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Chapter I – General Considerations and Principle

Tort
- A tort is a wrong independent of a contract, which arises from an act or omission of a person which causes some injury or
damage directly or indirectly to another person.

- Based on Article 2176 “Whoever by act of omission causes damage to another, there boing fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict.

Tort distinguished from breach of contract


Basis Tort Breach of Contract
1. Nature of Negligence Negligence is direct, substantive and Negligence is merely incidental to
independent the performance of the contractual
obligation. There is a pre-existing
obligation
2. Defense of “good father of This is a complete and proper This is not complete and proper
a family” defense insofar as parents, defense in the selection and
guardian, employers are concerned supervision of employees
3. Presumption of negligence There is no presumption of There is a presumption of negligence
negligence. The injured party must as long as it can be proved that there
prove the negligence of the was breach of contract. The
defendant defendant must prove that there was
no negligence in the carrying out of
the terms of the contract.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad


- Petitioner stepped on the sack of watermelons and fell on the platform which cause his arms to be amputated because it
was drawn under a moving car.

- It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of contract by reason of the
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.

- The proof on the part of the defendant that the negligence of his servant or agents caused the breach of the contract would
not constitute a defense to the action.

Japan Airlines vs. Simangan


- Respondent was not able to proceed to U.S. because of he was suspected to be carrying falsified documents.

- Japan Airlines is guilty of breach of contract of carriage.

- In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its
non-performance by the carrier through the latter’s failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination.

Radio Communication vs. CA


- Private respondent’s telegram message contained additional words (foul words) which caused her embarrassment.

- There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent
to the private respondent.

- Since the negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

Syquia vs. CA
- There was an alleged breach of the defendant of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the
remains of the deceased.

- There is no negligent act on the part of the defendant to justify an award of damages against it. Had there been actual
negligence on the part of the defendant, it would be held liable not for quasi-delict but for culpa contractual since there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

FEBTC vs. CA
- The supplemental card was lost which caused the cancellation of the card and upon presentment the card of respondent
was dishonored and caused him to feel embarrassed.

- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
malice in the breach of contractual obligation.
- Where without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act of omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort
by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
Here, the respondent’s damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship, without such agreement, the act
or omission complained of cannot by itself held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology


- The students were required to buy tickets otherwise they will be denied to take examinations.

- The relationship between the school and the student is a contract, in which a student, once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester.

- The fee was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be
unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

- An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that
violated the contract may also be a tort since the cause of action is based on Article 19 and 21.

Tort distinguished from civil liability arising from crime


Basis Quasi-Delict Delict or Crime
1. Legal basis of liability There can be quasi-delict as long as There can be no crime unless there
there is a fault or negligence is a law clearly pushing the act.
resulting in damage or injury to
another. It is broader in scope than
crime
2. Criminal Intent Criminal intent is not necessary for Criminal intent is essential for
quasi-delict to exist. Fault or criminal liability to exist.
negligence without intent will suffice.
3. Nature of right violated Right violated is a private right. Right violated is a public one. Crime
Quasi-delict is a wrongful act against is wrong against the State.
a private individual
4. Liability for damages Every quasi-delict gives rise to Some crimes (contempt, illegal
liability for damages possession of firearms) does not
give rise to liability for damages
5. Proof needed Preponderance of Evidence Guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt
6. Sanction or penalty Reparation or indemnification of the Punishment is either imprisonment,
injury or damage fine, or both or with accessory
penalty.
7. Divisibility of Liability Indivisible Divisible (minimum, maximum)

People vs. Ligon


- Cigarette vendor was clung to the window of Kombi (car) but lost his grip and fell down the pavement. He died eventually.
The defendant is acquitted on reasonable doubt.

- It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the fact
from which the civil liability migh arise did not exist.

Rufo Mauricio Construction vs. IAC


- Judge Solidum died due to collision with the Isuzu dump truck. The driver of the truck died during the proceedings therefore
the plaintiff proceed against the employer of the driver.

- The death of the accused during the pendency of the appeal or before the judgment of conviction becomes final extinguished
his criminal liability but not his civil liability should the liability arise from a quasi-delict. Therefore the liability of the employer
still subsists. The liability of the employer is not subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless no negligence on the part of
employer).

Dulay vs. CA
- The security guard shot and killed Atty. Dulay
- There is no justification for limiting the scope of Art. 2176 to acts or omissions resulting from negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.

- Since the action is based on quasi-delict, the petitioner may proceed directly against the accused and his employer. The
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 is direct and immediate, it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore it is incumbent upon the employer to prove
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employee.

Chua vs. CA
- When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities: 1) the society in which he lives in or the State 2) the individual
member of the society whose person, right, honor or property has been damaged.

- Private respondent did not waive the civil action nor did not reserve the right to institute it separately or institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charge therefore Lydia Hao’s counsel may interfere in the criminal action being
the representative of the private offended party (corporation).

Lumantas vs. Calapiz


- There is negligence on the part of the petitioner in the operation (appendectomy) of the son of respondents.

- There are two kinds of acquittal:


o Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
o Acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.

- The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that
there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable.

Independent Civil Action


Article 31: When the civil action is based on obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Article 32: When the public officer or employee, or any private individuals who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impeded or impairs any of the rights and liberties (enumerated) of another person shall be liable
for damages.

Article 33: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34: When a member of a city or municipality police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages.

Article 36: Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or proceed.
Prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of which is the logical antecedent of the issue involved
in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

Santos vs. Pizardo


- The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Actions based on quasi-delict prescribe in four years
from the accrual of the cause of action.

- At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages, the cause of action ex quasi-delicto had already prescribe, Nonetheless,
petitioners can purse the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, the surviving cause of action ex delicto.

- Dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer
based on Article 103 of the RPC especially the latter action had been expressly reserved.

L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Pagapong-Agraviador


- The driver of the petitioner hit a child which caused the latter’s death. Before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages against the employers of the driver (petitioner)

- Victims of negligence or their heir have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal
under Art. 100 of RPC and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Art.2176-2194 of NCC

- If the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject
to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. If the action chosen is for culpa criminal,
the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily llable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.

- The spouses in this case are suing for quasi-delict not for culpa criminal.

Consing Jr. vs. People


- There is no prejudicial question. The issue in Pasig civil case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted
as agent of his mother while in the Manila civil case for damages and attachments is whether Consing and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of disputed lot. Even if Consing is declared
merely as an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability since an agent may be held liable for conspiring with his principal.

Abuse of Rights
Article 19: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Sea Commercial Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
- SEACOM transacted directly with FSDC despite the dealership agreement with JII, which deprived JII of profits.

- Elements of Abuse of Right:


1. There is a legal right or duty
2. Which is exercised in bad faith
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Globe Mackay vs. CA (Test when principle may be invoked)


- In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of right has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 & 21
or other applicable provision, depends on the circumstances of each case. The Court after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

- The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner
in which the right is exercised and the effect flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable
for damages to the employee.

Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Cabansag


- It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment
to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty
due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
-
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith
or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she
believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same.
She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion
of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such
sale.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes


- Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

- Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which
is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

- Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of
personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity."7 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart
cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs.
Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot
amount to bad faith.

Ang vs. Ang (Factors to be considered whether a case is a Nuisance or Harassment Suit)
- Prohibition against nuisance and harassment suits. - Nuisance and harassment suits are prohibited. In determining whether
a suit is a nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall consider, among others, the following:
(1) The extent of the shareholding or interest of the initiating stockholder or member;
(2) Subject matter of the suit;
(3) Legal and factual basis of the complaint;
(4) Availability of appraisal rights for the act or acts complained of; and
(5) Prejudice or damage to the corporation, partnership, or association in relation to the relief sought.

- In case of nuisance or harassment suits, the court may, motu proprio or upon motion, forthwith dismiss the case.

- a plain reading of the allegations in the Complaint would readily show that the case x x x was mainly filed to collect a debt
allegedly extended by the spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang to [SMBI]. Thus, the aggrieved party is not SMBI x x x but the
spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang, who are not even x x x stockholders.

Roque vs. Torres


- The respondent cannot be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the damages suffered by petitioner because
respondent is not the employer of the security guards who inflicted the injuries upon the person of the petitioner.

- However, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another through
fault or negligence may be held liable in damages. By making it appear that he owns the disputed properties, putting security
guards thereat to inti[mi]date, harass or cause the rightful owner and his representatives and by providing the escape
vehicle, more than sufficient evidence was established on the civil liability of private respondent under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

- In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent violated the principle embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith." When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.

University of the East vs. Jader


- When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school
and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other such
information.

- It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether
they would be included among those who will graduate.

- However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to
take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.

Villanueva vs. Rosqueta


- That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of
the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest
mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage vs. Act Theater Inc.


- The petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right
to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. When a right is exercised
in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be
held accountable.

Manaloto vs. Veloso


- The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village
homeowners, who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondent's
good name and reputation among said homeowners.

- At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good
faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad
judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm

H.L. Carlos Construction Inc. Vs. Marina Properties Corporation (Unjust Enrichment Requisites)
- To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished project without paying for labor cost escalation validly incurred would
constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of petitioner. There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Since
petitioner had rendered services that were accepted by MPC, then the former should be compensated for them. Labor cost
escalation, in this case, has already been earned by petitioner.

Almario vs. Philippine Airlines Inc. (Manifestations of Unjust Enrichment)


- Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as:
(1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff;
(2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant;
(3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal;
(4) the increase of value of property of the defendant;
(5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference;
(6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and
(7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.

Benguet Corporation vs. DENR Mines Adjudication Board (Where there is no unjust enrichment)
- There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal
right to participate in further developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet
has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.
CHAPTER 1
Quasi-contracts
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract
to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)

Article 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts
which may come within the purview of the preceding article. (n)
SECTION 1
Negotiorum Gestio
Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property
of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the
affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position
to do so. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances:
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts
shall govern.

In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable. (1888a)

Article 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good father of a
family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by the owner of the
property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the circumstances of each
case. (1889a)

Article 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties, he shall be
liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter toward the owner
of the business.

The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless the management was
assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger. (1890a)

Article 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon;
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)

Article 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save property or business from imminent
danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events:
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the management.
(n)

Article 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business produces the effects of an
express agency, even if the business may not have been successful. (1892a)

Article 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly ratified, the owner of the
property or business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations incurred in his
interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the necessary and useful expenses and for the
damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties.

The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the management had for its purpose the
prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may have been derived. (1893)

Article 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has been no imminent and
manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of the
preceding article, provided:
(1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the owner. (n)

Article 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into with third
persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of action between
the owner and third persons. These provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business. (n)

Article 2153. The management is extinguished:


(1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto;
(2) When the officious manager withdraws from the management, subject to the provisions of
article 2144;
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the owner or the officious manager.
(n)
SECTION 2
Solutio Indebiti
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered
through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. (1895)

Article 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law may come within the scope of the preceding article. (n)

Article 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he may recover if he proves that it was
not due. (n)

Article 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees, when there has been payment of what is not due,
is solidary. (n)

Article 2158. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to a third person, the payee shall
comply with the provisions of article 1984. (n)

Article 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall pay legal interest if a sum of money
is involved, or shall be liable for fruits received or which should have been received if the thing produces
fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause, and for
damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is recovered. (1896a)

Article 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a thing certain and determinate shall
only be responsible for the impairment or loss of the same or its accessories and accessions insofar as
he has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it, he shall return the price or assign the action to collect
the sum. (1897)

Article 2161. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and expenses incurred by him who unduly
received the thing, the provisions of Title V of Book II shall govern. (1898)

Article 2162. He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who, believing in good faith that the
payment was being made of a legitimate and subsisting claim, destroyed the document, or allowed the
action to prescribe, or gave up the pledges, or cancelled the guaranties for his right. He who paid unduly
may proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the action is still effective.
(1899)

Article 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been
due or had already been paid was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the
delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause. (1901)

SECTION 3
Other Quasi-Contracts *
Article 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger,
the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety
and without intention of being repaid. (1894a)

Article 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person, without the knowledge of those
relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third person,
should the latter claim reimbursement. (1894a)

Article 2166. When the person obliged to support an orphan, or an insane or other indigent person
unjustly refuses to give support to the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply
when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him.

Article 2167. When through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes seriously ill, and
he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract, he shall be liable to pay
for the services of the physician or other person aiding him, unless the service has been rendered out of
pure generosity.

Article 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other calamity, property is saved from destruction by
another person without the knowledge of the owner, the latter is bound to pay the former just
compensation.

Article 2169. When the government, upon the failure of any person to comply with health or safety
regulations concerning property, undertakes to do the necessary work, even over his objection, he shall
be liable to pay the expenses.

Article 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event, movables separately pertaining to two or more
persons are commingled or confused, the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable.
Article 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost personal property shall be governed by articles
719 and 720.

Article 2172. The right of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for necessary and useful
expenses is governed by article 546.

Article 2173. When a third person, without the knowledge of the debtor, pays the debt, the rights of the
former are governed by articles 1236 and 1237.

Article 2174. When in a small community a majority of the inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for
protection against lawlessness, fire, flood, storm or other calamity, any one who objects to the plan and
refuses to contribute to the expenses but is benefited by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his
share of said expenses.

Article 2175. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of another shall be entitled to reimbursement
from the latter.

Advanced Foundation Systems Corporation vs. New World Properties & Ventures
- Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

- To allow New World to acquire the finished project at a price far below its actual construction cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of AFCSC. Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is
not allowed by law.

Philippine National Bank vs. CA (Corporation may be liable for Tort)


- The refusal of the PNB to approve the lease rate of P2.80 per picul inevitably brought about the recission of the contract to
the damage of Rita Tapnio in the amount of P 2,800 which was more than sufficient to pay-off her indebtedness to the bank.
- A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the rules
governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal
or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the
authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as
true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from
the directors as the governing body."

Guillermo vs. Uson


- Where personal liability attaches, not even all officers are made accountable. Rather, only the "responsible officer," i.e., the
person directly responsible for and who "acted in bad faith" in committing the illegal dismissal or any act violative of the
Labor Code, is held solidarily liable, in cases wherein the corporate veil is pierced.58 In other instances, such as cases of
so-called corporate tort of a close corporation, it is the person "actively engaged" in the management of the corporation who
is held liable.59 In the absence of a clearly identifiable officer(s) directly responsible for the legal infraction, the Court
considers the president of the corporation as such officer.

- Guillermo was personally liable for the illegal dismissal of Uson since Guillermo uses the corporation to avoid liability to
Uson.

Paleyan vs. Bangkili


- The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that its application should be relaxed,
considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of
his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellant from her responsibility as parent and
natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such proof in this case.

Nature of Solidarity

Lanuzo vs. Ping


- For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza,
is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also
primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

- For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of
this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador
Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.

- But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement
from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.

Malipol vs. Tan


- Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. The employer,
however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. The employer,
appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of
the lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant
Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to appellees.

Anuran vs. Buno


- As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.

- Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they
would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating
petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.

Parents Liability

Elcano vs. Hill


- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual.

- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons.

- Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

Exconde vs. Capuno


- In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for
the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
- The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. The only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage

Fuellas vs. Cadano


- It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if
the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea
is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under
his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should
be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.

Cuadra vs. Monfort


- As far as the act which caused the injury is concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and
which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against it.

Libi vs.IAC
- It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the
menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in
keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants
are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code

- We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the parents are solidarily liable.

Tamargo vs. CA
- We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive
effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable

Bartolome vs. SSS


- True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age.
- John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption who was then
left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

People vs. Darilay


- Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime (raping the 9 year old Marilyn), the appellant was a minor under
the parental authority of his parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily and directly liable for the damages
sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda

Owners and Managers of Establishment Liable for Tort

Garcia vs. Salvador


- For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something
which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient

- Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result.
However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest
is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission
constitutes a breach of duty.

- "Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation
to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units.

Pacis vs. Morales


- As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to
keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure
that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the
firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should
not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this
case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring
first that it was not loaded.

- Respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree
of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

Meaning of Employers

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Phil American Forwarders Inc.


- We are of the opinion that the term “employer” do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the
context of article 2180 that the term "manager"

- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Genson vs. Adale


- There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working
overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes of
tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an application for overtime
work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that
Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that his
presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement.

Martin vs. CA
- In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of
Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee
relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although the defendant alleged that
he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation."

Employer Chosen by employer or through another

Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co.


- Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this
distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two persons
on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co.,
charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the
lumber and the use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora
was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence defendant was responsible.

Pilipinas Petroleum vs. CA


- Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over
the manner of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence,
if any, in the conduct of the same.

Services Rendered in which the employer has authority to give

De Leon Brokerage vs. CA


- It does not appear that he was on an errand of his own. In the absence of determinative proof that the deviation was so
complete as would constitute a cessation or suspension of his service, petitioner should be held liable. Since both Luna and
petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their liablity is solidary, although the latter can recover from the former
whatever sums it pays to respondent.

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals


- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited
use of a company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability
for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Presumption of negligence and its effects

Umali vs. Bacani


- The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to
exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum
Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may
escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven
as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.

Secosa vs. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco


- Based on the foregoing provisions, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection.The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient
proof that it exercised such degree of care.

Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Baking


- When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after
such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 6 Here,
petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.

Mercury Drug Corporation vs. de Leon


- Mercury Drug and Ganzon cannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing
medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.

- Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as
pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De
Leon. Worse, they have once again attempted to shift the blame to their victim by underscoring his own failure to read the
label.

Vicarious Liability of Employers

Heirs of Redentor Completo vs. Albayda Jr.


- The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the
negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his
employee.The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.

Employers need not engaged in business to be held liable

Ortaliz vs Echarri
- Defendant-appellee, however, claims that there is no allegation in the complaint that "the defendant was engaged in some
kind of industry and that the employee had committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
industry," hence the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his driver and therefore the
complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. But paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention
for it clearly provides that "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."

Defense of diligence in selection and supervision of employees


Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
- Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any
companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
Aba responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all
efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for
the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee

Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.


- The defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired
as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'.

Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC


- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that
the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within
the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner
has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.

Child Learning Center vs. Tagorio


- Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer
is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 12 In this case, CLC’s liability
is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are
properly maintained.
- That Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention
that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the
product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own
negligence.

Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang


- Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In
fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless
driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or
reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding
that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.

Primary and Direct Liability of Employers

Africa vs. Caltex


- Boquiren can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely
nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products.
Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could
not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from
January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex
could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct
the business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to
Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The
control was such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.

Cerezo vs. Tuazon


- The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may
give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the
two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy,
whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action

- The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on
the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the
entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of
the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages
from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Subsidiary Liability of Employers

Yonaha vs. Court of Appeals


- The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires:
a. the existence of an employer-employee relationship;
b. that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
c. that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and
d. that said employee is insolvent.

State and Local Government Units Liability

Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte


- It will be observed that to attach liability to the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a declaration must be made that
he was a “special agent” – and not one upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.

- In this case, the employee was engaged in the performance of his governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or
proprietary functions - the government is not liable.

- The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties, losses and which would be subversive of the
public interest.

State of the Most Significant Relationship Rule

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA


- In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.

- There is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that
private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the
business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should be
stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

Teachers and Heads of Establishments of Arts and Trades

Bagajo vs. Marave


- Petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the
circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be
found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal
intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced
that the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.
The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and ¼ cm. wide) and the
fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to
discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline.

Rosaldes vs. People


- Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical
injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She
could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.

- Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child
as the parents.

- In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child.

Bongalon vs. People


- Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the
back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse
within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of
hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done
at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University


- When petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the
premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure
environment to its students.

- When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its
rules and regulations.

Capili vs. Cardana


- As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the
death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position.

- The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s
premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle
of res ipsa loquitur.

- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would
not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Mercado vs. CA
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In
these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother
to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar;
the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The
situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which
makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility
should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit. (repealed decision)

Palisoc vs. Brillantes


- The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called
upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350
and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students.

- There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must
live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.

Amadora vs. CA
- After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational
in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following
the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable.

- There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is
that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by
any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher
or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter
is a school of arts and trades.

Pasco vs. CFI of Bulacan


- We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts
and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university itself (as
distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned
speaks only of "teachers or heads”

Ylarde vs. Aquino


- As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head
of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the
teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court
went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.

Salvosa vs. IAC


- In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the
concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises,
or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the
mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being
in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.

St. Francis High School vs.CA


- In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened
not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class
of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its
principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity.

PSBA vs. CA
- When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its
rules and regulations. (not based on quasi-delict but on breach of contract since the accused is a third person/outsider)

Soliman vs. Tuason


- Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact
an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly
not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

School of the Holy Spirit vs. Taguiam


- The dismissal of the respondent is valid. As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners lost its trust and
confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful breach
of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. As a teacher
who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm
while in her company. Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves
may result in an accident.

St. Joseph’s College vs. Miranda


- The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from
liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an
apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and
employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps
to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of
science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative
foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute
safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers.

- Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational institution may
be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for
the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon
the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.

Aquinas School vs. Inton


- Aquinas School is liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CA’s belief that the school was
Yamyamin’s employer. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are
allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.

Cudia vs. PMA


- The PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty
to instill and impose discipline upon its students.

- The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment
of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital,
not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
St. Lukes College of Medicine vs. Perez
- Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students against foreseeable harm. In the case at bar, it
is well to remember that the victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners. the
Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St. Luke's. In the course description of the
clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base
operation of the clerkship program. The students were complying with an obligation under the enrollment contract, they were
rendering medical services in a community center as required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to
comply with their own obligations under the enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they would
designate their students is safe and secure, among others.

Sole Proprietorship

ALPS Transportation vs. Rodriguez


- The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it has
substantial capital, investment, tools, and the like. It is thus incumbent upon ALPS Transportation to present sufficient proof
that Contact Tours has substantial capital, investment and tools in order to successfully impute liability to the latter. ALPS
Transportation has failed to present any proof to substantiate the former's status as a legitimate job contractor. Hence, the
legal presumption that Contact Tours is a labor-only contractor has not been overcome. As a labor-only contractor, therefore,
Contact Tours is deemed to be an agent of ALPS Transportation. Thus, the latter is responsible to Contact Tours' employees
in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were directly employed by the bus company. Since ALPS
Transportation is a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner Alfredo Perez, it is he who must be held liable for the payment
of backwages to Rodriguez. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
the owner of the enterprise. Thus, the owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts and obligations of the business,
and it is against him that a decision for illegal dismissal is to be enforced.

The Collateral Source Rule

MMPSEU vs. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation


- The collateral source rule is ‘predicated on the theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit
from monies received by the injured person from sources unconnected with the defendant’. According to the collateral source
rule, ‘a tortfeasor has no right to any mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation received by the injured
person from an independent source.’ The rationale for the collateral source rule is based upon the quasi-punitive nature of
tort law liability. It has been explained as follows:

The collateral source rule is designed to strike a balance between two competing principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is
entitled to compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that
proximately result from his wrong. A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a windfall; a defendant
who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction one windfall and
deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the wrongdoer.

Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost for the full value of his or her negligent conduct even if it results in a windfall
for the innocent plaintiff. (Citations omitted)

As seen, the collateral source rule applies in order to place the responsibility for losses on the party causing them. 43Its
application is justified so that "'the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take
advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third persons."44Thus, it finds no
application to cases involving no-fault insurances under which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies,
regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the losses. Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence,
it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees which had already been paid
by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.