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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150793. November 19, 2004]


FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,[1] dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,
Branch 22. Also challenged by herein petitioner is the CA Resolution,[2] dated November 20, 2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of
Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172[3] in relation to Article
171[4] of the Revised Penal Code. The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual
Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in
his Notarial Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public document, by making or causing it to appear in said
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as
the said accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April 30, 1994 and neither has
participated in the proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 285721 [6] for falsification of public document, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and presented
Hao as their first witness.
After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainants counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and
prove any civil liability in the case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chuas motion and ordered the complainants counsels to be excluded from actively prosecuting
Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-94846,[7] entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty
Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is ordered to allow the intervention of the private prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C.
Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to
actively participate in the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in: (1) refusing to consider material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846 although it
was not a party to the criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3) effectively amending the information against the accused in violation of his
constitutional rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision denying the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as well as the Order,
dated December 3, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since
there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit. Respondent maintained that when the
directors or trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a demand from stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified documents pertaining to projects of the
corporation and made it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and a director of the corporation. According to the appellate court, the corporation
was a necessary party to the petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the Corporation of
its right to be a party and present its own claim for damages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors:
I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAOS FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-94846]
III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNAS DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA HAOS COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 285721
IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT
DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR BEING A SHAM PLEADING.[10]
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a
proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when (1) it sustained the lower court in giving due course to respondents petition
in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was not the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when it ruled that Criminal
Case No. 285721 was in the nature of a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-corporate proceedings and cannot be made part of a criminal action. He cites
the case of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,[11] where the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a
derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty
Corporation was not the private complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo
for estafa and falsification of public document. Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing
for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the
corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before
the court a quo nor in the instant petition which, in part, merely states that this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a
portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil liability against the
private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a
derivative suit.[12]
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot be treated as a derivative suit because the appeal lacked the
basic requirement that it must be alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of the corporation
and other shareholders who wish to join.
Under Section 36[13] of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23, [14] where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with
its board of directors or trustees.[15] An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks
in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of
the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest.[16]
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief
which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not
asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the corporation. [17]
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [18] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[19]
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose subject
concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena Realty Corporation has a cause
of action. And the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action against petitioner. Private respondent was the one who
instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed
in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly
situated who may wish to join him in the suit. [20] It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the
corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the
corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause
of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res
adjudicata against it.[21]
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation.
Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note that the case was
titled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner before us now claims that the corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal Case No.
285721, and thus cannot be included as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Devt. Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[22] In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the petition for certiorari, even though it was not a
party-in-interest in the civil case before the lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in her personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the
corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all remedies available to her before she instituted the case, not only to claim damages for
herself but also to recover the damages caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[23] when a trial court commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the person aggrieved can file a special civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the private offended party or
complainant.[24]
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended
parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file special civil action of prohibition and certiorari. [25]
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of a
corporation to join said petition for certiorari, despite the finality of the trial courts denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent Motion to
Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[26] we held that if aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a petition for certiorari. In that case,
petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible remedy since she could
not intervene in the probate of her father-in-laws estate.[27]
In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was brought in her own
name and in behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the
corporations project and the falsified documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari
because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 285721?
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,[28] holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the
offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable
is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State
whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not
so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime.[29]The civil action
involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.[30]
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.[31] Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages
arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a
result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel
as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are
the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does
not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or
reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.[32]
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that
evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has
the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the private prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of
the subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
with double homicide and double physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned
and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary
care and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which
said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate
no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with
plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no.
NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate
no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by
the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly
caused their death; while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of
time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in
the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters
death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity. P150,000.00, as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck
owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment
dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal
case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil liability [9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period.[10] The other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7,
1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process
when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is
DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect." [13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this
petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO
FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. [16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65
filed by petitioner against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and executory when accused applied for probation at the
promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a
party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between
him and accused. Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the incident. While these assertions
are not moved, we shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal
proceeding where the award is made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the
purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while"
in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the
employer. Hence, we held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs.
Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger
bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined.
One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given
the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance
company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.[23] Petitioner did not
intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship.[24] With the convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court
did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was
not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the
hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991,
where he properly alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any
function in relation to his work at the time of the incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and
December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991.
However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on
January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for
the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given
the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant
court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Maniks
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality
of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 2000 [2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his
unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum
of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her
unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00
as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00
for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as
moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral
damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of
income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of
the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal
of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by
the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due
course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received
[a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
[respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss. [6] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in
the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then
the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers
subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of
the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency
if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation
of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x [14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15
days from notice of the judgment against them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned
his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them
or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. [18]Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal
actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission. [24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently,
petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none
can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief [29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of
guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. [33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher
than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived
his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted
solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees
after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such conduct is intolerable
and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived
his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these
cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from
the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency.[44] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of
the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.[48] By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. [49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of
their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. [50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended
party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal
and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its
liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has
attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal
and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident
to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso factosubsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. [53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory
origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise. [54] Hence, the legal requirements
must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[57] In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules
have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases. [58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. [59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. [60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990
EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the Regional Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Antique; and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents.
Comelec Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison, Province
of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly,
publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas,"
which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import
which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate
civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and
circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby
DENIED.
After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom,
San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its decision on the criminal aspect.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral
damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa
vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by saying
that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case,
the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has been instituted
by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the
prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to
actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed
to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison,
Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an
award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final
adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner
with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be
taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to
the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to
appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively
intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate.
Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken,
prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found
in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual
character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either
because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3
In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be
criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or
damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability
results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention
precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at
bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient
to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident
complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case
as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect
thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in
the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22759 March 29, 1968
MANUEL R. JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite and OFELIA V. TANG and ESTEPANIA DE LA CRUZ OLANDAY, respondents.
David F. Barrera for petitioner.
Alfredo I. Raya and Raul A. Manalo for respondents.
Jimenez vs. Averia.
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite respondents Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with
estafa, the information filed alleging that, having received from Manuel Jimenez the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat known
as "Basnig", with the obligation on their part to return the money on January, 30, 1963 in case they should fail to buy the fishing boat, they misappropriated
the amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice of Jimenez.
Before arraignment, the accused filed Civil Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in the Court of First Instance of Quezon contesting the validity of a certain
receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962 (Annex "A" of the present petition) wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of
P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's commission, with the obligation, on
their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963 in case they were unable to buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged that they had
never received any amount from Jimenez and that their signatures on the questioned receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit and intimidation
employed by him. Several days later, they filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal action to suspend proceedings therein on the ground that the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon was a prejudicial question. The respondent judge granted
the motion in an order dated October 18, 1963.
The petition now before Us is one for certiorari predicated upon the proposition that in issuing the order just mentioned, the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Properly, however, the action is for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the relief
prayed being for this Court "to order the Hon. Court of Cavite Province to proceed with the case and to order the Hon. Court at Quezon Province to dismiss
the civil case".
The issue to be decided is whether the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense
that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed.
A prejudicial question has been define to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which, (question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Encyclopedia Juridical Española, p. 228). In People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-
5930, February 17, 1954, We held in connection with this subject that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case
before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Applying the above considerations to the instance case, it will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil
case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they
had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be
tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action.
Were We to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents Tang and De la Cruz Olanday and adopted by the respondent judge, there would hardly
be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing
an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Court of First Instance of Cavite to proceed without undue delay with the trial of
Criminal Case No. TM-235, with the result that the order complained of suspending the proceedings therein until after Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon has been resolved is hereby set aside. With cost against the respondent except the respondent judge.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for
subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio,
bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the
medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of
the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily
pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to
Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of
P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay
complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or
the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the
ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The
private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral
damages in the amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988,
modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil
liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the
accused as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of
the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability
of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order
was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its
decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the
judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a decision
based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision."
Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in
the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the
so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of
origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal
proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual,
while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary
liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a
delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for
culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be
regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer,
etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa
Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the
operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee's
criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party
to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings
against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved
in the execution."
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like
manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint
against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case,
it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the
appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision
based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its
decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability
does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier
discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be
enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court
to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear
and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32383 September 30, 1982
BAZA MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BOLINAO SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICE, INC., defendant- appellee.
Rolando S. Crisol for plaintiff-appellant.
Mario F. Racela for defendant-appellee.

VASQUEZ, J.:
This is an action filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the robbery of the value of stolen office equipments, attorney's fees and damages. After
the issues were joined and a pre-trial conducted, the parties, assisted by their respective counsels, submitted the following "Admissions & Stipulations
Of Facts":
COME NOW the above-named parties, Baza Marketing Corporation as plaintiff and Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc. as
defendant, through their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Court most respectfully allege, state and submit, namely:
(A) That during the pre-trail conference before this Honorable Court on January 16, 1968, the following admissions were made by
the parties, to wit:
1) That the parties ADMITTED that the security guard, Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo, had been convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Manila, which fact is more particularly described in the allegation in paragraph 6 of the
complaint;
2) That the parties ADMITTED that the above-named security guard is insolvent and can not satisfy the civil
liability imposed in the judgment of conviction, which facts are more particularly described in the allegation in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the complaint;
(B) That in addition to the above admissions made during the aforementioned pre-trial conference, the parties submit the following
stipulation of facts, t) wit:
1) That the parties ADMIT that Defendant is a corporation organized and existing in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, under the name Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc., with office
address at 1161 M. dela Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila;
2) That the parties ADMIT that the plaintiff is a lessee of the Chamber of' Commerce of the Philippines at its
only building located at Magallanes Drive, Manila, which fact is particularly described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint;
3) That the parties ADMIT that on May 1, 1965, Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc. entered into a
contract with the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines whereby it agreed to furnish security guards to the
latter for the purpose of guarding and protecting its properties and installations located at Magallanes Drive,
Manila from theft, pilferage, robbery, arson or other unlawful acts by strangers or third parties, and the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines agreed to pay each guard assigned for said purpose the amount of
P200.00 a month:
4) That the parties ADMIT that as of November 26, 1965, the aforementioned contract was in force and Jose
Silvestre y Fajarillo was one of the security guards furnished by the defendant to the Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines to guard its properties and installations as provided in the contract;
5) That parties ADMIT that plaintiff has had no contract with the defendant for security services of its office
equipment and supplies and therefore its office equipment, supplies and other properties were never
accounted for and placed under the control of the defendant or any of its security guards assigned in the
premises of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines;
6) That the parties ADMIT that Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo was duty bound to and was in fact guarding the building,
properties and installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines on November 26, 1965, and that in
said building were contained the office equipments and supplies as well as the office of the plaintiff;
7) That the parties ADMIT that Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo while he was thus guarding the building, properties and
installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, conspired and confederated with an outsider,
Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas, who was only a 16-year old boy, and by mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force upon things and with intent of gain and against the
will of the owner thereof, allowed Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas to gain entrance to the office of the plaintiff by
passing thru a hole of the building left so when an air conditioner placed therein was taken out to be repaired,
and once inside, stole and carried away therefrom, office equipments of the plaintiff all valued at P5,440.00,
which facts are specifically mentioned in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
8) That the parties ADMIT that on June 16, 1966 the Court rendered its decision in the aforesaid criminal case,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court sentences defendant Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOUR (4)
YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS, also of prision correccional, as maximum, and defendant
Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court further orders both defendants to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Baza Marketing Corporation in
the sum of P5,440.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency not to exceed one-third (1/3) of
their respective principal penalties, and to pay the costs pro-rata.
SO ORDERED.
9) That the parties ADMIT that the foregoing decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued on August 13, 196C- for the enforcement of the civil liability of both accused as decreed in the decision,
but the same was returned unsatisfied, per return of the sheriff dated August 22, 1966, on the ground of
insolvency of both accused;
10) That the parties ADMIT that the extent of the damages of the plaintiff is P5,440.00;
11) That the parties ADMIT that plaintiff made demands in writing on defendant for it to pay the amount of
P5,440.00 which is the total value of the stolen office equipments but that the defendant refused to pay on the
ground that it is not subsidiarily liable for whatever civil liability was adjudged against Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo
in the aforementioned criminal case;
12) That plaintiff and defendant hereby incorporate by way of reference and make as an integral parts of this
pleading, the following documents which were admitted as exhibits in Civil Case No. 152058 of the City Court of
Manila where the instant case was originally tried and decided, to wit:
Photostat copy of the Agreement consisting of three (3) pages between the Bolinao
Security & Investigation Service, Inc. and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines,
dated May 1, 1965 (marked as Exhibit 'A').
Duplicate copy of the Notice of Order Decision dated July 15, 1966 in Criminal Case No.
80784 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo and Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas" rendered on June 16, 1966 with the
Decision consisting of eight (8) pages attached (marked as Exhibit 'B').
Portion of the decision pointing out the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence on the part of the defendant Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo and already marked as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 'B-1'.
Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance and already marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 'C'.
The Sheriff's Return dated August 22, 1966 of Deputy Sheriff, Dante Ortiz, and already
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 'D'.
13) That plaintiff and defendant submit to the discretion of this Honorable Court the propriety of awarding the
damages and attorney's fees prayed for in their complaint and counterclaim, respectively, and the amount
thereof.
Manila, Philippines, April 26,1968.
(Sgd.) ROLANDO S. CRISOL (Sgd.) MARIO F. RACELA
Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendant
Ground Floor, C.C.P. Bldg. 303 Wm. Li Yao Building
Magallanes Drive, Manila Rizal Avenue, Manila"
Solely on the basis of the above admissions and stipulations, the trial court rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint on the following ratiocination:
And so from this the sole issue to be solved by this Court, is whether Defendant which furnished security guards to his Chamber of
Commerce Building, wherein Plaintiff was one of the tenants, is subsidiarily liable for the civil liability imposed on one its security
guard as it has been proven that he is insolvent. Plaintiff's action is based on Art, 103 RPC, which requires three requisites before
such a subsidiary liability may arise: first, that the employer is engaged in a kind of industry: second, that the employee is insolvent
and third, that the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of ms duties. The first two requisites are present for the
furnishing of security guards in engaging in some kind of industry, and the Stipulation of Facts shows that the security guard is
insolvent. But was the crime committed while in the discharge of his duties? This Court does not think so. The duty of the security
guard was to guard the premises assigned to him. The final decision finding the security guard guilty of robbery shows that in
connivance with a 16-year old, gaining entrance through the opening left by the repair of the airconditioning unit, the robbers made
away with office equipment owned by Plaintiff in the sum of P5,440.00. It is clear that this connivance was not in the discharge of
his duties as security guard so that Defendant cannot be subsidiarily held liable for such an act.
The complaint is, therefore, dismissed with costs against Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified by the said Court to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involves pure questions
of law.
Plaintiff-appellant has assigned a single error in its brief to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE WAS NOT IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY WHEN HE
COMMITTED THE CRIME AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER COULD NOT BE HELD SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE.
The trial court expressed the view that defendant-appellee may not be held liable for the loss of the office equipments of plaintiff-appellant inasmuch as
the security guard was not acting in the discharge of his duties as such when the connived with Ernesto Secreto, who actually committed the robbery.
The clear import of the trial court's ruling is that the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may only arise if the employee
commits the crime of which he was found guilty in line or in pursuance of the discharge of his assigned duties.
Defendant-appellee agrees with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court but not on the ground expressed by it. Defendant-appellee denies liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the reason that the security guard in question was not assigned by defendant-appellee to guard the
plaintiff-appellant's properties, his duty being to act as a security guard of the properties of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Defendant-
appellee would admit that if the properties which were stolen belonged to the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, defendant- appellee would be
liable inasmuch as the unlawful taking occurred in the performance of discharge of the duties of the security guard.
Plaintiff-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the subsidiary liability of the eemployer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code does not
require that the employee commit the crime within the scope of his assigned tasks. Instead, it is enough if the employee committed the act while he was
doing his assigned task as such employee, or on the occasion thereof, it being immaterial whether the act or crime committed is a part of the employee's
duty or assigned task. Plaintiff-appellant cites the example given by recognized commentators on Criminal Law to illustrate his point, to wit: "Where a
workman of a construction company stole some things while he was making minor repairs in a house and after being prosecuted was found guilty and
the workman cannot satisfy his own civil liability, under such a circumstance, the company is liable subsidiarily for the restitution of the things or for the
payment of their value." (Reyes and Revised Penal Code, 1960 edition, pp. 632-633; Albert, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1945 edition, p.
282.) It is argued that, as in the given example, the subsidiary liability of the employer may be imposed even if the crime committed was not in the
discharge of the duties of the security guard, it not being a part of his duties to commit theft or robbery.
We sustain the trial court's dismissal of the case. The law makes the employer subsidiarily liable for the civil liability arising from a crime committed by
an employee "in the discharge of his duties." (Article 103, Revised Penal Code.) This subsidiary liability does not arise from any and all offenses that the
employee may commit, but limited to those which he shall be found guilty of in the discharge of his duties. The law does not say, as urged by plaintiff-
appellant, that the crime of the employee must be the one committed "while in the discharge of his duties." It could not be contemplated that an
employer will be held responsible for any misdeed that his employee could have done while performing his assigned tasks. Thus, it is neither just nor
logical that, if a security guard committed robbery in a neighboring establishment near the one he is assigned to guard, or raped a woman passerby in
the course of his tour of duty, his employer should be made subsidiarily liable for his said misdeed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
crime was committed by the employee "in the discharge of his duties."
This conclusion is supported by the ruling in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568, wherein it was held that the subsidiary liability of the employer does not
arise where the owner of the car which figured in an accident causing the death of one and injuries to another, the said accident not having occurred in
the course of the performance of the duties for which the driver had been hired, it appearing therein that the driver took the car without the employer's
knowledge and used it as if it were his own.
In the case at bar, the security guard was assigned to guard the building, properties and installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.
(Paragraph 6, Stipulations of Facts.) The contract for security was between defendant-appellee and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.
(Paragraph 3, Ibid.) No contract was ever entered by the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee for security services of its office equipments and
supplies which were never accounted for and placed under the control of defendant-appellee or any of the security guards assigned in the premises of
the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, (Paragraph 5, Ibid) In conniving with another to steal or rob the office equipments of plaintiff-appellant,
the security guard in question may not be said have acted in the discharge of his duties as security guard. 'The circumstance that the office of plaintiff-
appellant is in the same building for which defendant-appellee had a contract for security service does not materially change the legal implication of the
said act. For all legal intents and purposes, the robbery could have been committed in a neighboring building or establishment, in which case, it may
hardly be argued that the employer of the security guard should be made responsible for the cosnequences of such malefaction.
Plaintiff-appellant may not derive decisive support for his contention from the example given by the commentaries on Criminal Law hereinabove-
mentioned. It is not correct to say that the employer's subsidiary liability will be imposed even when the act is not done in pursuance of the duties of the
employee, the act of stealing not being included in an employee's assigned tasks: nor would an employer ever include among the duties of his employee
the commission of a crime. The act contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily a crime from which civil liability had arisen but
which could not be satisfied by the accused employee. The statutory limitation that the crime of the employee must have been committed "in the
discharge of his duties" is clearly intended to exclude crimes not related to the performance of the duties assigned to him by his employer. The crime in
question pertains to this latter category.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26730 April 27, 1972


ANITA JAMELO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FEDERICO SERFINO, defendant,appellee.
Gayanelo, Salhay and Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Ismael A. Serfino for defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
The lower court, after noting that the case was on appeal before it from the Bacolod city court's order dated March 30, 1966 dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, related in its own dismissal order of August 29, 1966 the factual background of the case thus: "(I)t appears that in the evening of February 1,
1961, while Antonio Regoles was driving the truck of the defendant Federico Serfino, through his negligence and carelessness, said truck collided with
another truck parked on the right side of the road near kilometer 5 in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental. As a consequence of said collision his
co-employee Artemio Jamelo suffered injuries and he died. The mother of the late Artemio Jamelo filed in the Court of First Instance Civil Case No. 6198,
entitled 'Anita Jamelo vs. Antonio Regoles' for damages on May 15, 1961. On August 26, 1963 the Court of First Instance rendered a decision declaring the
defendant Antonio Regoles responsible for the death of Artemio Jamelo, and ordered Antonio Regoles to pay P6,000.00 to the plaintiff Anita Jamelo and to
pay an additional sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals, affirmed on June 10, 1965, the decision of the Court of First Instance. On
October 25, 1965, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court. On November 17, 1965 the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental returned
unsatisfied the writ of execution, stating that the defendant Antonio Resoles was insolvent. Consequently, the plaintiff Anita Jamelo filed this present
action against the defendant Federico Serfino for subsidiary liability as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles, claiming that said
defendant Federico Serfino is subsidiarily liable to pay the amount of P8,000.00 adjudged by the Court of Appeals against the defendant driver Antonio
Regoles who was
insolvent."1
The lower court then recounted that "(T)he defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, and if there is
any action, same has already prescribed. Defendant brought (out) the fact that there was no criminal complaint filed against the driver Antonio Regoles.
Plaintiff filed only a Civil Case No. 6198 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the driver Antonio Regoles. The present defendant owner
of the truck, Federico Serfino, was not included as one of the party defendants. The plaintiff evidently filed this present complaint under the provisions of
Art. 103 in relation with Art. 102 of the Revised Penal Code. Defendant contends that, there being no judgment in a criminal case filed against the driver
Antonio Regoles, the defendant in this present case Federico Serfino is not subsidiarily
liable."2
On the strength of Martinez vs. Barredo3 ruling that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the driver-accused and the
offended party, binds civilly the employer as the person subsidiarily liable under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code — such liability not being a
primary liability under the provisions on quasi-delict of the Civil Code but "a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
driver's criminalnegligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action" — the lower court found defendant's motion to dismiss
to be meritorious.
The lower court held that "subsidiary liability presuposes that there was a criminal action. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liabilitywould
not be predicated on Art. 103, (Revised Penal Code)" and accordingly ordered the dismissal of plaintiff's action, which sought to declare defendant-
employer subsidiarily liable to pay the P8,000.00-damages awarded plaintiff in her civil judgment against the insolvent driver.
Plaintiff-appellant formulates her issue on the case thus: "(I)s the conviction of the driver Antonio Regoles of the criminal case filed against him for the
death of plaintiff's son, Artemio Jamelo, a condition precedent in order that an action for subsidiary liability based on Arts. 103 and 102 of the Revised Penal
Code may lie against the defendant Federico Serfino as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles?" and submits "that the conviction of
the employee of the crime he was charged while in the performance of his duties is not a legal requirement before an action for subsidiary liability against
his employer under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code could be predicated."
Plaintiff-appellant's position is untenable. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code4 where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. What apparently unfortunately happened here is that plaintiff filed an independent
civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio Regoles based on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's son and secured
the P8,000.00 damage judgment against him alone, which she could not collect, however, due to his insolvency.
Plaintiff does not state what ever happened to the criminal action against him except to contend in her brief that in filing such independent civil action, "she
loses her right to intervene in the prosecution of the said criminal case against Antonio Regoles and that its dismissal will not bar the civil action she had
already filed against the said Antonio Regoles."5 Such civil judgment is enforceable solely and exclusively against the only defendant therein, the erring
driver, Regoles. But this is an entirely different matter from trying now to enforce said civil judgment in this action on the groundless basis of an alleged
subsidiary liability against defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The basis is groundless without the prior criminal conviction of
the driver-employee which is a condition sine qua non for the subsidiary liability of the employer to come into being under the cited provision of the Revised
Penal Code.
It is clear then that there having been no criminal conviction of the employee wherein his civil liability was determined and fixed, no subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code can be claimed against defendant-employer.
A direct and separate civil action for damages against defendant-employer for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, subject however to the
defense therein provided of proving due diligence in the choice and supervision of the employee, would have lain against defendant, if timely filed. Even if
the Court were to hold that the action filed below by plaintiff-appellant could be considered such a separate and direct action for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict — against plaintiff's own disclaimer and insistence that she wants to enforce the non-existent subsidiaryliability of defendant-employer — the
Court is constrained to sustain the dismissal order of the lower court, since such an action is now clearly barred by prescription as duly invoked by
defendant-appellee in his dismissal motion.
Actions based upon quasi-delicts prescribe after four years from the commission of the fault or negligent deed. 6Since the accident causing the death of
plaintiff's son occurred on February 1, 1961, the filing of the complaint below only on March 10, 1966 was already barred by the lapse of more than a year
beyond the four-year prescription period.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

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