IRRI vs.

NLRC, MICOSA
G.R. No. 97239; May 12, 1993
NOCON, J.:

Facts:

IRRI hired private respondent Micosa as laborer, and agreed its Employment Policy and Regulations
stating that “An employer who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be
dismissed from the service.

On 1967, Micosa stabbed one Reynaldo Ortega causing the latter to death inside a beer house in Laguna.
He was accused of the crime of homicide.

The trial court found Micosa guilty of homicide, however his punishment was mitigated for the reasons of
(a) self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender to the proper authorities.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.

Sinearch ko lang sa googel: Probation is a privilege granted by the court to a person convicted of a
criminal offense to remain in the community instead of actually going to prison/jail.

On 1990, IRRI informed Micosa that will become regular core employee for an indefinite period and who
"may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine
Labor Code.” In the same year, IRRI wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his
conviction in the case for homicide.

Micosa informed the IRR that he had no intention of resigning from his job. However, IRR insisted that the
crime he committed involves moral turpitude and thereby violating IRRI Employment Policy and
Regulations. He asked for his continued employment, but IRRI’s decision was to terminate him.

Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Micosa. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the latter

Issue:

WON a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment of
respondent (Micosa)

Held:

No, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. IRRI could
not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code. Article 282
of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment.
Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex,
having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the
conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related.

Besides, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever
that he was involved in any incident similar to his present case.

Likewise, it was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his
period of probation and that his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine. An act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so
classified as involving moral turpitude.

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit