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Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |1

G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918 place upon July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon
August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. About seven years after the confirmation of this
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as
vs.
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco,
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-
wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the
appellant.
judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant. this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
Hartigan and Welch for appellee. thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this action
upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has appealed. No
June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the action of the court upon
Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to said motion.
P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be the
quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in
sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose of
question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this
argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in the
instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he
matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in this
there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether those proceedings were conducted
for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several different,
court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that
though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and
particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire
court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
of China. This order was made pursuant to the following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
Civil Procedure:
and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the relief it may grant.
judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence
to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however, among the Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post- from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing publication as within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at
from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter emanated from the office. the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of
the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been properly to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given mail. The court, upon this against all the world.
occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from
March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in
said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs
Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |2
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations,
property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has said: purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this
proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure;
they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they are We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the foreclosure
substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself
object is the enforcement of the lien against the res; in the common law, they would be different personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power
in chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is
right ass an equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against
seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. the property itself.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires personal
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth
considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be acquired by publication and
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment, notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts until after the decision had been
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language: rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S.
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident, 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which have subsequently been
that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus
demand which may be established against the defendant by the final judgment of the court. But, acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a
if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear is
in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to subject the property wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by
attached to the payment of the defendant which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. ; publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the
only exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is
consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35
to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the property to that
lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from the
not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law requires that
though the property had been seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State, or by
520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an attachment the property may be seized at the his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal
inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until the time liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based
comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine
that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a
rem. nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore
it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from the statutes in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the cause of action is exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122
obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.) It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment
an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal service of process entered in the court below offends against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because
upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, the court in fact entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the
remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment. In a foreclosure proceeding
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the
impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring
that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of present case the judgment which was entered contains the following words:
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Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that form. (Cooley
indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . . on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc., etc.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a compliance with owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact
the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence of this it may be come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even
observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon
deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the
mortgage debt. (sec. 260). mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice
does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of the where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to
failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall
that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner,
could be given to a resident of a foreign country. Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
observe that we are fully aware that many reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
question of the sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the
jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some
This phraseology was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between service way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this,
by the publication and personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such
suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
the two forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which
It has been well said by an American court:
had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have been brought down to the
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive notice,
present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language in
then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without
which the courts have expounded their ideas.
either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no personal
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property, then no
of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was secured by the Act of effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would be that the courts would be
Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable one.
In dealing with questions involving the application of the constitutional provisions relating to due process (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
of law the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from attempting to define with precision the
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other form of
meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many
notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the publication of notice in
diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to
the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements of the law has been held to
a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is
be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
held that where newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over
publication was insufficient. With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of
the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We
hearing. Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To
the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform
answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the
his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or
mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or
destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered
substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner
to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing upon the clerk the duty of
may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon
sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in
him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish
the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates
master of constitutional law has used the following language:
to the sending of notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question as to
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with that
from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing requirement will be discussed by us further on.
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The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the The moving party has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the
notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case.
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January
Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in 1906; and the
unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the
proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated August 7,
proceedings.
1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end
viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage
jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that he had no knowledge of those
it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of things
the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that that he should have acquired information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the
step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the basis of this rational assumption we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume
other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due that he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things have
duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was
happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of a situation
fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the
more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this
purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the
presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the probability that the defendant
exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the
may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to him in
provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used
process of law has not been infringed.
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to may say that in view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of
send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the
irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these conclusions defendant, there being no proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it
the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still necessary, however, to was delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the
consider its effect considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view, however, it is obvious Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the mailing
that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle and frivolous; but
shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of applying to this situation
the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good defense against the action to foreclose the the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported by the
mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily
accompanies the motion. abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation which he had placed upon it; that
knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the proceedings is
those proceedings after they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the merit
usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the relief is sought, and in
of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for
addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general statement that a
relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only
party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a
qualified a few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself
judgment is void upon its face a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R.
existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe that the delay in
C. L., 718.) The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this
the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance which is imputable to
connection we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication:
the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted an action
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if in their own right to recover the property, it would have been different.
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was entered,
became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which had
except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that the party making
been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it appears that
the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and with ordinary diligence.
in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the notarial
Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed sufficient ground for refusing the
document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value
relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the finality of judgments, and
therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should
acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this character, since courts are always
remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for
reluctant to interfere with judgments, and especially where they have been executed or satisfied.
all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the appellant that when the
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bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation. It has been held by this general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or
court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a foreclosure, nor decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees
affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to
cases here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have
becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the owners;
question need not here be considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient to pay the
purchasing for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within
the contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the law as to notices
of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the which are directory to the administrators have been complied with. . . . The court is not bound to
plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset price and the price at which enter upon the record the evidence on which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2
in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the disposition which the court made of this Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all this apply after long lapse of time.
case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion
the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance. in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to foreclose a
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the action or mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should
that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be permitted to be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the front door of the court house
add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church as the court should
closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a nonresident, after publication in
the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The maximum here applicable is non pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the proceedings was called in question in
quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that publication had been made in its
United States: columns as required by law; but no proof was offered to show the publication of the order at the church,
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those or the posting of it at the front door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the
proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the property, for no The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title which he has reason to fear presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . . It is
may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and not readily discoverable defect. to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to see that its order for
(Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.) constructive service, on which its right to make the decree depended, had been obeyed.

In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure proceedings It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while in
on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based erroneously stated that the the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against it. The same
State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did not affect general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction,
the validity of the proceedings. In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being that in case of indirect attack
the notice by post as required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void,
proper assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in certain cases be overcome by
that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is not proof extrinsic to the record.
overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause. The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the knowledge
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to support the
"that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared that there is a conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that there ought to be
presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These presumptions are of course found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section 400 of the Code of Civil
in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The
et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the law in recognizing these
the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the face of such an omission. If we
require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of
case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting
with the business of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of
litigant must depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed. such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no of that piece of paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings
principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court of and for the interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a
Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |6
conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal representative from the
that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
proper proof of that fact. excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The
Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of papers
first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows:
which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally deposited in the
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is
archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of general information that no
unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court
judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the
of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy
pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated; and in particular, no such
exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter,
Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a
setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside. . . .
matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not
have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy
and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in the entire provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means
file. But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment
upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila, to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation. The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a
Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty and complete system of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions describing with much fullness the
that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it various steps to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the
for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively method of beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795
appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and had directed the notification of the same Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the
to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to comply provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and
with the exact terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has
erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight been once concluded.
basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions; and
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the evidence or the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the motion
makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or was proper. If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear that, if
it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was served at a particular place or in a based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have already
particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was also made at another place or in a different seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant.
manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it will not be The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked
presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be
Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in this. Where a judgment or
entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making the return is the officer who is by law judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
required to make the return, we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
the affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere
intermeddler. But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged
defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could be shown to
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the judgment of resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of law and practice, long
July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed, recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has
proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted. The passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into
proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation
merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may again resume its of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken without due process,
regular course. the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been
void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority of a
by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure defines the conditions under
Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the same
which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a
cause. This is as follows:
proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure
Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |7
here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion 4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee.
will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void SO ORDERED.[4]
on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its
After learning of the adverse decision against him, petitioners counsel filed with the Regional Trial
face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and
proceeding in court for that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It
docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.[5]
will be noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the
writ of execution.[6] Petitioner was given a grace period of one month within which to vacate the premises.
same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
His real property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was
levied and sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the monetary award.[7]
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief
[G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002] from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.[8] In support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE of merit,[9] alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. [10]
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. judgment.[11] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion
DECISION for Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14, 1997.[12] On the same day, a writ of demolition
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: was issued commanding the sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by petitioner on the
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, subject premises and to deliver the possession thereof to respondents.[13]
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered 432O2.[14] On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. [15] Petitioners Motion for
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Reconsideration was denied on November 14, 1997.[16] Hence this petition for review.
Filomena Bernardo. The petition is impressed with merit.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite. [1] They alleged defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons
that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein,
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. or by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner.[2] At the time of service of summons in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service
at petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed
Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was of.[17]
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing
with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge him.
by the Rehabilitation Committee.[3] Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to declare time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons
petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows: by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and charge thereof.
against the defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming rights under him: We have long held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service
1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the finality of the decision. should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The
2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service
up to the time he surrenders the premises considered as damages for the use of the or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is only under exceptional terms
subject land. that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees with an bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
additional P800.00 as appearance fees.
Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |8
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first
justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.[18] be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.[21]
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989 By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner was not duly apprised of the action against
to stress the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service, to wit: him. Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims against him. He was not given a chance
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty and erroneous implementation of Section 8, Rule to be heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court had actual knowledge that
14, Rules of Court on Substituted Service of Summons. petitioner was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to the complaint, as he was then confined at
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriffs the NBI-TRC. The trial courts failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated
together with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
substituted service as follows:
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual
xxx xxx xxx
notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA
liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it
305, must be strictly complied with, thus:
clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should
The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[22]
personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed in frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable
the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
followed strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than authorized by the statute is considered examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure
ineffective. For immediate compliance. are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is
In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons simply states: empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid
application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together
fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against
with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant REGALADO
petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and
SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of said court
relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial
processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto attached.
court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby respectfully returned to the court of origin duly
afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.[23]
served for information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.[19] In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Regional Trial Court, the petition for relief, filed
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed
on November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment
to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that
case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for relief should have been reckoned from
efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to
the date petitioner learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not have been counted
substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in
from the date of the Municipal Trial Courts decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the same. It was
derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant
the Regional Trial Courts decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for
to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another
relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final and executory
whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to
judgment.[24]
faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief must
ineffective.[20]
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that to be set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order has been entered or
petitioners brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age such proceeding has been taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
and discretion residing at petitioners residence. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service cause of action or defense.[25] It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of
of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears
afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules is that the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime
regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month period
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in prescribed by the Rules.
Constitutional Law II Session 1Page |9
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He alleged In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work permits violated
therein that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its registered owner. the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,[8] to wit:
Ownership is a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is the main issue in ejectment, it Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated, but not
is also one of the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an owner of real property is entitled to prevented from carrying on their business.
possession of the same. Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of possession to defeat that of
Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary
respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot exercise the seven "juses or attributes of ownership - the right
restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or
WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain from inspecting or
vindicate and to the fruits - is a crippled owner.[26] All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the
otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.).[9]
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Hence, all
proceedings had as regards petitioner were null and void. Necessarily, the enforcement of the writ of At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On January
execution as well as the sale at public auction of petitioners real property to satisfy the void judgment must 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. The
also be declared of no legal effect. dispositive portion of the trial courts order declared:
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over the premises in order to determine who, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary
as between petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess the property in dispute. This can only injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his authority, are and (sic)
be done in the proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be afforded every right to ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business
present evidence in his behalf. operations of Petitioner Corporations establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his official duties,
of Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required. On the other hand, Petitioners
Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file his answer and present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby denied, for to grant the same would amount to
hear and decide the case. The Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated granting the writ of mandamus prayed for. The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties shall
January 14, 1997, and the certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all have been heard on the merits.[10]
acts and deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED. However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations effective
January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed
an Urgent Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen who stopped Bistros operations on January
23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on
[G.R. No. 111397. August 12, 2002] condition that Lim would respect the courts injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business
HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents. operations. Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January
DECISION 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate
CARPIO, J.: commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue,
The Case suspend or revoke business permits and licenses.This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local
25, 1993,[2] and its Resolution dated July 13, 1993[3] which denied petitioners motion for Government Code of 1991.
reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order dated
and March 2, 1993,[4] issued by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial courts orders March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim (Lim for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned (1) The denial of respondents motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction or the
by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. (Bistro for brevity). dismissal of the instant case;
The Antecedent Facts (2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other impediments which
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition[5] for mandamus and prohibition, with were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and Exotic Garden Restaurant on February
prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume
of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and their operations;
investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the (3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed establishments of
stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations. [6] Lim also refused to accept Bistros petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993. [7] (4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to respondent to elevate
the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court.[11]
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 10
Bistros cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work disruption in
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed grave abuse
Bistros operations caused by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lims refusal to issue a business license to
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. On
Bistro and work permits to its staff for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the issuance
March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.[12] In a resolution dated July 13, 1993,
of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept
the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion for reconsideration.[13] On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No.
Bistros 1993 business license application and to issue Bistros business license. Also, the mandatory injunction
7783[14] took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently
seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of Bistros staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory
close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once.[15]
injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding or
In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
otherwise closing down Bistros operations pending resolution of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue
discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced.
Bistros business license and its staffs work permits for the year 1993. Lim contends that the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of
x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable
Manila, to grant and refuse municipal licenses and business permits as expressly provided for in the Local
injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the powers granted by
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant
these laws implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and close down Bistros operations for violation
to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
of the conditions of its licenses and permits.
action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of
the case. On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the
instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing the assailed
do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to
orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the petition is
specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistros
pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent correctly points out that the questioned writ was
business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro due process of law.The
regularly issued after several hearings, in which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory
their respective positions.
preliminary injunction. We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise of discretion of
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly
the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case of abuse thereof. x x x.
provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED.[16]
Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall
Hence, this petition.
be:
The Issues x x x.
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues: (l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for
1. DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the
1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993? business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest.
2. DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS
ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
1993?
Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
3. DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME MOOT AND
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF
City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO.
(3) x x x.
7783?
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
The Ruling of the Court condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
The petition is without merit. ordinance.(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court or
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses
the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another case, [17] the Court will deal only with
and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the
the first two issues raised by petitioner.
same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the violation of the
condition(s) on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 11
licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991
and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner
must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police
RESOLUTION
raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial
FELICIANO, J.:
establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution
and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716[18] which expressly prohibits
promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No.
police raids and inspections, to wit:
SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision
Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's
permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies. (Emphasis supplied) On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease
and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by
Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila,[19] and the City Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Government Code.[20]
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila without Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on
Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume
to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was
provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988 showed that
Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the
law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros
law.[21] Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing
that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass
clause of the Constitution. showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended
Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103
permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration of its business license on of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in effect denying the WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites. Lims zeal in his campaign against Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater
prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal
concern for his constituents when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such
area. However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until further orders from this Board.
business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim. SO ORDERED.1
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial courts orders. The sole objective We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution
fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;2 and
disposed of.[22] In the instant case, the issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and
dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and Natural Resources ("DENR").
stoppage in Bistros operations as a consequence of Lims closure orders. The injunction was intended to
maintain the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on the merits. The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-
operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining
in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto. 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant.
SO ORDERED.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 12
Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations. (a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that
the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by
or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the
the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Meantime, Solar filed a motion for
Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such
this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to
sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities.
immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or
In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the
abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
court. (Emphasis supplied)
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No.
desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an
Q-89-2287. On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds,
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not
was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had
essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect
the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may
addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment
Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that: exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate
facilities.3 threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set
by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.
academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved
for reconsideration, without success. The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the
that: Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health,
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.''
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for
chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants"
certiorari.
must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are
court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. Petitioner Board claims that classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in
under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations part provides that:
of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC a safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall
(now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges be classified according to the following beneficial usages:
of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 (a) Fresh Surface Water
of the 1982 Effluent Code. Classification Best usage
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering
may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or and industrial cooling and processing.
welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before (Emphases supplied)
the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:
to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 13
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of
of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.6 the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its
existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside
wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended
the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:
that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. . . .10

"Inland November September The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
Waters 1986 1988 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9 combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per
Station 1 Station 1 minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled
platinum (Apparent into the plant's existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
cobalt Color) 2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet
units installed.1âwphi1 Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7 seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection
ture in °C (°C) tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1 mg./1. analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and
suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .)11
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
solids in solids in From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the
mg./1. mg./1. Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152 and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting
mg./1. mg./1 the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December
in mg./1. mg./1. 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93 was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant
mg./1." mg./1. MBAS on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results
of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an
i) Dissolved 0
oxygen, mg./1.
ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were
conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5 appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis
Matter, mg./1.
Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
k) Total Dis 800 610 effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its
solved Solids Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. In this connection, we note that
mg./1.
in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently upheld the summary
l) Total Solids 1,400 690 closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO 3
70 finding that the records showed that:
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that: 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of
Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department
completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic). much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of
instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before the community from the emission in the operation of the business.
an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection. 2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 14
locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue
stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of
xxx xxx xxx effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ
(Annex A-2, petition)
of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B,
dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial
petition).. . .
court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by
Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET
has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition) ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the
xxx xxx xxx decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing
Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May before the Board.
25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its
permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community."
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but
by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable WORKERS’ BROTHERHOOD, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Respondents.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into Relations.
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and SYLLABUS
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The 1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. — The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort 2. TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW. — The Court of Industrial Relations is not
of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco v. Court of
power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar Industrial Relations Et. Al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may
temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements
not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by
disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations. It should 3. CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. — There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of
Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to
controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 15
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial "4. That the National Workers’ Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioner’s printed
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable memorandum, p. 25.)
from the authority conferred upon it.
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
4. CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. — In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
National Workers’ Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always
not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
been the rule.
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue "7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted,
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
and the entire record of this’ case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
Industrial Relations.
that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision. "9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."cralaw
DECISION
virtua1aw library
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after stated with reference to the motion for a
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la obra; motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin
the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the
tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica en la
cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma; nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
duracion y sin ser para una obra determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their
en virtud del paro."cralaw virtua1aw library own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
for a new trial, and avers: creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
"1. That Toribio Teodoro’s claim that on September 26,1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
native dealers in leather. will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work. consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
"3. That Toribio Teodoro’s letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 16
from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila v. Agustin, G.
employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-
R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S.
thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the
dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that ’the rules of evidence
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct.
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct.
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220,
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
In the case of Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.
(Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431. )Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.
or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material
the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal,
fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said
character: Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the
Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."cralaw virtua1aw library subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority
Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or
Court in Edwards v. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration." (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards v. McCoy, supra.) In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers’ Brotherhood (appendix A), the
is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 17
way, a conclusion of law. referred Cosinos complaint that the latter collected from Virfinia Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and
Mariano Evangelista, the amounts of P20,000.00 each, upon petitioner's word that they would be in
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent
exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao and Cosino claimed that the promised passport and visas did not
National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the National Labor Union,
materialize and despite many requests for the return of the amounts paid to petitioner, she refused to
Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
comply. Allegedly, "Vertudez threatened them that they cannot force her to pay back the said amount as
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and
she has the back up [of] higher BID officials."
this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather" ; that "the National Workers’ Brotherhood Union of Ang Acting upon Villas' letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a memorandum,[5] directing the petitioner to
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of submit a sworn written explanation. In her sworn written memorandum,[6] petitioner assailed the credibility
which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove of Villas. She alleged that Villas was not a member of the National Press Club as he claimed to be. She
his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due averred that the sum of P50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, was extended
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of to her by private respondent Buenaflor as a loan. She was constrained to borrow money from private
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching respondent and other close friends when her brother became seriously ill. However, she claimed that she
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the had fully settled her obligation to private respondent through installment. She also claimed that private
judgment rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the respondent was the one engaged in illegal recruitment through the use of falsified or forged passports.
petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of Private respondent was allegedly using petitioners name in dealing with some immigration officials and
justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents employees to expedite the processing of the documents of her (private respondents) clients. Petitioner
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The allegedly informed said officers and employees that she was not connected to private respondent in any
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to way. Private respondent allegedly resented this "abrupt disassociation." Also, her repeated refusal to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the "escort" private respondent's clients who were leaving for abroad using falsified travel documents allegedly
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire led private respondent to threaten her that she could easily use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 as
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen evidence to file charges against petitioner by making it appear that she (private respondent) gave the
the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the money because of petitioner's promise to facilitate her travel to Japan. Petitioner denied having received
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered. the sum of P29,000.00 from private respondent, contending that such claim is "pure falsehood because of
the absence of document to prove the alleged receipt." As regards the complaints of Lao and Cosino,
petitioner denied having met or known said persons.
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,[1] G.R. No. 153166 Finding petitioners explanation "unsatisfactory and [her] defense weak," Commissioner Rodriguez issued
- versus - Personnel Order No. RBR 98-60,[7] preventively suspending her for sixty (60) days pending the investigation
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, of the case. The instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor Norberto dela Cruz, who issued a
subpoena[8] ordering private respondent and petitioner to appear before him on October 15, 1998 for the
DECISION formal investigation of the case. It appears that in the meantime, Villas died and private respondent
personally took on the instant complaint with the BI for Grave Misconduct against petitioner, docketed as
PUNO, J.:
Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed their respective complaint-affidavits[9] with the BI
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and
which became the subject of another administrative case against petitioner. [10]On August 21, 1998,
set aside the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order No. RBR-98-60) with Motion to
Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from
Dismiss.[11] On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Prayer to Resolve Motion
government service.
to Dismiss,[12] averring that the complaint instituted by Villas in behalf of private respondent was a
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner at the Alien Registration Division of the
harassment case against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant action on the ground that in
Bureau of Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter[4] dated July 27, 1998, a certain Peng Villas, a news editor
addition to the instant administrative case, private respondent had personally filed her complaint-affidavit
of the Philippine Weekly Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez the complaints of
"of similar nature and character" with the Manila City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as 98-H-44000-1, and
private respondent Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against petitioner.
with the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-98-1701.
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into
Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her complaint-affidavit[13] as follows:
paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport and other travel
1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the Bureau of Immigration
documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797
and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila sometime in the middle part of 1996;
and 0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00.
2. That from that time on, we became friends because we come from the same
However, no visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail.
region and that she used to tell us that she is capable of deploying job applicants to
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that he Japan;
paid P60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and a passport for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 18
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by her office, she intimated October 27, 1998, during which, petitioner submitted her Counter-Affidavit[16] and the affidavits of her
to me that a group of Immigration Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training witnesses.Her version was:
and that she was the one who received a call from a Japanese Consul; 4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was still assigned at
4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in going to Japan the General Services Division of the Bureau of Immigration;
because she will find a way to accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply 4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she was connected
interested but my problem was that my passport was left in Bacolod City and she with a travel agency assigned to process/facilitate documents of their clients in the
volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate the processing of my passport and visa and that Buereau of Immigration;
[all] I need to do is give her my picture which I did; 4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making follow-ups of
5. That she even added that she has a brother in Japan who could also help documents in the different Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar
me find a job and I will be going there along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. to what were being done by the representatives of other travel agencies transacting
She showed to me her son's passport and application for a Visa, copies of which are business therewith;
attached and marked as Annexes "A", "B" and "C"; 4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became close friends because
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a salary of one lapad per she frequently visited me in my office at General Services Division and would even stay
day as a factory worker and that should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of thereat while processing documents and waiting for their release. In fact, she often took
me is to give her the amount of P80,000.00; her lunch and merienda with me and sometimes, with the other employees of our
7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from me Security Bank division;
Check No. 0014797 in the amount of P30,000.00 which she was able to encash and 4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was informed by my
likewise Security Bank Check No. 0014798 in the amount of P20,000.00 x x x Annexes relatives in our hometown that my brother, Mariano "Dido" Vertudes was seriously ill and
"D" and "E"; was thereafter confined on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog General Hospital located at
8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and persistence that I Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;
should deliver the balance of P30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week's time, I 4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive treatment and
was forced to produce the said amount by requesting a friend to pawn my jewelry in the medication; and for this reason, they requested for financial assistance to defray the
amount of P29,000.00 and the aforesaid amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the expenses therefor;
presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in (BID), Intramuros, Manila; 4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained to borrow money
9. That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to when I am with interests from Ms. Buenaflor and other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on
suppose[d] to leave because I was already prepared to leave and have in fact told my the part of Ms. Buenaflor she extended to me a loan in the total amount of P50,000.00
relatives and friends that I will be leaving soon for Japan but she did not stop making as represented by Security Bank check nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective
promises; amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 (citation omitted);
10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to know once and for all 4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the amount of P50,000.00
whether I could still leave, I requested my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for with the additional amount of P10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total
her to refund the sums of money which I delivered to her in the total amount of P60,000.00;
of P79,000.00 for the processing of my Passport and Visa for job deployment abroad but 4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial obligation to Ms. Buenaflor
she did not even answer the letter and neither called up my lawyer to explain her side; on or before the last day of May 1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
letter is attached as Annex "E"; 4.10. With the aforementioned amount of P50,000.00 loaned to me by Julie
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes' failure to make good her promise to deploy Buenaflor and the other amounts x x x from other friends, I was able to contribute the
me after receiving the amount of P79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in total amount of P100,000.00 for the treatment and hospitalization of my brother. It was,
Japan, I hereby charge her for the crime of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; x x x however, to no avail because my brother died on January 6, 1998;
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms. Buenaflor on
Annexed to private respondent's complaint-affidavit were: a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn installment basis the total amount of P60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the
Gutierrez[14] who attested that she accompanied private respondent in going to the office of petitioner and following dates:
she was with private respondent when the latter delivered to petitioner the checks amounting to P50,000.00 DATE AMOUNT
and cash worth P29,000.00 for private respondent's job placement to Japan; b) copies of the passport and February 28, 1998 P15,000.00
application for a visa of petitioner's son, to prove that petitioner showed these documents to her so she March 31, 1998 15,000.00
would believe that she would be going to Japan with petitioner's son; c) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 April 30, 1998 15,000.00
and 0014798, to prove petitioner's receipt of the total amount of P50,000.00 from private respondent; and May 30, 1998 15,000.00
d) letter of private respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding the refund of P79,000.00 from petitioner. 4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my residence on the
dates earlier enumerated in the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, and private respondent appeared before
Reyes; x x x
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the case.[15] The second hearing took place on
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 19
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented to her (petitioner's) son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., that The fact that complainant paid P79,000.00 to the respondent so she could get a passport
she (private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in Japan. She also assailed the and a visa to work in Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was desperately
credibility of private respondent by accusing her of using several passports under different names. Attached in need of a job. For her to give such amount to the respondent as an unsecured loan is
to petitioner's counter-affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application in the name of Honna Sumadia extremely incredulous. Respondent's claim that the present complaint is pure
Araneta showing the photographs of private respondent; b) referral slip of the Pasay City Police Station and harassment by the complainant is completely bereft of credence. What benefit or
the sworn statement of a certain Armando Gambala charging private respondent with Estafa and Illegal advantage would the complainant achieve in fabricating charges against the respondent?
Recruitment;[17] c) affidavits of petitioner's son, Jimmy Santos, Jr.,[18] and a certain Enrico Tuazon, showing
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was wronged by the
that they likewise filed a case for Estafa and Illegal Recruitment against private respondent; and d) a copy
respondent.
of the Certificate of Business Name and Certification[19] issued by Prudential Bank, to prove that private
Likewise, respondent's allegation that the P50,000.00 she received from the complainant
respondent misstated the address of her business establishment. Petitioner also submitted to Special
was a loan because she (respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed
Prosecutor dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay[20] of her two housemaids, Eliza Compo and
money to help her sick brother in the province was belied by her own son, Jimmy V.
Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to private respondent. Likewise, she submitted
Santos, Jr., who declared in his Affidavit that sometime in December 1997, he
the handwritten joint sworn statement[21] of Ernesto V. Cloma and Jhun M. Romero, media practitioners,
gave P50,000.00 to the complainant so that the latter could obtain a tourist visa for him
to prove that Villas asked for petitioners forgiveness before he died, admitting that he only sent his letter
to Japan. Why should the respondent bother to get a P50,000.00 loan from the
dated July 27, 1998 to Commissioner Rodriguez in consideration of the amount given by private respondent.
complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could readily obtain this amount from
On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the instant case for resolution.[22] Thus, in his Resolution her own son?
dated November 12, 1998,[23] Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and As to respondent's assertion that she was able to pay the P50,000.00 to the complainant,
recommended her dismissal from the service. Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with the there is nothing to support such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids -- Eliza
Office of the Ombudsman was referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor, thus: C[o]mpo and Jocelyn Reyes -- in their Sinumpaang Salaysay that respondent paid to the
After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed against the complainant the total amount of P60,000.00 during the months of February 1998 to May
respondent are not office related and that the administrative aspect of the case had 1998 cannot be believed. Being the housemaids of the respondent, it is but natural and
already been undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration. to be expected of these persons to come to the aid of their employe[r].[28]
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint
be referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,[29] reiterating her
action. argument in her Motion to Re-open. Again, the motion was denied.[30]Subsequently, the
SO ORDERED.[24] (emphases supplied) assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open[25] with the BI, contending that the finding of the Ombudsman that Cuevas.[31]Petitioner appealed to the CSC,[32] raising the issues of lack of due process
"the charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related" clearly shows that she is not and lack of substantial evidence. On November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner's
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case "to allow her to appeal. It held, in part, that:
adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Ombudsman." The motion, however, was A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of appellant reveals that the
denied for lack of merit.[26] requirements of due process have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this
case.
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial evidence to prove that
Prosecutor dela Cruz, viz:
respondent receive[d] money in exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found liable for grave
passport and visa of Julie Bernardo (sic).
misconduct under PD No. 807 and the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part as follows: x x
ordered dismissed from the service effective immediately with forfeiture of all benefits
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of the witness to foist said
under the law, with prejudice to her reinstatement in this Bureau and all its branches.
charges on respondent, the Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements
SO ORDERED.[27]
of witness Bernardo (sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted that she received money from
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz's resolution, viz: Buenaflor but argued that the money was a mere loan. However, if this were true,
After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the complainant and the Buenaflor should have demanded for a collateral, considering the amount involved.
respondent, this Office is more incline[d] to give credence to complainant's declarations Vertudez failed to present any evidence that she gave any security in return for said loan
that she was indeed duped by the respondent into parting with the hard-earned money which makes her version highly incredible. x x x[33]
of P79,000.00 on the promise of the respondent that she would secure a passport and
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[34] of the CSC's Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
visa for the complainant to Japan.
In so far as Vertudez'[s] illegal recruitment activities are concerned, the Commission
Respondent's alibi that the said amount was a loan from the complainant, who is her
finds the existence of clear substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence
friend, is highly unbelievable. Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who
presented all point to the fact that Vertudez solicited money from BI clients in return for
would so easily part with such big amount of money without any security without any
a visa to Japan. The witnesses against Vertudez include Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie
hope or assurance of being re-paid.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 20
Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[40] contending that the CA failed to resolve the issue of
The affidavits of said witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI,
whether petitioner's alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly connected with her duties and
where she approaches BI clients and offers them a visa, passport and an employment
responsibilities as a Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied.[41]
contract in exchange for P120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the issues as follows:
testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE DECISION
of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez after getting paid failed to fulfill her promise.
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of witness Buenaflor by
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED
implying that the former has a pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records,
IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;
however, show that the charges against witness Buenaflor all came up after Vertudez
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS
was formally charged by the BI and that such charges have no reasonable connection
THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT;
with her administrative case pending before the Commission. In this regard, "There
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER ABROAD
being nothing in record to show that witnesses were actuated by any improper motive,
CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]
their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit." (People v. Flores, 252 SCRA
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS;
31)[35]
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or not the DIRECT RELATION TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY RESPONDENTS
BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process; b) whether or not respondents erred in finding that IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
the alleged illegal recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation to and connected with the 7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTLY
performance of her duties and responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or not there is RELATED TO ANY OF HER FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT EXAMINER AT THE BUREAU
substantial evidence to support the finding that petitioner is an illegal recruiter, thus, warranting her removal OF IMMIGRATION.[42]
from public service.[36]
The petition is denied.
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found that "petitioner
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner contends that the essential requirements of due
was given more than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and disprove the charges leveled against
process as laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[43] and Doruelo v.
her, hence, there can be no denial of her right to due process."[37] Moreover, it held that "there is more
COMELEC[44] were violated in the case at bar. First, she contends that she was denied of her right to a
than substantial evidence proving the charge of grave misconduct against petitioner." [38] The CA
full hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as
ratiocinated that:
provided under Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She allegedly raised
In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner, indeed, received and
this issue in her appeal before the CSC.[45]
encashed the two (2) checks given by private respondent in the total amount of
The argument is unmeritorious.
Php50,000.00. This fact, therefore, gives credence to the claim of private respondent
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital element of due process as
that she gave petitioner two (2) checks in consideration of the latter's promise to
follows:
facilitate her employment abroad. This being the case, the burden was shifted to
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
petitioner to refute this established fact through equally weighty and competent
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
evidence.
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the two checks from private
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
respondent but offered the excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
from her testimony and that of her household helpers to prove this assertion, no other
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine
independent and unbiased evidence was offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her
a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is not sufficient enough to overthrow the fact
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
established by complainant. This considering that it is highly improbable and even
received or allowed to remain in the record.[46] (emphasis supplied)
contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge amount of money as
Php50,000.00 without any document evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was deprived of due process simply because no cross-
payment. Note even that the two checks were made payable to "cash," a bearer examination took place. Nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-examination during the
instrument, and was not even crossed on its face, hence, can be encashed by any person formal investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Notably, two hearings were conducted,
holding the negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private respondent gave the two checks during which, both private respondent and petitioner appeared. During the hearing dated October 27, 1998,
to petitioner as a clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate document both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit and
embodying their loan agreement, the latter should have at least been made the payee the affidavits of her witnesses. In fact, when petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case with the BI,
of the checks and a memorandum written at the back of the check to the effect that it she did not question the lack of cross-examination during the investigation proceedings. She merely based
is being extended as a loan, in order to protect the interest of the lender. This is her motion on the order of the Office of the Ombudsman finding the charge against her as "not office
conventional business practice which is altogether absent in the case at bar, hence, related." In the same pleading, she admitted that "[a]s early as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative
petitioner's theory of loan must necessarily crumble.[39] action has been submitted for resolution after the contending parties have submitted their
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 21
respective evidence" and that her move for the re-opening of the administrative case was merely "to and analyze evidence all over again.[54] Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial
allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Office of the agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are
Ombudsman." Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of Commissioner Rodriguez's supported by substantial evidence.[55] Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
order of dismissal, she merely reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-open. She never complained reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds
that she was deprived of her right to cross-examination during the investigation of Special Prosecutor dela might conceivably opine otherwise.[56]
Cruz. The right to cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner's stance, the affidavits of Lao and Cosino do appear
right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings
in the records of the CSC.[57] In any case, the affidavits of Villas, Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores are of
before the BI.
little relevance to the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating evidence. Note that it was only in
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an the CSC's resolution on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits were mentioned. These
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained affidavits were not used as basis for the decision rendered by the BI, the main decision of the CSC denying
of.[47] This was clearly satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave her sworn the appeal of petitioner and the decision of the CA. We find the unanimous finding of guilt of the BI, the
written explanation of the charges against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she also CSC and the CA amply supported by the following evidence on record: a) the complaint-affidavit of private
submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the charges against her, with all the attached annexes as respondent; b) the affidavit of Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of the passport and application for a visa of
evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial petitioner's son; d) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798; and e) letter of private respondent's
with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; counsel to petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of the P79,000.00 that private respondent paid
g) a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition for review. to petitioner.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez violated the principle that "the tribunal or body As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the self-serving quotations of petitioner from the
or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the complaint-affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit categorically alleged that petitioner told
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision" when his denial of private respondent that the latter would "be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and
her Motion to Re-open and his order finding her guilty of grave misconduct were based exclusively on the that should [she] accept [petitioner's] offer, all that [would] be required of [her was] to give [petitioner]
resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.[48] the amount of P80,000.00." Private respondent also categorically alleged that she was charging petitioner
This argument is likewise unavailing. for her "failure to make good her promise to deploy [her] after receiving the amount of P79,000.00 in
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the recommendation of a consideration of a job placement in Japan." Thus, contrary to petitioner's stance, the assailed findings of
subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief of bureau or office or the CSC are supported by private respondent's complaint-affidavit.
department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case to a subordinate.[49] What due process Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally weigh and assess the evidence which the subordinate that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
has gathered and not merely to rely on the recommendation of said investigating officer.[50] Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez enjoys the disputable presumption that official on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in this
duties have been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela case.[58]
Cruz does not necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the affidavits and evidence presented
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct warranting her
by the parties. Petitioner's bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez did not personally examine the
removal from government service. Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,[59] petitioner contends that "[m]isconduct,
evidence, without more, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
warranting removal from office of a public officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with the
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis in finding: a) that the affidavits of "Peng Villas performance of official duties, amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and
(Deceased), Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores x x x all failure to discharge the duties of the office." Since the BI is a government agency principally responsible
speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI" as these affidavits were not submitted to the CSC; and for the administration and enforcement of immigration, citizenship and alien admission and registration
b) that petitioner "solicited money from BI clients" inasmuch as private respondent never alleged that she laws, "by no stretch of imagination" can there be a direct relation between the function of a fingerprint
was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC's finding that private respondent "testified that respondent assured her examiner and the alleged promise to facilitate private respondent's employment abroad.[60] Petitioner also
of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez, after getting paid, failed capitalizes on the allegation of private respondent in her complaint-affidavit that she and petitioner "became
to fulfill her promise" is not supported by the complaint-affidavit of private respondent which merely stated friends" to contend that the acts being imputed against her are personal and not office-related.[61]
that petitioner "volunteered to work-out and facilitate the processing of [private respondent's] passport and
These arguments lack merit.
visa" and that petitioner "has a brother in Japan who could also help [private respondent] find a
The allegations in private respondents complaint-affidavit indicate that petitioner used her position as a BI
job."[51] Petitioner also assails the failure of the BI and CSC to consider the handwritten joint sworn
employee to assure private respondent that she could facilitate petitioner's deployment to Japan. Private
statement of media practitioners Cloma and Romero and the joint affidavit of the housemaids of petitioner,
respondent alleged that "during one of those times that [she] dropped by [petitioner's] office, [petitioner]
Compo and Reyes.[52]
intimated to [her] that a group of Immigration officers [were] scheduled to leave for Japan for
Again, these arguments fail to impress. training and that [petitioner] was the one who received a call from a Japanese Consul."
It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Petitioner "asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in going to Japan because [petitioner] will
the Rules of Court.[53] It is not the function of this Court, in a petition under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh find a way to accommodate [her]."
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 22
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
Even petitioner's own admissions show that her position as an employee of the BI may be utilized in
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
connection with illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner Rodriguez, as reiterated in her
vs.
counter-affidavit, petitioner alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal recruitment and "was
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National
using [petitioner's] name in her dealings with some immigration officials and employees,
University, respondents.
presumably to expedite the processing of the documents belonging to her clients." Petitioner
likewise claimed that she "declined [private respondent's] proposal that [she] 'escort' some of
NARVASA, J.:
[private respondent's] clients who would be leaving for foreign countries but with falsified
travel documents." Private respondent even told her that the "proposed scheme could easily be Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
done because being an employee of this Bureau, [petitioner has] several connections not only University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) but also in Mactan International Airport." persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies
That her position is designated as "fingerprint examiner" is not determinative of the issue of whether the with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
charge against her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint against petitioner and her own 1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their
admissions show that her duties go beyond her job title and that the charge against her is connected with respective courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the
her position as an employee of the BI. premises of the University.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not
Finally, petitioner contends that "a promise to find a way to accommodate private respondent and a
hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights
representation that petitioner has a brother who could help private respondent find a job are not misconduct
already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443
warranting the dismissal of petitioner from office" but, "[a]t most," only "entitle[s] private respondent to
(1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of
civil indemnity." Petitioner contends that the CA's finding that petitioner merely made a "promise to
petitioners;" and
facilitate" private respondent's employment abroad, as distinguished from the CSC's finding that petitioner
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without
committed "shameful illegal recruitment activities," practically absolved petitioner from the charge of grave
cause or if there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being
misconduct.
afforded the opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute
This argument deserves scant consideration. (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this
of behavior, especially by a government official.[62] As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements Court's requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a 1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own
charge of grave misconduct.[63] Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some 2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. [64] An act need not be already closed;"
tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral 3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading
turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.[65] boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August, 1982, the
latter had demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the charges against of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the
petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her criminally liable for such crime is not the hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to) take
issue at bar. At the very least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her position as an employee advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them to study;" that Guzman "however
of the BI to falsely promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private respondent's travel to Japan, continued to lead or actively participate in activities within the university premises, conducted without
including the processing of her passport, visa and other travel documents. Worse, she was found to have prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman
refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by private respondent even when the promised passport, "is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case
visa, and travel documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly, these acts involve "corruption, clear intent to No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on September 12,
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule." Under Section 23(c), Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Service Rules and Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which petitioner must suffer the entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from destruction of
penalty of dismissal. university properties
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 12, 4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary
2002 and Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766 are AFFIRMED. to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he
SO ORDERED. was also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university premises but
without permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and
5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 23
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly
learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continually published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
despise and villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking standing.
enrollment in an institution that they hate.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to
were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in
enroll them after the end of the semester.
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This Court is therefore
same and to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of
MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners
imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
for the coming semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed
or all of them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized and
expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of incorporation, and
respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a
indispensable to the successful management of the college." 10 The rules may include those governing
pending criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of
student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on
the opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any
"every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the
disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the
Manual further provides that-
meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of
... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must
said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever
be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their
protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and
parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate
peaceful manner.
such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia— of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already closed),
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And
it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several times before
it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents'
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school premises,"
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an
although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time;
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
"petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited; and
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the permission of the
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to issue such permit
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
repeatedly sought by the students. "
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:
decide the case.
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll
in the petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to
mandatory injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply
which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.
of counsel for petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE
SO ORDERED.
COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the
petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty
(20) days from notice. ... .
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 127980
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA
had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school - versus -
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 24
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
DECISION
punched him in the head with something heavy in his
REYES, R.T., J.:
hands parang knuckles. Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching
away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan. him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards
arrived; and the group of attackers left.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With
of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita
injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the sumuntok siya. What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents right to education vis-a-vis the Universitys
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at
right to academic freedom.
the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at
the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSUs petition
their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity
for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and
said: Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang.
Valdes, Jr.;[2] (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;[3] (3)
Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under
respondent Aguilars motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;[4] and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home.With a
dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.[5] Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
Factual Antecedents
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind
on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: Ayaw namin ng
to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manangs Restaurant gulo. But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente
near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez
Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two
mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods others.
had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manangs. Then, the three, together with four
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was
other persons went back to Manangs and confronted the two who were still in the
ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was
him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe. Respondent
a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence
Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
then.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was
respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
asking for an apology. Kailangan ng apology in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no
apology was made. In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner
of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: Mga putang-ina
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
niyo. Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently being satisfied
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According
with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to
to them, this person supposedly nambastos ng brod. As they could not find Mr. Yap, one
a friends house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before
of them remarked Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang.
they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three
cars roaming the vicinity.[6]
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 25
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.[14]
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonalds Taft
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[7] with the Discipline Board of p.m.together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said
DLSU charging private respondents with direct assault.Similar complaints[8] were also filed by Dennis Pascual that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3
and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled De or even 4 minutes.
La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a
(AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard
certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez alibi.[15]
Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the
answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[9]as it appeared that students from DLSU paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of
and CSB[10] were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board[11] was formed to his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would
investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing[12] to wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers
private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows: get paid everyday.
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,
constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in
4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. question.[16]
Cano.
Fourth, respondent Aguilar solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing.[17]
1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony
and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[18] finding private respondents
testimony or those of your witnesses. guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[19] pursuant to CHED Order No.
4.[20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board,
through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
of their proposed testimony. AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403),
ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion., In the
of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act charge.SO ORDERED.[21]
complained of.
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration[22] before the Office of the Senior Vice-President
For your strict compliance.[13] for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution[23] dated June 1, 1995.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSBJoint Discipline Board as follows: On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he was order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned
picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of
sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-
use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, President for Internal Affairs.
but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also
employed. The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO[24] directing DLSU, its
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist
Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondents from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to
house in BF Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 26
allegation in paragraph 3.21[25] of his original petition.Respondent Judge amended the TRO[26] to conform contempt of court.[34] Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance
to the correction made in the amended petition.[27] with respondent Judges Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued[35] a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121,[28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS). On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates,
and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention[29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on
corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents. your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3,
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss[30] in behalf of all petitioners, except James 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the
Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[31] the petitions-in-intervention. letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order[32] denying petitioners (respondents there) immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses
motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents (petitioners there) prayer for a writ offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads: graduation from said school.[36]
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari[37] (CA-G.R. SP No.
persons acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent
Judges September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995. On April
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3,
12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction.
1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-
intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents.As for Aguilar, he was to be
reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.[38] The Resolution states:
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
in the courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately
RESOLUTION 181-96
allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter. RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY
(DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR.,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
enjoyed from:
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3,
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF
1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-
THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., ( sic) MR.
intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.[39]
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling
intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to
and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters[40] to petitioner DLSU. In
forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and
view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June
complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No.
petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order
executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention dated September 23, 1996 which states:
will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining
if the Court will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled
De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion
thereto.
Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy
merit. Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in
(15) days from receipt thereof. SO ORDERED.[33] order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU,
through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he provisionally enroll, pending the Commissions Resolution of the instant Motion for
attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, Reconsideration filed by DLSU. SO ORDERED.[41]
1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 27
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in
allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilars counsel wrote another demand his favor.
letter to petitioner DLSU.[42] Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution Issues
No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss[43] in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the
CA case moot and academic. We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating
dismiss of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
disciplinary rules.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed. 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
SO ORDERED.[44] 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners motion for 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
reconsideration, as follows:
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in misdeed.
character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Our Ruling
Reconsideration is hereby denied. SO ORDERED.[45] Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners[53] that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.[46] Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the
which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the
Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS. On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation.
respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in
1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.[47] order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate
respondent Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of exercise of Our jurisdiction.[54] This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious
the order reads: reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate writ of to suspend their operation.[55]
preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
force and effect. power of supervision and review over
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Courts sheriff disciplinary cases decided by institutions
upon the respondents at petitioners expense. SO ORDERED.[48] of higher learning.
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to
the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga
of Civil Case No. 95-74122. desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.

On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO[49] as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,[56] 15(2) & (3),[57] 54,[58] 57(3)[59] and 70[60] of Batas Pambansa
a TRO[50] dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982.
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately
and until further orders from this Court. According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation[51] stating that he has long completed Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral
his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the
1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records[52] issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans,
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 28
programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHEDs powers and functions freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students,
under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the
Section 3 to CHEDs coverage of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural
specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions heritage.
and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary cases.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary
We cannot agree. cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the
invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes. Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which
CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.[62]
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the Section 77 of the MRPS[63] on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in
abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
hereinafter referred to as Commission.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]. This provision does not limit or
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what
institutions, public and private. petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include
the following: To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
powers and functions:
IIa. Private respondents were accorded
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other due process of law.
powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the
purpose and objectives of this Act; and Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.

o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on
operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
development of higher education. fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.[64] The constitutional behest that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.[65]
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the
CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are
withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned.They show that the authority and supervision against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post- counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS. adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.[66]
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on
the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is both public and private Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational complain of deprivation of due process.[67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process,
institutions, public and private. That would be absurd. It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority. proceedings.[68] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 7722[61] is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all of the action or ruling complained of.[69] So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause
citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. [70]
education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 29
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process it is enough that
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order
the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy
that alibi may succeed as a defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. [71] To be heard does not only
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility
mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
of his presence at the scene of the crime.[78]
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[72]
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
has been established by witnesses.[79] Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent,
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and
them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence
denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. [80] Well-
presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents
settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of
were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did.Lastly, the Discipline Board considered
the offended parties.[81]
all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121. Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the
accused.[82] Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-
easily fabricate an alibi.[83] Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in
examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National
light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at
University[73] where this Court held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
the scene of the crime and were the victims assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.[84] Alibi is the weakest of all defenses
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x
positive identification of accused by the witnesses.[85]
an essential part thereof.
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v.
higher learning, possesses academic
Court of Industrial Relations,[86] it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
freedom which includes determination
adequate to support a conclusion.
of who to admit for study.
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay
Reverente. They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime
ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
We hark back to this Courts pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty of
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
hazing:
when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.[74] According to present jurisprudence, academic
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for
students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
violated petitioner universitys disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the
study.[75]
authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary,
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner universitys academic freedom which
if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.[87]
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom what to
teach.[76] Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable
to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
graduation,[77] such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.[88] It must be borne in mind that universities are established,
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes
not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
its free choice of students for admission to its school.
attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.[89]
IIc. The guilt of private respondents
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was
Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes,
at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was
Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay wit:
napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 30
CERTIFICATION Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion[97] only, not expulsion,[98] imposed on them by the
CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this
Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30,
4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7,
Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14,
with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine 1996 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of
Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents
GAMMA PHI from said Batch 89 affair. Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin
Aguilar had asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car
with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.[90] [G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997]
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of
Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF
significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. [91] It is true THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the
prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi DECISION
assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of
ROMERO, J.:
accused.[92]
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible
harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may,
violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?
in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.[93]
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23,
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU
1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control,
on private respondents is disproportionate
regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, [1] the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-
to their misdeed.
85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
sa kanilang pagkakasala. must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and
in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage until
academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient General Manager. [6] Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.[94] This power, however, does not give them the pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective
untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office
the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot
element of arbitrariness intrudes.That would give rise to a due process question. association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 [7] on July 15,
Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any 1992, whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port
serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut users through the improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by providing therein that all
significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the
hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in
conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to
tool rather than a punitive measure.[96] yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 31
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association,
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
its governing body.
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 [8] which laid down the implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying No costs.
Factors: [9] safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for SO ORDERED.
Evaluation: [10] promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage
as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v.Carnation Philippines, Inc. [13] Thus,
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 4-92, but
abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the
Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors
property rights of the harbor pilots.Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must
of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before
be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently
the DOTC.
not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92;
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision,
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii),
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is
Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to
convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents right against deprivation of
restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through
property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and
lifted the restraining order issued earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the
and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Constitution, viz.:
Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
any port district. On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
x x x.
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks
or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04- of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of
92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,
rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage while substantive due process requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would
services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees performance. Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the pilots themselves could
PPAs jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied) ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately,
Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior consultation before the issuance of the the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, [15] where it declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to
consult with relevant Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times [16] before the
representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he
matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While
concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative
respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of pilots after
order.
administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, [17] the facts show that the MARINA, which took
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of
issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the
Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. [18] Neither does the
following judgment: [12] fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 32
a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In
only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85,
the requirements of notice and hearing.[19]
which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor surplusage [23] and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting
pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be forth the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in
withdrawn or shortened by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has Philippine Ports. It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation,
thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the disciplining and removal of harbor pilots - matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
condition set by the organic law. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision struck down.
that (t)he exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation
Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of
of, or interference with, property rights without due process. [20] He merely expressed the opinion that (i)n
the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested
the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a
in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial courts finding of animosity between him and private
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that PPA-AO 04-92 does not
respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private
forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession. As will be presently
respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which
primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan
is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
the granting of license especially to practice a profession. It is also the system of granting licenses (as for
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a
professional practice) in accordance with established standards. [21] A license is a right or permission granted
quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.
by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be
SO ORDERED.
illegal. [22] Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass
through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual
training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that here THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
(sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government vs.
professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice CARSON, J.:
for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
(4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a
qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots. permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the
provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they
slaughter of large cattle.
retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, (a)ll existing regular
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there
appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid
is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the
up to 31 December 1992 only, and (a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by
municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for
after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license
branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer
which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical
showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as
unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which
may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has
can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots
been requested.
and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer
period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted
unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a
only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term renewal. It is this pre-
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permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true
consumption. owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and
and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on
brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such
identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person
such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered
with date of permit. privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear,
sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner,
32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of
together with date of permit.
the provincial treasurer.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will
or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit
readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves
ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not
and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law
less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing
in the discretion of the court.
without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of
contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for ownership required. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions,
human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and
large cattle without a permit in that municipality. 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing
treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and
municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of
without such permit. misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the
general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined slaughterhouse.
apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion.
slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food
"killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A
consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such
municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of
"killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless
manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already
that which should be adopted. indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in
issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 34
violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the
"no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature
law." It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed
exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration
opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the
Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, public welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."
including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy,
but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture
use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected
others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community." struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste
for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners
extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation,
in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that,
notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the
without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the
country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon
deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their
the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast
exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for
of the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the
purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of
apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.
the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking,
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the
such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United
the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a
States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces
just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury
widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for
(supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in
agricultural work and draft purposes.
distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said: Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every
work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the
holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government
liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this
of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been
the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need
such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
for them was greatest. At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the
such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing
discovery and applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
proved in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can
operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those sections
be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude
which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 35
roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision
Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and of the court.
registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as
exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft
and dangerously affected.
purposes.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and
"general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in
welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the
the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can
disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under
be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise.
Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may
measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may
would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are
control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self- infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the
protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to
the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and
must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power. to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136): or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use,
or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to
is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The
include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction
establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases,
Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to
be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been
decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path
sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good,
of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes
food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of
private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor
public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those
that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards;
persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
legislature have authority" to impose. So a particular use of property may sometimes be
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may
forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is
was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus
health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
purposes. These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and,
United States clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that
the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
"no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 36
process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by
and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union. the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The
of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette
before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process
of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter. This Court has declared
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they
vs. are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply
means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
Executive Order No. 626-A. need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
The said executive order reads in full as follows: Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
wound or excise the affliction.
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the
transporting carabeef instead; and bench, especially this Court. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
carabeef subject of the violation; whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following: immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
hundred and eighty. the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. The thrust of his petition
was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule"
is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao
laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the
or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because
best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so
may require.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 37
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it
the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12 he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call
John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause. basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts
to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
preserve them.
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
power. due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not
was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this
number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price,
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law
cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
power and declared in part as follows:
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
worn and empty catchword.
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence individuals. ...
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter
se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter
offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
welfare from a clear and present danger.
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 38
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
improvident depletion.
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
elementary fair play. have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights. The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons,
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above,
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under
the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
and conviction of the accused.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 39
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with
JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to
ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3
vs.
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court
GANCAYCO, J.: held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it Commission, the two being co-equal bodies. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit We rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly
the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the
No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under
of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and
Regulation Commission." setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go
the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following
it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the
pertinent provisions:
contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted
by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission.
Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1 Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential
Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for
Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general
injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is
lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now
enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or
for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is
Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit: concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion:
other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a
respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of
for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance. government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal
SO ORDERED. 2 departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each
supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a
Hence, this petition.
presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain
be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and
the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that
subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial
the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held —
review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 40
because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To
review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties
by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14This does not cover rules and
and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely
same principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as
of all administrative officers. 10 a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the
Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an
the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an
filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards,
would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not
is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders,
which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case election laws." 16 As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract
of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . . to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is
into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by
threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by
February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by xxx xxx xxx
the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the
pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.) parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the
to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the
authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before
COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to
the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent
functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional
deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-
Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg.
judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
xxx xxx xxx
before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the
boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9,
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph Appellate Court. Thus:
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the
Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the
The contention is devoid of merit.
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9,
of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings
wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 41
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in
resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from
the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such
the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then
affected by it. Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be
purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within
aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review should not be curtailed. In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution
similar institutions . ... 21 No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs. SO ORDERED.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC.
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in
vs.
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued,
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
then they must be held to be invalid. 22
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
FERNANDO, J.:
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more
They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As
sustain an attack against its validity.
defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June
their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit: Manila. (par. 3).
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for
a grudging fashion.
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 42
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter ordinances;
to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all 3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the 4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661,
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15,
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly 1963 (Annex B);
authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being 5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of hereto as Annex C;
the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain 6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
issued.
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause. There was a plea for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file
memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding
without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity,
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to
whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause
the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional
of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to
and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation
to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
September 28, 1964, which reads:
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity
be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
to sue and be sued;
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The
of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 43
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2 requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical,
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
against the ordinance set aside. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure
those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
society.7 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels
"the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it. law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and
case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 44
upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
declared unreasonable.23
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25 rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing of a denial of due process?
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems
it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than
with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-
vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to
of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It
the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover,
such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
costs.
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
[G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005]
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L.
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S.
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28 CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON.
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON.
HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON.
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L.
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON.
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D.
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA,
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR.,
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON.
in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 45
Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, 4. Beerhouses
Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. 5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
DECISION 7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
TINGA, J.: 9. Cabarets
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after. 10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
Ernest Hermingway 12. Inns
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and
performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty. accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
J. Christopher Gerald SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of
The Courts commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place
of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
be, the Court will not hesitate to make the hammer fall, and heavily in the words of Justice Laurel, and allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote 1. Curio or antique shop
morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality. The pivotal issue in this Petition[1] under Rule 2. Souvenir Shops
45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision[2] in Civil Case 3. Handicrafts display centers
No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court), [3] is the validity of 4. Art galleries
Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.[4] 5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
The antecedents are as follows: 7. Coffee shops
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the 8. Flower shops
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. [5] It built and opened Victoria Court in 9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
hotel.[6] On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary 10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order[7] (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the 11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.[8] storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with
any machinery, or funeral establishments.
Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be
1993, the said Ordinance is entitled punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA- Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.[10] subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business
providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but these were not establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for
not limited to: entertainment, nor did they use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the
1. Sauna Parlors community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.[11]
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 46
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
(1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) [12] of the pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the offense.
establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. [21]Petitioners also maintained that
499[13] which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain
there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain
restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory
forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.[22] The Ordinance,
closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be
the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
protected; (4) The Ordinanceconstitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court
operation.[23] The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as
which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutional
class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other
rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property rights; (b) the City
places in the City of Manila.[24] On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio)
Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power
issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.[25]And on 16 July
to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as
1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.[26]
no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
but not outside of this area.[14] petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:[27]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of
In their Answer[15] dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this
Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral
Court against the defendant. No costs. SO ORDERED.[28]
welfare of the community as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, [16] which
reads, thus: Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal[29] on 12 December 1994, manifesting that
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. [30] On 11 January
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the
questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499[31] which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to
establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
unconstitutional.[32] In the Petition and in its Memorandum,[33] petitioners in essence repeat the assertions
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or they made before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a)
or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, 4 (vii) of the Code.[34] They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.[35]
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or In its Memorandum[36] dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is
not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,[17] petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in
arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it
the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of
amusement.[18]Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to
the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions. This is an opportune time to express the Courts
protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article
deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time
III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,[19] otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
resident, the Court witnessed the areas many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days
(Revised Charter of Manila)[20] which reads, thus:
of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its
ARTICLE III
lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion,
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore
Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: null and void.

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this them worthless. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 47
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the equality before the law of women and men.[45]
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate person be denied the equal protection of laws.[46]
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. [37] Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[47]
A. The Ordinance infringes
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution
the Due Process Clause
and to the laws.[38] The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o person shall be deprived of life,
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment liberty or property without due process of law. . . . [48] There is no controlling and precise definition of due
must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that
only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,[49]and as such it is a
latter.[39] limitation upon the exercise of the police power.[50] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture,
it.[40]The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to
City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.[51]
with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships
creation.[41] This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare
are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.[52] This clause has been
clause, viz:
interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called procedural due process and
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, substantive due process. Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other provide when it takes a particular action.[53]
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
there is a sufficient justification for the governments action.[54] Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.[55] For example,
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to enact used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. [56]
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. [42] The inquiry in this
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically[57] as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
The Ordinance contravenes
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
the Constitution
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. [58] Due
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
good.[43] In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as and property.[59]
it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
democracy.[44] public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights,
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 48
but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then
oppressive upon individuals.[60] It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting to the estimation of the authorities.
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
arbitrarily invaded.[61]
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council
intrusion into private rights[62] a violation of the due process clause. The Ordinance was enacted to address instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of
and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy. While petitioners
allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the
karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the proprietors and operators of wholesome, innocent establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear
case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila[63] had already invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning,
taken judicial notice of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to
traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication
presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.[64] and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values
to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;[67] and it may even impose increased license fees.
of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive. It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila Means employed are
to make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. constitutionally infirm
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses,
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-
than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given
businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which to wind up business operations
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per seprotect and promote the
or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution,
business allowable within the area. Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
the provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of permanently.It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,[65] it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons
classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, fundamental right to liberty and property.
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and
of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
moral welfare of the community. from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
the common welfare.[68] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties
prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty,
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue
may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments
any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[69]
enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in
the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,[70] sought to clarify the meaning of
behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every liberty. It said:
house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth
Simply because there are no pure places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in mans history.[66] the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to
injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual
doubt that the meaning of liberty must be broad indeed.
activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
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In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. [78] It is
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices,
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that private property shall not be taken for
the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
public use without just compensation. The provision is the most important protection of property rights in
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence,
give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a persons property
of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government
define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State.[71]
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of by the public as a whole.[79] There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory
the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs
invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motels when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. [80]
premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,[81] it was held that a taking also could be found if
policy as contained in the Constitution.[72] Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with
government regulation of the use of property went too far. When regulation reaches a certain magnitude,
others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty
in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the
protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. [73] Their right to liberty under
act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
a taking.[82] No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was a question of degree and therefore
exception.
cannot be disposed of by general propositions. On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action
freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.[74] The concept must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss
of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.[83]
the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[75] borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations
expectations for use.[84] A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use
are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
of land is, from the owners point of view, equivalent to a taking unless principles of nuisance or property
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders
law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. [85] When the owner of real
his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.[86]
free.
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should
under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors
of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers
including the regulations economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes
should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.[76] There is a great temptation to
with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries
have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict
are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some
itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not
whole.[87] A restriction on use of property may also constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the
diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-
prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made.
backed expectations of the owner.[88]
That, ultimately, is their choice.
Modality employed is The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its
unlawful taking approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
beneficial use of its property.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust.
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance
Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration
which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 50
must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably community. The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards
expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of
violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property. The second the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will
option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right
In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the to liberty and property. Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which
owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to is a far cry from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
the problem, it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,[95] the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating sexually
The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into
oriented businesses, which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels,
a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This
and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other
is a taking of private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted
The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that
a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. Petitioners renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They
cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional
exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was
nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle adequate to support the citys determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 )
finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that
which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those
taking. bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that
and beliefs.
the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed
or purpose and is therefore wholesome.[89] If it be of public benefit that a wholesome property remain reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,[96] it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that
compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use.[90] what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no
controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to
The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. prohibit.[97]
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone
and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even
by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.[91] Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed
Protection Clause
and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled
discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.[92] Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,[93] as cited in People v. Nazario,[94] the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. [98] The guarantee
an ordinance that had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. The ordinance was nullified as it imposed
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.[99] The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
no standard at all because one may never know in advance what annoys some people but does not annoy
protection of equal laws.[100] It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
others. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.[101]
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 51
What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: The ideal The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to
situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. The power of the City
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and other
serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. There is recognition, similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:
however, in the opinion that what in fact exists cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such Code, and shall:
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. Classification is thus (iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew that the laws operate motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated and transports . . . .
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
binding on the rest.[102]
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. [103] The Code, and shall:
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city
following requirements: in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement;
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.[104] regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns and moral welfare of the community.
but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit
purpose of the Ordinance. altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the
rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila[106] that:
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
The word regulate, as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and
Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but regulate should not be construed as
located outside the area. The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
synonymous with suppress or prohibit. Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive
municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment
to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave
or business shall be exercised.[107]
a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply
only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on And in People v. Esguerra,[108] wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which
gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only
objectives.[105] Thus, the discrimination is invalid. Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. (A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate
C. The Ordinance is repugnant or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.[109]
to general laws; it is ultra vires
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 52
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners assertion[110] that they were modified by the Code vesting method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override
upon City Councils prohibitory powers. Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public the earlier.[117]
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary
amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and
to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into
suspend such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment
prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community are stated in the second and third clauses,
subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained
respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4
on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail.[118]
(vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates
that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph.[111] These powers, therefore, should not be executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Thus,
suppression and prohibition.[112] submitting to petitioners interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to
prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject
variance with the latters provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers. It is well to point out
to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
enumeration therefore cannot be included as among other events or activities for amusement or
necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants or certain
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
forms of amusement or entertainment which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are judicial intervention.[119]
necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.[113] Moreover, it is a general
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and
the rule of strict construction.[114]
in this connection, shall:
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,[115] is instructive. It held that: houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency,
Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other
therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that,
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by
question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and
adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now
nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and
vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Councils powers
dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and
necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores maintenance.
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code.
it is the latest expression of legislative will.[116] If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two
Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of
statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable
massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 53
contractors defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined amusement as a pleasurable
diversion and entertainment, synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun; and amusement places
to include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. Thus, it can be inferred that WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their vs.
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, DECISION
where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the Tinga, J.:
same principle applies.[120] With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is
confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the
a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering
station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the
decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal
same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.[121] As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor
protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:[122]
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but I.
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which The facts are as follows:
are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and
appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police the youth in particular.
power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
in derogation of a common right.[124] Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
Conclusion similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00)
judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and
no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the
cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business
of laws not even under the guise of police power. license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary
the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 54
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. [To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992. motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992. and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance
TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent
of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which
MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by
shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
for a single offense.23
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta.
the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
oppressive interference in their business.
complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito
Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful
General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date,
object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated
dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14 by law.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and
enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They
arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional. During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On II.
October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
portion of the decision reads: establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being
null and void. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite
SO ORDERED.17 standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights. Standing or locus standi is the
ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is
jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal
on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a
similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine,
petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21 taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power importance.31
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local
government units, the power: For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth
doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 55
are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34 renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to
general welfare clause.
advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of
A.
persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held
flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
that:
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential
halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best
relation to them."36
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States
has rarely been denied.
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our
access to their market or function."38
emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former
the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth
cynicism.
analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth
protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of
doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39 In
government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing
liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance
fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by
suffers from overbreadth.
any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law,
patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal
III.
standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
questions of the day.
Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon.
B.
City Mayor of Manila.40Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section
form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before
1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is
they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance
due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and
in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-
partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due
the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be
liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
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If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50 presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, D.
traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of
be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and
sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
for its application. the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
C. necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]
Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "liberty." It said:
"fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and
laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
of review for economic legislation. the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
applied in all substantive due process cases as well. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of
challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for
a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining significance for our purposes:
the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are
fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63and interstate travel.64 built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will
the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself.
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should
recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
establishments in question. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are
seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are
proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In
gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated
exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that accurately stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 57
for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. intentions.
E. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of
private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.79
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72 about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong
review when life, liberty or property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest.
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74 Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices
Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are
frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the
section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all people to uphold the law.81
susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition. Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the
home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a
new grandeur to Manila. G.R. No. 133640
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK,
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLES
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and BANKS,
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the Petitioners,
rent for motel rooms and even apartments. versus
IV. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required Respondent.
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be DECISION
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as AZCUNA, J.:
their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash
otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 58
operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of
G.R. No. 133640,[1] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health and G.R. No. 133661,[2] entitled Doctors Blood Bank Center
laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created
vs. Department of Health are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of
within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as well
the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of
as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was
1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary
issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law,
of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and
which was characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of
Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant,
such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with
issue or renew petitioners license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980s, financial
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.[3] difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood
banks.[9]
G.R. No. 139147,[4] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health, on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when
respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court. This case was originally assigned the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the
to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and
dated August 4, 1999.[5] Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the
ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be taken
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood
duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public products for transfusion.[10]
respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and
charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question. In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order
No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services
The facts of the case are as follows: they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. requirements varied according to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and
The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.[11] In 1992, the DOH
regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP). The
1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way
on August 23, 1994. for the creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the
Regional Blood Councils.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).[6] In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an
Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 [7] provides: for other Purposes was introduced in the Senate.[12]
Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated
phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House
period of two (2) years by the Secretary. Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated. In January of 1994, the
New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides: (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to
Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected
of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study
based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks
public safety.[8] in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank
produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The
categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of
services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services. Years prior to the passage private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for
of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are
blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and mostly voluntary.[14]
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing
Laboratories. The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 59
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three 1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases,
namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated 2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
to PNRC. Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this
arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. 3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
Since they need the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus,
blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times 4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery t deliver
much safer than blood from paid donors.[16] the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment.
indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel
In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and
the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them
desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and
where the blood comes from.[17] On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase
regulations until further orders from the Court.[23] On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed
out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out
with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.[24]
period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section
23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood
been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial
to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later
became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial
under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
blood banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF
Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.[18] In the
TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM
aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely,
VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the
PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN
following grounds: [19]
COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.
Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called Project to Evaluate
discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. This has been taken note of. This is a
germane to the purpose of the law; study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Foundation in Alabang.
Implementing Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve
police power of the state; and, laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes
3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing for blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the
Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
Gentleman defines a commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial
before this Court entitled Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health, docketed as G.R. No.
blood bank really is.
133661. [20] This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.[21]
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr.
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules President.
and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is
beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the considered.
following questions[22] for resolution:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 60
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This
provision on Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, same blood will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it
exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its components. was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime
patient. Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with
Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the
hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The
Committee on Health.
worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The
give the Department of Health enough time to build up governments capability to provide humane dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act
an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use of blood for transfusion of giving it
is a medical service and not a sale of commodity.
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their
has succeeded in making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, interests among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even
here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood from healthy donors becomes
on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would difficult, tedious and unrewarding.
donate blood The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood for safe blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health
banks, they will cut corners because it will protect their profit. concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
in the high-risk category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so
that we can go into a national voluntary blood program. Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down,
It has been said here in this report, and I quote: there will be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure
Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy
who expects payment for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work
any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect
syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the
value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four Government can do it, and the Government must do it.[26]
diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the
screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet. Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and
best to limit his expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper committing similar acts that will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners blood banks.[27]
reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may
also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion
existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary
with many unethical practices. Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that blood banks
why contaminated blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood are closed or will be closed. According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in
banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits.[25] anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were
printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.[28]
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public
weak Filipinos, who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, respondents willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said
will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be case. Petitioners alleged that respondents act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order
bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about when they and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice. [29] Petitioners added
last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to
tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting. strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information under the guise
of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others, that this year
[1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 61
government blood banks.[30] Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
a press conference during the Blood Donors Week that commercial blood banks are illegal and dangerous AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
and that they are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest III
is more important than the lives of the people. These were all posted in bulletin boards and other WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and health centers.[31] AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IV
In respondent Secretarys Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the
AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND
department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining
PROPERTY;
to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Courts issuance
V
of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998.[32]
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was to VI
promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks.[33] In doing so, he was merely performing his AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public.
Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of
Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is
human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through public education, promotion in schools, an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was
professional education, establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors. incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial
program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue
voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor delegation of legislative power.
promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the commercial In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
businesses of petitioners.[34] to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by delegate of the Legislature.[38] Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and
petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.[35] The intervenors contended that Republic standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal delegated to it.[39]
liberty.[36] In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people
1999. and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial
blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe
of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that blood donation is a humanitarian act and blood and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power
transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized law.
under Section 12.[37] Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.[40] The Secretary of Health has been
and Regulations. given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions Act states:
raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be
summarized hereunder: in accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within
I sixty (60) days from the approval hereof
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative bodys authority
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and
II
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Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover
of the law for its proper implementation. every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited
but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions
study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence
only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.[43]
of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can
be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public
execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.[41] current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly
from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said
almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier
phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared
blood screening.[44]
the policy of the state:
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the
a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry
importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from
and to instill public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a
healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to
humanitarian act;
improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood,
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for
and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government. In
transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity;
lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of
and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.[45] Based on the foregoing, the
blood supply and blood products;
Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and
d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb
inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood
the hazards caused by the commercial sale of blood;
banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the
existing health subjects of the formal education system in all public and private We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
schools as well as the non-formal system; One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as
f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary
for voluntary and non-profit collection of blood; blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification, and the consequent
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation
National Blood Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion
improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of blood; as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their
blood donation and providing non-profit blood services, either through a blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
donations from governmental and non-governmental entities;
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to
i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to
address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
operate on a non-profit basis;
conditions.
j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the
operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers in the Philippines; Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the
collection, storage and banking of blood; and, Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a
l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include valid exercise of police power. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The
preventive services and education to control spread of blood transfusion health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
transmissible diseases. enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are
clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly
blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law. [42] What may be regarded as a oppressive upon individuals.[46]
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 63
what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of
wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.[54] Finally, with regard to the petition
public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation.
for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Healths
Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine
explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or
blood banking system. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law,
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law.
the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect
the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of
give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public. the court.[55] There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health
advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the States police power. Therefore,
and desist from distributing the same. In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity
the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable
in the questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
Regulations.mnThe fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.[47]
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely,
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for
deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
unmeritorious.
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services
of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the
Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation,
that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver
considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.[57]
are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because the latter can
be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:
classification. [48] Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be
1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE
disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other
VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services
health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment
Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
clause provided by the Constitution.
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of
Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.
government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. [49] Moreover, in the case of Philippine
No costs. SO ORDERED.
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[50] settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this
provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regulation. While the Court
[G.R. No. 142381. October 15, 2003]
understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, INC., and ALFREDO CHING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.
DECISION
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police CARPIO, J.:
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such The Case
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] to annul the Decision[2] dated 16 July 1999 of the Court of
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. [51] This Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39690, as well as its Resolution dated 17 February 2000 denying the motion for
doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations [52] where the Court reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated 31 August
held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power exercised for public 1992 rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (trial court). The trial courts Decision
welfare. As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the declared petitioner Alfredo Ching (Ching) liable to respondent Traders Royal Bank (TRB) for the payment of
general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we the credit accommodations extended to Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBM).
maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be Antecedent Facts
inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.[53] This case stems from an action to compel Ching to pay TRB the following amounts:
1. P959,611.96 under Letter of Credit No. 479 AD covered by Trust Receipt No. 106;[4]
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve
2. P1,191,137.13 under Letter of Credit No. 563 AD covered by Trust Receipt No. 113;[5] and
the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 64
3. P3,500,000 under the trust loan covered by a notarized Promissory Note.[6] money which said BANK may call upon them to pay arising out of, pertaining to, and/or in
any manner connected with this receipt. In case it is necessary to collect the draft covered
Ching was the Senior Vice President of PBM. In his personal capacity and not as a corporate officer,
by the Trust Receipt by or through an attorney-at-law, the undersigned hereby further
Ching signed a Deed of Suretyship dated 21 July 1977 binding himself as follows:
agree(s) to pay an additional of 10% of the total amount due on the draft as attorneys fees,
xxx as primary obligor(s) and not as mere guarantor(s), hereby warrant to the TRADERS ROYAL BANK, its exclusive of all costs, fees and other expenses of collection but shall in no case be less
successors and assigns, the due and punctual payment by the following individuals and/or than P200.00[8] (Emphasis supplied)
companies/firms, hereinafter called the DEBTOR(S), of such amounts whether due or not, as indicated
On 27 April 1981, PBM obtained a P3,500,000 trust loan from TRB. Ching signed as co-maker in the
opposite their respective names, to wit:
notarized Promissory Note evidencing this trust loan. The Promissory Note reads:
NAME OF DEBTOR(S) AMOUNT OF OBLIGATION FOR VALUE RECEIVED THIRTY (30) DAYS after date, I/We, jointly and severally, promise to pay the
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS CORP. TEN MILLION PESOS(P 10,000,000.00) owing to said TRADERS ROYAL TRADERS ROYAL BANK or order, at its Office in 4th Floor, Kanlaon Towers Bldg., Roxas Blvd., Pasay
BANK, hereafter called the CREDITOR, as evidenced by all notes, drafts, overdrafts and other credit City, the sum of Pesos: THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P3,500,000.00),
obligations of every kind and nature contracted/incurred by said DEBTOR(S) in favor of said CREDITOR. Philippine Currency, with the interest rate of Eighteen Percent (18%) per annum until fully paid.
In case of default by any and/or all of the DEBTOR(S) to pay the whole or part of said indebtedness In case of non-payment of this note at maturity, I/We, jointly and severally, agree to pay an
herein secured at maturity, I/We, jointly and severally, agree and engage to the CREDITOR, its successors additional amount equivalent to two per cent (2%) of the principal sum per annum, as
and assigns, the prompt payment, without demand or notice from said CREDITOR, of such notes, drafts, penalty and collection charges in the form of liquidated damages until fully paid, and the
overdrafts and other credit obligations on which the DEBTOR(S) may now be indebted or may further sum of ten percent (10%) thereof in full, without any deduction, as and for attorneys fees whether
hereafter become indebted to the CREDITOR, together with all interests, penalty and other bank actually incurred or not, exclusive of costs and other judicial/extrajudicial expenses; moreover, I/We
charges as may accrue thereon and all expenses which may be incurred by the latter in collecting any or jointly and severally, further empower and authorize the TRADERS ROYAL BANK at its option, and without
all such instruments. notice to set off or to apply to the payment of this note any and all funds, which may be in its hands on
deposit or otherwise belonging to anyone or all of us, and to hold as security therefor any real or personal
I/WE further warrant the due and faithful performance by the DEBTOR(S) of all the obligations to be property which may be in its possession or control by virtue of any other contract.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
performed under any contracts, evidencing indebtedness/obligations and any supplements, amendments,
charges or modifications made thereto, including but not limited to, the due and punctual payment by the PBM defaulted in its payment of Trust Receipt No. 106 (Letter of Credit No. 479 AD) for P959,611.96,
said DEBTOR(S). I/WE hereby expressly waive notice of acceptance of this suretyship, and also and of Trust Receipt No. 113 (Letter of Credit No. 563 AD) for P1,191,137.13. PBM also defaulted on
presentment, demand, protest and notice of dishonor of any and all such instruments, loans, advances, its P3,500,000 trust loan. On 1 April 1982, PBM and Ching filed a petition for suspension of payments with
credits, or other indebtedness or obligations hereinbefore referred to. the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 2250.[10] The petition sought to
suspend payment of PBMs obligations and prayed that the SEC allow PBM to continue its normal business
MY/OUR liability on this Deed of Suretyship shall be solidary, direct and immediate and not operations free from the interference of its creditors. One of the listed creditors of PBM was TRB.[11] On 9
contingent upon the pursuit by the CREDITOR, its successors or assigns, of whatever remedies it or they July 1982, the SEC placed all of PBMs assets, liabilities, and obligations under the rehabilitation receivership
may have against the DEBTOR(S) or the securities or liens it or they may possess; and I/WE hereby agree of Kalaw, Escaler and Associates.[12]
to be and remain bound upon this suretyship, irrespective of the existence, value or condition of any
collateral, and notwithstanding also that all obligations of the DEBTOR(S) to you outstanding and unpaid On 13 May 1983, ten months after the SEC placed PBM under rehabilitation receivership, TRB filed with the
at any time may exceed the aggregate principal sum herein above stated. trial court a complaint for collection against PBM and Ching.TRB asked the trial court to order defendants to
In the event of judicial proceedings, I/WE hereby expressly agree to pay the creditor for and as attorneys pay solidarily the following amounts:
fees a sum equivalent to TEN PER CENTUM (10%) of the total indebtedness (principal and interest) then (1) P6,612,132.74 exclusive of interests, penalties, and bank charges [representing its indebtedness arising
unpaid, exclusive of all costs or expenses for collection allowed by law.[7] (Emphasis supplied) from the letters of credit issued to its various suppliers];
(2) P4,831,361.11, exclusive of interests, penalties, and other bank charges [due and owing from the trust
On 24 March and 6 August 1980, TRB granted PBM letters of credit on application of Ching in his loan of 27 April 1981 evidenced by a promissory note];
capacity as Senior Vice President of PBM. Ching later accomplished and delivered to TRB trust receipts, (3) P783,300.00 exclusive of interests, penalties, and other bank charges [due and owing from the money
which acknowledged receipt in trust for TRB of the merchandise subject of the letters of credit. Under the market loan of 1 April 1981 evidenced by a promissory note];
trust receipts, PBM had the right to sell the merchandise for cash with the obligation to turn over the entire (4) To order defendant Ching to pay P10,000,000.00 under the Deed of Suretyship in the event plaintiff can
not recover the full amount of PBMs indebtedness from the latter;
proceeds of the sale to TRB as payment of PBMs indebtedness. Letter of Credit No. 479 AD, covered by
(5) The sum equivalent to 10% of the total sum due as and for attorneys fees;
Trust Receipt No. 106, has a face value of US$591,043, while Letter of Credit No. 563 AD, covered by Trust (6) Such other amounts that may be proven by the plaintiff during the trial, by way of damages and expenses
Receipt No. 113, has a face value of US$155,460.34. for litigation.[13]
Ching further executed an Undertaking for each trust receipt, which uniformly provided that: On 25 May 1983, TRB moved to withdraw the complaint against PBM on the ground that the SEC had already
placed PBM under receivership.[14] The trial court thus dismissed the complaint against PBM.[15] On 23 June
6. All obligations of the undersigned under the agreement of trusts shall bear interest at the rate 1983, PBM and Ching also moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
of __ per centum ( __%) per annum from the date due until paid. jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. PBM and Ching invoked the assumption of jurisdiction by
7. [I]n consideration of the Trust Receipt, the undersigned hereby jointly and severally the SEC over all of PBMs assets and liabilities.[16] TRB filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. TRB
undertake and agree to pay on demand on the said BANK, all sums and amounts of argued that (1) Ching is being sued in his personal capacity as a surety for PBM; (2) the SEC decision
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 65
declaring PBM in suspension of payments is not binding on TRB; and (3) Presidential Decree No. 1758 (PD a) Accept the P1.373 million deposits remitted over a period of 17 years or until 2006 which shall be applied
No. 1758),[17] which Ching relied on to support his assertion that all claims against PBM are suspended, does directly to the account (as remitted per hereto attached schedule). The amount of P1.373 million shall
not apply to Ching as the decree regulates corporate activities only.[18] be considered as full payment of PBMs account. (The receiver is amenable to this alternative)
The initial deposit/remittance which amounts to P150,000.00 shall be remitted upon approval of the
In its order dated 15 August 1983,[19] the trial court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to Ching and above and conforme to PISCOR and PBM. Subsequent deposits shall start on the 3rd year and annually
affirmed its dismissal of the case with respect to PBM. The trial court stressed that TRB was holding Ching thereafter (every June 30th of the year) until June 30, 2006.
liable under the Deed of Suretyship. As Chings obligation was solidary, the trial court ruled that TRB could Failure to pay one annual installment shall make the whole obligation due and demandable.
proceed against Ching as surety upon default of the principal debtor PBM. The trial court also held that PD b) Write-off immediately P4.278 million. The balance [of] P1.373 million to remain outstanding in the books
No. 1758 applied only to corporations, partnerships and associations and not to individuals. nUpon the trial of the Bank. Said balance will equal the deposits to be remitted to the Bank for a period of 17 years.[34]
courts denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Ching filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[20] before However, Atty. Aranda himself testified that both items (a) and (b) quoted above were never complied with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted Chings petition and ordered the dismissal of the case. The or implemented. Not only was there no initial deposit of P150,000 as required in the resolution, TRB also
appellate court ruled that the SEC assumed jurisdiction over Ching and PBM to the exclusion of courts or disapproved the document prepared by the receiver, which would have released Ching from his
tribunals of coordinate rank. suretyship.[35]
TRB assailed the Court of Appeals Decision[21] before this Court. In Traders Royal Bank v. Court of The Ruling of the Trial Court
Appeals,[22] this Court upheld TRB and ruled that Ching was merely a nominal party in SEC Case No. The trial court found Ching liable to TRB for P19,333,558.16 under the Deed of Suretyship. The trial
2250. Creditors may sue individual sureties of debtor corporations, like Ching, in a separate proceeding court explained:
before regular courts despite the pendency of a case before the SEC involving the debtor corporation. In
his Answer dated 6 November 1989, Ching denied liability as surety and accommodation co-maker of [T]he liability of Ching as a surety attaches independently from his capacity as a stockholder of the
PBM. He claimed that the SEC had already issued a decision[23]approving a revised rehabilitation plan for Philippine Blooming Mills. Indisputably, under the Deed of Suretyship defendant Ching unconditionally
PBMs creditors, and that PBM obtained the credit accommodations for corporate purposes that did not agreed to assume PBMs liability to the plaintiff in the event PBM defaulted in the payment of the said
redound to his personal benefit. He further claimed that even as a surety, he has the right to the defenses obligation in addition to whatever penalties, expenses and bank charges that may occur by reason of
personal to PBM. Thus, his liability as surety would attach only if, after the implementation of payments default. Clear enough, under the Deed of Suretyship (Exh. J), defendant Ching bound himself jointly and
scheduled under the rehabilitation plan, there would remain a balance of PBMs debt to TRB. [24] Although severally with PBM in the payment of the latters obligation to the plaintiff. The obligation being solidary,
Ching admitted PBMs availment of the credit accommodations, he did not show any proof of payment by the plaintiff Bank can hold Ching liable upon default of the principal debtor. This is explicitly provided in
PBM or by him. Article 1216 of the New Civil Code already quoted above.[36]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
TRB admitted certain partial payments on the PBM account made by PBM itself and by the SEC-appointed WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendant Alfredo Ching liable to plaintiff bank in the
receiver.[25] Thus, the trial court had to resolve the following remaining issues: amount of P19,333,558.16 (NINETEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND FIVE
1. How much exactly is the corporate defendants outstanding obligation to the plaintiff? HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT & 16/100) as of October 31, 1991, and to pay the legal interest thereon from
2. Is defendant Alfredo Ching personally answerable, and for exactly how much? [26] such date until it is fully paid. To pay plaintiff 5% of the entire amount by way of attorneys fees.
TRB presented Mr. Lauro Francisco, loan officer of the Remedial Management Department of TRB, and SO ORDERED.[37]
Ms. Carla Pecson, manager of the International Department of TRB, as witnesses. Both witnesses testified The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
to the following: On appeal, Ching stated that as surety and solidary debtor, he should benefit from the changed nature
1. The existence of a Deed of Suretyship dated 21 July 1977 executed by Ching for PBMs liabilities to TRB up of the obligation as provided in Article 1222 of the Civil Code, which reads:
to P10,000,000;[27] Article 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are
2. The application of PBM and grant by TRB on 13 March 1980 of Letter of Credit No. 479 AD for US$591,043, and the
derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him, or pertain to his own
actual availment by PBM of the full proceeds of the credit accommodation;[28]
3. The application of PBM and grant by TRB on 6 August 1980 of Letter of Credit No. 563 AD for US$156,000, and share. With respect to those which personally belong to the others, he may avail himself thereof only as
the actual availment by PBM of the full proceeds of the credit accommodation;[29] and regards that part of the debt for which the latter are responsible.
4. The existence of a trust loan of P3,500,000 evidenced by a notarized Promissory Note dated 27 April 1981
Ching claimed that his liability should likewise be reduced since the equitable apportionment of PBMs
wherein Ching bound himself solidarily with PBM;[30] and
remaining assets among its creditors under the rehabilitation proceedings would have the effect of reducing
5. Per TRBs computation, Ching is liable for P19,333,558.16 as of 31 October 1991.[31]
PBMs liability. He also claimed that the amount for which he was being held liable was excessive. He
Ching presented Atty. Vicente Aranda, corporate secretary and First Vice President of the Human Resources contended that the outstanding principal balance, as stated in TRB Board Resolution No. 5893-1990, was
Department of TRB, as witness. Ching sought to establish that TRBs Board of Directors adopted a resolution only P5,650,749.09.[38] Ching also contended that he was not liable for interest, as the loan documents did
fixing the PBM account at an amount lower than what TRB wanted to collect from Ching. The trial court not stipulate the interest rate, pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code.[39] Finally, Ching asserted that the
allowed Atty. Aranda to testify over TRBs manifestation that the Answer failed to plead the subject matter Deed of Suretyship executed on 21 July 1977could not guarantee obligations incurred after its execution.[40]
of his testimony. Atty. Aranda produced TRB Board Resolution No. 5935, series of 1990, which contained
TRB did not file its appellees brief. Thus, the Court of Appeals resolved to submit the case for
the minutes of the special meeting of TRBs Board of Directors held on 8 June 1990.[32] In the resolution,
decision.[41]
the Board of Directors advised TRBs Management not to release Alfredo Ching from his JSS liability to the
The Court of Appeals considered the following issues for its determination:
bank.[33] The resolution also stated the following:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 66
1. Whether the Answer of Ching amounted to an admission of liability. The case before us is an offshoot of the trial courts denial of Chings motion to have the case dismissed
2. Whether Ching can still be sued as a surety after the SEC placed PBM under rehabilitation against him. The petition is a thinly veiled attempt to make this Court reconsider its decision in the prior
receivership, and if in the affirmative, for how much.[42] case of Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals.[48] This Court has already resolved the issue of Chings
separate liability as a surety despite the rehabilitation proceedings before the SEC. We held in Traders
The Court of Appeals resolved the first two questions in favor of TRB. The appellate court stated:
Royal Bank that:
Ching did not deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the L/Cs, Trust Receipts,
Undertaking, Deed of Surety, and the 3.5 Million Peso Promissory Note upon which TRBs action rested. He Although Ching was impleaded in SEC Case No. 2250, as a co-petitioner of PBM, the SEC could not
is, therefore, presumed to be liable unless he presents evidence showing payment, partially or in full, of assume jurisdiction over his person and properties. The Securities and Exchange Commission was
these obligations (Investment and Underwriting Corporation of the Philippines v. Comptronics Philippines, empowered, as rehabilitation receiver, to take custody and control of the assets and properties of PBM
Inc. and Gene v. Tamesis, 192 SCRA 725 [1990]). As surety of a corporation placed under rehabilitation only, for the SEC has jurisdiction over corporations only [and] not over private individuals, except
receivership, Ching can answer separately for the obligations of debtor PBM (Rizal Banking Corporation v. stockholders in an intra-corporate dispute (Sec. 5, P.D. 902-A and Sec. 2 of P.D. 1758). Being a nominal
Court of Appeals, Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc., and Alfredo Ching, 178 SCRA 738 [1990], and Traders party in SEC Case No. 2250, Chings properties were not included in the rehabilitation receivership that the
Royal Bank v. Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching, 177 SCRA 788 [1989]). SEC constituted to take custody of PBMs assets. Therefore, the petitioner bank was not barred from
Even a[n] SEC injunctive order cannot suspend payment of the suretys obligation since the rehabilitation filing a suit against Ching, as a surety for PBM. An anomalous situation would arise if individual
receivers are limited to the existing assets of the corporation.[43] sureties for debtor corporations may escape liability by simply co-filing with the corporation a petition for
suspension of payments in the SEC whose jurisdiction is limited only to corporations and their corporate
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
assets.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED but modified with respect to the
amount of liability of defendant Alfredo Ching which is lowered from P19,333,558.16 to P15,773,708.78 Ching can be sued separately to enforce his liability as surety for PBM, as expressly provided
with legal interest of 12% per annum until it is fully paid. SO ORDERED.[44] by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals denied Chings Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
It is elementary that a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders
Hence, this petition.
and members. Being an officer or stockholder of a corporation does not make ones property the property
Issues
also of the corporation, for they are separate entities (Adelio Cruz vs. Quiterio Dalisay, 152 SCRA 482).
Ching assigns the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
Chings act of joining as a co-petitioner with PBM in SEC Case No. 2250 did not vest in the SEC jurisdiction
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
over his person or property, for jurisdiction does not depend on the consent or acts of the parties but
ALFREDO CHING WAS LIABLE FOR OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY PBM LONG AFTER THE
upon express provision of law (Tolentino vs. Social Security System, 138 SCRA 428; Lee vs. Municipal Trial
EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF SURETYSHIP.
Court of Legaspi City, Br. I, 145 SCRA 408). (Emphasis supplied)
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONERS
WERE LIABLE FOR THE TRUST RECEIPTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT Traders Royal Bank has fully resolved the issue regarding Chings liability as a surety of the credit
HAD PREVENTED THEIR FULFILLMENT. accommodations TRB extended to PBM. The decision amounts to res judicata[49] which bars Ching from
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER ALFREDO raising the same issue again. Hence, the only question that remains is the amount of Chings
CHING LIABLE FOR P15,773,708.78 WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT 12% PER ANNUM UNTIL liability. Nevertheless, we shall resolve the issues Ching has raised in his attempt to escape liability under
FULLY PAID DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE REHABILITATION PLAN OF PETITIONER his surety.
PBM, WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRIVATE Whether Ching is liable for obligations PBM contracted after execution of the Deed of
RESPONDENT IS ONLY ENTITLED TO P1,373,415.00.[45] Suretyship
Ching is liable for credit obligations contracted by PBM against TRB before and after the execution of
Ching asserted that the Deed of Suretyship dated 21 July 1977 could not answer for obligations not
the 21 July 1977 Deed of Suretyship. This is evident from the tenor of the deed itself, referring to amounts
yet in existence at the time of its execution. Specifically, Ching maintained that the Deed of Suretyship could
PBM may now be indebted or may hereafter become indebted to TRB.
not answer for debts contracted by PBM in 1980 and 1981. Ching contended that no accessory contract of
The law expressly allows a suretyship for future debts. Article 2053 of the Civil Code provides:
suretyship could arise without an existing principal contract of loan. Ching likewise argued that TRB could
A guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is not yet known;
no longer claim on the trust receipts because TRB had already taken the properties subject of the trust
there can be no claim against the guarantor until the debt is liquidated. A conditional obligation may also
receipts. Ching likewise maintained that his obligation as surety could not exceed the P1,373,415
be secured. (Emphasis supplied)
apportioned to PBM under the SEC-approved rehabilitation plan. In its Comment, TRB asserted that the first
Furthermore, this Court has ruled in Dio v. Court of Appeals[50] that:
two assigned errors raised factual issues not brought before the trial court. Furthermore, TRB pointed out
Under the Civil Code, a guaranty may be given to secure even future debts, the amount of which may not
that Ching never presented PBMs rehabilitation plan before the trial court. TRB also stated that the Supreme
be known at the time the guaranty is executed. This is the basis for contracts denominated as continuing
Court ruling in Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals[46] constitutes res judicatabetween the
guaranty or suretyship. A continuing guaranty is one which is not limited to a single transaction, but which
parties. Therefore, TRB could proceed against Ching separately from PBM to enforce in full Chings liability
contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time
as surety.[47]
or until revoked. It is prospective in its operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect
The Ruling of the Court
to future transactions within certain limits, and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they
The petition has no merit.
accrue, the guarantor becomes liable. Otherwise stated, a continuing guaranty is one which covers all
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 67
transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the description or contemplation of the schedule). The amount of P1.373 million shall be considered as full payment of PBMs account. (The
contract of guaranty, until the expiration or termination thereof. A guaranty shall be construed as receiver is amenable to this alternative.) The initial deposit/remittance which amounts to P150,000.00
continuing when by the terms thereof it is evident that the object is to give a standing credit to the shall be remitted upon approval of the above and conforme of PISCOR [xxx] and PBM. Subsequent
deposits shall start on the 3rd year and annually thereafter (every June 30th of the year) until June 30,
principal debtor to be used from time to time either indefinitely or until a certain period; especially if the
2006.
right to recall the guaranty is expressly reserved. Hence, where the contract states that the guaranty is to Failure to pay one annual installment shall make the whole obligation due and demandable. Now Mr.
secure advances to be made from time to time, it will be construed to be a continuing one. Witness, would you be in a position to inform [the court] if these conditions listed in item (a) in
In other jurisdictions, it has been held that the use of particular words and expressions such as payment Resolution No. 5935, series of 1990, were implemented or met?
of any debt, any indebtedness, or any sum, or the guaranty of any transaction, or money to be furnished A Yes. I know for a fact that the conditions, more particularly the initial deposit/remittance in the amount
the principal debtor at any time, or on such time that the principal debtor may require, have been of P150,000.00 which have to be done with approval was not remitted or met.
construed to indicate a continuing guaranty. Q Will you clarify your answer. Would you be in a position to inform the court if those conditions were
Whether Chings liability is limited met? Because your initial answer was yes.
A Yes sir, I am in a position to state that these conditions were not met.
to the amount stated in PBMs rehabilitation plan
Q Let me refer you to the condition listed as item (b) of the same resolution which I read and quote: Write
Ching would like this Court to rule that his liability is limited, at most, to the amount stated in PBMs off immediately P4.278 million. The balance of P1.373 million to remain outstanding in the books of
rehabilitation plan. In claiming this reduced liability, Ching invokes Article 1222 of the Civil Code which reads: the bank. Said balance will be remitted to the Bank for a period of 17 years. Mr. Witness, would you
Art. 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are be in a position to inform the court if the bank implemented that particular condition?
derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him, or pertain to his own A In the implementation of this settlement the receiver prepared a document for approval and conformity of
share. With respect to those which personally belong to the others, he may avail himself thereof only as the bank. The said document would in effect release the suretyship of Alfredo Ching and for that reason
regards that part of the debt for which the latter are responsible. In granting the loan to PBM, TRB the bank refused or denied fixing its conformity and approval with the court.
required Chings surety precisely to insure full recovery of the loan in case PBM becomes insolvent or fails xxx
ATTY. ATIENZA ON REDIRECT EXAMINATION
to pay in full. This was the very purpose of the surety. Thus, Ching cannot use PBMs failure to pay in full
Q Mr. Witness you stated that the reason why the plaintiff bank did not implement these conditionalities [sic]
as justification for his own reduced liability to TRB. As surety, Ching agreed to pay in full PBMs loan in was because the former defendant corporation requested that the suretyship of Alfredo Ching be
case PBM fails to pay in full for any reason, including its insolvency. released, is that correct?
TRB, as creditor, has the right under the surety to proceed against Ching for the entire amount of A I did not say that. I said that in effect the document prepared by the lawyer of the receiver xxx the bank
PBMs loan. This is clear from Article 1216 of the Civil Code: would release the suretyship of Alfredo Ching, that is why the bank is not amenable to such a document.
ART. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them Q Despite this approved resolution the bank, because of said requirement or conformity did not seek to
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may implement these conditionalities [sic]?
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected. (Emphasis A Yes sir because the conditions imposed by the board is not being followed in that document because it was
the condition of the board that the suretyship should not be released but the document being presented
supplied)
to the bank for signature and conformity in effect if signed would release the suretyship. So it would
Ching further claims a reduced liability under TRB Board Resolution No. 5935. This resolution states be a violation with the approval of the board so the bank did not sign the conformity.[54]
that PBMs outstanding loans may be reduced to P1.373 million subject to certain conditions like the payment Ching also claims that TRB prevented PBM from fulfilling its obligations under the trust receipts when
of P150,000 initial payment.[51] The resolution also states that TRB should not release Chings solidary liability TRB, together with other creditor banks, took hold of PBMs inventories, including the goods covered by the
under his surety. The resolution even directs TRBs management to study Chings criminal liability under the trust receipts. Ching asserts that this act of TRB released him from liability under the suretyship. Ching
trust documents.[52] Chings own witness testified that Resolution No. 5935 was never implemented. For one, forgets that he executed, on behalf of PBM, separate Undertakings for each trust receipt expressly granting
PBM or its receiver never paid the P150,000 initial payment to TRB. TRB also rejected the document that to TRB the right to take possession of the goods at any time to protect TRBs interests. TRB may exercise
PBMs receiver presented which would have released Ching from his suretyship. Clearly, Ching cannot rely such right without waiving its right to collect the full amount of the loan to PBM. The Undertakings also
on Resolution No. 5935 to escape liability under his suretyship. Chings attempts to have this Court review provide that any suspension of payment or any assignment by PBM for the benefit of creditors renders the
the factual issues of the case are improper. It is not a function of the Supreme Court to assess and evaluate loan due and demandable. Thus, the separate Undertakings uniformly provide:
again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by the parties particularly where the findings of 2. That the said BANK may at any time cancel the foregoing trust and take possession
both the trial court and the appellate court coincide on the matter. of said merchandise with the right to sell and dispose of the same under such
Whether Ching is liable for the trust receipts terms and conditions it may deem best, or of the proceeds of such of the same as
Ching is still liable for the amounts stated in the letters of credit covered by the trust receipts. Other may then have been sold, wherever the said merchandise or proceeds may then be found
than his bare allegations, Ching has not shown proof of payment or settlement with TRB. Atty. Vicente and all the provisions of the Trust Receipt shall apply to and be deemed to include said above-
Aranda, TRBs corporate secretary and First Vice President of its Human Resource Management Department, mentioned merchandise if the same shall have been made up or used in the manufacture of
testified that the conditions in the TRB board resolution presented by Ching were not met or implemented, any other goods, or merchandise, and the said BANK shall have the same rights and remedies
thus: against the said merchandise in its manufactured state, or the product of said manufacture
ATTY. AZURA as it would have had in the event that such merchandise had remained [in] its original state
Q Going into the resolution itself. A certain stipulation ha[s] been outlined, and may I refer you to condition and irrespective of the fact that other and different merchandise is used in completing such
or step No. 1, which reads: a) Accept the P1.373 million deposits remitted over a period of 17 years or manufacture. In the event of any suspension, or failure or assignment for the benefit
until 2006 which shall be applied directly to the account (as remitted per hereto attached of creditors on the part of the undersigned or of the non-fulfillment of any
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 68
obligation, or of the non-payment at maturity of any acceptance made under said Statement of Account as of 31 October 1991,[58] the accrued interest on the trust receipts and the trust loan
credit, or any other credit issued by the said BANK on account of the undersigned or of as of the filing of the complaint on 13 May 1983 were P311,387.51[59] under Trust Receipt No.
the non-payment of any indebtedness on the part of the undersigned to the said 106, P338,739.81[60] under Trust Receipt No. 113, and P1,287,616.44[61] under the trust loan. The penalty
BANK, all obligations, acceptances, indebtedness and liabilities whatsoever shall interest on the trust loan amounted to P137,315.07.[62] Ching did not rebut this Statement of Account which
thereupon without notice mature and become due and payable and the BANK may TRB presented during trial.
avail of the remedies provided herein.[55] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the following is the summary of Chings liability under the suretyship as of 13 May 1983, the date
Presidential Decree No. 115 (PD No. 115), otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law, expressly allows of filing of TRBs complaint with the trial court:
TRB to take possession of the goods covered by the trust receipts.Thus, Section of 7 of PD No. 115 states: 1. On Trust Receipt No. 106 (Letter of Credit No. 479 AD)
SECTION 7. Rights of the entruster. The entruster shall be entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the Outstanding Principal P 959,611.96
goods, documents or instruments released under a trust receipt to the entrustee to the extent of the Accrued Interest (12% per annum) 311,387.51
amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt, or to the return of the goods, documents 2. On Trust Receipt No. 113 (Letter of Credit No. 563 AD)
or instruments in case of non-sale, and to the enforcement of all other rights conferred on him in the trust Outstanding Principal P 1,191,137.13
receipt provided such are not contrary to the provisions of this Decree. Accrued Interest (12% per annum) 338,739.82
The entruster may cancel the trust and take possession of the goods, documents or 3. On the Trust Loan (Promissory Note)
instruments subject of the trust or of the proceeds realized therefrom at any time upon Outstanding Principal P 3,500,000.00
default or failure of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the trust Accrued Interest (18% per annum) 1,287,616.44
receipt or any other agreement between the entruster and the entrustee, and the entruster in Accrued Penalty Interest (2% per annum) 137,315.07
possession of the goods, documents or instruments may, on or after default, give notice to the entrustee WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
of the intention to sell, and may, not less than five days after serving or sending of such notice, sell the Alfredo Ching shall pay respondent Traders Royal Bank the following (1) on the credit accommodations
goods, documents or instruments at public or private sale, and the entruster may, at a public sale, under the trust receipts, the total principal amount of P2,150,749.09 with legal interest at 12% per annum
become a purchaser. The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private, shall be applied from 14 May 1983 until full payment; (2) on the trust loan evidenced by the Promissory Note, the principal
(a) to the payment of the expenses thereof; (b) to the payment of the expenses of re-taking, sum of P3,500,000 with 20% interest per annum from 14 May 1983 until full payment; (3) on the total
keeping and storing the goods, documents or instruments; (c) to the satisfaction of the accrued interest as of 13 May 1983, P2,075,058.84 with 12% interest per annum from 14 May 1983 until
entrustees indebtedness to the entruster. The entrustee shall receive any surplus but shall be full payment. Petitioner Alfredo Ching shall also pay attorneys fees to respondent Traders Royal Bank
liable to the entruster for any deficiency. Notice of sale shall be deemed sufficiently given if in equivalent to 5% of the total principal and interest.
writing, and either personally served on the entrustee or sent by post-paid ordinary mail to the entrustees SO ORDERED.
last known business address. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even though TRB took possession of the goods covered by the trust receipts, PBM and Ching remained
liable for the entire amount of the loans covered by the trust receipts.
Absent proof of payment or settlement of PBM and Chings credit obligations with TRB, Chings liability
is what the Deed of Suretyship stipulates, plus the applicable interest and penalties. The trust receipts, as G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
well as the Letter of Undertaking dated 16 April 1980[56] executed by PBM, stipulate in writing the payment LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
of interest without specifying the rate. In such a case, the applicable interest rate shall be the legal rate, BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
which is now 12% per annum.[57] This is in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416, which states: vs.
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
the Usury Law, the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall Bureau of Printing, respondents.
be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. (Emphasis supplied) ESCOLIN, J.:
On the other hand, the Promissory Note evidencing the P3,500,000 trust loan provides for 18% interest Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
per annum plus 2% penalty interest per annum in case of default.This stipulated interest should continue Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
to run until full payment of the P3,500,000 trust loan. In addition, the accrued interest on all the credit enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
accommodations should earn legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint pursuant to Article 2212 seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
of the Civil Code. the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
obligation may be silent upon this point. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
The trial court found and the appellate court affirmed that the outstanding principal amounts as of the a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
filing of the complaint with the trial court on 13 May 1983 were P959,611.96 under Trust Receipt No. 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
106, P1,191,137.13 under Trust Receipt No. 113, and P3,500,000 for the trust loan. As extracted from TRBs 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 69
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263- sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540- No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843- from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649- The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed
123.
to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
petition to be given due course.
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Grant T. Trent said:
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 70
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records— questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el unconstitutional by this Court.
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5 Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
included or excluded from such publication. not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
circularized to all concerned. 6 manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part binding force and effect. SO ORDERED.
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
obtain their official and specific contents. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been vs.
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
SARMIENTO, J.:
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their
wit: constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event.
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been The facts are not disputed:
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE
be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him
as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 71
amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked
Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same. Contrary to law. as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing
and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966,
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;
were translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —
the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I
Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond
worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan,
situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the
Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes
treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the
and the catching of fish.
letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond
On cross-examination, this witness declared: to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer
I worked with the accused up to March 1964. Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another
Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon — letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received
accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao,
still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as
captain of Pinagbayanan. Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from
On cross-examination, this witness declared: Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In
I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959. 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said
On re-direct examination, this witness declared: none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there. know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me
On re-cross examination, this witness declared: to pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish. Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from
— percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5,
pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.
receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused,
of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still
Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of
sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15,
paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D- series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.
3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the
1964, 1965 and 1966. taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering
On cross-examination, this witness declared: municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares. evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a
On question of the court, this witness declared: fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental. should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during
D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D- the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.
1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial. Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the
general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows: There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under
or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government,
Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 72
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually fishpond started operating before the year 1964." 10
converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. 1
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows: repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council muscle.
of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause
case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding. SO ORDERED. 3
or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
I.
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS
standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy
AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO.
others.' " 14 Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity is
12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language —
AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be "saved"
II.
by proper construction. It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.
directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code
III.
of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY
defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces
OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC
trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on
LANDS.
the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and
IV.
consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID,
CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON- It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained an act of
RESIDENTS. 4 Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the
the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted: terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at
Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited "is
fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5 not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire
xxx xxx xxx spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning
within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture,
relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6 expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or
xxx xxx xxx issues')." 23 The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, 24 insofar as the
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the
Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the rights of
thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of
started operating before the year 1964. 7 partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does
not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of State
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The petitioner
authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.
contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of
"owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a
payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 73
the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28 legislation was notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the
assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning
U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative
case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4,
elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of had prescribed. Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable,
individual liberties. and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates
to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however,
penalty, much less, a retrospective one.
that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic
rights, 30 or as in the Levycase, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest
the competence of the legislature is presumed. In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that local governments' taxing
with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local
coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing
deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, percentage taxes on sales.) First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate
and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National Government which thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of
that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances. land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the
challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures 33 designed to
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged
assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government,
against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather
on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune
on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as
from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.
fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits
There is, then, no merit in the last objection.
brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.
cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the
imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the
'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started
operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No.
15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
vs.
fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case,
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In
addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this FERNANDEZ, J.:
jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law. This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive
(Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries portion of winch reads.
(Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The
to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail. To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face SO ORDERED.
thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances. Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues
and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED
say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37 The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 74
IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground
WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3 purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. The
any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, regulation.
upon conviction. 5
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6 particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
declared null and void: executive Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
legislative powers:
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.7
discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
preliminary injunction. 8 discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the
petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent
mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in
Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9
question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person
I
before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
OF TAXATION.
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
II
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13 The trial court did not commit the errors
RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
assigned. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
costs. SO ORDERED.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW
IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 75
vs. temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish
CAYAT, defendant-appellant. Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in
MORAN, J.: the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community life
and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period.
Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos
President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
(P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
following information was filed against him:
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material
information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in
the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in
a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior,
this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides
have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non- communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as be understood and applied.
provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non- classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
Christian tribe. purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes'
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as
communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable,
these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any
for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The
attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled"
exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality
will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for
with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the
Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and
so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
humanity.
make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the
inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often
(communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 76
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial
standard of life and civilization. or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the
National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to
farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and
apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant
we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the
asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the
measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the
contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in
application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in
hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Finally, that the Act applies equally to all
the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public
members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a
morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the
certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the
Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which
equality of its application.
some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the
Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law,
notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means vs.
simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN
department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the
America and other foreign countries." 2
instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20,
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police
1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc
power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly
Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the
described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any
Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to
Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity
protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be
VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to
City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the
remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization
Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge
and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify
in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and
the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
export of sugar.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their
After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964,
Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in
rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of
education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization
defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses
and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
or fees not excluded in its charter.
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far
from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the
impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier. Section 1
world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax
activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 77
countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166,
Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF
sugar produced is exported. THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of vs.
the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void." Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses CRUZ, J.:
or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The
been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore
forestall any unfavorable results. act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation,
specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed. The Constitution The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the
[1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; certain other government offices.
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both
central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is Judiciary. We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided I
a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill
otherwise. passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff- surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation,
appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered. and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject
of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993 petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS,
Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 78
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
Therewith." We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides: accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system: effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality; II
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations; from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
and the like; (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
same. emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows: the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, in the Journal.
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
repealed or modified accordingly. amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated amendment.
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and These argument are unacceptable.
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as thus:
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2 conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained: beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with
matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 79
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy. the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
III Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause. and the people.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this
complaints against public offices and officers.10
need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification deserving. In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office
in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00.
from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is
Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11 withdrawn from it.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but
in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
discriminate against others. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
recognized in the courts of justice.
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the
Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of (On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection? Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.) It is worth observing that
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 80
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions. Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977,
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources of Land Transportation.
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation. operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of
Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of
grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process.
which reads:
The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions. We are unable to
units are used as public conveyances;
agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated
provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
taxis;
similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience,
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of
IV
his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as
beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby
violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
promulgates the following rules and regulations:
protection of laws."
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted
exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however for registration and allowed for operation;
undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public
debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right. registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for
registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from 1980 — Model 1974
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the 1981 — Model 1975, etc.
National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn
be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent. SO ORDERED. from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their
respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for
subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982 For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only
vs. after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
TRANSPORTATION, respondents. issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 81
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public classification and standard?
conveyances. To quote said Circular: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units 4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its
years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith powers:
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned: Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding
Year Model Automatic Phase- section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Out Year Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require
the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine
1980
Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the
1974 1981 Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other
government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in
1975 1982
the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of
1976 1983 this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
1977
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by
Strict compliance here is desired. 2 the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the
an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim,
testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that
additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars.
pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be
Resolution." 3 desired by the BOT.
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due
Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for
protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982. the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally
that the records of the case could not be located. dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
consideration by this Court: conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with (Emphasis supplied)
the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process? because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant
the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
(1) Equal protection of the law; standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to
(2) Substantive due process; and apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 82
standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit
for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness
and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because
the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the
outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall
immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall
be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only
after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already
being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in
other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared
to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good EN BANC
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. [G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987.]
Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7 TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA. NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the
need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled the
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of National Medical Admission Test (NMAT), Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA
classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES
the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE
that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), Respondents.
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and SYLLABUS
undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE AND
Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER; BURDEN OF PROOF TO BE DISCHARGED; CASE AT BAR. — Article II of the
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result. pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or
in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which
lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively
specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of
proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 83
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a Fernando in Edu v. Ericta — "The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-
prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
petitioners. Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On ‘safe transit upon the roads.’" We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section
the contrary we may note — in anticipation of discussion infra - that the statute and the regulation which 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a)
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to
take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons 4. ID.; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND OBJECTIVE; REGULATION OF PRACTICE OF MEDICINE INCLUDING
wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who ADMISSION TO RANKS OF AUTHORIZED PRACTITIONERS A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF. — There is
qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."cralaw virtua1aw another reason why the petitioners’ arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
library impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY ESSENTIALLY A QUESTION OF POWER OR AUTHORITY; QUESTIONS AS TO the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order
DESIRABILITY, WISDOM OR UTILITY OF LEGISLATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION PROPERLY — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical
ADDRESSED TO POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. — The petitioners also urge that the NMAT safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,
authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
political departments of the government not to the courts. valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission
3. ID.; PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; APPLIED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of
WHERE STATUTES DEAL WITH COMPLEX AND TECHNICAL SUBJECTS; PRINCIPLE OF SUBORDINATE the state.
LEGISLATION; STANDARDS SET FOR SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION NECESSARILY BROAD AND HIGHLY
ABSTRACT. — The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — What we have before us in the instant case is closely related; the
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting,
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission: "One thing, however, is apparent among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government
also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3) has been made to adapt itself to the is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
governments. (People v. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled
greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." The standards to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 84
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and defines its basic objectives in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
minds for disease or trauma.
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
6. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; NOT VIOLATED BY MECS ORDER NO. 52, S. of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
1985. — Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the MECS Order
which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the
Philippine Medical Colleges" infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly
that students seeking admission during a given school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative;
different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine,
that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools;
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of
obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:chanrobles law
such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; library
the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;
establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from (b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to
being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
to meet circumstances as they change. laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient
services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

DECISION (c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel,
including student-teachers ratio;

FELICIANO, J.: (d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine;

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. (e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional
by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August (g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was implementation of the foregoing functions." (Emphasis supplied).
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of schools:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 85
of completion of a bachelor’s degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be (a) Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance of human rights.
requirements that may be deemed admissible.
"(b) Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
. . ." (Emphasis supplied) promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as "(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture
an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state liberation and development.
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(d) Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
"2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, "(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject
shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."cralaw virtua1aw library
of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give other with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the
tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission that will burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision
yield information on other aspects of the applicant’s personality to complement the information derived invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms.
from the NMAT. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as
x x x the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic
objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their
case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to
enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986- 87, without the by the petitioners.
required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order." (Emphasis supplied)
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary
medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent we may note - in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation which petitioners
Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987- attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one
1988.chanrobles.com : virtual law library reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter
phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish
the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify
s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."cralaw virtua1aw library
order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court
would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative 2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed. of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from
the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, great departments of government, 1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 86
the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission: 2 hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine
"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this the public. 8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3) has been made to adapt legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
principle of ‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern power. 9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion
governments. (People v. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10 What we have before
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta 4 — required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and
"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy known.
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe transit upon the roads.’" 5 We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
"the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
requirements of the non-delegation principle.chanrobles law library resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added
on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission 4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the MECS Order
Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. which provides that.
But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the political departments of the government not to the every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
courts. Colleges." (Emphasis supplied).

There is another reason why the petitioners’ arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of admission during a given school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than
the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff
public order — of the general community. 6 An important component of that public order is the health and scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years.
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of
objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7 students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places
available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year;
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 87
immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may well result in an There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days,
they change. considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying reads:
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to
all personnel of the Department.
SO ORDERED. he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days
after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
Republic of the Philippines respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the
SUPREME COURT delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
Manila respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
EN BANC suspension herein provided.
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the
vs. requirements in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
City, respondents. terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner. terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be
taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive
KAPUNAN, J.: suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90)
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional days from arraignment.
Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and We disagree.
the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder1 and attempted First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It
murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with
court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the
R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides: case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does
or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be
days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension,3 relying on Section 42 of suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In his order dated December administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal8 or civil
14, 19936 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the
order of denial was, likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition
orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 10
We find the petition devoid of merit.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 88
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there
refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension
as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled
Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary.
implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an
the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive
ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law."
case is terminated. Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after
violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows: mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. 11
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court,
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. principles of due process and equal protection."
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such
Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due
suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal
shortened his term of office. Thus: Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section
office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the
would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety
mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into
to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined
the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if in Criminal Cases?" What is this all about?
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is
the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts.
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension
order of suspension should be lifted. Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for
an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one
character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 89
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
the office until the case is terminated." REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman. Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here
one day or more. because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
ganoon ba and . . .? SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .
disciplinary iyon e. SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene? provision? Is it?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive Suspension. REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision
magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses. is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e. are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . . is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft
xxx xxx xxx case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.
Case." Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the early xxx xxx xxx
termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the suspension REP. ALBANO. . . .
of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the
natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e. Veloso case.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that am saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter
a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago especially if it is a criminal case.
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension
should mandate. . . is until the case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing. balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . .
within a period. .
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial. SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days, SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito terminated not later than . . ." whatever we agree.
that the case shall also be terminated in one year from the time . . . THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon. So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman. Police Commission. . . . . . 13
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the
been held as directory even if you put it in the law? PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
solution to a particular situation. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
later than ninety days. that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
of these, well, looks exactly the same thing. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
this. We are really keen on having it quick, swift. easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice. preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman. R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 90
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate I.
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among The Case
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons First the facts.
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank
differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in
violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
JJ., concur. professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave. principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human
resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary
Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those
exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-
and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-
exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP.[1] Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in
the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate
Bill No. 1235; [2]
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the
SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law[3] of establishing professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; [4] (emphasis supplied)
EN BANC c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004] Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;[5]
vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents. d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within
DECISION the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-
PUNO, J.: and-file are also discriminated upon;[6] and
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted
its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers.[7]
the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[8] Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 91
without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature
should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.[9] from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. ( citations
Respondent BSP, in its comment,[10] contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection omitted)
clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.[15] The equal protection clause
the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. [16] If the
to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management. groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the and regulated differently from another.[17] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the
provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.[18]
even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.[11] above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
II. competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-
Issue result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. [19]
. . denied the equal protection of the laws."[12] That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill
III. does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, [20] this Court has
Ruling subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral
PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 conference committee of both Houses.
IS VALID. Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[21] An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. to be within constitutional limitations.[22] To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.[23]
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,[13] and EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
reiterated in a long line of cases:[14] OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold that
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The all validity out of the challenged proviso.
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were 1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid
which it is to operate. as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.[24]
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because circumstances.[25] Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality conditions.[26]
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,[27] where the Court
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the
for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an
and is not palpably arbitrary. invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
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While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey[32] is
in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing
and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on
arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating
for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the
adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying equal protection of the
changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is law, in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. [28] (citations omitted, emphasis In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,[33] the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
supplied) declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban[29] upheld that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled
the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State the Court:
of its police power[30] - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had
would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the countrys business, for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no
industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor
discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:[31] vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under
to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary
claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on
circumstances? their private rights of way.
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S.
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional
period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. A number of prior opinions of that court
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et
them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad
by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the
normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic
declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1). Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed
the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment.
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year Said the court, This certainly is not equal protection of the law.[34](emphasis supplied)
period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they [C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute
could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically
becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. [35] (emphasis supplied, citations
statutes in the United States. omitted)
xxx xxx xxx [W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be
circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .[36] (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis 3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
supplied, citations omitted) + 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause. According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of
the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were
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also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL.[37] Thus, SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon. allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
to 2004, viz: Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); xxx xxx xxx
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS); Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC); powers and functions:
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); xxx xxx xxx
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); (d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS organizational
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);[38] and and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances,
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective
share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act
expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below: No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907) otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows: xxx xxx xxx
Section 90. Personnel. - 5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
xxx xxx xxx Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and
standards approved by the Banks Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation,
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a
once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the
make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. ( emphasis Banks productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules,
supplied) and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank
xxx xxx xxx shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282) under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]: amended). (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx 6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following
other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other powers, functions and duties:
benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure xxx xxx xxx
the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, (e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of
however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by
President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporations
rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the
and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic
No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied) Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289) and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]: Corporations and the employees contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall: 7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
xxx xxx xxx Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards
10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporations human resource development
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 94
program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be
with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be denied the equal protection of the laws includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.[41]
from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no
with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied) substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising
other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioners injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to
granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000![39] provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension
there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, [t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical
classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies.[42]
rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides
reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government
face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as is that: [b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.[40] corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.
chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank- Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not Classification System of the SSL,[43] but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among
exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress power to classify so unbridled as to others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position
sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the
through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;[44] and (b) basic
right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum
a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a wages.[45] Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the
consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:[46]
the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made positions;
over a period of time? (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion (3) the kind of supervision received;
that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests on a policy determination by the legislature. All (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have been (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of (6) kind of supervision exercised;
a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing (7) decision-making responsibility;
inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution. (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
In fine, the policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank- (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and- The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
file and other GFIs who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
of scrutiny is not the declaredpolicy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At Constitution.[47]
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Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with
Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs
and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of
limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL. any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each direct result arising from one law. Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum. No
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary It has also been proffered that similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-
grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL. and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain persons
the SSL, based on the perceived need to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect
others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct to a legislative classification. Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:[54] this finding of similarity ignores
competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate
or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statutes different
were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining treatment of the two groups.
these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by
incidental. Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to military
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,[48] and service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar
the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.[49]It has the sole power and authority characteristics as follows:
to issue currency;[50] provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative
banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years.
functions, including the exempted GFIs.[51] Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment
the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institutions mandate cannot stand any xxx xxx xxx
more than an empty sack can stand. Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers.
with the particular circumstances of each institution. Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its
for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by
other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption benefits[55] (citations omitted)
of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are
over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
that of another, the deliberations show that the raison dtre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC
linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,[56] but also arbitrary. It is not based on
play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
the GFIs mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would
and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted put it - whether being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption from
SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government
and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291,
those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a preferred sub-class within government employees,
substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum
to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at
currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,[52] underscoring that GFIs are a particular the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven
class within the realm of government entities. separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the
manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of
other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act is of no moment.
given leave to have a compensation plan that shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in In GSIS v. Montesclaros,[57]this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant
the [BSP] and other [GFIs],[53] then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality
endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP. of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant
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but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means
The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of and ends was not required.
the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar. xxx xxx xxx
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a privilege fully within the legislative prerogative [From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Courts new equal protection and the
to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued two-tier approach.]
denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latters right to equal protection. In other words, From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during
while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of
of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. [58] So the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal
when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding
between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
the power to correct.[59] As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential old equal protection, a new equal
and Pensions,[60] once the State has chosen to confer benefits, discrimination contrary to law may occur protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection
where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying
under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. [61] for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown necessary
definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, to achieve statutory ends, not merely reasonably related ones. Moreover, equal protection became
deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by
from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any compelling state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of legitimate state ends.
rational basis. The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but characteristics: the presence of a suspect classification; or an impact on fundamental rights or interests.
it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both In the category of suspect classifications, the Warren Courts major contribution was to intensify the strict
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the
circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, fundamental interests ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate
the group is equally binding on the rest.[62] travel .]
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between xxx xxx xxx
the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its
of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw. best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-
IV. tier formulations of the Warren Courts equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an
Equal Protection Under interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the
International Lens fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while suspect
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications[63] and a xxx xxx xxx
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly
Constitution. [64] noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential old and interventionist new equal
A. Equal Protection protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered
in the United States approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static rational basis attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his
test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: [65] dissent in the Rodriguez case: [66]
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories
the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment except which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic)
upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. The old variety of equal Courts [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals
protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal
classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will
process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying fundamental values and scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the
restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classificationrequirement was readily satisfied: the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.
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Justice Marshalls sliding scale approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal
formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Courts results indicate at least two Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity
significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the old equal protection formula no and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law
longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. [74]
virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
rationality hands-off standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute discrimination and/or provisions about equality.[75] The general international provisions pertinent to
unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); [76] the
review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the old equal protection, are less demanding International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on
than the strictness of the new equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);[77] the Convention on the Elimination of all
an intermediate level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that classifications by gender must Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
objectives. That standard is intermediate with respect to both ends and means: where ends must be the American Convention on Human Rights;[78] the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;[79] the
compelling to survive strict scrutiny and merely legitimate under the old mode, important objectives are European Convention on Human Rights;[80] the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter
required here; and where means must be necessary under the new equal protection, and merely rationally of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the
related under the old equal protection, they must be substantially related to survive the intermediate level Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it
of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.[81]
B. Equal Protection The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first
in Europe generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires guarantee[s] of equal and effective protection
in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive against discrimination while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States
list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Parties to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination and
Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political to secure without discrimination the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.[82] These provisions impose a
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR[83] and in a very large number of Conventions administered by
discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. [84] Additionally, many of the other
which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment. [85]
prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of race, colour, language, religion The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to
or social origin.[67] view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies rights.[86] In Broeks[87] and Zwaan-de Vries,[88] the issue before the Committee was whether
with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case[68]the European Court set the standard discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26.
of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the
aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article
sought to be realised.[69] But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as
grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic,
in respect of those regarded as suspect (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26
orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, [70] the European Court declared that: applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the to social security found in ICESCR:
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any
treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention. obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example,
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,[71] the European Court held that very weighty reasons would have require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted
to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the
of nationality as compatible with the Convention.[72] The European Court will then permit States a very Covenant.[89]
much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck
the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes
example, large and small land-owners. [73] that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee[90] took into account the
C. Equality under definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
International Law . . . discrimination as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction
or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
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other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or Constitution.[94] The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise,
footing, of all rights and freedoms. [91] (emphasis supplied) this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance suffice.
with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires
hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign
irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have
with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.[92] been used to support many of our decisions.[95] We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: [93] through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. [96] Our laws must be construed in accordance
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law
of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve
of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that
[to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." our public interest is distinct and different from others.[97]
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: [A]merican
principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are
test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against constitutional settings and needs.[98] Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. [99]
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. Further, the quest for a better and more equal world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, effective judicial intervention.
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions equality as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in all phases of national development, further explicitated in
manner by which employers treat their employees. Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort
the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.[100]
creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and marginalized groups of society, including labor.[101] Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
xxx xxx xxx less privilege in life should have more in law.[102] And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides: not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and living reality.[103] Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
[favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular: forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: approximated.[104]
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of V. A Final Word
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It
to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has
xxx xxx xxx the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted) constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the legislative discretion would be given
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the deferential treatment. [105]
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But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless
of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from
This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government reasonless discrimination.
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of
of the actor. [106] Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna,
or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Panganiban, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., see dissenting.
Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.
Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in
our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend EN BANC
the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
"duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN
Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY
is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
this very Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE
as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY
Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In [G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003]
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the DECISION
government.[107] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation candidacy.
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M.
consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive
financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on
from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of
the quality of life for all.[108] Any act of Congress that runs counter to this the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is a consolidation of the following bills originating from
impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees
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House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the
PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;[1] propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES.[2] permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate[3] and sixteen (16) candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
members of the House of Representatives,[4] was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
and Senate versions of the bill. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, [5] signed by its the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or
proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.[6] longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees[7] to continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On
the Bicameral Conference Committee.[8] Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are
R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees[9] to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[10] still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of HB its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section
No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that becomes effective.
he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
of the report until the other members were given a copy thereof.[11] should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the Public Officers:[14]
report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, justice, and lead modest lives.
Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
this procedure was regular.[12] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000. therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and The Respondents Arguments
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss
Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present
P. Nazareno as the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742, and finally passed by both suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the
Houses on February 7, 2001. House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001. passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed
The Petitioners Case statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that irregularities
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of
expressed in its title. Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The
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title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
Elections through Fair Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an questions.[16]
election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as overarching significance to our society,[17] had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v.
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by Secretary of the Department of Energy,[18] this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing,
his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad
that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the unfairness (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic
equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.[19] Similarly, the Court took
the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged
permanent capacity. the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.[20]
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar
act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[21] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[22] Philippine
reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[23] Albano v. Reyes,[24] and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.[25]
every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo[26] as deriving its existence from the constitutional
forth. provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving is one of overarching significance that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court
of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue quite apropos:
of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular ... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the
imposed. exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable
Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand.[27]
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and Every statute is presumed valid.[28] The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled purpose of the law.[29]
to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006. inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of by the fundamental law.[30] And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the
Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.[31]
thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court. petitions.
The Courts Ruling Section 14 of Rep. Act
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised No. 9006 Is Not a Rider[32]
by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
at bar. Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters. paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees,
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[15] The hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
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President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very
candidacy. comfortable with the title Fair Election Practice so that we can get over with these things
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides: so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides
the title thereof. for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act Yes.
relating to its subject finding expression in its title.[33] SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that very touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what youre ...?
be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.[34] comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful comfortable with it.
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
of principles but also the objectives thereof: Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the REP. MARCOS:
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of
information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is
and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates actually one that indulge full coverage. It says An Act to enhance the holding of free,
and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices. But as you said, we will put that
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of aside to discuss later one.
harassment and discrimination.[35] Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election
index of its content.[36] Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that
violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.[37] THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a
instructive: title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify. Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that REP. MARCOS:
correct? Thats all. Because I believe ... I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title. Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: REP. MARCOS:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term fair What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
election practice, it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
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O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal... The full title, the same?
REP. PADILLA: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, Iyon na nga. The full title is An Act to enhance the holding ... Thats the House version, eh,
peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title This Act shall be known as the Fair Election
the Omnibus Election Code? Act.[38]
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
Why dont we remove fair and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act? discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
REP. PICHAY: Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation. society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun. exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.[39] It is not for this Court to look into the
REP. MARCOS: wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether
The Fair Election. it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether,
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
O, Fair Election Act. matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
REP. MACARAMBON: them within the range of judicial cognizance.[40] Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra[41] upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
election practices? repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
REP. PICHAY: election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Fair election practices? Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
REP. MACARAMBON: embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ... prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): legislators and the public.[42] In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the
Wala nang practices nga. repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
REP. PICHAY: upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives,
Wala nang practices. expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
(Informal discussions) Is Not Violative of the Equal
REP. PICHAY: Protection Clause of the Constitution[43]
Approve na iyan. The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be Fair Election Act. protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The rest wala nang problema ano? The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
VOICES: classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
Wala na. class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.[44] The Court has explained the nature of the
REP. MACARAMBON: equal protection guarantee in this manner:
Wala na iyong practices? The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
O, wala na? We will clean up. demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
REP. MARCOS: like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
Title? protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
The short title, This Act ... a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.[45]
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
Youre back to your No. 21 already. occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
REP. MARCOS: term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.[46] On the other hand, appointive
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officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive j. The disappearance of the Cayetano amendment, which is Section 12 of the compromise bill
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure[47] while others serve submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.[48] amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from for president and vice-president shall be considered ipso
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed candidacy.[50]
to take part in political and electoral activities.[49] The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed persuaded. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases[51] reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the
it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a- by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
not infringed. their observance the courts have no concern.[52] Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v.
Is Applicable In this Case De Venecia,[53]viz.:
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus: the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted
during its session on February 5, 2001; by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
the BCC on November 29, 2000; observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
without copies thereof being furnished the members; deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not The Effectivity Clause
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time Is Defective
it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House; Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members; invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,[54] this Court laid down the rule:
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened ... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
on November 23, 2000; publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
g. The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit: fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.[55]
... Following Article 2 of the Civil Code[56] and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or
9006, with the provision that This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval; a newspaper of general circulation.
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the
now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged
reasons for which no objection thereto was made; on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not contain a limitations or the limits of legislative power.[57] No such transgression has been shown in this case.
detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
measure; and SO ORDERED.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 105
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582


represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 106
VILLARAMA, JR., Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
PEREZ, and consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]
MENDOZA, JJ.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
Respondent. April 8, 2010 x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
x--------------------------------------------------------x Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

DECISION x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly


disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
DEL CASTILLO, J.: and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
of the existing order. gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

Justice Robert A. Jackson This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1] offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did
choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the
anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion. themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and
yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a
preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a
This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly. shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in
sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who
Factual Background do mischief (29:30).

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which
known as the Party-List System Act.[4] waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, of Sodom and Gomorrah).
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship,
membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC. or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised
Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented accreditation.
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims
of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 107
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
xx Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning. Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that
it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
upon: that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent
public morals; its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-
list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
establishment selling the same; individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been
brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether the party-list system will remain just that.
live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which:
(1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy II. No substantial differentiation
the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion;
(4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x
decrees and edicts. x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or
or literature which are offensive to morals. belief.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but xxxx
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be
no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and
writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As xxxx
an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8] IV. Public Morals
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 108
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts based on sexual orientation.
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms. The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application
for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their
V. Legal Provisions own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly
expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in reports by COMELECs field personnel.
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency Our Ruling
or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
We grant the petition.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and Compliance with the Requirements of the
direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11]Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15] registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and the Constitution and RA 7941.
desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16] Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all
as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang provinces in the country.[21]
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
granted the CHRs motion to intervene. nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was granted Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already
on February 2, 2010.[19] available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural
The Parties Arguments due process.
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 109
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented
itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang
networks: Ladlads Petition for Registration

Abra Gay Association


Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
Albay Gay Association religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
Boys Legion Metro Manila of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS) Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
Circle of Friends whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY) we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP) morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
LUMINA Baguio City religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
Naga City Gay Association Naga City approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
ONE BACARDI views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
PUP LAKAN second-class citizens.
RADAR PRIDEWEAR In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
The Link Davao City disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23] with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to
pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business. must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to
the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non- based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.[27]
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 110
proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
Petition for Registration proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with Equal Protection
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we
cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be
own existence.[28] denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[34]
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29] analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG of the Constitution.[37]
agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are
committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues: The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral
and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC
divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation,
and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31] and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the
nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to
society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals
remove an issue from our scrutiny. are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out
homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted
of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
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Freedom of Expression and Association challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.[44] A political group should not be hindered solely
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40] concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does
it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive,
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view.On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority consideration the values of other members of the community.
rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut
for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to homosexuality through this Decision.
ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad,
and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction
imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
one. transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It xxxx
follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that
supports LGBT individuals are protected as well. A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact,
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general
privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity
These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list
on the Courts analysis. elections.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43] system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed
by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that Non-Discrimination and International Law
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(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as
norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may follows:
become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access
In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires
enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens
have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.
Article 26
xxxx
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable
status. criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which
be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.[50]
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
international agreements.[49] ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding
The UDHR provides: principles of international law.

Article 21. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory
on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1)
through freely chosen representatives. of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis
Likewise, the ICCPR states: of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

Article 25 We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations.
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language,
representatives; then they are no longer controversial.

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will various international law professors, are at best de lege ferendaand do not constitute binding obligations on the
of the electors; Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
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most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts
role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is
directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

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