally valid in topology.

In conclusion it should be noted that the sentential calculus

can he interpreted in topology in various ways; the interpretation

discussed above is obviously not the only possible one. I f we

are dealing, for example, with the two-valued calculus, we

derive a quite trivial and in fact a general set-theoretical (not

especially topological) interpretation from 4.14; every set S can

in fact be made into an isolated topological space by putting

X = X for every c; 8 (cf. 3.6). A less trivial interpretation

of this calculus is obtained in the following way. We consider

the so-called regular oven sets of a topological space 8, i.e. sets

X cz 8 for which X — S-~S—X ; let &'(S) be the system of all

these sets. We define for the sets X, Y e @'(S) the operations

/., and *v- exactly as in 4.1, but we put

Iv T = S —S—X —Y

(X v Y is thus the smallest regular open set which includes X

and Jr). It can then be shown that the matrix

O '(S ) = [ 0 '( £ ) , 8, V A , -V]

XVn, $ 4 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULU S A N D T O P O L O G Y 44«

with the sentence

« = ‘<f>{X,Y,Z,.„y

the follow ing sentence:

= ‘ For any regular open sets X , Y, Z,... of the space 8,

<j>'(X,Y,Z,...) = S',

where ‘tf>'{X,Y,Z,...y is obtained from ‘<f>(X,Y,Z,...)’ b y re

placing the sign ‘ v ’ b y the sign ‘ V I t then appears that

the first principal theorem remains valid if “Hy in it is replaced

by % ’•

B oolean A lg ebr a an d in R elated M ath em atical

T h eo ries ®

Generalized Boolean algebra is here regarded as a part o f

abstract algebra, nam ely as the theory o f B oolean rings:

D efin itio n 5.1. A set B with at least two elements is called a

B oolean ring {with the fundamental operations + and .) if the

following formulas hold for all elements x, y, z e R:

(i) x-yy, x . y e B ,

(ii) x - f (y -fz ) = (x -f y )+z,

(iii) x = y+{x+y),

(iv) x.ly.z) = {x.y).z,

(v) x.ty+z) — x .y + x .z,

(vi) x . y = y.x,

(vii) x .x = x.

1 This follows from the fact that the family 0'{B) together with the opera

tions V \ A , and *v- satisfy the postulates of Boolean algebra. This fact was

noticed by me as far back as 1927, and was implicitly stated in Th. B of II,

where, however, a different terminology was used; cf. X I, p. 341, footnote 2.

Compare also Tarski, A . (81), Th. 7.23, p. 178, and footnote 25, p. 181, where

a reference to an earlier paper of von Neumann is given.

3 For varioiia topics discussed in this section see the following papers: article

X I of this book (the foundations of Boolean algebra, the concept of atom) ;

article X II of this book (the theory of deductive systems); Stone, M. H . (07)

(the relation of Boolean algebra to general abstract algebra and to the theory

of fields of sets); Stone, M. H . (68) (the relation of Boolean algebra to general

topology); Tarski, A . (80) (operations on Boolean-algebraic ideals).

450 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y X V II, § 5

Note 5 . 2* I t can be shown that form ulas (iii) and (vi) in 5.1

can be replaced b y the follow ing equivalent conditions:

(iii') there is an element u e R such that

x = y+u = u + y;

H ence we see that B oolean rings coincide with those rings

(in the sense o f abstract algebra) in which every element x

satisfies 5.1 (vii).

(i) We shall say that x is divisible b y y, or that y is a divisor o f

x , in symbols y\x (or x < y), if x, y e R and if there is a z e R

such that x = y.z.

(ii) We denote by 0 that element x e R which is divisible by every

yeR.

The tw o sym bols ‘ |’ and ‘0 ’ can be defined in various other

(equivalent) ways.

D e f in it io n

atom less according to whether, for every element y e R distinct

from 0 , there are finitdy or infinitely many elements x >which are

divisible by y.

Note 5.5. E very elem ent y o f a Boolean ring R is called an

atom if there exist exactly tw o elements x which are divisible

b y y (in fact x = 0 and x = y). A ring R is atom istic if and

only if every elem ent y ^ O of R can be represented as a sum o f

a finite number o f atom s1;* R is atom less if and only if there are

n o atom s in R .

D e f in it io n

I ^ R is called an ideal, (in R), in symbols I e<f(R), if for any two

elements x and y of I their sum x + y is in I, and for every dement

y in I aU the elements x such that, y |x are in I .

sense.

X V II, § 6 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y 451

D e f in it io n 6.7. IfRisaB<xdeanring,th&nforanyI, J e S { R )

we put

(i) y x-,

XeJ'(,R?J.Xcj

(ii) / V J = TT Xi

XeSa$)J+J£X

(Hi) l A J — I .J (the intersection of I and J):

(iv) ^ i = i-+{o} (= 2 x).

' M K I X X -W '

Prom 6.1, 5.6, and 5.7 we easily obtain

C o r o l l a r y 5 .8 . For every Boolean ring R we have

(i) {0}, R e J(R), and in fact {0} is the smallest and R the

largest ideal in R;

(ii) if I, J e*f(R) then I -> J , I v J , I A «/, - v / are ideaZs jR,

in fact I J is the largest ideal X for which I .X £ J and ^-1

the largest ideal X for which I .X = {0}, moreover, J V J is the

smallest ideal which includes I and J> finally IA J is the largest

ideal which is included in I and J ♦

D efin ition 5.9. The ordered sextuple [,/(2 ?), R, V , A , ^ ],

where R is a Boolean ringy is denoted by I(i?).

The follow ing well-known theorem exhibits a close form al

connexion between B oolean algebra and topology1:

T heorem 5.10. A normal topological space JBX, which satisfies

thefollowing conditions, can be correlated with every Boolean ring R :

(i) there is a function F which maps the system S(R) onto the

system &(RX) in such a way that the formulas

Ic:J and F{I)czF{J)

are equivalent for all / , J e*f(R) (in particular J^({0}) = 0 and

F(R) = B*);

(ii) R x is isolated if and only if R is atomistic;

(iii) R* is dense in itself if and only if R is atomless;

(iv) R x is a space with a countable basis if and only if R is

denumerable.

1 See Stone, M. H . (68).

462 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS A N D TO P O LO G Y XVU, f 6

if B x is the topological space correlated with the ring B according to

6 . 10, then the matrices l(JS) and 0 ( B X) are isomorphic.

Proof. W e first show b y means o f 4.2 and 5.8 that the function

F , which b y 5.10 (i) maps the system l(J?) on to 0 (B X) in one-

one fashion, satisfies the follow ing form ulas:

F ( I -> J) = F(I) F{J), F ( I vJ) = F(I) v F{J),

F { I a J) = F ( I ) a F{J), and F (^ I)= ^ F (I)

for all I , J eJ'(B) (where the signs ‘ v ’ , eto., are to be

interpreted on the left-hand side o f each form ula in the sense o f

Boolean algebra, and on the right-hand side in the topological

sense). H ence we easily conclude, with the help o f 2. 1, 2.3,

4.5, 4.0, and 5.9, that I(B) is a m atrix and is in fa ct isom orphic

w ith 0 { B X), q.e.d.

W ith the help o f the last tw o theorems all the results o f § 4

can be oarried over to Boolean algebra:

T h e o r e m 5.12. For every Boolean ring B we have

3 ft £ « (l(i? )) c 351.

[B y 2.7, 4 .8 , 4.11, 5.11]

T heorem 5.13. For every Boolean ring B and every sentence 51

the conditions 51 e 3 ft and -v -a- 51 e ®(l(iJ)) are equivalent.

[B y 2.7, 4.12, 5.11 or 1. 6, 5.12]

T h e o r e m 5.14. Let B b e a Boolean ring. In order that

« ( !( * ) ) = ZSt

it is necessary and sufficient that B be atomistic.

[B y 2.7, 4.14, 5.10 (ii), 5.11]

T h e o r e m 5.15. I f B is an atomless Boolean ring, then

« ( !( £ ) ) = 3 ft.

[B y 2.7, 3.10, 4.24, 5.10 (iii), (iv), 5.11]

Note 5.16. N ote 4.25 can mutatis mutandis be applied to

Th. 5.15. The converse o f this theorem does not hold. The

form ula ®(l(B)) = 3 ft, applies for exam ple, to every denumer

able B oolean ring B which, although not atomless itself, in

cludes an atom less subring (i.e. an atomless ring B1 £ B with

X V II, | 5 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AN D TO P O LO G Y 453

m any exam ples o f Boolean rings can be given for which neither

® (l(R)) = 3 & n or ® (l(i?)) = holds. T o such rings belong, in

particular, all infinite completely additive rings, i,e. Boolean rings

R which satisfy the follow ing condition:

for every set X c R there exists the greatest common divisor of

all elements x e X (i.e. an element y which is a common divisor of

all x e X and is divisible by every other common divisor of these

elements).

F or the com pletely additive rings R the follow ing property is

characteristic: = R holds for every I e*f(R)\ in

other words, the system ® (l(i?)) contains all sentences 31 o f the

form 3 1 = 'v ® V and cannot therefore be identical with

S it (cf. 1.5). On the other hand, as is easily shown, no infinite

com pletely additive ring R is atom istic, whence, b y virtue o f

5.14, «(»(H )) *£= 3 it.

Ths. 5.12-5.15 can be expressed in a form analogous to that

o f the first and second principal theorems o f § 4. In particular,

tw o sentences 31j and 3l2 o f Boolean algebra can be correlated

with every sentence 31 o f the sentential calculus in such a way

that 31 is respectively provable in the tw o-valued or in the in-

tuitionistic calculus if and only if 31xor 312holds for every Boolean

ring. From this we obtain a decision criterion for sentences o f

the form 3t2 or 3l2.

The remarks at the end o f § 4 regarding other possible inter

pretations o f the sentential calculus can also be extended to

B oolean algebra. The regular open sets in that case are to be

replaced b y the ideals I which satisfy the form ula = J.

A ll these results hold not only for the form al system o f

Boolean algebra, bu t also for every realization o f this system .

The best known o f these realizations is the theory o f fields o f

sets, i.e. o f systems o f sets which are closed under the operations

o f addition and subtraction. E very field o f sets with at least

tw o elements is, as is easily seen, a Boolean ring with the so-

called sym m etric subtraction T © Y = ( X— X) and

the ordinary set-theoretical m ultiplication as the fundamental

454 S E N T E N T IA L CALCULUS AND TOPO LO G Y XV II, § 6

which were m entioned in 5.14-5.16, can be drawn directly from

the theory o f fields o f sets. E very field o f sets, for instance,

which consists o f all finite subsets o f a given (finite or infinite)

set is an exam ple o f an atom istic ring. In order to obtain a

denumerable atomless ring, we consider the set X o f positive

rational numbers x < 1 and form the field o f sets which consists

o f all sums o f finitely m any intervals £ X (the right-hand end

point being included in the interval, but not the left-hand one).

As examples o f com pletely additive rings (in the sense o f 5.16) the

fields o f sets which consist o f all subsets o f a given set m ay serve.

Another im portant realization o f Boolean algebra is general

metamathematics, i.e. the theory of deductive systems.1

Finally, some o f the results obtained can be extended to a

m ore general theory, nam ely to the theory of lattices. In fact

we consider lattices in which the operation S o f infinite addition

(infinite join operation) is always perform able and in which

finite m ultiplication is distributive under both finite and infinite

addition .2 As examples o f such lattices the system o f all open

sets o f a topological space and the system o f all ideals o f a

Boolean ring m ay be m entioned. Let L be a lattice o f this type

with at least tw o different elements; we put

1 = S z, 0 = Sz (0 denoting the em pty set);

zeL zeo

x v y = x+y, xa y~x.y,

£->!/= S z, ^x —X 0

(xAz)\/V^V

for all x, y e L. It then results that M(L) = [L, 1, v , A,

is a m atrix, and that Ths. 5.12 and 5.13 remain valid if *M(L)’

is substituted for M(J2) ’ in them . Ths. 5.14 and 5.15 can also be

carried over to the theory o f lattices. In this way we obtain an

interpretation o f the tw o-valued and o f the intuitionistic cal

culus in the theory o f lattices.

1 See X II.

2 More generally, we could consider here arbitrary distributive lattices

(without infinite addition) in which for any elements x, y s L there is an ele

ment z e L such that (i) x.z-\-y = y t and (ii) u + z = z whenever u e L and

x .u + y = y. Such lattices are intimately related to the so-called Brouwerian

algebras (or Brouwerian logics). Cf. Birkhoff, G. (7a) and McKinsey, J. C. C.

and Tarski, A . (53a).