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ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may issue licenses and business permits with
OF APPEALS, Hon. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding conditions and whether the conditions imposed are binding to the petitioners
Judge of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Br. 1, Iligan City; SAMAHANG
OPTOMETRIST Sa PILIPINAS - Iligan City Chapter, LEO T. CAHANAP, City Legal RULING: Yes, the Mayor may issue licenses with special conditions for it is a valid
Officer, and Hon. CAMILO P. CABILI, City Mayor of Iligan, respondents. G.R. No. exercise of police of power but the conditions imposed in the case at bar is not binding
100152. March 31, 2000 to the petitioner.
FACTS:
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
 Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business general welfare of the people.[3] The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
permit. After consideration of petitioners application and the opposition exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order
interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. [4] This
Business Permit subject to the following conditions: delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code
1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic
but only a commercial store; The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and
optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the
clinics; power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
prescription having first been made by an independent
optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic. Acebedo
can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be
Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can to due process and equal protection of the law.
advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames;
5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription The power or authority of the City Mayor to impose conditions or restrictions in the
of an independent optometrist. business permit is indisputable. What petitioner assails are the conditions imposed in
its particular case which, it complains, amount to a confiscation of the business in which
 Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas , lodged a complaint petitioner is engaged.
against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that
Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first
is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or
 Then City Mayor Cabili designated City Legal Officer to conduct an Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes
investigation on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial
to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural
conditions of its business permit The City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit
 Petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a
the RTC contending that the City Mayor had no authority to impose the special
license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although
conditions on its business permit; RTC denied and then petitioners appealed
it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the
to the CA.
Board of Examiners in Optometry.
 THE CA dismissed the petition holding that although the Mayor acted beyond
his authority in imposing special conditions in the permit, the said special The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioners business permit
conditions nevertheless became binding on the petitioner upon its acceptance could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioners employ to produce a valid
thereof as a private agreement or contract and therefore estoppel applies. certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A
business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City
Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a
profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the
administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in
this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.

To accomplish the objective of the regulation, a state may provide by statute that
corporations cannot sell eyeglasses, spectacles, and lenses unless a duly licensed
physician or a duly qualified optometrist is in charge of, and in personal attendance at
the place where such articles are sold.[21] In such a case, the patients primary and
essential safeguard lies in the optometrists control of the "treatment" by means of
prescription and preliminary and final examination.

As to the ruling of the CA that the permit is in a nature of contract and estoppel applies,
this Court holds otherwise. It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the
nature of a contract but a special privilege.

"xxx a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or
permitee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is
rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is
within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute." [25]

It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that
petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject
business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra
vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts
which are clearly beyond the scope of ones authority are null and void and cannot be
given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which
is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative
Land Transportation Commissioner et al., respondents. power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. To avoid the taint of
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979 unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
FACTS: Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may
be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
 President Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
early seaming device for motor vehicles. from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Consistency with the
conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
 Petitioner assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction for being violative of legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and Congress being assumed."
regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Moreover, the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
standing, as being arbitrary, oppressive and one-sided, onerous and patently
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization ratified by the Philippine
illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a
the installation of road safety signs and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this
set of the so-called early warning device.
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The
Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction is constitutional the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to
RULING: Yes. which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way
of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
Police power is identified with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Its scope, ever-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that
the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public
safety specifically in the interest of safety on all streets and highways

There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in


Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to
purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor
vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this
early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever
source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can
even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same
substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers
and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as
petitioner so sweepingly concludes
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. G.R. thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
No. 92389 September 11, 1991 regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
FACTS: health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."
 Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
reads: A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING
BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public
MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." We ruled that police power is
PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
MUNICIPAL TREASURY. exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits.
 Respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof on the ground that there
is no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988 and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
of the inhabitants of Makati and that it still subject to the limitation that the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, which should be private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes
for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the all legislation and almost every function of the municipal governmentThus, it is deemed
Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits
case. of police power.

 Petitioner, through its Mayor, filed a special civil action of certiorari praying COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still
that COA Decision be set aside as null and void. subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause case."

RULING: Yes Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which promotion of the common good.
was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo
et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations Before a disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of urban poor, etc.
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The
of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
for the safety of the people. President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."
This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for
motives political or otherwise.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
FACTS: Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.

 Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING


THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: At least six (6) percent of the total area of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
5 years prior to their death,xxx Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
 For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
Quezon City Council passed resolution to stop any further selling and/or
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
 Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

 The respondent court rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance


No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

 Petitioner filed a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision
contending that it is a valid exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether the Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police
power?

RULING: No.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. Police power is the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction
in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose
of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
Administration, respondents. G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action.

FACTS: The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. There is no evidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
 The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case.
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a
ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
 In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned Department Order is constitutional ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means
impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap
RULING: Yes.
measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances
of each case.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined
as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep,
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed valiity. In the absence of clear and
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.
As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them. We hold that he carabao has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of E.O. No. 626
FACTS:

 Petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that no carabao regardless of age, original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of original measure, E.O. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of the questioned measure is missing
carabaos.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
 The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere.
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the RTC issued a writ of replevin upon order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their
his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The court sustained the
slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
confiscation of the carabaos.
their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate


The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
Court, which upheld the trial court, and then filed before the SC a petition for
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the instant case, the
review on certiorari.
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
ISSUE: whether or not the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
boundaries.

RULING: Yes. The E.O.is unconstitutional. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
The law exercising police power must have a lawful subject and lawful method. official arbitrariness. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and petitioner's peremptory treatment.
is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard
of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that
the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
RAMON FABIE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant- It is undoubtedly on of the fundamental duties of the city of Manila to make all
appellant. G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912 reasonable regulations looking to the preservation and security of the general health of
the community, and the protection of life and property from loss or destruction by fire.
FACTS: All such regulations have their sanction in what is termed the police power.

 Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila was enacted as an amendment of The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and
section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, relating to the secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of
issuance of permits for the erection of buildings. Section 107 so amended fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings
reads as follows: within the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private
SEC. 107. Issuance of permits. — When the application plans, and street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably
specifications conform to the requirements of this title and of title necessary to secure the end in view.
eleven hereof, the engineer shall issue a permit for the erection of
the building and shall approve such plans and specifications in In the first place it prevents the huddling and crowding of buildings in irregular masses
writing: Provided, That the building shall about or face upon a public on single or adjoining tracts of land, and secures an air space on at least one side of
street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially each new residence or other building constructed in the city.
approved. One copy of all approved plans and specifications shall be
returned to the owner or his agent and one copy shall be retained by
the engineer. In the second place, the provisions of the ordinance in question manifestly promote the
safety and security of the citizens of Manila and of their property against fire and
 The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms disease, especially epidemic disease, by securing the easy and unimpeded approach
a part of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which to all new buildings: First, of fire engines, and other apparatus for fighting fire; second,
is inclosed between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known of ambulances, refuse wagons, and apparatus used by the sanitary department in
as Tripa de Gallina, and lying within the corporate limits of the city of Manila. caring for the sanitation of the city; third, of fire and health inspectors generally; of
employees of the fire department and others engaged in fighting fire; and of employees
of the Bureau of Health engaged in their duty as guardians of the sanitary conditions
 The plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building
and general health of the city.
permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the property in
question. It was claimed that the purpose of the building was to serve as a
guard house. There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the ordinance
under discussion. It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of
 The permit was denied by the city authorities on the ground that the site of the the citizens of Manila generally and was not conceived in favor of any class or of
proposed building did not conform to the requirements of the above cited particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and safety of the city
ordinance which provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it
street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary to that end it was
approved." It is the contention of the appellees herein that this provision is and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.
unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the property
owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these
Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an
invasion of their property rights without due process of law.

 The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null
and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned ordinance is constitutional

RULING: Yes.

The appellant, the city of Manila, insists that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise
of the police power of the city, in that its sole purpose and aim is to effect these ends
by affording better sanitary regulations as well as increased facilities for protection to
property from loss by fire.
PEDRO P. ARONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MIGUEL RAFFIÑAN and A. INCLINO, theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows and boxing exhibitions, in addition to
as City Mayor and City Treasurer of Cebu City, respectively, Defendants- other license fees paid by the same enterprises under another ordinance of the same
Appellees. G.R. No. L-8673. February 18, 1956 city. This Court held that said ordinance imposes a tax on business and is not merely
regulatory, although its enactment was within the grant of power vested in the City of
FACTS:
Manila by its charter.
 One Pedro P. Arong, as owner of Liberty Theater operated in the City of Cebu, Indeed, it cannot be pretended that the fees exacted the ordinance in question are
and other theater owners impleaded the mayor and treasurer of said city to merely for regulation for under Ordinance No. 25, series of 1946, of the City of Cebu,
recover the sum paid under protest as license fee collected under Ordinance the theaters and other places of entertainment within its limits are already charged the
No. 43, series of 1947, on the ground that said ordinances are illegal and corresponding license fees for their Operation depending upon their classification.
oppressive and were enacted in violation of the City Charter.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the plaintiff may recover the same
 Defendants alleged as special defense that the amounts collected from
RULING: No.
the Plaintiffs are not taxes but license fees and so the enactment of the
aforesaid ordinances comes within the power granted to the City of Cebu by We are constrained to hold that they are prevented from recovering them it appearing
its charter and are not ultra vires. that these fees are paid not by the Plaintiffs but by the public. If any body has the right
to claim them, it is those who paid them. This is what we held in the case of Esteban
 The amounts which Plaintiffs seek to recover were collected under the Medina, et al., vs. City of Baguio. In this respect the decision of the lower court is
provisions of Ordinance No. 25, approved on February 10, 1947. Section 1 of correct.
the latter ordinance provides:
Wherefore, we hereby modify the decision of the lower court in the sense that, while
“SECTION 1. — In addition to the fees paid by cinematographs, the ordinances in question are ultra vires, Plaintiffs cannot collect the fees they had
theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows and boxing paid thereunder and, therefore, this case should be dismissed, without pronouncement
exhibitions, as provided for in Chapter Fifty-one of Ordinance as to costs.
Numbered Seventeen, entitled ‘An Ordinance prescribing rules and
regulations and fixing license fees and other revenues; revised,
amends and supersedes all previous ordinances on imposition and
collection of municipal and other revenues; also rules and
regulations governing the same, there shall be collected from the
places of amusement, which are specifically mentioned above, the
following fees on the price of every admission ticket sold by such
enterprises: xxxx

ISSUE 1: Has the City of Cebu the power to approve the above ordinances?
RULING: No.
Section 17 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 58, which we quote:
“SEC. 17. General powers and duties of the Board. — xxx (1) To regulate and fix the
amount of the license fees xxx
It should be noted that with regard to the business of theaters, theatrical performances,
cinematographs, and other places of amusements, the power that the charter gives to
the City of Cebu is merely “to regulate and fix the amount of the license fees.” It does
not include the power to tax as is the case with regard to other businesses and
occupations. This can be clearly seen from a cursory reading of the law. When it desires
to grant the power to tax it expressly so provides, other wise it merely employs the
words “to regulate” or “fix the license fees.”
The issue of whether the sums paid is in the nature of tax or license is not new as it
has already been decided in this jurisdiction. In Eastern Theatrical Company, Inc., vs.
Victor Alfonso, et al., wherein a similar ordinance was enacted by the City of Manila
which impose a fee on every price of admission tickets sold by cinematographs,
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FEATI BANK AND municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general
TRUST CO., defendant-appellee. interest and welfare"
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ISSUE 1: Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power;
FACTS:
 Plaintiff is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the RULING: Yes. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots Act," empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los or regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the
Santos Avenue (EDSA), Mandaluyong, Rizal. power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the
 Plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as word "regulation" under the provision. An examination of Section 12 of the same
vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two law which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that the implied
parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair
Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor
of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The only exceptions under
Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city
 The said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in
or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original
favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price,
terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not
the plaintiff executed the deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. The deeds of
apply in the case at bar.
sale contained the restriction that the subject land shall be used exclusively by the
Buyer for residential purposes. Such restriction was later annotated in TCT
covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. ISSUE 2: Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
 Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6 with TCT issued in its
name, respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated RULING: Yes. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
therein. Defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to
but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant of the people.
demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard
contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the
regulations. Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard
or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in
 Plaintiff filed a complaint which sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area,
injunction. especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the
highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA,
 Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCTs were imposed as a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
designated or established. ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing
 Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the the subject resolution.
western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a
commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and
 The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding prosperity of the state 43 and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of
that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. the individual are subordinated.
27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said