FLORENTINO ATILLO III v.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELD
G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997
Judicial Admissions
FACTS
Respondent Amancor, Inc. (AMANCOR) a corporation then owned and
controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III, contracted a loan in the
amount of P1,000,000 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
secured by real estate properties. Before the said loan could be paid,
petitioner entered into a MOA with respondent Michell Lhuillier
(LHUILLIER) whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As
a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER
each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of
AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%.
Due to the need for more capital to support the business operations of
AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER executed another MOA by virtue of
which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As
a result, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
the petitioner and LHUILLIER which states:
F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St.,
Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage
loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may
not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay
the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate.
Thereafter, petitioner incurred a 300,000 loan balance with Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the amount of P300,00 with some
of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which
remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Since AMANCOR failed
to pay, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money. Court
thereafter ordered AMANCOR to pay petitioner P199,888.89 plus interest.
The court absolved LHUILLIER. The petitioner appealed claiming that
LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable with
AMANCOR.
ISSUE
Whether there was res judicata- YES
The claim that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the appellees as
they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading is untenable. This is
because the postponement of hearing on January 14, 1957 to May 16,
1957 was due to respondents. Likewise, the hearing set on May 16, 1957
was postponed to July 12, 1957 upon motion of the respondents.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have
dismissed his first petition for annulment because no "parole"
evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged
being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and
L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial
notice and cognizance of the said court.
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in
the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge
Additionally, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice
of such records, he should have presented the proper request or
manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic
motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied.
Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was
taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said order had long
become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
Lastly, there was res judicata since the first petition (amending the records)
is similar to the present petition (asking for reconveyance of land) as in both
instances the effect would be the reversion of 157 hectares at issue. The
claim for damages and other reliefs are not materially different from “such
other remedies, just and equitable in the premises" prayed for in the first
case.