PEOPLE VS. AMADOR PASTRANA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 196045

February 21, 2018
(Sec. 4 – requisites)

FACTS:

1.) On 26 March 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan filed a Sworn Application for a
Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he
received confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their
employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing
shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock,
however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated to different transactions. Special Investigator Gaerlan
averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).

2.) On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant.

3.) Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and
Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return, dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory
Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize the following:

1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents: Telephone bills of the company calls to clients; List of brokers and 201
files; Sales agreements; Official receipts; Credit advise; Fax messages; Clients message slips; Company brochures; Letterheads; and
Envelopes.
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.

4.) On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two (2)
offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the
rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.

5.) On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant, respondent Abad moved for the
inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months without action on the motion to quash clearly
showed Judge Salvador, Jr.'s aversion to passing judgment on his own search warrant.

6.) In an Order, dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the case was re-
raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.

7.) In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it violated the
requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. Aggrieved, petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.

8.) In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search Warrant No. 01-118
clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense, because the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was committed
by respondents.

9.) Hence, petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in sustaining the trial court’s order which quashed the search warrant.
Ruling:

The purpose of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill), the Court stressed two points which must be considered in the
issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the
judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularlydescribe the things to be seized. Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the
seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to
amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense."

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and
for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."

First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law such as manipulation of
security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use
of unregistered clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among others.
Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime: ( 1) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three
ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these
reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a
broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as such with the
Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents
acted as brokers or dealers without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to
Quash,47dated 5 April 2002.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the
issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each
other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be
said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing
the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged committed by respondents.
Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that
the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of
particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of
respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of registration
with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.