The

Pashtun Uprising

Compiled by

Barakwal Myakhel

March 2018
1
 Anyone can print the content of this book
without censorship

Specifications:
Book Name :: Pashtun Uprising

Authors :: Different

Compiled by :: Barakwal Myakhel

Published by :: Lmar Compose Koar

Year :: 2018

2
 Dedicated

To the souls of freedom’s heroes

Bayazid Roshan, Khushal Khan Khattak,

Emal Khan Momand, Darya Khan Apridai,
Mirwais Khan Hotak, Ahmad Shah Durrani,
Abdullah Khan Assakzai, Aminullah Khan
Logari, Wazir.M.Akbar Khan, Muhammad Jan
Khan Wardak, Malalai of Maiwand, Ghazi
Muhammad Ayub Khan, Mullah Pawanda
Masud, Mirzali Khan Wazir (Faqir Ipi), Haji
Sahib Turangzai, Bakhtnama Kakar, Masho
Khan MaraNai (Sherani), Sherak Kakar,
Azmir Khan Mandokhel, Kakaji Sanobar
Hussain Momand, Bacha Khan and Abdul
Samad Khan Assakzai.

3
 Contents

1. Introduction......……………………..……… 7

9 ....................……………. : .2

12 . …………………………… .3

17 ......................... : .4

20 ............................................... .5

23 ............................. .6

28 ............................................. .7

8. The protest of the Pashtun………….…….. 31

9. Conceptually engineered…………………. 38
10. Pashtun Grievances Echo In Islamabad.. 43
11. Pashtun protest sparks debate about Pakistan’s
counter-terrorism policies……………………. 50
12. New face of Pashtun nationalism………... 57
13. In Pakistan, Long-Suffering Pashtuns Find Their
Voice……………………………………………. 63
14. Pashtun sit-in a new political awakening?.. 69
15. Pakistan's 'FATA Spring'…………………… 74
16. Pakhtun movements for rights…………….. 81
17. Pashtun protest……………………………… 87
18. The volcano of Pashtun unrest……………. 93

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 19. Pashtuns’ parlat……………………………… 97
20. Young Pashtuns have shown the mirror to
‘mainstream’ Pakistan………………………….. 101
21. A time for empathy…………………………… 107
22. The Pashtun long march……………………. 111
23. Listen to the Pakhtuns………………………. 117
24. Pashtun’s uprising: The subalterns finally… 123
25. The Pashtun odyssey is our national odyssey… 128
26. Pashtun Spring: Time to redraw the boundary
between Pakistan and Afghanistan…………... 133
27. PashtunLongMarch:A peaceful resistance... 138
28. We will organize, we shall overcome!.......... 142
29. The Pakhtun awakening…………………….. 148
30. To Be Young and Pashtun in Pakistan……. 155
31. Angry Over Decades of Mistreatment, Pashtuns in
Pakistan Rally in Search for Dignity………….. 165
32. The Pakhtun spring………………………….. 181
33. Pashtuns breaking the silence……………... 186
34. Manzoor Pashteen: The voice of Pashtuns for many
in Pakistan………………………………………. 193

201 …..…… , .35

209 ………………….. ٔ : .36

217 …………………...... ٓ .37

233 ………………………....... ٔ ٓ .38

237 ………………….. ٔٓ : .39

5
‫‪245‬‬ ‫‪……………………...‬‬ ‫۔۔‬ ‫‪.40‬‬

‫‪254‬‬ ‫‪…………………….‬‬ ‫‪.41‬‬

‫‪260‬‬ ‫‪……………….‬‬ ‫‪.42‬‬

‫‪266‬‬ ‫‪………………...‬‬ ‫‪.43‬‬

‫‪:‬‬ ‫‪.44‬‬

‫‪275‬‬ ‫…………‪………………................................‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪286 .........................................‬‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫‪.45‬‬

‫‪6‬‬
 Introduction

The book is compilation of Pashto, English and Urdu

articles which were published in different newspapers and
websites during and after sit-in protest of Pashtuns in
Islamabad held from 1st till 10th of February 2018 known as a
Pashtun Long March. The protest is considered Pashtun
uprising which was started in the beginning by the youth of
FATA especially of Waziristan and after then joined by the
youth of Khyber Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan as well. This
unique protest, which inspired by Naqeebullah Masud, killed
in Karachi allegedly in fake-encounter by police in January,
is the end of silence and fear after more than fifteen years of
terror era. During long march, protest and afterward uprising
of Pashtun Tahafuz Movement the organizers of this
agitation disclosed what has been happened in Waziristan by
Pakistan Army while conducting operations reportedly
against militants.
Though Pakistani print and electronic media did not
cover this protest properly, but some of its English and Urdu
newspapers and International outlets published articles,
analysis and columns about Pashtun uprising. I had been
reading these write ups in which the protest of Islamabad and
Pashtun youth movement were discussed comprehensively
by Pashtun and non-Pashtun writers in the light of Pashtun
Nationalism and society. Then I thought that these articles
are not only on current issues but also include the aspects of
7
long period of oppressions of Pashtun society, therefore I
tried to collect and compile all these articles and publish in
form of a this soft book.
I don’t know the book will have any commercial benefit
for someone publisher to be published sometimes in hard
form, but for now I am compiling it for those readers which
might have missed to read it in newspapers and need to know
the cause of Pashtun uprising and its roots.

Barakwal Myakhel
Virginia- US
11 March 2018

8
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‫‪30‬‬
The protest of the Pashtun
Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen

Our journey began in pitch darkness. I came of

age at a time when my family and our entire
community, the Mehsud (locally called Maseed)
tribe, was forced to leave our South Waziristan
homeland during a massive military offensive in
2009. Everyone I know among the estimated half a
million Mehsuds has lost at least one loved one to
Taliban bombs, airstrikes or artillery shelling.
In seeking a way out of this morass, I began
organising volunteers a few years back with like-
minded college friends. Our aim was simple: protect
our people. We called our organisation the ‘Mehsud
Tahafuz Movement’ – the movement for the
protection of Mehsuds. Soon, we faced the might of
the state for raising our voices for a people who had

31
been forced to abandon their homeland for eight
years. We were harassed, abducted and kept in
unlawful detention.
Over the past two years, some members of our
tribe have returned to villages and valleys infested
with landmines which too often blow up our
children and maim our adults. A militant attack or
any disturbance near a village or community can
lead to the mistreatment and humiliation of
civilians. While officials have been heralding their
counterterrorism successes and praising the bravery
of Pashtun residents of South Waziristan and the
rest of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(Fata), they have turned a blind eye to – and hence
perpetuated – the misery, humiliation, exploitation
and subjugation that we have been enduring.
Sacrifice, under any legal regime and culture is
voluntary. But in our case, there was a policy to
sacrifice us at the altar of so-called strategic
interests via terrorist groups allowed to operate in
our homeland. Our villages were then bombed and
our people forced to leave their homes in the name
of counterterrorism operations. Thousands of our
youth were detained unlawfully or became victims
of enforced disappearances. Most of our prominent
tribal leaders, many clerics, politicians, and youth

32
leaders were targeted in assassination campaigns.
The state has failed to arrest and prosecute a single
perpetrator of such crimes in Fata – and very few in
other neighbouring Pashtun-inhabited regions, such
as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the northern districts of
Balochistan.
The bitter reality of literally all counterterrorism
endeavours in our homeland is that they may have
barely achieved any tangible results. The fear is that
the operations failed to cause lasting damage to
terrorist networks; instead, locals allege that these
operations have collectively punished and
humiliated the Pashtun public of these areas.
For example, the residents of South Waziristan
and neighbouring North Waziristan tribal agencies
were forced to acquire Watan or homeland cards.
While all Pakistani citizens carry national ID cards,
these special identity cards required applicants to be
cleared by all intelligence agencies. Even after
acquiring a Watan card, the residents of Waziristan
were subjected to endless searches, waits and
humiliation in the name of the very security that
they still do not have.
For decades, millions of Pashtuns in Fata and
elsewhere have sought shelter in Karachi, the major
cities of Punjab such as Rawalpindi and Lahore, and
33
the federal capital Islamabad. This migration has
been massive during the last fifteen years because
state and non-state actors have continued a veritable
reign of terror. But even as our helpless people
sought shelter in these places, they were subjected
to stereotyping, harassment, terror, mayhem and
extra-judicial murders. Karachi, which now hosts
the largest Pashtun urban population in the world,
turned into a slaughterhouse for many of these
people seeking safety in their own country.
Naqeebullah Mehsud, an entrepreneur and an
aspiring fashion model, was one of the numerous
Pashtun victims in Karachi. His murder was
allegedly orchestrated by the notorious police
officer Rao Anwar in a staged gun battle by the
latter’s death squad. Minutes after the news of his
brutal murder went viral, thousands of his Facebook
friends and followers knew that police claims about
his terrorist ties were a cover for state brutality. The
photographs of a sharply dressed handsome aspiring
young model were a testament to his innocence.
Although we had already decided to hold a
protest sit-in in Islamabad, it was Naqeebullah’s
extra-judicial murder that gave us a powerful
impetus. We concluded that the rulers occupying
seats of power in Islamabad and Rawalpindi would

34
never heed our sorrows and protests if we
remained in our local areas only. We had to take
our grievances to their doorstep. In late January,
we began our journey from Dera Ismail Khan in
southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and decided to
visit most major Pashtun settlements en-route to
Islamabad in the north. Our journey busted many
myths. Growing up, we had heard that Pashtuns
could not be united and that that they were not
capable of confronting and changing what
afflicted them.
But everywhere we went, we were welcomed
with open hearts and open arms. Our sorrow was
felt and shared as we met parents kept alive by the
hope of one day seeing their forcefully disappeared
sons. Like us, many we met had lost their loved
ones in senseless terrorist attacks and military
sweeps ostensibly aimed at countering militants.
They were traumatised by the fact that, despite
being the worst victims of terrorism, they were
perceived to be guilty in perpetuating the very
crimes that had rattled their world. Our situation is
best expressed by the Pashto proverb ‘Marr hum za
yum, parr hum za yum’ – it’s ironic that Pashtuns
were massacred in droves but blamed for it too.

35
 Thus, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, or the
movement for the protection of Pashtuns, was born
even before we set foot in Islamabad.
From the onset on February 1, the country’s
media ignored our peaceful sit-in protest in front of
the press club in Islamabad. Despite reluctance and
reservations, the conviction of our youth and the
mass appeal of our rightful demands compelled
Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders to
acknowledge our grievances. We only postponed
our protest for one month on February 10 when our
demands were accepted in writing by the
government. Numerous residents of the federal
capital told me that they had never seen such a
peaceful and democratic gathering where women,
minorities and people from all walks of life and
political shades participated.
In the ensuing days, we saw some steps to
address our demands. Scores of victims of enforced
disappearances have been united with their
families. Our organisation has so far received the
names of more than 4,000 people who have
disappeared. This list is growing every day.
However, this number alone testifies to the great
tragedies our people have endured.

36
 But what is more encouraging is that the
Pashtun public has woken up. Our people are no
longer prepared to live as second-class citizens.
Protests in Bajaur, Swat, Zhob, Waziristan, Kurram
and elsewhere have a loud and clear message for the
state. We have buried enough of our innocent loved
ones. We are determined that nothing short of
absolute peace, dignity, freedom and prosperity
willsatisfy us.
I am often told that I need to read the history of
Pashtun people extensively to draw the right lessons
from it. I, however, say that we have set out on a
path to make a new history of our own, a history our
future generations will be proud of. Our movement
arose from within society; we know our pain and
have the right prescription to treat it. The long night
of terror and oppression must end with the onset of
a bright morning of peace and prosperity.

37
Conceptually engineered
Shehar Bano Khan
FEBRUARY 10, 2018

On October 16, 2017, Pakistan became one of

15 states elected by the UN General Assembly to
serve as members of the UN Human Rights Council,
from January 2018 to December 2020. In its
election pledges, Pakistan said that it is ‘firmly
resolved to uphold, promote and safeguard universal
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.’
Hereby lies the falsity of ‘universal human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. Universal
human rights and fundamental freedoms are
internationalised edifice concepts ornamentalising a
state’s extrinsic countenance with no mandatory
edict to apply or comply endogenously.
The ongoing peaceful demonstration organised
by the Pakhtun outside the Islamabad press club is a
confluence of tyrannised individuals who befit
Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer.
38
 The state of Pakistan is under no obligation to
comply or apply the universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms. They certainly cannot be
extended to homo sacer trained and disciplined to
heed the trumpet, at times announcing the infidels’
impending territorial conquest, at other times
mercilessly criminalising their genealogy.
Pakhtun have an exceedingly uncomfortable
relationship with the state of Pakistan and a periodic
pledge of allegiance is required of them to affirm
unity. The three principles of ‘faith’, ‘unity’ and
‘discipline’, enunciated as standard behaviour by Mr
Jinnah were executed not to determine allegiance
but to regulate ethnicity.
The Babarra massacre of August 12, 1948, at
Charsadda in the erstwhile North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) where hundreds of unsuspecting
non-violent Khudai Khitmatgars led by Khan
Ghaffar Khan, protesting the arbitrariness of the
government were killed on the orders of the chief
minister, Abdul Qayyum Khan.
It was the beginning of the Pakhtun’s first
lesson in ‘faith’, ‘unity’ and ‘discipline’. The
massacre was archived as a rebellion against
nationalism, not to be forgotten neither to be
forgiven. Their historically celebrated intrepidity
39
against the Greek, against the Moghuls and against
the British turned into a referral looked upon with
suspicion. The genetic configuration of the Pakhtun
needed to be conceptually engineered.
The Pakhtun identity, a definitive idiom
preceding the 1947 partition of the subcontinent and
pre-existing the doctrinal instructions in religion
could only be tamed through disembodied,
beheaded non-exclusive nationalism imposed by
geography.
On the West lay Afghanistan, whose premier
vote of dissent against the newly created state of
Pakistan never ceased to remind of the Pakhtun
origin. Their anthropological roots were
dangerously straddling both sides of the Durand
Line. Unity through indoctrination of faith was the
single most powerful tool to discipline the Pakhtun.
Their past ventures provided the state with a
perfect contraption to regulate the Pakhtun. The
drafters of geographical nationalism believed a
Pakhtun could only remain pliable to the state if
placed in an environment of constant threat. Two
elements of ‘infidels’ and ‘religion’ were
hypothesised to conceive the theory of
‘endangerment’ and put forward to the potent

40
Pakhtun whose Pakhtunwali was about to be
mercilessly manipulated.
The conceptual engineering was carefully laid
out and poured into the crucible of the geographical
events cultivated as a consequence of the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As an inhabitant of
the state of Pakistan, the Pakhtun had to express
unity and allegiance by fighting the infidel in the
name of religion.
The seemingly benign theory of ‘endangerment’
was stilted on extremely dangerous ground. The
indomitable holy warriors representing the state
became its operational ploys in, what came to be
known but could not be uttered, gaining strategic
depth.
Not before too long, the theory of endangerment
became untenable to gain strategic depth and the
flaws in the conceptual engineering of the Pakhtun
began to appear. But the state was not willing to
concede guilt. Certainly not if it wanted to expunge
its pariah state image. The blame had to be
attributed to someone. The deportation of the
Pakhtun from the historical warrior to an
impregnable terrorist momentarily sanitised the state
character. To eternalise its clean, righteous entity

41
the Pakhtun had to be synonymous with the Taliban
and terrorist, respectively.
Hence began a desperate attempt of vindication
and vilification. From operation Al-Mizan to Rah-e-
Haq, from operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem to Rah-e-
Raast and from Rah-e-Nijaat to the not too long,
Zarb-e-Azb, the unarmed Pakhtun are wilting under
heavy artillery and indiscriminately disproportionate
fire power.
On February 7, 2018, in the name of law and
order, the people of Swat were denied the legitimate
right to peacefully protest the murder of
Naqeebullah Mehsud. The denial should be seen as
yet another mechanism to regulate the Pakhtun
identity. Should felicitations be in order? Perhaps it
is too soon for self commendation, for the Pakhtun’s
most misunderstood and underrated characteristic is
the dangerous calm before the outburst. End
The writer is a journalist and writer who formerly worked
for Friday Times, Frontier Post and the Dawn

Published in Daily Times, February 10th 2018.

42
 Pashtun Grievances Echo
In Islamabad Protest
February 05, 2018

Abubakar Siddique

Millions of ethnic Pashtuns have endured years

of terrorist violence, military operations, and
displacement in northwestern Pakistan, and yet their
protests rarely reverberate in the country’s capital,
Islamabad.
But the murder of a young shopkeeper in an
allegedly staged gunbattle with the police last month
appears to have stirred up grievances that were long
suppressed.
The killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud in the
southern city of Karachi prompted thousands of
activists to converge on Islamabad to press for their
demands in seeking justice and an end to their
oppression.
Participants and speakers from all walks of life
thronged the protest site in front of a busy
Islamabad market on February 5. In a series of
emotional speeches, speaker after speaker ran
through their grievances and called on the
government to act.
43
 “Naqeebullah Mehsud was not the first Pashtun
killed unlawfully in this country. A lot of our blood
has been spilled,” protest organizer Manzoor
Ahmad Pashteen thundered from the top of a metal
shipping container used as a makeshift stage.
“However, our patience has now run out after this
killing.”
Pashteen, an activist who has spent years
lobbying to draw attention to the plight of his
Mehsud tribe, is among the campaigners determined
not to leave Islamabad until their demands are met.
The protesters listed five demands, shaped by
years of neglect and suffering. Swift justice for
Mehsud tops the demands; they are asking
authorities to arrest Rao Anwar, a fugitive police
officer blamed for the murder according to a
government probe.
Anwar has a reputation of staging gunbattles
with suspected terrorists and criminals, and
Pakistani media reports say he has supervised the
killings of hundreds of people in what are locally
called fake police encounters.
“The chief justice [of Pakistan] should
personally monitor a judicial commission to probe
unlawful killings in Karachi and the regions
inhabited by the Pashtuns,” read a leaflet distributed
44
at the protest. “All the victims of enforced
disappearances should be presented before a court
of law. Those found guilty of a crime should be
punished while the rest should be freed.”
Last month, Pashteen, now in his 30s, mobilized
a Mehsud jirga, or tribal council, to warn Islamabad
to clear landmines and unexploded ordinance from
their homeland in the South Waziristan tribal district
or brace for unprecedented protests.
It’s no surprise that clearing the deadly
landmines is one of the protesters’ demands. An
estimated half a million Mehsuds left their homes
before the onset of a major Pakistani military
offensive in 2008, and nearly 80 adults and children
have reportedly been killed in landmine explosions
since most Mehsuds returned to their homes by the
end of last year.
In a telling revelation about life in a conflict
zone, the protesters are demanding an end to curfew
and other coercive measures used after attacks
against security forces. “Across FATA and
Waziristan in particular, authorities should avoid
imposing curfews and beating civilians,” the
pamphlet said, referring to the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas by its acronym.

45
 Waziristan, divided into North and South
Waziristan districts, are two of the seven FATA
districts. The region turned into a front line of the
global war on terrorism after 9/11 when Al-Qaeda
and allied extremism sought shelter in the region
after the demise of the hard-line Taliban regime in
neighboring Afghanistan in late 2001.
In the subsequent years, millions of Pashtuns in
FATA and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Province paid a steep price. They comprise a
majority of the more than 50,000 civilians whom
authorities say have been killed in militant attacks
and military offensives. More than 6 million were
displaced in dozens of military operations as
hundreds of thousands of families lost their
businesses and livelihoods.
Many of those who took part in the Islamabad
protest say they are angry over Pashtun profiling
and atrocities by Pakistani security forces. “Every
one of us has endured immeasurable suffering. Our
bodies bear the scars of what we have endured, and
our homeland has turned into hell,” Ali Wazir told
participants.
Wazir, a tribal leader turned politician in his
40s, has lost nearly a dozen members of his
extended family to violence in South Waziristan
46
since 2003. Like thousands of killings across
Pakistan’s northwestern Pashtun regions, the
murders of his brothers, father, uncles, and cousins
remain unresolved.
“Today, I can protest in Islamabad, but we
cannot do the same in my homeland,” he said.
“Today, we are in Islamabad and want to ask how
many innocent people like Naqeebullah have you
killed, and how many are languishing in prisons for
years?”
Fazal Khan, a lawyer, lost his son in a 2014
Taliban attack on an army-run school in the
northwestern Pashtun city of Peshawar in December
2014. He is deeply critical of the powerful Pakistani
Army’s approach of killing some militants while
appeasing others.
“We should not be deceived in the name of the
Taliban,” he said, referring to the military’s
treatment of a former Taliban spokesman whose
faction accepted responsibility for the attack on his
son’s school but was apparently pardoned after
surrendering to the authorities last year. “They are
like a guard who is fed, clothed, and armed in the
best way possible but fails to protect our home
from ruin.”
47
 The Pakistani military, however, rejects such
criticism. Last month, army chief Qamar Javed
Bajwa claimed Pakistan had defeated “terrorists of
all hues and colors” in its restive border regions and
is now going after their “disorganized residual
presence under Operation Raddul Fasaad,” or
purging of evil.
Pakistani authorities are largely silent on
protestor demands. On February 3, a junior cabinet
minister, Tariq Fazal Chaudhry, visited the protest
site and told participants that their
administration supports their demands and is keen
on resolving them, according to the daily Pakistan
Times.
Former Pakistani lawmaker Afrasiab Khattak
says the protest is a manifestation of the oppression
endured by more than 5 million FATA residents.
“Pashtuns in FATA in general and Waziristan in
particular have been devastated by the armed
conflict, but their sufferings and agonies remain
unnoticed,” he said. “Rapid urbanization, education,
remittances, and the rise of professionals and the
middle class have led to greater awareness, but the
process of political empowerment lags far behind.”
Khattak says Islamabad’s failure in
implementing reforms in FATA contributes to
48
resentment as the region still languishes under a
draconian colonial-era legal regime known as the
Frontier Crimes Regulations.
He says youth activism has taken seasoned
politicians by surprise and the masses appear to be
now mobilizing for their rights. This, he says, is also
changing perceptions about Pashtuns as a collection
of warlike tribes.
“Such stereotypes are being shattered by the
most peaceful and disciplined political agitation in
Islamabad’s recent history,” he noted.

49
 Pashtun protest sparks
debate about Pakistan’s
counter-terrorism policies
Abubakar Siddique

March 7, 2018 0
Last month, the grievances of millions of ethnic
Pashtuns echoed in Pakistan’s capital as thousands
participated in a 10-day sit-in to demand rights and
an end to unlawful killings, impunity, harassment,
racial profiling, and landmines.
The protest has become a mass mobilization for
what its young leaders say is an attempt to change
security policies that have turned their homeland in
the northwestern Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) into a war zone, wreaked havoc in
neighboring Afghanistan, and made life miserable
for the estimated 40 million Pashtuns who form
roughly 20 percent of the country’s 200 million
population.
Pashtuns are concentrated in an arc along
Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan in
FATA and the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and Balochistan. During the past 15 years, a
50
majority of terrorist attacks and counterterrorism
sweeps have been concentrated in the Pashtun
heartland. Pashtuns make up a majority of the more
than 80,000 people killed and maimed in the
violence. Insecurity forced more than 6 million
Pashtuns to flee their homes for months or years.
Officials typically reject responsibility for the
suffering, saying their country is the real victim of
terrorism. They often point to the deaths of alleged
extremists as evidence of the success of their
counterterrorism efforts, evoking this narrative to
silence domestic critics and fend off pressure from
international institutions.
A close look at statements by senior civilian and
military leaders, however, gives an idea of what is
wrong with Islamabad’s counterterrorism approach
and why — despite so much suffering — the
country is still seen as a bastion of jihadist
networks.
The most revealing sentiment is a little-known
speech by the civilian federal cabinet member in
charge of FATA affairs.
While addressing a gathering of Pashtun elites
in October 2015, Abdul Qadir Baloch made
some startling revelations. He told tribal leaders,
lawmakers, and professionals from among the
51
Mehsud tribe that the state has spent the past seven
decades using them for its own strategic ends.
The Mehsud homeland in FATA’s South
Waziristan tribal district has been the epicenter of a
complicated Taliban insurgency since 2004.
“During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, our
people [military strategists] talked of fighting the
war for the defense of Pakistan inside Afghanistan,
because if the Russians were able to move forward
from there then no one would have been able to stop
them,” he said of Islamabad’s engagement in the
anti-Soviet war in the 1980s.
Following the events of 9/11, he said, Islamabad
ostensibly joined Washington and its Western allies
to target Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime hosting
them in Afghanistan but failed to prevent the same
groups from establishing a foothold inside Pakistan
after the Taliban regime crumbled in late 2001.
South and North Waziristan became the latest
frontline in that war.
“Then South and North Waziristan within
Pakistani territory were chosen to [support the latest
phase of the war in Afghanistan],” he said. “From
that time [in 2001] till today these two agencies
(tribal districts) and other agencies in FATA have
suffered terribly.”
52
 But the afflicted areas soon became “nurseries
for terrorism,” Baloch added. “They were used to
propagate extremism and radicalize people into
suicide bombers and do everything that reason
would not permit.” He did not name on whose
behalf this took place, but his comments have been
interpreted by Pashtun protesters as backing their
claims that Islamabad used their homeland as a
sanctuary for militant groups.
Islamabad has repeatedly rejected any
suggestions that it supports militant groups in
FATA. “Pakistan has contributed immensely as a
frontline state in countering terrorism and violent
extremism over the past two decades,” said a
Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman recently.
Nearly half a million members of the Mehsud
tribe suffered atrocities under the Taliban before
being forced to flee for nearly eight years after the
army launched an offensive against militants in
2009. As in Pashtun communities elsewhere,
hundreds of prominent Mehsud tribal leaders were
assassinated. But most of these crimes were never
investigated, and no one was held accountable.
As part of Pakistan’s counterterrorism drive,
many young Mehsuds were killed in allegedly
staged police gunbattles in cities such as Karachi.
53
The southern seaport city has the biggest urban
concentration of Pashtuns. The January murder of a
young aspiring model and shopkeeper in Karachi
was the catalyst for the February protest.
In his 2015 speech, Baloch went on to reveal
why Mehsuds were forced to make so many
sacrifices, saying the reason is their “special
qualities.”
“You, the people of Waziristan, especially
members of the Mehsud tribe, are extremists. You
Mehsuds are extreme in bravery — you sacrifice
everything without thinking,” he said.
Baloch’s candid admissions are in sharp
contrast to the standard Pakistani narrative that
paints Islamabad as a victim of terrorism. While
admitting past failures, most current officials are
adamant about their counterterrorism achievements
and resolve.
“We are harvesting what we sowed 40 years
back,” Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Qamar
Javed Bajwa, told a Munich security conference on
February 17.
“The Frankenstein was actually created by the
liberal free world, with willing but myopic
cooperation from our side after the Soviet invasion

54
of Afghanistan in 1979,” he added. “We all are
responsible for making the world population in
general, and the Muslim population in particular,
hostage to this extremist ideology.”
Bajwa said that during the past 15 years, more
than 35,000 Pakistani were killed while another
48,000 were maimed or sustained grave injuries as
the financial cost for their country exceeded more
than $250 billion.
“Very few countries have achieved as much
success as we have in our war against terror,” he
said. “With over 1,100 Al-Qaeda operatives killed
and another 600 handed over to the United States,
Pakistan is instrumental in the disruption and
decimation of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and
Pakistan.”
But recent and past statements from senior
officials raise questions about such claims. Two
years ago, Pakistan’s adviser for foreign affairs,
Sartaj Aziz, said Islamabad holds substantial
sway over the Afghan Taliban because the
movement’s leaders reside in Pakistan.
“We have some influence over them because
their leadership is in Pakistan and they get some
medical facilities. Their families are here,” he told a
think-tank audience in Washington in March 2016.
55
“We can use those levers to pressurize them to say,
‘Come to the table’. But we can’t negotiate on
behalf of the Afghan government because we cannot
offer them what the Afghan government can offer
them.”
In recent years, disagreements over
counterterrorism and security policies have
increased between civilian and military officials.
In January, as most senior Pakistani leaders
united in condemning U.S. President Donald
Trump’s criticism of Islamabad’s counterterrorism
failures, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif urged
the country’s powerful military establishment to
give up self-deception.
“We need to ask ourselves why, despite our
sacrifices, the world is not listening to us, why the
blood of our army, police, civil security forces,
civilians, and innocent children is so cheap in the
eyes of the world,” he told journalists in Islamabad.
Sharif urged Pakistanis to first put their house in
order and ponder why the world’s opinion about
their country has turned negative.

56
 New face of Pashtun
nationalism
February 25, 2018

Farman Kakar

Pashtun nationalism is on the cusp of a new

beginning. The ethnicity is waking up to the many
‘systematic’ injustices which, it believes, are the
extension of Afghan theatre of war. There is also a
growing realisation within the ethnicity that they
have been suffering at the hands of the power
brokers post 9/11.
The Pashtun sit-in in front of Islamabad Press
Club for 10 days was the opening salvo of the
ethnicity’s newfound activism. The awakening
movement started from the Mehsud populated areas
of South Waziristan under the banner of Mehsud
Tahafuz Movement (MTM). The Mehsud residents
of the agency, led by a 26 year old Manzoor
Pashteen, had a litany of grievances. They claimed
to be the victims of terror but treated as its
perpetrators, a feeling almost universally shared by
Pashtuns inside Pakistan.
57
 It was not Naqeebullah’s extrajudicial murder
that sparked activism. Manzoor Pashteen said in an
interview, shared from his Facebook account, that
he had planned the sit-in before Naqeeb’s murder.
Mindful of the popular response he received beyond
the narrow confines of his Mehsud tribe, Pashteen
renamed MTM as All Pakhtun Qaumi Jirga (APQJ)
and Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM)
respectively. The Islamabad’s protest sounded a
clarion call to Pashtuns to arise from their languor.
Dozens of rallies and protests of Pashtuns and
concerned citizens came out in support of their
embattled brethren in Quetta, Karachi and elsewhere
in the country. Rallies were also held in Kabul,
Sydney and Washington DC to name a few places.
Similarly, thousands of demonstrators registered
their protest in Bajaur on February 20 after the
murder of a Bajaur student allegedly in a fake
encounter in Karachi on 16th of the month. They
replicated their protest in front of Islamabad Press
Club the following day. Swat, followed the suit.
On February 18, a large number of
demonstrators agitated against strict checking and
humiliating behaviour meted out to them at security
check posts in Swat valley. The protest was
triggered by the passing away of a sick baby on the

58
way to hospital. The vehicle, carrying the baby
patient, was stuck in the long queue to pass through
a security check post. More, the PTM has also
called for its first public gathering in Quetta on
March 3.
Pashtun activism is a revolt against the
extremely authoritarian and imperious policies of
the state towards Pashtun populated northwest at
least for the last 15 years. In the long run, it springs
from a perception that Pashtuns are the target of
organised oppression since April Revolution of
1978. On the first count, the common thread that
runs through all shades of Pashtun opinion is the
element of miseries that bring them on the same
page. Since 2004, Pashtuns from tribal areas have
been passing through the worst experiences of their
existence since 1947.
As a regular visitor to the Pashtun Islamabad
sit-in, what I could gather from interaction with the
otherwise disparate crowd of Pashtun participants
and intelligentsia from across Pakistan was the
repetition of almost similar stories of suffering.
The rise of Taliban in Fata, the attendant drone
attacks, curfews, numerous military operations,
enforced disappearances and the plantation of IEDs
were combined with internal displacement of
59
millions of people to make life hell on the dwellers
of the hinterland. What became common sights
were long queues at check posts, humiliation
suffered at the hands of security personnel, and
passing through numerous entry and exit points in
almost all Pashtun populated areas throughout
Pakistan — all the trappings of a typical security
state that is at war against itself!
Similarly, there is an understanding among the
nationalist elites that the integration of Pashtun
areas into Afghan theatre of war, in the wake of the
nascent progressive communist revolution, was
meant to push Afghans into the dark alley of
retrogression. Ever since then, Pashtun areas in
general and Fata in particular remain the reservoirs
for proxy war in Afghanistan and freedom struggle
in Kashmir, they maintain.
Intriguingly, the appearance of huge crowd of
Pashtuns, both young and old women and men, in
Islamabad sit-in from all four provinces and tribal
areas, was a telling sign of the incipient activism
that pervades the ethnic community. The
participation of Pashtun women in the public
gathering, generally considered as men’s exclusive
preserve, has helped open new avenues of
expression for female in a typically male-dominated

60
society. The very civilised conduct of the dharna,
managed by youngsters from tribal areas, laid bare
the invalidity of the stereotypes that tribesmen are
apolitical and not yet fit for democratic transition.
Neither spontaneous nor haphazard, the political
awakening is not an abrupt outburst of anger
directed against the state policies. Rational, the
feeling among the Pashtuns that the ethnicity is the
target of a ‘systematic’ oppression is the outcome of
a process that has been maturing in the wombs of
epochs. The feeling of being victim precedes
activism on the platform of PTM, however. It is on
the latter count that activism is spontaneous, having
no stimulus from Pashtun nationalist political
parties.
Seen this way, the activism is a case study of
deep disillusionment both with the state and
traditional Pashtun leadership. Unadulterated, it
truly represents the aspirations of the oppressed and
hapless public disowned by the triumvirate
comprising ruling elites, Pashtun nationalists and
Pashtun mullahs. Tribal maliks and mullahs
deserted the movement right in the midst
of dharna and nationalist high command paid a lip
service to it. During Islamabad dharna, when I
asked Pashteen if he was impressed of the

61
nationalists’ response, his “no comment” reply
spoke volumes about his disappointment with them.
There is no interface between the current
Pashtun rights movement and secessionist
tendencies. Nevertheless, before the movement
could become a prairie fire, its democratic demands
should be met. In the long run, there is a dire need
of calling time on security state outlook and
switching to one informed by the welfare of
citizenry; the sooner, the better!

62
 In Pakistan, Long-
Suffering Pashtuns Find
Their Voice
Mehreen Zahra-Malik
Feb. 6, 2018

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — At first, the killing

last month of Naqeebullah Mehsud — an aspiring
model shot by the police in Karachi who claimed
afterward that he was a Taliban militant — seemed
merely the latest in a long series of abuses carried
out by the authorities against ethnic Pashtuns in
Pakistan.
But Mr. Mehsud’s case has proved different.
The 27-year-old’s killing, in what appears to have
been a staged gun battle, has prompted a protest
movement led by young Pashtuns from the tribal
areas in the country’s northwest, where they have
long been the targets of military operations, internal
displacement, ethnic stereotyping and abductions by
the security forces.
Last week, a social-media-savvy group of
young Pashtuns organized a sit-in in Islamabad, the
capital, promoting it with the hashtag
#PashtunLongMarch. As of Tuesday, the
63
demonstration’s sixth day, at least 5,000 Pashtuns
from the tribal areas and other parts of the country
had joined, and members of all major Pakistani
political parties had declared their support.
“Certainly, this kind of organized struggle for
Pashtun rights, reforms and resources has not been
seen in years and years,” said Rahimullah Yusufzai,
the Peshawar-based editor of The News, a Pakistani
newspaper. “The people of the tribal areas have had
pent-up feelings of resentment and anger at their
treatment by the state for decades,” he added.
“Naqeebullah’s killing was just the tipping point.”
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of
Pakistan, which border Afghanistan, are governed
under regulations dating from the era of British
colonial rule. Pakistani courts and Parliament have
no jurisdiction there; instead, they are ruled by a
“political agent” appointed by the central
government. Pashtuns and others living in the tribal
areas have few rights and can be exiled, their homes
and businesses razed, and members arrested en
masse over minor transgressions.
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States, the tribal areas — particularly South
Waziristan, where Mr. Mehsud was from, and North
Waziristan — became a front line of the war on
64
terrorism, as Al Qaeda and other groups took refuge
there. Pashtuns in the tribal areas suffered both from
militant attacks and from crackdowns by the army,
and those who fled to other parts of Pakistan — like
Karachi, in Mr. Mehsud’s case — say persecution
followed them.
“Thousands of young Pashtun boys have
disappeared in the last decade and a half, picked up
from their homes and universities and streets in the
name of curbing militancy,” said Farhad Ali, the 24-
year-old vice chairman of the Fata Youth Jirga, one
of the organizations leading the Islamabad protests.
“We want all these young men to be produced
before a court of law and concrete evidence
presented that they have committed any crime.”
“This is one of our major demands: Stop this
stereotyping of Pashtuns as militants,” Mr. Ali said.
“Stop imposing curfew in our areas every time there
is any untoward event in another part of the country.
Let us live in peace, please.”
The demonstrators, who have set up tents
outside the National Press Club in Islamabad, are
also demanding the arrest of Rao Anwar, a Karachi
police commander who has been accused of killing
Mr. Mehsud and who is now on the run.
They also say they want the army to clear land
mines from the tribal areas, particularly the South
65
Waziristan district. Mr. Ali said that since 2009,
more than 35 people had been killed by land mines
in South Waziristan.
“I wanted to do something with my life, I
wanted to become someone, but look at me,” said
Islam Zeb, from South Waziristan, who took part in
the Islamabad protest. Mr. Zeb said he had been
blinded in a land mine blast that cost his brother his
hand.
“If a soldier is wounded in a land mine
explosion, entire families are arrested, people
disappear without a trace,” Mr. Zeb added.
The Pakistani Army’s media wing denied that
the army had ever laid mines in the tribal areas,
saying that militants had done so. But it said that the
army would send 10 demining teams to South
Waziristan immediately.
Other officials were also quick to assure the
demonstrators that they had been heard. Tariq Fazal
Chaudhry, a government minister who met with
protest leaders, said the government fully supported
their demands. But he declined to say when they
would be met.
Manan Ahmed Asif, a professor of history at
Columbia University, called the tribal areas “a
geography outside the laws of the nation,” where
both militant groups and the army had found that

66
“violence could be meted out with little regard to its
inhabitants.”
At least 70 percent of the region’s five million
people live in poverty, the literacy rate is just 10
percent for women and 36 percent for men, and the
infant mortality rate is the nation’s highest. For
years, Pakistani militants have used the lawless area
to initiate assaults against Pakistan’s government
and against United States-led forces in Afghanistan.
Since 2001, the Pakistani military has launched
10 operations against militant strongholds in the
region, most recently in 2013 in North Waziristan.
The offensives have displaced almost two million
people, according to figures from the United
Nations refugee agency and the Geneva-based
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, as homes,
schools and hospitals have been turned into hide-
outs by militants and meager civic amenities have
been destroyed.
The Pakistani Army says it is now spending
millions to repatriate displaced people, rebuild
infrastructure and earn residents’ good will. But
many residents still view the soldiers as occupiers,
and militants continue to pose a threat.
Parliament is considering a proposal to merge
the war-torn and neglected tribal areas with the
67
adjoining province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. That
would allow the people in the tribal areas to become
full citizens of Pakistan for the first time. But the
plan has become a divisive issue among those
favoring reform, with some political parties
opposing a merger and calling for the tribal areas to
become a separate province instead.
Simbal Khan, a security analyst and nonresident
fellow at a think tank, the Center for International
Strategic Studies, in Islamabad, said she was
skeptical that the protests would lead to real change
for Pashtuns.
“All this movement you see, it is pre-election
mobilization,” Ms. Khan said, referring to national
elections scheduled for July.
“It doesn’t portend to become a genuine
Pashtun uprising,” she added. “Political parties and
other groups want to pick up issues that resonate
with the public, and this march provides them a
platform. This is just politicking.”

68
 Pashtun sit-in — a new
political awakening?

Rafiullah Kakar
Published: February 8, 2018

A large group of Pashtuns from Fata and other

parts of Pakistan have staged a sit-in in front of the
National Press Club, Islamabad for the last seven
days. Protesters have a four-point agenda, including
demands for strict legal action against Rao Anwar
and his team for the extrajudicial killing of
Naqeebullah Mehsud, recovery of all missing
persons from the tribal areas, an end to harassment
and extrajudicial killing of people of tribal areas and
removal of all landmines from Waziristan.
This sit-in is indicative of the emergence of a
new form of politics of belonging and resistance
that has been brewing in the Pashtun region for over
a decade now. Spearheaded by the educated Pashtun
youth, this new form of identity politics is informed
by and anchored in the individual and collective
experiences of Pashtuns in the distinct socio-
political milieu of the post-9/11 world. These are
Pashtuns who have personally experienced
humiliation, displacement, unlawful abductions and
69
detentions, ethnic profiling and stereotyping, and
lost dear ones in military operations, terrorist
violence and drone attacks over the last 15 years.
The tormenting personal and collective experiences
of these people were made worse by the
indifference and apathy of the mainland Pakistan
towards their plight, creating strong feelings of
resentment and marginalisation. While nearly all
classes and sections of the Pashtun society have
been affected by terrorism and the concomitant
politics of fear and discrimination, Pashtun
labourers, students and salaried class have borne the
brunt of the crises. One of the most important
outcomes of these experiences has been the
politicisation of previously apolitical constituencies
and groups in the Pashtun society. In this regard, the
case of the educated Pashtun youth is a fairly
interesting one and pertinent to the subject under
discussion.
Young Pashtuns pursuing studies in major urban
centres of the country were at the forefront of the
Pashtun society’s interaction with the outside world
in the post-9/11 world. Hailing predominantly from
middle and lower middle class backgrounds, these
young Pashtuns not only personally experienced
ethnic profiling and discrimination but were also
forced by their circumstances to make sense of the
70
situation in their region and come up with an
informed explanation. The proliferation of digital
technology and social media enabled them to
connect with the Pashtun youth from other parts of
Pakistan who were also going through a similar
crisis of belonging. The shared experiences of
negotiating through this crisis have led to the
emergence of a new political consciousness that
seeks recognition, fair treatment and peace for
Pashtuns within the federal framework of Pakistan.
Unlike the old nationalist thinking, this new
consciousness doesn’t draw inspiration from
abstract references to Pashtun ethnicity, homeland
or golden past. Nor does it take pride in the
orientalist myths about Pashtun bravery,
invincibility and hospitality. Instead, this new
thinking is rooted in the actual social and personal
experiences of Pashtuns in the post-9/11 world. This
breed of Pashtun political activists may not feel
strongly about the Durand Line but it clearly wants
to revisit the current relationship with the Pakistani
state. They don’t want to continue living as second
class citizens. They want a fairer and more critical
engagement with the state and its project of
Pakistani nationalism. They are unequivocally clear
in their criticism of the hegemonic narratives of the
state and the role of its ill-advised adventurous
71
policies in creating and sustaining the menace of
terrorism.
Moreover, this emerging political consciousness
also indicates growing dissatisfaction with
traditional Pashtun leadership, including Pashtun
nationalist parties which have failed to come up
with a clear and effective political plan and
programme to steer the Pashtun region out of the
current crisis. Their hollow slogans and empty
condemnations are becoming increasingly
irrelevant.
The Islamabad sit-in is the first proper sign of
the growth of this new politics among the Pashtun
youth. This protest movement was initiated, and is
being successfully managed, by the Pashtun youth
without the backing from any major political party.
As the sit-in is entering an eighth day, it has
remained completely peaceful, busting all myths
about Pashtuns in general and people of tribal areas
in particular.
While patience and maturity of the participants
of the sit-in is commendable, the apathy shown by
mainstream media and the government is shameful.
Media has for long defended its non-coverage of the
issues of Fata on grounds of non-accessibility. Now
when the people of tribal areas have marched all the
72
way to Islamabad to get their voices heard, media
and the government have ignored them completely.
This apathy is deplorable when compared with the
response of the state and media to other recent sit-
ins and protests. The lesson that the protesters are
being taught is that the state only understands the
language of violence — an idea with potentially
dangerous implications for national integrity.
Whether this protest translates into a sustained
political movement and force of resistance depends
mainly on the ability and capacity of the educated
Pashtun youth to overcome the constraint of
organisation. The current sit-in is an encouraging
development but it has not yet acquired the shape of
a sustainable social movement. One-off sit-ins can’t
effectively address longstanding structural issues.
Instead, only organised and sustained political
struggle can help address such issues. Anyhow,
regardless of the outcome of the sit-in, it has
rekindled the question of what it means to be a
Pashtun in the 21st-century Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 8th,
2018.

73
 Pakistan's 'FATA Spring'

Daud Khattak
February 24, 2018

The protests, mostly by youth, in northwestern

Pakistan since early February are a clear and visible
indication of decades-old resentment among locals
against a system based on repression, injustice,
suppression of free speech, and widespread
corruption in the country’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), which are still being ruled
under colonial-era laws.
The protests also suggest the replacement of the
traditional old guards — the Malaks or tribal elders
— by the younger generation, who are educated,
well-informed, politically more aware, and ready to
challenge the system they believe to be denying
them their due rights under the Constitution of
Pakistan.
Manzoor Pashteen has become the linchpin of
the so-called “FATA Spring.” The 25-year-old
youth from South Waziristan tribal district was
catapulted to fame and popularity after he led a
rally in Islamabad and staged an unprecedented 10-
day sit-in protest, which culminated in the
74
acknowledgement of almost all their demands by
the authorities.
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The key demands included, but were not limited
to, the clearance of landmines that often kill
civilians, mostly children; the removal of security
check-points; the release of all those held in
extralegal detention by the security agencies; and
the arrest of a police officer who allegedly killed a
tribal youth in a “fake police encounter” in
Pakistan’s port city of Karachi in January.
The roots of the so-called “Pashtun Uprising”
date back to 2015, when Manzoor Pashteen, along
with 25 comrades from the tribal areas, launched a
protest campaign against the landmines in their
areas.
However, the real catalyst is more deeply
buried: the decades of subjective and discriminatory
treatment of the tribal people by successive
Pakistani governments, both civilian and military;
the incoming al-Qaeda leadership in FATA and the
emergence of the Pakistani Taliban after the
overthrow of the hard-line Taliban regime in
Afghanistan; and the subsequent takeover of the
Pakistani security forces, who conducted numerous
75
anti-Taliban operations that also displaced hundreds
of thousands of tribal people and damaged their
businesses.
Uprooted from their remote and backward
villages and towns in the tribal belt, which stretches
north to south along Pakistan’s border with
Afghanistan, the tribal people, many of them for the
first time, came to settle in the cities. This gave
them the chance to see and observe progress,
prosperity, and amenities firsthand.
The displacement also provided tribespeople the
opportunity to access the media, admit their children
to government-run schools, use treatment facilities
at well-equipped city hospitals, and observe the
legal system, comprising police, courts, and the
right to appeal.
The last one in particular was unbelievable for
the tribal people who continue to suffer under the
colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).
Under the FCR, a political agent, who is
representative of the federal government, can arrest
any number of people from a family, clan, subtribe,
or tribe if one member commits a crime. The
political agent can also sentence people to prison for
any number of days without the right to appeal.
When Manzoor Pashteen was laying the
foundation stone of his Mehsud Tahaffuz
76
Movement (Mehsud Protection Movement) in 2015,
he was conscious of the rights and privileges
enjoyed by his fellow Pakistanis in the cities and
towns outside his tribal areas. Unlike the elders,
who remained stuck in the old system by providing
support to the political agent to ensure their personal
and family access to perks and privileges, Pashteen
and his young comrades were more concerned about
the collective benefit of their people.
The killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud, an aspiring
model from Waziristan, added fuel to the fire.
Youths from other tribal districts rushed to become
part of the movement raised from Waziristan, which
soon spread to areas as far away as the Valley of
Swat and the Bajaur tribal district bordering
Afghanistan’s eastern province of Kunar. The
struggle launched to protect the rights of Mehsud
tribe people was soon converted into the broader
Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement or movement for the
protection of Pashtuns.
“We raised those issues while looking into the
eyes of the civilian and military authorities in
Islamabad, which people were scared to mention
even within the four walls of their houses before
this,” said Manzoor Pashteen in his Facebook Live

77
message after ending his protest sit-in in Islamabad
on February 10.
Since then, massive protests, mostly by youth
without the participation of traditional political
leadership or tribal elders, have been observed in the
Valley of Swat and the Bajaur tribal district.
Swat, also known as the Switzerland of
Pakistan, witnessed the Taliban’s brutality when a
cleric by the name of Mullah Fazlullah raised an
army of Taliban using his FM radio sermons from
2006 till 2008. Mullah Fazlullah, who is now
leading the proscribed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), not only started intimidating, taxing, beating,
and even beheading locals but also challenged the
state by forcefully occupying the government
offices in the Malakand region, of which Swat is a
district.
The Pakistani security forces launched
numerous operations against Mullah Fazlullah,
finally dislodging him from Swat in May 2009.
Since then, the security forces have maintained a
presence in the valley to block the Taliban re-entry
there.
However, the people of Swat often complain
about maltreatment at the check-points established
by the Pakistani security forces. On February 18,
78
despite orders from the authorities, youth in Swat
Valley’s main town of Mingora organized a massive
rally to express their resentment over the presence
of security check-posts.
Like the protest in Islamabad, a complete media
blackout of the Swat rally was observed.
Later, police filed cases against the organizers of the
protest under the sections of the Pakistani law
relating to terrorism and sedition, although the rally
ended quite peacefully.
Days later, another protest was staged in Bajaur,
one of the seven tribal districts. Here, as in other
areas, Pakistani security forces had conducted
numerous operations from 2007 onward to defeat
the Taliban.
The protest in Bajaur, the first of its type in
more than a decade, was organized to demand the
arrest of the killer(s) of a university student from
that area who was kidnapped by unidentified people
in Karachi. The student’s blood-soaked body was
found earlier this month. The news sparked
widespread anger in his hometown.
Encouraged and emboldened by the protests in
Islamabad and Swat, the youth in Bajaur came out
on the roads in large numbers on February 20 and
warned they would undertake a march toward
79
Islamabad if the killers were not arrested. The
protest was once again ignored by mainstream
Pakistani media.
The wave of protests by youth in areas where
the people have adopted an enforced silence, partly
because of the Taliban brutalities and partly because
of the military presence, signals a landmark shift.
The old-style Malaks (tribal elders) are ceding
influence to the educated and somewhat high-tech
generation of tribal youth, who are using the
expanding influence of social media to create
awareness and protect their rights.
Daud Khattak is Senior Editor for Radio Free Europe
Radio Liberty’s Pashto language Mashaal Radio.
Before joining RFE/RL, Khattak worked for The News
International and London’s Sunday Times in
Peshawar, Pakistan. He has also worked for Pajhwok
Afghan News in Kabul.

80
 Pakhtun movements for
rights

Usama Khilji
February 26, 2018

IN the past year, two important movements

relating to Pakhtuns and led by Pakhtun youth have
emerged in Pakistan: the movement for merging
Federally Administered Tribal Areas with Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, or the Fata Youth Jirga; and what is
referred to as the Pakhtun Long March that has
demanded an end to violations of rights of Pakhtuns,
especially enforced disappearances and extrajudicial
killings, sparked by the killing of Naqeebullah
Mehsud in Karachi by the Sindh police.
Both these movements have common
characteristics: they are completely peaceful, largely
led by youth, demanding justice from a state seen as
complicit in rights violations, across political
affiliations, and involve an organised use of social
media for projection.
It’s unfortunate that mainstream media has
provided little coverage to these two movements.
There are three possibilities why.
81
 It is unfortunate that mainstream media has
provided less than due coverage to these
movements.
First, the demands of both relate to the security
policies of the state, and involve a discussion on
Pakhtuns, who have been linked to the narrative of
terrorism by the state and media. This discussion is
considered taboo. This was evident in the
conspicuous lack of coverage given to the Pakhtun
Long March sit-in in Islamabad.
Second, access of media personnel to Fata has
been limited owing to threats from both state and
non-state actors. There are few alternatives to
journalists embedded with security forces that paint
a rosy picture of a ravaged land, and official
statements.
Third, news relating to Fata and Pakhtun issues
does not generate much interest and hence ratings
for corporate news channels driven by profits. This
is also linked to the larger public narrative that has
dehumanised Pakhtuns, especially those from Fata,
as terrorists or criminals.
It is interesting to note that mobile internet has
been blocked in Fata since June 2016, and broadband
connectivity is restricted to only a few towns.
Then, in the absence of media coverage and
internet in Fata, how are the youth able to create
82
critical mass on the internet? Youth active in
Pakhtun movements relating to Fata on social media
are either displaced by security operations and
reside in nearby areas in KP, or in large cities such
as Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad,
often subjected to racial profiling by state actors as
well as society.
There are several injustices that Pakhtuns say
they have been subjected to both in their native Fata
and KP, and in other urban centres.
First, several checkposts have been set up in
Fata and in Swat, often at very close intermittent
distance from one another that make movement for
locals cumbersome. Instances of humiliation of
locals here cause resentment of being treated like a
suspect in one’s own land. For South and North
Waziristan Agencies, locals were issued special
cards without which they could not enter, referred to
as ‘Waziristan visa’ by locals.
Second, the imposition of curfews in Fata and
Swat is routine, and rounding up of locals after an
attack on the military has also drawn protests. This
includes shooting at sight anyone found in the
vicinity of an attack. The collective punishment
clause of the draconian colonial Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR), 1901, has been employed several
83
times whereby all male members of a tribe are
punished for the act of one person from the tribe,
and in the absence of a court system, justice is
administered by the local political agent and
commanding officer of the military.
Third, there is frustration that despite the
presence of strict security checks, terrorist attacks
on locals have continued. This was the point of the
protest in Parachinar in 2017, where several bomb
attacks took place despite the security posts.
Fourth, Pakhtuns often find themselves being
racially profiled in the rest of the country, under a
Punjab police order in 2017, and earlier
announcements of disallowing IDPs from Fata into
Punjab and Sindh.
However, what sparked the launch of the
Pakhtun Long March was the killing of Naqeebullah
Mehsud in a fake encounter in Karachi by the Sindh
police, where, like millions of Pakhtuns, he was a
migrant worker. He was an aspiring model as well.
The story of his killing went viral on social media,
making him the poster case of extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and discrimination that
Pakhtuns face.
The protesters camped in Islamabad from Feb 1
to Feb 10 ended the sit-in after the government
84
promised to agree to their demands. These included
an inquiry commission to investigate extrajudicial
killings of Pakhtuns; arrest and trial of Rao Anwar,
the police officer held responsible for Naqeebullah’s
extrajudicial killing and, as reported in this
newspaper, hundreds of others; an end to
mistreatment of locals during curfews in Fata;
release of forcibly disappeared Pakhtuns; and
complete removal of landmines in South Waziristan
that have claimed several lives.
The Fata Youth Jirga has been able to achieve
some of its goals. Their advocacy contributed to the
favourable vote in parliament finally extending
jurisdiction of the superior courts to Fata. The
Pakhtun Long March has also seen some success. Its
leaders claim that 71 missing persons whose return
was demanded by the protesters were back home.
Meanwhile, the army chief scrapped the
requirement of the Watan card, also known as the
Waziristan visa, to enter Waziristan. These victories
have encouraged thousands of other Pakhtuns to
protest peacefully in Swat, Khyber Agency, and
Bajaur Agency against mistreatment at checkposts,
curfews and raids on locals’ houses, enforced
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.

85
 It is time the state realises that the politics of
information and communication technologies are
radically different from previous mediums of
communication such as newspapers, pamphlets,
radio and television, which were easy to censor.
Circumventing censorship attempts on the internet
is far easier, and social media has empowered
citizens to mobilise and organise against injustices
peacefully.
Hence, intimidation tactics such as registration
of FIRs against protesters in Swat, or labelling
organic local movements as unpatriotic and
supported by foreign agencies is not going to work.
The Pakhtun millennials have grown up in a post
9/11 security state and witnessed displacement,
violence and discrimination. There is an urgent need
for the state security policy to prioritise human
security and fundamental rights, even when fighting
terrorism. The organised and determined youth will
not settle for less.
The writer is an activist and researcher, and director of Bolo Bhi, an
advocacy forum for digital rights.

Twitter: @UsamaKhilji
www.usamakhilji.com

Published in Dawn, February 26th, 2018

86
 Pashtun protest

February 10, 2018

Afrasiab Khattak

More than a week of peaceful protest by

thousands of Pashtun activists ( mostly from
Waziristan and FATA) in front of Islamabad Press
Club may or may not succeed in forcing the
government to accept their reasonable demands but
it has definitely redefined Pashtun political
discourse in Pakistan. The contradiction between
ever growing socio political awareness brought by
urbanisation and the utter political disempowerment
is the main factor behind the current protest. This
non violent political uprising, manifesting
impressive energy in Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan and
Islamabad, has given voice to the voiceless. It is
basically a protest against war and colonial type
subjugation in Federally Administered Tribal Area (
FATA). It isn’t surprising that the nucleus of the
protest has originated from Masood tribe (
pronounced Maseed in the local Pashto dialect) of
South Waziristan political agency. Masoods have

87
faced death and destruction on a large scale in the so
called war on terror. They have literally been in the
eye of storm. After the collapse of Taliban control
over Afghanistan in December 2001, Taliban and
Alqaida turned Waziristan, a backward and isolated
tribal region adjacent to Paktia, Khost and Paktika
provinces of Afghanistan, into their main base for
regrouping and launching a new war in Afghanistan
with tacit support of Pakistani state. In 2003,
Taliban Shura ( Council) formally established the ‘
Emirate of Waziristan ‘ with Jalaluddin Haqqani as
its Amir ( Leader). The unemployed youth in both
South and North Waziristan flocked into the ranks
of Taliban. Unlike Wazirs who have natural
resources like forest and fertile land of Wana valley,
Masoods mostly live on remittances from Middle
East and employment in Karachi and other big cities
in Pakistan. In December,2007 Taliban decided to
create Tahreek-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP) for division
of work and efficiency, Masood dominated the
leadership of the new outfit. Bait Ullah Masood.
Hakimullah Masood, Waliurahman and some other
top leaders of TTP belonged to Masood tribe.
Waziristan has witnessed several military operations
in the last few years, leading to displacement on
wide scale. Majority of Masoods, like many other

88
tribal Pashtuns, have lived as IDPs for more than a
decade.
The brutalisation and state oppression isn’t
confined to Waziristan and other parts of FATA.
FATA Pashtuns have been the main target of
military and police operations in Karachi also. The
present protest was triggered by the murder of of
Naqibullah Masood, a young man from Waziristan
based in Karachi. Naqib was killed in a fake
encounter with police led by Rao Anwar, a police
officer notorious for his “ expertise “ of fake
encounters. But the narrative that has emerged from
the speeches in the sit-in over the last one week is
the expression of cumulative alienation of Pashtuns
created by state violence, oppression and
humiliation. FATA is devastated by the war brought
to the area by the misguided Afghan policy of
Pakistani state. Pashtuns belonging to FATA remain
excluded from modern state systems and full
fledged citizenship under an administrative structure
devised by colonial rule. Every government in
Pakistan has repeatedly backed out on promises to
introduce reforms in the area mainly for two
reasons. One, FATA has been used as a launching
pad for Taliban’s war in Afghanistan and under this
Afghan policy it’s the strategic need of Pakistani
state to keep it a no go area and a black hole. Two,
89
The huge black economy of the area is milked by
Pakistani bureaucratic elites along with local war
lords. This powerful vested interest in the status quo
effectively blocks all the efforts for reforms. After
the large scale deployment of Pakistan army since
2002 and the protracted military conflict has
worsened the situation. Four out of the five demands
of the Pashtun protest are about military’s control.
They include cleaning of the area from land mines
and IEDs, bringing an end to enforced
disappearances after arbitrary raids on their homes
and also stopping the imposition of prolonged
curfews in the area. Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan
Abbasi told a delegation of the protesters that he
will make sure the arrest and trail of Rao Anwar, the
police officer responsible for the murder of Naqib
Masood. The Prime Minister made no commitment
about demands related with Military’s actions but he
promised to persuade the GHQ to meet the
representatives of the protesting Pashtuns.
It is for the first time in history that a movement
that isn’t initiated by any nationalist political party
has consistently embraced Pashtun identity. The
need for unity required rising above tribal divisions.
The mainly spontaneous movement that’s largely
blacked out by Pakistan’s Urdu language electronic
media, has attracted huge sympathy and support
90
from all sections of Pashtuns not just from within
Pakistan but also from Afghanistan and Pashtun
diaspora based in UK, US, Canada and many other
countries. The anti war narrative of the Pashtun
protest in Islamabad has widely resonated with
Afghans who are sick of brutality and devastations
of war. Pakistani state is nervous and clueless at the
outpouring of solidarity and support from wider
sectarians of Pashtun society. The Pakhtunkhwa
based political parties, that took their time to
overcome their initial inhibition, were ultimately
forced to join the protest and declare their support
for it. Interestingly this protest has become a
shoulder for the tears of all Pashtuns aggrieved by
state policies and they also include Pashtuns from
settled areas. Many people couldn’t hold their tears
when Fazal Khan Advocate, whose child was killed
in the terrorist attack at Army Public School
Peshawar in 2014, narrated the agony and
disappointment of his family. Families from Swat
raised the issue of enforced disappearances in their
areas. Many of the few thousands people caught
during military operation remain incarcerated in the
so called internment centres. Some have dubbed
these centres as Pakistani version of the Guntanamo
Bay. Out of the fear of being labeled as “ anti-state”
most of the political parties are hesitant to raise such
91
issues on their platforms. Pent up feelings on such “
taboo” subjects have defined the present subject.
The active participation of women activists has
given a new colour to the protest of tribal Pashtuns
who are otherwise dominated by patriarchal
traditions. Songs, poetry and slogans recited and
raised in the protest are creating an interesting new
body of Pashto literature. Pashtun social media
activists are using the full potential of the new
media for promoting their cause. It’s in this context
that some people have called the protest a Pashtun
Spring.
Be that as it may, the most positive
characteristic of this uprising is its total non violent
and civil nature. Instead of going up to their
mountains for launching their traditional armed
uprisings, people of FATA have learnt to converge
on big cities for peaceful political protest. But they
have a long way to go for achieving peace and
political empowerment.
The brutalisation and state oppression isn’t
confined to Waziristan and other parts of FATA.
FATA Pashtuns have been the main target of
military and police operations in Karachi also.

92
 The volcano of Pashtun
unrest

February 25, 2018

Afrasiab Khattak

The ten days long sit-in by Pashtun youth in

Islamabad in the beginning of February has been
followed by powerful protests in Swat and Bajour
Agency. In Swat people were protesting against
security checkpoints where people have to wait in
long queues and they are allegedly humiliated.
People of Swat were particularly infuriated after a
child died while waiting at a security checkpoint.
This is an issue which was also raised by
the Pashtun Long March and sit-in in Islamabad.
Strong public protest in Bajour was caused by the
arrival of the dead body of a young student Ahmad
Khan from Karachi. Ahmad Khan died in the
custody of security forces. It was a sort of repetition
of the fake encounter staged by police for killing
Naqeeb Masood which had triggered
the Pashtunprotest. Rao Anwar, the police officer

93
involved in the murder of Naqeeb Masood is still at
large. The killing of Ahmad Khan has clearly
demonstrated that those at the helm of security
affairs in Karachi haven’t learnt any lesson from the
tragic death of Naqeeb Masood. Even in Swat,
instead of listening to the demand of the people for
ending humiliation and delay at security
checkpoints, the police have registered cases against
some of the leaders of the protest under anti-
terrorism law. This has obviously caused concern in
the civil society which is reflected in the powerful
resolution passed by Peshawar High Court Bar
Association.
The pro-Taliban Afghan policy, shaped and
implemented by the security establishment of
Pakistan, is the root cause of Pashtun unrest in
Pakistan. According to the official statements of the
Government of Pakistan more than fifty thousand
civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks the last
fifteen years. But they don’t provide regional
breakup of the aforementioned deaths. Pashtuns
believe that more than 90 percent of the dead belong
to their area. For exporting Talibanisation to
Afghanistan the factories for its production are
being run in the Pashtun belt. The latest additional
grant of Rupees 270 million to Haqqania seminary
by PTI’s provincial government indicates the
94
continuation of pro-Taliban policy which has not
only brought death and destruction to the area but
has also negatively affected economy, culture and
life in general. No systematic study has been
conducted about the massive dislocated of Pashtuns
due to the four decades long military conflict. It is
far bigger and larger than the dislocation caused by
Mughal invasions on the Afghans in the end of 15th
and early 16th century.
Pashtun living in FATA have borne the main
brunt of the armed conflict caused by the bankrupt
Afghan policy of Punjabi dominated Pakistani
establishment. Interestingly General Qamar Javed
Bajwa called this policy “myopic” in his speech in
the recent Munich Security Conference. But there is
still no sign of change in it. FATA has literally
become a bleeding wound as it has been used as a
launching pad for Taliban’s war in Afghanistan.
Flattening of the once large bazaars of Mir Ali and
Miram Shah during operation Zaib-e-Azb has been
a big blow for the residents of the area. There are
more such examples in other political agencies. All
the thirteen US drone attacks during the last one
year hit their targets in FATA. Government has
gone back on its promises for implementing reforms
in the area because it still needs to keep the area
closed to media and civil society.
95
 Diversion of Afghan transit trade to Chah Bahar
and fencing of the border has been a big blow
to Pashtun economy in general and to the economy
of the people living in border area in particular.
Colonial type of governance in FATA and adverse
impact of war on their economy are the major
factors behind shaping
the volcano of Pashtununrest . Under pressure from
the security establishment the mainstream political
parties failed to raise their voice on these issues.
Ultimately Pashtun youth, particularly the ones
socialised under the wretched conditions of
displacement decided to come to the forefront for
raising their own concerns. The spontaneous
response they have received so far is amazing. The
slogans raised in their sit-in and the poetry recited
there has spread like a wild fire. The Army has
accepted some of their demands which is a positive
development. One hopes authorities will handle the
situation carefully. But this unrest is basically
caused by war in Afghanistan which is causing
death and destruction in Pashtun lands. Pakistani
state can win hearts and minds only by revisiting its
Afghan policy.
The writer is a retired Senator and an analyst of
regional affairs.

96
 Pashtuns’ parlat
Shaheen Buneri
FEBRUARY 13, 2018

In the last weeks, Islamabad witnessed an

outpouring of extreme anger and fury from
Pakistan’s Pashtun dominated areas. Thousands of
protestors including University students, rights
activists, and political workers converged at the
National Press Club to condemn extrajudicial
killings, disappearances of Pashtuns youth, loss of
lives in landmines, forces’ arrogance on security
check-posts, curfews and harassment of tribesmen
on the pretext of maintaining security.
Pakistan’s quest to safeguard its delusional geo-
strategic interests in the region has posed serious
challenges to the survival of Pashtun community.
The Afghan Jihad had radicalised their society
and the ongoing war on terror has destroyed it.
Pakistan’s recent military adventures in the tribal
region caused unmeasurable sufferings when

97
millions were displaced from their homes.
Meanwhile, this whole region from Waziristan to
Swat Valley remained the prime target of terrorist
attacks resulting into large scale death and
destruction. Hundreds more were either disappeared
or target-killed. Even schools and places of worship
were not spared. Furthermore, exclusion in the
decision-making process and exploitation of their
resources have created an acute sense of alienation
among the Pashtuns. This had forced them to raise
their voices and ask is it a fight against Taliban or a
campaign against them?
Over the years, Pakistani security establishment
tried to stifle voices of dissent and we never found
out how the people of FATA viewed the ongoing
military and intelligence operations in their areas.
The mainstream media ignored their side of the
story or twisted it‘in the national interest’.
Tribesmen have no rights under the draconian
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) and they had few
schools and health units which were also destroyed
in the conflict. Tall claims of the civilian and
military officials regarding the development of the
region don’t tally with the abject poverty,
lawlessness and deprivation on the ground.

98
 Over the years, Pakistani security establishment
tried to stifle voices of dissent and we never found
out how the people of FATA viewed the ongoing
military and intelligence operations in their areas.
The mainstream media ignored their side of the
story or twisted it ‘in the national interest’
On January 26, young Mehsud men under its
charismatic leader Manzoor Pashtun determined to
challenge the State narrative and to protect their
fundamental human rights. They announced to
march on Islamabad to protest the State atrocities.
War weary people from other parts of the tribal
region and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also
joined them and the Mehsud Protection Movement
that started its journey from South Waziristan
Agency was transformed into the
#PashtunLongMarch when it reached Islamabad. It
was an organic and spontaneous movement with no
backing from any political or religious party. For ten
days they observed a peaceful protest sit-in (Parlat)
with more and more including women and war
victims joining them every day.
Braving cold weather, threats and intimidation
these young protestors were successful in creating
solidarity across the borders, rejecting religious
extremism, focusing real Pashtun issues and
99
redefining the war against terror. In a series of
tweets Afghan President Ashraf Ghani not only
supported the #PashtunLongMarch but also praised
the movement purpose “to mobilise citizens against
fundamentalism and terrorism in the region.”
After deliberations with the country’s Prime
Minister, and senior military officials and written
assurance from the government the protestors
agreed to postpone the sit-in for a month. Their
leaders assured that if the government failed to
honour its pledge they will launch a larger and more
organised protest.
This is uncertain whether the State will change
its discriminatory policies towards FATA, recognise
Pashtun tribesmen as equal citizens of the country,
address their issues and compensate for their losses
or not, but the frustration and alienation of the
Pashtuns is more obvious than ever. The demands
are legitimate, the issues are genuine and the anger
is real. Hope sanity prevails!
The writer is a journalist based in Prague, Czech Republic

Published in Daily Times, February 13th 2018.

100
 Young Pashtuns have
shown the mirror to
‘mainstream’ Pakistan
FEBRUARY 11, 2018

Raza Rumi

This past fortnight Pakistan witnessed

unprecedented mobilisation by the youth of tribal
areas. Thousands protested seeking justice for
Naqeebullah Mehsud brutally killed in a fake
encounter by Karachi police — all in the name of
counter terrorism. Mehsud’s death sparked national
outrage and it soon became a metaphor for the
historic injustices meted out to residents of tribal
areas and the way millions have faced conflict,
displacement and landmines since the start of US-
led war on terror aided by Pakistan’s elites.
The protests are over for now after assurances
from the government. But the movement for justice
has just begun.
For 10 days, the youth of FATA were joined by
many others within and outside the country. What
started as a Mehsud Tahafuz Movement for cleaning
of landmines in Waziristan turned into Justice for
101
Naqeeb Mehsud movement after his extra-judicial
killing in Karachi. The tribal maliks (or elders) from
North and South Waziristan also joined them.
Organised by a youth activist, the protests
remained peaceful, and resisted the control of any
organised political factions. The mainstream media
especially the TV channels repeated their odious
practice of selective hysteria. For days, TV channels
did not cover the protests. This was curious given
the same band of reporters, anchors and media
owners were eager to give disproportionate
coverage to protests against the elected
government[s]. Most recently, in November 2017, a
pack of clerics received inordinate coverage and
some even supported their acts of violence when the
government tried to disperse the protestors.
Multiple jurisdictions and legal systems,
discriminatory laws operate in the same country and
create classes of citizenship. The people of FATA
continue to be treated as second-class citizens and
all talk of ‘reform’ founders at expediency of the
civil-military elites
But this was not altogether unexpected. Much of
what was said during the Pashtun long march and
sit-in challenged the carefully nurtured myths about
Pashtuns popular in ‘mainstream’ Pakistan. The
102
‘other’ told its story and reminded of the national
disregard for the lives and livelihoods of Pashtuns.
The aerial bombardments, forced displacement, and
the encouragement and havens provided to violent
extremists in FATA and KP over the years as part of
the defence strategy. These stories are hard to tell on
TV screens that are closely monitored and operate
under unwritten but widely accepted norms of self-
censorship.
Fazal Khan Advocate, father of a child who was
killed in the 2014 APS attack by the Taliban,
delivered a moving speech in which he raised the
most pertinent question: since Pakistanis ‘own’ the
national military, why should they not question its
policies, especially when they have grave
consequences for the citizenry? And he rightly cited
the case of Eshanullah Eshan, former commander of
Pakistani Taliban, who, for all practical purposes, is
a ‘state guest’ while the parents of slain children in
Peshawar attack seek justice.
It is a shame that successive regimes in Pakistan
have continued the imperial policy of keeping
FATA and its peoples as colonial subjects in
ostensibly an ‘independent’ country claiming to
own a constitution and international human rights’
obligations.

103
 Last week, I wrote about the fast changing
nature of Pakistan’s social and political landscape.
The Pashtun long march and its 10-day long protest
in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad testifies to how the
marginalised are negotiating the contradictions of
today’s Pakistan. The state structures are moribund
and outdated. Multiple jurisdictions and legal
systems, discriminatory laws operate in the same
country and create classes of citizenship. The people
of FATA continue to be treated as second-class
citizens and all talk of ‘reform’ founders at
expediency of the civil-military elites.
Youngsters from tribal areas are less willing to
engage with the state structures as their elders have
done in the past. Such differences were reported
towards the end as the younger activists were
unwilling to end the protests without written
agreements. The way the youth of FATA view their
predicament is also shaped by their individual and
collective experiences. Manzoor Pashteen, the
organizer of the long march, reportedly said, ‘I am
safer on this road in Islamabad than my house in
Waziristan’. This is true for many, many others.
A large number of FATA residents are
internally displaced and now live in cities such as
Karachi and urbanizing parts of KP. The marginal

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and the mainstream are not so distinct. New media,
as evidenced during the Pashtun long march, have
freed the youth from the earlier imperatives of
gaining the attention of the ‘mainstream’ to make
their voice heard. More importantly, a decade-long
civilian interregnum has created a relative openness
for such mobilisations to take place.
Such growing spaces also allow for
contestations of state-approved political alignments.
The full embrace of Pashtun identity by the
protestors in Islamabad challenged the historic
imposition of a hegemonic ‘national’ identity. For
decades, segments of Pashtun elites have played
along with the civil-military power wielders to
further a sanitised nationalism but it seems that the
younger generations are challenging that. Ethnicity-
based politics will remain a reality and it needs to be
accepted by powers-that-be. Democraticsation,
howsoever flawed it might be, enables
reconciliation of multiple political and social
identities.
Efforts to suppress information flow failed with
this impressive mobilisation. The taboo subject of
missing persons is back in the national
conversations. Muzzling information and punishing
those who reported on it has not worked. It is

105
imperative that the national political parties, the
military and traditional media adjust to what is
changing in their fiefdoms.
There is still a protracted battle for justice,
democratisation and pro-people notions of security
to be waged. The young Pashtuns have shown the
way.
The writer is editor, Daily Times. He can be reached at
razarumi@gmail.com and tweets @razarumi

Published in Daily Times, February 11th 2018.

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 A time for empathy
Zubair Torwali

February 7, 2018
Looking for conspiracies and foreign hands in
almost every social or political act has become a
norm in Pakistan. Facts are only facts when they get
some institutional cover. If not, even brute facts like
natural disasters are termed as conspiracies.
The unending war on terror has made Pakistanis
more vulnerable. Along with bloodshed, mayhem
and money, it has brought many ills to our society.
The war has also militarised our society further.
There was a time when our children seldom got to
see soldiers on the streets, in front of mosques or
even outside the gates of their schools. But the war
on terror has brought them into our social fabric.
We weren’t prepared for this war and it has
brought many other ills into our social
consciousness. Among these are deadly labels like
‘terrorist’, ‘traitor’, ‘extremist’, ‘fascist-liberal’,
‘anti-Pakistan’ and ‘anti-Islam’ – all of which are
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based on individual perception, with no objective
definition by the law. Although such labels have
always existed, their use was mostly limited to the
wrangling among the political elite. Now these
labels are used so vehemently by people on social
media and in public gatherings that a reasonable
man would choose to remain silent on a political,
social or international issue just to refrain from
using them.
Controlling social realities and moulding them
into warlike narratives tends to become the modus
operandi in perpetual wars. This is why freedom of
expression has been hampered in Pakistan and fears
are manufactured in its place. This is why some
voices are given more of an impetus by our media
while others are not heard at all.
A few thousand people, mostly tribesmen from
South Waziristan, have been holding peaceful
protests outside the Islamabad Press Club since
February 1. Their major demand is to ensure
punishment for former Malir SSP Rao Anwar who
is responsible for the death of a young man in an
‘encounter’ after being labelled a ‘terrorist’. The
tribesmen have also used this as an opportunity to
raise objections against the deadly landmines in

108
their areas and demand an end to the enforced
disappearances and long curfew in Fata.
Some circles have, by now, started speculating
about who has brought these people to the capital,
and who is funding their daily needs and planning
their other logistics. A daily newspaper even
attributed the media blackout of the protests to
slogans that are being raised by some of the
aggrieved youth from the tribal belt. But we cannot
forget that the media gave 24/7-coverage to a sit-in
by a cleric from Punjab, the fiery Khadim Hussain
Rizvi, in November 2017, even though he was
spewing every possible abuse at the judiciary and
politicians.
This does not mean that every ‘provocative
slogan’ of the current protest in Islamabad should be
given full coverage. Instead of blacking them out in
this manner, the media and the state must show
some empathy. The protesters must be heard
because this is the least that they deserve.
The tribal region has witnessed countless
challenges in terms of development. The people of
the tribal belt have been victims of proxy wars since
the 1980s, and Fata has been a no-go area for the
media. What we hear is just an official narrative,

109
which can never provide a true and inclusive
picture.
Pakistan has witnessed severe tensions on its
eastern and western borders. Given this scenario, it
has become even more imperative to treat those
citizens who live near the borders with greater
empathy.
The people of Fata need to be treated with more
dignity than they have been shown in the past. It is
time our state listened carefully to these
‘provocative slogans’ and tried to understand any
mistakes made in dealing with people from the
region.
Instead of blaming those who have sacrificed
their lives, livelihood, homes and land of playing
into the hands of the enemy, we must engage in self-
assessment. Silence does not always mean consent.
It can also mean helplessness.

Email: ztorwali@gmail.com

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 The Pashtun long march
Imran Khan

February 23, 2018

This year will mark the 71st year of Pakistan’s

independence. It would be correct to say that most
Pakistanis today are better off than the Indian
subjects of the British Empire. It will also be correct
to say that there are exceptions to this norm, and one
such exception are the people of Fata. These
Pakistanis have been denied their basic rights
through the draconian FCR, and have been
subjected to collective punishments and
discriminatory treatments that should be unthinkable
in this day and age.
The beginning of military operations in Fata
brought with it grievances against the military. And
as is the norm in Pakistan, most political parties and
the media shy away from issues where they have to
criticise actions taken by Pakistan’s military.
It is in the backdrop of these constraints, and the
resulting desperation, that the recent Pashtun dharna
111
in Islamabad can be understood. At the core of this
dharna was a group of millennials from the Mehsud
tribe of South Waziristan Agency (SWA). Born in
the mid-90s the members of this group, Mehsud
Tahafuz Movement (MTM), have had a life that is
typical for their generation across Fata and parts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, all thanks to our policy of
good and bad Taliban.
From the massacre of tribal elders across Fata,
to the Taliban’s takeover of Fata, to becoming IDPs
due to military operations and then returning back to
their villages to face landmines, random curfews,
and humiliation at checkpoints etc. To understand
the desperation of this lot, one only has to imagine
one’s own childhood, teenage and young adulthood
in their shoes.
Their desperation was further augmented by the
indifference to their plight from most of Pakistan’s
political parties as well as the media. An
indifference that denied them the much-needed
public mobilisation that is essential for bringing
change. To by-pass this indifference, the MTM did
what any group of millennials would do these days;
they turned to social media.
The success of their strategy was evident in the
size of the crowd at the Pashtun dharna, which kept
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increasing on a daily basis. A ‘virtuous cycle’ of
sorts was created where videos of speeches and
charged crowds encouraged participation, which
resulted in more galvanizing visuals and motivating
speeches, all of which were instantly circulated
through social media mostly under the hashtag
#PashtunLongMarch. Such was the outreach that the
dharna had participants coming from as far as
Shangla in the north to Zhob in the south.
The outpouring of sympathy might also be
because of the shock factor created by the MTM’s
demands; these demands reflect the abysmal manner
in which these Pakistanis have been treated by the
Pakistani state. For instance, consider their demand
that landmines – which have resulted in death and
injury – be removed from areas that have been
declared ‘clear’ by our military. Similarly,
information on the status of missing relatives is not
something that citizens should be demanding from
the state, as the state should not be creating missing
citizens in the first place.
Surprisingly, despite these genuine grievances,
the MTM was not able to transcend the ethnic
divides within Pakistan, as very few non-Pashtuns
participated in the dharna in Islamabad. However,
the movement was able to reach out across the tribal

113
and geographical divides within Pashtuns, a
significant achievement as tribal identities have
been a traditional hindrance for Pashtun nationalist
parties.
The main reason for this could be the shared
sense of frustration on these issues across Pakistan’s
Pashtuns, but the MTM’s measured use of
symbolism might also have played its part. For
instance, the leader of the MTM, Manzoor Ahmed,
uses the name Manzoor ‘Pashteen’ (pronunciation
of the word ‘Pashtun’ in Waziristani dialect) instead
of using his tribe’s name. Also, during the dharna,
the MTM announced it would change its name from
the ‘Mehsud Tahafuz Movement’ to the ‘Pashtun
Tahafuz Movement’ (PTM). Furthermore, the stage
of the Pashtun dharna was open to all, and speakers
included relatives of missing persons and terror
victims as well as other concerned individuals from
across Pakistan, and not just South Waziristan. As a
result, the Pashtun dharna resonated across tribes
and regions – resulting in solidarity dharnas/protests
in Quetta, Bannu, Zhob, Peshawar and Swat.
The effort seems to be bearing fruit already;
many missing persons have returned home, and
there are reports of bomb disposal teams working on
the removal of landmines in Waziristan. The recent

114
abolition of the humiliating ‘Watan Card’ in
Waziristan can also be accredited to the efforts
initiated by the PTM. These developments are good
but there still is a long way to go in terms of the
state’s response to address its biases, mistakes and
incompetence in dealing with Fata. The PTM has
also vowed to continue its struggle until the
demands are met in a sufficient manner.
More importantly, the dharna has inspired
others to protest about issues in their own regions;
in D I Khan, protesters are demanding a clamp
down on Amn-committees/Good Taliban who are
harassing the local population. Similarly, in Swat,
protesters are demanding the removal of military
checkpoints after a sick child, on the way to the
hospital, died in the waiting line of a military
checkpoint. However, in the case of Swat there has
been the typical kneejerk response where an FIR has
been registered against peaceful protesters. It is this
sort of response that is likely to add more fuel to the
fire, where legitimate demands are made
controversial by simply declaring them ‘anti-state’.
The leader of the PTM, Manzoor Pashteen,
responded to such reductionist thinking by saying
that: “Yes, we do want “azadi” (independence), the
azadi that is enjoyed by the rest of Pakistan”.

115
Labelling genuine grievances as ‘anti-state’ has
never worked for us; the fall of Dhaka is testament
to that fact. Let’s hope we learn from our history for
once, and not repeat the same mistakes again.

The writer is a freelance contributor.

He blogs at iopyne.wordpress.com

Twitter: @iopyne Email: iopyne@gmail.com

116
 Listen to the Pakhtuns
Zaigham Khan

March 5, 2018

Pakhtuns are talking and Pakistan must listen.

They are talking the language of peaceful protest,
the most beautiful language human civilisation has
invented. In order to make sense of these protests, it
is important to understand the medium, the message
and the messenger. It is equally important to put the
current protests in the perspective.
Pakistan is emerging out of a bloodbath.
Everyone carries some scar from the period when
death stalked us on the streets. Fata suffered the
most as it was taken over by terrorists who ran their
violent unholy emirate from these areas. The
military success against terrorists has revived a
sense of normalcy to much of Pakistan. After years
of siege, Pakistanis are flocking to tourist spots,
festivals, musicals and playgrounds.
It is also an appropriate time to come out for
protests. Sociologists have noted that protests
happen not at the worst of the time, but when the
117
worst is over and the situation starts improving. This
is because the improved situation fails to fulfil
expectations. People in Fata are returning to their
homes. It is time to take stock of their losses. The
level of horror they faced instils numbness. They are
starting to feel the pain once again. They are taking
stock of the losses and the losses are staggering.
Their houses and their markets are a pile of rubble.
Their farms are fallow, their livestock is dead and
their businesses are gone. What is worse, they feel
humiliated and stigmatised.
The people of Fata want to come out of the
constitutional limbo and live their lives as normal
citizens of the state of Pakistan. They have become
weary of the cultural stereotyping they once used to
wear as a badge of honour. Their movement is a
movement for inclusion, not of exclusion or
separation.
Naqeebullah Mehsud, a young aspiring model,
represented these aspirations – for a normal life in a
globalised world. His murder in a staged encounter
allegedly on the hands of Rao Anwar, a police officer
notorious for fake encounters, galvanised his fellow
Mehsuds and many other residents to protests. It also
won the residents of Fata much-needed sympathy
from the rest of the country. They have used this

118
opportunity well to put their demands on the national
agenda through the Pashtun Long March.
Tribal culture has been both glorified and
blamed for being the root cause of terrorism.
According to Akbar S Ahmad, a Pakhtun social
anthropologist and former civil servant, terrorism all
over the Muslim world is based in tribal areas and
has its roots in tribal culture. “All Al-Qaeda
leadership is from tribal societies”, he said in an
interview some years ago. “Ninety-five percent of
Al Qaeda comprises tribesmen and 18 out of 19
hijackers were Yemeni tribals, 12 from the Saudi
Aseer province belonging to Yemeni tribes.”
In his analysis, the problem is not in tribal
cultures per se but the way governments (the centre)
have dealt with tribal areas all over the Muslim
world as peripheries. It is the lack of respect for
tribal cultures by the central authority that is at the
root of the problem.
In fact, Fata is in no way unique in its tribal
form of social organisation. All humanity has
passed through a tribal phase and all the four
provinces in the country have an element of
tribalism in some areas. Elman Service, an
American anthropologist, in his famous
categorisation divided human societies into four
119
categories of increasing population, size, political
centralisation, and social stratification: band, tribe,
chiefdom, and state.
As these factors change, tribes cannot run their
affairs using tribal structures, and turn into chiefdoms
or get integrated into state structures. This is how state
structures have replaced tribes and chiefdoms all over
the world. Tribal structures cannot survive because of
religious ideology, riwaj or a psychological state like
‘ghairat’ (honour) in the face of change in population
size, subsistence, political centralisation, and social
stratification of an area.
It is these demographic and socioeconomic
changes that had made tribal structures obsolete
even before the Taliban dealt them a mortal blow.
While Fata was ripe for integration with the rest of
the Pakhtun areas and the nation-state, successive
governments resisted reforms in the area. This is
what created a terrible vacuum and led to space for
the Taliban and other extremists to find refuge here.
The Taliban physically eliminated jirgas and elders
through their suicide bombers and turned these areas
into their chiefdoms, if we use the Service’s
categorisation.
The state is culpable by denying political
reforms and human development to the area and
120
fostering a criminal elite that has turned this
egalitarian society into a land of stark inequality. In
terms of distribution of wealth, Fata is today the
least egalitarian area in the country, home to a
minority of extremely rich people living side by side
with a large majority of the poorest and least
developed people in the country.
Every crisis is an opportunity and every
opportunity for reform has a limited time span. Fata
is clamouring for reforms while our governments
are dragging their feet and are reluctant to set aside
administrative and material resources required for
the purpose.
Building a post-conflict society is a huge
challenge. Unfortunately, the threat of violence is
not completely over as the TTP has found
sanctuaries on the other side of the Durand Line.
The current difficulties in Fata are rooted in the fact
that the government has failed to undertake reform
and establish a post-conflict management structure
in the area. The old order is over, but the new order
has not replaced it. By now, civilian institutions
should have been able to take over most
responsibilities from the military.
Scholars like Akbar S Ahmad and politicians
like Imran Khan have long defined Fata in terms of
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the tribal code of revenge. According to Ahmad, the
tribal code based on revenge and honour is the main
operating force behind terrorism. Rather than
Islamic ideology of any sort, it is this tribal code
that this violence is emanating from.
Citizens in a civilised society use the code of
peaceful protest while making demands on the state
and, in this, the residents of Fata are no different
from the people of any democratic society – or any
other part of the country. Now that the nightmare of
the Taliban is behind them, people in Fata want rule
of law; they want integration with Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and they want respect and dignity.
The people of Fata are some of the most
enterprising and hardworking people in the country.
They deserve equal rights and must be willing to
share equal responsibilities with the rest of the
people of the country. A new social contract is
needed, not with tribes but with the people of Fata
as citizens of Pakistan.

The writer is an anthropologist and development

professional.

Email: zaighamkhan@yahoo.com

Twitter: @zaighamkhan
122
 Pashtun’s uprising:
the subalterns finally
speak
Inam Ullah

The celebrated anti-colonial leader and writer,

Frants Fanon in his essay, The Pitfalls of National
Consciousness holds that during the anti-colonial
resistance all the masses actively participate and
make sacrifices for the cause, but once the formal
independence is declared, the fruits of independence
are not evenly distributed and never reach to the
common masses. The post-independence political
scenario of the once colonized countries is
dominated by some powerful classes of the land
who perpetuate the colonial system and keep the
masses away from the real form of independence, it
ushers into an era of neo-colonialism. In case of
Indian freedom movement, especially Pakistan,
Pashtuns have been kept away from the real fruits of
independence through various ‘neo-colonial
designs’. Their socio-economic and political rights
and needs have always been rickety with the
federation of Pakistan. They have really been turned

123
into subalterns, as Guha and Spivak term such
classes. However, the rise of militancy on their soil,
internal displacement and stereotypical
representation in the national mainstream discourses
finally resulted into the uprising, the immediate
cause being the death of Naqeebullah Mehsud by a
state institution.
The good aspects of the uprising was its being
peaceful, and the demands put forward are in
keeping with the law and the constitution of the
land. Briefly put, they demand security of life and
limb, equal status of citizenship like their co-
citizens, free and fair trials, and punishment and
reward in accordance with the dictates of the law.
No sane mind can negate the legitimacy and
urgency of the demands, and it was due to these
reasons that their stance was dully endorsed by
human rights group and civil society both inside and
outside the country. No doubts, the movement
challenged the mindset which has been foisting a
close ended format of political nationalism and
social homogeneity in the country, and even make
use of fouls means like oppression, negation of
fundamental rights for the propagation and
perpetuation of their objectives. Federations across
the globe, are formed by consensus of its units and
certain rules for running the business are
unanimously agreed upon by the stakeholders,
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 focusing on the rights and duties of the citizens,
called a social contract , popularly known as
constitution. If a party to the contract or the
institution formed therein, fails doing its job and or
exceeds the designated authority, rest of the
stakeholders do preserve the right to raise their
voice against it. The exercise has been in vogue
across the world, and terms of engagements in the
contracts are reviewed, readjusted and grievances of
the parties are redressed. However, in Pakistan such
acts amount to treason, foreign agenda and
disloyalty to the state.
The recent sit- in was an unprecedented
manifestation of Pashtuns’ unity with convergence
of interest, and reflected a rise of national
consciousness among them. The decades long
oppression, harsh and unjust treatment by the state,
denial of fundamental rights, and suppression of
their voices, finally compelled them to take to
streets. The movement, however, for the time being
has put five demands to the state, but if even the
demands are met, the movement should not die
down and serve as an active body of Pashtun
representation. The movement, in order to live up to
the expectations, should incorporate the following:
 It should be named as Pashtun (better
Pakhtun) Qami Malatar.

125
  It should be distanced from every kind
of political affiliations, solely taking into
consideration Pashtuns’ cause and the protection
of their interest.
 It should stay away from the electoral
politics (at least for the time being).
 It should be given a strong and well-
knit organization structure, at district levels in
the Pashtuns’ areas.
 The Pashtun diaspora should actively
be engaged in the movement.
 There should be a regular fund raising,
preferably through mobile phones. (The way
charities collect donations).
The struggle should not only be confined to the
political rights, it should also focus on the cultural,
social and economic aspects. There should be Social
media team, legal team, and cultural experts etc.
members of the teams should be selected from
among the Pashtun educated class/ intelligentsia
keeping in view their areas of interest and academic
field. The committees should check Pashtuns’
negative representation, resist the Pashtuns’ ethnic
profiling and stereotypical representation especially
in the main stream media of Pakistan. In case of

126
issues, they should give an intellectual response
through ‘ Re-writing’ (as Edward Said calls it).
The struggle certainly seems an uphill task,
hurdles are all around, especially from the centrist
forces of the state and the so called institution of
tribal Malakis , a white elephant, because the
movement will gradually sink their position and
replace it with the active, energetic and educated
class. But perseverance , steadfastness and the spirit
of serving without any vested interest will certainly
make it possible. One must be hopeful, as long as
Manzoor Pahteen continues to pursue Bacha Khan’s
will, “My nation now I have turned aged, can’t keep
visiting your hamlets and give you the lessons of
social reformation and political awareness, now
every Pashtun should propagate the spirit of service,
humanity and create awareness’.

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 The Pashtun odyssey is
our national odyssey
Kiran Nazish

February 6, 2018 0
The truth is no matter what we assume as
Punjabis, Urdu speakers or Sindhis, no one in this
country has sacrificed as much as the Pashtun.
The fact that thousands of Pashtuns have to
demand that a police officer who is accused of the
extra-judicial murder of dozens of Pakistani citizens
be punished for his actions exposes how weak the
justice system in this country is. Pakistan’s Pashtun
people haven’t come out in force to voice their
concerns in over a decade. This march, which has
culminated in a protest outside the Islamabad Press
Club, includes tribal elders and youth from all over
the country.
However, coverage of this protest by the media
has been scant. In comparison to previous sit-in’s in
Islamabad, this one is being ignored. The question
is, why?
The demands of the protesting Pashtuns are that
the killers of Naqeebullah Mehsud should be
punished, landmines removed from FATA,
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individuals from the Pashtun community forcibly
taken away by state agencies be produced in court,
and the policy of applying a curfew in FATA after
every untoward incident be ended.
Why is it that a state which wants its citizens to
be proud of its nuclear power status, the prowess of
its military and its successes in the fight against
terrorism can’t find the killers of dozens of civilians
— mostly from the Mehsud tribe? A tribe that has
been targeted in incidents of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings for years.
The military can brag all it likes about resettling
hundreds of thousands of IDPs from Waziristan who
were displaced during operations against the Tehrik-
e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but the fact remains that
anti-terror operations in FATA have their dark side
as well. During my recent visits to FATA in
November and December last year, dozens of
sources gave me details of Pashtuns being taken
away from North and South Waziristan. The local
populace was also abused both verbally and
physically. Children were killed by Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) almost every week. Local
tribal journalists have complained about reports
about these issues and the trauma they caused being
repressed.
Not only have these reports been repressed by
state actors, mainstream media has also ignored the
129
issues faced by the people of FATA. This could be
because since the creation of Pakistan, the issues
faced by Pashtuns have not been acknowledged. Not
only have we been discriminatory towards Pashtuns,
we have also ignored their sacrifices and love for
this country. I distinctly recall that during my
childhood, we often shared jokes about the Pashtuns
which mocked their intelligence. Much like “dumb
blonde” jokes insult women’s intelligence.
The truth is no matter what we assume as
Punjabis, Urdu speakers or Sindhis, no one in this
country has sacrificed as much as the Pashtun. Nor
has any other community put their necks on the line
for this country as many times as Pashtuns. If
anyone deserves attention and appreciation for their
contributions, it is the Pashtuns.
The Pashtuns are one of the first ethnicities to
make their mark on the territory which is now
known as Pakistan. They have been on the frontlines
of many of this region’s most significant conflicts.
First during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan,
and later in the conflicts that have plagued this land
since 9/11. Not only have they been on the
frontlines politically and militarily, but also as
civilians. They have faced the brunt of US drone
campaigns, the Pakistan military’s operations in
2009 and 2014. Their ongoing protest is aimed at

130
bringing attention to all the injustices they have
faced because of these clashes.
The Pashtuns have been forced to broadcast
their grievances in such a manner because we in this
country have accepted an almost hierarchal
organisation of ethnicities which gives certain
groups a better quality of life than others. We think
it is natural for a country to give some citizens
stability and safety, while others are completely
marginalised.
Meanwhile, our media has become increasingly
ideological in how it prioritises the news to how it
portrays it. But what is ideological news? One that
seems true, when it is in fact made up. For example,
the news outlets which falsely accuse the march to
be anti-state, because of the slogans a group of
attendees shouted accusing security officials of
being responsible for the abuse they faced. Well,
one must ask, isn’t it the military itself which brags
about fighting terrorism and bringing stability to the
tribal regions? Is it wrong for those who are
innocent but have suffered in these operations to
call out the authorities for the hand they have played
in their suffering? The impact of this ideological
media has been so strong that there are segments of
the population which can’t even differentiate
between the tribal areas of FATA and the KP
province. It is high time that these segments get
131
over their intellectual lethargy and stop relying on
the mainstream media when it comes to forming
opinions about the Pashtun people.
Once this happens, the different communities of
this country can finally begin to love and respect
one another as humans and fellow citizens. We
cannot simply assume that nothing can be done
about the suffering of the Pashtun people any
longer. Until that happens, we cannot truly call
ourselves a nation.

(First published in DailyTimes)

The writer is Co-Founder Coalition For Women

in Journalism and tweets @kirannazish

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 Pashtun Spring:
Time to redraw the
boundary between
Pakistan and Afghanistan
Ahmad Shah Katawazai

9 February 15, 2018

Angry Pashtun tribesmen chanting anti-Taliban

and freedom slogans torched the office of the
Taliban in Pakistan’s northwestern province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in response to the Jan.
3 police killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud, an
inspiring Pashtun model, during a raid of what
police said was a “terrorist hideout.” Mehsud’s
death sparked a protest by young Pashtuns from
throughout the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and
tribal areas along the Durand Line, the border with
Afghanistan, where, for decades, Pashtuns have
suffered targeted killings by the Pakistani military
and have protested against injustice and state-
sponsored terrorism in their areas.
Now, protesters are asking for justice for
Mehsud and demanding freedom for
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Forcefully imposed by British India in 1893
over Afghan objections, the Durand Line and FATA
area has turned into a hub of terrorism, insurgency
and drug trafficking. People in the area proudly and
publicly bear arms, sell smuggled goods and make
weapons. For criminals, arms dealers, terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaeda, Haqqani network and
ISIS, the area has become somewhat of a safe
haven. The semi-autonomous tribal region is a place
where foreign jihadists, many of whom have been
there for more than a decade, can take advantage of
the lawlessness and benign support that Al-Qaeda
and Taliban insurgents have received from Pakistan.
Such activity in this location presents potentially
dangerous consequences for U.S., NATO and
Afghan troops in the region.
In this region, insurgents can retreat to tribal
areas when U.S. and Afghan forces fight them, with
the belief that neither U.S. nor Afghan forces will
pursue them once they cross the boundary. Their
Pakistani sympathizers will provide them with
sanctuary and support. This trend has continued for
16 years but should be put to an end, because of the
grave risk it poses to U.S. and Afghan forces.
Now is the time to change the status quo. This
requires bold, confident decisions to address
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 grievances of the people and redress mistakes of the
past. In a May 2017 article published in The
Pashtun Times, Ryszard Czarnecki, the former vice
president of European Parliament, noted that
“Pashtun-dominated tribal areas and portions of
Pakistan that were forcefully taken away and
merged into British India need to be restored to their
earlier status as the sovereign territory of
Afghanistan.” Indeed, it would be in the best
interest of the United States, NATO and
Afghanistan to redraw the Durand Line.
The Afghan government never has accepted the
Durand Line as a true international border. The
government and people of Afghanistan have
consistently asked for the territory to be re-
incorporated into Afghanistan. People who live
along the Durand Line don’t consider it to be a
border. They cross the border freely and, in many
places, the line is unclear. Pashtun inhabitants along
the line take pride in asserting their autonomy and
proudly assert that their Pashtunwali traditions and
tribal codes of conduct supersede the Pakistani laws
and courts.
Redrawing the line, to merge
FATA, Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Balochistan into
Afghanistan could help to end the blood spilled in
this region. This would eliminate the safe-haven
status of the region for terrorists by bringing the
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lawless territory under the control of Afghanistan,
where U.S. forces are operating. Eliminating the
arbitrary, artificial border would be a great legacy
for the United States and international community
— winning over the hearts and minds of the
region’s inhabitants by bringing together people
who were forcefully divided more than a century
ago.
In addition, redrawing the boundary would be a
quick solution to reaching the collective objectives
of the United States, NATO and Afghanistan. This
would:
 Make it difficult for terrorists to use the
area to plan and train for their operations, and
will deny them a place to which they can escape
the U.S., NATO or Afghan forces;
 Help in monitoring Al-Qaeda activities,
since the terrorist group continues to seek
opportunities to strike Western countries;
 Help to contain ISIS, whose members
often hide in the mountains of the area;
 Help the United States with its
stabilization efforts in Central and South Asia;
 Bolster the reputation of and regard for
the United States, by promoting unity among
people of the region.

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 Ultimately, bringing stability to this region, and
getting rid of Pakistani-backed insurgency, could
become a model of freedom. Redrawing the Durand
Line and merging the territory into Afghanistan
would give the country access to international
waters, providing a win from a logistical and
economic perspective for the United States, NATO
and Afghanistan. This would pave the way for a
direct connection between Central Asia and the
Middle East. (First published in the HILL)

The writer is an Afghan diplomat with the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a national
security expert. The views expressed are his
own. Follow him on Twitter at @askatawazai.

137
 #PashtunLongMarch:
A peaceful resistance
February 9, 2018 0

Huma Naseri

It has been a week that thousands of Pashtuns

man, women, youth have gathered outside the press
club in Islamabad highlighting human rights
violations against their community. The march
began with demand ‘justice for Naqibullah’ A
young Pashtun shopkeeper killed in a fake police
encounter on January 13 in the financial heart of
Pakistan, Karachi and claimed that he was a Taliban
militant. Nonviolent struggle, peaceful resistance,
revolution or whatever term you use for the current
PashtunMarch its actually the outcome brutalities
and injustice towards Pashtun.
Situation in FATA
For decades the people of FATA have
enormously suffered from militarism and terrorism
and remained the most neglected, deprived and
forgotten part in Pakistan. Since the 9/11 the tribal
areas witnessed more than 10 big operations for
countering militancy and are still continuing in one
or other form. FATA became the victim of both
terrorist and counter-terrorism which destroyed the
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social, cultural, traditional and political life of the
tribal society. The military operations and terrorist
attacks have deeply disturbed the socio-
psychological fabric of society according to a report
“Violence is prevailing in FATA as the Taliban’s,
foreign fighters and drone attacks worsen the
condition of the area. The damage to infrastructure
and human losses includes destruction and damage
of public buildings, schools, hospitals, clinics and
lives lost and injuries sustained and the Internally
Displaced Persons that were forced to migrate to
escape violence and damage to privately owned
property” according to another report “There is no
internet facility in FATA and people have been
disconnected from national and international
mainstream which is a right violation. Those among
FATA people I mean social and human rights
activists raise voice of concern are targeted and
silenced. They are persecuted intimidated and
harassed. NGOs are not allowed to interact with
people at ground in FATA. Media is not allowed to
work independently and with fairness. FATA is like
a hell where people have been caged”
Pashtun Long March – Peaceful resistance
For years Pashtuns became the prime target be
that cold war against the former Soviet Union or
9/11 war on terror. FATA have constantly been
targeted for providing sanctuaries to local and
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transnational militant organizations. They have been
suffering by the armed conflict yet their sufferings
and tortures remain unnoticed and were justified as
the war on terror however ironically when terrorist
carried attack in Lahore, “there was a widespread
crackdown against anyone who merely looked
Pashtun or Afghan. Official and unofficial circulars
and notices were distributed by the police
specifically targeting the Pashtuns and portraying all
of them as suspected terrorists” Labeling a certain
ethnic group is a harmful act and emotionally
damaging. Labeling someone means creating
boundaries or putting them in a box, no matter what
they do or say, they can’t get out of that box. The
label defines them. In the scenario, Pashtun is put in
the box and labeled terrorist given this fact and in
the light of such an injustice thus Pashtun have
every right and every reason to protest.
Today they are gathered encounter and change
the damaging stereotypes, Pashtun war-loving,
barbaric individuals and confront pro-terror and
anti-Pashtun policies. They are mobilizing in the
most peaceful, disciplined and constructive way to
struggle effectively for justice and reaffirmed their
commitment to nonviolence of Bacha Khan.
The protest isn’t against they government its
about peace and stability its against Pashtun
genocide, state-sponsored terrorism and human
140
rights violations in FATA like the Afghan President
Said “Pashtun Long March is a protest movement
led by young Pashtuns from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where they
have long been the targets of military operations,
internal displacement, ethnic stereotyping and
abductions by the security forces” the international
community should pay serious attention to the
brutalities against innocent Pashtuns and human
rights violations in FATA. The mainstream media
and anyone that belief in peaceful resistance should
support this genuine moment and raise their voice
against militant and terrorism which is a treat not
only to Pashtun people but entire world.

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 We will organize, we shall
overcome!
January 22, 2018 0

MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR

In the aftermath of Naqib’s extra-judicial

murder and the spontaneous emergence of Pashtun
protests organized by youngsters against the state
oppression, some friends have raised important
questions: For example, they ask: how could
Pashtuns be organized against state oppression if the
mainstream political parties, i.e, PkMAP and ANP
are sidelined, whose political leadership is being
‘unfortunately’ discredited by ‘Pashtun
intellectuals’; how these disorganized, scattered,
reactionary, ideology-less, and party-less protests by
Pashtuns could be sustained and prevented from
dying; and, how these scattered protests be
channelized and mobilized at larger scale without
the help of traditional political parties.
My response:
First, no doubt political parties are the vehicles
for mass organization and mobilization. Their
leaders are supposed to be the political teachers of
those who they claim to lead. However, established
political parties and its top leadership are always
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vulnerable to manipulation and cooperation, either
due to threats or temptations, or both – especially in
an oppressive state like Pakistan. But when political
parties and their leaders fail their constituents – for
whatever reason – a counter-elite class emerges
from the masses to fill the political vacuum. As we
can see there are numerous new faces of youngsters
(like Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen, Hayat Preghal ) who are
at the forefront of the current political movement,
involved in organizing and mobilizing the masses.
Look at their demands. They are raising all those
issues on which the mainstream political parties are
(or have been made to remain) silent. The very
reason for the spontaneous emergence of these
smaller scale movements is that the mainstream
political parties have left the political vacuum. One
of the greatest political benefits of the emergence of
the counter-elites and the movement they lead is
that they put pressure on the traditional political
parties and their leadership, who are forced to leave
the policy of indifference. So far, the political-
economic cost-benefit analysis of the Pashtun
nationalist leaders has led them to remain
tightlipped on the oppressive policies of the state
against Pashtuns (to which this movement is a
reaction). They are till now ready to pay the
political costs of losing the sympathy of their
Pashtun base (short of political death) in order to
143
protect themselves against the oppressive state.
However, the emergence of counter-elites and
spontaneous political movements (like the present
one) put these parties and their leadership in a very
tight spot, especially when they are confronted with
making a stark choice of either continuing to take
the side of the oppressive state or face an imminent
political death. To avoid the second scenario, they
will be forced to voice and mainstream the political
grievances and demands of their base. In that sense,
these apparently disorganized and spontaneous
movements and the emerging counter-elite play an
important role in keeping the traditional political
parties on a tightrope. It is therefore incorrect to
suggest that only political parties are the vehicles of
organization and mobilization. Look at the civil
rights movement in the USA in the 1950s-70s. It
was not led by a single mainstream political party
by many smaller organizations like NAACP,
MLK’s, Malcolm X, Black Panther etc, and political
parties were forced to get on board.
Second, the current ongoing spontaneous
protests may appear in disarray and disorganized,
but behind the veneer of apparent chaos, there is a
common political principle that weaves them into
one movement: the commonality of their grievances
and their reaction against and demands on the
oppressive state. When a people endure oppression
144
for a long time, then Rosa Park’s refusal to sit in the
back of the bus or Naqib’s murder just prove the
proverbial last straw on camel’s back. The lid over
the volcano is removed and the pent-up anger finds
its way out. Now, look at the statement of the
apparently illiterate father of Naqib. He pointed out
to the same organizing principle. He said that if the
murder of his son provided an opportunity to
Mashud and other Pashtuns to ‘protect’ themselves
against the oppression of the state, he would think
his murder was not wasted. In other words, he does
not take the murder of his son as an individual and
private grievance but is trying to make it part of
similar and larger grievances that Pashtuns are
facing at the hands of the oppressive state. Most
importantly, he said that Pashtuns do not have
weapons or anything else but to organize, protest
and make noise against the state oppression, and
that is the only way to protect themselves against
those who have guns in their hands. He mocked the
Mullahs who have recently issued a Fatwa against
the suicide bombing. He questioned the delayed
issuance of the fatwa, saying where were these
Mullahs when all suicide bombers blew themselves
and others. He also questioned why the same
Mullah brigade does not issue a fatwa against the
extra-judicial killing (pointing to the unholy alliance
between oppressive state and Mullah!). This is
145
extremely significant, this is nothing but an
organizing principle.
Third, it is also incorrect to suggest that the
present movement is without any ideological basis
or direction. Yesterday, Dr. Said Alam Mahsud and his
friends organized a committee that has clear
objectives to archive (I am going to share the video
in the comments section), Mahsud Tahaffuz
Movement and other like organizations also have
similar and clear objectives: protest against extra-
judicial murders of Pashtuns; compilation of lists of
Pashtun missing person in oppressive state’s
custody (alive or killed); the issue of land-mines left
by the Pak army which have blown up hundreds of
innocent children in FATA; night raids against and
unlawful searches of people in FATA; breaking the
state promoted stereotypes of Pashtuns showing
them as terrorists; refusing to become Shuhada any
more, etc. I think, these are the immediate issues
that the Pashtuns of the tribal belt (and overall) are
facing. The mainstream political parties are silent on
these issues. They have some other priorities:
‘saving (NS’s) democracy’ and ‘(Punjab’s)
constitution’. The commonality of these problems
has brought unity of thought/ideology to this
movement, which might, in turn, possibly bring
unity to their action too. The mainstream Pashtun
political parties cannot remain affected by all this.
146
They have to get onboard on these issues or wither
away and thrown into the dustbin of history.
Lastly, to those who point out to the spontaneity
and short-lived life of these movements, springing
up after such incidents and then immediately dying,
I have to say this: granted, this or that event may die
in the short term, but rest assured, the oppression of
the state is so well entrenched and its oppressive
machines runs to such an extent on the blood of
ethnonational minorities that it will keep on
churning out new reasons for Pashtuns and other
ethnonational groups to organize. And organize we
will. We shall overcome.

The writer hails from South Waziristan and is

currently completing PhD studies from Indiana
University. He can be reached at
mzubair@indiana.edu

147
 The Pakhtun awakening
March 11, 2018 1 Comment

Rafiullah Khan
The resentment of Pakhtuns has found a
language to express itself and a popular counter
narrative in contrast to Pakistan’s national,
ideological and institutional narrative is in the
making
Having a false notion of bravery and heroism
about themselves, Pakhtuns are practically the most
wretched people in today’s world. Both politics and
geography account for their miseries. If we take a
longer view of the Pakhtun landscape, hardly a
single period without socio-political vicissitudes
could be presented.
However, the crises since 9/11 outweigh all
other events in magnitude and length of time.
In terms of time, the problem spreads over, at
least, two decades. A new generation has grown up
in a situation of haplessness, discrimination and
uncertainty. And the degree of pain and despair
reflects the fact that it has been experienced across
gender, age and class. State institutions and non-
state perpetrators both within and outside
148
Pakhtuns’ lands are believed to be responsible for
this state of affairs.
The feeling of helplessness is further aggravated
by outsiders’ extremely negative attitude towards
Pakhtuns — manifested in things like racial
profiling and socio-cultural exclusiveness.
The fundamental human rights of Pakhtuns have
been violated. They have been surrounded by
uncertainties with respect to their subsistence, health
and education. Since the people seem to have lost
dignity and respect, an appalling sense of alienation
and deprivation has been generated. The prolonged
silence which had prevailed due to fear and
suppression came to an end with Naqeebullah’s
killing in Karachi a few months back.
The ongoing developments, variously termed
strikes, Pashtun Long March and national
resistance, intend to put an end to this age of terror.
In the whole phenomenon resonates people’s
resentment, annoyance, anger and above all a
resolution to struggle for their rights to which they,
as human beings, are entitled.
The movement — or strikes, resistance,
treachery, label it the way you like — is important
from multiple points of view. And their appreciation
in a mature manner is a sheer call of the time.
149
 In the first place, the whole phenomenon is the
ultimate manifestation of a memory ghost — the
decades-long bitter experiences. The resentment of
people has found a language to express itself
through the victims themselves rather than via
armchair human rights advocates. And herein lies
the importance of the current developments.
People, irrespective of rank and file, are in the
vanguard. As it is the people who make their own
representations, there is hardly any room for vested
interests to benefit from the situation. Hence, all that
has been going on is pretty beyond manipulation by
ordinary politics. Parliamentary politics, in such a
situation, seems trivial and parochial and utterly
fails to contaminate or hijack the politics of survival
and fundamental human rights.
Furthermore, we need to gauge the intensity of
people’s resentment which has found expression in
the current movement. The declared perpetrators are
state institutions, Punjab and Punjabis and even
politicians. This is what people and their posts,
likes, shares and comments on social media say.
A popular counter-narrative in contrast to
Pakistan’s national, ideological and institutional
narrative is in the making. Not only state institutions
are being questioned, the very national symbols and
150
constructed memory are under severe attack. And
all this provides us our last, but crucial, point of
analysis.
There is no denying that memory assumes
critical importance not only in formation but also in
dismemberment of states and nations. States and
nations everywhere diligently invent memories
aiming at buttressing integration and consolidation.
Pakistan has also been vehement in this regard from
the very beginning. The state version of history, full
of polemic memories, exclusive philosophies and
ideological symbols, enjoys wide popularity in the
country. Rival memories in the form of ethno-
national movements have persistently, and with
great success, been suppressed.
Unfortunately, Pakhtuns are being given a new
memory. A memory which is, at the same time,
personal, experiential, genocidal and popular. Since
it has, simultaneously, been experienced by
different generations of Pakhtuns, it is plausible to
term it a multi-generational memory.
This multi-generational memory can play havoc
in the long run, like the one which caused the
debacle of Dhaka. It also may not be considered just
a passing sentiment. This memory embodies not

151
only cultural purges but an encroachment on human
rights as well.
Since human rights have attained a universal
language, the representation which Pakhtuns make
of themselves is gaining in moral strength. And
Pakhtun intelligentsia, civil society and literati are
conscious about stark violation of both the culturally
particular norms and values and the universally
accepted human rights. They have made their bitter
experiences immortal in literary works, public
speeches, scholarly publications etc. Even there are
calls for preserving these memories by keeping
diaries. And above all, folklore, which never dies, is
also playing an important role in this respect.
All this said, let us think about what needs to be
done. Purges do not always successfully work. So,
the only way out is to correct the wrongs of recent
decades (though some would contend that wrongs of
the past cannot be corrected).
Studies have recently appeared from across the
world that deal with the concept of memory and
justice. Some argue that for future peace,
forgetfulness is vital while others stress the
importance of remembrance for achieving a better
society and system. Forgetting the past wrongdoings
is, no doubt, not totally a futile idea; however,
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‘remembering past pathologies’ is more crucial and
effective.
Critical voices of philosophers, for instance
Adorno and Habermas, sound sane in this respect.
Their insights such as ‘self-critical “working
through” of the past’ and ‘the responsibility for a
shared history’, respectively, are of great help in our
context.
Throughout the world retrospective justice is
being dispensed, arguably not out of remorse but in
the context of new challenges that modern nations
face. Some examples of acceptance of the past
wrongdoings are: ‘the Pope’s apologies to Jews and
Aboriginals, “sorry” from Japan’s prime minister
for his country’s crimes during World War II,
“sorry” from the Canadian prime minister to his
county’s indigenous population.’ We also have
instances of acts of retribution and fact-finding
commissions in this connection.
All this is done not for nothing. The purpose is
to create and promote mutual understanding,
safeguard human rights and achieve socially
legitimate democratic societies. Pakistan needs to
follow suit. Strategies other than this are destined to
failure ‘particularly now in the context of the
globalisation of the language of human rights and
153
the importance of memory as a source of collective
identity’.
Pakhtuns and others who feel disenfranchised,
stigmatised and victimised, must be assured about
protection of their human rights. No doubt, without
dispensation of social justice, patriotism,
consolidation and development remain hollow
mantras and pious wishes.

The author has done his PhD in History/

Archaeology. He is serving as Assistant
Professor at Taxila Institute of Asian
Civilizations, Quaid-i-Azam university,
Islamabad.

154
 To Be Young and Pashtun
in Pakistan
MARCH 9, 2018

RAZA WAZIR

On Jan. 13, the police in Karachi,

Pakistan, claimed to have killed four militants
suspected of having links to the Islamic State. Rao
Anwar, the officer leading the operation, said that
the men had opened fire on the police and were
killed in the gunfight.
Pictures of the dead circulated on social media
and were broadcast on Pakistani television
networks. Family members watching television
news recognized one of the dead: Naqeebullah
Mehsud, 27, from Waziristan, in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas on the border with
Afghanistan. He had been arrested by the police 10
days earlier.
Mr. Mehsud, who is survived by his wife, a son
and two daughters, had worked various jobs in the
city and recently decided to set up a clothing store
with help from his brother. He was also an aspiring
fashion model, posing rakishly in bright clothes and
sporting a manicured beard in photographs on his
Facebook page.
155
 On that night in January, a photograph of Mr.
Mehsud’s bloodied corpse in a bare room appeared
on my Facebook feed. I shivered with a mixture of
dread, anger and hopelessness. He wasn’t very
different from me: a young Pashtun man who had
escaped the pitiless war consuming our home in
Waziristan, a poor, isolated place that became an
epicenter of the so-called war on terrorism and
would be referred to as “the most dangerous place in
the world.”
Mr. Mehsud, like me, was trying to build a life
in a Pakistani city far from home. Doing that
requires acts of will and hope despite an awareness
of a history of neglect, prejudice and violence that
the people of the tribal areas share with Pakistan.
An operation by the Pakistani Army against
militants in the tribal areas in 2014 displaced around
a million people. The process of return beganin
2016, and military authorities formulated new rules
of passage. To visit or to return to live in Waziristan
and a few other districts, you needed more than a
Pakistani national identity card. You had to produce
identification called a Watan Card.
I got my Watan Card last March. On it, apart
from my biographical details and a photograph,
there is a drawing of the Khyber Pass and the
abbreviation N.W.A., for North Waziristan Agency.
156
It marks me and other residents of the region as
separate from the full citizens of Pakistan.
In the aftermath of Mr. Mehsud’s death, as
accusations mounted that the gunfight in which he
was said to have died had actually been staged by
the police, thousands of young Pashtuns began
marching in protest to Islamabad, the capital.
On Feb. 8, I set out from Lahore in a bus to join
them. On the ride, I thought of the personal and
political history that had shaped our lives, brought
us to the moment when thousands of Pashtuns were
gathering in an unprecedented protest to say treat us
with dignity and as equal citizens.
I was born in the late 1990s in Khushaly, a
village in northern Waziristan circled by blue and
black mountains about 30 miles from the Durand
Line, which messily demarcates the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border.
Most people in the area were subsistence
farmers, cultivating wheat in winters and corn in
summers. Some ran small stores in Mir Ali, a nearby
town of about 20,000. The economic precariousness
forced a substantial number of men to leave for
distant lands as migrant workers. I was 5 when my
father left for Dubai to work as a laborer.
I lived with my mother, a sister and a brother in
a mud-brick house. Our days began with the
157
morning call to prayer. After the prayers we
returned home and drank tea with milk. Pakistan
might have had a nuclear bomb, but my people
couldn’t afford breakfast.
Over the years, men from Waziristan and other
tribal areas like my father sent home remittances
and nourished dreams of a better life for their
children. Thanks to these remittances, thousands of
students in Waziristan in the mid- and late 1990s
were able to enroll in modest private schools, which
were an improvement on the abysmal government-
run schools.
Our troubles began after the Taliban, led
by Mullah Muhammad Omar, took over Kabul in
1996. Waziristan became the gateway for thousands
of madrasa students who traveled to Afghanistan to
join the Taliban. Many young men from madrasas in
our area signed up. When they returned home, they
set out to replicate the oppressive, puritanical ways
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
In the summer of 2001, my father returned
home from Dubai after seven years. He set up a
shop in the Mir Ali bazaar, buying and selling
automobile tires. He spoke wistfully of the doctors
and engineers he had met in Dubai. He hoped I
would study to be a doctor.
158
 A few months later, the Sept. 11 attacks and the
fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan changed
everything. Arab and Central Asian militants on the
run from Afghanistan sought refuge in Waziristan.
In the summer of 2002, the Pakistani military
started operations against the militants. Anger over
these operations radicalized young men in the area,
who flocked to join militant groups.
My father worried that I would get caught up in
the war. In the spring of 2004, I left my village with
him to attend high school in Peshawar, the largest
city in northwestern Pakistan. Every day I wondered
whether my family and friends back home were
alive, whether they were safe. Newspapers ran
cryptic reports about the violence and the deaths in
Waziristan. Phones remained cut off for weeks.
A decade of pitiless violence followed. The
militants attacked military posts and passing
convoys, and planted bombs on roads. The military
retaliated with aerial bombings and artillery fire.
New cemeteries were opened across the region.
Coffin stores did brisk business. Civilians were
disappeared and killed by both the militants and the
military.
President Barack Obama increased the number
of American troops in Afghanistan in December
2009, and intensified the drone strikes on Qaeda and
159
Taliban fighters in South and North Waziristan.
Researchers at the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism in London estimated that American
drone strikes in Pakistan from 2009 to 2015 killed
256 to 633 civilians and 1,822 to 2,761 militants.
I witnessed my first drone strike when I was
home for summer holidays in 2009. One night I was
sleeping on a cot under the starlit sky, when a fierce
explosion woke me up. I tried to collect myself. My
uncle shouted: “Drone! A drone attack!” Two more
explosions followed. My uncle led me to the village
square where people had gathered.
Villagers had seen a ball of light and fire rise
from the house hit by the missile fired from the
drone. Normally, we would rush there to help. Yet
fear of another drone strike kept us from making the
short journey, from picking up the remains of the
dead and transporting the injured to a hospital. I saw
the corpses of three militants in the morning when
the funeral was held. The missile had shredded their
bodies. I couldn’t sleep for days.
The war continued. After graduating from high
school in Peshawar, I moved to a public college in
Lahore in 2010 to study literature. The seductive,
sprawling metropolis of Lahore was strikingly different
from the war-ravaged Peshawar and Waziristan.
But my Pashtun ethnic origin, my being from
Waziristan, would turn me into a target for racial
160
profiling. The prejudice and suspicion against ethnic
Pashtuns like me intensified after the tribal areas
became the base for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,
whose bombing campaign killed hundreds in
Pakistan’s cities.
One night several policemen barged into my
dorm room, which I shared with three other
students, ethnic Punjabis. After the policemen
looked at our identity cards, they took me aside and
rifled through my books and my belongings for
incriminating evidence.
Yet I made new friends, found inspiring
teachers and went to diverse social and academic
gatherings in Lahore. A new world seemed possible.
My father continued running his shop in Mir
Ali. He had switched from selling tires to being an
ironsmith. One night in December 2013 I was
watching the television news at my university and
saw a report about Pakistani planes bombing the
market in Mir Ali. Fortunately, my father was not at
the store at the time of the airstrikes. The next
morning, my family packed up and joined a caravan
of people seeking safety in Dera Ismail Khan, a city
about 180 miles south of Peshawar.
Six months later, in June 2014, came the
military operations against the militants in the tribal
areas that resulted in the displacement of more than
161
a million men, women and children. People fled
their homes with only what they could carry in their
hands. Most of them found refuge in the
neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
A week later I visited Bannu, the town closest to
the tribal areas. Families displaced from villages in
Waziristan filled the road leading into town.
Carcasses of cows, goats and sheep, which had died
of thirst in the punishing heat, were rotting by the
highway. Malaria and other diseases spread in the
camps for the displaced outside the town because of
open sewers and mosquitoes. Most of the displaced
lived in those difficult conditions for two to three
years.
Three years passed before I could return home.
Last March, at a refugee camp in Bannu, I was able
to get my Watan Card, which allowed me to travel
to Waziristan. While waiting for my card to be
issued to me at a military checkpoint, I met an old
man from my area. “Waziristan is like a garden hit
by a hailstorm,” he said. “Everything valuable had
been destroyed.”
We boarded a military pickup truck going to
Mir Ali. Along the way were the remains of the
years of fighting: burned-out mud huts, houses
disfigured by bullets and artillery fire.
162
 About half an hour later, we entered a vast flattened
area strewn with debris. It was the town of Mir Ali. The
grocery stores, vegetable and tea stalls and bookshops I
had grown up with were dust. I spotted the plot where
my father’s shop once stood. Workers were carrying
away the rubble. Bricks, iron rods, broken furniture and
my memories were being carried off in a truck, to be
resold in a nearby town. Every signpost of my personal
geography had been destroyed.
It was already dusk when I reached my home in
Khushaly, about five miles from the town. A family
whose house had been destroyed in aerial bombing
was camping out there. After his shop was
destroyed, my father had decided not to return. I
stayed with relatives and heard tales of horror and
suffering. The absence of hope marked our
conversations.
The murder of Mr. Mehsud became the tipping
point that compelled young Pashtuns to gather in
Islamabad by the tens of thousands to raise our
long-suppressed voices, to express
the accumulation of pain and frustration over the
past 16 years of war.
The protesters chanted the refrain of a song
about our status as unequal citizens in the
independent Islamic Republic of Pakistan: “What
163
sort of independence is this? What sort of
independence is this?”
I saw a sea of students, lawyers, professors and
doctors. Young and old, men and women. We
shared stories of oppression, abuse and injustice. All
of us had lost a friend or a relative in the unending
war. Arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and the tribal areas, multiple displacements, the loss
of homes and livelihoods, the maiming and killing
of children by the land mines planted during the
military operations had all fueled despair and anger.
A woman from Swat district of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa spoke about how her two sons had
vanished in Karachi after being arrested by
policemen led by Rao Anwar — the officer
involved in the death of Mr. Mehsud. She had lost
her eyesight since then but continued looking for
them, beseeching the Pakistani authorities for help.
“I won’t be able to see them now,” she said. “But I
would recognize the smell of my sons.”

The writer is from Waziristan.

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the Opinion Today newsletter.

164
 Angry Over Decades of
Mistreatment, Pashtuns in
Pakistan Rally in Search
for Dignity
Mohammad Taqi

Resentment among Pashtuns at the state’s

despicable treatment of them has been brewing for
almost a decade-and-a-half and finally spilled over
when the police shot dead Naqeebullah Mehsud, an
aspiring model, in an 'encounter'.
Some have called it the ‘spring of Pashtun
awakening’, some ‘an uprising’ and yet others
have smeared it as a façade engineered by foreign
intelligence agencies, but to me, the Pashtun
protests over the past two months are the cries of a
wounded soul, a shriek of the insulted and
humiliated, the wailing of the bereaved that came
out as an appeal for redress but could turn into a call
for an upheaval.
Bhagat Singh had said that a rebellion is not a
revolution, but it may ultimately lead to that end.
165
The protests by the tribal Pashtuns in Pakistan are
certainly neither rebellious nor seeking anything
revolutionary, but if their demand to be granted a
right to life with safety and dignity according to the
constitution of Pakistan is not heeded, it could
portend the makings of something more radical.
The Pashtun Long March
Anger among the Pashtuns living in Pakistan at
the state’s despicable treatment of them had been
brewing for almost a decade-and-a-half. It finally
spilled on to the streets when Naqibullah Mehsud, a
young Pashtun man from South Waziristan, was
killed extrajudicially on January 13 by a police
officer named Rao Anwar in the provincial
metropolis Karachi. Anwar, a senior superintendent
of police (SSP), later tried to smear Naqeeb as a
terrorist, but it was clear that he had slaughtered in
cold blood – in a staged police encounter – an
innocent man.
I pointed out immediately that Naqeeb appeared
to be an aspiring model rather than a terrorist thug.
His body was retrieved by three young men from
the southern Pashtun town of Zhob on January 17
and within hours social media was ablaze with calls
for justice and the arrest of SSP Anwar.

166
 Karachi is home to the largest urban Pashtun
population, some of whom took to the streets to
protest the violent killing of a benign young man.
An official inquiry exonerated the deceased but
the culprit policeman remains at large.
For the first time in Pakistan’s 70-year history,
the Pashtuns from the tribal regions, supported by
others from the “settled areas”, converged on the
federal capital Islamabad to protest and seek justice
for Naqeeb. This came to be known as the Pashtun
Long March (PLM) and drew upwards of five to six
thousand people who chanted daily, for a week, in
Islamabad: “Da Sanga Azadi Da … What kind of
freedom is this, in which Pashtuns are being
murdered, being ruined”.
Pashtun identity politics
It truly was unprecedented. The last time I recall
when Pashtuns gathered en masse anywhere near
Islamabad in a demonstration was 45 years ago in
March 1973, when the Pashtun nationalist leader
Wali Khan, leading the National Awami Party
(NAP) at the time, addressed a
united opposition rally at Liaquat Bagh,
Rawalpindi next door to Islamabad, which was fired
upon by thugs acting at the behest of the then prime
minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, killing 11 people.
167
 There are, however, key differences between the
NAP and its eventual successor, the Awami
National Party (ANP), its estranged sibling outfit
Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), which
has led the nationalist campaign in the Pashtun part
of Pakistan’s Balochistan province, and what has
now come to be known as the Pashtun Tahafuz
Movement (PTM or Pashtun Defence League), not
limited to the fact that the PTM is a grassroots
awakening that has no anchor in ideology or a
political manifesto.
More importantly, Pashtun nationalist politics
in Pakistan has always been led by Pashtuns like the
great Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka Bacha Khan or the
Frontier Gandhi and his contemporary Abdul Samad
Khan Achakzai, both of whom hailed from what
were classified and called as ‘settled areas’ by
the British colonialists and then its successor
Pakistani state.
The British double-frontier policy
The Pashtun identity politics of Bacha Khan and
Samad Khan Achakzai dovetailed into the Indian
freedom struggle and were carried out
predominantly from the urban and suburban areas of
Peshawar and Quetta. On the other hand, an
organised political process in what in Pakistan is
168
called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), was banned by the British and then the
Pakistani state.
As far as one can tell, there has not been a tribal
Pashtun movement bucking or protesting the central
authority since the one led by Faqir of Ipi in 1936
against the British. Additionally, the latter-day ANP
and PMAP have focused on parliamentary politics
with attention on Islamabad and have tried to avoid
overt and official condemnation of the Pakistani
army’s excesses lest they are labeled again as
seditionists as they were for a good 40 years
of Pakistan’s existence. Without either a past
political baggage or a future stake in Islamabad the
PTM had no such constraints; it was free to call a
spade, a spade.
The PLM was an inevitable response to the
Pakistani state’s neglect and outright atrocities in
the FATA, which have been going on for decades;
the Naqeeb murder was a mere tipping point – the
proverbial last, straw which broke the camel’s back.
After the British exited from the South
Asia, Pakistan effectively preserved all of their
policies in the FATA. The British empire in India
saw Afghanistan as a buffer against the Czarist
Russia and then the Soviet Union, and the FATA as
169
a buffer against the buffer. The British maintained a
policy of a “double frontier”, wherein the Durand
Line was the demarcation between Afghanistan and
the FATA, while an additional administrative
demarcation separated the FATA from the British-
Indian North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
which is now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
province in Pakistan.
Pakistan maintained the exact same policies
post-1947, with the country’s founder Mohammed
Ali Jinnah making a compact with the
tribal Pashtuns of FATA that if they remain loyal
to Pakistan, they’d keep their so-called autonomous
status. That quasi-autonomy was a farce before,
during and since Jinnah’s reign.
The British ruled the FATA through the heinous
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), and the
Pakistani state has continued to do so since the
independence. The FCR is a draconian set of laws,
first implemented in 1901, which is not only ultra
vires of the fundamental human rights but also flies
in the face of Pakistan’s 1973 constitution. It has no
room for due process of the law and the modern
criminal justice system and courts. Additionally, the
FCR affords the state the power to inflict collective

170
punishment on the Pashtun tribes, clans or families
for the offences committed by individuals.
Afraid of the Pashtun nationalism and
irredentism brewing under the shadow of
Afghanistan, Pakistan opted to keep both the British
double-frontier policy and the FCR to rule the
FATA. Residents of the seven tribal agencies – two
of which were formed after the Partition – were at
the whim of the Pakistan-appointed political agents
and the army, which, despite claims to the contrary,
maintained fortresses and cantonments in the
FATA.
In a standoff with Afghanistan over its
revanchist claims on the Pashtun territories that
became part of Pakistan, the latter chose to use the
FATA as a launching pad for the Islamist
insurgency in Afghanistan. As early as 1973-
74, Pakistan facilitated an Afghan jihadist
Jalaluddin Haqqani to establish his jihadist network
in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA), which was
the harbinger of what became known as the terrorist
outfit Haqqani Network (HQN). The HQN launched
insurgent attacks first against the government of
President Sardar Daoud Khan in Afghanistan and
has continued its assaults against the incumbents in

171
Kabul except the Taliban, whom it has been a part
of.
Similarly, other jihadists were harboured in
FATA by Pakistan, to fight against the Soviet Union
and then the US in Afghanistan. The Kurram, SWA
and NWA were the principal points d’appui to
launch the jihadists into Afghanistan from the mid-
1970s to date. Jalaluddin Haqqani, for example, set
up his madrassa (religious seminary) and training
facility near the district and military headquarters in
Miram Shah, NWA in 1973-74 that remained
functional till at least 2014.
A new double game
When the US, in retaliation of the 9/11 attacks
by the Taliban-supported al Qaeda, attacked
Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda fled to the
FATA with a tacit support from Pakistani army.
These jihadists, including Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens
– moved through the tortuous Tirah valley across
from the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan and
made their way to the NWA and the SWA.
This jihadist resettlement peaked from 2003-04
and, quite ominously, they also recruited and
organised locally in the Pashtun tribal areas. Many
elements of this jihadist conglomerate operating out
of the SWA and the SWA, saw the policy of the
172
military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf to side
with the US, as exactly what it was – duplicitous
and treacherous.
When the US told Musharraf the option he had
was to be “with us or against us”, he opted to play a
double game wherein he and the Pakistan army
helped the US carry out certain actions against the al
Qaeda but preserved and jealously guarded the
Afghan Taliban and its HQN affiliate leadership
inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban and the
HQN drew support from and recruited among the
radicalised Pakistanis, including from the
FATA Pashtuns. Some sections of this Af-Pak
Taliban combine deeply resented even the
Musharraf regime’s outward policy of supporting
the US.
When Musharraf ordered, under duress from the
Chinese, a military action against the Lal Masjid – a
jihadist hub inside Islamabad – the Pakistani section
of the Taliban rebelled against him and the state,
forming what became known as the Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an outfit that pledged
allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s emir Mullah
Omar and vowed to topple the Pakistani state.
The TTP unleashed a reign of terror against the
Pakistani people, state and the army, killing tens of
173
thousands in hundreds of terrorist attacks. The state
first dragged its feet but under immense public
pressure to respond, the army eventually retaliated
through at least ten military operations – all in the
FATA save two in Swat valley. The disconcerting
part, however, has been that the army targeted
exclusively the so-called bad Taliban i.e. the ones
who attacked the Pakistani military and the state.
These operations effectively spared “good
Taliban” vis the Afghan jihadists and the ones like
the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) who targeted Afghanistan
and India, respectively. The problem with this
scheme was that the good Taliban harboured the bad
ones and even jointly ran suicide bomber-training
schools. The Pakistani army and state first
attempted to negotiated with the “good Taliban” and
even inked deals with them, but when the latter did
not relent in their barbaric attacks, the former
responded by force.
The problem with these military operations
against the TTP was several folds: they were
formally announced months in advance affording
the militants a gingerly escape; focused exclusively
on the “bad Taliban; targeted the civilian population
of FATA rather indiscriminately and punitively;
forced the bystanders and innocents to flee their
174
homes and become the so-called internally
displaced persons (IDPs); failed to concede or
acknowledge that the jihadist disaster in FATA was
a blowback from the Pakistan army’s Afghan
policy.
Assault after assault
The Pakistan army launched its penultimate
major operation in FATA by the name Zarb-e-Azb,
in summer 2014. The operation was ostensibly
conceived to purge the FATA, especially the NWA,
from the jihadists of all shades. The reality,
however, was that before the actual operation was
carried out, a curfew used to be imposed in the
theatre of action, and the Taliban and jihadists
friendly to the Pakistani army, specifically the
HQN, were bussed out to other safe havens.
The so-called bad Taliban were then targeted in
not only a land assault but also an
aerial bombardment by the Pakistan Air
Force (PAF), which ended up targeting the civilian
population and business centers in the NWA
virtually creating ghost towns. The locals were
forced to become IDPs within their own country and
some had to seek refuge in Afghanistan. And when
these IDPs were to return to their homes, after the
operations were declared over and successful, they
175
were forced to sign-up for an additional form of
identification called the Watan Card.
More distressfully, one their way back, they
were forced to go through humiliating interrogation,
inspection, abuse and extortion at the check-points
set up by thePakistan army. Women and tribal
elders were disrespected and insulted at these check-
posts.
Western observers reported these abuses years
ago but the Pakistani media, which is not allowed
into the FATA without the army’s permission and
also self-censors abundantly, did not report any of
it. When some of them protested, they were beaten,
tortured and even murdered. After going through the
extortion and torture at these crossing points, when
the IDPs returned to their homes they found their
properties levelled by the aerial bombing, their
belongings stolen and even their books burnt. In
addition, landmines in the war zone were led to
several innocents getting maimed or killed.
According to the key leader of the PTM,
Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen, the Pakistan army has
been inflicting collective punishment on families
and clans when one of their members is suspected of
being a TTP partisan. Several young tribal Pashtun
men were killed on the suspicion of being Taliban
176
sympathisers or members and their families were
forced to sign declarations that the men died a
natural death. Additionally, hundreds if not
thousands of Pashtun men have been held in
internment camps by the army without any legal
recourse.
In addition to the thousands of Baloch who have
been forcibly disappeared, the Pashtun missing
persons epitomise a human rights disaster underway
inPakistan. Several others, were killed extra-
judicially just like Naqeeb Mehsud, over the
suspicion of being the TTP’s members or
sympathisers.
The PTM’s protests, therefore, are not a bolt
from the blue; it is something that has been upwards
of 14 years in the making. The leaders of this
Pashtun protest, including its face Manzoor Ahmed
Pashteen, are in their mid-20s. These young men
were mere boys when they were forced to become
the IDPs first in 2004 and then in 2006, 2007 and
finally in 2014 when the Pakistan army conducted
its cherry-picked operations against the TTP’s bad
Taliban. They spent their formative years in camps
or cramped-up rented quarters in the Pakistani
cities, observing that while they were becoming
cannon fodder in Pakistan’s proxy war against
177
Afghanistan, their peers in the settled areas were
enjoying the benefits of city life and pursuing
education, career goals and family life in relative
comfort.
The economic, social, educational
and constitutional disparity between the FATA and
rest of the Pakistan is a chasm the size of the Grand
Canyon. The PTM, however, is essentially apolitical
in the sense that it does not seek any political goal
as in a part in the government, self-governance or
stake irredentist claims, which historically have
been the declared or undeclared agenda of the urban
Pashtun nationalists.
The current mobilisation is essentially a civil
and human rights movement that seeks redressal of
their grievances within the four corners of the
Pakistani constitution. The ten-day-long sit-in in
Islamabad had really straightforward demands: a)
arrest, prosecute and punish the SSP Rao Anwar; b)
clear landmines from FATA; c) stop insulting,
humiliating and stereotyping Pashtuns, especially
the women, at the FATA check-posts; d) produce or
bring to book the missing Pashtuns.
The first round of protests in Islamabad did not
yield anything concrete. The leaders of the PLM
met with the Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid
178
Khaqan Abbasi and the directors of the military’s
intelligence and public relation wings. There were
reassurances from the state and its functionaries that
the demands will be met and even a few dozen
missing persons were surreptitiously released.
No meaningful initiative, however, has been
taken formally to put into practice the PTM’s
demands, forcing the latter’s leadership to continue
with their protests in the Pashtun territories.
The incredibly warm welcome they have received in
the Pashtun areas of Balochistan province and
the provincial capital Quetta, where they were
joined by the ethnic Baloch and Hazaras, has
unnerved the army and its intelligence wing. The
cellular network service and internet was
mysteriously interrupted in cities that PTM has been
holding its rallies in, to deny it social media
coverage and networking. Mainstream Pakistani
media is accustomed to self-censorship and toes the
army’s line in a docile manner and has a near-
complete blackout over the PLM. The issue,
however, is not going to go away by denying it
social or conventional media coverage. There are
genuine grievances that need to be addressed, and
soon.

179
 It is unlikely that the Pakistani army will cave in
to the Pashtun demands anytime soon.
The Pakistan army’s Afghan jihadism project is one
of the corner-stones of its regional policies and it is
unlikely to abandon it. The organisers of the
Pashtun protests have to conceive their response to a
recalcitrant continuation of the disastrous policy and
calibrate it to remain non-violent, organised and
constitutional.
Forty years of injustice cannot be undone within
days or even months; what is heartening is that the
young Pashtun leadership is stepping up to the plate.

Mohammad Taqi is a Pakistani-American

columnist; he tweets at @mazdaki.

180
 The Pakhtun spring

March 15, 2018

Khurram Husain
AN incredible series of events is unfolding in
the aftermath of the murder of Naqeebullah
Mehsud. A group of young Pakhtun men and
women, have found their voice, and in growing
numbers, are stepping forward to tell their tale.
Their stories are finding so much traction in the
wider society, that the beginning of a grass-roots
movement appears to be in the making. What is
particularly interesting about this movement is that
it is spontaneous, and has an amorphous leadership
drawn from a younger generation with no links to
organised politics. What is dismaying to see is how
their efforts have been ignored by the big
mainstream political parties, as well as the
mainstream media.
Going by the name of the Pashtun Long March,
or the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), their
demands are simple. They want the rights that the
Constitution guarantees them: the right to be secure
181
from arbitrary detention, the right to peaceably
assemble, to speak their minds. The roots of the
movement go back in time to the discontentment
that was brewing in the camps set up to house IDPs
from the military operations in the tribal agencies,
as well as Swat, in the 10-year campaign against the
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. The discontentment
grew out of a sense of humiliating treatment by state
authorities, whether at any of the myriad
checkpoints or at Nadra centres when applying for a
national identity card. In addition, they have lent
their support to the recommendations of the Fata
reforms committee, finalised in late 2016 (and yet to
be implemented).
Listen to the voices at the sit-in they held in
Islamabad. Listen again to the voices that spoke at
their events in Zhob and Qila Saifullah last week, or
in Quetta this Sunday. Listen also to the voice of
Raza Wazir, writing in the New York Times,
describing what it is like to grow up a Pakhtun amid
the ‘war on terror’. Fortunately for us, social media
recorded these events even as mainstream media
chose to focus its attention on the Senate elections.
Listen to their voices, and you will not believe
that they are describing the same Pakistan that you
and I live in.
182
 Listen to these voices, they are not hard to find,
and your ears will not believe that they are
describing the same Pakistan that you and I live in.
The stories they tell sound more like those one hears
coming out of active war zones like Iraq and Sudan,
and one is hard-pressed to believe that an entire
generation has grown up with the horrors of such an
enormity as a basic fact of their lives.
Consider this: anybody below the age of 30,
who is from any of the tribal areas, Swat, or even
Peshawar or Quetta, came of age during the war that
began in 2001, a little more than a decade and half
ago. A 10-year-old in 2001 would be 28 years
today. If lucky, this child would have completed
schooling, and college by now, and reached the
stage in life when one is full of optimism as one
goes about the task of building a life, family, career,
job, business. But for a young man or woman who
has reached this age, and succeeded in not getting
sucked into the war as a combatant or as a victim,
the experience of this age is very different.
What is even more terrible in seeing this unfold
is the memory of the enormous sacrifices made by
the people of Peshawar, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
more broadly, as well as Quetta during the ‘war on
terror’. We have forgotten the early years of the
183
terrible conflict with the TTP that got going
following the Lal Masjid operation, when bombings
in Peshawar had become an almost daily
occurrence, including, in one case, targeting a
market frequented by women and children
specifically.
“An enormous strength of character is shining
through,” went an editorial in The News at the time,
hailing the stoic strength with which the people of
Peshawar and the rest of KP braved the terrible rain
of calamities coming down upon them with ferocity.
Thousands died in that rain of bombings that
stretched for years after Lal Masjid, but not once did
we see the people or the leadership of this great
province plead for mercy.
This is not the first time we are hearing these
tales. Only a few years earlier, a marvellous rebel
emerged from Quetta city, telling a story very
similar to the ones being told by the young men and
women of the PTM. He had lost a son apparently in
a counter-insurgency operation and resolved to walk
from Quetta all the way to Islamabad, stopping in
towns along the way to meet small groups of people
and tell them what was happening in his province.
His name is Mama Qadeer, and his long march was
one of the earliest of these grass-roots voices to
184
emerge from the depths of a conflict that the rest of
us know little about.
Along the way there have been others, farmers
in Okara, families asking after loved ones gone
missing, each asking for nothing more than justice,
for their rights, for inclusion as equal citizens in the
social contract that ties us all together.
What is sad to see is how the play of democratic
politics has missed these voices almost entirely. The
self-correction of democracy, one of the most
powerful social forces in the world, relies on
harvesting these grievances and channelling them into
the mainstream political life of the system. But when
democratic politics is disfigured by the constant play
of unelected forces, it responds less to the demands
coming from below, and more to the pressures
coming from above. The recent Senate election,
which happened at the same time as the PTM march,
was only the latest instance where this disfigurement
of our democratic polity was plainly in view.
khurram.husain@gmail.com

Twitter: @khurramhusain

Published in Dawn, March 15th, 2018

185
 Pashtuns breaking the
silence

Habib Khan

The recent Pashtun appraisal is one of the

important moments of Pashtun national history. For
the first time in their history, they have woken after
the ravages of proxy wars in their lands which
demolished their social, cultural, political and
economic ingenuities.
It speaks incredibly sad stories and cries of the
people who were kept in dread of bumping and
dumping for many years in FATA and nearest belts
including settled areas of Pakhtunkhwa, particularly
North and South Waziristan which was portrayed and
referred to by President Obama as ‘the most
dangerous place in the world’.
How these areas were converted to hellholes is an
important question in the upcoming phase of Pashtun
history. However, the expectancy of life plummeted
to trajectory low, not by natural death but by violence,
predatory, torture, widespread devastation, scare and
dramatic mental health consequences.
186
 Living in such despotic way is self-immolation
for oneself again and again. This realisation of the
Pashtun resistance has been constructed and
preoccupied in their common cognition and mind due
to the series and unprecedented decades’ long
imposed proxy wars, genocide, repression, harsh
human rights abuses, economic deprivation, stifling of
their political dissent and racial profiling with
different meanings and interests of exterior and
interior regimes. Fear makes them turn their backs on
death or denying the life. Everything became
alienated, remote and strange to them.
The heartfelt voice they had dreaded hearing to
the world can be guessed in the following couplet of
Manzoor Pashteen of South Waziristan who leads the
current Pashtun uprising.
Har Cha Pa Zarha Ke De Satali Grana
‘Everyone had encaged the wrath in bosom’
Sok Na Manni Ao Cha Mannali Grana
‘Oh Beloved! Someone doesn’t accept and
someone accepts this’
Pashtun Ehsas Che Rana Khawre Na Ki
‘It may not put our Pashtun sprite of elation in the
ground’
Nor Kho Me Har Sa De Belali Grana
‘Oh Beloved! Otherwise, we have already lost
everything in life’
187
 The genesis of this awakening of Pashtun in
Pakistan can’t be bent with the single murder of
innocent young Pashtun boy Naqeeb Mehsud who
was killed in a fake encounter in an extra-judicial
killing in Karachi last month. However the death of
Naqeeb Mehsud is triggering and locomotive
response of historical baggage of the land which faced
mayhems, atrocities, holy wars, ferocious laws and
deprivations imposed on Pashtun by the Pakistani
state.
Courtesy, this resistance doesn’t demand
complete disintegration of the state, independence or
civil disobedience but simply wants the life to live,
dignity as a human being which Pakistani state
deliberately prevented from coming into mainstream
consideration. If social contract is disrupted or ignored
by either side, the abyss is ultimately offered to
disorder and chaos in the system and one of them will
be going out.
Unfortunately, this principle, pillar, constitution,
of the state is always being abolished, violated and
ridiculed by Pakistani establishment, military elites
and its intelligence agencies, in the federating system
from the very existence of state through direct and
indirect interventions. In actuality, this constitution is
the only repository instrument which unites the
188
different ethnic groups in Pakistan otherwise there is
no any logical fact which attracts them jointly.
Such fatal slip was tested and known how on
December 16, 1971, when majority population of
Bengal went away from this system. Parallel
reservations still are not addressed in this federation of
Punjab, Pashtun, Sindh and Baloch and over and over
again those mistakes have recurred.
I don’t know which unit now drives out because
the Baloch already considers itself here as the victim
of marginalisation and an anti-state struggle continues
in the province for full freedom. Although Pashtun
parallel goes through the same antagonism and doubt
due to ambiguous policies towards them, God forbid
it may night force them to an armed struggle that
would be impossible for Pakistani state to bear and
restraint.
Still, they just demand to reassess state policies of
intervention in domestic politics and neighbourhoods
which effectively dooms their lives and properties into
perdition. Pakistan military must stay away from
FATA anymore which they once used and still uses it
as a launching pad for the Islamist terrorism against
Afghanistan during cold war and after 9/11 where all
international terrorists including Uzbek, Tajik,
Chechens and Arabs were resettled and facilitated in
their areas including nitrous Al-Qaeda and Haqqani
189
Network and FATA was altered to international hub
of terrorist groups for the safeguard of Pakistan
military’s doctrine of strategic depth. More suffering
on FATA was added when international pressures
increased on Pakistan, the military launched façade
operations on terrorists and left them escape
peacefully in advance but the punishment was given
to common scared people of the areas which already
were the victims of terrorists in the areas.
The residents of these areas of FATA, tortured
and excruciated from both sides. Thousands of
Pashtun people of North and South were displaced
and after returning they found nothing of their homes
either it was demolished in Pakistani jets
bombardments or looted by army or terrorists
according to them. In the non-Pashtun settled areas of
Pakistan these people are always being prosecuted,
satirized, punished and portrayed as terrorists.
These grievances, at last, compelled them to
launch mass mobilization of the concerned ethnic
Pashtun which they named it Pashtun Tahafuz
Movement (PTM), Pashtun protection movement.
According to PTM leader Manzoor Pashteen that
when we stage our peaceful protests for the safety of
our lives, properties and human rights the Pakistan
army and intelligence personals says that don’t protest
it lowers our morale. Actually, do they need our blood
190
for their morale? Our fellow men lives are ending. I
am talking about our people lives and you’re talking
about your morale. So what kind of morale is this that
needs our blood and humiliation? PTM just demands
human and citizenship rights for their Pashtun people
within the state which is guaranteed under the
constitution of Pakistan.
In this regard, PTM staged huge public gatherings
in Islamabad, Zhob, Qilla Saifullah, Khanozai and
Quetta and addressed their years of injustice to the
people they faced in FATA. Pakistani mainstream
both electronic and print media has ignored them and
were completely black-out from the PTM’s huge mass
gatherings which censorship of media effectively left
deep and bad perception and insightful about the army
and the state as a whole.
Rather listen and address the concerned issues
people demand, in Zhob and other areas where the
PTM staged public gatherings, the administrative
authorities have registered FIR against the leadership
of PTM and declared these protests as anti-state and
traitorous One gets surprised what kind of the state is
this which could be disintegrated and its army’s
morale could be decreased by simple peaceful and
non-violent protests for the demands of their due
constitutional rights under the state constitution
blame? Is constitution of Pakistan itself anti-state or
191
something suspicious? Whither define the constitution
in its true sense or clarify the state of Pakistan to the
people that aren’t only for army elites, intelligence
directorate and their puppets. Otherwise, the state
can’t be run through the disguise and treacherous
rules anymore in this 21st century’s civilized world.

The writer is studying in International Relations

at QAU, Islamabad
Published in Daily Times, March 17 2018. th

192
 Manzoor Pashteen: The
voice of Pashtuns for
many in Pakistan

Shereena Qazi

Sher Shah Atif

Pashteen is a 26-year-old graduate who is leading

protests calling for the rights of Pashtuns to be
respected [Al Jazeera]
Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen is usually seen
wearing a red and black patterned hat.
The story goes that he received the hat from a low
paid labourer in his hometown of Sarwakai district, in
Pakistan's northwestern South Waziristan region.
The 26-year-old then gave the worker his brand
new hat and took the worn red and black one in
exchange.
"I gave him my hat without any hesistation. Why
not?" Pashteen told Al Jazeera.
The hat has become something of a symbol: the
design is now worn by those who support Pashteen's

193
cause, to fight for the rights and protection of
Pakistan's ethnic Pashtun citizens.
His popularity has swelled to such an extent that
some of his followers - as a gesture of respect - have
taken to referring to themselves by his last name.
Roughly 15 percent of Pakistan's 207 million
population is Pashtun, according to the country's 1998
census. The cause of Pashtun citizens took on
particular prominence earlier this year.
On the evening of January 3, Naqeebullah
Mehsud, a 27-year-old father and aspiring model from
Waziristan, was forcefully abducted during a raid by
police personnel in Karachi. He went missing for at
least 10 days.
On January 13, police said that they had killed
four "terrorists" suspected of having links to the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known
as ISIS) group and the Pakistani Taliban.
One of the four killed was Mehsud. The police
officer who led the operation, Rao Anwar, said that
Mehsud was killed in a shootout.
A police inquiry ordered by the Supreme Court of
Pakistan later revealed that Anwar had presided over
444 killings in 745 police shootouts.
The investigation found no evidence to Anwar's
claim that Mehsud was a “terrorist". Anwar is now on
the run.
194
 Protests
The young man's death sparked a string of
protests, manifesting in thousands camping out for a
sit-in in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, for 10 days,
under the banner of being a "Pashtun Long March" .
Pashteen, who graduated in veterinary
medicine from Gomal University in Dera Ismail
Khan, was one of a group of young activists who
founded the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement in 2014 - an
organisation for the protection of the people of their
tribe - the Mehsuds.
Known as a hardworking man who grew up in
poverty, Pashteen's father, a teacher at a local school,
did not earn enough to feed his family of eight and
used to take on loans to fill the financial gap.
"[Pashteen] never aims to earn money from
anything he does, all he wants to do is fight for the
rights of Pashtuns," said Noor Rehman Mehsud, a
member of the movement and one of Naqeebullah
Mehsud's cousins.
Describing Pashteen as a fierce and brave activist,
Noor Rehman told Al Jazeera that it was "not easy to
raise your voice against the government and the
Pakistan army".
"In this country, you cannot fight against the army
and the government, this is a very sensitive line that
you cannot cross. You have to work with them. We
195
have always expressed our concerns in a peaceful
manner and so has Pashteen, so that people who have
been killed unlawfully get justice."
The Pakistan army launched an offensive in 2009
against the Pakistani Taliban in pockets of South
Waziristan, displacing the group into neighbouring
districts.
In a series of operations across the country's
northwest since then, the military says it has now
effectively destroyed the Pakistani Taliban's
infrastructure in the country. It claims the group is
now operating from provinces on the Afghan side of
Pakistan's northwestern border.
The human cost of the conflict propelled Pashteen
towards activism.
He and his comrades took up the cause of the
more than 600,000 Mehsuds displaced by the military,
forced to abandon their homes as the army fought
pitched battles with Taliban fighters in a long-drawn
operation.
The military now says South Waziristan is safe
for residents to return, but many continue to stay
away, saying their homes have been destroyed and the
government has not yet built facilities for basic
service delivery.
"When I started the movement, I use to go from
house to house and tell people what was going on in
196
our area in terms of injustice and atrocities," Pashteen
told Al Jazeera.
"But most of the time, I would get a reply from
them: 'Pashteen, you will get killed. Don't do this'."

'Our national cause'

According to Pashteen, he was forced to abandon
his hometown, kept in unlawful detention and often
harassed for suspected links with armed groups in
Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan.
"Everyone knows, it is a common thing said to us
by the military forces near checkpoints 'esko murgha
banao' [translated as: make him a rooster. A common
form of punishment in South Asia, where the person
takes a position of squatting and then holding the
ears]." he said, adding that the position was an utter
state of humiliation.
The Pakistani military was not immediately
available for a comment but has previously denied
any wrongdoing.
As news of Naqeebullah Mehsud's killing spread
earlier this year, Pashteen and his fellow activists led
protesters from the town of Dera Ismail Khan, where
many Mehsuds have settled since the military
operation began.
As their numbers grew, boosted by support from
across Pakistan, the group changed its name to the
197
Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, or Movement for the
Protection of Pashtuns.
Hashim Khan, a member of Pakhtunkhwa Milli
Awami Party (PkMAP), a Pashtun nationalist political
party, is among those who says he has changed his
last name to Pashteen and wears the red and black hat.
"I participated in Pashteen's [march] in Quetta
without my party flag because we nationalists knew
this is our national cause," said Khan.
The PTM has broadened its initial set of demands,
which focused on getting justice for Naqeebullah's
murder, to include a reduction of military-enforced
curfews in the country's tribal areas; the production of
thousands of missing persons believed to have been
held by the military; and the formation of a judicial
commission to investigate police killings of terrorism
suspects.

'Missing persons'
As part of his activism, Pashteen often sent
statistics and pictures of those affected by the
government's fight against the Taliban to local
journalists, to highlight the human impact of the war.
In one of his interviews in March to local
Pakistani media, Pashteen claimed that tens of
thousands of people were missing in FATA. Al
Jazeera is unable to independently verify that figure.
198
 A government-run judicial commission on
enforced disappearances says at least 1,640 people are
missing across Pakistan as of February 2018, although
rights activists say that number is vastly understated.
Families of the missing live with the uncertainty
of not knowing whether their children are dead or
alive.
Calling Pashteen "the son of the Pakistani soil",
Said Alam Mehsud, a co-founder of the Pashtun
Tahafuz Movement, told Al Jazeera: "In FATA where
there is no political, economic and social
development, Manzoor Pashteen is the first person
from FATA to speak out publicly and openly about
what was in the peoples' hearts and minds".

'Case against Pashteen'

On Tuesday, Pakistani police registered
cases against Pashteen for criticising the country's
military during the Pashtun Long March.
He is accused of "wantonly giving provocation
with intent to cause [a] riot", and if convicted, faces
up to five years in prison.
"Whatever we are doing, we are doing within the
law. We have the right to protest. This is our basic
human right. And by lodging the [police report], they
are pressurising us," Said Alam Mehsud told Al
Jazeera.
199
 "This also takes attention away from the
extrajudicial killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud by Rao
Anwar, who is still at large.
Pashteen is determined to remain persistent until
the demands of PTM are met, despite the lack of
support from his family, as they are worried for his
life.
"My father, wife and mother expect every day to
hear the news of my death or disappearance. They are
worried for me and sometimes, angry at me," he said,
adding that he wants a better future for Pashtuns in
Pakistan "including my month old daughter".
"But I know deep down, beneath all the worry,
they are proud of me because this is not about me, it is
about making this country a better place for us to live
in."

Follow Shereena Qazi on

Twitter: @ShereenaQazi

Follow SherShah Atif on

Twitter: @SherShahatif

200
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February 17, 2018

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‫‪228‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬

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‫‪229‬‬
 ‫۔‬

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‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪230‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ء‬

‫‪231‬‬
 ،

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، ۲۵

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ٓ ٔ

ِ ، ،

‫۔‬

Twitter: @khanzamankakar

232
 ٔ ٓ
February 11, 2018

‫۔‬ ٔ ‫۔‬

ٓ ،

‫۔‬ ٔ

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‫۔‬

ٔ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬
233
 ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ء‬ ‫۔‬

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‫‪234‬‬
 ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫؟‬

‫ٔ ؟‬

‫‪235‬‬
 ‫ء‬ ‫؟‬

‫؟‬ ‫ٓ ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪236‬‬
 ‫ٓٔ‬

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‫ٓ‬ ‫‪26‬‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪237‬‬
‫ٓ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫‪:‬‬ ‫۔‬

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‫‪238‬‬
 ‫۔‬

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‫‪239‬‬
 ‫۔‬

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‫ٔ ۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪240‬‬
 ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ ۔۔۔‬ ‫‪ٓ،‬‬ ‫ٔ ‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

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‫‪25‬‬

‫‪241‬‬
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‫‪100 ،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‪،‬‬

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‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪242‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

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‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪243‬‬
‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫‪244‬‬
 ‫۔۔‬
‫‪19/02/2018‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫‪1997‬‬ ‫“‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪-‬‬ ‫“‬

‫”‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫“‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫‪245‬‬
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ٔ 2014 26

، ٔ

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246
 ٓ

‘‘ ، “

‫۔‬

(Civil Square ) ٔ ِ

‫۔‬

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‫۔‬ ٔ ِ

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247
 ‫۔‬ ‫‪79‬‬ ‫۔‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ ۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪2017‬‬

‫‪248‬‬
 Legislature

ٔ ٓ ‫۔‬

2018

‫۔‬ ٔ ٔ

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249
 ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٓ‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪250‬‬
 ‫۔‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫ٔ ۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪251‬‬
 ‫۔‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪252‬‬
 ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪253‬‬
 ‫‪11/02/2018‬‬

‫ٔ ۔‬

‫“‬ ‫”‬ ‫“‬ ‫”‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ ٔ‬ ‫“‬ ‫”‬ ‫“‬ ‫”‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬
‫‪254‬‬
 ‫ٓ ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫۔‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ ۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪255‬‬
 ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ ۔‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ ۔‬

‫ء‬ ‫؟‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫۔ ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪256‬‬
 ‫۔ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ء‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ ۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪70‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

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‫؟‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ ‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ ؟ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪257‬‬
 ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

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‫۔‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٓ ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪258‬‬
 ‫ء‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫“ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫”‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬
‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ء‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ ۔‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪259‬‬
 ‫‪10/02/2018‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬
‫ٔ‬

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‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪260‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬

‫؛‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ ؛‬ ‫ٓ ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪261‬‬
 ‫؛‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫!‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫؛‬ ‫؛‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫‪.‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ُ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪262‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫‪26‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٰ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪263‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪ٓ،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ ‪،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٰ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪264‬‬
 ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪265‬‬
 ‫‪2018‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫؟‘‬ ‫‪’،‬‬

‫‘۔‬ ‫’‬ ‫؟‘‪،‬‬ ‫’‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ً‬

‫‪266‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔ ‪23‬‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪ٰ ،‬‬

‫’‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔۔۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‘۔‬ ‫’‬ ‫‘‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪267‬‬
 ‫’‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫’ ‘‬ ‫‘‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫‪9‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪268‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫ٔ ۔‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‘‬ ‫’ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪269‬‬
 ‫ُ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ُ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪270‬‬
 ‫‘‬ ‫’‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫؟‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫؟‬

‫‪271‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‘‬ ‫’‬ ‫’ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪80‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫؟؟؟‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫؟‬

‫؟‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫؟‘‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪272‬‬
 ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫ٰ‬
‫ٓٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ ‪،‬‬

‫؟‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪273‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔۔۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪274‬‬
 :

ٓ
March 14, 2018

‫۔‬ ٔ

11 9‫۔‬

ٔ ، ، ‫۔‬

‫۔‬

275
 ‫ٔ۔‬

‫ٔ۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‪ٔ 8‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫(‬ ‫)‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ ۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪276‬‬
 ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫’’‬

‫ٓ ٔ ‪،‬‬ ‫‪ٔ ٓ،‬‬ ‫‘‘۔‬

‫ٓ ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪’’ ،‬‬

‫‘‘۔‬ ‫‪GHQ‬‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪’’ ،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‘‘۔‬ ‫‪GHQ‬‬

‫’’‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪277‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‘‘۔‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪’’ ،‬‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔ ‪25‬‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫‘‘۔‬

‫‪16‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫‪278‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ ۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪279‬‬
 ‫‪ٓ ،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

‫ِ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫‪280‬‬
 ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬

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‫۔‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٰ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

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‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪281‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬

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‫۔‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪70‬ء‬ ‫‪60‬ء‬

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‫‪282‬‬
 ‫ٓ ٔ‬

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‫۔‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫‪283‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫۔‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫۔‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫؟‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪284‬‬
 ‫؟‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫؟‬

‫۔‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٓ ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ ٓ‬

‫۔‬
‫ٔ‬
‫!‬

‫‪285‬‬
 ٓ

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286
 ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫(‬ ‫)‬ ‫ٔ ‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‘‘‬ ‫’’‬ ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪287‬‬
 ‫ٓ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‘‘‬ ‫ً ’’‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫’’‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‘‘‬ ‫’’‬ ‫‘‘‬

‫(‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫‘‘ ؟)‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫’’‬

‫‪288‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‘‘‬ ‫’’‬ ‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫ٓ‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫‘‘‬

‫۔‬

‫‪289‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫۔‬

‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‘‘‬ ‫’’‬

‫‪290‬‬
 ‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

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‫ٔ‬

‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫‪ٓ،‬‬

‫ٓ ٔ‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫‪291‬‬
 ‫ٔ‬ ‫’’‬

‫‘‘ ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

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‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫ٔ ‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫۔‬

‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫‪292‬‬
 ‫‪،‬‬

‫؟‬ ‫ٔ‬

‫ٓ‬

‫۔‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪،‬‬

‫؟‬

‫ٰ‬

‫ٔ‬

‫‪.‬‬ ‫ٓ‬

‫‪293‬‬