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FERNAN, C.J.:
On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison, Province
of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly,
publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas,"
which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import
which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate
civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and
circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby
DENIED.
After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom,
San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its decision on the criminal aspect.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral
damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa
vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by saying
that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case,
the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has been instituted
by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the
prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to
actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed
to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison,
Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an
award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final
adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner
with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be
taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to
the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to
appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively
intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate.
Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken,
prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found
in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual
character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either
because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3
In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be
criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or
damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability
results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention
precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at
bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient
to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident
complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case
as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect
thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in
the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22759 March 29, 1968
MANUEL R. JIMENEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite and OFELIA V. TANG and ESTEPANIA DE LA CRUZ OLANDAY, respondents.
David F. Barrera for petitioner.
Alfredo I. Raya and Raul A. Manalo for respondents.
Jimenez vs. Averia.
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite respondents Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz Olanday were charged with
estafa, the information filed alleging that, having received from Manuel Jimenez the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat known
as "Basnig", with the obligation on their part to return the money on January, 30, 1963 in case they should fail to buy the fishing boat, they misappropriated
the amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice of Jimenez.
Before arraignment, the accused filed Civil Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in the Court of First Instance of Quezon contesting the validity of a certain
receipt signed by them on October 26, 1962 (Annex "A" of the present petition) wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of
P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240.00 as agent's commission, with the obligation, on
their part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963 in case they were unable to buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged that they had
never received any amount from Jimenez and that their signatures on the questioned receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit and intimidation
employed by him. Several days later, they filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal action to suspend proceedings therein on the ground that the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon was a prejudicial question. The respondent judge granted
the motion in an order dated October 18, 1963.
The petition now before Us is one for certiorari predicated upon the proposition that in issuing the order just mentioned, the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Properly, however, the action is for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the relief
prayed being for this Court "to order the Hon. Court of Cavite Province to proceed with the case and to order the Hon. Court at Quezon Province to dismiss
the civil case".
The issue to be decided is whether the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense
that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed.
A prejudicial question has been define to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which, (question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Encyclopedia Juridical Española, p. 228). In People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-
5930, February 17, 1954, We held in connection with this subject that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case
before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Applying the above considerations to the instance case, it will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil
case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they
had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be
tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action.
Were We to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents Tang and De la Cruz Olanday and adopted by the respondent judge, there would hardly
be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing
an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Court of First Instance of Cavite to proceed without undue delay with the trial of
Criminal Case No. TM-235, with the result that the order complained of suspending the proceedings therein until after Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon has been resolved is hereby set aside. With cost against the respondent except the respondent judge.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for
subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio,
bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the
medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of
the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily
pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to
Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of
P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay
complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or
the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the
ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The
private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral
damages in the amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988,
modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil
liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the
accused as shown by the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of
the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability
of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order
was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its
decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the
judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a decision
based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision."
Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in
the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the
so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of
origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal
proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual,
while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary
liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a
delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for
culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be
regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer,
etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa
Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal
action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the
operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee's
criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party
to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings
against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved
in the execution."
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like
manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint
against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case,
it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the
appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision
based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its
decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability
does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier
discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be
enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court
to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear
and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32383 September 30, 1982
BAZA MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BOLINAO SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICE, INC., defendant- appellee.
Rolando S. Crisol for plaintiff-appellant.
Mario F. Racela for defendant-appellee.
VASQUEZ, J.:
This is an action filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the robbery of the value of stolen office equipments, attorney's fees and damages. After
the issues were joined and a pre-trial conducted, the parties, assisted by their respective counsels, submitted the following "Admissions & Stipulations
Of Facts":
COME NOW the above-named parties, Baza Marketing Corporation as plaintiff and Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc. as
defendant, through their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Court most respectfully allege, state and submit, namely:
(A) That during the pre-trail conference before this Honorable Court on January 16, 1968, the following admissions were made by
the parties, to wit:
1) That the parties ADMITTED that the security guard, Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo, had been convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Manila, which fact is more particularly described in the allegation in paragraph 6 of the
complaint;
2) That the parties ADMITTED that the above-named security guard is insolvent and can not satisfy the civil
liability imposed in the judgment of conviction, which facts are more particularly described in the allegation in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the complaint;
(B) That in addition to the above admissions made during the aforementioned pre-trial conference, the parties submit the following
stipulation of facts, t) wit:
1) That the parties ADMIT that Defendant is a corporation organized and existing in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, under the name Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc., with office
address at 1161 M. dela Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila;
2) That the parties ADMIT that the plaintiff is a lessee of the Chamber of' Commerce of the Philippines at its
only building located at Magallanes Drive, Manila, which fact is particularly described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint;
3) That the parties ADMIT that on May 1, 1965, Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc. entered into a
contract with the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines whereby it agreed to furnish security guards to the
latter for the purpose of guarding and protecting its properties and installations located at Magallanes Drive,
Manila from theft, pilferage, robbery, arson or other unlawful acts by strangers or third parties, and the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines agreed to pay each guard assigned for said purpose the amount of
P200.00 a month:
4) That the parties ADMIT that as of November 26, 1965, the aforementioned contract was in force and Jose
Silvestre y Fajarillo was one of the security guards furnished by the defendant to the Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines to guard its properties and installations as provided in the contract;
5) That parties ADMIT that plaintiff has had no contract with the defendant for security services of its office
equipment and supplies and therefore its office equipment, supplies and other properties were never
accounted for and placed under the control of the defendant or any of its security guards assigned in the
premises of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines;
6) That the parties ADMIT that Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo was duty bound to and was in fact guarding the building,
properties and installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines on November 26, 1965, and that in
said building were contained the office equipments and supplies as well as the office of the plaintiff;
7) That the parties ADMIT that Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo while he was thus guarding the building, properties and
installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, conspired and confederated with an outsider,
Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas, who was only a 16-year old boy, and by mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force upon things and with intent of gain and against the
will of the owner thereof, allowed Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas to gain entrance to the office of the plaintiff by
passing thru a hole of the building left so when an air conditioner placed therein was taken out to be repaired,
and once inside, stole and carried away therefrom, office equipments of the plaintiff all valued at P5,440.00,
which facts are specifically mentioned in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
8) That the parties ADMIT that on June 16, 1966 the Court rendered its decision in the aforesaid criminal case,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court sentences defendant Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOUR (4)
YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS, also of prision correccional, as maximum, and defendant
Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court further orders both defendants to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Baza Marketing Corporation in
the sum of P5,440.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency not to exceed one-third (1/3) of
their respective principal penalties, and to pay the costs pro-rata.
SO ORDERED.
9) That the parties ADMIT that the foregoing decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued on August 13, 196C- for the enforcement of the civil liability of both accused as decreed in the decision,
but the same was returned unsatisfied, per return of the sheriff dated August 22, 1966, on the ground of
insolvency of both accused;
10) That the parties ADMIT that the extent of the damages of the plaintiff is P5,440.00;
11) That the parties ADMIT that plaintiff made demands in writing on defendant for it to pay the amount of
P5,440.00 which is the total value of the stolen office equipments but that the defendant refused to pay on the
ground that it is not subsidiarily liable for whatever civil liability was adjudged against Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo
in the aforementioned criminal case;
12) That plaintiff and defendant hereby incorporate by way of reference and make as an integral parts of this
pleading, the following documents which were admitted as exhibits in Civil Case No. 152058 of the City Court of
Manila where the instant case was originally tried and decided, to wit:
Photostat copy of the Agreement consisting of three (3) pages between the Bolinao
Security & Investigation Service, Inc. and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines,
dated May 1, 1965 (marked as Exhibit 'A').
Duplicate copy of the Notice of Order Decision dated July 15, 1966 in Criminal Case No.
80784 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo and Ernesto Secreto y Arcenas" rendered on June 16, 1966 with the
Decision consisting of eight (8) pages attached (marked as Exhibit 'B').
Portion of the decision pointing out the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence on the part of the defendant Jose Silvestre y Fajarillo and already marked as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 'B-1'.
Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance and already marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 'C'.
The Sheriff's Return dated August 22, 1966 of Deputy Sheriff, Dante Ortiz, and already
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 'D'.
13) That plaintiff and defendant submit to the discretion of this Honorable Court the propriety of awarding the
damages and attorney's fees prayed for in their complaint and counterclaim, respectively, and the amount
thereof.
Manila, Philippines, April 26,1968.
(Sgd.) ROLANDO S. CRISOL (Sgd.) MARIO F. RACELA
Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendant
Ground Floor, C.C.P. Bldg. 303 Wm. Li Yao Building
Magallanes Drive, Manila Rizal Avenue, Manila"
Solely on the basis of the above admissions and stipulations, the trial court rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint on the following ratiocination:
And so from this the sole issue to be solved by this Court, is whether Defendant which furnished security guards to his Chamber of
Commerce Building, wherein Plaintiff was one of the tenants, is subsidiarily liable for the civil liability imposed on one its security
guard as it has been proven that he is insolvent. Plaintiff's action is based on Art, 103 RPC, which requires three requisites before
such a subsidiary liability may arise: first, that the employer is engaged in a kind of industry: second, that the employee is insolvent
and third, that the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of ms duties. The first two requisites are present for the
furnishing of security guards in engaging in some kind of industry, and the Stipulation of Facts shows that the security guard is
insolvent. But was the crime committed while in the discharge of his duties? This Court does not think so. The duty of the security
guard was to guard the premises assigned to him. The final decision finding the security guard guilty of robbery shows that in
connivance with a 16-year old, gaining entrance through the opening left by the repair of the airconditioning unit, the robbers made
away with office equipment owned by Plaintiff in the sum of P5,440.00. It is clear that this connivance was not in the discharge of
his duties as security guard so that Defendant cannot be subsidiarily held liable for such an act.
The complaint is, therefore, dismissed with costs against Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified by the said Court to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involves pure questions
of law.
Plaintiff-appellant has assigned a single error in its brief to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE WAS NOT IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY WHEN HE
COMMITTED THE CRIME AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER COULD NOT BE HELD SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE.
The trial court expressed the view that defendant-appellee may not be held liable for the loss of the office equipments of plaintiff-appellant inasmuch as
the security guard was not acting in the discharge of his duties as such when the connived with Ernesto Secreto, who actually committed the robbery.
The clear import of the trial court's ruling is that the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may only arise if the employee
commits the crime of which he was found guilty in line or in pursuance of the discharge of his assigned duties.
Defendant-appellee agrees with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court but not on the ground expressed by it. Defendant-appellee denies liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the reason that the security guard in question was not assigned by defendant-appellee to guard the
plaintiff-appellant's properties, his duty being to act as a security guard of the properties of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Defendant-
appellee would admit that if the properties which were stolen belonged to the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, defendant- appellee would be
liable inasmuch as the unlawful taking occurred in the performance of discharge of the duties of the security guard.
Plaintiff-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the subsidiary liability of the eemployer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code does not
require that the employee commit the crime within the scope of his assigned tasks. Instead, it is enough if the employee committed the act while he was
doing his assigned task as such employee, or on the occasion thereof, it being immaterial whether the act or crime committed is a part of the employee's
duty or assigned task. Plaintiff-appellant cites the example given by recognized commentators on Criminal Law to illustrate his point, to wit: "Where a
workman of a construction company stole some things while he was making minor repairs in a house and after being prosecuted was found guilty and
the workman cannot satisfy his own civil liability, under such a circumstance, the company is liable subsidiarily for the restitution of the things or for the
payment of their value." (Reyes and Revised Penal Code, 1960 edition, pp. 632-633; Albert, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1945 edition, p.
282.) It is argued that, as in the given example, the subsidiary liability of the employer may be imposed even if the crime committed was not in the
discharge of the duties of the security guard, it not being a part of his duties to commit theft or robbery.
We sustain the trial court's dismissal of the case. The law makes the employer subsidiarily liable for the civil liability arising from a crime committed by
an employee "in the discharge of his duties." (Article 103, Revised Penal Code.) This subsidiary liability does not arise from any and all offenses that the
employee may commit, but limited to those which he shall be found guilty of in the discharge of his duties. The law does not say, as urged by plaintiff-
appellant, that the crime of the employee must be the one committed "while in the discharge of his duties." It could not be contemplated that an
employer will be held responsible for any misdeed that his employee could have done while performing his assigned tasks. Thus, it is neither just nor
logical that, if a security guard committed robbery in a neighboring establishment near the one he is assigned to guard, or raped a woman passerby in
the course of his tour of duty, his employer should be made subsidiarily liable for his said misdeed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
crime was committed by the employee "in the discharge of his duties."
This conclusion is supported by the ruling in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568, wherein it was held that the subsidiary liability of the employer does not
arise where the owner of the car which figured in an accident causing the death of one and injuries to another, the said accident not having occurred in
the course of the performance of the duties for which the driver had been hired, it appearing therein that the driver took the car without the employer's
knowledge and used it as if it were his own.
In the case at bar, the security guard was assigned to guard the building, properties and installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.
(Paragraph 6, Stipulations of Facts.) The contract for security was between defendant-appellee and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.
(Paragraph 3, Ibid.) No contract was ever entered by the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee for security services of its office equipments and
supplies which were never accounted for and placed under the control of defendant-appellee or any of the security guards assigned in the premises of
the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, (Paragraph 5, Ibid) In conniving with another to steal or rob the office equipments of plaintiff-appellant,
the security guard in question may not be said have acted in the discharge of his duties as security guard. 'The circumstance that the office of plaintiff-
appellant is in the same building for which defendant-appellee had a contract for security service does not materially change the legal implication of the
said act. For all legal intents and purposes, the robbery could have been committed in a neighboring building or establishment, in which case, it may
hardly be argued that the employer of the security guard should be made responsible for the cosnequences of such malefaction.
Plaintiff-appellant may not derive decisive support for his contention from the example given by the commentaries on Criminal Law hereinabove-
mentioned. It is not correct to say that the employer's subsidiary liability will be imposed even when the act is not done in pursuance of the duties of the
employee, the act of stealing not being included in an employee's assigned tasks: nor would an employer ever include among the duties of his employee
the commission of a crime. The act contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily a crime from which civil liability had arisen but
which could not be satisfied by the accused employee. The statutory limitation that the crime of the employee must have been committed "in the
discharge of his duties" is clearly intended to exclude crimes not related to the performance of the duties assigned to him by his employer. The crime in
question pertains to this latter category.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
The lower court, after noting that the case was on appeal before it from the Bacolod city court's order dated March 30, 1966 dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, related in its own dismissal order of August 29, 1966 the factual background of the case thus: "(I)t appears that in the evening of February 1,
1961, while Antonio Regoles was driving the truck of the defendant Federico Serfino, through his negligence and carelessness, said truck collided with
another truck parked on the right side of the road near kilometer 5 in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental. As a consequence of said collision his
co-employee Artemio Jamelo suffered injuries and he died. The mother of the late Artemio Jamelo filed in the Court of First Instance Civil Case No. 6198,
entitled 'Anita Jamelo vs. Antonio Regoles' for damages on May 15, 1961. On August 26, 1963 the Court of First Instance rendered a decision declaring the
defendant Antonio Regoles responsible for the death of Artemio Jamelo, and ordered Antonio Regoles to pay P6,000.00 to the plaintiff Anita Jamelo and to
pay an additional sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals, affirmed on June 10, 1965, the decision of the Court of First Instance. On
October 25, 1965, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court. On November 17, 1965 the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental returned
unsatisfied the writ of execution, stating that the defendant Antonio Resoles was insolvent. Consequently, the plaintiff Anita Jamelo filed this present
action against the defendant Federico Serfino for subsidiary liability as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles, claiming that said
defendant Federico Serfino is subsidiarily liable to pay the amount of P8,000.00 adjudged by the Court of Appeals against the defendant driver Antonio
Regoles who was
insolvent."1
The lower court then recounted that "(T)he defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, and if there is
any action, same has already prescribed. Defendant brought (out) the fact that there was no criminal complaint filed against the driver Antonio Regoles.
Plaintiff filed only a Civil Case No. 6198 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the driver Antonio Regoles. The present defendant owner
of the truck, Federico Serfino, was not included as one of the party defendants. The plaintiff evidently filed this present complaint under the provisions of
Art. 103 in relation with Art. 102 of the Revised Penal Code. Defendant contends that, there being no judgment in a criminal case filed against the driver
Antonio Regoles, the defendant in this present case Federico Serfino is not subsidiarily
liable."2
On the strength of Martinez vs. Barredo3 ruling that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the driver-accused and the
offended party, binds civilly the employer as the person subsidiarily liable under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code — such liability not being a
primary liability under the provisions on quasi-delict of the Civil Code but "a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
driver's criminalnegligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action" — the lower court found defendant's motion to dismiss
to be meritorious.
The lower court held that "subsidiary liability presuposes that there was a criminal action. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liabilitywould
not be predicated on Art. 103, (Revised Penal Code)" and accordingly ordered the dismissal of plaintiff's action, which sought to declare defendant-
employer subsidiarily liable to pay the P8,000.00-damages awarded plaintiff in her civil judgment against the insolvent driver.
Plaintiff-appellant formulates her issue on the case thus: "(I)s the conviction of the driver Antonio Regoles of the criminal case filed against him for the
death of plaintiff's son, Artemio Jamelo, a condition precedent in order that an action for subsidiary liability based on Arts. 103 and 102 of the Revised Penal
Code may lie against the defendant Federico Serfino as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles?" and submits "that the conviction of
the employee of the crime he was charged while in the performance of his duties is not a legal requirement before an action for subsidiary liability against
his employer under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code could be predicated."
Plaintiff-appellant's position is untenable. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code4 where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. What apparently unfortunately happened here is that plaintiff filed an independent
civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio Regoles based on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's son and secured
the P8,000.00 damage judgment against him alone, which she could not collect, however, due to his insolvency.
Plaintiff does not state what ever happened to the criminal action against him except to contend in her brief that in filing such independent civil action, "she
loses her right to intervene in the prosecution of the said criminal case against Antonio Regoles and that its dismissal will not bar the civil action she had
already filed against the said Antonio Regoles."5 Such civil judgment is enforceable solely and exclusively against the only defendant therein, the erring
driver, Regoles. But this is an entirely different matter from trying now to enforce said civil judgment in this action on the groundless basis of an alleged
subsidiary liability against defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The basis is groundless without the prior criminal conviction of
the driver-employee which is a condition sine qua non for the subsidiary liability of the employer to come into being under the cited provision of the Revised
Penal Code.
It is clear then that there having been no criminal conviction of the employee wherein his civil liability was determined and fixed, no subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code can be claimed against defendant-employer.
A direct and separate civil action for damages against defendant-employer for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, subject however to the
defense therein provided of proving due diligence in the choice and supervision of the employee, would have lain against defendant, if timely filed. Even if
the Court were to hold that the action filed below by plaintiff-appellant could be considered such a separate and direct action for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict — against plaintiff's own disclaimer and insistence that she wants to enforce the non-existent subsidiaryliability of defendant-employer — the
Court is constrained to sustain the dismissal order of the lower court, since such an action is now clearly barred by prescription as duly invoked by
defendant-appellee in his dismissal motion.
Actions based upon quasi-delicts prescribe after four years from the commission of the fault or negligent deed. 6Since the accident causing the death of
plaintiff's son occurred on February 1, 1961, the filing of the complaint below only on March 10, 1966 was already barred by the lapse of more than a year
beyond the four-year prescription period.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.