(PSI Reports) Bernard D. Cole-Sea Lanes and Pipelines - Energy Security in Asia-Praeger (2008) PDF

Sea Lanes and Pipelines
Energy Security in Asia
Bernard D. Cole
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Geography of the Region
Energy in Asia
Getting the Oil: Pipelines Ashore
Getting the Oil: Ships at Sea
Threats to the Sea Lines of Communication
Maritime Sovereignty Disputes
Maritime Strategies in Asia
Naval Forces in Asia
Maritime Security and Multilateralism in Asia
Conclusion: Future Scenarios
Notes
Bibliography
About the Author

Preface
Much has been written about the evolving energy situation in the world, a
situation that affects practically all contentious international situations in the
world. In Asia, energy resources and demands are vital issues to Russia,
Japan, the Koreas, China, the nations of Southeast Asia, and those of the
subcontinent. Central Asia promises to be a future energy breadbasket, while
Africa is looming large in that respect.
With the increasing prominence of energy supply and demand come issues of
energy security. The availability and affordability of energy resources have
hitherto been concentrated in Southwestern Asia and the Middle East, long
distances from the primary customers in East Asia. These distances are
traversed by seagoing tankers steaming over sea lines of communications
(SLOCs).
These sea lines offer much risk of interruption from many different sources.
Negating these threats and securing the SLOCs is a traditional naval mission,
one that has in recent history been carried out by the U.S. Navy. The United
States is increasingly absorbed in the global war on terror, however, and its
navy is shrinking in size, just as China grows in power and the issue of energy
security grows in importance. Hence, most Asian nations are expanding and
modernizing their naval forces, led by Japan, South Korea, China, and India.
This book addresses energy security from these two perspectives: the
increasing importance of energy security to the nations of Asia, and the
regional drive to develop the naval power to ensure that security.
The author relied heavily on government, industry, and press reports, as well
as on interviews with Asian and U.S. civilian officials, naval officers, and
energy industry representatives. Conclusions are based on multiple sources in
most cases and wherever possible.
Civilian, military, and industry officials who discussed energy and naval issues
with the author are not named, to protect their anonymity. I owe a great debt
to the colleagues, scholars, and experts who read all or parts of this
manuscript. At the risk of unintentionally omitting some of them, I must in
particular note the assistance of Dr. William Hill, Dr. Philip Saunders, and Ms.
Susan Sherwood of the National Defense University. Dr. Sarah Mikel and her
wonderful staff at the University's superb library were untiring in their
assistance. Dr. Paul H.B. Godwin, despite his emeritus status, continues to
serve as my academic “sea daddy,” while retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon
surveyed the manuscript with his unsurpassed editorial eye. Valuable advice
was also offered by two former students, Colonel William Barnett, USA, and Mr.
Stephen Schwartz, as well as by Mr. Gabriel Collins, Ambassador Chas.
Freeman, Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Dr. Robert Sutter, and Dr. Stanley B. Weeks.
Dr. Cynthia Watson provided invaluable advice and friendship.
I alone of course bear the responsibility for any errors of omission or

commission. Furthermore, this manuscript reflects my personal views and not
those of the National Defense University or any other agency of the U.S.
Government.
ABBREVIATIONS
AAW
Anti-Aircraft Warfare
ADB
Asia Development Bank
AFP
Agence France Presse
AMW
Amphibious Warfare
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Conversation
ARF
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASROC
Anti-Submarine (Torpedo) Rocket
ASUW
Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Bbbl
Billion Barrels
Bbl
Barrel
Bcf
Billion Cubic Feet
BSP
Brunei Shell Petroleum
BTM
Billion Ton Miles
BTU
British Thermal Unit
CLCS
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CNOOC
China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CS
Continental Shelf
CSI
Container Security Initiative
CSIST
Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology
CTAP
Counter-Terrorism Action Plan
CTTF
Counter-Terrorism Task Force
CZ
Contiguous Zone
DOA
UN Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
DWT
Dead Weight Tons
EEZ
Exclusive Economic Zone
EW
Electronic Warfare
EWG
Energy Working Group
FAO
UN Food and Agricultural Organization
FPCC
Formosa Petrochemical Company
FTA
Free Trade Agreement
GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
Grafimar
Geographic Information System
GTCL
Gas Transmission Company Ltd.
GWOT
Global War on Terrorism
HP
Horsepower
ICBM
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICC
International Chamber of Commerce
ICPO
International Criminal and Police Organization
IGTS
Integrated Gas Transportation System
IHO
International Hydrographic Organization
ILO
International Labor Organization
IMB
International Maritime Bureau
IMO
International Maritime Organization
INTERPOL
International Police Organization
ISA
International Seabed Authority
ISPS
International Ship and Port Security
ITLS
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
ITS
Integrated Transmission System
JDA
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area
JI
Jemaah Islamiya
JMSDF
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
KCG
Republic of Korea Coast Guard
Km
Kilometer
KNOC
Korea National Oil Corporation
KOGAS
Korea Gas Company
Kt
Knots
LCM
Landing Craft Mechanized
LCU
Landing Craft Utility
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LPD
Landing Platform Dock
LSD
Landing Ship Dock
LST
Landing Ship Tank
MANPADS
Man-Portable Air Defense System
MBTU
Million Btus
Mcf
Million Cubic Feet
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIW
Mine Warfare
Mmbbl
Million Barrels
MSEG
Maritime Security Experts Group
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIDS
National Institute for Defense Studies
NKN
North Korean Navy
Nm
Nautical Mile
OPEC
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC
Overseas Petroleum Investment Corporation
PETROBANGLA
Bangladesh Oil, Gas, and Mineral Corporation
PGU
Peninsular Gas Utilization
PK
PetroKazakhstan
PLA
People's Liberation Army
PLAAF
People's Liberation Army-Air Force
PLAN
People's Liberation Army-Navy
PRC
People's Republic of China
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
ReCAAP
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
RMAS
Regional Movement Alert System
RMSI
Regional Maritime Security Initiative
ROC
Republic of China
SAARC
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAR
Special Administrative Region or Sea and Air Search and Rescue
SEANFZ
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SEATO
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SELB
Strategic Energy Land Bridge
SLOC
Sea Line of Communication
SOLAS
International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea
SOM
Senior Officials Meeting
SSM
Anti-Surface Ship Missile
SSR
Soviet Socialist Republic
STAR
Secure Trade in the APEC Region
Su
Sukoi
TAPI
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
Tcf
Trillion Cubic Feet
TCG
Taiwan Coast Guard
TPTWG
Transportation Working Group
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UN
United Nations
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
VSP
Vietsovpetro
VSTOL
Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing
WCO
World Customs Organization
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION
This book is about energy and the freedom of the seas, which is very much an
international responsibility. That freedom is required to ensure “law and order
at sea with free and safe movement of shipping, and nations able to pursue
their maritime interests and mange their resources in a manner which is
1
agreed and accepted by other nations.”
Specifically, it investigates the military aspects of energy security in maritime

Asia. This vast area includes the world's second and third largest consumers of
energy, China and Japan, and depends on very long sea lines of
communication for commerce, especially energy imports. The Asian landmass
also includes many of the world's most prolific energy producers, including
Russia and the countries of Southwest and Central Asia. Comparing transport
costs for China supports the fact that no form of transporting oil is more
important than the sea: the cost per barrel per 1,000 kilometers (.62 statute
2
miles) is $.163 by tanker, $.793 by pipeline, and $7.19 by train.
This work is being written from a naval perspective; the role of naval force on
the seas provides the primary vehicle from which the question of the military
security of Asia's energy supplies is viewed. Hence, some definitions are in
order. First, naval missions are usually categorized as forward naval presence,
power projection, maritime security operations, crisis response, sea control, or
3
deterrence.
Naval presence is defined as the ability to station naval forces at a distance

from homeport, to “demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, [and
to] deter and dissuade potential adversaries.” Crisis response is facilitated by
forward naval presence, and allows naval forces to respond in a timely fashion
to “natural disasters and man made crises.” Power projection calls upon
“amphibious operations, strike warfare, special forces, and information
operations” to project power from the sea into continental arenas. This may be
carried out by Marine Corps and special warfare forces, aircraft carrier strike
aircraft, and long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles, facilitated by effective
command and control, maritime prepositioning (to include overseas bases or
4
basing rights), and alliances. Sea control connotes the ability to use the sea,
while denying that ability to an opponent. Deterrence is the ability of maritime
forces to dissuade another from taking a specific action by threatening or
establishing presence or sea control.
Maritime security operations are not only flexible and far-ranging, but also
expensive. Furthermore, the technological advances impacting naval and
commercial maritime forces in the twenty-first century provide a degree of
globalization that argues for multilateral efforts to strive effectively for the
degree of energy security demanded by the Asian nations. The threats to the
sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are real, but amenable to amelioration.
This discussion defines Asia as those nations with a coastline, extending from
Russia south and then west to Pakistan. The role played in the Asian energy
and maritime calculus by Iran, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), and the Central Asian nations is certainly significant, but does not
directly concern this work's conclusions.
Asia in 1945 was largely an economic wreck. Russia had suffered huge
personnel losses and expended enormous material resources in the recent war.
Japan was literally a smoking ruin, as was much of eastern China, a nation
enjoying only a brief hiatus in a near-half-century of civil warfare. Southeast
Asia, with the exception of Thailand, had been victimized by more than four
years of war and hostile occupation, only to be reinvaded by its former colonial
masters at the end of the war. South Asia likewise was in the midst of a
struggle to escape from colonialism.
The region's economic progress during the remainder of the twentieth century
is often described as a “miracle,” with Japan and others labeled “Asian tigers.”
Without taking away from the efforts of the peoples of the region states, some
easily identifiable factors contributed mightily to their success. These included
the security blanket spread over much of Asia by the United States during the
Cold War that occupied the half-century most crucial to the national economic
“miracles,” from approximately 1947 to 1989.
The United States also was the primary architect of the unique post–World War
II global economic infrastructure. This was anchored by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, among other institutions, the viability of
which rested on Washington's willingness to make export capital readily
available. The United States also provided a remarkably open market for the
developing Asian economies. Associated with these policies was the important
fact that the U.S. Navy, to a great extent, guaranteed the freedom and safety
of seaborne commerce so crucial to this intensely maritime region.
As the nations of the region recovered from the ravages of World War II and
with the end of the Cold War gained even more freedom from the threats of
international conflict, they naturally turned their attention to building the
military forces thought necessary to defend their national security interests. In
all the maritime Asian states, this included a range of interests, from maritime
border defense and coast guard functions, to projecting power at sea and in a
few cases ashore.
One common factor in the rapid development of the Asian economies during
the second half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
centuries, and the modernization of naval forces that accompanied or followed
that growth, has been a steadily and dramatically increasing dependence on
imported energy supplies. Some nations, such as Japan, have almost no
indigenous sources of energy and hence have been long-term importers;
others, such as China and Indonesia, do possess very significant native
supplies of petroleum, natural gas, and coal, but so fast has been their
economic growth and so inefficient their use of energy resources that they too
have become dependent on imported energy to maintain economic vitality.
Energy security is a simple phrase that describes complex issues. A widely

accepted definition is “the availability of energy at all times in various forms,
5
in sufficient quantities, and at affordable prices.” The phrase may be usefully
broken down to encompass two lesser but still broad definitions of “security.”
The first definition is most conveniently verbalized as “military security”:
protection or defense against attack by overt military means, sabotage, or
other media of physically constraining the availability of energy supplies—
encompassing piracy and terrorism.
A second definition is both more complex and difficult to appreciate:

maintaining the availability and affordability of energy supplies. These two
definitions are, respectively, the military and economic facets of a discussion of
“energy security.” The security of energy resources has been a primary
concern of mankind since fire first began to be used.
The use of petroleum products to produce energy is a relatively recent

development, dating to the mid-nineteenth-century discoveries of oil in
6
Pennsylvania. The beginning of what is currently the world's most important
industry, possibly excluding the information technology arena, has been and
continues to be marked since its beginning in modern times by not only
scientific and engineering advances, partnerships and betrayal, corruption,
greed, and excessive profit-taking, but also enormous benefits to man.
Hydrocarbon energy resources were and are key to economic progress;
petroleum has dominated as (arguably) the best source of energy since the
final years of the nineteenth century.
The value of petroleum as fuel for lighting and power generation in industry,
transportation, and for military applications had become apparent to military
strategists by the first decade of the twentieth century. Led by Admiral Sir
John Fisher, the Royal Navy began conversion from coal to oil to power its
globally dominant warships early in the twentieth century; Germany and other
naval powers also followed this path. The conversion decision was remarkable
for the expense and operational changes involved, especially at a time of
British alarm about German naval expansion. This important military effect
had direct political and foreign policy implications.
Domestically, the advent of oil as a vital national security element contributed

mightily to the revolution in military affairs that occurred before, during, and
after World War I. The internal combustion engine was dependent on oil and
hence so were the ships, submarines, airplanes, and armored vehicles of the
new century—as well as the mobile generators that provide electrical power to
modern “electrified” armed forces. Perhaps most significantly, petroleum was
vital to the development of the enormous chemical industry, including the
advent of synthetic rubber and plastics that emerged at the turn of the
century, an industry that revolutionized much of civilian life as well as military
forces. The national security parameters of the world's nations were
irrevocably altered by the discovery, development, and possession—or lack of
—oil and its derivative products; possibly as important as fuel was the military
application of the products of the chemical industries that relied on petroleum
products.
The secret diplomacy of the World War I period addressed these concerns, as
did the events that marked the breakdown of U.S.-Japanese relations leading
to the 1941–1945 Pacific war. The role played by Japan's increasing thirst for
oil during the period between World War I and the early years of World War II
only increased with the dramatic entry of the United States in December
1941; Tokyo's inability to satisfy that thirst drove its gratuitous aggression and
marked the first instance of energy resources as a major strategic cause of war
in Asia.
The Pacific theater even more sharply demonstrated petroleum's importance:

the U.S. oil embargo against Japan in mid-1941 was an important factor in
that nation's decision to invade Southeast Asia. The Japanese army and navy
both were concerned about Japan's almost total reliance on imported energy
resources, but the navy was the leading advocate for securing oil resources by
armed force. At a crucial cabinet meeting in October 1941, the navy chief of
staff “emphasized the need for speed by pointing out that the navy alone was
7
expending four hundred tons of oil per hour.” This contributed in a major way
to Tokyo's basic strategic decision not to strike to the north, where the Soviet
Union remained Japan's chief, historic rival for control of Northeast Asia, but to
the south, where Indonesia was a vital source of petroleum for energy-starved
Japan.
For the United States, oil played a prominent war-fighting role in both the
Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Diplomatically, increasing recognition of its
importance led to greatly intensified interest and diplomatic efforts in the
Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. In the words of Daniel Yergin,
“American policymakers arrived, belatedly, at the same conclusion that had
directed British oil policy ever since the end of World War I—the centrality of
8
the Middle East.” The advent of the Cold War and the end of the British Empire
as a leading international force in the late 1940s, especially in the Middle East,
coincided with and contributed to the United States’ replacing the European
9
nation as the predominant Western power in the Middle East.
The Cold War defined the second half of the twentieth century, and a major
event in its first decade was the early 1950s revolution and counterrevolution
in Iran. The first phase of this conflict included the assassination by Islamic
terrorists of Iran's prime minister; his democratically elected replacement,
Mohammed Mossadegh, was a French-educated lawyer who tried without
success to maintain a strong nationalistic stance, which included
nationalization of the giant Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh's tenure in
office ended in 1953 when he was overthrown in a military coup supported by
U.S. and British intelligence officers led by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). This made Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi the nation's ruling
dictator, a bit of Cold War legerdemain, the unanticipated results of which are
10
still echoing in the halls of global energy relations.
Much less immediately effective than the Iranian intervention was the Western
powers’ failed attempt to reverse the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal
by Egypt's President Gamal Nasser. This Western fiasco closed the Suez Canal
only briefly but demonstrated the vital importance of the maritime transport of
oil. The 1956 canal closure underlined the importance of maritime energy
security, but paled in comparison to the closure that resulted from the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, when it was out of operation for more than six years, until
reopened in 1974 as part of the peace settlement following the 1973 Arab-
11
Israeli conflict. This much longer closure shifted the oil logistics burden to
increasingly larger seagoing carriers, with the “super tanker” increasing the
efficiency of transporting petroleum by ship—and eventually leading to the
energy security ramifications of large-scale oil pollution disasters.
The 1967 war caused an Arab oil embargo against the Western industrial
nations that supported Israel, also lasting approximately six years. The
experience spurred exploration and development of new energy sources
around the world, as the major consuming nations sought to lessen their
dependence on Middle Eastern oil reserves. It also might have been expected
to have heightened the importance of strategic oil reserves being established
12
on either a national or a regional basis.
That this did not occur to a significant extent speaks more to the governmental
and industrial shortsightedness than to the logic of the step, increasingly
recognized today. The rapid, near-total Israeli victory in the 1967 war, the
canal closure, and the 1973 war all failed to weaken an apparently blasé
American belief described imaginatively by Yergin as “Hydrocarbon Man
13
continued to take his petroleum for granted.”
The events of 1967–1973 did provide an “oil shock” to the world and raised in
the popular mind the issue of energy security, in terms of price and
availability. Furthermore, the decade of the 1970s marked the end of classic
supply and demand as the energy industry's ruling paradigm. The stature of
major global oil suppliers, organized into the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, became formidable as a result of these
developments and henceforth would no longer have to invoke embargos to
control the balance of demand-supply-cost.
Two other seminal events marked the 1970s. First, the United States for the
first time became just another consumer on the international oil market (albeit
the largest one); second, by the end of the decade, China had begun its run to
economic modernization and status as a world-class energy consumer.
The twentieth century was one of almost continuous war, both hot and “cold,”
both local and global; energy security was a continuing element in the
causation, conduct, and settlement of that long period of warfare. The coal
mines of central Europe; the oil reserves in Central Asia (Azerbaijan), Persia
(Iran), Mesopotamia (Iraq), the sultanates and kingdoms of the Persian Gulf,
and Southeast Asia were objectives that Great Britain, France, Germany,
Japan, and the United States led the way in trying to obtain, even to the point
of war.
The century's final quarter-century directly affected energy security issues:

the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Iranian revolution of 1979, which as noted
replaced a pro-U.S. monarch with an anti-U.S. theocracy, the long Iraq–Iran
“tanker war” in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s, the 1990–1991 coalition
war against Iraq, Iran's increasingly belligerent posture, and the U.S.-
designated “war on terrorism” all focused increased attention on the
availability, affordability, and security of petroleum supplies, while reflecting
the tenuous of political stability throughout most of the oil-rich Middle East.
This quarter-century was further marked by the increasingly globalization of
conflict, as the revolution in military affairs, especially that of information
generation, transformation, and impact, became a force in international
relationships, a force that is still emerging and developing as the twenty-first
century gains its stride.
ASIAN ENERGY LANDSCAPE

There is no doubt about the importance of energy resources today;
furthermore, energy security in the vast Asian theater cannot be usefully
addressed only as a national issue, even for such giants as Japan, China, and
India. Hence, energy security issues are discussed from an Asian perspective,
while examining each of the region's national energy security concerns. The
former focus is usually determinant regarding the crucial military security
arena, but cannot be completely separated from individual national issues.
Especially notable is the continued widespread reliance on coal as a source of

energy. Although deposits are widely distributed, 67 percent of the world's
estimated recoverable coal reserves are located in just four countries, all of
them in or directly concerned with Asia: the United States (27 percent), Russia
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(17 percent), China (13 percent), and India (10 percent).
National and international concerns often are not clearly delineated, however,
particularly as the global energy situation becomes more and more
internationalized, as has dramatically occurred since the end of World War II in
1945. Japan, China, and India lead the way in recognizing that globalization is
a factor that must be dealt with as they seek to gain control of international
energy resources from discovery through consumption. All apparently view
this general policy as key to attaining energy security.
As Asia's largest nation and consumer of energy, with the world's fastest
growing economy and concomitant energy requirements, China is a major
participant in the energy equation, whether focused globally, regionally, or
nationally. Japan and India are similarly positioned, although primarily as
consumers, while Russia's major stature is as supplier rather than consumer of
energy resources.
Japan currently consumes more energy than any Asian state except China;
India exceeds Japan and is second only to China as a potential dominating
energy consumer in Asia. The rapidly increasing Chinese and Indian energy
demand results both from their very large populations, each exceeding one
billion, and from their rapid rates of economic growth rates. Japan remains a
vitally important economic force in Asia, but its geographic limitations, aging
population, and economic slowdown since the early 1990s have contributed to
slowing its potential for dramatic growth in energy demand. Other Asian
nations run a wide range of energy requirements, domestic availability, and
reliance on international sources.
In addition to Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, New Zealand, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan possess almost no onshore (“continental”) energy reserves. Asian
Russia (Siberia), China, Australia, Indonesia, Australia, and India are rich in
such reserves. Offshore deposits of oil and natural gas are available to China,
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and
Burma, although their recoverability is often complicated by legal and
sovereignty issues, as well as in some cases by a lack of the effective
governance and technological sophistication required for their profitable
recovery and processing.
The complex of domestic and international issues and relationships stretches

throughout the vast Asian region from Siberia to Pakistan; they all affect and
are affected by the security issue: Where are the necessary energy resources?
Will they be affordable? Will they be safe against disruption at their source,
while en route to the consumer, and through the processing and transportation
process? There are two primary pathways in the energy security issue:
overland and ocean bottom pipelines, and sea lines of communications. They
provide the focus of our investigation of the energy security issue in Asia
today and in the future.
Responding to unpredictable and transnational threats in the world's

ambiguous security environment requires international cooperation to prevent
attacks, protect people and infrastructure, minimize damage, and ensure safe
recovery and utilization of energy resources. International integration and
alignment of different maritime security programs and initiatives is required,
involving both public and private sectors. Such collaboration is fundamental to
worldwide economic stability and growth.
The world's largest ocean, the Pacific, exemplifies the expression of “oceanic
commons,” described by one analyst as a “resource to which no single decision-
15
making unit holds exclusive title.” This more modern expression of “the high
seas”—historically the seas lying more than 3 nautical miles (nm) from land,
but now defined as the seas lying more than 12 nm from land—refers to ocean
areas open to all nations for purposes of navigation, fishing and other
16
resources recovery, and communications.
This concept of seas open to all has been brought into renewed question by
several factors dating to the late twentieth century. First is the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an unintended
consequence of which has been to significantly reduce the “high seas” as a
result of the expanded territorial waters, and creation of national Economic
Exclusion Zones (EEZ) and Continental Shelf (CS) areas. These new
demarcations have led many nations—China, for instance—to aspire to exert
17
sovereign rights to at least 200 nm and possibly 350 nm from their coasts.
Second, population increases and the concomitant rise in protein

requirements, shore-based pollution of the seas, and possibly global warming
have resulted in significant fisheries depletion and intensified competition for
this increasingly scarce resource. This is a particularly crucial problem in the
18
South China Sea, which contains great biodiversity. China has taken the lead
in fisheries conservation efforts in this sea but has had only marginal success
obtaining the cooperation of its own fishermen, let alone that of neighboring
19
countries. Fishing disputes are common, and have not infrequently led to
20
shooting incidents. Recent cases included a Chinese Naval vessel reportedly
sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat and an Indonesian ship opening fire on
21
another Vietnamese boat. Fishermen were killed in both cases.
Third, while criminal and environmental threats have always been present in
the maritime realm, the increase of terrorism as a favorite instrument of
dissident groups, and governance problems in countries such as the Philippines
and Indonesia have raised the level of threat to the use of the seas by all
nations.
Fourth, the dramatic increased need for energy resources transported by sea
has equally increased the need for secure SLOCs. The degree of security
established for the sea-lanes has serious military, economic, and political
implications; these elements also must be part and parcel of attempts to
eliminate or at least reduce threats to that security.
Each of the following chapters focuses on different aspects of the energy

security equation in Asia. Chapter 2 describes the region's maritime
geography. Its maritime environment is marked by thousands of islands, many
crucial navigational straits, navigational hazards, and stateless threats from
piracy, other forms of international crime, and terrorism. The primary SLOCs
are identified and described; these reach from Alaska's North Slope terminus
at Anchorage to Pakistan's newly expanded port of Gwadar, near the Strait of
Hormuz.
Energy security is a vital national security interest to all nations, and Chapter
3 examines the role and importance of energy in East Asia, with a focus on
each of the region's nations. A concise description of each country's energy
situation is presented, to include proven and estimated energy reserves,
current and projected energy imports, current and projected energy
consumption, strategic reserves in operation or planned, and government
attitudes and policies for the energy sector.
Chapter 4 looks at the pipelines; in some respects, this is the most far-
ranging and inclusive chapter, since pipeline construction and plans extend and
affect the energy pictures from Sakhalin Island northwest of Japan, to the
Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea areas. Chapter 5 focuses on the merchant fleets
of the region that transport energy supplies. Energy carriers are of particular
interest; this chapter includes examination of national maritime
infrastructures, to include shipbuilding capabilities and port facilities.
In Chapter 6, threats to the SLOCs that form the arteries of the region's
economies are examined. Piracy, terrorism, navigational hazards,
environmental dangers, and political disputes all affect the security of the long
SLOCs stretching from the Arctic to the limits of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf
of Aden. Potentially most dangerous, however, are the more traditional great
power factors of conflicting sovereignty claims and outright war over disputes.
Chapter 7 explores the region's maritime sovereignty disputes. The 1982

UNCLOS frames the discussion: island ownership, maritime boundaries,
ownership of maritime resources, and regulatory authority all play a role in
these disputes. Some are minor, such as the status of the small state of Sabah,
in dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia; others are major and
threaten world peace, such as the status of Taiwan.
The UNCLOS delineates four areas of national maritime rights, all measured
from a state's coastline:
1. 12 nm: Territorial Sea, in which the state exercises full legal sovereignty
2. 24 nm: Contiguous Zone (CZ), in which the state exercises limited legal
sovereignty
3. 200 nm: Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which the state exercises full
economic sovereignty
4. 350 nm (maximum): Continental Shelf (CS), in which the state exercises
limited economic sovereignty
Chapter 8 focuses on the national maritime strategies of Asian nations that

have significant naval and commercial fleets at sea. China, Japan, South
Korea, and India lie at the center of this examination. Since the United States
remains the region's dominant naval and economic power, U.S. maritime
strategy is examined, as is the average daily naval and merchant fleet
strength in the region. Other nations may possess relatively small naval
and/or commercial fleets but still engage in coherent maritime strategic
programs; Singapore is the prime example.
In Chapter 9, the navies of the regional states are described. Strengths,

weaknesses, and potential futures are adumbrated; reliance on foreign
equipment and support is also noted. A key component of naval strength is the
ability to safeguard SLOCs. These may be categorized as littoral, regional, and
interregional. Almost all of the Asian nations have at least some capability to
guard their littoral SLOCs, those within 200 nm of their coastline. Very few—
only Japan and China—have navies capable of providing some degree of
regional SLOC protection throughout East Asia; only India deploys that
capability in South Asian Waters. On the largest scale of SLOC defense, only
the United States possesses the naval force necessary to operate throughout
East and South Asia, although even the U.S. Navy would be hard-pressed to
safeguard those very long SLOCs with any degree of certainty.
Chapter 10 addresses multilateralism and energy security in Asia.

Organizations ranging from the United Nations (UN) to the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) are examined. The focus includes economic, political, and
military aspects of multilateral organizations as they affect energy security.
Chapter 11 concludes the discussion, and includes a brief discussion of future

scenarios in the region. There will be no surprises in the likely cases that are
examined. Already in the public eye are the international disputes between
Japan and Russia over the southern Kurile Islands; between Japan and Korea
(both North and South) over the “island” of Takeshima/Dokdo; and between
Japan and China over ownership of both the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and sea
bottom energy reserves in the East China Sea. No dispute in East Asia is more
dangerous than that between Beijing and Taipei over the status of Taiwan, a
dispute in which the United States is very much involved.
Just south of Taiwan lie the disputed land features—islands, reefs, rocks—of
the South China Sea. These are claimed in their entirety by China (and
Taiwan) and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. The importance of the various bits of land is not as important, or
ominous, as their possible legal qualification as “islands” under international
law: if so qualified, they would possess the various rights under the UNCLOS,
including an EEZ of up to 200 nm. That would create a legal jigsaw puzzle of
conflicting claims that would almost certainly lead to naval conflict, should
significant energy reserves be discovered.
Furthermore, a South China Sea divided into a sovereignty hodgepodge would

lead to restrictions on the freedom of navigation through one of the world's
most heavily traveled network of sea-lanes. This would be unacceptable to the
United States, as well as to many other Asian nations, and would also raise
high the possibility of recourse to naval power to maintain free passage for the
vital energy supplies that populate those sea-lanes.
Farther west, disruptive conflicts in the Indian Ocean would more likely result
from traditional international conflict than from territorial disputes. Thailand,
Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka suffer from armed insurgencies and
unstable governments. India and Pakistan maintain a state of enmity that has,
since their creation sixty years ago, thrice broken out into active warfare.
Discussion of political, economic, and military futures includes the role of non-
Asian nations in that region's security: the United States is the most important
of these, but mention is also made of European Union members, as well as
those Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries that play a
significant role in Asian energy security. The emphasis is on energy-centric
issues and disputes with the potential to generate international conflict.
The concluding chapter continues with a summing up, by individual country,

subregion, and region, of energy security issues, concerns, policies, and
possible future events. This includes discussion of possible future courses of
military action, pipeline construction, and international efforts at cooperation
and improved producer–consumer cooperation.
GEOGRAPHY OF THE REGION
Asia is the major part of the Eurasian landmass, the largest “island” on a globe
that is more than 70 percent “maritime”: covered by water. Eurasia was a
focus of Halford Mackinder, a British geographer who in 1904 wrote a seminal
work in which he described the Eurasian continent as the world's “heartland”
1
and the “pivot” of global power. Mackinder offered the following syllogism in
1919: Who rules eastern Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the
Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands
the world. He averred that the world had evolved into a “closed system,”
interpreting history as largely a contest between continental and maritime
powers and that the advent of railroads (and presumably airplanes) had
irrevocably shifted the strategic balance in favor of the continental nations.
An American geostrategist, Nicholas Spykman, further developed Mackinder's

ideas, but arrived at dissimilar conclusions. Writing in 1944, he speculated
about power projection into and out of the Heartland. Whereas Mackinder
assumed that geographical formations made for easiest access from the center,
Spykman argued that the littoral areas of the Heartland, or what he called the
“Rimland,” were key to controlling the world. He updated Mackinder, positing,
“Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the
2
destinies of the world.”
While Mackinder had been influenced by the Crimean War and the lesser wars
of the second half of the nineteenth century, which were relatively localized
conflicts, Spykman lived from 1893 to 1943 and was a product of global war.
Both, however, were focused on control of the Eurasian supercontinent, home
to many of the world's leading industrial and energy consuming countries
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Asia
[Source:http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/reference_maps/asia.html]
Spykman was a political scientist by training, but believed that geography was
“the most fundamentally conditioning factor because of its relative
permanence” and should be considered a prime motivator of a nation's
3
national security strategy. During the Cold War (1947–1990), the United
States led an anti-Communist strategy of containment that focused on the
Soviet Union; it was described by the leading American historian of that
strategy as a Western attempt to use the Rimlands to control the Heartland,
4
which was dominated by Russia and China.
This Cold War construct may accurately be rephrased for the twenty-first
century as using sea power to control land power. The Eurasian supercontinent
today remains dominated by Russia and China, with India a rapidly rising force
on that same gigantic landmass. Japan is the leading Asian maritime nation,
together with the insular countries of Southeast Asia: Taiwan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the small island
states of the South and Southwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean states,
including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Perhaps most important
from an Asian perspective is that the United States, although not
geographically an “Asian” nation, is so powerful a maritime power that it
dominates the “Rimlands.”
This position as the dominant power certainly is neither limitless nor timeless.
China's rise as a naval and commercial sea power is a fact of the twenty-first
century; similar modernization and the potential expansion of India's maritime
presence may finally be reaching maturity. Japan is already a sea power, while
Russia retains the resources to reemerge as an Asian maritime power, should
Moscow decide to pursue that path. Meanwhile, the United States
preoccupation with the so-called global war on terror and economic
perturbations, along with shrinkage of its naval and merchant fleets, all
indicate the limits and even fragility of American power.
As the twentieth century dawned, the United States debuted as a world power
with the vanquishing of Spain; the century ended with the United States
established as a superpower stronger than any in the history of the world. The
twenty-first century has begun with a revitalized and prospering Asia; the
economic “tigers” that developed during the later part of the previous century
were severely damaged by the vicissitudes of the 1990s, but remain important
economic and political actors. They have been overshadowed, however, by
China's unprecedented economic growth during the past quarter-century. Only
Japan, and possibly India, today is capable among Asian nations of matching
China in economic and military terms. Both are crucial participants in the
Asian energy calculus of availability, affordability, and security.
China and Russia alone among the Northeast Asian states possess significant
indigenous energy supplies of oil, natural gas, and coal and have been
developing their huge energy reserves. Japan and South Korea possess very
limited energy resources, even as their need for greatly increased energy
supplies increases. India's accelerating economic development increasingly
positions it with Japan and China among the world's most voracious energy
consumers. All are located in a region usefully described as a continental
“heartland” bordered by a maritime “rimland.”
For our discussion, Asia is delineated by a series of geographic features

beginning in the northeast with Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile
Islands extending to the south; next, beyond the Soya or La Perouse Strait lies
Japan's four large main islands and the Ryukyu Islands, extending southward
beyond the Osumi Strait. The principal straits will be discussed further.
The Ryukyus are Japan's southernmost island group, stretching toward Taiwan.
Their area of 2,200 square miles is concentrated on Okinawa, Miyako, and
Ishigaki, as is the population of approximately 1,318,000. The Ryukyun
kingdom was a Chinese tributary state from 1372 to 1609, when it was seized
5
by Japan and, in 1869, annexed by Tokyo. The Ryukyus’ Japanese sovereignty
is not formally challenged, despite this history and the possibility of a Chinese
claim.
The islands point south-southwest to the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutais

to the Chinese) and then to Taiwan. The Taipei government's territorial claims
conform to those of Beijing's, and include the islands of Mazu, Jinmen, and the
Penghus, all lying between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Taipei also
agrees with Beijing's sovereignty claims to almost all of the land features in
the South China Sea.
Next, the Philippine archipelago lies south of Taiwan, beyond the Luzon Strait.
Although this strait extends 200 nautical miles (nm) from the southernmost
tip of Taiwan to the main Philippine island of Luzon, it is divided into a series of
channels by the Batanes and Babuyan island groups. The main channels are
the Bashi in the north, Balintang in the center, and Babuyan in the south of
the strait. The Republic of the Philippines includes over 7,000 islands
extending 1,200 nm to the south, ending in the disputed state of Sabah on the
island of Borneo, which is also claimed by Malaysia.
The Philippines form the eastern boundary of the South China Sea, separating
it from the Philippine Sea and the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. Several
important straits link the two bodies of water; the most notable of these, from
north to south, and running west to east, are first the San Bernardino Strait
opening to the Pacific between Luzon to the north and Samar to the south,
reached after first circumnavigating Mindoro to gain access to the heart of the
archipelago. Second is the Surigao Strait, running between the islands of
Leyte to the north and Mindanao to the south to reach the Pacific after first
transiting the Bohol Sea south of the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. The
third main transit route through the Philippines runs through the Sulu and
Celebes Seas, south of Mindanao through the Sarangani Strait or farther
6
offshore to reach the Pacific.
The Philippine Islands lead directly to the Indonesian Archipelago, which is

marked at its eastern extremity by the many islands of the Moluccas group
and then stretching westward across the important Makassar Strait to the
prominent Borneo. Approximately two-thirds of this large island is sovereign
Indonesian territory, but Borneo also hosts the large eastern part of Malaysia
and the small sultanate of Brunei. Indonesia itself is the world's largest island
nation, with an archipelago of between 17,000 and 18,000 islands, of which
between 6,000 and 7,000 are inhabited. The great island chain extends
approximately 3,000 nm generally east to west across the southern end of the
South China Sea.
Indonesia forms one side of the world's most important and most heavily
traveled navigation strait, the Malacca, with Singapore and the western part of
7
Malaysia to the north. Many sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are
available at the eastern end of Indonesia, between Timor and New Guinea;
these run north–south through the Timor, Banda, and Molucca Seas. The
Indonesian archipelago
Northeast Asia
[Source: CIA Map no. 801986 1-92.]
Southeast Asia
[Source:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/reference_maps/southeast_asia.html.]]
is also marked by several important straits running north–south. From east to

west, these are first, the Flores Strait, through the Lesser Sunda Islands, with
the islands of Sumbawa to the west and Flores and Sumba to the east; second
the Lombok Strait, between Bali and Lombok; and third, the Sunda Strait,
between the islands of Sumatra and Java.
West of the Malacca Strait lies the Indian Ocean, the third largest body of
water in the world, after the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is bounded on the
east by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesa, and Australia; on the north by the
8
Indian Table 2.1 Distances between Ports
Distance Transit Time

From To
(nm) at 16 kts
Busan,
Singapore 2,503 6.5 days
South Korea
Abadan,
Iran
Fremantle,
Australia
Fremantle Abadan 5,411 14.1 days
[Source: H.O. Publication 151: Distances between
Ports (Bethesda, MD: National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA), 10th ed., 1999)]
subcontinent and other South Asian nations; on the west by the Arabian
9
Peninsula and Africa; and on the south by Antarctica and its associated ocean.
The Indian Ocean's littoral is divided into the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal,
Arabian Sea, the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, the Red Sea and the Persian (or
Arabian) Gulf, and smaller associated bodies of water.
This great Asian maritime reach from the far northwest Pacific Ocean to the
Red Sea includes more than one-half of the earth's surface. Seaborne
commerce dominates its international economic life, both in the bulk cargo
now largely carried in containers, and in the Southeast and Southwest Asian
energy supplies so increasingly crucial to the economic powers of East Asia.
The distances of the SLOCs that cross these seas are impressive, as shown in
Table 2.1.
In addition to their length, the SLOCs of the Asian maritime theater traverse a
very complex geographical environment. This includes many narrow transit
points constraining the sea-lanes; despite the great distances involved, few
10
areas of the Asian seas are remote from continental or insular landmasses.
The length and geographical complexity of these SLOCs pose severe challenges
to both their defense and attempts to intercept their merchant traffic. The
sensitivity of the attendant navigational chokepoints are due not solely to their
width—although all are much narrower than the seas or other bodies of water
they connect—but also by their location on major SLOCs.
The seas surrounding Asia's Pacific landmass from Russia's Kamchatka

Peninsula south and west to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden are divided into
ocean basins by several narrow navigational passages, or chokepoints. The
first basin is the aforementioned Sea of Okhotsk, separated from the North
Pacific Ocean by the Kurile Straits, a series of passages between the Kurile
Islands. These straits do not serve as major merchant SLOCs, but are crucial
to Russian naval deployments, as they intervene between the major base
complexes at Petropavlask and Vladivostok and the open ocean.
SEA OF JAPAN
Immediately to the south-southwest, the Soya (La Perouse) Strait lies between
the northernmost Japanese island, Hokkaido, and the Russian island of
Sakhalin, marking the northern boundary of the second major Asian maritime
11
basin, the Sea of Japan. This strait will increase in importance as the natural
gas fields in the waters around southern Sakhalin Island become increasingly
productive, with Japan as the future primary customer. The Sakhalin project is
planned for six phases of development, with Korea, possibly China, and other
nations eventually sharing in the vast natural gas reserves that lie in the
waters off the long island. Some energy is already being produced in Phase
One of the project, but major benefits to Japan are unlikely to be realized
12
before 2011.
South of Hokkaido, between that island and the Japanese main island of
Honshu is the Tsugaru Strait, connecting the Sea of Japan and the North
Pacific Ocean. The Tsugaru is a primary SLOC for merchant shipping following
the Great Circle route from the west coasts of the United States and Canada to
Korean and Russian ports, as well as to ports on Japan's west coast. It is a
sensitive military chokepoint from Tokyo's perspective, guarding the country's
northern islands and the Sea of Japan.
The southern boundary of this sea is pierced by the Tsushima Strait, lying
between the southern Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula. It
is divided by Tsushima Island, as well as by a very small group of land
features. This bit of disputed territory—little more than a collection of rocks—is
called Dokdo by Korea and Takeshima by Japan, and lies just north of
Tsushima. Korea, as noted previously, disputes the very name of this sea,
insisting on calling it the East Sea. From South Korea's perspective the
Tsushima Strait also serves as an obstacle to renewal of the deeply despised
Japanese aggression and the colonization early in the twentieth century.
THE YELLOW SEA

The Yellow Sea forms the ocean basin across the Korean Peninsula from the
Sea of Japan. It lies northwest of Tsusima, and is bounded by the Korean
Peninsula and the Chinese mainland. Although claimed in its entirety by
Beijing, both North and South Korea dispute exact maritime boundaries with
China. This relatively shallow sea, with an average depth of just 144 feet, or
24 fathoms, has important economic and military value for China; hence, any
maritime disputes involving lines of demarcation or resources draws Beijing's
immediate attention.
The Yellow Sea also continues to be the scene of significant disputes between
North Korea and South Korea. These include national boundaries, fisheries,
and defense concerns that occasionally degenerate into naval clashes, with a
record of death and destruction inflicted on both sides. Seoul and Pyongyang
continue to disagree on this sea border; although the most recent clash
between the two navies occurred in 2002, recent negotiations “ended
13
fruitlessly.”
The East China Sea is maritime basin lying south of Korea, southwest of Japan,
and west of the Ryukyus, between the Yellow and the Philippine Seas. The East
China Sea stretches south from Tsushima to Taiwan, which is separated from
the Asian mainland by the strait of that name. The legal status of this channel,
no more than 100 nm at its widest point, is part and parcel of the Taiwan
issue. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for the international
community, is the question of China's position on the status of the Taiwan
Strait as international waters. The (United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea) UNCLOS not only states clearly that ships have the right of innocent
passage through such straits (Article 45), but also empowers states bordering
such straits with rights and responsibilities that provide rationale for
14
controlling or limiting such free passage (Articles 37–44).
Beijing has intimated, however, that it views the Taiwan Strait as sovereign
territorial water, or possibly even internal waters, as defined in Article 8 of the
UNCLOS. China would presumably advocate this position by claiming a straight
baseline from a point on its mainland to the northern end of Taiwan, and from
the island's southern end back to the mainland, or perhaps directly to the
island of Hainan, which lies at the northern end of the South China
15
Sea. While such a claim would still require China to grant innocent passage
(Article 17), it would empower Beijing to apply stricter measures of control,
under the UNCLOS Article 19 qualifier that “passage is innocent so long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”
The North Pacific Ocean is the name given to the swath of the Pacific lying to
the east of Japan and the Kurile Islands, and extending northward to the
Kamchatka Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands chain. The western Pacific
Ocean south and east of the Ryukyus and Taiwan is the Philippine Sea. It
stretches eastward to a line approximately 2,000 nm from the Asian mainland
and its important archipelagos. This sea thus includes the United States’
Marianas Islands, and the semi-independent island states of Micronesia.
SOUTH CHINA SEA

The several straits that are crucial gateways to the South China Sea warrant
special attention. Two important straits, the Luzon Strait, described previously
as lying between the northernmost large Philippine island of Luzon, and the
Taiwan Strait serve as primary points of entry and egress to and from the
northern South China Sea, the next ocean basin on the Asian circumference.
Less frequented by large merchant ships, but still significant, are the San
Bernardino and Surigao Straits that lie on the eastern edge of the Philippines.
At the southern boundary of the South China Sea, three primary north–south
routes penetrate the Indonesian archipelago. They are more heavily traveled
than the Philippine passages, especially the Sunda Strait, deeper than the
primary southwestern point of entry and egress to and from the southern
South China Sea: the Singapore and Malacca Straits, between Indonesia and
Singapore-Malaysia.
The Strait of Malacca is the most important shipping lane in the world, more
important than either the Suez or Panama Canals in terms of both geopolitical
significance and because of the numbers of ship and amount of tonnage that
pass through it. Malacca is the main ship route between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, directly linking Southwest, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia,
including India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and China.
Fifty thousand transits by seagoing vessels are made through the strait
annually, carrying almost 25 percent of the world's maritime trade. This
includes more than 25 percent of the world's shipborne oil, gapproximately
11.7 million barrels daily in 2004, an amount that will increase in direct
16
proportion to increasing Asian energy consumption. Such narrow straits
obviously increase the risk of ship collisions or groundings; forty-four of the
former and fifteen of the latter occurred between 1995 and 2005, with one
observer estimating that this number will “increase dramatically” as the
94,000 ships transiting the Malacca and Singapore Straits in 2004 to increases
to an estimated 141,000 ships in 2020. Such a startling figure underlines the
17
straits’ importance as security, economic, and environmental issues.
The more than 400-nm-long Malacca Strait narrows to 1.5 nm near Singapore,
creating one of the world's most significant navigation chokepoints. It is
actively threatened by piracy and terrorism; its geopolitical importance means
that it is potentially at risk in the event of major military conflict anywhere
along the Asian rimland.
INDIAN OCEAN
The Malacca Strait empties to the west into the Andaman Sea, bounded by
Thailand and Malaysia to the east and Burma to the north. The sea contains
the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands, two small Indian archipelagos that
provide New Delhi with naval outposts close to the Malacca Strait.
The Andaman Sea serves as entry to the easternmost of the two great basins
into which the northern Indian Ocean is divided. This is the Bay of Bengal,
lying north and west of the Andaman Sea, and framed by India to the west,
Bangladesh to the north, and Burma to the east. This is a tragic ocean basin,
heavily trafficked by small merchant and fishing vessels that all too often fall
victim to the massive cyclones that devastate the bay. The Indian Ocean's
other ocean basin is the North Arabian Sea, which lies to the west of the
subcontinent. This sea leads to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz
and to the Red Sea (and the Suez Canal) through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Lying directly south of India is the Chagos Archipelago, with Diego Garcia the
group's major atoll. Although claimed by both the Seychelles and Mauritius,
these small islands are administered by Great Britain, which has, de facto,
provided them to the United States as a naval facility, logistics hub, and
strategic air base. Their value to the American employment of military force in
Southwest Asia cannot be overestimated.
The Indian Ocean contains several insular nations. Sri Lanka lies less than 30
nm off India's southeast coast; it remains torn by a vicious, decades-old civil
The Indian Ocean Area
[Source: CIA Map no. 802126 (R00367) 5-93.]
war, a conflict even direct Indian political and military intervention was unable
to resolve. The island nation of the Maldives lies 348 nm southwest of Sri
Lanka. The Seychelles, Mauritius, the Comoros, and Madascar are the other
island states of this maritime region, located far to the south. The former two
states are in the central Indian Ocean, while the latter pair lie just off the East
African coast. None of these island states possesses significant economic
potential or military strength, but all have energy security concerns and play a
role in Indian Ocean geopolitics.
Northwest Indian Ocean
[Source: CIA Map no. 801648 (545634) 12-20.]
Two of the world's most important navigational chokepoints connect with the
Arabian Sea, the northern Indian Ocean's second major maritime basin. The
Strait of Hormuz narrows at one point to less than 18 nm and is bounded on
the north by Iran, with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the
south. Hormuz is the only route for seaborne oil transport from the rich
oilfields of the Persian Gulf nations, including Iraq and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia
also ships most of its oil from its Persian Gulf ports, but also borders the
eastern side of the 1,000 nm-long Red Sea, which the 14 nm-wide Bab el-
Mandeb connects to the North Arabian Sea, between the Arabian Peninsula to
the northeast and the African continent to the southwest. Although the major
Saudi Arabian oil port of Yanbu is located on the Red Sea, that body of water is
chiefly important as the waterway that connects Asia to Europe, through the
Indian Ocean, Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea.
The Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are further constricted by small
islands in their courses. These both complicate sovereignty disputes in the
area and provide potential military bases for organized militaries and non-
state groups seeking to disrupt the flow of oil from the area to East Asia.
CONCLUSION
This great maritime expanse from the northeastern to the southwestern
extremities of the Asian continent is marked by many of the world's most
important navigational chokepoints: the straits at the Kuriles, La Perouse,
Tsugaru, Tsushima, Taiwan, Luzon, San Bernardino, Surigao, Torres (between
Australia and New Guinea, east of Indonesia), Sunda, Lombok, Malacca,
Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. All are heavily traveled by seaborne traffic; most
of them are vital to the flow of petroleum from the world's center for those
energy reserves in Southwestern Asia to the South and Northeast Asian
economic giants of India, China, Japan, and Korea.
Commercial sea power is even more important at the beginning of the twenty-
first century than it was at the end of the nineteenth, when petroleum began
gaining world prominence. The reason for this is simple: energy. The United
States uses approximately one-quarter of daily global petroleum production,
but the rapid rise of China as a global economic power rivaling Japan has
already constrained U.S. influence over the price and supply of energy.
Southwest Asia remains the world's petroleum “breadbasket,” a situation
unlikely to change before the mid-century (at the earliest) realization of the
potential contained in Russian Siberia and the multinational Caspian Basin in
Central Asia. And the Southwest Asian energy supply depends on seaborne
transport to reach its global markets. The same dependency applies to African,
Canadian, and Latin American oil; Southeast Asian natural gas; and Australian
and North American coal.
The maritime sweep around Asia is marked by thousands of islands, some of

them nation-states but many under a cloud of disputed sovereignty. Chapter 7
will address these disputes: Russia and Japan in the southern Kuriles; Korea
and Japan over Dokdo-Takeshima; China and Japan over Daoyutai-Senkaku
Shoto; China and Taiwan; China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei,
and Malaysia over South China Sea land features, primarily the Paracels and
Spratlys; the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah; Indonesia and Malaysia
18
over Ambalat Island; Great Britain, Mauritius, and the Seychelles over the
19
Chagos Archipelago; Iran and the UAE over Abu Musa and Tomb Islands.
Geography rarely if ever changes. The geopolitical importance of energy

resource location, SLOCs and the straits, distances and depths, coastal
contours and ocean bottom gradients are all factors that contribute to defining
Asia's maritime arena—and its political and military fate.
ENERGY IN ASIA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will survey the Asian energy picture on a nation-by-nation basis,
focusing on the maritime countries: Japan, Russia, the Koreas, China
(including Taiwan, separately described), the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, Burma, and the
Indian Ocean Nations: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Estimates of
hydrocarbon energy reserves—coal, oil, and natural gas—typically vary widely
for a specific region, depending on the source of the estimate. This may result
not only from objective scientific differences of opinion, but also from the self-
interest of energy companies, energy-hungry nations, and the interests of
international agencies concerned with energy reserves. The most accurate
data is usually that provided by the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy
Information Agency (EIA), which furnishes most of the data on which this
discussion is based.
JAPAN
Japan has almost no indigenous energy resources and is—except for its
nuclear power plants—completely dependent on imported crude oil and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) to meet its energy requirements. This has led the
Diet, Japan's legislature, to pass laws requiring Japanese refineries to maintain
a sixty-day supply of petroleum to meet a national emergency. Tokyo also
attempts to budget its power supplies, to maximize the efficiency of its
1
electrical production, and minimize LNG demand growth.
Japan leads the world in LNG imports: 6 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day, in
2
addition to approximately 5.4 million barrels (mbbls) of oil. These energy
imports continue to increase, with the amount in 2003 rising 23 percent over
that in 2002, further emphasizing Japan's dependence on imported energy
3
supplies. The country imports approximately 90 percent of its oil from the
Middle East, with Persian Gulf countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran—leading the way. Overseas energy acquisition
is under the Japan National Oil Company (JNOC), established by Tokyo in
1967. Private sector Japanese oil companies are also actively seeking reliable
sources of energy overseas.
LNG imports are likely to furnish the country's increasing hydrocarbon

demands, but this may prove problematical in the future, given the increase in
Asian LNG demand in the face of finite supplies. The projected LNG shortfall
may take effect as early as 2013, reflecting the slow growth in LNG recovery,
4
processing, and shipping.
Japan covets eastern Siberian oil and gas reserves. Recovery of these
resources has not been realized, due largely to the difficult climate, lack of the
technological know-how, personnel necessary to extract them efficiently, and
Moscow's reluctance to conclude an agreement with Tokyo. For much of the
past half-century, Japan has often been viewed as the nation most suitable in
terms of location, expertise, and financial wherewithal to turn Siberia's
potential into reality.
At the June 2007 Group of Eight summit meeting, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Tokyo “help
Russia speed up social and economical development” of Siberia, with the
implied quid pro quo of resolving the Kurile Islands dispute. Putin described
the proposal as “attractive and constructive” and promised a reply after
5
studying the details of the proposal.
RUSSIA
Russia is the world's third-largest producer of petroleum, producing 348
million metric tons (mmt) of oil in 2006, behind Saudi Arabia (536 mmt) and
the United States (418 mmt). It is also the world's second-largest energy
producer and a leading energy exporter in the global energy market. Russia is
already the world's largest supplier of natural gas, and may vie with Saudi
Arabia for the global lead in oil extraction and production during the twenty-
6
first century.
Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) depends on its energy exports, which
represent up to 25 percent of that statistic and approximately 50 percent of its
7
budget revenues. These figures highlight the importance and caution with
which Moscow is treating decisions about the sale and distribution of its oil and
natural gas. The chairman of Russia's Central Bank emphasized the
importance of energy production in 2003, when he cited oil prices as “the very
8
basis of the Russian economy.” Moscow has also declared that “all oil pipelines
under construction in Russia would remain state property,” underlining the
government's belief that energy production and its transportation are matters
9
of national security.
The vast majority of Russian energy exports go to Central and Western

Europe, but Russian companies have been working to increase oil sales to
Asia, particularly to China. The government is encouraging companies in
northern Russia and Siberia to build pipelines and oil loading stations in ice-
free ports to meet growing demand.
Russia holds clear dominance in known supplies of natural gas, possessing 48

10
trillion cubic meters (tcm), close to a third of all estimated global reserves.
First, Moscow does face at least significant challenges to marketing its energy,
however, primarily because much of its reserves are in Siberia, far from its
usual dominant European markets. Second, that distant location means higher
transportation costs and hence a lower profit margin. Third, Siberia's very
difficult environment, both meteorologically and geologically, means that
development will require unusually high capital investments to recover the
11
energy resources and modernize the existing plant infrastructure. Moscow
has long understood the potential of Siberian energy reserves, but has (as of
2007) been unable to solve the recovery, processing, and transportation
problems to the degree necessary to take full advantage of the energy
resources of the region.
Russia's energy production potential is immense, however, and the increased

availability of Russia's energy reserves could significantly improve the security
of the international energy supply, making it less vulnerable to geopolitical
crises. It would also, of course, increase Moscow's influence during such crises.
China might be key to the future direction of Russia's energy exports. The
present focus is to the West, to Europe, but government and industry
spokesmen in a series of announcements since 2005 have given weight to
previously contradictory statements from Moscow and Beijing about fulfilling
agreements for the sale of huge amounts of oil and natural gas to China.
These agreements are still tenuous—due in part to Beijing's concern about
Moscow's high prices, the availability of sufficient reserves to make some of
the more grandiose pipeline projects profitable, and Russian concern about
12
Chinese commercial challenges.
Sakhalin
Sakhalin Island, located off the east coast of Russia and to the north of Japan,
and its coastal waters hold vast hydrocarbon resources. Oil reserves are
estimated at almost 12 billion (bbbls), and natural gas reserves at
approximately 90 trillion cubic feet (tcf). These resources have been described
13
as “a gas station right on the Pacific Rim.” Two projects, Sakhalin 1 and
Sakhalin 2, are in progress, with Sakhalin 3 and Sakhalin 4 on the drawing
14
board.
Groups of international energy companies have formed consortia to develop

the resources. Although they all have extensive export plans via LNG
terminals and export pipelines to the Asian mainland, to Japan, and to other
Pacific nations, there has been little progress except in the Sakhalin 1 and
Sakhalin 2 areas, which lie to the southeast of Okha, a city at the north end of
the island.
The Sakhalin 1 Project
The Sakhalin 1 project is led by the joint U.S.-Russian effort, Exxon Neftegaz,
with Japan's Sakhalin Oil Development and Exploitation Company (SODECO),
India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh (ONGC), and two Rosneft
(Russian) subsidiaries (Sakhalinmorneftegaz and RN Astra) as consortia
members. Total capital expenditure for the project was set at $12.8 billion in
2003, with the first phase of the project involving $6.5 billion. An estimated
$5.7 billion had been spent by April 2007.
Consortium members began drilling in May 2003 and commercial production

began in October 2005. Maximum production of 250,000 bbl/d of oil and 140
million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d) of natural gas was announced in February
2007. This output is being piped to the Russian port of De-Kastri whence
natural gas is pumped into the Russian system under pressure from Moscow.
Most of the oil is sold and shipped by sea to Asian countries, including India.
Sakhalin 1 is selling natural gas to local markets, but the final form of this
product has not been chosen. ExxonMobil would like to send the natural gas to
the south via pipeline to China, but other shareholders and Gazprom prefer
marketing natural gas as LNG via Sakhalin 2, requiring an expansion of the
facilities there.
The Sakhalin 2 project is being developed by a consortium that now includes

Gazprom, Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui. The consortium members have
estimated the project's cost at more than $20 billion, which would make it the
largest single foreign investment in Russia. Approximately $13 billion had
already been spent by the end of 2006.
In February 2007, Gazprom announced it would pay $7.45 billion for a 50

percent plus one share in SODECO. This would ensure Russian control of the
15
project, a high priority to the Putin autocracy. Shell will keep 27.5 percent
less one share, Mitsui 12.5 percent, and Mitsubishi 10 percent. This deal was
concluded in April 2007. Gazprom intends to play a leading role as the major
shareholder, but Shell will remain technical advisor, reflecting the technical
expertise of private Western energy companies.
Shell estimated in July 2005 that recoverable reserves at 17.3 tcf of natural
gas and 1 Bbbls of petroleum were contained in Sakhalin 2, a reserve that has
been producing 80,000 bbl/d of oil during ice-free summer months, since July
1999. Phase II of the project should lead to full-year oil production of about
180,000 bbl/d by late 2007. Construction of an associated 9.6-million-tons-per
year LNG conversion facility began in early 2003; Shell anticipates LNG sales
beginning in 2008.
Sakhalin Island
Sakhalin 2 is expected to supply natural gas to the United States, Japan, and
South Korea. Contracts were signed in 2004 with Shell Oil's North American
gas marketing company, Coral Energy, to supply 1,800 billion cubic feet (bcf)
of LNG over twenty years to a power plant on the border of California and
Mexico; and with the Tokyo Gas and Electric Power Company (TEPCO) for the
annual sale of 300,000 tons of LNG starting in summer 2008. In July 2005, a
twenty-year sales agreement of 1.6 million tons per year of LNG to Korea
Natural Gas (KOGAS) was announced.
The delay in year-round oil and LNG production until at least 2008 is due to
concerns about disturbing the gray whale population. The consortium
announced in 2005 that it would be rerouting some of the pipelines, which
lead from the platforms to the shore-based processing facilities. Shell may
genuinely be concerned about this very endangered species, but the Russian
government is more likely using “environmental concerns” as a pretext for
16
pressuring the consortium to yield a controlling interest in the project.
An auction for three of the four blocks in the Sakhalin 3 project (estimated to
contain 5.1 bbbls of oil and 46 tcf of natural gas) was scheduled for late 2007,
but had not occurred as of early December. Moscow will determine which
companies will be allowed to bid. Its decision will be based on ensuring Russian
control of the project.
The fourth block, with estimated oil reserves of 1.2 bbbls and 9.1 tcf of gas,
was allocated to a Russian-Chinese consortium in February 2006, operating as
Venineft. The former's members, Rosneft and Sakhalinskaya N.K., will have a
74.9 percent stake in the project, with Sinopec holding the remaining 25.1
percent. They were given these rights when Moscow cancelled the 1993
17
agreement with an ExxonMobil-led consortium.
The Sakhalin 4–5–6 Projects
These phases aim to develop the northernmost fields lying offshore Sakhalin
Island; significant oil and natural gas reserves are expected but not proven. BP
and Rosneft have begun drilling in weather conditions that limit their
18
operations to the “four summer months.”
Full development of the Sakhalin project will make great amounts of energy
resources available to Asian nations, especially those on the Pacific rim.
Recovering those resources will continue to pose many challenges, however,
including unforeseen expenses, geophysical problems, ecological concerns, and
most acutely, Moscow's determination to maintain firm control over the
19
project, for both economic and strategic reasons. As stated by one observer,
“The question remains as to what will come first to Sakhalin—wealth,
ecological disaster or the usual stagnation caused, as one local put it, by ‘three
20
great Russian diseases,’ greed, graft and red tape.”
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea has no domestic oil reserves and must import all of its crude oil,
which makes up the largest share of its total energy consumption—2.6 million
bbls/d in 2006. The country is the world's ninth largest oil consumer and fifth
largest net oil importer. Most of these imports come from the Persian Gulf
region, with Saudi Arabia supplying about one-third of the requirements in
21
2005. The state-owned Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) is pursuing
equity stakes in oil and gas exploration around the world, with nineteen
overseas exploration and production projects in twelve countries, including
Vietnam, Indonesia, Yemen, Argentina, Peru, and the North Sea. Areas
22
offshore Korea are also being explored.
To ease its dependence on imports, Seoul has developed a strategic petroleum

reserve, managed by the KNOC, to hold a ninety-day supply. In the longer
term, KNOC is pursuing international investments in oil and gas exploration; it
currently has twenty-five overseas projects in fourteen countries. By the end
of 2007 these will include Australia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea
23
area, Libya, Yemen, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. The South
Korean government plans for KNOC to provide 10 percent of the country's oil
needs by 2008, a date which was recently moved forward from 2010. This goal
is not likely to be attained, since KNOC's output was providing just 4 percent
of the country's requirements at the end of 2005.
South Korea currently relies on imported LNG for most of its natural gas
requirements, though it began producing a small quantity of natural gas from
one offshore field in early 2004. Imports of LNG began in 1986, after the
founding of the state-owned monopoly LNG importer Korea Gas Company
(KOGAS). South Korea currently gets most of its LNG from Qatar, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Oman, with smaller volumes coming from Brunei and Australia,
and occasional spot cargoes from elsewhere.
In fact, South Korea is the second largest importer of LNG worldwide and for
the past three years had the highest growth in the world. Natural gas
consumption has increased dramatically, from near zero in 1985 to 1.077 bcf
24
in 2005. Russia may serve as the primary future LNG source: Moscow and
Seoul signed a twenty-year agreement in 2005 for the delivery of LNG from
25
Sakhalin, beginning in 2008, initially by ship.
Coal supplies approximately 22 percent of South Korea's total energy

requirements. Most of this coal is imported, since the only indigenous coal
resources consist of low-quality anthracite, which was historically used in
home heating and small boilers. Bituminous coal supplies (steam coal for
power plants and industrial boilers and metallurgical coal for steel making)
come mainly from Australia and China; 90.6 million short tons (mmst) of coal
was consumed in 2004, of which only 3.5 mmst (less than 4 percent) was
26
produced domestically.
South Korea's limited energy resources and dependence on imports over long
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) makes it an avid aspirant for Russian
energy reserves. It should be able to take advantage of the oil and gas
production of the Sakhalin projects; another pipeline under discussion would
transport Siberian natural gas from the Kovykta gas field near Irkutsk to
27
China's gas grid, with Seoul as a copartner.
The Kovykta field is estimated to hold 840 million tons of natural gas, enough
to provide Korea with almost half of its annual requirement. This project has
been discussed by Russia and South Korea since 1997, but no development
28
has occurred. The pipeline would be very expensive, with an estimated cost
29
of $11 billion. South Korea's participation in the Kovykta Gas Field
production would be less expensive, however, if the supplying pipeline ran
through North Korea instead of via an undersea route direct from Russia or
China.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea relies on two domestic sources of commercial energy—coal and
hydropower—for most of its energy needs. In 2003, coal accounted for more
than 80 percent of primary energy consumption and provided one-third of its
electric-generating capacity. Hydroelectric plants produced the other two-thirds
of electrical generation capacity, but many of these are believed to remain out
of operation due to damage from major flooding in 1996. The country's total
electricity consumption in 2000 was only 65 percent of what it had been in
1991. As a result of the electricity shortage, North Korea has resorted to a
rationing system. The country often experiences extended blackouts and
power losses due to its antiquated transmission grid.
Despite the paucity of energy sources, Pyongyang apparently does not support
the trans-Korean pipeline from Kovykta, perhaps fearing the reliance on a joint
venture with Seoul. Although there is no evidence of North Korean petroleum
reserves, the West Korea Bay may contain hydrocarbon reserves, as it is a
geological extension of China's oil-rich Bohai Bay. Companies from Sweden,
Great Britain, and Australia have been granted oil exploration concessions for
offshore blocks, while a Singapore company has been granted an onshore
exploration concession for an area in the Tachon-Rajin region near the Chinese
border. In September 2002, the company reported that initial seismic survey
results had indicated probable oil and natural gas deposits of modest size, but
30
production has not started.
In the meantime, North Korea imports all of the petroleum it consumes, which
accounts for approximately 6 percent of total energy consumption. Most
petroleum is imported as crude oil and processed at domestic refineries.
Pyongyang has not been a direct, open participant in discussion concerning
Northeast Asian pipelines, but given the country's heavy reliance on imported
energy supplies, is very concerned about the continued availability of energy
resources.
CHINA
China's GDP increased by 9.9 percent in 2005, 10.7 percent in 2006, and
31
averaged 11.5 percent during the first three quarters of 2007. This strong
economic growth is accompanied by increasing energy demands. Oil
consumption increased by almost 500,000 bbls/d in 2006, which was
32
approximately 38 percent of the total growth in world oil demand. The “trade
value” of the country's energy imports and exports increased by an amazing
330.5 percent between 2001 and 2006, from $23.27 billion to $100.19
33
billion. This trend has continued into 2007; in the first quarter, imports of
34
crude oil increased by almost 11 percent over the same period in 2006.
China is an important factor in world oil markets as the world's second-largest
consumer of oil, behind only the United States, and the world's third-largest
35
net importer of oil, behind the United States and Japan. Between January
and May 2006 China received 46 percent of its crude oil imports from the
Middle East and 32 percent from Africa, while its Asia-Pacific neighbors
36
supplied only 5 percent of its imports.
Approximately 85 percent of China's indigenous oil production capacity is

located onshore. Its largest oil-producing field, at Daqing in northeastern
China, accounts for more than one-quarter of China's total crude oil
production. Daqing has been long in service, however, and production levels
have been reduced since 2004, while the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) works to extend the life of the field.
Many foreign companies have contracted to undertake oil exploration and

production activities in China, but China's national oil companies are legally
entitled (required, in practice) to take a majority (51 percent) stake in any
commercial discovery. The national oil companies can also take over field
operations once the contracted firm has recovered its development costs. In
offshore zones, the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) reserves
the right to take over operations at any new discoveries, although certain
shallow water locations such as the Zhao Dong field in the Bo Sea—really a
large bay that extends from the Yellow Sea—are exempt. The Chinese
government typically mandates a royalty fee of 12.5 percent for foreign
companies involved in the oil sector, although discounts have been offered for
development and exploration in more remote onshore areas, such as the
western province of Qinghai and the autonomous region of Xinjiang.
Recent oil exploration efforts have centered on developing oil and natural gas
fields in the western provinces of Sichuan and Gansu, and autonomous regions
of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as well as offshore fields in the Bo Sea, Pearl
River Delta, and the South China Sea. A particularly large find was announced
in May 2007, when CNPC reported discovering an oilfield in Hebei Province,
partly offshore, with an estimated reserve of 7.35 bbbls. If proven, this would
37
indeed be a major find.
China's increasing dependence on oil imports has led its major energy
companies to acquire interests in exploration and production abroad. The CNPC
has exploration and production interests in twenty-one countries spanning four
continents, and in 2005 announced its intentions to invest a further $18 billion
in foreign oil and gas assets by 2020.
Sudan has been a particular target of CNPC's efforts, receiving more than $6
billion, including investments in a 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea. This has
drawn widespread criticism from the United States and other nations, who
accuse China of supporting genocide through its economic, political, and
38
military support of the Sudanese dictator, Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir.
Beijing argues that its investments in Sudan in fact help ameliorate the harsh
political conditions in that strife-torn nation. Additionally, several other
nations, including India and Malaysia, are also significant investors in Sudan's
39
petroleum sector.
Major Chinese energy investment efforts have also been made in Kazakhstan,
where in October 2005 CNPC finalized the purchase of PetroKazakhstan, with
assets including eleven oil fields and licenses to seven exploration blocks. This
purchase was complemented in December 2005 by completion of the 600-mile
Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline, with a design capacity of delivering 200,000 bbl/d of
crude oil to China. No more than one-half of this amount was being
transported in 2007, however, apparently due to inadequate production in the
40
Kazakh fields and oil pricing disputes.
Sinopec also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iranian

government in 2004 to acquire a 51 percent stake in the large Yadavaran oil
field, which industry reports suggest could produce 300,000 bbl/d. China and
Iran were still negotiating over the possible $70 billion agreement in April
2007, however, unable to agree on pricing. Also under discussion was a
41
commitment by China to import LNG from Iran.
The company has further acquired a 40 percent stake in Synenco Energy's

$4.5 billion Northern Lights oil sands project in Canada. It expects the project
to produce a total of 100,000 bbl/d of synthetic crude oil in 2010, when
42
commercial operations are scheduled to begin.
CNOOC is also working to expand its international oil production and

exploration assets, with a concentration on maritime resources. In 2005, the
company was forced by U.S. Congressional opposition to withdraw its $18.5
billion bid to acquire the American company, Unocal, valued for its deep-sea
drilling technology and natural gas interests in offshore Burmese fields, but
this was just one bump in the development road. Later, in 2005, CNOOC
purchased Repsol-YPF's oil field interests in Indonesia, making it the largest
operator in that country's offshore oil sector. Then, in 2006, it acquired a 45
percent stake in an oil and gas field in Nigeria for $2.3 billion. The company
also has successfully negotiated smaller exploration and development
contracts with Equatorial Guinea and Kenya.
These activities are only a sampling of the patchwork of international

partnerships and acquisitions that Chinese oil and gas firms have made in
recent years. While Chinese purchase of oil and gas assets abroad has received
much attention, in 2006 Chinese oil companies pumped less than 1 percent of
world oil production, and sold approximately two-thirds of that amount on the
43
international market.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Chinese officials raised the possibility of building a national strategic petroleum

reserve (SPR) in 1993, and codified the proposal in China's tenth Five-Year
Plan (2000–2005). This program was in progress by 2004; the first of these
facilities, located in Zhenhai, was completed in August 2006, with a capacity to
store 32 million barrels (mmbbls) of oil. The second, at Zhoushan (25
mmbbls), was completed in March 2007; the third and fourth, at Huangdao (25
44
mmbbl) and Dalian (25 mmbbls), will be completed in 2008. The first two of
these are in Zhejiang Province, south of Shanghai in east-central China, and
the last two in Shandong and Liaoning Provinces, both farther north in eastern
China, respectively. All four SPRs, however, are located relatively near China's
coast, with ready access to and from the sea.
These form the first of the project's three phases, the final goal of which is to
45
provide ninety days’ oil supply by 2020. The rapidity with which the SPR
facilities are being constructed is impressive, but the project reportedly is
46
suffering from more than 25 percent cost overruns. Furthermore, Beijing has
yet to determine how the SPR will be used, for emergency supplies or to
moderate global pricing increases. The latter policy would significantly affect
global oil prices, unless Beijing is transparent about oil purchases for the SPR.
Historically, natural gas has not been a major fuel in China, but its share in
the country's energy mix is increasing. In 2004, natural gas accounted for only
around 3 percent of total energy consumption in China, although this figure is
expected to rise in the coming years. Proven reserves of natural gas stood at
53.3 tcf as of January 2006. China's consumption in 2004 of 1.3 tcf of natural
47
gas was double the figure for 1999, a trend that is continuing.
LNG has increasingly been considered by Chinese companies, because of

uncertainties surrounding the potential of piped Russian natural gas. In a joint
venture with BP and local firms, CNOOC built China's first LNG import terminal
in Guangdong Province, which received its first 60,000 ton shipment of LNG in
May 2006. The facility has a capacity to handle 3.7 mmt per year (mmt/y),
with a future second phase that would double that capacity. The company
awarded a twenty-five year, 3.3 mmt/y LNG supply agreement to Australia's
Northwest Shelf consortium to supply the new import terminal in 2006.
Another LNG import terminal is under construction in Fujian Province; this 3
mmt/y capacity facility is scheduled to begin operation in 2008 and will receive
LNG from BP's Tangguh consortium in Indonesia.
As many as a dozen other LNG terminals are either planned or proposed.

CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC are all considering new LNG facilities, but recent
LNG price increases have delayed some plans, while the companies try to
negotiate long-term LNG supply agreements. Planned or proposed LNG
projects not yet under construction include: CNOOC projects at Ningbo in
Zhejian Province, Qingdao in Shandong Province, and Shanghai;
CNPC/PetroChina projects at Tangshan in Hebei Province, in Jiangsu Province,
and Dalian; and Sinopec projects in Shandong and an island off the
southeastern city of Zhuhai.
Coal provides approximately 70 percent of China's total primary energy

consumption, and the country is both the largest consumer and producer of
coal in the world. China holds an estimated 126.2 billion short tons of
recoverable coal reserves, the third-largest in the world behind the United
States and Russia. Northern China, especially Shanxi Province, contains most
of China's easily accessible coal and virtually all of the large state-owned
mines. Coal consumption has been on the rise in China over the past five
years, reversing the decline seen from 1997 to 2000.
China's coal industry is plagued by many problems, including inefficient

management, insufficient investment, outdated equipment, poor safety
records, and extreme environmental pollution. These not only prevent the full
utilization of coal resources but also have proven resistant to government
attempts to gain control of the sector in order to increase coal output, attract
greater investment, institutionalize new coal technologies, and improve mining
48
safety, while reducing environmental damage.
Despite governmental awareness of these problems, announced programs to

improve coal mine safety and to reduce pollution have been disappointing. The
pollution problem resulting from continued heavy reliance on coal has been
49
especially resistant to control.
The coal sector is becoming increasingly open to foreign investment,

particularly in an effort to modernize existing large-scale mines and introduce
new technologies into China's coal industry. Coal liquefaction is one technology
being pursued; converting the mineral to a liquid at the mine mouth increases
its thermal value and significantly eases its transportation. The liquefaction
process is relatively costly, however, and further development may have at
50
least temporarily fallen victim to the marketplace. The coal sector thus
provides an element of energy security, but at significant cost.
This contributes to Beijing's drive to secure energy supplies at the source. The
drive for foreign energy assets combined with a strong interpretation of the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (notably not interfering in the
internal affairs of another country) has led China to support some of the
world's most abusive governments, such as those ruling Burma, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe, as Beijing places access to energy resources near the very top of
51
its list of international priorities.
The Sino-Venezuelan relationship includes a similar energy element. At issue

is the petroleum product called orimulsion. This product is produced by mixing
bitumen (found in large quantities in the Orinoco region of Venezuela) with
fresh water and surfactant. Bitumen has too high a viscosity for easy shipment
or burning as fuel. Hence, the bitumen must be mixed with water at a 70
percent to 30 percent ratio to make it a viable source of energy. This process
liquefies the bitumen into a crude oil-like state, easier to ship and to being
burned in power generating plants.
That Venezuela has both the world's currently known largest reserves of
bitumen—267 bbbls—and a special relationship with China makes this fuel an
52
issue of importance to the general Asian energy situation. As early as 2000,
Beijing committed to the purchase of orimulsion, although this decision may
have been made as much for political as for economic reasons relating to
energy requirements. China may have found irresistible the opportunity to
bolster the Hugo Chavez regime in Caracas, which remains a disturbing factor
53
for the United States.
Most recently, Sinopec reportedly agreed to participate in the Orinoco projects,

which have an estimated value at more than $30 million, if the estimated
54
production of 600,000 bbl/d proves accurate. This reported investment is
more portentous in view of the decision by ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips not
55
to meet Caracas's demands for local ownership. It may increase the
importance of Venezuela—currently just China's seventh largest supplier of
56
petroleum, following Angola, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Oman, and Sudan.
China's leaders appear well aware of the nation's energy requirements,

resources, and shortfalls, both currently and in the future. This awareness is
reflected in the eleventh Five-Year Program for Energy Development,
57
published in 2007. The plan includes steps to manage future energy needs,
focusing on problems including resource constraints, supply security (due to
the volatile international price of crude oil), and the need to increase energy
58
efficiency. The corrective “Guidelines and Goals” listed by Beijing include
speeding the construction of the strategic petroleum reserve facilities and the
59
“oil and gas pipeline network.”
TAIWAN
Taiwan has very limited domestic energy resources and relies on imports for
almost all of its energy requirements, equating to 973,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006.
This followed 2005 energy consumption, which consisted of imported
petroleum, 51.3 percent; coal, 31.9 percent; natural gas, 8.0 percent; nuclear,
60
7.3 percent; and hydropower, 1.5 percent.
Taiwan's national oil company, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), is the
dominant player in all sectors of the island's petroleum industry. Significant
competition did begin in July 2000 when the privately owned Formosa
Petrochemical Company (FPCC) opened a refinery at Mailiao. Taiwan's
legislature then passed the Petroleum Administration Law in October 2001,
which reduced CPC's near-monopoly, with the goal of eventually privatizing
the firm.
Taiwan and China have developed a cooperative relationship in the field of

energy, despite the tension and lack of formal ties between Taipei and Beijing.
CPC and CNOOC concluded an agreement in 1996 to jointly explore a 6,000
square mile area in the Tainan Basin of the Taiwan Strait. Some estimates put
recoverable oil reserves in the basin at 300 mmbbls, although no production
has yet taken place.
CPC is also active in overseas oil exploration and production projects through
its overseas arm, the Overseas Petroleum Investment Corporation (OPIC).
OPIC currently holds equity stakes in eight overseas oil fields in Australia,
Indonesia Ecuador, Venezuela, and the United States. The government of Chad
awarded a joint oil exploration contract to OPIC in January 2006 for a 10,000
square mile area, but after reaching the agreement, the Chadian government
suspended diplomatic recognition of Taipei. CPC officials have declared that the
61
move would not affect OPIC's contract.
Taiwan has very limited domestic natural gas reserves, 2.6 tcf as of January
2006. It consumed 352 bcf of natural gas in 2004, while producing only 30 bcf.
CPC anticipates an increase in natural gas demand because of the construction
of additional natural gas-fired power plants and rising LNG imports. Taiwan has
nine onshore natural gas producing fields on the western side of the island, as
well as three modest offshore platforms. Indonesia and Malaysia provide most
of the island's LNG.
Taiwan has very limited coal resources, and domestic coal production stopped
in 2000. Sixty-three million short tons (mmst) were consumed in 2004, an
increase of 27 percent since 2000. All of Taiwan's coal is imported, primarily
from Indonesia, Australia, and China.
In sum, for a land facing a very large security threat across a narrow strait,
Taiwan is doing remarkably little to reduce its almost total dependence on
seaborne energy imports. Domestic politics and lack of will appear contributing
factors to Taipei's inability to develop additional nuclear and other
nonhydrocarbon sources of energy. The lack of strategic energy reserves is
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also notable and difficult to understand.
THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines had 138 mmbbls of proven oil reserves in January 2006, but a
history of very limited production. In fact, there was no oil production at all
between 1996 and 2000. Following development of offshore reserves,
production reached just over 25,000 bbl/d in 2006. This is far short of daily
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consumption, however, which was estimated at 349,000 bbl/d for 2006.
The Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) has historically dominated the
country's oil sector, but the government has attempted to open the market to
foreign companies. Deregulation began in 1998 and has allowed several
private companies to enter the oil exploration and development market in the
Philippines. PNOC remains the primary player in upstream oil market
activities, although it frequently partners with foreign companies on its major
projects.
The Philippine Department of Energy had granted at least eleven licenses for
such consortia by the end of 2005, all of them focused on offshore energy
fields, in the Mindoro, Salawan, and Sulu Sea basins. Exploration activities in
the South China Sea remain constrained by the sovereignty disputes, but
PNOC, CNOOC, and PetroVietnam have signed an agreement to jointly explore
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an area located within 100 nm off the Philippine island of Palawan. The
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Malaysian company, Petronas, joined international efforts in 2007.
The Philippines produced no significant amount of natural gas before 2001,

although it was credited with 3.9 tcf of proven natural gas reserves as of
January 2006, most of it in the Malampaya natural gas field. Although natural
gas consumption has increased significantly since 2001, production in 2004
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provided less than 8 percent of total Philippine energy consumption. The
Malampaya natural gas field, off the northwest coast of the Philippine island of
Palawan with estimated reserves of 3.7 tcf, has been developed by an
international consortium of Shell (45 percent stake), Chevron (45 percent),
and PNOC (10 percent). This $4.5-billion project was inaugurated in October
2001; natural gas is pumped through a 270 nm undersea pipeline to a
processing facility in southwestern Luzon and then to three power plants that
are capable of producing 2,700 megawatts of electricity.
The Philippines has recoverable coal reserves of 260 mmst, but production was
only 2.9 mmst in 2004, while consumption was 10.1 mmst. This represented a
45 percent increase in coal usage since 1999. The shortfall is made up by
imports, primarily from Indonesia, China, and Australia. In fact, the relatively
plentiful domestic supply of various energy resources has been seriously
underexploited by successive Philippine governments, resulting in
unnecessarily heavy dependence on energy imports.
INDONESIA
Indonesia joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in 1962, but became a net importer of oil in 2004. The nation was
credited with 4.3 bbbls of proven oil reserves as of January 2007, but
production has decreased steadily since 1996. Production averaged 1.1 bbl/d
in 2006, a reduction of 32 percent since 1996.
The state oil company, Pertamina, was forced by the government in October
2001 to relinquish its monopoly position in the petroleum sector, and a new
regulatory company, BP Migas, was established. Indonesia's oil sector is now
dominated by several international oil companies, including Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil (United States); BP (United Kingdom); CNOOC
and PetroChina (China); and Total (France); even Iran has agreed to build an
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oil refinery in the country.
Indonesia cannot meet its current OPEC crude oil output quota of 1.45
mmbbl/d; in fact, daily oil consumption requires importing 1.2 mmbbl. Ongoing
exploration does not appear likely to reverse this trend.
Indonesia is the tenth-largest holder of proven natural gas reserves in the

world and the single largest in the Asia-Pacific region, with 97.8 tcf of proven
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reserves as of January 2007, more than 70 percent of it located offshore.
The natural gas sector was subject to reforms in 2001 similar to those applied
to the oil sector. The Indonesian company, PT Pertamina, controls 21 percent of
natural gas production, but six international companies dominate the industry:
total (estimated 30 percent market share): ExxonMobil (17 percent), Vico (11
percent), ConocoPhillips (11 percent), BP (6 percent), and Chevron (4
percent).
Indonesia produced 2.6 tcf of natural gas in 2004, of which half was consumed
domestically and half exported as LNG to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This
made Indonesia the world's largest exporter of LNG in 2005, exporting 1,123
bcf of LNG, about 16 percent of the total world annual production. The
government has a plan for increasing domestic natural gas consumption to
replace declining oil supplies, but Indonesia's inadequate natural gas
transmission and distribution network is limiting implementation of this
program.
One promising LNG project is the BP-led Tangguh project in Papua Province,
with 14.4 tcf of proven natural gas reserves onshore and offshore. BP (37
percent) heads a consortium of Japanese (36 percent), Chinese (17 percent),
and German (10 percent) companies that is developing this field.
Indonesia also has an estimated 5.5 bsts of recoverable coal reserves, about
two-thirds located in Sumatra. Production in 2004 of 142 mmst was an
increase of approximately 68 percent since 2000. Domestic consumption has
remained relatively flat, at 24 mmst in 2004, while the country has become
the world's second largest net exporter of coal in the world after China,
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shipping approximately 118 mmst that same year.
Indonesia is attempting to gain the maximum benefit from its large natural gas
and coal reserves, especially in view of the declining petroleum picture, but in
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the process is ceding majority control to foreign companies. This policy has
apparently contributed to limiting benefits from these resources accruing to
the domestic population. Meanwhile, Jakarta has moved to make large
investments in modernizing its navy, although as a motivation for this
program, energy security seems secondary to increasing domestic political
stability and the security of the nation's extensive littoral waters.
BRUNEI
Brunei's small, wealthy economy depends almost entirely on exports of crude
oil and natural gas. These revenues account for nearly half of GDP and 80
percent of total government revenues. Brunei consumes little energy
domestically, with the bulk coming from natural gas.
Brunei's oil reserves are declining, standing at 1.1 bbbls of proven reserves in
January 2007. Approximately 220,000 bbl/d were produced during 2006, of
which 198,000 bbl/d was crude oil and the remainder natural gas liquids. The
government has deliberately limited oil production since 1979, in an effort to
conserve its limited reserves. The industry is dominated by Brunei Shell
Petroleum (BSP), a joint venture between Shell and the government. Despite
Brunei's status as a net exporter of oil, the country imports about half of the
refined petroleum products that it consumes. This results from the country's
limited refining capacity and increases its dependence on secure SLOCs.
Neither onshore nor maritime areas are estimated to contain significant new
supplies of oil for Brunei. Most promising are some deep-water areas in the
South China Sea, but these are disputed with Malaysia. July 2007 negotiations
between the Brunei and Malaysian heads of state were promising, with Kuala
Lumpur proposing a joint venture, but Brunei has not been willing to
renegotiate its contracts with other foreign companies to reach agreement
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with Malaysia.
Brunei became the first Asian exporter of LNG in 1972 and remains an
important producer, with 333 bcf exported in 2005. It held 13.8 trillion cubic
feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2007; production of 406
bcf in 2004 included 71 bcf for domestic consumption and 357 bcf for export.
Japan received 92 percent of these exports, with the remainder going to South
Korea. BSP dominates natural gas production, while LNG activities are
conducted by a Brunei (50 percent)-Japan (Mitsubishi, 25 percent)-Shell
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(international, 25 percent) joint venture.
VIETNAM
Much of Vietnam's large rural population relies heavily on noncommercial
biomass energy sources such as wood, dung, and rice husks, which means that
Hanoi is able to concentrate on the commercial sector, with relatively little
concern for the effect of energy security on domestic tranquility.
Vietnam claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea land features;
while this claim is contested in part by the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia,
China is the most important and dangerous counterclaimant. Beijing seized the
Paracel Islands and some of the Spratly Islands after brief naval battles with
Vietnamese forces in 1974 and 1988, respectively. Vietnam, China, and the
Philippines did agree in March 2005 to exchange seismic survey information
about potential oil and natural gas reserves in some of the areas they dispute,
but this agreement does not address sovereignty issues. It is noteworthy that
the last significant clash occurred over twelve years ago, when China occupied
Mischief Reef off Palawan.
The nation's largest oil producer is Vietsovpetro (VSP), a joint venture

between PetroVietnam and Zarubezhneft of Russia. Crude oil production
declined from 403,000 bbl/d in 2004 to 370,000 bbl/d in 2005, but Vietnam
still exported 111,000 bbl/d, which reflects the country's industrial reliance on
natural gas. Japan, Singapore, and South Korea purchase most of Vietnam's
crude oil.
Vietnam has 600 million barrels of proven oil reserves, with promising offshore
fields still being explored. One promising offshore discovery, of 100 million
bbls, was made in 2004 by a joint venture comprised of American
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Technologies, Petronas, Singapore Petroleum, and PetroVietnam.
Vietnam's natural gas production and consumption have been rising rapidly
since the late 1990s, as proven gas reserves of 6.8 tcf are exploited. Natural
gas is currently produced entirely for domestic consumption, from fields
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offshore the Mekong Delta. Vietnam has also greatly increased exploitation
of its estimated 165 mmst of coal reserves since 1996. Production of more
than 18 mmst in 2003 allowed the export of 7 mmst, most of it to Japan and
China.
CAMBODIA
Cambodia has significant hydroelectric potential and indications of oil and
natural gas reserves offshore, as well as coal deposits. An April 2007
announcement by Chevron indicated that Cambodia might possess “huge
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deposits [of oil] off the southern shore.” The World Bank estimated the six
fields identified as containing perhaps two Bbbls, while the UN Development
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Program “confirmed” Cambodia's reserves as 700 mmbbls. The nation
remains in such a state of economic disarray, however, that all commercial
fuels currently are imported. Cambodia will probably be unique in its
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dependence on wood energy well into the twenty-first century.
MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a significant Southeast Asian producer of oil and natural gas,
although proven oil reserves have declined in recent years. It contests
ownership of some of the Spratly Islands and other South China Sea land
features with Brunei, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Several of
Malaysia's natural gas fields in offshore Sarawak and Sabah lie in waters that
may also be claimed by China.
The state-owned oil company, Petronas, dominates the country's oil sector. It is
also the single largest contributor of government revenues, holding exclusive
ownership rights to all exploration and production projects; all foreign and
private companies must operate through contracts with Petronas. ExxonMobil
is the largest foreign oil company operating in Malaysia, but there are
numerous other foreign firms also working with Petronas.
Malaysia was credited with proven oil reserves of 3.0 bbbls as of January
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2007, a decrease from 4.6 bbbls in 1996. Most of these are located in
offshore fields. The decline in proven oil reserves is expected to continue, with
a 13 percent decrease from 2006 to 2008 forecast. Petronas is pursuing two
tracks to offset this decline: first, domestic exploration; and second, energy
projects in twenty-nine foreign countries.
Most of Malaysia's estimated 75 tcf of proven natural gas reserves are located
offshore, particularly in the South China Sea near Sarawak. Production rose
47 percent between 2000 and 2004, reaching 2.2 tcf, while domestic natural
gas consumption also increased, rising 61 percent between those two years, to
1.2 tcf in 2004. The Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) in the
lower part of the Gulf of Thailand is a prime area for future natural gas
exploitation, with an upper estimate of 24 tcf of proven and “speculated”
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reserves.
Malaysia is one of the world's leading exporters of LNG, selling more than one
tcf in 2005, which was 15 percent of total world LNG exports. Most of these
exports went to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, Malaysia's
International Shipping Corporation owns and operates twenty-three LNG
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tankers, the largest LNG fleet in the world by volume of LNG transported.
Kuala Lumpur has also announced construction of a large crude oil depot
designed specifically to serve tankers transiting the Malacca Strait. The joint
project with German and Belgian companies, will further position Malaysia as a
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competitor to Singapore, which currently owns the only depots on the strait.
The offshore location of the majority of its petroleum and natural gas reserves,
its location as one of the nations delineating the Malacca Strait, and its
modernizing navy all contribute to Malaysia viewing maritime energy security
as a vital national priority.
SINGAPORE
Singapore's viability as a nation-state depends on imported energy resources,
since the country has no domestic reserves, but the city-state consumed
763,000 bbl/d in 2005 and drew 80 percent of its power generation needs
from natural gas. It is also a leader in petroleum refining, with three refineries
operated by ExxonMobil (605,000-bbl/d), Royal Dutch Shell (458,000-bbl/d),
and the Singapore Petroleum Company (273,600-bbl/d).
Natural gas use is rising rapidly, as the government promotes policies aimed at
reducing carbon dioxide and sulfur emissions, ensuring energy security, and
promoting the country as a regional hub for an integrated gas pipeline
network. All the natural gas Singapore consumes is imported, 233 bcf in 2004.
Currently all natural gas imports arrive via undersea pipelines from Indonesia
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and Malaysia.
Singapore's strategic location at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Malacca,

through which roughly one-third of global sea commerce passes, has helped it
become one of the most important shipping centers in Asia. Probably no Asian
nation is more strategically aware of its position in the world, particularly with
respect to the SLOCs and energy security. For instance, senior Singapore
government officials conducted a series of missions to the Middle East,
including Iran, in February–March 2004, to build stronger trade and political
relationships. Results included free trade agreements (FTA), including one with
the massively energy rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
THAILAND
Thailand has limited domestic oil production and reserves, so imports make up
a significant portion of the country's oil consumption. Approximately 85
percent of crude oil production comes from offshore fields in the Gulf of
Thailand. Thailand produced an estimated 336,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006, while
consuming 922,000 bbl/d, requiring 586,000 bbl/d of imports, second largest
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among Southeast Asian nations. Exploitation of Thailand's 290 million
barrels of proven oil reserves is dominated by PTT, the state-owned oil and gas
company.
Although foreign companies may operate in the oil sector, they usually do so
through joint ventures with PTT. In fact, foreign companies provide most of
Thailand's domestic oil production, with Chevron accounting for more than
three-fourths of the country's crude oil production in 2006. PTT is seeking
energy supplies overseas, with most of its investments among its neighbors
(Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia), but also in Algeria, Iran, and
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Oman.
Thailand has large proven natural gas reserves, but while production has
increased since 2000, imports are still required to meet growing demand. The
14.8 tcf of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2007, are almost all
located offshore in the Gulf of Thailand. The 790 bcf produced in 2004 was not
enough to satisfy the 1,055 bcf consumed domestically and most of the net
265 bcf difference was imported by pipeline from Burma. This relationship
constrains Thailand's ability to deal with the politically repressive Burmese
regime, either bilaterally or through the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). It is a clear case of energy security driving national foreign
affairs policy.
Thailand's future ability to satisfy domestic natural gas demands will depend
on the JDA in the Gulf of Thailand being developed with Malaysia. A new
pipeline—the second of three planned—to bring JDA resources into the
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domestic infrastructure began operating in June 2007.
AUSTRALIA
Australia is rich in petroleum, natural gas, and coal reserves. Its huge coal
reserves are the world's fourth largest, estimated at 86.5 billion tons in 2007.
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Production has grown by 36 percent since 1996 and continues to expand.
Domestic energy consumption is dominated by coal, which fuels most of the
country's power generation plants.
Australia is also the world's largest net exporter of coal, with 29 percent of
global exports, representing 60 percent of its annual coal production. Japan
buys almost two-thirds of these exports, a status likely to be challenged by
China, if its economy and need for raw materials continue to grow. These coal
sales result from Australia's wealth in that mineral, of course, but also reflect
China's inadequate transportation infrastructure: it is often less expensive to
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import coal from Australia than to purchase and ship it domestically.
Most of Australia's 1.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves are located
offshore, primarily off the western coast and in the Bass Strait, between
southern Australia and the island of Tasmania. The country is not rich in crude
oil deposits—39 percent of consumption in 2006 came from imports—and
production will continue to fall, barring success in ongoing exploration for
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additional offshore fields.
The Australian government believes petroleum import dependency will

increase by 2010 to as much as 80 percent of domestic requirements. Relief
may come from the country's huge unconventional oil reserves in the form of
the shale oil reserves in Queensland, which may contain as much as 30 bbbls.
The government is currently developing infrastructure to bring more natural

gas reserves to market, to compensate for declining crude oil production. Over
the past two decades, Australia has consumed increasing amounts of natural
gas, a trend likely to continue in the medium term. Australia is also the world's
fifth largest exporter of LNG, with exports increasing by 58 percent between
1994 and 2004. This trend will almost certainly continue, in view of an
agreement to sell $25 billion worth of LNG to China over the next twenty-five
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years.
Australia is credited with 30.4 tcf of proven natural gas reserves, with the
possibility of an additional 100 tcf of reserves, most of them offshore the
continent's northwest coast, with significant fields also located in the Bass
Strait area. Natural gas production increased from 930 bcf to 1,300 bcf
between 1994 and 2004, with consumption growing from 660 to 931.3 bcf;
Canberra expects to maintain natural gas self-sufficiency.
Two foreign relationships will significantly affect the future Australian energy
picture. First and most important is the increasingly close economic
relationship with China, based on the sale of energy resources and other raw
materials, and one that is disturbing to some Australian and United States
security strategists. The two nations announced “Australia's biggest ever single
export deal” in September 2007: the sale of $45 billion worth of LNG to
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China. A conflict between political and economic priorities—between
Australia's mutual defense treaty obligations with the United States and
Australia's economic obligations with China—may well affect the Asian political
and economic scene.
Second is Australia's dispute with Timor Leste over natural gas deposits in the
Timor Sea, discovered in September 2005 by American (ConocoPhillips) and
Australian (Santos) companies. Ownership of these resources has been
contested between the new, extremely poor nation of Timor and Australia,
particularly over the area called the “Timor Gap.” This maritime area lies closer
to the former than to the latter, but the distances involved—no more than 100
nm separate Timor from its larger neighbor to the south—make the
sovereignty issue a classic example in which the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not provide a solution to the dispute.
Negotiations led by the United Nations (UN) produced the Timor Sea
Agreement 2003, however, creating the Timor Joint Development Area (TJDA)
and dividing of royalties from the disputed area's energy resources 90 percent
to 10 percent in Timor's favor.
The major natural gas lying completely within the TJDA, the Bayu Undan,
began operation in February 2004 with an estimated 3.4 tcf of natural gas.
Only 20 percent of the Greater Sunrise field, which is estimated to contain
almost three times as much natural gas (9.3 tcf) lies within the TJDA, which
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leaves a significant majority of Timor Sea reserves in dispute.
BURMA
Burma possesses extensive sources of energy, including hydropower, coal,
forest products, petroleum, and especially natural gas. Because of political
heavy-handedness and economic disarray, however, the country has yet to
position itself even to begin garnering full benefit from these abundant
resources. Instead, the military junta that has been misgoverning the country
since the late 1980s seems intent on continuing to sell off its considerable
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energy riches to China, rather than develop them for its people's benefit.
Additionally, Russia, the United States, Vietnam, Thailand, and India are just
some of the many countries that would like to access Burmese energy
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reserves.
The Burmese government is taking advantage of these resources to solidify its

position in power. Much of the energy revenues are used by the ruling military
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junta to purchase arms.
INDIAN OCEAN NATIONS

Economic and population growth in South Asia resulted in a 52 percent
increase in energy consumption between 1993 and 2003. The region's
commercial energy mix in 2003 was 44 percent coal, 35 percent petroleum, 13
percent natural gas, 6 percent hydroelectricity, 1 percent nuclear, and 0.3
percent “other,” but there are significant variations present. Bangladesh's
energy mix is dominated by natural gas (67 percent in 2003), while India
relies heavily on coal (52 percent in 2003), Sri Lanka and the Maldives are
overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum (84 percent and 100 percent,
respectively); and Pakistan is diversified among petroleum (38 percent),
natural gas (41 percent), and hydroelectricity (14 percent).
The increased energy demand confronts inadequate energy supplies. Industrial

and general economic growth is requiring steadily increasing energy
resources; even more important, however, is ensuring an adequate supply of
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electricity, crucial to maintaining societal peace and national cohesion.
South Asia contains proven reserves of only 6.2 billion barrels of oil, just 0.5
percent of total world reserves; the region consumed 3.09 million bbl/d in
2005, but produced approximately 0.93 million bbl/d, almost all of it from
Indian offshore fields. This shortfall is made up for the most part by Middle
East imports of approximately 2.2 mmbbl/d.
The South Asian natural gas picture is not much better. Proven reserves in
January 2006 were estimated at 62.1 tcf, just 1 percent of the world total.
Indian and Pakistani reserves are 38.9 tcf and 28.2 tcf, respectively;
Bangladesh, with 5.0 tcf is the only other South Asian country which has
proven gas reserves. All current natural gas production in South Asia is
consumed domestically, reflecting a two-thirds increase in consumption
between 1993 and 2003.
Even if additional natural gas reserves are found in the region, it will have to
overcome a rudimentary domestic infrastructure. International pipelines or
LNG facilities would have to be built, not an easy task in such a politically
disrupted region.
South Asia's coal reserves of 105.3 billion short tons are approximately 11
percent of the world total, and coal accounts for 44 percent of total energy
consumption. Nearly all of that is produced and consumed by India, however;
coal plays a relatively minor role in Pakistan's energy mix (6 percent in
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2003).
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh has just 28 mmbbls of proven oil reserves and is a net oil
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importer. Its only significant source of commercial energy is natural gas,
estimates of which vary widely. The Ministry of Finance in 2004 estimated 20.5
tcf of recoverable reserves; earlier, in June 2001, the U.S. Geological Survey
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had added an estimated 32.1 tcf of “undiscovered reserves” to this number.
The government estimates that natural gas accounts for 80 percent of the
country's commercial energy consumption and 463 bcf were produced in 2004,
up from 429 bcf in 2003, and more than doubling the 1994 level. Given the
uncertain size of the country's natural gas reserves, the government has been
reluctant to export this product and has instead restricted it to domestic
energy requirements.
Biomass is a significant noncommercial energy source in Bangladesh, as it is in

Burma, estimated to account for over half of the country's energy
consumption. Its utility eases the government's concern about providing
alternative sources of energy for noncommercial purposes, but also reflects the
raw nature of Bangladesh's economy and the tenuousness that this imparts to
the nation's political viability.
INDIA
India has become a significant consumer of energy resources as its economy
rapidly expands and modernizes, ranking as the world's fifth-largest consumer
of oil in 2006. Its 5.6 bbbls of proven oil reserves as of January 2007 are the
third largest in Asia, after Russia and China. Much of it is located offshore the
western coast, although substantial undeveloped reserves are estimated to lie
in the Bay of Bengal. Production levels have not been able to keep up with
increasing oil consumption, and imports are increasingly necessary. In 2006,
846,000 bbl/d were produced but 2.63 million bbl/d were consumed. The latter
figure represented an increased oil demand of 100,000 bbl/d, a trend likely to
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continue.
India's oil sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises, led by the state-

owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). A subsidiary company, ONGC
Videsh, has embarked in significant overseas investments, holding interests in
twenty-five oil and natural gas projects in fifteen countries, spanning Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Two of ONGC Videsh's most notable
investments are its share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
(GNPOC), which operates in Sudan, and a 20 percent stake in the ExxonMobil-
led consortium in the Sakhalin 1 project. Indian officials have announced
development of a strategic petroleum reserve to increase energy security.
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Construction of a 36.7 mmbbls facility began in early 2007.
As is the case with its oil reserves, India's 38 tcf of proven natural gas
reserves are for the most part found offshore the country's west coast. These
fields produced 996 bcf of natural gas in 2004, but the nation consumed 1,089
bcf, requiring 93 bcf of imported LNG, which came from Qatar. Reliance on
imported natural gas is expected to continue and New Delhi is investigating
various LNG and pipeline projects to ameliorate this dependence. Proposed
projects would access energy resources from Burma and from Central Asia,
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including Kazakhstan and Iran.
India began receiving LNG shipments in January 2004 with the startup of the
Dahej terminal in Gujarat state, in western India. Two terminals are currently
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in operation, through which 222 bcf were imported in 2005. In sum, India's
economic growth must deal with a marginal energy situation; the abundance
of coal will likely not be able to compensate for oil and natural gas shortfalls.
Maintaining energy security for New Delhi will require astute international
political and economic diplomacy.
India is the world's third largest coal producer, after the United States and
China. Approximately 70 percent of India's coal consumption is used for power
generation. New Delhi was “readying” an energy security plan in early 2007,
designed to increase use of nonfossil fuels and renewable energy sources. The
plan also addressed pursuit of the new strategy in cooperation with the other
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nations of the non-aligned movement.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is increasingly reliant on oil imports from the Middle East, a situation
exacerbated by the country's inadequate refining capacity, which means
having to import petroleum products as well as crude oil. Proven oil reserves
of only 300 mmbbls are mostly located in the southern half of the country, and
imports are required to satisfy domestic demand, with Saudi Arabia the leading
supplier.
Natural gas provides approximately 50 percent of Pakistan's total energy

consumption. Since that exceeds domestic production, natural gas also has to
be imported. Most of Pakistan's 28 tcf of proven natural gas reserves also lie in
the southern half of the country. Production in 2004 was 968 bcf, a modest
amount expected to decline over the next fifteen to twenty-five years, while
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demand is expected to increase. Islamabad is exploring several pipeline and
LNG options, including with Central Asia and Iran, to increase the security of
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those imports.
Pakistan has failed to take advantage of its estimated 3,362 mmst of proven
recoverable coal reserves. Just 3.5 mmst were produced in 2004 and
additional coal was imported to meet domestic demand. An additional 1,929
mmst of high quality coal reserves in Sindh Province have attracted both
domestic and foreign development interest. Apparently due to Pakistan's rigid
negotiating position, however, China, which had proposed developing the new
coalfields and building a series of power-generating plants in the area, has
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reportedly abandoned the proposal.
The concentration of Pakistan's domestic energy reserves in its southern

region makes them vulnerable to maritime strike. Furthermore, the country's
only seaports would be relatively easily to interdict because of their location
close to India.
CONCLUSION
China looms largest among Asian national energy profiles, but other states are
also important, on a global scale. Beijing's energy requirements are second
only to the United States; Japan's are third. But India, at number six in the
world, has the potential to match both of the Northeast Asian economic giants,
while Australia and Indonesia are vitally important sources of energy supplies
in the region.
Russia apparently has the necessary resources and may well aspire to become
the dominating source of energy for Asia. Siberian resources, both crude oil
and natural gas, may be among the world's largest untapped sources of
energy. Their recovery has begun, but full exploitation remains problematical.
The chief claimants of these resources are Japan and China, although both
North and South Korea will eventually benefit from Russian energy reserves.
Russia already serves as the major source of natural gas to Central and
Western Europe; the addition of eastern customers would indeed place Moscow
in a dominant position in the Eurasian energy infrastructure.
Japan may eventually draw from the Sakhalin gas fields as a primary source,
but currently is continuing to rely on LNG arriving by sea as the main form of
gas used for energy needs. Although piping Sakhalin's natural gas directly to
Japan would seem to be more efficient than LNG, existing LNG infrastructure
offers advantages not easily replaced by the building of a similar infrastructure
for piping natural gas.
In any case, Japan's almost complete lack of domestic energy resources casts a
strong shadow across its foreign policies. The availability of Iranian oil and
natural gas, for instance, has driven Tokyo to ignore U.S. policy wishes against
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that nation and to pursue agreements to access those reserves.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a tour of the Middle East in April
2007, visiting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, reflecting
Japan's dependence on energy imports from the Middle East and Southwest
Asia—which provide 70 percent of the nation's oil and natural gas. No nation is
more concerned with the security of sea lines of communication, especially
focusing on the main routes through the South China Sea, Singapore and
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Malacca Straits, and the Indian Ocean.
South Korea is in a position similar to that of Japan but has the advantage of
possible continental connections to Siberian reserves. North Korea is so
isolated from the international community that as of 2007 only China is a
reliable source of the energy imports that are vital to Pyongyang. North Korea
has of course periodically received shipments of fuel oil as part of various
attempts to bribe the regime to halt its development of nuclear power. These
began in 1994 and in 2007 were resumed by South Korea, with a first
shipment of 50,000 tons of oil sent by sea. Plans for additional energy
109
assistance to North Korea were also in place by December 2007.
China has been a net energy importer since 1993, but its huge coal reserves—
third in the world, but reportedly superior in quality to those of Russia and the
United States—provide a significant security margin for the nation's energy
110
future. The rapidly developing economy has meant an even more rapidly
growing requirements for energy. China's role as one of the world's three
largest importers of energy resources makes it a crucial player in global
energy security determinations, particularly in Asia.
Taiwan remains very much a province of China in terms of energy availability
and distribution. The island is no better off for indigenous energy resources
than is Japan. Almost incredibly, Taipei has made nearly no provisions to
ensure the availability of sources independent of Beijing's influence. Even the
construction of nuclear power plants has, since 2000, been hampered by the
“green” concerns of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government.
The maritime nations of Southeast Asia—the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei,

Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Burma—vary widely in
their energy infrastructures. Many of these states are at least close to self-
sufficiency in the matter of energy resources, with Singapore flourishing as
entrepot. West of Malacca, Thailand, Burma, and the nations of South Asia also
are full participants in the global process of energy production and
consumption.
Energy is a main thread in economic, political, and national security priorities

throughout Asia. Japan, China, and India are the giants of consumption;
Russia, China, and Indonesia, those of production. The nations of the region
are certainly nationalistic, each subject to contrary domestic trends of energy
internationalism and political autonomy.
China exemplifies the important characteristics of Asian energy issues. First, it

became an energy importer only relatively recently, despite possessing very
substantial energy resources. Second, domestic, and perhaps international
security depends in significant part on continued economic growth and the
betterment of its people's standard of living, which in turn requires increasing
supplies of affordable energy sources. Third, a perhaps natural drive toward
acquiring assured energy, from source to consumption, conflicts with the
market forces that drive the global energy industry: politics and economics do
not always combine to deliver energy security. Fourth, the fact that almost all
the Asian nations are pursuing a finite supply of energy, in competition with
many non-Asian nations, bears in it seeds of conflict.
History demonstrates that nations will pursue policies and take action,
including military action, which might seem counter to economic logic, if
deemed necessary in the pursuit of national security. Hence, as an exemplar of
Asian energy issues, and one of the dominant—and the most expansive—of the
region's nations, China, in its aggressive and expansive approach, may well
hold the key to the role that the pursuit of energy security will play in future
111
Asian developments.
GETTING THE OIL: PIPELINES ASHORE
One way to facilitate the undoubted economic benefits from the increasingly
huge tankers that are discussed in the next chapter is to use them only on the
high seas, with pipelines to transfer their cargoes across isthmuses and around
navigational chokepoints. This also ameliorates the threats to the security of
the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) over which tankers travel. A
widespread program of pipeline construction is underway in Asia on both a
regional and a national basis. The transportation issue goes directly to a
central question of energy security: ensuring reliable access to energy
resources.
SIBERIA
The most significant pipeline proposal in Asia, in terms of potential economic

and political impact, is the often announced pipeline designed to exploit
Russia's vast Siberian petroleum reserves. The political dynamics of this
enormous project are as significant as is the economic impact for Russia and
for the two most important competitors for these reserves, China and Japan.
Moscow faces a series of decisions based on geopolitical as well as economic

factors. South and North Korea, Mongolia, and the United States are also
concerned with the distribution of Siberian energy reserves, although not as
direct participants in the decision regarding major pipeline routes.
The United States is concerned about the fate of Siberian resources for
1
economic and political reasons. First, U.S. energy demand remains the largest
in the world and is constantly increasing. Second, Washington has an economic
and political interest in the two primary alternatives under consideration for
routing the major pipeline from interior Siberia; these are from Angarsk in
Russia to either Daqing in China, or Nakhodka, a Russian port city on the Sea
of Okhotsk. The first route would transport Russian oil south of Lake Baikal
directly to China (although a route through Mongolia has also been proposed);
the second would transport the oil north of Lake Baikal and keep the pipeline
entirely in Russia, with distribution at Nakhodka to China, Japan, South Korea,
or other Pacific nations. Significant political-military considerations are
associated with the route selected for a pipeline or pipelines constructed to
exploit the vast, but difficult to access, eastern Siberian energy reserves.
Exploitation of Russia's far eastern resources has strong political implications

for the region and the future of its major players. Energy exploitation
questions will be decided for reasons of state as well as by economic
calculation. There is a rich historical background to the present situation; the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was narrowly won by Japan; the war's
concluding treaty ceded to Tokyo the southern half of Sakhalin Island.
This territory, as well as the entire Kurile Island chain, was occupied by
Moscow in 1945, at the end of World War II. Tokyo does not actively dispute
Moscow's sovereignty over Sakhalin or the central and northern Kuriles, but
does maintain that the southern Kurile Islands—Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir,
and Etorofu—are Japanese. The two nations reestablished diplomatic relations
in 1956 and signed a major trade agreement in 1957, but they have never
signed a treaty formally ending their World War II state of hostilities. The
status of these islands remains a sensitive subject in Japan's domestic politics,
while retention of all the Kuriles is an equally sensitive issue of national pride
in the much-reduced, post-Soviet Russia.
One way around this conundrum might be a quid pro quo whereby Japan
would furnish the economic and technological wherewithal for developing
Siberian resources in exchange for the return to its sovereignty of the four
southern Kurile Islands. This possible settlement has been discussed
periodically by Japanese and Russian leaders, at least since President Mikhail
2
Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo in 1991, but the dispute remains unresolved.
Siberian Russia covers 2.4 million square miles, but has a population of just 8
million people, less than that of Moscow. According to the Russian government,
Siberia has proven oil and gas deposits that could make it a near equivalent of
Saudi Arabia in terms of energy resources. This estimate may reflect national
pride as much as geologic fact—in 2004, for instance, Moscow quintupled its
estimate of Siberian oil and natural gas reserves—but the reserves that are
3
present are almost certainly of global significance. Several problems have
delayed development of Siberia, including the lack of transportation and
communications, underpopulation, difficulty in retaining skilled workers due to
the harsh climate, poor housing, low wages, and the estimated $15 billion cost
4
“on the exploration and other preparatory work” reportedly required. Russia
lacks the financial and technological resources necessary to exploit Siberia's
mineral wealth without foreign assistance.
Institutional disregard for the environment has characterized economic

development in Russia, and Siberia is no exception. There are no resources in
the Russian federal and regional budgets to ensure proper environmental
assessments are carried out, although both routes proposed to exploit the
Siberian reserves would undoubtedly have major impacts on Siberia's
5
environment. The Angarsk-Daqing route would cut directly through the Ukok
Plateau, an area near the Russia-Mongolia-China juncture that is renowned for
its abundance of rare and endangered species, and might also threaten the
6
huge Tunkinsky National Park, on the shores of Lake Baikal.
Despite its long record of disregard for the environment, Moscow has not
hesitated to use environmental concerns as a rationale for decisions and
7
delays, much more likely driven by economic or political reasons. Most
recently, financing and construction of the six-phase project to exploit
Sakhalin's natural gas reserves have been delayed by decisions, which Moscow
8
claims are based on environmental concerns.
While Siberia is a potential major source of crude oil and natural gas imports
for both China and Japan, so far there has been more talk than action. The
Russian government has been holding regular bilateral discussions with the
Chinese and Japanese governments on the feasibility of pipelines to make such
exports possible. Moscow's desire for the financial return from selling these
resources to Japan is shadowed by the Kuriles controversy; selling to China is
shadowed by historic Russian suspicion of Chinese demographic, economic, and
military threats.
During several years of discussion and negotiations, Siberian energy reserves

have flowed into China via rail, but on a much smaller scale than Beijing hopes
for in the future. Moscow and Beijing signed a potentially important agreement
in September 2001 to jointly explore and develop petroleum reserves in east
Siberia, estimates of which run as high as 11.5 billion tons, with as many as
5.1 billion available to China during the first twenty-five years of the pipeline's
9
operation, at a cost of $150 billion. Additional Russian statements in early
2005 indicated that priority would be given to the route to Daqing (China), but
during Russian President Putin's visit to Japan in November of that year he
announced that “we chose the Lake Baikal northern route, which will be costly,
10
because we will be able to link it to the Pacific [Japan] route.”
Reasons include the aforementioned European orientation of Russia's energy

exporting infrastructure and the difficulty of building pipelines through the
Siberian topography. Redirecting the nation's infrastructure to supply China
and Japan will have to overcome very significant obstacles. The Russian
company, Yukos, had been supplying oil to China by rail since 2001, with 2.7
million tons delivered in 2002 and 7.5 million tons in the first ten months of
11
2006. Rail shipments were significantly reduced, following Moscow's effective
12
breakup of Yukos, and thereafter were provided by Rosneft.
Another Russian company, East Siberian Oil, is currently exporting crude oil
from Yurubchenskoye to China by a combination of road and rail transport.
Quantities are small, but East Siberian claims the field could have a production
potential of 400,000 bbl/d if fully developed. Another proposal would link the
Russian gas grid in Siberia to China, and possibly South Korea, via a pipeline
from Irkutsk, drawing on the Kovykta gas field, but this link would not be
13
operational before 2010 at the earliest.
The cost of this latter project has been estimated at $10 billion, and a
feasibility study is ongoing. Russian participation in building this pipeline would
reportedly make GazProm “Russia's largest trade and economic establishment
14
in the Chinese capital,” where it has opened a “permanent office.”
In December 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President

Jiang Zemin issued a post-summit meeting statement that emphasized “the
great significance of energy cooperation” between their countries, since “it is
critical to make sure that Sino-Russian cooperation projects concerning crude
oil and natural gas pipelines” are “carried out according to schedule” and that
15
“the implementation of promising energy projects” be coordinated. In
January 2003, however, following a visit to Moscow by Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi, President Putin made statements indicating he preferred the more
Japanese-friendly pipeline route, to Nakhodka to the line favored by Beijing, to
16
Daqing. Most recently, Putin and China's President Hu Jintao agreed to
continue developing their nations’ “strategic relationship,” to include “gradual
implementation of large-scale bilateral cooperation projects in the energy
17
area.”
An early estimate described a 1,400-mile-long pipeline capable of providing

147 mmbbls of crude oil a year to China when completed in 2005, and 221
18
mmbbls by 2010. This pipeline would cost approximately $2 billion and have
the capacity to convey 30 million tons of petroleum—a very significant
proportion of China's total demand—from Russia to China annually by 2010.
The lead companies for the project were to be China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) and PetroChina for China, and Yukos and Transneft for
19
Russia. Beijing has further attempted to sweeten the deal for Moscow by
discussing a loan of $10 billion and the technology to develop additional
energy fields in Siberia, while CNPC offered to invest $1.2 billion in building
20
the pipeline.
The Chinese “pipeline offensive,” designed to gain control of Siberian energy

resources, includes the following proposals:
1. Oil deposit exploration and development throughout Siberia
2. A pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing
3. A pipeline from Angarsk to Northern China, which presumably would pass
through Mongolia
4. The Kovykta gas pipeline project, built with South Korea's participation
5. A pipeline from Sakha-Yakutia in western Siberia to Daqing
6. Chinese participation in exploring and developing oil and gas deposits in
the Khabarovsk region in northeastern Siberia
Russia has also continued to negotiate with Japan about building a pipeline
from Angarsk to Nakhodka, a seaport on the Sea of Japan, with a branch
pipeline to Daqing, in northeastern China. That would facilitate the shipment
21
of Russian oil both to Japan and to other Pacific nations.
The Japanese “pipeline offensive” is based on both Russian economic and

national security concerns. First, Tokyo is offering Moscow more than double
the money suggested by China; reportedly $14 billion invested in Russian oil
projects, including $5 billion in the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline, $7 billion for
“supplementary exploration of oil deposits in Eastern Siberia,” and $2 billion
22
for “implementing social projects in the Far East.” Japan is also offering to
fund construction of a refinery and oil-loading port on the eastern Siberian
23
coast.
Second, the stream of Japanese officials visiting their Russian counterparts

apparently is not hesitant about playing on Moscow's historic reservations
about China as a threat. While both Moscow and Beijing repeatedly emphasize
their nations’ strategic amity, Tokyo may be trying to push the Russian
“button” about a future Chinese threat. Japan's case for the pipeline to
Nakhodka includes the fact that piping its energy resources to a seaport would
strengthen Russia as a global strategic power; sending those commodities
directly to China would hand a strong card to Beijing.
The economic and engineering grounds for selecting one or the other of these
pipeline routes is straightforward: a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing, the
Chinese preference, would cost about half as much and run about half the
distance of a pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka, the Japanese choice.
Furthermore, the Nakhodka pipeline would need to carry at least 50 million
tons of oil annually to be financially viable, while the shorter (Chinese) route
24
to Daqing would require only 20 million tons a year. The Angarsk-Daqing line
would cover approximately 1,600 miles and cost $1.8 billion; the pipeline from
25
Angarsk to Nakhodka would be 2,500 miles long and cost $4 billion.
Significant military considerations affect this route selection. As demonstrated
by T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East during World War I, and currently by the
Ejército de LiberacioÓn Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, and antigovernment forces
in Iraq, aboveground pipelines are particularly difficult to protect. Domestic
pipeline security concerns are being addressed by Beijing; the West-East
Pipeline's origin in Xinjiang makes it vulnerable to Uighur separatist or other
terrorist attention; one Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official has stated that
“the pipeline is going underground to escape both the extreme climate and its
26
potential as a target for terrorist attack.”
Protecting pipelines ashore, however, is still simpler than defending the

lengthy SLOCs upon which Chinese and Japanese energy imports currently
depend. There are more strategic considerations regarding which of these
pipelines is built, however, than just operational level considerations of direct
military or terrorist action.
Moscow's decision will almost certainly be made for political rather than more
“practical” reasons. Building the pipeline to Nakhodka offers Moscow strategic
advantages that will likely be decisive. First, it would run entirely in Russian
territory, affording a simpler defense task. Second, Russia would retain the
ability to stop and start the flow of energy resources to its customers, rather
than having Beijing in a position to at least share in those decisions. Third, a
pipeline to Nakhodka positions Moscow to sell its resources to the highest
bidder: China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, or any other customer
within reach of the tankers carrying the Russian oil and natural gas.
The on-again, off-again Russian game with China and Japan continues,
although the now enduring strategic play between Moscow and Beijing
indicates a future decision in China's favor. Or, at least, the state of the
relationship among the three nations indicates that any pipeline carrying
significant Russian energy reserves eastward, away from its primary Western
Market, in Europe, will include China as a primary customer. That country
offers a potential customer population of 1.3 billion, after all, compared to
27
Japan's 127.8 million (and declining) population.
The Siberian pipeline project remains in the planning stage as of December

28
2007, with no firm start date. Despite a long string of apparently
contradictory press reports from Moscow and Beijing, few real steps have been
29
taken to build the envisioned pipeline. Moscow has begun building an initial
section of pipeline on the route north of Lake Baikal, but no decision has
apparently been reached on where or when a delivery line to China and/or
30
Japan will be constructed.
CHINA
China has an extensive domestic pipeline system and the national oil
companies are working to establish an even more integrated and complete
network to better satisfy growing demand. CNPC's subsidiary, PetroChina,
currently owns and operates more than 6,000 miles of crude oil pipelines and
more than 1,200 miles of refined product pipelines, with plans to build several
new systems in the coming years. In 2005, less than half of the crude oil
transported domestically by CNPC traveled via pipeline, while the rest typically
traveled by rail.
PetroChina, Sinopec, and CNPC are all engaged in constructing trans-China

pipelines to deliver either oil or natural gas to eastern China from Lanzhou, in
northwest China's Gansu Province; Jinzhou, in the northeastern Liaoning
31
Province; and from China's far western Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Finally,
Sinopec, China's largest oil refiner, is actively expanding its pipeline network to
provide crude oil connections between Tianjin port and its petrochemical
complex in Beijing, between domestic fields and its refineries along the
32
Yangtze River, and with its pipeline network in northeastern China.
In July 2006, China began receiving crude oil imports from its first
transnational oil pipeline. The 620-mile line connects Atasu in northern
Kazakhstan with Alashankou in Xinjiang. It was developed by the Sino-Kazakh
Pipeline Company, a fifty-fifty joint venture between the CNPC and
Kazakhstan's KazTransOil. The project has an initial capacity to transport
200,000 bbl/d of crude oil, with plans to double the capacity by 2010. Half of
the imported oil comes from Kazakhstan and half from Russia, however,
reflecting production shortfalls in the Kazakh fields.
In April 2006, China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

reportedly approved a feasibility study to construct a new crude oil pipeline
from Burma to China. The commission approved construction of this pipeline,
from Burma's deep-water port at Sittwe, on the Andaman Sea, to Kunming,
capital of China's Yunnan Province, in April 2007. It will stretch 1,479 miles
33
and cost an estimated $1.04 billion to build.
This pipeline will serve several purposes. First, it will allow Chinese energy
imports traveling by sea from Middle Eastern and African sources to avoid
transiting the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, thus bypassing potential
navigation, criminal, terrorist, and other hazards. Second, although Burma
apparently does not possess large reserves of crude oil, it may contain
“Southeast Asia's largest natural gas reserves,” which is why CNPC has signed
an agreement with that nation's Ministry of Energy to explore three promising
34
deep-water blocks off Burma's coast.
Third, construction of this pipeline will be an extension of the already

significant Chinese investment in Burma, especially its energy sector. This is a
strong element in China's near colonial infiltration of Burma's economy,
military, and political infrastructures. Fourth, Burma's energy reserves have
become a prize in the competition with India for both economic resources and
political advantage in South and Southeast Asia.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
A high point in regional planning was represented at the September 2002

meeting in Osaka of more than sixty nations to address uncertainties in Asia's
energy supply. The energy ministers discussed an information-sharing network
35
as a first step to be taken in preparing emergency response measures. This
is such a massive concept that its creation would change the basis of
international relations in Asia: the region's nations will have to balance
carefully their increasing energy requirements with traditional sovereignty
issues.
Several Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states had

advocated building a regional pipeline system during the Fourteenth ASEAN
Energy Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1996. The project was
estimated to cost $15 billion and would be designed to meet future regional
growth in demand for natural gas. The first major component of this “energy
bridge” would be the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). The TAGP has been
broken into seven segments, pipelines connecting:
1. Malaysia and Singapore

2. Burma and Thailand
3. Indonesia and Singapore
4. Camago and Malampaya in the Philippines
5. West Natuna and Duyong in Malaysia
6. Joint Malaysia-Thailand Development Area (JDA) sites
7. Singapore and Indonesia
Signs of such a complex do exist as of 2007, but overall ASEAN coherence is

lacking. Some of these pipelines were under construction and even in
36
operation before ASEAN agreed on a true multilateral concept. The first
pipeline was opened under TAGP aegis “with much fanfare” in August 2003,
when Singapore President Goh Chok Thong described the $420 million natural
37
gas pipeline as “a vital step for the Trans-Asian Gas Pipeline.” All seven
segments of this 2,800-mile version of the TAGP are scheduled to be in
38
operation by 2020. Japan also supports the project, although it remains
cautious about the financial viability of some of the individual component
39
parts.
ASEAN members have continued developing the concept of a transregional

pipeline network to enhance their energy security. “Vision 2020” was adopted
by the heads of states attending the organization's Second Informal Summit,
in Kuala Lumpur, in December 1997. The vision statement calls for establishing
“interconnecting arrangements for electricity and natural gas within ASEAN
through the ASEAN Power Grid and a ‘Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline.’” The next
year, a meeting in Hanoi issued a Plan of Action proposing to implement by
2004 a Trans-ASEAN Energy Network comprising the ASEAN Power Grid and
the TAGP projects. The seventeenth ASEAN Energy Ministers Meeting approved
the TAGP Plan of Action in 1999, which was incorporated into the ASEAN Plan
of Action on Energy Cooperation for the period 1999–2004.
The TAGP concept relies on using existing national grids and bilateral pipeline
connections “to ensure greater security of gas supply at a gas price that is
competitive to alternative fuels within Member Countries.” The ASEAN Council
on Petroleum is developing an implementation plan, and has formed four
“expert working groups” to examine the project, focusing on the following:
1. “The regional energy/gas market, reserves, supply/demand balance” (led

by Indonesia)
2. “Technical analyses, scheduling, and gas pipeline and power grid routing”
(led by Malaysia)
3. “Economic feasibility and energy/gas pricing” (led by Thailand)
4. “Institutional, legal, financial/commercial, technical,
health/safety/environmental and management framework” (led by the
Philippines)
Despite this plan's sweeping ambitions, ASEAN members remain quite

sensitive to issues of national prerogative. The agreement states that “subject
to, and consistent with, the national laws of each Member Country, take
individual and collective initiatives to study, assess, and review national and
regional legal and institutional frameworks for natural gas, concerning cross
border issues relative to the commercial and economic feasibility, construction,
financing, operation, and maintenance of the Pipelines as well as the supply,
40
transportation, and distribution of natural gas to Member Countries.”
A steady increase in natural gas pipelines is taking place in Southeast Asia,

with about 3,458 miles already built and another 4,350 miles in the planning
stage. The region's dependence on imported energy would be reduced
substantially upon completion of the TAGP. ASEAN has called for the
formulation of a new master plan to hasten creating the TAGP.
The ASEAN Gas Center is another regional proposal under discussion. It is

envisioned as a system of pipelines linking the region with Russia, China,
Japan, and Korea; and a visionary complex of pipelines that would stretch from
41
Kazakhstan to Shanghai and from Australia to Russia's Far East. This last
project assumed in 2001 a 58.8 percent growth in Southeast Asia's energy
needs by 2010 and would require an investment of an estimated $180
42
billion.
One prominent accomplishment is the Indonesia–Thailand Pipeline completed

in 2004 and stretching 591 nautical miles (nm) under the sea. It links gas
fields located in Songkhla Province in southern Thailand with Indonesia's
43
Natuna gas fields in the South China Sea.
A second is the Camago-Malampaya pipeline built by Shell-Phils Exploration

and Occidental-Phils. It cost $1.8 billion and transports gas from the Camago-
Malampaya field in Palawan (the southwestern-most large Philippine island) to
Luzon. This pipeline includes a 500-km-long undersea section from the gas
fields, which connects to an onshore LNG plant.
The TAGP concept is a valuable planning tool, and reflects its sponsoring
nations’ concern with increasing energy security, in terms of availability and
affordability; however, military threats from terrorism and from potential
national conflicts, are acknowledged but not adequately addressed:
“Appropriate measures to ensure security and safety of the pipelines and the
uninterrupted flow of contracted natural gas for transmission through the
pipelines including a framework for cooperation in the event of a serious
44
disruption of natural gas supply, subject, however, to mutual consultations.”
The military issue remains a weakness in such multilateral plans; shipping

energy through a pipeline instead of in ships does not remove threats to its
delivery, particularly when the pipeline traverses the sea bottom, as do many
of them. Individual nations recognize that danger; naval modernization is a
near-regional phenomenon throughout Asia, as discussed elsewhere.
THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONCEPT
In 1998 the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in partnership with the
private sector Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, completed a yearlong
“APEC Natural Gas Infrastructure Initiative,” which developed policy
recommendations to accelerate investment in natural gas. The plan was
approved by APEC's eighteen energy ministers at their third ministerial
meeting in Okinawa, Japan, in October 1998. APEC also recommended
cooperating with the Asian Gas Grid natural gas project. This proposed
construction of offshore pipelines to connect both existing and proposed gas
networks (such as the TAGP), with major regional consumers.
ASEAN's TAGP plan includes a key role for Indonesia as the main gas supply
hub. Both APEC and ASEAN assume (almost certainly correctly) that regional
gas demand will continue increasing, especially given the trend demonstrated
in the Malaysian and Thai power sectors, in which natural gas fuels 60 percent
of power generation, and also meets the demand from Malaysian, Thai, and
Singaporean petrochemical industries.
Despite the project's advantages, significant hurdles remain in its path,

including the following:
1. Cross-border connections require agreeing on legal and regulatory

frameworks, gas pricing schedules, and common technical standards for
design and construction, operation, maintenance, and safety
2. Gas distribution is a monopoly held by state-owned petroleum companies
in many ASEAN countries, but private sector participation and investment
will have to be included
3. Individual governments must also move toward a market-based pricing
system and away from product subsidies, price intervention, and tax
45
distortions that lead to inefficient natural gas
SINGAPORE
As a city-state, Singapore draws on its neighbors for all of its energy
requirements. In January 1999, the Singaporean consortium, SembGas,
signed an agreement to purchase West Natuna natural gas from the
Indonesian state energy company, Pertamina. Indonesian natural gas to
Singapore comes via pipelines from two separate fields, in West Natuna and
Sumatra. Another pipeline from Sumatra is planned to deliver natural gas to
Singapore's planned Island Power station, but the project has experienced
numerous delays.
Singapore's Senoko Power currently imports natural gas through a pipeline
from the Malaysian national oil and gas company, Petronas. The Senoko-
Petronas deal is set to expire in mid-2008, though news reports suggest the
46
two firms are working to extend the contract. To transport the natural gas,
Keppel and Petronas are jointly constructing a 2.5-nm pipeline between
Plentong in the southern Malaysian state of Johor to the Senoko area in the
north of Singapore.
MALAYSIA
Malaysia has one of the most extensive natural gas pipeline networks in Asia,
owing to the multiphased Peninsular Gas Utilization (PGU) project that was
completed in 1998. The purpose of PGU is to create and expand a natural gas
transmission infrastructure on peninsular Malaysia. It covered 880 miles by
2006 and is able to transport two bcf/d of natural gas. The PGU's completion
has led to the planned increase of domestic natural gas consumption and has
expanded Malaysia's role as a hub in regional natural gas distribution.
Construction of the Trans-Thailand-Malaysia Gas Pipeline System was

completed in 2006; it allows Malaysia to pipe natural gas from the Malaysia-
Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) in the Gulf of Thailand to its domestic
system. The new system also significantly enhances transporting natural gas
to Singapore and Indonesia, an important step toward realization of the TAGP.
Malaysia's extensive natural gas infrastructure and its location at the center of
Southeast Asia make it an indispensable participant in any comprehensive
system of regional energy security.
INDONESIA
Indonesia's natural gas distribution company, Perusahaan Gas Negara (PGN),
operates more than 3,100 miles of natural gas distribution and transmission
lines, organized into nine regional networks. These have limited
interconnectivity, however, which has hampered increasing natural gas
consumption. Indonesia began exporting natural gas via pipeline in 2001,
when it opened the 348-nm, 325-mmcf/d subsea pipeline from West Natuna to
Singapore. A second subsea pipeline began delivering natural gas to Malaysia
in 2002, and then, another natural gas connection to Singapore was opened in
2003, this one originating in South Sumatra. Full operation was achieved in
47
2006, when Singapore signed a twenty-year contract with Indonesia.
Four additional domestic natural gas pipelines are planned, to improve

interconnectivity. The completed infrastructure is called the Integrated Gas
Transportation System (IGTS) and will eventually link the islands of Sumatra,
Java, and Kalimantan via a 2,600-mile pipeline. The IGTS is being jointly
financed by PGN, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
The project is under construction, with full operations scheduled to begin in

2010, but domestic political unrest along sections of its path and tenuous
48
financing resources both continue to slow progress. Nonetheless, Indonesia
has played a leading role in discussions of the proposed TAGP; Jakarta
envisions a central role for Indonesia in any regional cooperative energy
structure.
THAILAND
The Petroleum Authority of Thailand developed a plan in the mid-1990s to

build twelve major gas pipelines between 1997 and 2005 at a cost of at least
$3.1 billion. The six primary and six alternate lines are designed to increase
access to the JDA in the Gulf of Thailand and then to increase natural gas
distribution throughout Thailand.
The most significant of these projects is the Trans-Thai-Malaysia line (TTM),

which began in 1979 when Thailand and Malaysia signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to explore the possibility of jointly developing newfound gas
reserves in the JDA, located approximately 140 nm off the Thai coast in the
Gulf of Thailand. The JDA was established in an effort to resolve the two
nations’ conflicting claims to ownership of energy resources suspected to exist
in their shared continental shelf. Development of the project did not begin
49
until 2004, but was in production for both countries by 2007. If sufficient
resources are found in the JDA to exceed domestic requirements and
additional international pipeline connections are established, the TTM pipeline
system could form a major component of the proposed TAGP system.
Bangkok's “Natural Gas Pipeline Master Plan III” is based on the country's
natural gas demand projections and was announced in 2001. It was approved
by the Thai government with an estimated cost of $2.32 billion and focuses on
both domestic gas distribution and offshore access pipelines. A third pipeline
from Gulf of Thailand fields was included and was in fact completed in 2006;
three additional offshore gas pipelines, including one from the JDA, are
50
scheduled for completion in 2009.
Thailand's oil pipeline system is limited, in contrast to the natural gas

51
transmission infrastructure under construction. Thailand is also building
international natural gas pipelines; the 410-mile Thai-Burmese pipeline from
Burma's Yadana gas field in the Andaman Sea to an Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) power plant in Ratchaburi Province was
completed in mid-1999. As a result of the Asian Financial Crisis and Thailand's
ensuing currency crash that began in 1997, however, Bangkok reneged on its
gas purchase contract with Rangoon; this agreement was renegotiated in
2002, but the pipeline currently pumps less than a third of the contracted
amount of natural gas: just 150 mmcf/d as of 2007, instead of the contracted
52
525 mmcf/d.
In 2003 Bangkok adopted a new “Strategic Plan for Thailand,” which included
the ambition for the country to become the “Regional Energy Center” of
Southeast Asia. The stated goal is to enhance energy security of the country
by contributing to assured access to energy supply, thus reducing the risk of
energy supply disruption. The plan proposes to take advantage of the following
factors:
1. Geographical advantage
2. Existing large-scale domestic energy market and expertise in energy
business
3. Existing energy infrastructure, with considerable idle capacities
4. Opportunities to expand energy trade to other countries in the ASEAN
53
region and to southern China
Bangkok has proposed building a canal or a pipeline across the Kra Isthmus to
54
bypass the Malacca and Singapore Straits. These projects aim to make
Thailand the primary Southeast Asian oil-trading center by building a Strategic
Energy Land Bridge (SELB) linking Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian oil
suppliers with Northeast Asian customers. The $7 billion dollar project would
include construction of deep seaports, 155 miles of pipeline, oil refineries, and
two 16-mmbbl oil depots, one on each coast of the Kra Isthmus. The pipeline
would stretch from the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand, thus bypassing
55
the Malacca Strait.
The SELB project was adopted by the government in 2004 with a completion
date of 2010 and with China, Japan, and South Korea envisioned as primary
customers—and as investors. Once completed, the project would be able to
transport 1.5 bbbl/d of oil across the Kra Isthmus. The cost of transshipping
the oil across the isthmus was an estimated one-third more per barrel than
shipping direct, however, and while the trans-Kra pipeline would eliminate the
Malacca Strait chokepoint, the project remains in the proposal stage and the
56
increased cost makes its completion problematical.
At least three additional proposals have been made—and one reportedly
approved—for a pipeline to bypass Malacca. One of these is Bangkok's 2003
proposal to build a pipeline from Thailand's coast on the Gulf of Thailand,
57
probably at Sattahip, north to China's Yunnan Province.
The second, reportedly approved in 2006 by Beijing and Rangoon, is the

58
pipeline from Burma's Andaman Sea coast north to Yunnan. Most recently, in
May 2007, Kuala Lumpur announced a joint project among Malaysian,
Indonesian, and Saudi Arabian companies to begin construction in 2008 of a
185-mile pipeline “across northern Malaysia” to reduce dependence on the
sea-lanes through the Malacca and other straits giving access to the South
China Sea. The stated purpose was to gain greater security for Middle Eastern
59
energy resources flowing to China; this project remains under study.
All of these proposals present significant engineering challenges, given the

area's topography and the region's political uncertainties, but the recent
upgrading of the old “Burma Road” to China attests to Beijing's ability and
60
willingness to make the necessary investments to bring a pipeline to fruition.
More serious problems are posed by the political uncertainties in Burma, which
is rent by ethnic divisions, economic failings, and harsh political repression;
nascent Islamic radicalism also threatens Malaysia and is in active rebellion in
southern Thailand.
AUSTRALIA
Australia has a well-developed oil and natural gas pipeline network. The
Australian Pipeline Trust is the largest operator, with 4,350 miles of pipeline.
Epic Energy is the second largest, with 2,500 miles of pipeline
Australia's present natural gas pipeline system is designed to carry the product
from centrally located fields to coastal cities like Sydney and Melbourne. The
prospect of natural gas recovery shifting to offshore fields means that a large
investment in the country's pipeline network will be required to bring the
resource to its customers. Canberra estimates that this will require a ten-year
investment of $5.5 billion. Elements of this plan are underway, including
pipeline projects from natural gas fields offshore southwestern and
61
northwestern Australia.
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh's domestic natural gas pipeline network is operated by the Gas
Transmission Company Ltd., (GTCL), a subsidiary of the national energy
company, the Bangladesh Oil, Gas, and Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla).
GTCL currently operates 480 miles of pipelines and is the sole natural gas
transmission company in Bangladesh.
Most of the network is concentrated in the more populated and developed

eastern zone of the country, although a twenty-mile pipeline across the
Jamuna River, which separates the eastern and western parts of the country,
was completed in 2000. Bangladesh and the ADB signed a $230 million loan
package in 2006 to finance construction of an additional four gas pipelines,
62
measuring 220 miles, which will transport natural gas to west Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has been negotiating since 1997 for an agreement with Burma and
India to serve as the entrepot for a 560-mile pipeline to transport natural gas
from the former to the latter. Dhaka conditionally approved the project in
January 2005, stipulating that Burma and India had to meet certain
conditions, including trade concessions. This stance stymied the plan, however,
as New Delhi has not accepted the Bangladeshi demands.
INDIA
India has been touted as a probable world economic superpower almost since it
achieved modern independence in 1947. This potential has yet to be fully
realized, but as the twenty-first century reaches the end of its first decade,
India is making very significant economic progress, which brings with it equally
significant increased energy demands. New Delhi is considering several
massive projects as it seeks to ameliorate energy shortfalls. With the trans-
Bangladesh pipeline planning in hiatus, the Gas Authority of India (GAIL), the
state-owned pipeline operator, completed a feasibility study in June 2006 for
an 870-mile pipeline from Burma that would bypass Bangladesh. This option
would be longer, which would significantly increase the cost of delivering
natural gas from Burma, and possibly less secure, since it would have to travel
through unstable areas in northeastern India. Recent plans include
construction of two undersea pipelines to ease the distribution difficulties
caused by the country's inadequate transportation infrastructure and tanker
63
resources.
The most prominent and contentious such project is the proposed Iran-
Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, which has been under discussion since 1994. The
plan calls for a 1,600-mile pipeline from Iran's South Pars fields to the Indian
64
state of Gujarat at an estimated cost of $7 billion. While Iran is eager to
export natural gas and India needs that energy resource to meet its growing
domestic demand, economic and political issues have delayed and continue to
trouble the project.
Indian officials have made it clear that any import pipeline crossing Pakistan
would need to be accompanied by a security guarantee from Islamabad. These
security concerns are paramount, but another problem is the inability to agree
on pricing the natural gas, following failure of tripartite talks in December
2006. Both Indian and Pakistani officials refused Iran's proposed price of $8.00
per million btu (mbtu), insisting on a maximum price of $4.25/mbtu, a
significant gap. In 2007 Islamabad reportedly asked Moscow to take on the
project, but this likely was just a Pakistani attempt to pressure Iran into
65
lowering its price. Negotiations continued into the winter of 2007, without
66
agreement among the three nations.
India might welcome Russian involvement as a guarantee for Pakistani “good

behavior,” but remains understandably chary about investing in a pipeline
through its historic enemy's territory. Additionally, New Delhi has been
pressured by the United States government not to form any agreement with
Iran. Washington is attempting to pressure Tehran because of its nuclear
weapon development program, while at the same time signing a nuclear
67
development agreement with New Delhi. India has not given up completely
on the IPI, but is hedging for that line's problematic future by exploring
68
alternate energy reserves from Central Asia.
The United States strongly supports the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan

(TAP) pipeline as a vehicle for increasing the viability of the Afghan economy.
It is a $3.5 billion project consisting of a 1,050-mile pipeline from
Turkmenistan's natural gas fields to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and eventually
India. New Delhi was invited to join the TAP project in February 2006, and
announced its agreement to become a member in November 2006, and the
other participants accepted Indian participation in May 2007, when it became
69
known as the TAPI project.
This plan still faces several significant hurdles. In addition to the security
concerns for a pipeline that would cross both war-torn Afghanistan and
unstable Pakistan, there are doubts about the adequacy of Turkmen natural
70
gas supplies to meet its proposed export commitments to TAPI customers.
A third international pipeline proposal envisions India importing natural gas

71
from Burma, as discussed above. No option discussed by New Delhi seems
likely of success, however, in view of Burma's decision in December 2006 to
reserve its natural gas reserves for liquefaction and sale to Japan and South
72
Korea. This was followed by the reported, possibly contradictory, decision by
the Burmese government in June 2007 to direct natural gas exports to China
73
over the newly approved pipeline to Kunming.
Additional proposals are under discussion in India for increasing natural gas
imports, but India's limited domestic transmission network may not be
adequate to handle increased natural gas volume. GAIL's domestic
transmission system is presently concentrated in the country's natural gas
production centers, with minimal regional interconnection. GAIL has
announced an ambitious long-term plan to increase this network from
approximately 1,900 to 6,200 miles as a National Gas Grid, but only a handful
74
of actual expansion projects are even in the planning stage as of 2007.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan's government is hoping to build the IPI pipeline, which would bring
access to Iran's massive natural gas reserves and large transmission fees from
India, perhaps as much as $70 million annually. The project's success is much
in doubt because of U.S. opposition, Indian uncertainty about the security
situation in Pakistan, and Iran's excessive pricing demands. Iran and Pakistan
extended a previously signed memorandum of understanding in August 2006;
this was scheduled to expire at the end of 2007, but negotiations are
continuing. Tehran has offered to finance 60 percent of the pipeline's
construction costs and Islamabad has stressed Pakistani ability to maintain
pipeline security.
Pakistan and Iran have also agreed to work on a bilateral Iran-Pakistan

pipeline project, should New Delhi continue refusing to participate in the IPI
75
project. Such a pipeline would be so limited as to be of doubtful economic
viability and its construction would represent more of a political than an
economic decision: Iran would have countered U.S. desires, while Pakistan
would have spited India.
Islamabad is also considering a planned natural gas link from Qatar's North
Dome field to Pakistan via an ocean-bottom pipeline from Oman. A preliminary
agreement to purchase natural gas from Qatar has been signed, but
completion of this project remains far in the future.
Pakistan is also concerned about the serious obstacles confronting the TAPI,
including Indian distrust, the lack of security in Afghanistan, the price
Turkmenistan would charge for the natural gas, and the doubtful sufficiency of
the product to make the pipeline economically viable.
Islamabad is moving to improve its capabilities to import and export seaborne
energy supplies, relying on Chinese financial, engineering, and construction
assistance and aid. The focus of these efforts has been the port of Gwadar, a
city on the North Arabian Sea coastline just 110 nm east of the Iranian border
and close to the Strait of Hormuz. Effective utilization of this port facility may
be hindered by its location in the unstable Baluchistan Province, and by the
questionable stability of the Pakistani government itself.
China's estimated $250 million investment in Gwadar's expansion—80 percent

of the project's total funding—no doubt makes India uneasy at this potential
76
extension of Chinese naval presence into the eastern Indian Ocean. In the
event of heightened tension with India, the new port would offer Islamabad
little more than an attractive target that would have to be defended against
hostile naval action.
CENTRAL ASIA
There are two regions of this amorphously described area that offer Asian
customers good pipeline possibilities. The first is Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan.
These former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) are in a tenuous geopolitical
situation; they are located in the midst of the energy interests of their former
ruler, Moscow; the European nations and the United States, which hopes to
export the area's oil directly to the West; and their would-be exploiter, Beijing.
Kazakhstan's crude oil output was 365 mmbbls in 2005, approximately 70

percent of which was exported. According to its government, the country's
annual oil output might exceed 730 mmbbls by 2015, given the huge reserves
77
estimated to lie beneath the Caspian Sea. Even if that estimate stretches
reality, Kazakhstan will almost certainly increase its stature as a global
petroleum resource.
78
China began receiving Kazakh oil via pipeline for the first time in May 2006.
This 225-mile pipeline from Atasu in Western Kazakhstan to Xinjiang AR in
Northwestern China has a reported design capacity of 10 million tons of crude
79
oil per year. It came about after long-term efforts dating back to the mid-
1990s. Activation of this pipeline means that for the first time China will be
able to access Central Asian energy resources by pipeline, which should
decrease long-term reliance on Russia. It also may lessen Chinese reliance on
the maritime transport of oil over the very long SLOCs linking it to the Middle
East.
Additionally, in 2004, Sinopec signed a memorandum of understanding for a

90 percent stake in two Caspian blocks controlled by Kazakhstan's state-owned
oil company, KazMunaiGaz, with estimated reserves of approximately 700
million tons. Kazakh First Deputy Foreign Minister, Kairat Abuseitov,
announced that the 1,800 mile, $3 billion Atasu-Alashankou pipeline under
80
construction would carry this oil to China's Xinjiang AR. Another pipeline has
been proposed, to carry Kazakh natural gas to China. A feasibility study for
81
this pipeline is reportedly scheduled for completion in 2007.
Beijing's dealings with Kazakhstan's primary oil production company,

PetroKazakhstan (PK), represent a significant diplomatic and economic victory
for Beijing over New Delhi, which had also been bidding for Kazakhstan's
energy reserves. When CNPC concluded its purchase agreement with PK, the
competing Indian companies claimed that Kazakhstan had not afforded them a
82
fair opportunity to compete.
Indian press commentary described China's “growing strategic influence” into

Central and South Asia as a threat to “India's turbulent northeastern region
and its ‘near abroad,’” defined as including Bangladesh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan,
83
Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. This concern of China's neighbors as it drives to
acquire energy reserves in Central Asia is further illustrated by concern that
Beijing's intent, in addition to monopolizing Kazakh oil, is to “undercut” the
U.S.-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which opened in the summer of
2005, with a designed capacity of approximately 50 million tons a year. This
claim is almost certainly misplaced, but not irrelevant.
China has also agreed to import natural gas from Turkmenistan. While Beijing
signed an April 2006 agreement with Ashgabat to buy 1 tcf of natural gas
annually from Turkmenistan, and a July 2007 agreement to build the pipeline
84
to bring that product to Xinjiang remains in the proposal stage. Furthermore,
since China does not share a common border with Turkmenistan, the pipeline's
construction would have to be supported by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and/or
85
Uzbekistan.
China wants to be a primary destination for the Caspian Basin energy reserves
but is competing with a less expensive and easier route to the West for these
reserves. That is, Beijing apparently wants nothing less than to shift the
general flow of Central Asian energy resources from West—toward Europe—to
East, a stunning ambition.
The difficulty of achieving this global redirection of energy reserves is

illustrated by the fact that China is still unable to access enough Kazakh oil to
fill the pipeline just opened from that country to Xinjiang. That is likely a
short-term problem, however, given estimates of Kazakhstan's reserves
amounting to 35 billion bbls, at least twice the amount of the North Sea fields.
The Kazakh government has previously agreed to sell all its exports to Russia
until 2012, just as Turkmenistan's gas exports are under contract to Moscow
until 2009, and most of Uzbekstan's transit pipelines have been booked by
86
Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy company, until 2010.
Beijing is fighting an uphill battle to take full advantage of Central Asia's

energy reserves. China's new pipelines and its purchase of PetroKazakhstan
have placed Beijing in a position to decrease reliance on the maritime
importation of energy reserves, but. Beijing will have a difficult time changing
Turkmenistan's historic orientation toward Russia, which currently is the focus
87
of most Central Asian energy shipments.
CASPIAN BASIN PIPELINES

The Caspian Sea region has become a focal point for China's ambitions to
access natural gas resources. European companies have been exploring the
Caspian region since the turn of the twentieth century and proven oil reserves
have yet to fulfill estimates. Natural gas resources that lie beneath the
Caspian Sea are now also an objective.
The countries of the Caspian Sea region remain relatively minor oil and
natural gas producers, struggling with difficult national economic and political
issues. Caspian regional oil reserves are estimated at between 17 and 49
bbbls, an amount comparable to OPEC members Qatar on the low end, and
Libya on the high end.
Caspian oil production totaled 2.3 mmbbl/d in 2006, comparable to Brazil's

annual production, South America's second largest oil producer. More than
200,000 bbl/d may be produced in 2007 and between 2.9 and 3.8 million bbl/d
by 2010, an amount greater than Venezuela's annual production, largest in
88
South America.
The Caspian Sea region's natural gas potential may be more extensive than its
oil reserves, with proven natural gas reserves estimated at 232 tcf. Production
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 2005 totaled
just 5.2 tcf, about 75 percent of Canada's production.
Gas production from the Caspian area has been inconsistent since 1990, with
modest annual increases registered. A particular issue is this production's
competition with natural gas produced by Gazprom, the Russian state natural
gas company. Since the major pipelines connecting the Caspian area to world
markets are owned by Gazprom and routed through Russia, Moscow has been
89
able to exert considerable control over the market. And Moscow seems
determined to continue dominating the Central Asian and the European
natural gas markets.
CONCLUSION
The movement of energy supplies throughout Asia, including shipments from
Southwest and Central Asia is a core issue of energy security. The primary
method remains seaborne, tankers sailing well-known SLOCs among ports and
fueling stations throughout the region's great sweep, south, and then west
from maritime Russia into the Persian Gulf.
The frailties of reliance on shipborne transport are recognized, which has given
rise to major efforts to construct domestic and international pipelines to
reduce the dependence on tankers. These are sometimes discussed as part of a
construct that would include the entire region, with pipelines reaching from
Sakhalin to Australia, and from Japan to the Caspian Sea basin.
This Pan-Asian Energy Bridge remains more ideal than reality as a coherent
construct. More immediate are the national and relatively limited multilateral
projects that have been constructed during the past quarter-century, are
under construction, are planned, or are under discussion.
These pipelines exist or are in advanced planning throughout the region,

ranging from the natural gas pipelines from Sakhalin to Japan, to offshore
pipelines built by almost all Asian nations, to the infrastructure designed to
exploit the resources of the Caspian Sea basin and other energy-rich areas of
Central Asia. One of the most significant future pipelines, in terms of both
economic and political import, is the Siberian plan—better described as
competing plans forwarded by China and Japan—that eventually will access the
enormous oil and natural gas reserves in the eastern third of the huge Russian
landmass.
Some of these reserves, the natural gas fields located offshore of southern
Sakhalin Island, are already being accessed by pipeline. The construction of
this multiphase project evidences a not uncommon characteristic of the
international pipelines being planned and built in Asia: maritime pipelines
routed along the sea bottom.
Japan should become the most direct beneficiary of Sakhalin pipelines, but
both North and South Korea hope to gain energy supplies from both the
Sakhalin and Siberian lines, and also from a planned project that would pipe
90
natural gas to them from Russian fields at Kovykta.
China is leading all Asian nations in the comprehensiveness and extent of its
energy pipeline construction programs. Domestically, Beijing has since the turn
of the century already constructed impressively long pipelines throughout the
country, both north-south and east-west, many to bring the energy resources
of the underpopulated western sections of the nation to the heavily populated
and economically advanced eastern Chinese areas.
China also is in the midst of an extensive program of transnational pipeline

construction. In addition to the proposed Siberian pipeline, Beijing's pipelines
with Kazakhstan promise to make a significant contribution to China's energy
requirements. China has in fact devoted very significant time and resources to
establishing a useful energy relationship with Kazakhstan, including a 1,864-
mile-long pipeline, but these successes have yet to yield significant benefits to
Beijing, with just 1.19 million tons imported (primarily by rail), just 1.3
91
percent of China's total oil imports for 2004. The Kazakh resources should
eventually provide China with a major energy resource that is not dependent
on the sea-lanes.92
The Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand all

utilize pipelines leading from offshore energy fields, while Indonesia also is in
the midst of constructing an ambitious pipeline infrastructure that will link
most of its major islands, in addition to tapping the huge maritime reserves it
possesses. Brunei draws its disproportionate wealth from offshore energy
resources accessed with maritime pipelines.
India is attempting to emulate China by creating a massive infrastructure of

domestic and transnational pipelines to better secure the energy supplies
demanded by its expanding economy. Of chief interest is India's attempt to
access the reserves of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin through a pipeline
that would pass through politically unstable areas.
The viability of the national and limited transnational pipeline projects

discussed above are based on several factors, including national requirements;
political and national defense concerns and objectives; the geographic location
of energy reserves; economic considerations, including recovery costs and
delivery considerations; and the competition for specific reserves, balanced
within global energy reserves and markets.
Both maritime and continental pipelines offer relief from the costs and dangers
of the seaborne delivery of energy reserves. Ships are able to transport crude
oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and coal at very economical rates. They
are, however, susceptible to considerable risks, including navigational hazards
and bad weather, but also the dangers posed by maritime terrorism and piracy
in peacetime, and by targeting and attack during wartime.
From the perspective of military defense, pipelines ashore are significantly

easier to protect than ships at sea. First, defense ashore is a relatively
straightforward task: the locations of both pipeline and potential dangers are
well known and that of the former does not move. At sea, on the other hand,
the lines of communication are inherently indefinite, as is the seascape.
Second, every nation in Asia fields ground forces, both army and police. These
vary widely in size and capability, of course, but are designed to achieve each
nation's national defense priorities, which in every case includes security
required for energy resources. Relatively few nations deploy significant
maritime forces, however, navy or coast guard. While Japan, China, and India
are well able to defend at least coastal SLOCs and offshore energy fields to an
appreciable degree, almost none of the remaining Asian nations possess that
capability. And building naval forces is far more expensive than building land
forces, in terms of equipment, personnel, and even the energy resources
necessary for those forces to operate.
Overlying maritime security issues throughout Asia is the naval dominance

exerted by the United States. While this causes some unease, especially in
Beijing and to a lesser extent in New Delhi, it provides a significant element of
maritime reassurance to the nations of Asia. Within these considerations,
maritime transport remains the dominant method of transporting energy. Until
a clearer security picture emerges between pipeline and sea-lane, the latter
will maintain that position.
GETTING THE OIL: SHIPS AT SEA
INTRODUCTION
The ability to deliver energy supplies reliably from origin to customer is key to
energy security. The two primary methods of delivery are via pipeline or by
seagoing tanker. Relatively insignificant energy supplies are also transported
by truck or train.
Merchant ships remain the world's dominant means of international

commercial transportation, despite the relatively recent emergence of air
travel. Indeed, seaborne commerce has continued to increase steadily, rising
from approximately 2,600 million to over 7,000 million dead weight tons (dwt)
1
since 1970. Furthermore, ships employed in the transport of energy supplies
are of increasing size and specialized design.
Oceanic oil transportation is provided almost entirely by self-propelled ships,

although barges are widely employed in insular, riverine, and archipelagic
waters. Approximately two-thirds of the world's crude oil and refined
petroleum products move by tanker, including approximately 43 million barrels
2
per day (mmbbls/d) of crude oil.
Coal may be carried in a variety of bulk cargo ships, although the installation
of special fire detection and fighting equipment is required. Petroleum, both
crude oil and refined products, is routinely transported by large tankers, some
displacing hundreds of thousands of tons. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) requires
the most specialized shipping of all, since the liquefaction process for natural
gas requires very low temperatures, not above −260°F (−162°C), at which the
liquid product must be maintained for safe shipment. Liquefaction was first
developed by German scientists in the 1870s; American engineers built the
first commercial LNG plant in 1912; and the first ship designed to transport
LNG, SS Methane Pioneer, began operating in 1959.
The importance of seaborne energy traffic is indicated by the number of ships

involved. The hundreds of thousands of miles of sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) that encircle the globe were transited by 30,851 merchant ships
totaling 960 dwt in 2006, a 64.2 million dwt or 7.2 percent increase over
2005. This shipping carried 7.11 billion tons of goods, which equated to 29,045
3
billion ton-miles (btm).
Petroleum tankers made up more than a third of this fleet and increased in
number by 5.4 percent, while LNG carriers increased by 7.5 percent and
4
“miscellaneous tankers” rose by a remarkable 26 percent. The total number
5
of tankers increased from 2,516 in 1980 to more than 10,400 in 2006.
The great majority of these ships are in almost constant use, with less than 1
percent classified as “surplus tonnage.” Oil tankers are especially busy, with
the overall volume of crude oil transported by sea increasing by 4.5 percent
annually. About 77 percent of all tankers carry crude oil, while the remainder
carries petroleum products. Another measure of the importance of petroleum
in world maritime trade is that of “ton-miles.” Energy resources counted for
more than half of the world's total of 29,045 btm that all cargo carrying ships
steamed in 2005: petroleum accounted for 11,705 btm, while coal measured
6
another 3,140 btm.
Ownership of the world's commercial fleets throughout history has usually

been a positive indicator of national power and the international balance
among nations. The nineteenth-century Pax Britannica included as a significant
factor Great Britain's merchant fleet, which dominated global maritime
7
commerce to a degree never seen before or since. Japan's rise to
international prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
also featured dramatic expansion of its merchant marine and has now
recreated the world-class merchant marine destroyed during World War II.
World-scale commercial fleets have also been built by post-1954 South Korea
and, most dramatically, by China.
An exception to the relationship between global economic growth and

merchant fleet must be noted, however: the United States first achieved
recognition as an international military power following its defeat of Spain in
1898 and is today the world's acknowledged sole superpower. The American
merchant marine, however, began shrinking rapidly after World War II and
8
today is extremely small.
Both of those contrasting historic points dominate at the beginning of the

twenty-first century: the United States shows few signs of losing its status as
the world's overwhelmingly dominant superpower, despite its minor merchant
fleet, and China's rise to global economic power is being accompanied by
dramatic growth of that fleet. Furthermore, the flag-of-convenience
phenomenon complicates evaluation of global merchant marine ownership. As
ship owners seek the lowest available insurance, licensing, and operating fees,
a country whose companies own the most ships may have relatively few ships
actually flying its national flag.
Today, the world merchant fleet is dominated by thirty-five states whose

companies own 95.17 percent of total world shipping, with just ten states
owning more than 70 percent of the world's tanker fleet. Greece and Japan
lead the overall list, with Germany, China, the United States, Norway, Hong
Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore rounding out the top ten ship-
owning nations or entities; India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Australia
9
are also ranked in the top thirty-five ship-owning nations. This concentration
of ownership of one of the world's most important international resources
carries with it serious political and economic implications that will be explored
elsewhere.
Asia's dependence on maritime transport is particularly acute in the provision

of energy supplies; the region is the world's leading importer of LNG, with
Japan importing the greatest amount; Japan is also the largest importer of
coal, receiving a stunning 26 percent of the world's total coal exports, almost
as much as that of the entire European Union (27 percent). The next largest
importers in Asia are South Korea and Taiwan, each consuming approximately
10
10 percent of the region's total imports.
Asia's increasing energy demand is also reflected in the amount of crude oil it
imports: 53.7 percent of the world's total, which comprises 39.7 percent of
total global petroleum shipped by sea. This shipping dependency is
demonstrated even more impressively in ton-miles: Asia's seaborne trade in
crude oil, petroleum products, and coal accounts for over half (51 percent) of
11
global ton-miles of total seaborne trade.
SHIPBUILDING
Asian nations dominate the global shipbuilding industry. The region's shipyards
build more than 86 percent of the world's merchant shipping of more than
1,000 tons displacement, with South Korea, Japan, and China alone producing
12
more than 75 percent of the world's total, including tankers. Asian shipyards
build almost all of the world's new oil tankers, with orders in that region
accounting for an impressive 97 percent of the world's total new tanker orders
13
in 2005. New ship orders during the first six months of 2006 increased by 43
14
percent over those for the same period in 2005. These new ships are for the
15
most part petroleum carriers, including LNG tankers.
Furthermore, twelve of the world's largest twenty container ship owners are
Asian, and six of the largest ten container ports are in Asia, including Hong
Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Kaohsiung.
Tanker construction has advanced dramatically in the past half-century. The

standard-sized oil carrier in 1950 was the “T2” tanker, with a dead weight
(carrying capacity) of 16,000 tons, 620 of which were built in the United
States between 1942 and 1946. At the end of World War II, this version of the
famous “Liberty Ship” was sold in large numbers, forming the backbone of
many new national fleets; many were in use well into the 1960s. Tanker sizes
had begun to grow significantly by then; Universe Apollo became the first
tanker to pass the 100,000-ton figure in 1959, when it was launched at
114,356 dwt. Ships five times that size were operating by 1975.
Minimizing the transit time between cargo origin and destination is the
primary criterion for evaluating shipping routes. For oil cargos, these are
determined primarily by maritime geography, especially by the location and
depth of passage of the navigational chokepoints that mark the world's sea-
lanes.
Tankers of more than 300,000 dead weight tons require a water depth of more
than 60 feet (10 fathoms) for safe navigation. By way of comparison, a
modern aircraft carrier displaces approximately 98,000 tons and draws just 37
16
feet of water.
These huge tankers are designed for maximum cost-effectiveness. They

typically have a relatively short life expectancy—as few as ten years—are
17
underpowered, and designed to be sailed with small crews. Tankers are
commonly classified as follows:
1. 10,000–60,000 dwt: Product Tanker

2. 60,000–80,000 dwt: Panamax (capable of transiting the Panama Canal)
3. 80,000–120,000 dwt: Aframax (the most flexible of tankers; commonly
employed in intraregional trade)
4. 120,000–200,000 dwt: Suezmax (capable of transiting the Suez Canal)
5. 200,000–315,000 dwt: VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier)
6. 320,000–550,000 dwt: ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carrier)
The largest ship ever built is Knock Nevis, a ULCC of 647,955 dwts and able to
carry approximately 4.1 mmbbl of petroleum. It draws 81 feet of water when
fully loaded, which makes it impossible for the ship to navigate either the
18
Malacca Strait or the English Channel, let alone the Suez or Panama Canals.
The primary reason for this dramatic increase in size was tanker owners’
realization of the benefits of economies of scale. Crude oil tankers are
relatively unsophisticated and fairly simple to build. The larger ship is less
expensive to build on a comparative carrying capacity basis, since the amount
of steel required basically determines the cost of construction; using four times
as much steel produces eight times as much cargo capacity in the ship.
Hence, oil tankers have grown enormously in size since the 1960s. While
25,000-dwt tankers were common in the 1950s, tankers of 80,000 dwt were
being built in the 1960s, and ships of 350,000 dwt were operating in the mid
1970s. This rapid increase in size was sparked by the 1967 closure of the Suez
Canal, which forced Europe-bound tankers from Southwest Asia with cargoes
for Europe or the Western Hemisphere to proceed around the Cape of Good
Hope, a much longer transit that emphasized the benefits gained from the
economies of scale noted above.
Additionally, the increase in the size of a ship is not directly matched by an

increase in the crew required to operate the larger ship. Crew sizes began
decreasing in the 1950s, a trend that has continued as shipbuilders and
operators have taken advantage of automation. Today, tankers of 200,000 dwt
or more operate with crews of no more than twenty-four personnel, while the
much smaller tankers of fifty years ago required a crew of forty to fifty. Shore
management and other administrative costs also fell or at least remained the
same, since fleet operating and administrative costs depend primarily on the
number of ships being operated rather than their individual size.
Fuel costs are also proportionately lower for larger tankers. A 60,000-dwt ship,
for instance, typically requires approximately 16,000 horsepower (hp) to
operate at 15 knots (kts), while a 260,000-dwt ship requires 42,500 hp. This
equates to using 2.7 times as much energy to transport 4.3 times as much
cargo.
There are factors, however, that limit the economical size of a tanker. First,
there are a limited number of shipyards capable of building the larger ships
and the number of ports able to service them is similarly limited. Second,
several of the world's most important shipping routes are too shallow for the
very large and ultralarge ships. The Suez Canal is limited to fully laden ships
of 70,000 dwt; the Malacca Strait is too shallow for loaded tankers greater
than 260,000 dwt. Larger ships proceeding from the Middle East to Northeast
Asia have to transit the Lombok Strait, which adds an additional 956 nautical
miles (nm) to the voyage. Many other important routes around the world,
including the Strait of Dover and the Bosporus, also present navigational
difficulties to large ships.
Overall, however, developments since the late 1960s have encouraged ship
owners to build increasingly large tankers. At the same time that the Suez
Canal was closed in 1967, world trade was booming, and the United States
only recently had become a major oil importer instead of exporter. Shipping
rates and profits both soared. The cost of a new VLCC of more than 200,000
19
dwt could be paid off in less than two years.
Thus, the past forty-year boom in tanker building and size is not surprising.
Shipyards in Japan, South Korea, and more recently in China have led the
tanker-building surge, with ships of dramatically increasing size. The increase
in the number and size of newly constructed tankers has not been continuous
since the early 1970s, however, as world demand and events have created
imbalances between supply and demand; overall, however, a remarkable
expansion of seaborne trafficking in energy supplies has occurred during the
past few decades.
The tanker market has been increasingly volatile during the last few years,
affected by different influences at different times. Overall, however, the
average age of the tanker fleet is declining. Only some 4.5 million dwt of
tankers were decommissioned in 2005, but the tanker fleet increased by some
7 percent as some 30 million dwt of tankers were delivered. After a ten-year
period with a fairly steady tanker fleet until 2002, the fleet is now increasing,
as it will likely do until at least 2009. In fact, between 2004 and 2008 the
tanker fleet is expected to increase by 25 percent, from 335 million to 415
million dwt.
During 2003, 697 tankers with 49.9 million dwt were added to the order book,
including 574 oil and oil product tankers totaling 46.6 million dwt. This was an
exceptionally high increase over 2002, and was part of a continuing trend of
large tonnage deliveries to tanker fleet owners.
As of January 2004, in fact, more than 1,100 tankers of 300 gross tons or
20
more were on order, the highest level since 1975. This number consisted of
925 oil tankers totaling 71.3 million dwt, 100 chemical tankers of 1.4 million
dwt, and 106 liquid gas tankers of 7.5 million dwt. This represented 22.6 per
cent of the world's total tanker tonnage.
Asia's global shipbuilding lead is increasing, as South Korea, Japan, and China
continue to increase their capacity. The latter's shipbuilding industry reported
a 113 percent rise in the first six months of 2006 over the same period for
2005. This is approximately 17 percent of global shipbuilding and reflects
Beijing's “Medium- and Long-Term Plan of the Shipbuilding Industry,” which
stipulates Chinese acquisition of “more than 25 percent of the world
21
[shipbuilding] market.”
Most of these ships are being built in East Asia, as the predominance of the
region's shipyards is reflected both in the number of ships on order and in the
world's operational tanker fleet. Asian ports also dominate seaborne energy
22
commerce, with South Korean facilities overtaking Japanese ports in 2004.
In 2005, 140 crude oil tankers totaling 19.8 million dwt entered the global
fleet. For the period 2002–2006, the crude oil tanker fleet expanded from 233
million to 257 million dwt. The large number of recently delivered new ships
has lowered that fleet's average age from more than twenty years in 2002 to
23
just over seventeen years in 2006.
The total tanker fleet still relies heavily on smaller ships, however; at the
beginning of 2006, 7,635 ships—73.4 per cent of all tankers—had a capacity of
less than 40,000 dwt. The fleet included 471 VLCC tankers (200,000–320,000
dwt) and 10 ULCC tankers (320,000 dwt and above). The VLCC and ULCC
ships had an average age of 9.3 years, with six of the ULCC ships less than
five years old. The trend toward the larger tankers continues with thirty-one
VLCC/ULCC tankers (above 200,000 dwt) totaling 9.5 million dwt on order at
the beginning of 2006.
The tanker tonnage supply in future years will be significantly influenced by

24
the continued phasing-out of single hull tankers. In 1967, following the
disastrous oil spill when the Torrey Canyon ran aground off the Portuguese
coast, the world's primary tanker-owning nations agreed to reduce the
possibility of future spills by requiring that liquid carriers be built with a double
hull. This allows the outer hull of a tanker to be breached, usually as the result
of the ship running aground, without the cargo leaking into the sea.
Although the goal was for 109 million dwt of single-hull tankers to be phased
out by 2005, this objective is unlikely to be met before 2015 because of
construction limits, states refusing to ratify the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) regulations, and single-hull tankers being shifted to non-
25
oil carriage. This means that single-hull tankers with a capacity of about
12.3 million dwt which should have been phased out by the end of 2005 are
still operating, posing an increasing danger to the environment as they age.
In fact, among Middle Eastern oil producers, only Saudi Arabia ratified the
international maritime requirements for double-hulling tankers, in 2006.
Single-hull ships will also be able to trade under Panamanian or Liberian flag.
In fact, however, many national administrations have still not clarified their
position on the special provisions contained in the international law, which will
extend the trading life of newer single-hull tankers past 2010 to twenty-five
26
years operational life or 2015, whichever is earlier.
The tanker fleet has political as well as economic weight; a current case
illustrative of the importance of tankers to nonenergy related international
issues is the ripening relationship between China and Venezuela. As discussed
earlier, Venezuela has huge reserves of bitumen which can be processed into a
27
more liquid form called orimulsion. Recent visits to China by President Hugo
Chavez Frias have led to announcements that Venezuela would double its
energy exports to China, and had agreed to purchase eighteen oil tankers from
28
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation for a price of $1.3 billion.
This shipbuilding agreement notwithstanding, the difficulties of processing

orimulsion and the distances involved in transporting the product to China
indicate that Chavez Frias’ claims are made more for political purposes, to
antagonize and gain distance from the United States, than for economic
reasons. While his visit to Beijing in August 2006 was headlined as an “11
Billion Dollar Oil Deal,” less than 20 percent of that amount actually relates to
29
the Venezuelan energy industry.
Future trade patterns will be strongly affected by Chinese imports, forecast to

30
reach 12 percent of world oil and oil products imports in 2010. China's
powerfully sustained growth is driving the shipping markets, with its oil
imports representing approximately 8 percent of the tanker market in ton-
miles. Although Chinese oil demand increased less in 2005 (compared to the
rest of the world) than in any year since 2001, it recovered in 2006,
increasing to 38 percent of the total growth in world oil demand.
Uncertainty about future fleet composition increases after 2008, and is marked
by the fact that 2010 is the last year that single-hull tankers can trade to the
environmentally harder-line countries in the European Union, as well as with
Australia, Canada, and the United States. Accomplishing a total ban on single-
hull tankers by 2010 would require the phaseout of approximately 65 million
dwt of single-hull tankers in that year alone, an eventuality almost certain not
to take place.
LNG SHIPPING
The LNG shipping fleet deserves special attention. This is due to both the
advanced technology required to manufacture and operate these ships, and
their potential attractiveness to terrorists as targets with which to attack
major seaports. LNG-laden ships and terminal storage tanks do possess the
potential to create large fires and explosions, if explosively breached, but their
31
susceptibility for this potential is more storied than real.
The global LNG fleet numbered over 150 tankers at the end of 2003. These
ships ranged in capacity from under 50,000 to more than 120,000 cubic
meters (m3), with the newer ships at the larger end. Fifty-five ships were
under construction in 2004, with forty-six capable of carrying at least 138,000
32
m3 of LNG (equivalent to 2.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas).
Construction of even larger LNG carriers, with up to 250,000 m3 of capacity
(5.3 bcf of natural gas), is under way in East Asian shipyards, and existing
LNG terminals will have to be expanded to accommodate the larger ships.
The LNG carriers built since 2003 have raised total global capacity by 44
percent, from 17.4 million m3 of liquid (366 bcf of natural gas) in October
2003 to 25.1 million m3 of liquid (527 bcf of natural gas) in December 2006.
Further expansion of the LNG fleet is limited by the fact that only eight
shipyards in the world currently build large LNG tankers: three in Japan; three
in Korea; and two in Europe, but India and China have also constructed
33
shipyards capable of building the larger LNG tankers.
Seaborne transportation of LNG remains relatively expensive, with the

liquefaction process and transport costs accounting for as much as 30 percent
of the product's delivered value, depending on the distance from origin to
market. By comparison, the shipping cost for petroleum delivery is less than
10 percent.
Furthermore, the cost of $150 to $160 million to build a 138,000 m3 LNG

carrier is more than double the price of a VLCC capable of carrying four to five
times as much energy. LNG tankers are more expensive to build and operate
because they require insulated containment for the cargo and sophisticated,
reliable cryogenic equipment to maintain exact environmental control.
Most petroleum carriers are built on speculation, but LNG ships have
traditionally been built for specific routes or projects. Recently, however, the
British Petroleum (BP), Shell, and Tokyo Gas companies have ordered LNG
ships not already obligated to a particular project prior to construction
beginning.
Asia leads the world in LNG imports, as noted; on the other side of the coin,
Malaysia is one of the world's leading exporters of LNG, exporting 21.2 million
metric tons (mmt), approximately 1,031 bcf of natural gas, in 2005, which
amounted to 15 percent of global LNG exports. Most of Malaysia's LNG went to
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Malaysia International Shipping
Corporation (MISC) transported most of this, utilizing its twenty-three LNG
tankers, the single largest LNG tanker fleet in the world by volume of LNG
carried.
Coal is another energy source produced, consumed, and transported by

maritime shipping in East Asia. Indonesia supplanted Australia in 2005 as the
region's leading source of steam coal (used to produce energy), although the
latter retained its leading position as a source of coking coal (used for
industrial purposes).
Ships comonly used for international transportaion of coal are categorized by

size, ranging from:
1. Handysize: 40–45,000 dwt

2. Panamax: approximately 60–80,000 dwt
3. Capesize: approximately 80,000+ dwt
About 775 metric tons (mt) of hard coal was traded internationally in 2005, 90
percent of which was seaborne. Coal transportation is expensive, in some
34
instances acounting for up to 70 percent of the delivered cost of the coal.
Ships are used for long distances; because of the expense, only higher quality
coal is usually traded internationally. Lignite and subbituminous (“soft”) coal is
traded regionally but is too expensive for shipment over longer distances,
because of its low energy content compared to harder coals.
Coal remains a major energy source in the twenty-first century; it contributes

to almost 40 percent of global electricity production, a number not expected to
change significantly over the next thirty years. Asia is the biggest coal market
35
in the world, consuming 54 percent of global production.
CONCLUSION
According to official data, Chinese-owned ships carried only 9 percent of the
crude oil the country imported in 2005. For its overall market size, China's
tanker fleet is relatively small, with eighteen VLCCs, most of them among the
oldest in the world's tanker fleets. Chinese planners reportedly want to expand
the country's energy carriers as a step toward ensuring security of supply. This
effort reportedly aims to build a fleet of seventy-five tankers by 2012, with an
eventual goal of providing a ninety-tanker fleet by 2015, capable of carrying
36
50 percent of the nation's energy imports. This massive, $7-billion-plus plan
not only reflects Beijing's concerns about energy security, but also appears to
conflict with the conventional wisdom of the international energy business
37
community.
This plan highlights the importance of shipping to energy security. It is not

unique, but notable only because of China's size, expanding economy, and
dramatically increasing requirements for the energy supplies to maintain that
economic progress. Japan is even more dependent, and South Korea hardly
less so, on tankers being able to move securely over the long SLOCs leading
from the energy resources that lie across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. It
is not surprising, therefore, that these three countries dramatically lead the
world in large oil and LNG tanker capability and production.
That so much of the global energy fleet flies flags of convenience is not
especially significant, despite Beijing's apparent belief otherwise. The ocean is
indeed a great commons, offering energy arteries so valuable that no effort to
interdict them would be able to endure in the face of international demand.
This conclusion is based not on international theory or on economic

interdependence, but draws on the facts of the twenty-first-century
globalization of the energy market and the distances involved in Asia's
continuing search for energy resources. First, for instance, a tanker flying a
Panamanian flag loads crude oil at an Iranian terminal in the Persian Gulf and
departs for Yokohama; en route, as the international oil market rises and falls,
the tanker's cargo may be sold several times. It may arrive at the Malacca
Strait only to be told its cargo is going to a Singapore refinery before being
offered on the market in the form of petroleum products, crude oil no more. At
what point in this process would an antagonist be able to identify the tanker as
one whose interception would help his cause?
Second, given the lengths of the SLOCs under discussion—5,000 nm from

Shanghai into the Persian Gulf, for instance—there is no navy in the world
today or in the foreseeable future able to systematically intercept the
seaborne flow of energy to a meaningful degree. Third, what would threaten
those SLOCs; why would a belligerent in an East or South Asian conflict decide
that its cause would be helped rather than condemned were they to interrupt
energy deliveries?
The new century will certainly witness traditional international conflicts and
disputes. Navies will continue to modernize and expand as the weaponry
under, on, and above the sea continues to grow in technological capability and
sophistication. So long as dependence on hydrocarbon energy sources
continues, securing the tankers that carry energy across the seas will continue
to be a vital security interest.
THREATS TO THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
INTRODUCTION
Asia's inherently maritime environment retains the characteristics addressed

by the Western naval theorists of the late nineteenth century. At the same
time, this environment is subject to the rapidly changing technology of the
twenty-first century, as well as by the developments that succeeded first, the
end of the Cold War in 1990 and second, the changes in the conduct of
international relations imposed by the United States following the events of
September 11, 2001 (9/11).
These changes are characterized by complexity and ambiguity in the current

maritime security environment. The sea lines of communications (SLOCs)
remain a focal point of maritime security concerns. Threats to the SLOCs in
the early twenty-first century include military conflicts between regional
nations, sovereignty disputes which threaten military conflict, terrorism, and
1
international crime, usually falling under the rubric of “piracy.”
Each of these threat categories will be addressed below. Military threats to the
Asian SLOCs are relatively slight. None of the regional states currently hold
any apparent strategic objectives that would involve interdicting SLOCs,
although China might do so, at least for a short period of time, should active
military conflict develop over Taiwan's status. Similarly, the conflicting claims
to sovereignty over the South China Sea land features might lead to a
situation involving opposing military forces.
Finally, unintended escalation between two or more opposing naval and air
force units might lead to an armed clash.
The other, essentially nonmilitary threats to the SLOCs are more likely to
occur; in fact, to a degree they are already occurring. Natural disasters,
international crime, and conflicting sovereignty claims are all facts of
international maritime life. Examples include the 2004 tsunami in Southeast
Asia; the incidents of maritime crime that characterize some of the waters in
proximity to the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well in the Bay of Bengal
and western Arabian Sea; and the territorial claims held by the different states
bordering on the South China Sea. It must also be noted, however, that most
of these situations are currently being dealt with peacefully, on a multilateral
basis.
While potential for major combat operations at sea remains, terrorism has
significantly increased the presence of “nonmilitary” and multinational threats
in the maritime domain. These threats present challenges difficult for maritime
nations to counter. They present situations in which threats and adversaries
are neither clearly defined nor perhaps even readily identifiable by source.
Additionally, defeating these threats will require more than purely military
instruments and processes. Similarly, defeat may well not be satisfactory:
resolving their causative bases will be necessary to ensure lasting peace at
sea.
SLOCs crossing the Indian Ocean from west to east offer various routes,
although common sea lines pass through the One and Half Degree, Six
Degree, or the Nine Degree Channels, which offer different passages between
the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean archipelagoes. These are not as
vulnerable as either Bab el-Mandeb or Hormuz as navigational chokepoints,
and they pale in significance next to the primary access and egress to the
eastern Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which connects
the Andaman and South China Seas.
A brief review here of the detailed regional geography of Chapter 2 reveals

that navigational chokepoints, in the form of straits, are a salient feature in
examining the threat to ocean commerce for the region. These straits are not
equal in either importance to the shipment of energy supplies or in
susceptibility to terrorist attacks. The most important of these navigational
chokepoints for this discussion are those of Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz, and
Malacca.
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
Terrorists are generally committed to and benefit from political instability in

individual nations and even throughout a region, such as Southeast Asia. Such
instability may be the result of large-scale environmental disasters; hence,
intentionally causing such events can have far-reaching, negative effects on
economic health and political stability, especially in a region already suffering
from political unrest, economic deprivation, or religious conflict.
Additionally, recent and increasing competition for declining maritime

resources has resulted in a number of violent incidents. These have occurred
between nations, as in the East China Sea (China and Japan), and between
national agents, such as those frequently occurring between the fishermen of
almost all East Asian states. These incidents underscore the high stakes in
diminishing resources such as fish stocks, and increasingly valued resources
such as petroleum.
Fisheries are a particularly fragile resource and a matter of vital importance to
all the nations of East Asia, as providing the single most important source of
protein to the populations of the region. Overfishing is a relatively recent
phenomenon in the East and South China Seas. A Chinese study claims that
the total catch in the latter sea increased from 425,000 tons in 1955 to 3.34
million tons in 1999, while the total for the East and South China Seas was a
stunning 12.2 million tons. Correspondingly, the “fish resources density” as of
1999 may have dropped to approximately one-quarter of its density a half-
2
century earlier. An even more recent study, completed in 2006, forecasts
doom for the entire fisheries industry, warning that, “If fishing around the
world continues at its present pace, more and more species will vanish, marine
ecosystems will unravel and there will be ‘global collapse’ of all species
currently fished, possibly as soon as mid-century, fisheries experts and
3
ecologists are predicting.”
Similarly, terrorists might cause deliberate, massive pollution of the oceans to

damage ecosystems and undermine the national and economic security of the
nations that depend on them. In the words of one scientist, the combination of
sovereignty and ecological problems mean that the “whole ecological system in
4
the areas is at the brink of collapse.”
TERRORIST THREATS
Terrorist threats have become notably more important at sea, in terms of both
range and impact. This is due in part to the oceans’ role as the world's
commons, presenting opportunities for global movement and relative
covertness: despite satellites and other modern detection systems, the oceans
remain capable of hiding even large vessels and embarked terrorists.
Additionally, recent advances in telecommunications and in international

commercial logistics have increased the ease with which terrorist activities
may range the maritime realm, a realm, as we have seen, that defines the
East Asian international environment. Even the most secure national borders
effectively end at the coastline and adversaries able to take advantage of
maritime transnational capabilities will be increasingly able to carry out their
damaging activities throughout the East Asian political, economic, and military
realms.
The maritime commons also eases access to a broad array of potential targets
suitable for terrorists to maximize the ability of their disruptive activities to
cause mass casualties and catastrophic economic damage. The terrorist threat
cannot be neatly described or enumerated, and may grow in method and
capability; however, sources can be broadly categorized as nation-states,
terrorists, and transnational criminals and pirates.
Although capable of dramatic attacks, terrorist groups have not demonstrated

the ability to disrupt the commerce flowing on the world's SLOCs to a
significant degree. Even during the “tanker war” in the Persian Gulf in the
1980s, oil shipments continued, with attacks never affecting more than 2
5
percent of the tankers transiting the Persian Gulf. More recently, Southeast
Asia has been the scene of active maritime terrorism, with the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and the Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
conducting attacks at sea. These groups may be loosely linked to al-Qaeda,
which conducted the attacks on the American warship USS Cole while she was
pier side in Aden in 2000 and on the French tanker SS Limburg, while that
6
ship was at anchor off the Yemeni coast, in 2002.
In both cases, the ships were stationary; in the latter case, no special state of
7
alert was in effect. Two terrorist incidents of note have also occurred in
Southeast Asian waters. The Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
attacked a coastal freighter, Our Lady Mediatrix, in 2000, killing forty and
wounding fifty people. Even more serious was another attack in Philippine
waters, reportedly committed by the ASG in 2004, when a bombing attack
8
againstSuperFerry 14 sank the ship and caused 116 deaths.
As is the case across the spectrum of man-made threats to maritime

commerce, terrorist groups are most likely to target seaborne commerce at
straits, where ships are constrained by slow speeds and restricted
maneuvering in the face of geographical restrictions and navigational hazards.
Most notable of these for the energy exporting and importing nations of Asia
are the Middle East and Southeast Asia chokepoints previously noted,
including the Bab al-Mandeb, and the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca-Singapore,
Sunda, Lombok, Makassar, Surigo, San Bernardino, Luzon, and Taiwan.
Relationships between terrorist groups and nation-states are often complex,

9
even contradictory, and usually difficult to decipher. Clarifying such
connections, however, is crucial to countering terrorist threats at sea. The
nexus of such connections often occurs in seaports, river ports, or elsewhere
on internal waters. This last category is of course particularly expansive in the
case of archipelagic states such as the Philippines and Indonesia.
The Asian terrorist groups currently posing the most active maritime threats
are located in the Philippines and Indonesia. Also notable, however, was the
extent of terrorist cells found in Singapore and Malaysia during post-9/11
10
investigations. These groups’ ability to exploit inherently open maritime
borders challenges the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations and
increasingly threatens regional peace and stability; since successful maritime
attacks may disrupt regional and global economies out of proportion to the
attack itself, as shippers and insurers react to the danger. Furthermore,
maritime avenues serve terrorist groups admirably for personnel and logistics
carriage, and often offer a target-rich environment with escape routes readily
11
at hand.
Maritime platforms amenable to terrorist employment include explosives-laden

suicide boats, as was used to attack USS Cole; merchant or cruise ships to ram
another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform; commercial vessels
as launch platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate
ports; and unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles. Mines are also
effective weapons that are low-cost, easily manufactured and deployed,
difficult to counter, and require minimal training to employ.
Merchant ships’ legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied

natural gas (LNG), may also provide terrorists with the explosive component of
an attack. A ship laden with explosive cargo, such as LNG or other petroleum
products, would be an obvious platform for misuse, especially since such ships
routinely berth in important port areas and transit the region's most sensitive
navigational narrows. Particularly troubling is the availability to terrorists of
the many thousands of containers in which most shipboard cargo is carried.
The U.S.-sponsored Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to ensure the
12
safety of these containers, but has barely made a dent in the problem.
The presence of terrorist groups in maritime Asia is incontrovertible, as

unfortunately is the continued presence of the social, economic, and political
conditions that give rise to their existence. Weapons in the form of individual
arms and vessels laden with dangerous cargo are also all too readily at hand.
Finally, financial support may be obtained from illegal activities at sea, ranging
from piracy to the international drug trade.
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND PIRACY

Maritime criminals may be gaining significant financial benefits from piracy, as
they are from smuggling and illegal trade, particularly in drugs. Indeed,
continued and possibly increasing maritime threats against nations and the
international community include the smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and
other contraband. More dangerous to life, although also more disorganized, is
the age-old maritime crime of piracy—armed robbery on the high seas. Piracy
and incidents of maritime crime usually occur in areas of heavy commercial
maritime activity such as straits, harbors, and archipelagic passages, but
criminals rarely attack large ships underway at sea.
Piracy in Asian waters has a recorded history dating at least to the fifth
century. Chinese dynasties suffered from the problem, as did Western traders
who entered the region. Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, and other
13
outsiders all tried to deal with the problem, but with inconsistent success.
Today's pirates are different from the classic picture—except in the shared
commonality of ferocity. They are often well organized and well equipped with
advanced communications, weapons, and high-speed craft. The capabilities to
board and commandeer large underway vessels, although difficult and
occurring in only a few piracy incidents, could also be employed to facilitate
terrorist acts.
In fact, Southeast Asia is one of the world's two most frequent scenes of pirate
attacks against seagoing vessels, 25 percent of these occurring in Indonesian
14
waters in 2003 and 2004. Most of these attacks are small-scale, perhaps
following the fictional but applicable description: “It is just as occasion offers . .
. In the South China Sea, by all accounts, the rule is to take anything you can
15
overcome, and avoid or trade with anything you cannot.” Despite 2004 data
indicating that less than one-half of 1 percent of all seaborne traffic transiting
the Malacca Strait was attacked, the piracy medium offers too tempting a
vehicle for would-be terrorist groups for the region's navies to ignore the
threat. Particularly nefarious are probable financial and other support links
16
between pirate bands and terrorist groups.
Piracy seems to increase in direct proportion to significant political and

economic instability, with the usually concomitant lack of maritime law
enforcement by local nations. Economic and social dissension within a national
society, or within a significant ethnic or religious segment of that society,
contributes to the frequency of international criminal incidents at sea.
Organized terrorist movements in Southeast Asia have also launched a few
attacks on vessels or other targets in the maritime realm that were clearly
17
linked to those groups.
There was an average of fewer than sixty reported piracy incidents annually
during the 1980s and 1990s, but this number increased dramatically following
the 1997 economic crash that swept the region, reaching 161 in 1999 and 242
in 2000. The number of reported pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters
further increased to 445 in 2003, 170 in the Malacca Strait alone.
Furthermore, pirate attacks are probably underreported; some authorities
estimate that no more than one-half of such attacks are reported to national
authorities, while a regional antipiracy conference in Singapore in late 1999
estimated that “as few as one in eight attempted or actual incidents were
18
reported.”
Piracy attacks have been significantly reduced, however; in fact only twelve
“armed- robbery and piracy incidents” were reported in the first quarter and
no pirate attacks were reported in the Malacca area for the second quarter of
19
2007. This reduction is likely due to greater awareness, improved economic
conditions, and to the increasingly cooperative efforts of the area's naval,
coast guard, and police units. This multilateral effort is commendable, but
could not have occurred without the help of Japan, the United States, India,
and other extraregional nations, lending verbal and material support; despite
20
Malaysia's unhelpful sense of nationalism.
The situation remains unsettled, however, as the local and user states attempt
to reach an equitable agreement for enforcing and resourcing antipiracy and
other security programs for the straits area. The security issue involves legal,
economic, and nationalism issues that will continue to figure actively in the
21
ongoing international efforts to increase the security of these crucial SLOCs.
The definition of “piracy” is one factor muddying the statistical picture. The UN
defines piracy as “an attack taking place in international waters,” while the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an agency of the International Chamber
of Commerce, uses a much broader definition, including any “act of boarding
or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or
any other crime…regardless of whether the target vessel is berthed, at anchor,
22
or underway in national or international waters.” This is a crucial difference,
since a relatively small portion of Southeast Asian waters lie outside any
nation's territorial sea (extending 12 nm to seaward from its coast or until
meeting a neighboring territorial sea).
The IMB on the other hand has established four categories of piracy. The first
and largest is “opportunistic boarding aimed at theft or robbery” from a ship,
after which the robbers escape with their loot. Many of these attacks are
conducted against ships at anchor or berthed at a pier, usually with few
crewmembers onboard and a low level of watchfulness. Boardings at sea,
although still falling within this relatively straightforward category, are far
more dangerous both to ships’ crews and the pirates. In these cases, the
pirates actually take control of vessels that are underway, perhaps for several
hours, before fleeing with crewmembers’ valuables, ship's funds, and other
high-value items such as navigation equipment. An easier and more often
employed method is to “plant” a pirate onboard as a crewmember, a process
greatly facilitated by the fungibility and lack of accountability that prevails in
merchant ship crewing processes.
The IMB's second category of piracy occurs when a specific ship is targeted and
hijacked because of its cargo. Petroleum products have typically been the
cargo of choice in such cases. The third category of piracy involves the pirates
replacing the crew, repainting and renaming the ship, and then selling the
cargo (and even the ship) on the international market. This category is the
most dangerous to crewmembers, since in some cases they have been
murdered by the pirates.
This degree of ruthlessness has seldom occurred, however, and the hijacking of
tugboats and their towed barges has become more common. This in turn has
given rise to a fourth category of piracy: the kidnapping and holding for
ransom of crewmembers, especially officers. This crime has most often been
committed in and around the northern end of the Malacca Strait, where the
Free Aceh Movement has been active. This criminal activity is very likely the
most seldom reported by ship owners, who do not want to be blamed by the
industry either for paying ransom to pirates or for sacrificing their
crewmembers.
The IMB has also been one of the most important participants in the
international effort to reduce piracy, however defined. It not only played the
primary role in establishing the Anti-Piracy Reporting Center in 1992, but also
recently established a “Maritime Security Hotline” to improve reporting of
23
criminal incidents at sea, better to alert mariners. The center has reporting
agreements with Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and
Vietnam. It enhances regional cooperation to improve maritime security by
sharing information, increasing law and order at sea, and by establishing
24
cooperative agreements among maritime nations.
The narrow waters of the Malacca Strait bounded by Indonesia, Singapore, and
Malaysia certainly provide pirates with good opportunities, especially at the
strait's eastern and northern ends, as ships have to slow down to maintain
safe navigation. However, the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong has emerged as
the most dangerous port in Asia, and possibly in the world, with Lagos,
25
Nigeria, ranked the second most dangerous, and Chennai, India, the third.
Linkage between pirates and terrorists is suggested by the attention al-Qaeda
and Jemaah Islamiya have paid to maritime operations. Not only did the
former conduct the attacks against USS Cole and SS Limburg, but also
reportedly owns several old steamers; these may be used for logistics
purposes, but could also serve to launch large-scale attacks on other ships or
against port facilities. Jemaah Islamiya sank the Philippine SuperFerry 14, and
uses Philippine waterways for logistics and for personnel attack and withdrawal
26
routes.
Despite such evidence, not all the nations of the region apparently believe that
piracy–terrorism links exist. Malaysia in particular has been reluctant to
acknowledge linkage, despite joining in multilateral antipiracy patrols,
27
protesting the lack of any “credible link” between pirates and terrorists.” That
said, behind the scenes Kuala Lumpur has been willing to join in cooperative
efforts, even with the United States, in July 2006 signing an agreement to
28
cooperate against “corruption, terrorism, and people smuggling.” Most
effective has been the trilateral agreement among Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Singapore to conduct sea and air patrols to counter piracy; Thailand joined this
29
arrangement in 2005.
Regional stability may also be influenced by illegal international migration.

This is a long-standing issue that will increase in proportion to national
instability. Illegal international movement of people is often a maritime issue;
terrorists can easily take advantage of human smuggling networks to
circumvent national border security measures.
NATION-STATE THREATS
Obviously, nation-states capable and willing to engage in terrorist activities are

the easiest threats to identify, although assigning culpability in a particular
instance may be difficult. In East Asia, North Korea has been by far the most
obnoxious state engaged in terrorism, including assassination, kidnapping,
counterfeiting, illegal weapons transfers, and other criminal activities. The
military autocracy ruling Burma seems chiefly guilty of only oppressing its own
citizens, although its genocidal attacks on various ethnic minority groups in
the country have certainly affected Thailand's and Bangladesh's security.
Pyongyang's international criminal activities threaten SLOC security because

of the threat posed by its activities causing a major regional conflict involving
major powers from both within and without the region. China, Russia, Japan,
South Korea (ROK), and the United States are all directly involved in trying to
resolve at least the nuclear weapon threat posed by North Korea. This defines
a multiparty process involving a plethora of international treaties, alliances,
friendships, enmities, and actual states of war that in turn poses a calculus
difficult both to delineate and to solve; the failure satisfactorily to do so has
the potential to lead to nuclear war among the six concerned parties.
Less obvious than North Korea's disruptive activities are other individual states
that provide safe haven to criminals and terrorists, who use these countries as
bases of operations to export illicit activities into the maritime domain and into
other areas of the region. In East Asia, the limited governing ability of some
governments, notably the Philippine and Indonesian, has created havens for
international terrorist groups. That these groups have almost invariably had
origins in previous national insurgent movements is both testimony to the
weakness of the host governments and the difficulty of rooting out such
groups: their indigenous origin owes much to the disfunctionality of the
national governments and the economic, political, and socioreligious
differences and inequalities that form the basis of their appeal to potential and
actual supporters.
The unfortunate conditions in the Philippines and Indonesia have given rise to
numerous groups so dissatisfied as to resort to armed insurgency. Some of
these groups have sought and received support from international Islamic-
based terrorist organizations. Since both of these nations are archipelagic and
hence intensely maritime, they are prime potential sources of international
maritime disruptive actions, ranging from religiously motivated terrorism to
piracy both for profit and for causing breakdowns in the flow of seaborne
merchant traffic so critical to the Asian nations.
Malaysia and Thailand also suffer from insurgent movements possibly linked to
international Islamic terrorist groups, but appear so far to be containing the
ability of these movements to disrupt the maritime arena. This does not lessen
the potential dangers to Thailand and Malaysia from these groups, but
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have so far demonstrated awareness of the
dangers and the will to move against them.
The ultimate threat posed by national governments, or by terrorist groups

either national or international in character, is the possibility of their acquiring
one or more weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the increasing
prevalence of the requisite knowledge and spread of suitable materials and
technology, this danger must be assumed to be increasing daily.
Pakistan has exhibited the criminal propensity to proliferate such critical

advanced conventional weaponry, WMD components, delivery systems and
related materials, technologies, and weapons expertise to several states,
ranging from Libya to North Korea. Once on the open market, the availability
of such catastrophic capability is almost impossible to restrict to other states,
or to prevent its acquisition by a terrorist organization. The maritime domain
offers the most likely venue for hiding and transporting a WMD.
SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS
Many wars have been sparked by sovereignty disputes between two or more
nations, and Asia is rife with such maritime disputes. These disputes involve
the nations with the most serious maritime interests and the strongest naval
forces to enforce their claims. Hence, these maritime sovereignty disputes
pose a significant potential for armed conflict.
Disputant states may resort to a range of actions, many of them apparently

not military in nature, to imaginatively press their claims to specific territory.
These have been described as “creeping jurisdiction,” and include actions that
30
essentially restrict freedom of navigation. They may take the form of safety
regulations, including restricting navigation of seagoing vessels to traffic lanes.
Another restrictive category would be based on suspicion of containing an
environmental pollutant, or to ensure that shipping did not encroach on United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)-designated maritime
zones. And “nuclear-free” zones, such as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (SEANFZ) or New Zealand's national law, may effectively restrict
the freedom of navigation of other nations.
Sovereignty disputes in Northeast Asia exist between Japan and Russia, Japan
and South Korea, and Japan and China. But the most serious dispute in Asian
waters is Taiwan's unresolved status. Beijing insists that the island is a Chinese
province; the current government in Taipei insists it is an independent state.
The danger of this dispute is due in significant part to potential U.S.
31
intervention to ensure that resolution of Taiwan's status occurs peacefully.
The most direct effect on SLOC security may be that this dispute over Taiwan
exacerbates disputes with Japan and complicates maritime cooperation
prospects with the United States. Thus it is a hindrance to potential maritime
cooperative efforts.
More than thirty territorial disputes mark Southeast Asia, but almost all are
relatively minor, with the only ones of immediate concern those of the South
China Sea land features—islands, rocks, reefs—and ocean areas contested by
32
China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
The South China Sea disputes are particularly ominous, since control over the
waterway would place a potential chokehold on East Asia's primary SLOCs to
the energy resources of the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States has
stated that any attempt to declare the South China Sea as sovereign territory
—and China is the only likely claimant—would be considered a violation of the
principle of the freedom of the seas and unacceptable. Beijing has not
threatened to interrupt navigation in the South China Sea or elsewhere—
including the Taiwan Strait—seeming to recognize that China's interests would
not be served by such an imprudent move.
INCREASING MARITIME SECURITY

The nations of Southeast Asia, joined by other powers including China, Japan,
South Korea, and the United States, are attempting to address maritime
security issues from a regional perspective. They have stressed the urgent
need to establish an accurate and timely information system and apply a
cooperative approach to identify problems and delineate measures to combat
threats to maritime security.
Among the most basic but effective steps that the nations of the region will
have to take, in addition to the willing exchange of information on a real-time
basis, is to follow the procedures of agreed-upon international cooperative
frameworks, ranging from the UNCLOS to the trilateral antipiracy patrols
conducted by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The rough edges of the lack of agreement about the importance of various
threats will have to be smoothed over to facilitate more effective allocation of
resources and procedures at sea. This will require correcting or at least
significantly ameliorating the lack of political will, a lack of trust between
countries, difficulties in exchanging classified information, and a lack of
resources in terms of information and data.
Some major initiatives have been launched, primarily with U.S. sponsorship,
perhaps most notably the CSI, a technology-intensive program with very
ambitious goals. Because of its dependence on technology, the CSI offers a
viable path to increasing the security of the evermore ubiquitous maritime
shipping containers that have already been used by terrorist organizations to
33
transfer personnel and material.
Another promising but equally difficult-to-implement program aims at

certifying seafarers and port facility workers’ identity and security status. The
UN's International Labor Organization (ILO) instituted a revised Seafarers’
Identity Documents Convention in February 2005 to establish more valid bases
for establishing crewmember identification. Allied with the revised Convention
is the ILO's Code of Practice on Security in Ports, adopted in March 2004. This
code has also been adopted by the UN's International Maritime Office (IMO)
and provides a framework for developing and implementing port security
strategies designed specifically to extend security beyond the previously
34
specified ship-berth interface, to include the entire port facility.
CONCLUSION
One serious threat to energy security in East Asia is for all practical purposes
out of the control of the region's nations: the political instability and ongoing
armed conflict in Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian oil-producing nations.
Sudan is a genocidal military dictatorship teetering on the edge of UN
intervention. China remains the nation's largest oil customer, and Beijing has
expressed only the mildest reservations about Khartoum's status as the world's
greatest humanitarian disaster, clearly setting oil supply as a higher priority
than both the humanitarian issue and the condemnation it is receiving from
35
Washington and other capitals. This prioritization seems to reflect the role
energy security may play in matters affecting even a country's international
reputation.
The U.S. war in Iraq, possessor of the world's fourth largest oil reserves,
36
continues to negate almost completely that nation's oil producing ability. The
other Persian Gulf nations are on the edge of Iranian dominance, where the
post-1979 Islamic revolution continues to hold sway, at its most extreme
trying to impose seventh-century social mores on a twenty-first-century
nation. China, Japan, and other nations work to maintain relations with Iraq
and Iran and other regional oil-producing nations, in order to promote access
to oil, once more reflecting the pivotal role of energy and SLOC security in
bilateral relations and international conduct.
East and South Asian access to Caspian Basin and other Central Asian
petroleum reserves remains largely in the future, and will depend on the
construction of pipelines through the politically unstable nations of the region,
ranging from Kazakhstan to Pakistan. Future Asian energy needs will perhaps
be satisfied by the huge oil reserves located in Siberian Russia; indeed, Japan
and China have for the past decade or more been engaged in a competitive
struggle to secure at least Moscow's agreement to make these reserves
available. Delivery remains somewhat problematical, however, as Russia
continues to struggle with resolving production, environmental, and political
problems associated with the reserves. This perpetuates the importance of
energy supplies by sea.
Other petroleum sources also present serious reliability problems. Saudi

Arabia was China's largest source of imported oil until surpassed by Angola in
2006. In fact, Africa provides Beijing with more than 30 percent of its
petroleum imports, but the region suffers from widespread corruption, political
37
oppression, economic inequality, and domestic instability in general. Even
the Southeast Asian oil-producing areas—the East and South China Seas,
Indonesia, and the Andaman Sea—offer political instability and sovereignty
disputes that cast a shadow over their reliability as energy sources.
Within Asian waters, the great majority of demonstrated threats remain

traditional acts of piracy and international crime. Few distinctly terrorist acts
at sea have been committed since 9/11, but their potential remains deadly and
ominous. The various described multilateral counterefforts being developed,
particularly in Southeast Asia, will have to serve in the long run to defeat
nonnational threats to the security of Asian SLOCs. Preventing traditional
national threats to energy transport through maritime Asia from erupting will
also require effective multilateral efforts to resolve international disputes.
Looking at the obverse of this issue, the common desire for energy security
could become a unifying factor in bilateral and international relationships,
particularly with respect to ensuring the security of the SLOCs. Thus, the
common goal of achieving energy security might play a positive role rather
than serving as a divisive factor.
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
Despite near-universal agreement with the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and wide adherence to most of its concepts and
definitions, the world is rife with maritime disputes, with Asia the scene of
particularly acute disagreements. Maritime sovereignty disputes have the
potential to jeopardize the flow of commerce over sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) either indirectly through the fostering of instability or directly through
armed conflicts over conflicting claims.
They are bilateral, ranging from disputes over annual fisheries allocations to
the status of Taiwan and multilateral, including the South China Sea and the
safety of the Malacca Strait. Although none of the existent maritime disputes
currently seem to threaten the near-term use of military force, future
developments could result in open warfare. The more than thirty maritime
disputes in which Asian nations are claimants all provide security concerns to
1
those states.
Current significant maritime disputes can be conveniently organized by

subregion. Some of these are arbitrarily delineated, but serve to demonstrate
both differences and linkages between and among disputants. Any dispute with
the potential to disrupt the SLOCs also threatens the smooth flow of seaborne
energy cargoes.
NORTHEAST ASIA
This area has long been the scene of economic, political, and military conflict
among its constituent nations. Several bitter wars have been waged during the
past century and a quarter between Japan, China, Korea, and Russia,
sometimes with out-of-area allies. These wars have left a legacy ranging from
simple hatred of past foes to occupation of conquered territories.
The Kurile Islands are a chain of barren land features reaching from the
northern major Japanese island of Hokkaido to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula.
Russia occupied all of this chain in 1945 as spoils of World War II. Japan
maintains a sovereignty claim over the southern Kurile Islands of Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group. These are called the Northern
Territories by Tokyo and the Southern Kurile Islands by Moscow.
The islands are of little intrinsic value but have been important to Russia for
reasons of national pride. During the Cold War and its attendant mutually
assured destruction standoff with the United States, however, the Kuriles were
viewed as a geographic barrier between the Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk, an
almost enclosed Russian “lake” used by Moscow as a primary operating area
for its submarines armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Hence, the Kuriles were viewed as important to the Soviet Union's strategic
nuclear deterrent capability.
Japan's demand for the return of the southern islands to its control is based
largely on national pride and cultural values. The disputed islands were long
used by Japanese fishermen and are the location of Japanese cemeteries.
Periodic negotiations between the two nations over the islands’ sovereignty
have been unproductive. The most recent Japanese attempt to engage Russia
over the islands’ status was rebuffed out of hand by Moscow, and the dispute
2
continues as a point of contention between the two nations. Any sovereignty
dispute that threatens Russo-Japanese relations casts a shadow of doubt over
the effective recovery and distribution of the enormous oil and natural gas
reserves in the Sakhalin and Kamchatka energy fields.
JAPAN AND KOREA

Another notable maritime sovereignty dispute is that between Japan and Korea
(both South and North) over a small island group in the southern Sea of Japan
(called the East Sea by Korea). These land features are called Takeshima by
the former and Dokdo by the latter, although many maps still label them as the
Liancourt Islands, after the French whaling ship that charted them in 1849.
Takeshima/Dokdo is located approximately 117 nm northwest of the nearest
commonly recognized Japanese territory, the Oki Islands, and 50 nm east of
South Korea's Ullung Island. The disputed territory consists of two islands and
several rocks. The entire land area is less than a large indoor sports arena and
is not capable of independently supporting human habitation. There are
significant fishery resources in the waters immediately surrounding the
islands, as well as potential, but unproven, reserves of natural gas and
minerals.
Then South Korean President Syngman Rhee declared in January 1952 that
Dokdo was Korean territory. There have been several confrontations between
Japan and South Korea over the islands since then, including national ships
firing on each other. Even when the two countries signed their Basic Treaty in
June 1965, the issue of Takeshima/Dokdo was described as an unresolved
dispute.
South Korea currently has a lighthouse, watchtower, and military troops

stationed on Dokdo. In April and May 2006, the already tense relations
between Seoul and Tokyo moved closer to the breaking point when Japan
began to implement its plan to conduct a maritime survey around the islets of
Takeshima/Dokdo; Seoul immediately dispatched twenty small naval vessels to
the area to prevent the survey. As the two sides edged toward confrontation,
rhetoric escalated and public opinion was mobilized, particularly in South
Korea. Diplomatic consultations resulted in a temporary stand-down, but the
patchwork agreement was followed by a hardening of positions that does not
bode well for a permanent solution to the dispute in the near future.
The conflict between Seoul and Tokyo over Takeshima/Dokdo is inflated by

nationalist sentiment and ideology, and is entangled in history which is easily
exploited by politicians on either side. The mix of historical, political,
economic, and ideological elements in the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute points to
the political fragility of relations among the Northeast Asian states. The
potential energy resources in their associated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
further raises tension and hardens national resolve.
Washington's influence in the region has eroded since the end of the Cold War
and the American focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which have
engendered doubts about the durability of the U.S. military presence and
commitment. Hence, Seoul and Tokyo both feel the need to assert their
interests more independently, resulting in appeals to nationalism.
Tokyo and Seoul should both feel that the need to contain and roll back
Pyongyang's nuclear threat, and to resist Beijing's bid for regional hegemony,
is motivation for at least not escalating the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute. The
spring 2006 near-confrontation over Japan's planned maritime survey and
acrimonious Korean reaction demonstrated the depth of mutual suspicion in
Seoul and Tokyo, however, as well as the general enmity of Korea toward
Japan. These may well be the determinant factor in South Korea's possible
decision to forge closer relations with Beijing and Pyongyang in the future.
The strategies of the two sides in advancing their claims are determined by the
fact that Seoul controls the islets. As the power that wants to maintain the
status quo, South Korea has resorted usually to “low-key diplomacy” in an
effort to keep the dispute from escalating to the point at which pressures
would appear to have it resolved by an international body. Tokyo, in contrast,
has pressed for a judicial settlement.
Neither Japan nor Korea wanted further confrontation at sea after the events
in 2006 and they began negotiations in Seoul on April 21 of that year. A
provisional agreement was reached, in which Tokyo agreed to suspend the
survey in return for Seoul's promising not to submit Korean names for the
seabed features at the June International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
meetings. Both sides agreed to meet in May 2006 to negotiate their EEZ
boundaries. The April agreement was not received favorably in South Korea
where it was seen as a concession to Japan. Under heavy public pressure, the
South Korean president promised to keep Dokdo/Takeshima under Seoul's
control “at any expense or sacrifice.”
No significant energy deposits have been found in the contested area, but the
dispute does not appear near settlement and demonstrates the potential for a
maritime sovereignty dispute affecting SLOC security. Seoul is unwilling to
back down for historical and domestic political reasons; Tokyo is no doubt
concerned that if it is too conciliatory in the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, it will
lose traction in sovereignty disputes with Beijing and Moscow, in the East
China Sea and in the Sea of Okhotsk respectively. The United States tries to
remain neutral in this dispute between allies, concerned about maintaining
their full cooperation in the more important issues of North Korean threats and
Chinese military modernization.
YELLOW SEA
With an area of about 400000 square kilometers, the Yellow Sea is formed by
Korea on the east and by China on the west and north. Its basin has been
estimated to contain anywhere from 1 to 10 bbbls of oil. Moreover, it is one of
the rare bodies of water in which commercial fishing may be profitably pursued
year-round.
Disputes in the Yellow Sea arise from different demarcations of the continental
shelf between China and North Korea, and between China and South Korea.
The sea is shallow, with depths averaging just 30 fathoms (180 feet) and
3
nowhere exceeding a bit over 68 fathoms. This shallow basin is probably a
factor in the good fisheries in the sea, but also severely limits its utility as a
naval operating area, especially for submarines. A rule of thumb is that safe
4
submarine operations require at least 100 fathoms depth of water.
China claims most of the intervening Yellow Sea continental shelf based on the
5
principle of “the natural prolongation of land territory.” This in turn is based
on the huge amounts of silt deposited in the Bohai (the Bo Sea is really a large
bay extending to the west from the Yellow Sea) by China's Huang He (Yellow
River). Beijing specifically claims a continental shelf in the Bohai based on the
farthest “silt line” created by this runoff. Where this silt line cannot be
demarcated, in the Bay of Korea in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, China
agrees to a maritime boundary based on an equidistant line between the two
countries.
This is in accord with both North and South Korea's adoption of the median
6
line principle for seabed demarcation between their claims. North Korea cited
this principle in 1977, when it claimed a 200 nm EEZ, as delineated in the
UNCLOS. South Korea also cited the median line principle when unilaterally
declaring its sovereignty over four oil fields in the Yellow Sea seabed.
Oil exploration is proceeding on both sides of the median line between China
and North Korea in the Bohai, in which both nations have discovered oil and
natural gas on their sides of the line. The North Korean discoveries are within
approximately 26 nm of the western extension of the military demarcation line
with South Korea—the Northern Limit Line—which, however, makes recovery
of the resources a military issue.
The eastern Yellow Sea is already producing both oil and natural gas in
commercially profitable quantities to China's benefit. From a legal point of
view, the disputes in the Yellow Sea should be relatively easy to resolve. The
geographical circumstances are straightforward, and Chinese-North Korean
relations are good. However, the situation is complicated by the continuing
North–South Korean animosity, although Beijing's growing relationship with
Seoul should facilitate settlement.
EAST CHINA SEA

The dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in
Chinese) is neither straightforward nor promising of early resolution. The
islands appear to lie on the Asian (Chinese) continental shelf, separated from
the Ryukyus by a deep underwater trench, approximately 120 nm northeast of
Taiwan, 200 nm east of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nm west-southwest of
Okinawa. These eight uninhabited islands and rocks have a land area of only
6.3 square kilometers.
Japan claimed the islands as official Japanese territory in 1895, having made
surveys as early as 1885 that showed that the Senkakus had been
uninhabited, with no physical evidence of Chinese control. Based on this
conclusion, Tokyo formally incorporated the Senkakus into the territory of
Japan.
They were not specifically included with Taiwan and the Pescadore (Penghu)
Islands as territory ceded to Japan by China's Qing Dynasty in the 1895 Treaty
of Shimonoseki, ending the Sino-Japanese War. Accordingly, the Senkakus are
not included in the territory renounced by Japan as part of the 1952 San
Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the World War II between Japan and the
United States (and its allies, including the Republic of China).
The Senkakus remained under U.S. control after World War II and were only
returned to Japan in 1971, as part of the Ryukyu Islands. Neither China nor
Taiwan has ever conceded that the Diaoyutais are Japanese territory. Both cite
Chinese historical records detailing the discovery of these islands in 1403,
after which they were traditionally administered as part of Taiwan and used as
a base by Chinese fishermen. If part of Taiwan, the Diaoyutais should have
been included in that island's return to China at the end of World War II in
1945, based on the 1943 agreement of the “big three” in Cairo.
Tokyo classifies the islands as part of its Southwest Islands. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) bases its claim not just on the historical record, but
also on the fact that the islands sit on the edge of the continental shelf of
mainland Asia, and are separated from the Japanese Ryukyu Islands by the
sea trench known as the Ryukyus Slough. Tokyo, however, argues that the
continental shelf stretches to the much deeper Nansei-shoto Trench to the
east, and that the Senkakus and the Ryukyus are on the same continental
shelf.
The dispute over where the mainland Asian continental shelf ends also
influences the Sino-Japanese dispute over seabed energy resources in the East
China Sea. Beijing insists that its mineral rights extend to continental shelf
limit in accordance with the UNCLOS definition. Tokyo, however, also cites the
UNCLOS (the provision for resolving such disputes), insisting on using a
median line between the different continental shelf limits argued by the two
7
nations.
A 1968 survey found oil fields in this area. The Republic of China government
in Taipei then formally claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyutais in 1971,
matching Beijing's claims, as it has always done in the South China Sea
territorial disputes. This underlines the importance of the disputes over these
areas—both islands and seabed—as nationalistic as well as economic in
character.
Beijing and Tokyo had conducted eleven negotiation sessions by December

2007, attempting to reach an agreement over joint recovery of these reserves.
The dispute remains unresolved, although recent discussions between senior
government officials focused on some form of joint development. Meanwhile,
China continues recovering seabed energy reserves, despite Japanese protests.
Although one of many sore points in Sino-Japanese relations, the energy
8
resources in the disputed area are relatively minor.
China's most important maritime issue lies just south of these islands, where
the Taipei government has established de facto independence for Taiwan and
several outlying islands, including Kinmen, Matsu, and the Penghus in the
Taiwan Strait, and Pratas and Ittu Aba in the South China Sea. Beijing insists
Taiwan remains a Chinese province, while the current Taipei government
insists that the island is an independent country.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
All of China's insular sovereignty claims have a creditable basis in the law of
the sea, with respect both to historical precedent and claims, as described in
the 1982 UNCLOS. Beijing signed and ratified the treaty in 1996, but
9
expressed five “reservations” in the process. These reserved China's right to
reinterpret important provisions of the UNCLOS, most notably in the clauses of
the treaty describing national sovereignty provisions for the EEZ and
Continental Shelf (CS) regimes.
Under the UNCLOS, a nation may claim an EEZ to a maximum distance of 200
nm seaward from its coastline. A CS is a geological phenomenon defined by
the gradient of the ocean floor and a nation may define its CS at a maximum
10
distance of 350 nm seaward from its coastline. These areas are delineated by
the UNCLOS almost entirely for economic purposes, and neither confers
sovereign rights on the claiming nation. But it is precisely this tenet about
which China issued reservations and which Beijing has seemed to claim on
several occasions, most notably in April 2001, during the EP-3 incident.
This incident involved severe damage to an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft

and the loss of a Chinese F-8II fighter aircraft with the death of its pilot. It
resulted from reckless airmanship by the fighter pilot while harassing
(“bumping”) the EP-3 in airspace that, while within China's EEZ, is by
international law open to air traffic—just as the seas within a claimed EEZ are
open to maritime traffic. Beijing, however, strongly implied that the EP-3 was
committing an illegal act by flying through this airspace without first obtaining
China's permission. In fact, when China signed the UNCLOS in 1996, the first
of the six “reservations” Beijing expressed was that “in accordance with the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
People's Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an
11
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.”
This despite the fact that it appears directly to contradict the treaty it signed
while expressing it.
These matters of legal definition remain unresolved by the UNCLOS, which

advocates peaceful resolution of conflicting claims through any of several
venues it suggests. These include the World Court, and in fact, that body has
agreed to hear a case in 2009 challenging the very definition of “continental
shelf.” If resolved, and if accepted by concerned nations, that redefinition could
directly affect at least two disputes between China and Japan over important
sovereignty/ownership issues in the East China Sea, both of them with
significant energy security implications.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The maritime disputes discussed above are the most important in Northeast
Asia. Southeast Asia is the scene of more complex but less serious maritime
sovereignty disagreements. Most of the sovereignty disputes in this subregion
concern the archipelagos that spot the South China Sea. This relatively small
body of water measures no more than 1200 by 600 nm, and is almost
completely enclosed by the landmasses of China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippine Islands, with Taiwan sitting like a cork at its top.
THE GULF OF TONKIN

The Gulf of Tonkin (called the Beibu Gulf by China) is a semienclosed bay
embraced by the mainland of China and Vietnam, as well as by China's Hainan
Island. Except for the width of the territorial sea within which China and
Vietnam have exercised their respective jurisdictions, the two sides have
never delimited their maritime boundary, and current disputes involve
demarcation of that boundary and differing interpretations of the 1887 Sino-
French Convention regarding the gulf. Since the continental shelf in the gulf is
the natural land extension of both China and Vietnam, and since the gulf is
only 170 nm wide at its widest, dispute resolution will require active
negotiation and compromise by Beijing and Hanoi.
The Gulf of Tonkin contains rich resources, including petroleum and fish stocks.
China has proposed establishing a rectangular “neutral zone” in the gulf's
center, which would remain free from exploitation until the two countries could
reach an agreement on the delimitation. Vietnam has never formally accepted
this proposal, but like China has halted exploration for oil in the proposed joint
development zone.
Although Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement on settling their land boundary
in 1993, their maritime boundary dispute remains unresolved, although
Vietnam is recovering significant energy reserves from some of the disputed
12
fields. Negotiations have occurred, and resolution should occur peacefully.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The other disputes in the South China Sea involve six countries: China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. The disputes
embrace the sovereignty issue over the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands,
and the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the sea areas adjacent in the
13
southern part of the South China Sea. This sea is a deep basin with a steep
gradient that leaves “virtually no continental shelf along the Philippine side.…
Only on the side of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and, to a lesser extent,
14
Vietnam, is there some breadth of continental shelf.” This topographical
feature seriously complicates applying UNCLOS criteria to the disputes.
Since China occupied all of the Paracel Islands, in the northern South China
Sea, after a brief naval battle with Republic of (South) Vietnam forces in 1974,
the most contentious claims are those concerning the Spratlys, further to the
south. China maintained occupation of several of these islands after a similar
battle with Vietnamese naval units in 1988. The Spratlys include more than
400 land features—islands, reefs, shoals, and atolls. Among them, only thirty-
three rise above the sea, and only seven have an area exceeding 0.3 square
miles. They are scattered over an area that is 400 nm from east to west and
500 nm from north to south.
The area is rich in fish and may contain significant oil and other energy
resources. Chinese surveys indicate that about 25 billion cubic meters of gas
and 105 billion barrels of oil exist in the continental shelf around the Spratly
Islands, but U.S. surveys are not nearly so optimistic. In fact, unsuccessful oil
prospecting in the South China Sea dates back at least to Japanese efforts in
the mid-1930s. Total 1998 production in the sea was just over 1.3 mmbbl/d,
from proven reserves of approximately 7.5 bbbls, but almost all of this came
from the northern fields in the Tonkin Gulf or in the Vietnamese-claimed EEZ,
or from southern fields in the Indonesian, Brunei, and Malaysian littoral.
There are no proven reserves for the Spratly or Paracel Islands in the sea's
central area, and no commercially recoverable oil or gas has been discovered
there, although efforts continue. Geologists and analysts disagree on the
presence (and recoverability) of petroleum reserves near these islands, with
15
widely varying estimates. The level of rhetoric over these territorial disputes
has lowered significantly since the signing of the 2002 “Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” This nonbinding agreement
encouraged the claimants to peaceful resolution of disputes, but neither
resolved any of the disputes nor included a provision banning future
construction of facilities on occupied land features. This was a notable failing,
since the other Southeast Asian states were concerned about China's
militarization of Mischief Reef after occupying it in 1995. This reef is also
claimed by the Philippines, lying less than 100 nm off that nation's Palawan
Island.
The 2002 declaration was followed in September 2004 by the signing of an

agreement between Chinese and Philippine companies—China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC)—to exchange seismic data developed while they surveyed for energy
reserves in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Vietnam's PetroVietnam
joined the agreement just six months later, in March 2005. The three nations
emphasize that this is a commercial agreement only and in no way affects
their respective sovereignty claims. It is little more than a tentative move to
16
exchange information.
The Spratly Islands are also of strategic military significance, because of their
central position in the South China Sea, astride vital SLOCs. These are the
main transit routes from Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean and Northeast
Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
Almost all of the various land features in the South China Sea are claimed by
China and Vietnam, while the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei
claim particular bits of land, based on various historical, geographical, and
legalistic grounds. Except for the latter two countries, all the claimants have
established a military presence on one or more of the disputed land features,
increasing tension and the chances of military confrontation. As of 2006,
Vietnam has occupied twenty-seven of the land features; the Philippines,
eight; Malaysia, nine; China, seven; and Taiwan, one.
The South China Sea is thus crisscrossed by overlapping sea boundaries. The
most contentious claim is China’s, exacerbated in 1992 when Beijing reissued
a map that shows a nine-dashed intermittent line encompassing almost all of
the South China Sea, implying that the entire body of water and its land
features are sovereign Chinese territory. Hanoi issued a similarly
comprehensive claim in 1977.
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

Sovereignty disagreements also exist between Indonesia and Malaysia. Their
disputed ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan islands in the Sulawesi Sea, east of
the large island of Borneo, was settled in Malaysia's favor by the International
Court of Justice in 2002. This decision still rankles in Jakarta, which refuses to
submit an associated dispute to international jurisdiction: the small island of
Ambalat is located in the same sea and the seabed surrounding the island is
estimated to contain significant oil and natural gas deposits, which would not
be unexpected in these energy rich waters. This long-standing dispute flared
up in February 2005, when each nation sent armed vessels and aircraft to
protect its claims. Diplomatic negotiations followed a brief Malaysian seizure of
Indonesian workers sent to the island, but have so far failed to resolve the
17
dispute.
The maritime boundary disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam is

18
complicated by an unresolved dispute over small islands. Australia and
Indonesia dispute ownership of Ashmore Reef, in the Timor Sea. Australia has
not only established a national park in the islands’ vicinity and banned
Indonesian fishing, but has also allowed oil exploration, to which both Jakarta
and Timor Leste object.
The latter also disputes seabed mineral rights in this sea with Australia; the
two nations have agreed to defer delineation of the maritime boundary for fifty
years, while sharing oil revenues. Additionally, Indonesia and Timor Leste
contest the sovereignty of the uninhabited coral island of Pulau Batek/Fatu
19
Sinai, which delays resolution of their maritime boundary disagreement.
West of the Malacca Strait, India has disputed maritime boundaries with
Bangladesh and Pakistan. The first of these disputes has little political
meaning, and should be resolved through negotiation of geoeconomic issues.
The latter dispute, however, is part of the political enmity between the two
nations and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.
Several maritime boundary disputes continue to roil Persian Gulf waters. Iraq
and Iran have yet to agree on their boundary seaward of the mouth of the
Shatt Al Arab, at the northern end of the Persian Gulf; Iran and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) dispute ownership of Tunb and Abu Musa Islands. These
are also claimed by Iran, which has stationed armed forces on them; this
would enhance Tehran's ability to interdict the flow of merchant ships through
the Strait of Hormuz, should it so decide.
CONCLUSION
Sovereignty disputes over maritime energy fields are complicated by the
international character of the search for energy resources in Asia. An example
is the sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over maritime areas in
the southern South China Sea, unresolved as of December 2007. Both
countries awarded production-sharing contracts for the same waters not only
to their national companies but also to companies from Australia, France,
20
Japan, Shell, and the United States.
With the exception of the Taiwan issue, none of the many maritime
sovereignty disputes in Asian waters would normally be considered serious
enough to threaten military conflict. Many of the disputes are dynamic; in the
age of increasing dependence on imported energy, when almost any maritime
dispute may escalate to the point of affecting the security of energy flows at
sea, the potential for conflict remains. The multifaceted South China Sea
dispute is notable for the number of nations involved, the extreme importance
of that body of water to the entire global maritime community, and China's
refusal to engage in negotiation over the dispute.
That said, Beijing's claim to the South China Sea's land features is at least as
convincing, and perhaps more so, as any other claimant’s. The real issue is not
whether China possesses or even installs land garrisons on the disputed
islands, reefs, and rocks but whether Beijing claims the surrounding waters—
those within the infamous “Nine-dashed Line”—as sovereign waters. The
meaning of this line is not clear. It might simply delineate all of the land
features claimed by China, or it might mean that Beijing claims all of the
ocean areas of the South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory. The 1992
law indicates that the latter is the case, although Beijing has never stated that
claim in a public forum. If it were to do so, its claim would immediately
generate an international crisis with almost guaranteed naval intervention by
21
the United States.
Japan has maritime disputes with Russia, Korea, and China; China also has
disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia; these
nations share disputes over various small islands and the delineation of
maritime economic interests; Australia has disputes with Indonesia and with
East Timor, which also has a dispute with Indonesia; India has disputes with
Bangladesh and Pakistan; Iran has disputes with the UAE and with Iraq.
The United States plays no direct role in any of these disputes, but is
ineluctably a party to all of them, given its dominance in the world energy
market and its naval power throughout Asia. Furthermore, Washington has a
syllogistic policy view of Asia's maritime disputes: the United States does not
favor any one claimant or claimants over another, urges that all such disputes
should be resolved peacefully, but stipulates that any attempt to interfere with
freedom of navigation will evoke immediate American action to restore that
freedom.
This means in practical terms that the United States has assumed the role of
final arbiter of maintaining the freedom of the sea lines of communication
throughout the region. That is more understood than agreed to by the region's
nations. Following chapters will examine the position of Japan, Korea, China,
and India, among others, with views of their energy dependence, maritime
economic dependence, political views, and naval capabilities.
More to the point, the United States is a party in mutual defense treaties with
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. A near-equivalent
relationship exists with Thailand, based on the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Agreement
and the treaty that formed the basis for the now defunct Southeast Treaty
Organization. The Taiwan Relations Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979
places that island in a unique American focus; the U.S.-Singapore relationship
22
also has a strong “mutual defense” character. It is difficult to imagine any
maritime sovereignty dispute in Asia erupting into crisis without drawing
immediate U.S. attention and probably direct naval involvement.
MARITIME STRATEGIES IN ASIA
The application of maritime strategy is governed by national capabilities and
priorities, and by international law. History, since Grotius, is replete with
attempts to structure and impose maritime rules of behavior to limit
1
competition and conflict at sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) is the current such effort, but its limits and privileges are
not absolute, since many of the signatory nations expressed written
reservations about specific provisions. In other words, many signatories
disagreed with parts of the treaty, which guarantees disputes.
Great Britain's Sir Walter Raleigh once observed, “Whosoever commands the
sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world
commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”
Unimpeded sea lines of communication are as important to the Asian nations
today as they were to Raleigh at the turn of the seventeenth century and to
his successors, who created a mercantile empire sustained by the Royal Navy's
control of the sea lines of communication linking England, its colonies, and its
trading partners in Asia. More than 80 percent of global trade still moves by
sea, and Asia depends on the free and unimpeded movement of its share of
that commerce.
Sea power continues to be a strategic imperative for any maritime nation.

Every nation with a seacoast has a maritime element in its national security
strategy. Much of this is due to the immutable facts of geography: the oceans
cover three-quarters of the earth and 75 percent of the world's population
lives within 100 nautical miles (nm) of the coastline.
Maritime power is composed of more than just navies, encompassing merchant

fleets and the facilities—ports, harbors, shipyards, and shore infrastructure—
they require for administrative and logistic support. Furthermore, a nation's
government must recognize and furnish the financial and organizational
resources to support its stake in the commercial and naval maritime sectors of
its vital national interests.
Three primary naval roles may be identified as comprising the naval element
of maritime power:
1. Projection and maintenance of a balance of power by exercising control

over the oceans in times of peace and conflict (military role)
2. Support of foreign policy either through a passive/persuasive presence or
in a manipulative/coercive sense (diplomatic role)
2
3. Sovereignty protection and coastguard-type activities (policing role)
Nonetheless, maritime strategy in the twenty-first century retains the same

core idea it has historically embodied: controlling all or a particular area of the
seas necessary to defend or advance national maritime objectives.
The carriage of world commerce is dominated by oceangoing vessels. Land and

air transportation, however technologically advanced, is still not able to
replace the convenience and efficiency with which the bulk of the world's trade
and communications is carried on the seas. More important, the seas
surrounding a particular landmass represent an incontrovertible emblem of
national sovereignty, over which numerous wars have been waged. The
potential for armed maritime conflict increases when known or even suspected
seabed resources are at stake, as in the case of the Spratly Islands. This
motivates states to strive for navies able to defend their maritime national
interests, or at least to deter threats over territorial waters. These interests
always include the preservation of political and territorial integrity, and
ensuring freedom of access to the seas.
Any seagoing nation will develop a maritime strategy designed at a minimum

to ensure its ability to use the sea. It also will almost certainly include
3
campaigning to deny that use to an enemy.
In the early 1950s, the political scientist Samuel Huntington reviewed the
dilemma of the post–World War II U.S. Navy and posed the question, “What do
4
navies do when they have an undisputed command of the sea?” Today, navies
must be able to answer similar strategic questions: in the absence of active
conflict, what is the justification for a national command authority to make the
very large investments necessary to deploy a formidable navy; what is its
mission; and why is it necessary?
In addition to traditional great power maritime conflict, a navy must be able to

deal with unconventional conflicts and nontraditional naval challenges. The
firing of missiles into suspected terrorist camps in Sudan in 1998 from an
offshore U.S. submarine; the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Iraq between
the two wars; the endless spates of clashes amongst the Chinese, Philippine,
Malaysian, and Vietnamese naval authorities over alleged “trespasses” in the
vicinity of the Spratly Islands; the recent stepped-up patrols by Singapore's
coast guard against illegal immigrants; self-protection in port (a high priority
after the attack on USS Cole) and in restricted waters; and the relief efforts in
the wake of the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia; all reflect the variety of
naval missions in the post-Cold War era. The U.S. Navy has characterized this
expanded focus as no longer power at sea, but power from the sea, the ability
to project power effectively into littoral waters along coastlines, as well as
against targets ashore.
Littoral waters are defined as the areas to seaward of the coast, which are
susceptible directly to influence or support from the land; and the areas inland
from the coast, which are susceptible to influence from the sea. This area of
maritime concern and operations may also be referred to as “coastal waters”
or “brown water.”
Throughout the maritime realm, navies have traditionally been employed to

support policy in situations requiring limited application of force. Naval force
can be used to apply limited pressure on opposing nations or transnational
groups to achieve specific objectives, including political concessions. These
applications range from the mere presence of naval combatants to (often)
nonviolent acts of war, such as denying freedom to use the sea to potential or
active belligerents. This reflects the inherent qualities of sea power: it is
flexible, may not be constrained by specific treaty provisions, operates on a
neutral medium with long staying power and few limitations; and probably
most importantly, it is easily extractable.
Sea power offers the capability to maintain position for extended periods near
a crisis area while political options are considered, which provides a nation
with a powerful but peaceful avenue for resolving potential conflict before it
erupts. Ships are able to stand by to evacuate a nation's nationals from a
potential or active conflict zone; they are also able to send strong political and
military signals to potential belligerents. The many variations in the
application of sea power emphasize its utility as a primary element in major
national security strategy, particularly as a continuation of politics in time of
either peace or war.
Since 1990, traditional maritime concerns such as competing sea bottom

resource claims, contested fishing rights, and boundary disputes, have no
longer been subsumed under or subordinated to the threat of global nuclear
war, suppressed as they were during the fifty years of the Cold War. These
disputes now bear increased potential for conflict at sea, especially since
maritime issues usually transcend national boundaries, especially the twelve-
mile sovereignty limit delineated in the UNCLOS. Problems on the
international maritime commons include environmental and humanitarian
disasters, piracy and other international crime, terrorism, and illegal
immigration that affect the ocean areas simultaneously dividing and linking
neighboring countries.
Resolution of problems in the maritime arena almost always requires bilateral
or multinational cooperation, especially amid today's complex commercial
linkages and disruptive social issues. Ocean commerce has always spanned the
world, but the phenomenon of late-twentieth and early twenty-first century
globalism is making the world's maritime commons more crucial than ever,
both to the economic and political health of nations, as well as to relations
among nations and trans- or nonnational organizations. Navies, despite state-
of-the-art weaponry and advanced technology, are unable by themselves to
resolve these issues; political, economic, and nonmilitary maritime approaches
are required to achieve a nation's strategic security concerns.
Almost all potential international crises in Asia have significant maritime

facets. Chinese-Japanese disputes over East China Sea territory and resources,
Korean-Japanese territorial disputes, the China-Taiwan dispute over the
latter's status, and the contesting claims over land features in the South China
Sea are only the most prominent of the many international issues that mark
maritime Asia in the twenty-first century. These nations are each trying to
formulate a maritime strategy that will enhance defense of their national
interests, among which energy security looms large.
An effective maritime strategy requires air, sea, and land forces operating
jointly to influence events in the littoral, and at least the potential to influence
events farther out to sea. Implementing a maritime strategy requires these
forces and a sensible naval strategy, but also must be based on realistic
operational constructs, which provide the ability to influence events in the
littoral, as well as in blue-water maritime areas vital to the nation. Many
aspects of the international military, sociopolitical, and economic environments
have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, but the classic
concepts of sea denial, sea control, and power projection remain important
tenets of maritime strategy in the twenty-first century:
Sea denial aims to prevent the use of the sea by another nation's navy for
a given period of time. It emphasizes defense, with the initiative perhaps
lying with the intruding power. The current Chinese strategic concept of
“offshore defense,” however, notes that a strategy of sea denial includes
seizing any opportunity for offensive operations against the enemy.”
Sea control is defined as that condition which exists when a nation is able
to use a maritime area for its own purposes for a set period of time, while
denying similar use to an opponent.
Power projection is not exclusively a maritime strategic concept, but

recognizes that maritime forces can shape, influence, and control the
strategic environment, to include influencing events and delivering combat
5
power ashore.
Land forces are an essential part of a modern maritime strategy; air combat
and strike capability to a very considerable degree are essential to sea power,
to allow fleets to deploy and operate. There is no clearer argument for the
absolute necessity of joint military capability than in the synergistic effect
resulting from, and required by, the exercise of national military power at sea.
CLASSIC MARITIME THEORISTS

The two giants of Western maritime strategic thought are the American
admiral, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the British lawyer, Sir Julian Corbett.
Both wrote in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; both were
influential among naval officers, political leaders, and their national publics.
Mahan's most famous work is The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1669–
1783, published in 1890. Corbett is best known for his, Some Principles of
6
Maritime Strategy, which appeared in 1911.
The writings of Mahan and Corbett still provide a clear conceptual linkage
7
between sea power and a nation's well-being. Mahan built a construct of
national power with sea power as a vital element, while Corbett more usefully
illustrated the connection between naval strategy and national security policy.
The importance of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to achieving energy
security support the applicability of Mahan's and Corbett's theories to Asia.
Mahan's emphasis on achieving command of the sea was defined by him in

more than one way. First, he assumed “naval superiority” as a prerequisite to
command: “It is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which
drives the enemy's flag from it, . . . and which, by controlling the great
common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the
enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great
8
navies….”
Second, he argued that a “combination of maritime commerce, overseas

possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets . . . produces national
‘wealth and greatness.’” Third, he listed “production, shipping, colonies and
9
markets” as “in a word, sea power.”
Corbett also theorized that maritime strategy must be integrally linked to

national security objectives to be effective; naval action alone was insufficient.
This is at least as important in the early twenty-first century as it was 100
years ago. Maritime security remains as key to national survival and
prosperity today as it did in the days of Corbett and Mahan. Shipping,
maritime resources, and secure sea-lanes are still important elements of most
modern economies. Japan, South Korea, China, India, and almost all the other
Asian nations are dependent on the sea as the primary avenue of commercial
life and economic health.
Indeed, the protection of sea-lanes and ports is a strategic imperative for any
maritime nation, particularly in the modern, highly interdependent world of
the twenty-first century. The oceans are too important as sources of economic
wealth and commerce not to be national strategic issues. Command of the sea
and the maintenance of rights of free passage on Mahan's “great highway” or
10
“wide common” are key to national survival and economic development.
Mahan and Corbett's greatest contribution to maritime and national strategic
thought at the turn of the twentieth century was to provide a coherent
framework for naval officers and political leaders to think about maritime
strategy, different from the derivative theories of land warfare on which they
had previously relied. The two contemporaries described the connection
between the maritime strategic realm and national security requirements,
although their audiences often listened selectively.
Mahan in particular argued that dominance at sea historically had always

made key contributions to a nation's military power and economic prosperity.
Mahan noted six elements characteristic of a nation that was a sea power:
geographical position, physical conformation or seaboard, extent of territory,
population size, national character, and character of government. His list
reflected study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Great Britain; while this
paradigm certainly does not capture fully his theories, it provided an easy
catechism to aspiring sea powers, particularly Japan, which seemed to fit the
model as well as did Great Britain. Post-Meiji Restoration strategists seized
eagerly upon the paradigm, with results not fully appreciated until December
7, 1941.
Julian Corbett also stressed the utilitarian nature of the maritime dimension
in supporting the primacy of politics. More than Mahan, however, Corbett
viewed sea power as merely a means to a higher strategic end. He believed
that economic power was more important than military power. In Corbett's
view, the navy is but one element of maritime strategy—which is just one
element of the national security strategy.
Both theorists focused on command of the sea. Mahan thought that this was a
determinant value, necessary to preclude an enemy from achieving victory at
sea. He noted the need for acquisition of a superior fleet of capital ships, which
in his day meant battleships, to achieve command of the sea by seeking out
and annihilating the enemy's similar fleet: winning this “decisive battle” at sea
11
should be the navy's primary focus. Corbett, however, stressed the
omnipresent unknowns in naval warfare, summed up by the British Admiral,
Horatio Nelson, arguably the most famous admiral in Western history, in the
phrase that “nothing is sure in a sea fight,” and what Karl von Clausewitz
12
might have termed “friction at sea.” Corbett advocated a primary naval
mission in wartime of gaining “working control of the sea,” necessary to secure
communications—guaranteeing free use of the SLOCs. He considered
“command of the sea,” a relative concept limited in time and space, not an
13
absolute state of affairs. Corbett also placed less emphasis on a decisive
battle at sea than he did on power projection, noting the important role played
by land forces and the employment of amphibious operations in winning a
maritime conflict. He viewed maritime power as one of many instruments of
statecraft in wartime; victory at sea was certainly desirable, in his view, but as
a means to an end.
Technological changes have significantly impacted Mahan and Corbett's

theories. Neither, for instance, foresaw the role and impact of either
submarines or airpower, which made battleships obsolete as capital ships.
Furthermore, and not surprisingly, neither Mahan nor Corbett anticipated the
revolutionary roles that would be filled by advancing technology employed at
sea, especially that derived from the electromagnetic spectrum, although those
developments began while they were active at the turn of the twentieth
century.
Despite technology's almost continual reshaping of the maritime environment,

it has not eliminated the need to control ocean areas, ranging from littoral to
global, to ensure secure SLOCs and, in time of conflict, the ability to project
combat power to achieve national security objectives. This advanced
technology adds to the lethality of sea power, rather than detracting from its
value as an instrument of statecraft.
In addition to the six “national characteristics” noted above, Mahan named five
geographic key points, the possession of which was crucial to global maritime
power:
1. Straits of Dover
2. Gibraltar
3. Singapore/Malacca Strait
4. Cape of Good Hope
5. The Suez Canal
All of his key geographic points directly affected seaborne traffic between
Europe and East Asia. More important than the two lists recounted above,
Mahan's general theory relating maritime and national power held direct
relevance for Asia: he noted the importance of clearly defining national
interest, the importance of SLOCs, the composition of fleets, logistical
requirements, and “most importantly, the uses of navies as instruments of
national policy.” It was no coincidence that the American president who
dispatched the Great White Fleet on its epic voyage through Asia in 1907 was
one of Mahan's biggest supporters; Theodore Roosevelt was determined to
establish the United States as a global naval power. A similar effect was made
on the German Kaiser, who reportedly stated that he had “memorized” Mahan's
work and ordered a copy for every German ship's wardroom, stating that “I am
just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book.…It is on board all
14
my ships.…” In Great Britain, where he traveled shortly after his masterpiece
was published, Mahan was hailed by the public and many government officials.
How have current Asian governments translated their national priorities and
energy security concerns into maritime strategies?
RUSSIA
The once formidable Pacific Fleet built by the Soviet Union lies pier side, as
Moscow struggles to build a twenty-first century state. First, Russia's economy,
including its energy sector, remains focused on Europe and not the Far East.
Second, Russia historically has been a land power, although at least once
during each of the past three centuries it has striven to deploy a modern navy.
In the early twentieth century, the Soviet “Young School” of maritime strategy
came to the fore, emphasizing coastal defense by a navy of small surface craft
and submarines. The Young School developed in the Soviet Union shortly after
World War I, based on conditions particular to postrevolutionary Russia:
1. A new regime that was under military and political attack by several
capitalist countries and had not completely quelled domestic fighting
2. A regime that expected to be attacked by capitalist nations, especially from
15
“the ultimate bastion of imperialism, the United States”
3. A navy that was in disarray, and almost entirely manned by captured
and/or defecting former enemy personnel
4. Budgetary shortages that limited the amount available to spend on
expensive naval systems
5. Lack of an industrial infrastructure to produce modern naval armaments
6. A maritime frontier hemmed in by unfriendly fleets and bases
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union seized upon
a much more ambitious maritime strategy, closer to Alfred Thayer Mahan
than to the Young School. Moscow built and operated a navy second only to
that of the United States. This navy operated under a maritime strategy
enunciated by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who commanded the Soviet fleet for
three decades, from 1956 to 1985.
Gorshkov built the modern Soviet navy and promulgated a strategy based on
traditional maritime missions, including naval presence, power projection, and
deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. The focus of these missions was
simple: to defend the Soviet homeland against the maritime threat posed by
the United States. This still required a defensive maritime strategy, in view of
American and allied naval and air power. The Cold War Soviet Navy was
centered on platforms and systems—submarines, ships, aircraft, and cruise
missiles—designed to prevent nuclear-armed U.S. naval forces from
approaching the Soviet homeland. This was a Cold War construct, and focused
on achieving strategic goals in the face of the balance of nuclear power with
the United States.
The Russian naval forces remaining in the Pacific in 2007 are marginally
capable of defending their homeland, although in the current absence of a
credible threat that level of capability is sufficient. Moscow retains an
important role in the maritime balance of power in Asian waters, however, as
the source of technologically advanced sensor and weapons systems. Russia's
vast energy reserves are also a strategic instrument, poised to affect future
Asian economic well-being and the balance of economic power in the region.
JAPAN
No country is more dependent than Japan on the long SLOCs between
Northeast Asia and the Middle East. And no country other than the United
States acted more seriously on the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Mahan himself thought that his works had been more widely translated into
16
Japanese than any other language. In 1902, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei paid
tribute to American's analytical skills, offering him a teaching post at Japan's
17
Naval Staff College. Mahan refused the offer, but Captain John Ingles, a
British officer, did teach at the Naval Staff College for six years at the turn of
the twentieth century; he stated that “Japanese naval officers are much
impressed with the advantage in a land war of superiority at sea. They have
been, I think, faithful students of the American naval historian, Captain
18
Mahan.”
Currently, an issue unique to Japan is the necessity of strengthening its

relationship with the United States as a maritime ally, to prepare for situations
in areas surrounding Japan, while also developing multilateral diplomacy so as
to make the Asian ocean basins—especially the Sea of Japan, the East China
19
Sea, and the South China Sea—seas of harmony rather than seas of conflict.
Tokyo faces several contentious issues that challenge the rule of law at sea
20
based on the UNCLOS. Japan's physical position reaffirms the axiom about
21
equating geography with destiny. Maritime power is indeed inseparable from
geography; Japan's insular nature and proximity to other maritime powers—
Russia, Korea, and China—means that it must wield maritime power to
maintain its viability as a nation-state. Tokyo not only has a vast coast to
defend, but Japan is also an insular nation stretching the equivalent of an area
22
“as large as NATO-Europe, plus the entire Mediterranean.”
The immutable geographic realities confronting Japan merit particular

attention because they have shaped and will continue to shape Japan's
interactions with its neighbors. Its maritime posture is intimately linked to
geography. It possesses almost no energy or other natural resources and is
almost completely dependent on seaborne imports. Obviously, Tokyo must
always have the status and security of the surrounding seas very high on its
priority list of national security concerns.
Several implications flow from this geopolitical analysis. First, while

continental powers have the option of venturing seaward or retreating from
the oceans, Japan enjoys no such luxury, given its insular character. The
importance of a coherent strategic framework for Japanese naval planners is
hard to overstate. Second, and closely related, Tokyo cannot avoid
entanglement with immediate neighbors that harbor maritime ambitions of
their own. Japan is located near enough to the Asian continent that it must
constantly be alert for any realignment or imbalance among regional sea
powers.
Third, if forced to defend its maritime interests by itself, Japan would be

compelled to build a maritime force far larger and more capable than its
current modestly sized, if world-class, fleet. If Tokyo succumbed to such
pressures, the resulting naval expansion would evoke similar, countervailing
actions from its neighbors, and a ripening of the anti-Japanese sentiment that
continues to fester in most of East Asia as a result of World War II,
exacerbated by the perception that Japan has failed to adequately
acknowledge this history.
This maritime awareness is illustrated clearly in the 1997 Defense Cooperation

Guidelines between Japan and the United States. In this agreement, the
phrase “in areas surrounding Japan” appears twenty-two times, as in “to
establish a framework for effective responses to an armed attack against Japan
23
or to situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Japanese strategic thinking
about nautical affairs is closely linked with East Asian international relations in
general.
Japan's legislature passed a “basic maritime law” in 2006, with the goal of
establishing a framework to improve the defense of national maritime
interests. The new law entered into force in July 2007; the framework creates
a “general maritime policy headquarters” in the cabinet secretariat, headed by
the prime minister, as well as naming a state minister in charge of maritime
policies, to promote national maritime policies. The basic law aims to ensure
that Japan's national security strategy is supported by appropriate maritime
24
policies, and that these policies are integrated and synergistic. During the
Cold War, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was equipped and
trained to control the strategically important Soya (La Perouse), Tsugaru, and
Tsushima international straits. SLOC defense was also a primary mission, given
Japan's dependence on seaborne commerce for almost all aspects of national
economic well-being.
The essence of Japanese defense in the maritime as well as other facets of the
country's national security rested, however, on the United States. American
aircraft carrier and submarine deployments provided the basis on which JMSDF
effectiveness depended. To this end, Japan's Cold War maritime strategy was
derived largely from that of the United States.
The JMSDF faced new challenges with the end of the Cold War. The strategic
nuclear threat and the operational challenges of Soviet submarine operations
faded rapidly, but the U.S. naval presence was also much reduced.
Furthermore, the rise of a modern, operationally expansive Chinese navy and
constantly increasing dependence on foreign energy supplies have all posed
new and heightened challenges confronting Japanese maritime defense forces.
China especially looms large in the view of Japanese maritime strategists and
naval planners. Politically, economically, and in terms of naval strength, the
former is growing rapidly in presence and influence in the East, Southeast, and
South Asian waters that lie between Japan and the vital energy resources of
the Middle East.
Three Chinese sovereignty claims, among those examined in Chapter 7, are

especially troublesome to Japan. To review them briefly, the first is Beijing's
claim to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese) and sea bottom energy
resources in the East China Sea. Second is the China-Taiwan imbroglio, with
Beijing refusing to forsake military force as a means of reunifying the island
with the mainland. Third is China's claim to all the land features, and possibly
the entire ocean area, of the South China Sea.
All three disputes highlight the strategic maritime uncertainties confronting

Tokyo and JMSDF planners. Chinese control of the South China Sea would
mean, in effect, Chinese control of the several straits that give access to that
sea, and its vital SLOCs. China might assert control of these waters regardless
of the status of the disputes, but apparently Beijing prefers the moral high
ground of a “legal” claim as justification for any hostile actions it might
contemplate.
Japan's naval planners certainly understand that their forces, both navy and
coast guard, must be capable of both “war fighting” and “maritime operations
other than war.” Significantly, Japanese public opinion has changed to support
operations outside of a narrowly defined operational area around the Japanese
islands; this reflects a growing realization that protecting Japanese security
does not have a boundary at the limits of its sovereign territory, or even at the
limits of its claimed maritime areas. The deployment of JMSDF mine warfare
forces to the Persian Gulf in 1991, increased participation of Japanese military
forces in various UN peacekeeping missions, and the ongoing operation of
JMSDF forces in the North Arabian Sea—a naval deployment that has
continued for an uninterrupted six years, supplemented by the presence in
Iraq of Japanese engineering and other ground troops—all evidence this
seminal change in Japanese public opinion.
In nonconflict operations, Japanese maritime and air support for the 2005
tsunami relief operations in Southeast Asia, and support and operational
involvement in the campaign to cope with transnational threats in the Malacca
Strait area are examples of Tokyo's increased willingness to use the maritime
instrument of statecraft in the conduct of its national policies.
Most important for delineating a maritime strategy for Japan, however, is the
almost complete dependence on seaborne commerce, most critically for the
import of energy resources. Defending the long SLOCs on which Japan is so
dependent, has been the primary focus of Tokyo's maritime strategists since
they were first influenced by Mahanian thought. Their impact was increased
because it closely followed the late nineteenth century Meiji Restoration that
led to Japan's emergence as a modern nation.
While Tokyo has not promulgated a neatly packaged “maritime strategy,” the
political and economic concerns, naval and coast guard forces, and domestic
political developments in Japan all attest to coherent maritime strategic
thought: guard national sovereignty, protect the sea-lanes over which flows
the energy and other commerce vital to Japan, and act as a responsible and
active member of the world community.
SOUTH KOREA
The Republic of Korea (ROK) faces an almost insuperable strategic situation,

located at the nexus of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese maritime strategic
concerns. While national survival is number one on any nation's priority list of
national security objectives, few states have had to confront those dangers on
a closer or more consistent basis than has South Korea. Almost sixty years
after the invasion by North Korean and Chinese communist forces, maximum
defensive efforts are still required on land to preserve South Korea's survival
as a nation-state. Seoul has, perforce, been so confronted by this continental
threat that the ROK Navy has labored almost entirely as a supporting arm of
the army.
Nonetheless, the ROK Navy has demonstrated the capability to defend its
nation's coasts, frequently intercepting North Korean seaborne attempts at
infiltration and other infringements of South Korea's sovereign waters. The
ROK Navy has also responded to national command authority direction with
respect to demonstrating, by naval presence, Seoul's claim to the island of
25
Dokdo as South Korean territory.
Seoul has promulgated a maritime strategy, first defining the navy's primary
mission as deterring war and “protect[ing] national and maritime sovereignty.”
Should war break out, the navy is tasked primarily with “protecting the sea
26
lines of communications, the life line of the country.” Then-President Kim
Dae-jung stated (during a speech to the naval academy graduating class in
March 2001) that South Korea was creating a “strategic mobile fleet” with the
capability to “protect state interests in the five big oceans and play a role of
27
keeping peace in the world.” It apparently is a plan for transforming the navy
from a primarily coastal force to one capable of extended operations
throughout the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and through the Korea Straits to
the East China Sea. Under “Defense Reform 2020,” promulgated in 2005, the
navy is directed to simplify its command structure, establish a separate
submarine operations command, a naval aviation operations command, and to
28
move naval headquarters from Jinhae to Busan.
The Modernizing South Korean navy's stated mission of securing littoral waters
and SLOCs may well have an underlying strategic tasking, however, which is
preparing to deal with future threats from Japan. The ROK Chief of Naval
Operations declared in 2007 that the navy's responsibility was to “prepare for
future warfare, [requiring that] we must construct operational units that can
carry out the joint operations and the mission of Network Centric Warfare and
Effects Based Operation, which requires jointness, integration, [and]
29
simultaneity.”
Naval modernization has focused on both antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and

antiaircraft warfare (AAW). The threat to the SLOCs perceived by the ROK
Navy is an intriguing question. The force would overwhelm any North Korean
hostile efforts at sea, but is not—and apparently does not plan to become—
strong enough to combat the Chinese navy successfully. It faces little threat
from the much-reduced Russian Pacific fleet. That leaves Japan's MSDF as a
potential opponent, a not unexpected conclusion, given Korea's historical
antipathy toward Japan based on several centuries of aggression and a half-
century of brutal Japanese colonization of the peninsula.
CHINA
Except for the Taiwan crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, and the enduring
concern about Taiwan and U.S. involvement, China's national security concerns
since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 have focused almost
entirely on internal security and continental threats, primarily from the Soviet
Union after 1960. Warfare was conducted against the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
India, South Korea, and the United States during that period, and none of
these wars involved significant Chinese naval participation. It has only been in
the past two decades that modern China has become navy-minded, and then
apparently only by a relatively small number of national security policymakers.
As China increasingly develops modern maritime capabilities, its navy has

become the third largest in the world, trailing only after the United States and
Russia. Beijing's offshore national security concerns include Taiwan, the East
and South China Seas, and the SLOCs, all issues whose resolution may well
require the ability to prevail in a naval environment.
Chinese maritime strategists have described “four strategic sea-lanes” for their
country, one for each cardinal direction. By far the most important is the
“Western SLOC,” running from Southwest Asia through the Indian Ocean, the
Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea to China. Approximately 80 percent
of its oil imports are transported over this SLOC, described by one analyst as
30
“China's lifeline of economic development.”
This relates to what one Chinese author describes as the increasing

“territorialization of the seas” as nations strive to control as well as use ocean
areas under the “idea that a state's jurisdiction over the land is simply pushed
seaward in terms of rights and duties concerning good order, the exploitation
of resources and the exercise of limited sovereignty.” Included in this concept
are “environmental concerns, nationalism and above all, economic
31
exploitation.…‘Sovereignty protection’ is now a high priority naval mission.”
Chinese maritime strategists discuss the need for a strong navy in geopolitical
terms, including the need to defend Chinese sovereignty, which has a strong
maritime focus since Beijing is party to six of East Asia's more significant
maritime territorial disputes, examined in Chapter 7 and listed here:
1. The Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands with Japan

2. Taiwan
3. The Paracel Islands, with Taiwan and Vietnam
4. The Spratly and other islands in the South China Sea, with Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia
5. Water areas of the South China Sea, with the foregoing nations
32
6. Maritime boundaries with both Koreas and Vietnam
Concern for the maritime borders was summed up in a 1996 statement by a

People's Liberation Army (PLA) strategist who claimed that
in the last 109 years, imperialists have repeatedly invaded China from the
sea.…470 times,…84 of these being serious invasions. The ocean has
become an avenue for the aggressors to bring in their troops and haul
away our wealth.…The ocean is not only the basic space for human
survival, but also an important theater for international political struggle.…
The better people can control the sea, the greater they have the sea
territorial rights [which have] become inseparable from a country's
sovereignty.…
This writer urged China to draw lessons from this experience, including that
1. a strong naval force is a protection of the land

2. a nation not understanding the importance of the ocean is a nation without
a future
3. a major sea power not capable of defending its sea territorial rights will
33
not be a major sea power for very long
China historically has been a continental rather than a maritime power, despite
possessing over 11,000 miles of coastline and more than 6,000 islands. The
analysis offered by two senior naval officers at the PLAN's (People's Liberation
Army-Navy) leading research institute is worth quoting at length:
The seas have become the new high ground of strategic competition
[including] rivalry over ocean islands, rivalry over sea space jurisdiction,
rivalry over marine resources, rivalry over the maritime strategic
advantage, [and] rivalry over strategic sea-lanes. . . . [W]e have to first
establish a solid coastal defense. . . . So expanding the defensive depth of
the naval battlefield is of crucial importance. . . . [T]he naval battlefield is
no longer limited to the traditional sea battle alone, rather gradually
developing in the direction of sea-control-of-the-land with the seas as the
base. . . . [S]ea space is no longer limited to the surface, rather being
“four-dimensional” space covering sea air, sea surface, the water itself, and
the seabed. . . . The seas are of crucial importance. . . . The developing
trends in maritime strategic competition . . . are likely to be characterized
as follows:
1. Local naval wars or armed conflicts are entirely possible

2. The UN will become the main arena of world maritime contention
3. Maritime development will become the major means by which certain
countries achieve their political aims . . . to seize and defend their own
maritime rights and interest
4. Instability in local sea areas will tend to escalate [as] contending for
the technical advantage in naval operating equipment has become one
of the key features of world arms development
5. The Asia-Pacific region will become one of the priority regions of
maritime strategic competition. . . . Certain countries are acting to
illegally seize maritime rights and interests
6. Establishing a Chinese maritime strategy has become a task of top
34
importance [as we look] to the seas for our future survival space
The most cogent, although very brief, Chinese description of China's maritime
strategy falls under the rubric of “Offshore Defense,” defined by the following
points:
1. Defensive strategy, but offensive operations
2. Not limited by space or time
3. No boundaries on offensive operations
4. Wait for favorable time and place to launch operations
5. Focus on enemy's weaknesses
6. Will use forces to eliminate enemy forces
7. Simultaneous offensive operations against the enemy to defend our
35
forces
The PLAN commander in 1996, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, did not describe
“offshore” as a geographic term, but as covering “a vast maritime space,”
which would allow China “to become a major naval power in [the] Asia-Pacific
36
within this century.” His successor, once removed, as commander of the PLAN
in 2007, Admiral Wu Shengli, argued that to “maintain the safety of the
oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy and resources,
ensure the jurisdiction of our nation to neighboring areas, continental shelf,
and exclusive economic zones, and effectively safeguard our national maritime
rights, we must build a powerful navy.”
Beijing is building the navy required to carry out this active maritime strategy,
a modern People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) capable of defending national
sovereignty on the mainland, enforcing insular claims, and operating
successfully at sea. Its strategy addresses coastal, regional, and global waters,
extending to concerns about the long SLOCs on which the nation is dependent
for energy and other commercial resources. It is a classically Mahanian
strategy, loosely defined: economic issues are its rationale and a large,
modern fleet and merchant marine its primary vehicle.
Taiwan is China's most important national security and hence maritime issue,
especially given the absence of viable foreign military threats to the
37
homeland. There are two general aspects to Taiwan's importance as a
strategic issue. First is the widespread belief among Chinese leaders that
Taipei's acquiescence to Beijing's suzerainty—some form of reunification—is
necessary to end the civil war that has remained unconcluded for most of the
last half of the twentieth century, and further as a sign that the Chinese
revolution (launched with the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911) is at last
complete.
Second is a maritime strategic view of Taiwan as the keystone in the so-called

“island chains” delineated by General Liu Huaqing when he was commander of
the PLAN in the 1980s. In this view, Taiwan is the “gateway” to the Pacific for
China's maritime forces; its possession is required to ensure free passage for
China's merchant and naval fleets operating from mainland ports. This view
also probably includes a belief by PLAN planners that Taiwan's position along
the important SLOCs between Northeast Asia to the oil-rich Middle East offers
China an important maritime strategic lever in any conflict involving Japan.
This factor ties directly to the “four core roles” listed by Liu for the PLAN,
which he said must be capable of:
1. Defending or disrupting SLOCs

2. Successfully conducting sea battles with less than first-rate navies
3. Capturing, occupying, and defending islands
38
4. Deterrence
The difficulties in accomplishing the first of these roles have been noted by
Chinese naval planners. Defending the very long energy SLOCs on which the
country depends would require a PLAN capable of operating over those
distances; for example, the distance from Shanghai to the Strait of Hormuz is
5,600 nm. The PLAN's ability to defend or interdict those SLOCs would be very
limited geographically, given its almost complete lack of maritime
39
airpower. SLOC/chokepoint susceptibility is, nonetheless, much on the mind of
Chinese strategists. The “Malacca Dilemma” achieved media prominence in late
2003, when President Hu Jintao was erroneously credited with this phrase
40
noting that 80 percent of imported oil passed through that strait.
Thoughts about building a Chinese navy strong enough to defend far-flung

SLOCs no doubt has occurred to PLAN strategists, and planners are no doubt
41
delineating the forces necessary to achieve such strategic objectives. The
lacunae in such a paradigm are vast, however.
First, while Russia, Japan, India, and perhaps a combination of Southeast

Asian states—in addition to China itself—currently possess the military forces
able to interfere significantly with free passage of the SLOCs just in their own
littoral waters, only the United States would be able to do so regionally or
42
interregionally. Second, Beijing would have to reorder economic priorities at
the national level to devote the vast financial, material, and personnel
resources required to build a navy capable of effectively defending SLOCs all
the way to the energy-rich Middle East.
Third, there is no threat to those SLOCs either now or in the foreseeable

future that would justify such a diversion of national efforts. None of the lesser
threats to merchant ships—terrorism, piracy, and other international crime,
environmental dangers, and even single-nation attacks—require massive naval
fleets to be neutralized. In fact, those hazards are most efficiently dealt with
by multilateral efforts, as is being demonstrated today. The prospect of PLAN
participation in the Thousand-Ship Navy concept raised by Admiral Michael
Mullen, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, with Admiral Wu Shengli, the
PLAN commander, has introduced the idea of USN-PLAN (U.S. Navy-PLAN)
43
cooperation in this task, which is seen as too big for either navy alone.
China's current naval modernization brings to mind the crucial question posed
by Mahan: As he stated in 1892, “All the world knows…that we are building a
44
new navy. . . . Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?”
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The region that includes the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca,
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar is arguably the world's most important region of
constrained navigation, based on geography and volume of merchant shipping.
It controls the South China Sea SLOCs, sea-lanes traversed by almost half the
world's merchant shipping and large percentages of Asian trade. Shipping
traffic through the Malacca Strait is several times greater than the traffic
through either the Suez or Panama canals.
That factor illustrates this region's significance to Asia's maritime commerce;

the economic strength of all Asian nations and their trading partners depends
on unimpeded passage in the region. The United States is concerned about the
threat to freedom of navigation through the South China Sea posed by
disputed sovereignty claims in the area, especially those by Beijing. As
described, several nations claim some or all of the Spratly Islands and, by
extension, rights over the water adjacent to the islands. China, Taiwan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have garrisons on some of the atolls.
Finally, because of oil spills associated with accidents in the Strait of Malacca,
the international community has considered regulating shipping for
environmental concerns and maritime safety. There is no way to separate the
issue of free commerce from the defense of U.S. interests in the South China
Sea and nearby waters, and defending these waters is an interest of U.S.
maritime strategy.
The nations of this region are linked economically through the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), militarily through the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), and politically through common interests and subregional
agreements. Eight of the ten ASEAN nations share the South China Sea as a
maritime boundary, while Burma borders on the adjacent Andaman Sea (as do
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Only Laos is landlocked.
These ties do not for the most part impose mandatory commitments on their
parties, but have proven effective in relation to various maritime issues. Most
significant has been the antipiracy cooperation among Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia. This effort has been notable in several ways. First, piracy has
45
reportedly been reduced. Second, these international efforts have extended
to antipollution and safety-of-mariners cooperative programs. Third, this
trilateral action has drawn political, military, and economic support from Asia's
leading naval powers, including the United States, Japan, China, and India.
Fourth, the Malacca and Singapore Straits multilateralism has moved the
ASEAN and ARF to a new substantive level; the long discredited Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) may finally be succeeded by a meaningful
regional body.
The Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam do not have explicit
maritime strategies, although they all have territorial claims in the South
China Sea that conflict with claims by China (and in some cases with each
46
other). Furthermore, all of these nations are deeply dependent on the
freedom to use the sea, from the fisheries that provide the majority of the
protein in their populations’ diet to the SLOCs that enable them to participate
in the regional and global economy.
Additionally, the Philippines and Indonesia are two of the world's most
completely archipelagic nations, each consisting of thousands of islands. This
heightens their dependence on seaborne transport of personnel and material
for political unity, military defense, and economic viability; it also places them
in a prominent position with regard to the vital energy SLOCs flowing through
47
the South China Sea and adjacent waters.
An associated legal question is Indonesia's declaration of sovereignty over the

waters and SLOCs enclosed within its territory, under the novel doctrine of
“archipelagic sea lines.” Most Asian nations have protested Jakarta's attempts
to gain control over shipping among its islands, which would pose serious
danger to the freedom of navigation, since the straits through the Indonesian
archipelago are important for direct, cost-effective maritime activity between
the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Specifically, Article 49 declares such waters as “sovereign” to the host state,

while Article 52 states that “all States enjoy the right of innocent passage
through archipelagic waters.” This same article then states, however, that the
“archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters
the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the
protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having
been duly published.”
For instance, the Philippines could legally, seriously affect international

seaborne trade by declaring the San Bernardino Strait (between the islands of
Luzon and Samar) closed for reasons of national security. Much more serious
would be similar action by Indonesia over the straits of Lombok (between the
islands of Bali and Lombok), Sunda (between the islands of Java and
48
Sumatra), or even Makassar (between the islands of Borneo and Sumatra).
As is often the case, UNCLOS allows for interpretive differences of its
provisions that, as has not infrequently been the case with Indonesia, may
lead to disagreement and potential conflict.
In addition to homeland defense, freedom of navigation, transnational crime,

and fisheries, sea bottom natural resources are a common concern among the
ASEAN states. These disagreements are the major cause of the territorial
disputes in the region. They arise both from potential resource riches, such as
those in the South China Sea, and from producing oil and natural gas fields,
such as those that mark the peripheral areas of the sea.
These economic, political, military, and sovereignty concerns should lead each
of ASEAN's nine maritime nations to develop and pursue a carefully conceived
and well-articulated maritime strategy as an essential—perhaps the most
important—part of its national security strategy. Yet, this is not the case.
Singapore appears to have produced the most carefully constructed maritime

strategy. Although the smallest of nations, Singapore arguably holds Asia's
most sensitive and important maritime position, at the eastern entrance to the
Malacca Strait. One strategist has listed Singapore's most important maritime
issues as “the rise of China as a regional power, globalisation, security of sea
lines of communications, and the growth of military activities in exclusive
49
economic zones.” Vietnam has long had the most contentious, even
dangerous, maritime relationship with China of any ASEAN nation. Short naval
wars occurred between the two in 1974 and 1988, as a result of which China
occupied all of the Paracel Islands and some of the Spratly Islands, long
claimed by Vietnam. Furthermore, competing energy resource claims and
drilling in the western and northern South China Sea have on several
occasions almost produced armed naval clashes between the two. The
maritime boundary separating Vietnamese- and Chinese-claimed waters
remains in dispute, as discussed earlier.
The Central Committee of Vietnam's Communist Party met in March 2007, and
one of its directives was to draw up a “coherent integrated national ‘Maritime
Strategy towards the Year 2020.’” The lack of a “coherent plan to integrate the
economic development of coastal areas with the exploitation of marine
resources in Vietnam's territorial waters” was noted, with attention to national
defense as well. The perceived need for a national maritime strategy was
strengthened by the prediction that the marine economy was estimated to be
contributing “up to 55 percent of GDP and between 55–60 percent of exports”
50
by 2020.
Malaysia has made significant efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first
century to combat piracy and other international maritime crimes in its waters,
with a focus on international cooperation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
While these may be categorized more as police enforcement than naval
operations, they contribute directly to Malaysia's national security as well as to
regional maritime security. Kuala Lumpur also has major issues with the
sovereignty of various South China Sea land features, and the energy
resources that may be associated with those “islands.”
Malaysia established the National Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center

(NMECC) in 1985, tasked with coordinating and improving bilateral maritime
activities with neighboring countries. It also formed the National Maritime
Council in late 1987, assigning it to “coordinate maritime activities stemming
from UNCLOS.” Then, in 2001, Kuala Lumpur published a National Policy on
the Environment, which focuses on protecting the environment while
exploiting its natural resources in a sustainable manner. While it may be
accurate to complain that a “single, coherent maritime strategy” has not been
developed, as stated by one analyst, and while “an integrated approach in
managing the nation's maritime realm, is essential…[but] is lacking,” Malaysia
has taken significant steps to clarify its maritime missions and to enhance both
51
national and international procedures for their accomplishment. Thailand is
certainly aware of the importance of the waters of the South China and
Andaman Seas to its national defense and economic well-being. While no
maritime strategy, per se, has been promulgated, one may assume that
Bangkok's maritime concerns are reflected in its national military strategy.
52
This focuses on defense through deterrence and the safeguarding of borders.
Indonesia has not formulated a maritime strategy based on its national

interests, despite major continuing disputes over maritime resources and
navigational passage. This does not mean that Jakarta is failing to pursue
resolution of these issues, but does underline the lack of a coherent strategic
maritime policy. An exception is the multilateral effort formed with Singapore
and Malaysia, erstwhile nemeses, to reduce the threats from international
crime and environmental disasters in the Malacca-Singapore Straits.
Brunei has promulgated a Maritime Master Plan, but this focuses on port
development and associated economic concerns. Its very small but modern
navy would be incapable of safeguarding the sultanate's maritime concerns,
consisting primarily of sea bottom energy resources, and has to depend on the
cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia to achieve maritime security. Cambodia,
with just one major seaport, Sihanoukville, has recently found proven sea
bottom energy reserves in its territorial waters. Phnom Penh continues to be
concerned about Vietnamese incursions into its territorial waters but like
Brunei will have to rely on ASEAN and the United Nations to defend its
53
interests at sea.
The Philippine government, although certainly aware of its maritime

dependence and threats, has not dedicated the resources needed even to gain
awareness of the status of and events transpiring in its territorial waters. That
condition has been alleviated in part by major U.S. assistance in specific
waters associated with the global war on terror, but this assistance is
geographically limited and temporary in effect. Manila has yet to demonstrate
the ability to develop coherent national strategy.
AUSTRALIA
Current Australian national security policy is very broadly outlined in a listing
of “strategic interests” in the Defense 2000 White Paper issued by Canberra.
In order of priority, these are to:
1. Ensure the defense of Australia and its direct approaches

2. Foster the security of our immediate neighborhood
3. Support strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region
4. Support Global Security
These strategic interests are objectives of the Australian Military Strategy,

which aims to shape the strategic environment, conduct military support
operations, and provide combat-ready forces to accomplish five major, and
again very broad, strategic tasks:
1. Defeat attacks on Australia

2. Defend regional interests
3. Defend global interests
4. Protect national interests
5. Shape the Strategic Environment95
Two points about these tasks are particularly notable. First, defending
Australia requires a navy capable of enforcing sea denial, particularly to the
north of the continent, to prevent an aggressor from launching attacks.
Second, the order of the strategic tasks indicates their importance for building
military force structure.
Australia's maritime strategy focuses on interests driven by the need to

“protect, monitor and control” its 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
reliance on shipping for its international trade also demands maintenance of
its essential SLOCs. The current Oceans Policypromulgated by Canberra notes
that South Pacific countries would benefit from a regional oceans policy.
Combat capability is defined to include air and strike capability: national
security strategy includes the ability to maintain maritime and air superiority
in the region.
Australia further defines maritime strategy to include “constabulary” tasks in

54
the region and the ability to conduct effective combat operations. This range
of strategic tasks was recently addressed in the Department of Defense's
“blueprint for military operations” for the period until 2030. This “Joint
Operations for the 21st Century” document envisions a Pacific maritime
environment in which China and India are the dominant Asian naval powers,
and in which Australia will have to rely on three primary avenues of defense.
First is creation of an “automated battle space,” in which unmanned vehicles

will minimize the exposure of personnel to combat and the attendant dangers.
Second is the “enormous importance of the U.S. alliance.” Third is the need to
increase interactions and mutual operability with allied forces, particularly
55
those of Japan and Singapore. Accomplishing these ambitious strategic
objectives will require a not-always-compliant legislature to allocate the
necessary resources for military acquisition. The government obtained an
increase in the 2008 defense budget, but one that falls short of fulfilling its
56
strategy's requirements.
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand's defense policy is built around five objectives:
1. Defend its EEZ

2. Maintain a strong relationship with Australia
3. Fulfill responsibilities in the Pacific Islands
4. Assume an expanding role in the security dialogue of Asia
5. [Employ] a global approach
This policy allows for possible operations outside of the country to support
peacekeeping efforts and participate in international coalitions.
The navy lists its missions as to:
1. Ensure the sovereignty of New Zealand's EEZ and territorial waters

2. Protect New Zealand's interests in the Southern Ocean and Ross
Dependency
3. Counter any threat posed by terrorism or acts of sabotage
4. Provide support in civil defense and other emergencies
5. Contribute to the Government's social and economic priorities by providing
opportunities for training and rewarding careers
A Maritime Force Review (MFR) was conducted in 2002, but it placed more
emphasis on trade and the economy than on military threat. The review
commented that: “assuming that there is no emergence of a military littoral
threat, which according to most strategic analysis seems highly unlikely, . . .
the major demands will continue to be in the areas of fisheries, customs and
57
marine safety including environmental protection.” The MFR also supported
the single Maritime Coordination Center (MCC) for combined management of
both information and operations for both military and civilian maritime
security.
The MFR supported increased coastal and offshore surveillance capabilities,

while delineating a naval surface force capable of:
1. Civilian requirements for coastal and mid-range offshore capabilities

2. Carrying out obligations in the “Ross Dependency and Southern Ocean”
3. The sealift required for disaster relief and other tasks in the South Pacific
Insofar as the nation has a maritime strategy, it might be described as

assuming that practically no maritime threat exists. As a result, maritime
forces include just two frigates, one amphibious ship, and three modern small
patrol craft.
INDIA
India is the fourth major nation in Asia with a maritime strategy and a long
maritime history, although in its case subsumed under Portuguese, French,
and British colonialism for most of the three centuries preceding modern
independence in 1947. Its improving economy and expanding economy have
created a correspondingly important need for additional energy supplies. The
Ministry of Defense Annual Report for 2006 noted that: “Energy security is
particularly crucial to India for two main reasons: the country's dependence on
the imports of fossil fuels and the physical proximity of the two energy rich
areas of the Gulf and Central Asia, where competitive access rivalries contain
58
inherent tendencies towards conflict involving outside powers.” One Indian
analyst recently laid out the parameters for a twenty-first century maritime
strategy, addressing the need, “Through the use of appropriate maritime
forces:
1. In conjunction with other Armed Forces of the union, act to deter or defeat
any threats or aggression against the territory, peoples or maritime
interests of India, both in war and peace
2. Project influence in our maritime area of interest, to further the nation's
political, economic and security objectives
3. In cooperation with the Coast Guard, ensure good order and stability in
our maritime zones of responsibility
4. Provide maritime assistance (including disaster relief) in our maritime
59
neighborhood.”
New Delhi is well into a program of modernizing its already impressive navy,
which includes submarines, aircraft carriers, missile-equipped surface
combatants, and both tactical and long-range aircraft. There is no navy in
South Asia capable of matching India's naval power.
The nation's maritime interests are defined by its location as a huge peninsula,
extending far to the south of the Asian mainland and effectively dividing the
20 million square miles of the northern Indian Ocean. It has maritime
boundaries with seven nations: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand,
Myanmar, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Geographically, it dominates much of the
Indian Ocean, which washes the shores of Australia, Mauritius, the Seychelles,
and all the nations of East Africa and of the Arabian Peninsula.
New Delhi's policies must address the full spectrum of maritime strategic
interests. Although the country's maritime boundaries are not in active
dispute, those with Pakistan and Bangladesh are not completely resolved. The
former nation, of course, is the primary perceived threat against which the
Indian navy is poised to defend its homeland.
Second in importance to homeland defense as a naval mission is ensuring the

safety of the SLOCs that traverse the Indian Ocean. These are crucial for both
the Middle East and the Far East as the primary transportation routes for
energy supplies. India is in a key geographic position with respect to energy
security, astride the primary SLOCs between the energy-rich Middle East and
the energy hungry nations of East Asia.
Indian maritime strategists understand this critical geography and have no

doubt supplied the rationale for the recent—2005 and 2007—deployments of
Indian naval task groups east of the Malacca Strait, as far as Japan, Korea, and
60
Russia, where they have engaged in exercises with those navies. This
reflects New Delhi's interest in joining the ASEAN. Additionally, Indian Navy
exercises with the Vietnam Navy in 2000 and 2007, and with the navies of
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the latter year, have
aroused concern in Beijing with respect to the implications of New Delhi's
61
“Look East” policy, often described in anti-Chinese terms.
Indian naval operations are also focusing on the western Indian Ocean,
intended to increase the security of the SLOCs in that region, which the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has cited for the world's highest incidence
of piracy. First, an intelligence-gathering station has reportedly been opened in
northern Madagascar, the island nation located off the southeastern African
coast. The post is intended to cooperate with two other listening stations on
India's west coast “to gather intelligence on foreign navies operating in the
region.” New Delhi has also formed strong naval relationships with
62
Mozambique and the Seychelles. Second, a task group composed of two
destroyers, two frigates, and a replenishment-at-sea ship made a deployment
63
to the “West Asian region” in August and September 2007.
The Indian Navy's moves east of Malacca and west to Africa are part and parcel
of a classic Mahanian maritime strategic approach, balancing economic and
maritime elements in a complex calculus. As part of this policy, India has
decided to establish a closer relationship between its navy and those of the
United States, the ASEAN nations, Japan, and South Korea. This expansion of
the previous reliance on first the Soviet Union and then Russia for assistance
in naval modernization will work to India's advantage by making its navy more
formidable; improving the nation's position vis-à-vis its most obdurate threat,
Pakistan; and in furthering its desired position as hegemon over the Indian
Ocean, from the Andaman Sea to the North Arabian Sea.
The Indian Navy commander noted in 2005 that the “Indian Ocean is now the
highway along which over a quarter of the world's trade and energy
requirements move,” a factor that “makes the Indian navy a key component of
64
the nation's foreign policy.” New Delhi issued a national Ocean Policy
Statement (OPS) in 1982, as a preliminary step toward establishing a national
maritime strategy. The OPS addressed economic and environmental issues
only, however, to the exclusion of traditional maritime security concerns. This
is recognized by Indian strategists, but 2001 proposals to promulgate a
65
national Maritime Security Policy (MSP) remain unfulfilled. Despite the lack
of a formal document, New Delhi and the Indian Navy appear to have a clear
strategic vision of maritime missions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with an
emphasis on homeland defense, increasing India's capability as an Asian
maritime power, and defending the energy SLOCs.
PAKISTAN
If Pakistan has a maritime strategy, it is composed of those elements that will

contribute to its continued existence as a nation-state. Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz stated in 2005 that “Pakistan would not allow the domination of the
Indian Ocean,” by another power; while the Pakistani Navy is not insignificant,
66
its power is not comparable to that of its historic opponent, India.
Seaborne trade is the backbone of Pakistan's economy, but the shipping and
shipbuilding industries are “in disarray,” and exploitation of offshore natural
67
resources is largely restricted to fisheries. The navy must rely on just two
major bases, at Karachi and at Port Ormara, 216 nm to the west. Karachi is
just 87 nm from the border with India and hence vulnerable to a no-warning
68
attack. Furthermore, the Ormara base is located in unstable Baluchistan
Province. Pakistan's strategists understandably have a continental mindset,
which leaves the navy in the unenviable position of planning to execute a
limited strategy designed to deny Indian (or presumably other hostile) naval
forces the ability to operate within missile range of Karachi and other littoral
69
targets.
UNITED STATES
Any discussion of Asian maritime strategies must include that of the United
States. In 2005, even as the decline in ship numbers was threatening the
navy's ability to dominate Asian waters, the U.S. government issued a
comprehensive, unrealistically ambitious National Strategy for Maritime
Security (NSMS), to cover all areas and issues of, on, under, relating to,
adjacent to, or bordering on sea, oceans, or other navigable waterways,
including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and
vessels, and other conveyances.
The U.S. Cold War maritime strategy so successfully written and managed
during the 1980s gave ground in the 1990s to the “From the Sea.…” series,
which never achieved the gravitas of its predecessor. Most recently, the navy
has attempted to formulate a new maritime strategy to bridge the very difficult
gap between traditional naval challenges and the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT), which has degenerated into a series of foreign ground campaigns that
leaves the navy in the difficult position of having to justify large, aircraft
carrier-centric fleets in the absence of a Soviet-style naval threat.
A December 2004 presidential directive to develop a comprehensive National

Strategy for Maritime Security included aligning all federal government
maritime security programs with appropriate state, local, and private sector
entities. Following this directive, the U.S. Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security developed eight supporting plans to address specific
maritime threats and challenges, with preserving the freedom of the seas as a
top national priority and one of the broad principles overlying the national
strategy for maritime security. This focuses on the freedom of the seas, on the
right of vessels to engage in innocent and transit passage through
international waters, and have access to ports.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps then
promulgated a “Naval Operations Concept, 2006,” which, if not a complete
strategy, does delineate naval service missions and objectives. These are:
1. Forward Naval Presence “to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen

alliances, deter, and dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance [rapid
response] to crises”
2. Crisis Response: to provide a timely, worldwide response to unforeseen
and rapidly unfolding natural disasters and manmade crises
3. Maritime Security Operations: policing the maritime commons with the
cooperation of allied and friendly maritime forces to ensure freedom of
navigation and combat transnational crime
4. Sea Control: defending SLOCs, defeating hostile naval forces, and
interdicting enemy sea commerce
5. Deterrence: both strategic nuclear deterrence and containing conventional
70
conflict at sea
A de facto U.S. maritime strategy is very much in place for Asian waters. It
guides fleet operations to guarantee the freedom of navigation necessary for
global commerce, to counter terrorism and other international disturbances at
sea, defend U.S. interests, and provide support for allies and friends in the
region, particularly Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, Thailand, and Singapore.
Finally, Taiwan occupies a special place, less than an ally but more than just
another friend, under the aegis of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which states
that Washington will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
71
United States.” The most likely result of the maritime strategy being written
in 2006–2007 is dependence on what the Chief of Naval Operations has
72
termed the “1,000 ship navy.” This concept, renamed the “Global Maritime
Partnership” in 2007, is based both on the shrinking U.S. fleet and the
recognition that the early twenty-first century has and is likely to continue
seeing naval challenges more in the line of post-9/11 events than of a bipolar
contest at sea. Admiral Mullen has made it clear that he expects the U.S. Navy
73
to work seamlessly at sea with a wide range of coalition partners. Hence, the
Maritime Global Partnership would include the navies, coast guard forces, and
merchant fleets of the United States, allies and friends, and all nations whose
74
security requires secure SLOCs—and who elect to participate.
CONCLUSION
All of the Asian maritime nations, from Russia to Pakistan, share similar
concerns: homeland defense, to include the ability to safeguard their
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and other littoral waters; preservation of
national rights over maritime resources in the EEZ and Continental Shelf areas
delineated by the UNCLOS; guaranteed freedom of navigation on regional and
global seas; and prevention or at least minimization of transnational problems
such as piracy, terrorism, other crimes, and environmental degradation. Using
the sea as a venue for nuclear strategic deterrence has been limited to Russia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France; however, the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century will almost certainly see China deploy
operational submarines armed with nuclear tipped ICBMs, and the possibility
that India will do so, as well.
Despite these common concerns, few Asian nations have articulated a coherent
maritime strategy. Even fewer possess the maritime force—commercial, naval,
coast guard—necessary to achieve their strategic maritime goals. Only South
Korea, Japan, China, Australia, India, the United States, and arguably Russia
are in that position. Japan, China, and India are capable of exercising maritime
power in subregional as well as littoral waters. The JMSDF is tasked with
missions out to 1,000 nm from its bases, which means the ability to project
maritime power south to the vicinity of the Luzon Strait and north to the
Aleutian Islands. China's maritime power projection goals currently seem to
extend to what Beijing calls the “second island chain,” a line approximately
1,800 nm from its mainland, extending north to south from Japan through the
Bonin Islands, the Marianas, and Palau. Further ambitions are no doubt under
consideration, but there is little evidence that China had decided to develop
the maritime forces sufficient to extend its power into the North Pacific or
Indian Oceans.
India is modernizing its navy with the objective of exerting effective maritime
power throughout the Indian Ocean; near-term maritime concerns remain
focused on threats from an aggressive or failing Pakistan. Mid-term ambitions
in New Delhi also seem aimed at maritime power projection into Southeast
Asian waters. Meanwshile, the United States remains the only naval power in
Asia able to project that power throughout the entire region.
Achieving strategic maritime objectives throughout Asian waters requires the

willingness to cooperate multilaterally to maintain peace and security at sea.
None of the existing Asian bilateral, or multilateral—in the case of the South
China Sea—maritime disputes by themselves appear to threaten active
conflict. There would be maritime aspects to a conflict arising from more
traditional international disputes, of course, including those on the Korean
Peninsula, between China and Taiwan (and the United States), and between
India and Pakistan. In all these cases, the primary threat to the international
community would be interruption of SLOCs, with the concomitant interruption
of energy deliveries a primary consideration.
NAVAL FORCES IN ASIA
The history of maritime commerce includes the history of navies that have
often pioneered and then secured the sea-lanes over which that commerce
steams. This is as true today as it was during the great fifteenth, sixteenth,
and seventeenth century exploratory voyages of Western and Chinese
seamen, as well as the great sea battles that marked the European wars of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.
Asia's commerce continues to be defined by the great sweep of oceans and

seas that border its continental mass south and west from the Arctic to the
Malacca Strait, and then to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Despite the
twentieth-century advent of air power, the conduct of commerce throughout
the region is delimited by its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and the
merchant fleets that use them.
Almost all the Asian navies are modernizing, led by the Japanese, Chinese,
and Indian programs to deploy naval forces equipped with twenty-first-century
technologies and capabilities. As expected, those are among the nations with
the largest defense budgets: China, Japan, and India, in that order. All of these
pale by comparison with U.S. defense expenditures, of course, but they are
1
making serious efforts to improve their naval capabilities.
JAPAN
The most powerful Asian naval force on any given day is the Japanese
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). This extremely professional, well-
trained force includes approximately 46,000 personnel manning 146 major
warships, including 21 submarines, 55 destroyers and frigates, 33 mine
warfare ships and boats, 9 patrol craft, and 9 amphibious ships. It also flies
some 179 fixed-wing aircraft and 135 helicopters.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan was one of the world's
leaders in developing naval capabilities, including long-range submarine
missions and aircraft carrier operations. It demonstrated in the December
1941 attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor the dominance of the carrier as
the world's capital warship, a status this class of ship still enjoys. Currently,
the JMSDF is again moving to deploy a form of these formidable combatants.
Japan's surface combatant fleet is led by four Aegis-equipped destroyers, by

far the most modern Asian warships currently operating. The Aegis combat
system, first developed by the United States in the 1970s, is a highly
automated, integrated combination of radars, computers, and weapons
launchers.
Japan was the first foreign navy to receive this system from the United States;
the Kongo-class ships displace approximately 9,500 tons and feature eight
antisurface ship (SSM) Harpoon missiles, as well as up to ninety antiair (SM2),
2
and antisubmarine (ASROC) missiles. Guns and torpedoes also form part of
this class's formidable battery; the ships are further equipped with an
extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) suite of sonars and helicopters.
TheKongos have extensively computerized systems and the command and
control architecture necessary to participate in netcentric warfare with other
JMSDF and U.S. warships. A follow-on class of two “improved Kongos” is under
construction.
Japan's five Takanami-class destroyers are not equipped with the Aegis combat
system, but are armed with antiship missiles and are very capable
multimission destroyers. They are part of a fleet that includes more than thirty
additional modern destroyers and frigates.
The JMSDF does not include an extensive amphibious fleet, but does deploy
one of the world's most capable mine warfare forces. Some of its more than
thirty minesweepers proved their professionalism and capability while
sweeping hostile mines in the Persian Gulf following Operation Desert Storm.
Japan deploys two fast combat support ships for underway replenishment, each
displacing 13,500 tons.
Japan already deploys five ships capable of operating three or more

helicopters. The twoShirane-class DDHs are thirty years old and built as guided
missile destroyers. Three Osumi-class ships each operate several helicopters or
vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft. Although classified as
landing ships-tank (LST) by Japan, these have large flight decks and look like
3
typical aircraft carriers. At 11,000-ton displacement, they are small, but
demonstrate Japan's intentions to increase its seaborne aviation capability.
Next on plan for Japan are at least two “DDHMs.” Although classified as
destroyers, these appear to be 14,000-ton displacement through-deck ships
capable of operating helicopters and VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft.
Escorting this developing force of air-capable ships are warships designed for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a capability that is the pride of Japan's force of
over fifty destroyers and frigates. Supplementing the innate capabilities of
these ships is the demonstrated competence and professionalism of the JMSDF
crew and officers. Furthermore, these personnel are experienced in operating
with the U.S. Navy, at sea and under arduous conditions.
Japan also deploys an experienced force of nineteen conventionally powered

submarines; two more are under construction and will be powered by air
independent propulsion (AIP) engines, which will enable them to remain
submerged for at least fourteen days, instead of the four days capability of
4
most conventionally powered boats.
The JMSDF includes an impressive naval aviation branch. Its ships operate a
combination of American, Japanese, and British helicopters, while the navy's
shore-based force is composed of large helicopters and more than eighty U.S.-
designed P3C patrol aircraft, the latter capable of antisurface (ASUW) and
electronic warfare (EW), as well as ASW. The force also flies ten minesweeping
helicopters.
The JMSDF's command and control infrastructure and capabilities are its most
significant capability. In addition to a near state-of-the-art system onshore,
Japan's naval and air forces are able to operate “linked” with each other and
with the United States, and other ships equipped with the necessary electronic
5
capability. This allows JMSDF units operating at sea to gain synergistic
increases in effectiveness through their real-time ability to conduct
coordinated and integrated operations. Only the United States is similarly
capable in East Asia.
Japan's maritime power includes the coast guard, the renamed Maritime Safety
Agency. Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) duties include search and rescue,
hydrographic and oceanographic surveying, and maritime traffic management.
This force also is responsible as the maritime “first responder,” a role it has
performed admirably in the face of Chinese intrusions into Japanese-claimed
waters and outright North Korean aggression.
The JCG includes two “special forces:” the Special Security Force (SSF) and its
Special Security Team (SST). The SST was originally organized in 1985 as an
airport security team but is now Japan's official maritime counterterrorist unit,
with the mission of rapid response to domestic terrorist and hijacking incidents
involving any ships in Japanese waters.
The JCG's 12,000 personnel operate approximately forty lightly armed cutters
of more than 1,000 tons displacement, most capable of embarking helicopters.
Two dozen fixed-wing aircraft are employed for maritime surveillance. In 2001,
JCG ships intercepted a Chinese-flagged vessel believed to be North Korean in
origin, in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), west of Kyushu. When
the vessel failed to halt, the JCG opened fire, which the suspect vessel
returned. The unidentified vessel was sunk with all hands, but after it had
crossed into the Chinese EEZ. It was later salvaged by the JCG, and found to
have been carrying weapons and spy equipment, apparently for conducting
6
North Korean operations in Japan. The JCG has also adopted an international
role, participating in exercises with Chinese, Hong Kong, South Korean, United
7
States, and Indian counterparts.
The esprit of Japan's Coast Guard is unquantifiable, but is an important factor.

JCG officers reportedly consider themselves as the nation's first line of defense
8
against all threats, from terrorism to national assault. In fact, the JCG has
become a fourth branch of the Japanese military, one not bound by
9
constitutional restrictions.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA

The Republic of South Korea Navy (ROKN) is a capable, modernizing force.
Seoul has been making significant investments in maritime power during the
past decade and a half, especially in surface combatants and submarines.
South Korea is in the midst of an ambitious modernization program for its

surface force. By 2009, the present shipbuilding plan will lead to a ROKN led
by three KDX-3 destroyers, AAW ships equipped with the Aegis system firing
Standard SM-2 missiles, both acquired from the United States. These ships are
versions of the three existing KDX-2 destroyers, also equipped with SM-2s but
without the Aegis system. The three KDX-1 ships from which the latter two
subclasses are derived are equipped with older systems, but all three KDX-
classes are twenty-first century, multimission warships. They are capable
across the warfare spectrum and operate helicopters.
The nine KDX-class ships are backed by thirty-seven older but still capable
corvettes and frigates, which while multimission capable, represent 1970s-era
naval technology. South Korea operates a large patrol boat force—more than
eighty craft, with a forty-boat building program in progress. These main-force
ships are supported by approximately eight fast-attack craft, soon to be
replaced by the forty new boats that will be equipped with Harpoon antiship
missiles.
The ROKN's amphibious force presently consists of eight LSTs and numerous
smaller landing craft. Notable is Seoul's program for building 13,000-ton
displacement LPDs, the first of which is scheduled for commissioning in 2007.
This ship will closely resemble Japan's Osumi-class and other navies’ helicopter
carriers.
The ROKN operates one minelayer and, surprisingly, just six mine hunters.
Finally, the ROKN is supported at sea by three small replenishment-at-sea
ships. These each displace just 7,500 tons, but each operates a helicopter for
vertical replenishment and each is capable of refueling two ships
simultaneously.
South Korea had no submarine force before 1992 when, acting contrary to
Washington's advice, Seoul launched a purchase and construction program
with Germany resulting in the acquisition of nine Type 209 (Chang Bongo in
10
the ROKN lexicon) conventionally powered submarines. A new three-boat
class of Type 214s is under development, with the first submarine launched in
2005. These are indigenously constructed and will be equipped with an AIP
engineering plant.
The ROKN deploys more than twenty French-designed helicopters aboard its
ships, while land-based maritime airpower is led by eight P-3C and eight old S-
2F ASW patrol aircraft. Additionally, the ROK Air Force's F-16 fighters are
capable of firing Harpoon antiship cruise missiles. Acquisition of eight
minesweeping helicopters is budgeted for 2008, with a reported 2010–2011
11
delivery.
The Korean Coast Guard (KCG) is responsible for maritime safety and control
of coastal waters. It was founded as the Maritime Police and is subservient to
the Korean military command; by law, its operations are limited to the nation's
EEZ. The KCG mans thirteen stations and over 300 other offices supporting a
force of vessels and aircraft dedicated to maritime patrol, environmental
pollution response, and fighting maritime crime.
The ROKN has benefited from long periods of operations with the U.S. Navy,
but the heart of its professionalism and dedication lies with its personnel's
determination in the face of the long-standing threat from North Korea. The
potential of South Korea's modernizing surface and submarine forces is
impressive, so much so that it may well be focused ultimately on Japan as its
likely future opponent, rather than the North Korean ragtag maritime force.
NORTH KOREA
The North Korean Navy (NKN) is led by approximately twenty old, Soviet-
designed Romeo-class submarines. They are conventionally powered and can
be armed with torpedoes or mines, but their current operational capacity is
“doubtful.” The Romeos are supplemented by more than thirty Sang-o class
minisubmarines of Yugoslav design. These may be armed with torpedoes or six
externally carried bottom mines, but are intended primarily to deliver special
12
forces personnel. They are slow, but capable of more than 2,000 nm range.
At least twenty additional midget submarines of varying capability are also in
the inventory, with the mission of infiltrating personnel into South Korea.
The North Korean surface force includes four old frigates. The one Soho-class
was commissioned in 1982 and is, at 1,600 tons displacement, one of the
world's largest catamaran warships. It is armed with a single 100-mm gun and
four CSS-N-2 antiship missiles of old but still effective Soviet design. The two
Najin-class frigates each displace 1,550 tons. Both classes are diesel-powered
and armed with antiship missiles; Soho has a helicopter platform but no
hangar.
The NKN also counts more than 200 patrol vessels of various size and
capabilities, ranging from 42 to 650 tons displacement; some are armed with
antiship missiles. In the frequent clashes that North Korea has provoked with
South Korea since 1950, the NKN has also employed armed fishing trawlers
and semisubmersible craft designed specifically for infiltrating armed agents
into the South.
North Korea operates a small amphibious force of 10 LSMs and nearly 100
smaller, Nampo-class, assault landing craft. Nineteen coastal minesweepers
13
comprise the mine warfare (MIW) force. The country apparently does not
operate a naval air force; coast guard functions are carried out by the regular
navy and by the Coastal Security Force, which operates approximately fifteen
small (eight-ton displacement) patrol craft.
CHINA
The People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) was established in 1949 and has
been modernizing slowly throughout its history. This pace was dramatically
affected by the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, however; the PLAN is now moving at
a stronger pace to become capable of defending China's maritime interests in
14
the twenty-first century.
The PLAN's greatest strength lies in its large, increasingly modern submarine
force. China's thirty or more Romeo-class conventionally powered boats are
copies of a 1950s Russian design; they are being retired as newer submarines
are commissioned. These include twelveKilo-class boats purchased from Russia,
ten of which are the more effective “domestic” vice “export” model. None of
China's three domestically produced submarine classes probably match the
Kilo's capabilities, but Beijing's efforts nonetheless are impressive.
The first of the Ming-class was operational in the early 1970s and at least
15
twenty have been built. They are little more than Chinese improvements on
the Romeo-class and will likely be retired as more of the new classes of
indigenously built submarines join the fleet. At least twelve of these Song-
class have been launched or are under construction. The initial Song was
commissioned in 1999, but the first two of this class suffered from serious
stability problems, causing long construction time (eight years) and radical
redesign of follow-on boats. This class reportedly is equipped with French-
16
designed sonars and German-designed diesel engines.
The PLAN unveiled a new submarine in August 2004, when it emerged from a
construction shed at the navy's Wuhan shipyard. Dubbed the Yuan-class by
Western observers, this boat initially was thought to be China's first AIP-
equipped submarine, but further study indicates inadequate hull length for this
technology. Yuan may be the first of a new class of submarines designed by
Beijing to replicate the Kilo-class, or it may be designed to serve as a test
platform for advanced submarine technology.
In addition to its conventional force of approximately forty-five newer

submarines, China is in the process of recapitalizing its small fleet of nuclear-
powered boats (SSN). The five Han-class were obsolete when they were
launched in the 1970s and 1980s, and only three or four of them are still
operational. The Hans are copies of the late-1950s November-class SSNs
designed by the Soviet Union; they are apparently difficult to operate and very
17
noisy. That is, they generate a high level of self-noise for a submarine, which
makes them that much easier to detect on in-water listening devices, such as
ship- and submarine-mounted sonars, helicopter dipping-sonars, and aircraft-
launched sonobouys.
The replacement class for the Hans is the Type 093 or Shang-class, which
appears to be an improved version of the late 1970s Victor III-class designed
by the Soviets. Two of the Shangshave been launched and an additional
number no doubt will be built. Currently, the PLAN has organized its
submarine force so that all the nuclear-powered attack boats are stationed in
the same squadron of the North Sea Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao, in
18
Shandong province. This is convenient for maintenance and training
purposes, but limits their operational flexibility. As the PLAN amasses the
experience and logistics infrastructure to operate SSNs, they probably will be
assigned to each of the navies’ three fleets.
China in the early 1960s began building a nuclear-powered submarine armed
with ballistic missiles (FBM), called the Xia-class. The Xia has experienced
engineering problems throughout its life and, although still in commission,
apparently has never made an operational patrol. It is armed with twelve
JuLang 1 regional ballistic missiles, each carrying a single nuclear warhead and
capable of a 1,160 nm range. Only one missile has ever been successfully
launched by Xia, in 1988, and its flight probably was only partially
19
successful.
The current nuclear submarine building program includes a new FBM, known
as the Type 094 or Jin-class. This boat is undoubtedly being built with Russian
assistance, and probably uses the Type 093's hull lengthened to accommodate
twelve JuLang 2 missiles. These are the sea-going equivalent of China's
newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31, with a range of
4,320 nm, able to target the western United States. Two Jin hulls have
reportedly been constructed and, while the final number to be built is
unknown, U.S. practice would indicate construction in multiples of three.
The most significant factor in China's surface force modernization is the dual
acquisition process being followed. A few ships are purchased from Russia—
four Sovremenny-class DDGs—but China's indigenous shipbuilding industry
has demonstrated dramatic strides in capability. Indeed, the PLAN in 2006
began acquiring four new classes of surface combatants, all built in China.
Particularly significant is the apparent Aegis-like AAW systems with which at
least one of these new classes is equipped.
The Type 052C or Luzhou-class appears to be the PLAN's first combatant

capable of area AAW defense: this would equip a PLAN surface force for the
first time to effectively escort a formation of transports or other logistics ships
on an opposed operation. An amphibious assault would be one such mission, of
course, but the new ships’ area AAW capability would also significantly
increase any PLAN formation's survivability in the face of a modern opposing
naval and air forces. The Types 051B and 051D Luyang I- and Luyang II-
classes are also advanced AAW ships.
China is in the midst of a program to expand its amphibious warfare (AMW)

capability. PLAN troop-lift capability has traditionally been estimated at two
20
divisions, a not especially formidable force of less than 20,000 troops. China
has commissioned almost two dozen new AMW ships since 2000, however,
including almost twenty landing ships tank (LST), each displacing
approximately 3,500 tons, and reportedly an LPD that may displace as much
21
as 26,000 tons.
More important than the new ships has been the mission specialization and
additional amphibious training assigned to at least two PLA divisions in the
Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MR). The Marine Corps remains at
two-brigade strength, approximately 12,000 troops, but its officer accession
22
process has been regularized within the PLAN personnel system.
The PLAN seems to be investing little in mine warfare, the ability to place and
clear minefields. The minesweeping force remains composed of approximately
two dozen old T-43 ships and a half-dozen coastal craft of Soviet design and
approximately forty-five remotely controlled minesweeping boats (in the
reserve force). News reports in recent years have indicated that the PLAN has
at least begun exercising with modern, often autonomously operable sweep
23
gear. There is no reported evidence, however, that China is following the
United States’ lead in acquiring a helicopter-borne minesweeping capability.
Suitably equipped combatant ships are tasked with an annual training
requirement to demonstrate their minelaying capability, which would
supplement the PLAN's single dedicated minelaying ship.
The most limiting PLAN mission capability is the small size of its
replenishment-at-sea (RAS) force, although that is being improved. The PLAN's
inventory of ships capable of replenishing combatants and amphibious ships at
sea, while underway, is a critical indicator of China's naval ambitions. Until
2005, the PLAN included just three such ships and only one of these, the ex-
Soviet Komandarn Fedko, at 37,000-ton displacement, is large enough for
extended multiship operations outside of littoral waters. The other two oilers,
of the Fuqing-class, each displace just 21,000 tons.
In 2005, however, China built and commissioned two new Fuchi-class RAS
ships, each displacing 28,000 tons and capable of supplying the fleet with fuel,
ordnance, food, and other supplies. If Beijing uses these new RAS ships as
replacements for the two smaller units, it will indicate a continued lack of “blue
water” ambition on its part. If, however, each of China's three naval fleets—
North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea—acquires two or more RAS ships, then
more long-range intentions will be indicated for PLAN missions.
Naval Aviation
PLAN aviation is its weakest branch, although progress is being made. All
fixed-wing aircraft are based ashore, including the navy's two-dozen Su-30
fighter-attack aircraft purchased from Russia. This is the PLAN's only truly
modern tactical aircraft, although its 200 J8IIs are an indigenous attempt to
produce a contemporary fighter.
China's naval aviation force has reportedly increased and modernized its force
of B-6, Soviet-designed aircraft with a primarily mission of launching antiship
cruise missiles. New and more capable versions of the indigenously produced
24
FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft are also joining the PLAN. The patrol and
ASW aviation force is relatively weak, with approximately two dozen aircraft;
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) apparently continues to provide China's primary
electronic warfare aircraft for maritime missions.
The PLAN also deploys a shipborne helicopter fleet. Sixty or so aircraft of

either French or Russian design are deployed, most of them onboard ship.
Each of China's new destroyers and frigates is capable of hangaring and
operating one helo, although only the four or so newest ships appear able to
“link” with its aircraft while it is in flight. This computer connection permits
automated flight control and engagement information to be passed both ways
between ship and aircraft, and is crucial for prosecuting engagements against
hostile forces.
The PLA Navy's large force of missile boats is topped by the impressive new
Houbei class. Although limited in range, the antiship cruise missiles of this
force could be a formidable factor in a cross-Strait conflict.
Sentiment for acquiring aircraft carriers no doubt is present among PLAN

officers, but little support has been in evidence in the past for this very
expensive acquisition elsewhere among China's military and civilian decision-
makers. Beijing has acquired four decommissioned aircraft carriers during the
past quarter-century, but none has been viewed as an operating unit. The
most recent acquisition was the ex-Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag. This
hulk has been dry-docked in Dalian, almost certainly to conduct the hull
maintenance necessary to keep the ship afloat. The repairs necessary to allow
the carrier to operate as such—especially the installation of a functioning
25
engineering plant—have apparently not been completed. Nonetheless, the
puzzling and extensive work on Varyag and recent reports of the purchase of
carrier-compatible Su-33 aircraft from Russia indicate that the PLAN sentiment
26
for acquiring large aircraft-capable ships remains. China may be seeing a
role for a fixed-wing aviation ship in sea-lane security missions beyond the
range of land-based aircraft.
Coast Guard
China organized a maritime militia in the early 1950s as part of the effort to
defend its fishing fleet and coastal trade against depredations by Kuomintang
(KMT) naval forces. It consisted largely of fishing trawlers armed with machine
guns and hand-held weapons. They were controlled by local Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) branches and when on a mission carried CCP
27
representatives.
China does not have a formally organized coast guard, but the functions
normally assigned to that service are the responsibility of various national,
provincial, and even municipal organizations. The Ministry of Public Security
operates the maritime police, the Ministry of Communications is responsible
for rescue and salvage and for maritime safety, fisheries fall under the Ministry
of Agriculture, and the State Ocean Administration conducts hydrographic
28
surveys and maintains aids to navigation.
The Customs Service employs a collection of more than 200 patrol craft of
various classes, some of them sea-going. Some of these paramilitary vessels in
the past were rumored to be involved in piracy and other illegal acts in China's
29
coastal waters. The State Oceanographic Bureau is responsible for research
and environmental protection, including enforcement of the “Marine
30
Environmental Protection Law of the PRC,” passed in December 1999. This
law assigns responsibilities as follows:
1. State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA): a consolidated

supervisory and managerial department for national environmental
protection work
2. State Marine Administration: supervision and management of the marine
environment and organization of investigations, monitoring, lookout,
evaluation, and scientific research of the marine environment
3. State Maritime Affairs Administration: supervision and management of
nonfishing and nonmilitary shipping pollution of the marine environment
4. State Fishery Administration: supervision and management of pollution to
the marine environment by nonmilitary ships inside fishing port waters
and fishing boats outside fishing port waters
5. Military Environmental Protection Department: supervision and
management of pollution to the marine environment by military ships and
31
boats
Other craft are in the Coastal Regional Defense Forces, which includes
approximately 25,000 personnel. This force is probably part of the Naval
Coastal Defense System, which includes a system of Coastal Observation Posts
along China's coastline, coastal cruise missile and artillery sites, coastal patrol
32
boat squadrons, and a network of coastal radar and communications stations.
The Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), established in 1998, operates

under the Communications Ministry in Beijing and is reportedly charged with
supervising the “management of navigation marks, the surveying of sea-
routes, and the inspection of ships and maritime facilities,” with a special focus
33
on shipboard safety. Its ship salvage responsibilities are carried out through
the semiprivate China Salvage Company, which also provides sea and air
search and rescue (SAR) assistance. Twenty regional MSA offices had been
established by the end of 2006.
Finally, the Frontier Guard Department is “in charge of administering social

order of vessels along the coasts.” Some concern is evident in guidance to this
force to “strictly abide by law-enforcement procedures [and not] to levy fines
34
which are beyond their authority, or which are too excessive.”
Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is part of China, but deploys a
separate maritime security force that is a holdover from its time as a British
colony. The Marine Police are tasked with maintaining the integrity of maritime
boundaries and territorial waters; much of their efforts are devoted to
countering illegal immigration and smuggling. Sea-Air Rescue (SAR) and
casualty evacuation are other missions. The force's newest craft are six 105-
ton displacement Keka-class patrol vessels and approximately sixty other
patrol boats ranging from high-speed rigid inflatable boats to six 170-ton
35
displacement Protector-class command craft.
TAIWAN
Taiwan's navy has been slowly modernizing since the mid-1990s, although
seriously hampered by the dysfunctional nature of the island's post-2000
political system. Modernization has been based almost entirely on U.S.
assistance, albeit with the assistance of Taiwan's technologically advanced
defense industrial base.
During the past decade and a half the Taiwan Navy has acquired modern
frigates, destroyers, amphibious ships, aircraft, and missiles from the United
States and France. Some of these acquisition programs have included a phase
of indigenous construction; they have all been accompanied to a greater or
lesser degree by acquisition of shipboard weapons and other systems.
Taiwan's indigenous contributions to naval modernization have been largely in

the fields of sensor and missile systems, originating in the Chung Shan
Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST). These have not been
insignificant, especially in the development of antiship cruise missiles that may
also have an anti-land target capability, but are very much subsidiary to
foreign acquisitions.
The navy operates four submarines. The two old Guppy-class boats were
acquired from the United States and their sixty-plus year-old age restricts
them to training missions and diving to no more than 200-foot depths. Even
the two newer submarines, the Hai Lung-class, are twenty years old, having
been acquired from the Netherlands in 1987. Despite the age of the
submarines, their personnel are highly dedicated and professional. The Taiwan
Navy has been studying the acquisition of new submarines since at least 2003,
a prospect much discussed since its inclusion in the package offered to Taiwan
36
in 2001 by the Bush administration.
Taiwan's surface combatants are led by the four Kidd-class destroyers acquired
from the United States in 2005 and 2006. These large (9,500-ton
displacement) ships are the world's most capable AAW combatants not
equipped with an Aegis radar and missile suite. Renamed the Chi Teh-class,
they are equipped with long-range antiaircraft, antisurface ship, and
antisubmarine missiles, as well as guns, torpedoes, and the capability to
operate two helicopters. The ships’ effectiveness is seriously degraded by the
Taipei government's decision to purchase the Kidds with only half the number
of AAW missiles they were designed to carry; furthermore, three of the four
did not receive the flight deck modifications required to operate the Taiwan
37
Navy's newest helicopters.
Backing up these large destroyers are eight ex-U.S. Knox-class frigates.

Designed primarily for open-ocean antisubmarine warfare, these Chin Yangs
(as renamed by Taiwan) are also armed with antisurface ship and
antisubmarine missiles, and are capable of hangaring and operating one
helicopter. Taiwan has also acquired eight U.S.-designed Perry (Cheng Kung)-
class frigates. These are smaller than the Chin Yangs and designed primarily
for AAW, although still capable of operating in all three primary surface
combatant missions. The Cheng Kung-class has the flight deck and hangar to
operate two aircraft.
Finally, in 1998 Taiwan finished acquiring six French-designed LaFayette (Kang

Ding)-class frigates. These are less impressively armed than the other Taiwan
frigates, but are multimission capable, including the capability to operate a
helo; of particular note is the Kang Ding-class's stealthy design.
Taiwan's navy also includes almost seventy patrol craft of various capabilities,
some armed with antisurface ship missiles. Two ex-U.S. LSDs lead the
amphibious force, which includes two ex-U.S. Newport-class and twelve older
LSTs. These relatively large ships are supported by almost 300 smaller landing
craft.
The navy's mine warfare force is led by eight ex-U.S. minesweepers at least
fifty years old and four newer—built in 1991—mine hunters acquired from
Germany. Taiwan additionally deploys one combat support ship capable of
replenishing ships at sea and three troop transports.
The helicopters operated by these destroyers and frigates include nine old
U.S.-built MD-500 aircraft and two squadrons of U.S.-built S-70C helos
designed for ASW and ASUW. Other naval aviation assets include four E-2T
Hawkeye aircraft acquired from the United States and operated from ashore.
These are airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) that operate
primarily with Taiwan's air force aircraft. Finally, Taipei in November 2007
offered to acquire twelve P3C long-range, ASW, and ASUW aircraft made
available by the United States in 2001 to replace the twenty-six antiquated S-
2T antisubmarine aircraft.
Taiwan Coast Guard (TCG) is not an arm of the Ministry of Defense but is
assigned directly to the Executive Yuan. The TCG is responsible for the usual
coast guard missions—maritime safety, search and rescue, maintaining
environmental standards—but also garrisons several of the small islands
occupied by Taiwan and disputed by China. The TCG operates fifty-two patrol
boats, as well as seventy-one small, inshore patrol craft.
THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippine Navy is not a significant force, other than the small craft
operated by special forces units. Three twenty-five-year-old ex-British
Peacock-class corvettes form the core of the surface fleet. These displace 763
tons and are armed with a single 76-mm gun; they are overtasked and
underequipped to maintain watch over Philippine territorial waters.
ThePeacocks are augmented by a Cyclone-class patrol boat (acquired from the
United States in 2004) and eight patrol craft of dubious reliability.
As many as forty smaller patrol craft are operated by the navy and the
Philippine Coast Guard: the former operates seven small maritime surveillance
aircraft. Amphibious forces include five ex-U.S. LSTs. The recently reorganized
Coast Guard also deploys four new (2000)San Juan-class patrol craft displacing
500 tons and has an Australian-built class of six search and rescue ships under
construction.
A shortage of trained personnel constrains Philippine naval operational

effectiveness, as do funding shortfalls in almost every area of training,
maintenance, and operations. Those units most capable, such as the navy's
special operating forces, are being repeatedly deployed to fight insurgents in
38
the southern Philippines, despite material and manning shortages.
VIETNAM
Vietnam's navy includes 9,000 personnel organized into four regional
commands; from north to south, these are Haiphong, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and
Can Tho. The naval service includes a Coast Guard formed in 1998 that is
responsible for enforcing customs regulations. The Vietnamese Navy is led by
five Petya-class “light frigates” acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1980s,
and since modernized. These 1,180-ton displacement ships are powered by
combined diesel-gas turbine (CODAG) engine plants and equipped for both
ASW and ASUW.
Other surface combatants include one or two Russian-designed Paulk-class

missile patrol boats, 517-ton displacement vessels designed to carry eight of
the very capable SS-N-25 Uranantiship cruise missiles. Two Tarantul-class
missile boats were acquired from Russia in the early 1990s; an additional ten
are reportedly on order. The two older boats are armed withStyx antiship
missiles; the newer models will probably be armed with the Uran missile.
Additionally, Vietnam operates four to six Russian designed Svetlyak-class
365-ton displacement patrol craft, and a collection of smaller patrol craft of
various classes. These include approximately a dozen patrol boats assigned to
Vietnam's rivers. Four Australian-designed Stolkraft fast attack craft have been
acquired, with an additional twelve under construction in Vietnam, possibly
intended for customs enforcement duty. Vietnam's amphibious force consists of
three Soviet-built LSMs and approximately thirty-six smaller amphibious craft,
most left behind by the United States in 1975. Eight Russian-built
minesweepers are deployed; five minesweeping boats are likely assigned river
patrol duties. Finally, no less than seventeen lightly armed, 1,000-ton
displacement “offshore supply vessels” are used to support Vietnam's claimed
39
islands in the South China Sea.
CAMBODIA
Cambodia has no navy other than a river patrol force of two Malaysian-built
Kaoh-class patrol boats, each displacing forty-four tons, and perhaps 170
40
“motorized and manual canoes.” Two modified Stenka-class torpedo boats
acquired from Russia are also operated.
Despite this very modest force, Phnom Penh is concerned about safeguarding
its maritime energy interests. A nascent marine corps has been established,
with the transfer of 1,000 troops from the army to the navy with the mission
41
to “protect maritime borders and, more especially, the offshore oil fields.”
INDONESIA
Indonesia has the largest navy in Southeast Asia. Its submarine force consists
of two, thirty-year-old Dutch-built boats; a program to acquire two additional
boats from South Korea is apparently on hold because of budgetary limitations.
A similar fate may meet acquisition of submarines recently offered by
42
Moscow.
The surface force is headed by sixteen ex-East German Parchim-class corvettes

of 769-ton displacement and includes six, forty-year-old frigates built in the
Netherlands; each displaces 2,200 tons and has a helicopter landing platform,
but no hangar. Armament includes eight U.S.-built Harpoon antisurface ship
missiles, which are extremely capable in well-trained hands. Two new
corvettes are under construction in the Netherlands and due for commissioning
in 2008. These 1,650-ton displacement ships will be armed with both surface-
to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, and will have helicopter landing
platforms. Thirty-eight smaller patrol craft are also operated.
Amphibious forces include the first of a four-ship class of 11,400-ton

displacement vessels capable of troop and equipment lift, hospital service, and
command and control of complex operations. This Tanjung Dalpele-class has
flight deck and hangar facilities for two helicopters and a well deck capable of
accommodating two utility landing craft (LCU). Fourteen old, U.S.-built LSTs
are deployed, as are twelve ex-East German LSTs. Indonesia operates twelve
minesweepers and two small oilers capable of underway replenishment. The
ex-UK Arundisplaces 11,500 tons and has two replenishment stations; the ex-
Yugoslav Sorong displaces just 9,000 tons and has a limited replenishment
capability.
Indonesian naval aircraft include eleven helicopters capable of shipboard

operations. Two dozen patrol planes acquired from Australia are shore-based,
as are eight F-5E fighters built by the United States.
The Indonesian Coast Guard (ICG) was organized in 2003 by combining the
43
Marine and Air Police, and the Directorate General of Sea Communications.
These units have long been suspected of corruption, however, and are of
44
questionable reliability.
BRUNEI
Brunei's maritime forces are led by three new (2005) Brunei-class corvettes,
each displacing 2,000 tons, fast (30 kts), and capable of a 5,000 nm cruising
range. They each operate a helicopter and are armed with eight Exocet
antiship missiles. Brunei also deploys six smaller patrol craft and four LCUs.
Three shore-based patrol aircraft operate with the navy and the police force,
which also deploys ten small (less than 100-ton displacement) patrol craft.
SINGAPORE
The Singapore Navy is part of Asia's most coherent defense force. It is focused
on defending the nation and safeguarding the Malacca Strait. Of particular
note is the decision to acquire a submarine force. Four, twenty-five-year-old
Challenger-class boats of Swedish (Sjoorman-class) construction have been
purchased; two of these are scheduled for replacement in 2010 by other old
Swedish (Vastergotland) submarines. Presumably, all these boats will be
replaced during the next decade by new submarines, but a meaningful mission
for this force will have to be developed and implemented to justify its cost in
financial and personnel resources.
Singapore's surface force, led by six new Formidable-class frigates of French

45
design, is modern and impressively operated. These 3,200-ton displacement
ships embody stealthy construction and are multimission capable, with systems
enabling the ships to conduct surface, subsurface, and antiair warfare. The
Formidables operate SH-70 helicopters acquired from the United States and
are armed with both antisurface (Harpoon) and antiair (Aster) missiles.
Singapore also deploys six 600-ton displacement German-designed corvettes

built in the mid-1980s and armed with Harpoon antiship missiles. They are
supported by eighteen patrol craft displacing between 270 and 500 tons,
armed with antiship missiles. Additionally, the Singapore Navy operates an
amphibious force led by four very capable LSDs, each displacing 6,000 tons
and equipped to operate both helicopters and landing craft, and forty-six
smaller landing craft. Four Bedock-class mine warfare ships built in 1995 to a
Swedish design form the mine warfare force.
Finally, the Singapore Navy is aided by the Singapore Police Coast Guard. This
force is responsible for maritime safety, navigation aids maintenance, coastal
security, and maintenance of law and order on the waterways surrounding
Singapore. The Coast Guard operates approximately 100 small craft of various
46
designs.
MALAYSIA
Malaysia's navy is similar to Singapore's in important aspects, including a

newly acquired submarine force with an ill-defined mission and a modernizing
surface combatant force of foreign design. That said, Malaysia is deploying a
capable, modern naval force.
Two Dutch Zwaardis-class submarines were transported to Malaysia in 2005,

47
but never joined the fleet. Kuala Lumpur instead has contracted with France
for two new Scorpene-class submarines, scheduled for delivery by 2009. The
surface combatant force is led by two British-built Yarrow 2000-class frigates
placed in service in 1999. These 2,270-ton displacement ships are armed with
Exocet antiship missiles as well as with surface-to-air missiles and a full ASW
suite, including a helicopter.
Other frigates include an older (1966) Yarrow-class, and two Kasturi-class, the
latter two displacing 1,700 tons. These began operating in 1984 and are
48
scheduled for modernization to extend their service beyond 2010. Malaysia
also deploys a significant force of smaller patrol craft, some armed with
antisurface missiles. Most formidable are the Meko-class frigates, which
displace 1,650 tons and feature a helicopter flight deck and hangar. Six of
49
these ships are scheduled for acquisition by the end of 2008.
Malaysia's limited amphibious force includes one ex-U.S. Newport-class LST,

two small (116-ton displacement) “fast troop vessels,” and assorted personnel
boats. The mine warfare force is more imposing, although numbering just four
Italian-built Lierci-class mine hunters. Two small (4,300-ton displacement)
multipurpose supply and command ships round out Malaysia's surface navy.
Kuala Lumpur has acquired eighteen rotary-wing aircraft for its frigates,
British- and French-built aircraft capable of executing ASW and ASUW
missions. The navy also operates four small maritime surveillance aircraft as
well as eighteen British- and American-built Hawk and F/A-18 aircraft, based
ashore and capable of launching Harpoon missiles in a maritime role.
The Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) force of more than eighty patrol
craft is responsible for law enforcement in territorial and riverine waters. It
conducts joint antipiracy patrols with Indonesia and Singapore, as well as joint
operations with Philippine and Thai units. Although responsible to the
Department of Interior, the RMMP participates in joint operations with civilian
police and military forces.
THAILAND
Thailand's navy is led by a relatively small aircraft carrier, the Chakri

Naruebet, an 11,000-ton displacement ship acquired from Spain in 1997. It
has operated infrequently, however, and reportedly is manned to only 20
50
percent of allowance. Thailand acquired two Chinese-builtType 25T frigates
in 1994–1995, but because of faulty construction had to re-engine these
2,600-ton displacement ships with U.S.-built machinery. They are also armed
with U.S. Harpoon missiles. Four Chinese-built Jianghu III-class frigates are of
51
equally marginal construction and limited to marine police employment.
More capable, although over thirty-years-old, are the one Yarrow-class and
two U.S.-built, 4,200-ton displacement, Knox-class frigates. The Yarrow is
employed primarily as a training ship but the two Knox, armed with
antisurface and antisubmarine missiles, are Thailand's most capable warships.
The Thai Navy also operates two ex-U.S. 960-ton displacement Mk 16 patrol
craft armed with Harpoon missiles, as well as over seventy other patrol craft of
varying size and capability, some armed with antiship missiles. Additionally,
the navy operates a riverine force of more than 100 patrol boats, employed
primarily on the Mekong River.
Thailand's mine warfare force consists of two forty-year-old, ex-U.S. coastal

minesweepers and twelve small minesweeping boats. Its amphibious force is
led by seven ex-U.S. LSTs; two of these are twenty years old, while the
remaining ships date to the mid-1940s. Approximately sixty small landing craft
are also operated. Finally, the Thai Navy deploys an underway replenishment
ship acquired from China. This 22,000-ton displacement oiler has a flight deck
and hangar for a helicopter and is equipped with four refueling stations.
The Royal Thai Marine Police (RTMP) operate several hundred patrol craft in its
efforts to perform maritime and riverine law enforcement, safety,
environmental safeguarding, and other police, customs enforcement, and
fisheries patrol missions. The RTMP is supported by the Customs Service and
Fisheries Patrol Service.
The Thai Navy's shore-based fixed-wing aviation force includes eight Spanish-
built Matador (Harrier) VTOL aircraft assigned to Chakri Narubet, four U.S.-
built A-7E attack and three P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, five German-
built F-27 patrol aircraft, and approximately thirty other logistics aircraft.
Helicopter assets include twelve U.S.-built S-70B Seahawks and two UH-1
Hueys, and two UK-built Super Lynx 300 aircraft. The P-3Bs and some of the
F-27s are capable of launching Harpoon antiship missiles.
BURMA
This navy numbers, on paper, as many as forty-five patrol craft, but probably
only the sixHouxin-class guided-missile patrol craft acquired from China in the
late 1990s are fully operational. Burma's most significant maritime challenge
lies on its rivers, where it operates a large fleet of small amphibious and patrol
craft.
The Burmese military is preoccupied with subduing internal dissent and

maintaining the military autocracy in power. Its long record of inconsistent
performance against the many domestic challenges is probably shared by its
naval forces.
AUSTRALIA
The Australian Navy is led by six Collins-class, conventionally powered
submarines. These have been long in construction (begun in 1989), with
significant delays caused by the problems plaguing their weapons systems.
They are armed with torpedoes and eight submerged-launched Harpoon
missiles.
Australia's surface combatant force includes four U.S.-designed, 4,100-ton

displacement Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates armed with antiaircraft and
antisurface ship missiles. These ships operate a single helicopter and, although
updated, are nearing the end of their useful life, with two of the original class
of six ships already decommissioned. They are being replaced by eight 3,600-
ton displacement Meko-class frigates from Germany. These are CODAG-
powered ships equipped with Harpoon missiles, but only relatively short-range
NATO Sea Sparrow AAW missiles. These latter are less capable than the Perry-
class's Standard AAW missiles, but theMekos do feature improved fire-control
systems and missile-defense capability. The ASW suite includes a helicopter
and a sonar that should make the ships more dangerous to enemy submarines
than are the Perrys.
Finally, the patrol force includes fifteen Fremantle-class “large patrol craft”
displacing 245 tons. These are scheduled for replacement by the 270-ton
displacement Armidale-class; at least three of a planned twelve are in
commission.
Two U.S.-built Newport-class LSTs were acquired by Australia in 1994 and

modified into very impressive amphibious and command ships. Aviation
capabilities have been improved to allow the operation of four Blackhawk
helicopters, including hangar facilities. The flight deck was also strengthened
to handle the heavy CH-47 transport helo. The well deck was retained,
although the bow ramp was not. Instead, a crane was installed to handle two
LCM-8 landing craft stowed forward of the bridge. The ships also have had
expanded medical facilities and a command-and-control suite installed.
The amphibious force also includes a 3,300-ton displacement “heavy lift ship,”
six heavy LSMs each displacing 509 tons, and four personnel landing craft.
Australia's mine warfare force features six Italian-designed Gaeta-class mine
hunters.
One Durance-class RAS ship is deployed, with four replenishment stations and
a hangar-flight deck configuration capable of operating an SH-3 Sea King
helicopter. A Sirius-class oiler is reportedly undergoing conversion to provide a
second RAS unit.
Australia deploys an impressive maritime aviation force, featuring both ship-

board helicopters and shore-based patrol aircraft. The former includes forty-
seven SH-2 and SH-3, and thirteen AS-350B aircraft of American, British, and
French design, respectively. All are multimission capable, although designed
primarily for ASW operations. Ashore, the Australian Navy operates eighteen
U.S.-built P3C long-range ASW and maritime patrol aircraft and four Boeing-
737 electronic-warfare (EW) airplanes. The Australian Air Force flies
seventeen F-111s capable of maritime strike with cruise missiles, and four RF-
111Cs for maritime coastal surveillance.
NEW ZEALAND
The past two decades of Labor governments in Wellington have redefined New
Zealand's navy from one designed to conduct NATO-level operations with
Australian and U.S. allies into a coastal defense force of limited capability. The
force consists of two Meko-class frigates, nearly identical to Australia's, and
four small—less than 100-ton displacement—inshore patrol craft. These latter
are being replaced by 340-ton displacement craft in 2007 and 2008. One
replenishment ship, the South Korean-built Endeavor, operates in support of
the navy. It is small (12,500 tons) and slow (13.5 kts), but adequate for New
Zealand's needs.
Under construction are two 1,600-ton displacement offshore patrol ships,
which will be capable of operating a helicopter. These are intended to patrol
New Zealand's EEZ and to assist various South Pacific nations in maritime
missions. Another unit scheduled to join the fleet in 2007 is a “multitask ship”
displacing 8,870 tons, capable of embarking an infantry company and its light
armored vehicles, and operating two SH-2G helicopters. This vessel is
designed for humanitarian and disaster relief operations, with a limited
capacity for peace and military support operations.
The navy has five SH-2 helicopters for shipboard operations. The New Zealand
Air Force operates six P-3K maritime patrol aircraft.
BANGLADESH
This small country is in a difficult geographic position, facing India across the
environmentally dangerous Bay of Bengal. In 2004 the Bangladesh Navy
announced that it intended acquiring a submarine force by 2012, but action in
52
that direction had not occurred as of December 2007.
The navy's largest surface combatants are three ex-British frigates—one

Salisbury- and twoLeopard-class—and a Chinese-built Jianghu-class frigate.
None of these ships qualify as a twenty-first century naval combatant, but all
are well-maintained, professionally manned, and serve the Bangladeshi Navy's
53
primary mission of coastal patrol. Osman, as the Jianghu-class is named, is
armed with old, but still formidable Styx antisurface ship missiles. A more
capable Ulsan-class frigate was acquired from South Korea in 2001. This ship
operates a helicopter and is armed with French-built, long-range (ninety-seven
miles) antiship missiles.
The navy also operates approximately forty smaller patrol craft of varying age
and capability, some armed with antiship missiles. Four ex-British River-class
and one Chinese-built T-43 minesweeper form the mine warfare force. Eleven
small amphibious craft support navy and army operations.
INDIA
India deploys one of the three most formidable navies in Asia, ranking with
China and Japan. Given the nation's position, bisecting the northern Indian
Ocean, this is a crucial force in Asia's maritime picture. India is successfully
54
pursuing its announced policy of “becoming a maritime power.”
The Indian Navy has historically focused on aircraft carriers, but currently
operates just one,Viraat, acquired from Great Britain. This 29,000-ton
displacement ship was built in 1959 and operates twenty-eight fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. It will almost certainly be placed out of service following
the commissioning of India's newer carriers, including its first indigenously
built ship of this type.
The first of these Vikrant-class ships began construction in 2005 and is

scheduled to join the fleet in 2011. This impressive, 827-foot-long ship will
displace 40,000 tons and operate thirty fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, led by
Soviet-designed MiG-29 STOL planes. Vikrant will be propelled by U.S.-built
LM-2500 gas-turbine engines, and manned by over 1,400 personnel. It will be
the most impressive aircraft carrier in the world, other than those of the U.S.
and French navies.
Vikrant will be preceded in 2008 by the rebuilt Soviet carrier, Admiral

Gorshkov. This 45,000-ton displacement ship, renamed Vikramaditra, began
construction in 1978 but underwent a long hiatus when the Soviet Union
collapsed. This ship is a VSTOL carrier about the same length asVikrant, but
equipped with a steam propulsion plant. This will enable Vikramaditra to go
faster than Vikrant—32 as opposed to 28 kts—but will prove more difficult to
maintain than the latter's gas turbine engines. Vikramaditra will operate at
least twenty-two fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
India's navy is not one-dimensional, however, and features a large,

modernizing submarine force. The navy has long aspired to the production of
nuclear-powered attack submarines and previously borrowed a Soviet-built
Charlie-class SSN from 1988 to 1991. This experience apparently was not
successful and India still lacks a nuclear-powered submarine. A research and
development program to build a nuclear-powered submarine has been
underway since the mid-to-late 1980s, under the title of “Advanced Technology
Vessel,” probably based on the Soviet-designed Akula-class. Program dates are
uncertain; 2012 is the earliest possible date for an Indian-build SSN to
55
become operational.
India's conventionally powered submarine force will be led in the next decade
by six French-designed Scorpene-class boats. The first of these submarines will
be constructed in France, with the remaining units produced in Indian yards.
The first Scorpene may join the Indian fleet in 2010, with one per year
delivered in succeeding years. Significantly, these boats will almost certainly
56
be equipped with AIP systems. The Indian Navy still operates two very old
Foxtrot-class submarines acquired from the Soviet Union; while refitted, they
are likely restricted to training status. More capable are four Type-1500 boats,
members of the globally popular Type-209 family of submarines produced by
Germany. Ten Soviet-built Kilo-class submarines were acquired between 1986
and 2000, including both models built for export as well as the more capable
design built for the Russian Navy.
The priority given to submarines is reflected in India's relatively modest force

of modern surface combatants. Three 6,700-ton displacement Delhi-class
destroyers, although built in India, are versions of an early 1980s Soviet
design; they are heavily armed with missiles and capable of operating two
helicopters. A newer class of three Kolkata destroyers is under construction.
The first of these 7,000-ton displacement warships should become operational
in 2010, with the following two units joining the fleet in 2011 and 2012,
respectively. TheKolkatas will also be heavily armed with very capable
antisurface ship missiles, operate two helicopters, and like the Delhi-class, be
powered by gas-turbine engines. Finally, the Indian Navy still deploys five
Rajput-class versions of the Soviet-designed Kashin II-class AAW destroyers.
The Kashin was a late 1960s design, but the Indians have updated their units,
to include a flight deck and a one-helicopter hangar.
The navy also operates a formidable and modernizing force of frigates, several
classes of which are armed with antisurface ship missiles. Three Godavari-class
ships commissioned in the mid-1980s as Indian versions of the British-
designed Leander-class frigate displace 4,200 tons, are steam-powered, and
operate a helicopter. The modernized Godavaris are armed with old (1950s)
but still dangerous SS-N-2D Styx antiship missiles of Soviet design.
More modern and capable are the three Talwar-class frigates, 4,000-ton
displacement ships that are CODAG-powered. The Talwars, commissioned in
2003 and 2004, were built in Russia and display stealth characteristics. One
helicopter is embarked and the ship's main battery is eight SS-N-27 Klub
antiship missiles, probably the most capable antiship cruise missile in the
world. India may order three more of these ships.
Even newer, and also armed with the Klub missile, are three Shivalik-class
frigates built in India. Two of these ships have been commissioned; the third is
scheduled to join the fleet in 2009. They are large for frigates, displacing
4,900 tons. The Shivlaks have CODAG propulsion plants and operate one
helicopter; they do not incorporate the stealth characteristics of theTalwar-
class.
The fleet also includes three Brahmaputra-class frigates. These 4,450-ton

displacement ships were long in building, with the first laid down in 1989 but
not commissioned until 2000; the third of the class was commissioned only in
2005. They are steam-powered, reflecting their relatively old design
(apparently patterned on the British Leander-class), but the long course of
construction has allowed modernization of helicopter and missile capabilities.
TheBrahmaputras now operate two helos and are armed with no less than
sixteen formidable Uranantiship missiles. Steam-powered ships so long in
57
construction often prove problematic in operation.
India in fact still operates five Leander-class frigates, built in Indian shipyards.
These ships displace 3,000 tons, lack antiship or antiaircraft missile capability,
but may still be useful for ASW missions. The Indian Navy also operates
approximately forty-five corvettes and patrol craft, many armed with antiship
missiles.
The amphibious force consists of approximately twelve LSTs. These were built
in Indian shipyards, although of either British or Soviet design. Twelve Soviet-
built minesweepers lead the mine warfare force. Notable is the navy's force of
three underway replenishment ships, with future acquisition of a fourth “under
58
consideration.”
Since most of India's destroyers and frigates operate helicopters, the navy
maintains a fleet of almost three dozen large ASW rotary-wing aircraft. Most of
these are U.S.-designed but British-built Sea King helicopters, although twelve
Russian-built Ka-28A Helix are also flown. Additionally, the navy employs nine
smaller Ka-31 Helix-B and approximately two-dozen much smaller French-built
Alouette III helicopters. India began building a version of theAlouette in 1984,
but the first two of these, named the Dhruv, did not become operational until
2003. Sixty-four had been delivered to the armed forces by 2006, twelve of
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them to the navy.
India's fixed-wing naval aviation force includes two German-built F-27 and
fifteen Dornier-228 maritime patrol aircraft; more capable are the three
Soviet-produced Il-38 May aircraft. The navy also flies eight Soviet-built Tu-
142 Bear-Fs for long-range surveillance, and eight British-designed Jaguar
tactical strike planes.
The Indian Coast Guard is the fourth service, tasked to guard the nation's
nearly 4,000 nm of coastline. It was created by the Coast Guard Act in August
1978, with direction to work closely with the navy and the Customs
Department. Coast Guard missions include SAR, countering piracy and other
maritime crime, and safeguarding the maritime environment. Its operations
are limited to India's EEZ.
The coast guard has a large number of fast vessels, including hovercrafts and
hydrofoils to patrol littoral and riverine waters, including Kashmiri lakes. These
craft include seventy-five ships and smaller patrol boats. The air arm operates
Dornier Do-228 airplanes, and forty-fourChetak and Dhruv helicopters.
The Coast Guard's very ambitious 2002–2012 “Perspective Plan” envisions a

force of 169 vessels, including 12 hovercraft, and 99 aircraft. It has projected
force-levels of 268 vessels (including 173 small patrol craft), 113 aircraft, 18
Nishant unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and over-the-horizon (OTH) radars
by 2017. Included in these force levels are sixty helicopters, thirty-five Do-228
aircraft for coastal surveillance, eleven medium-range reconnaissance aircraft,
more than forty interceptor boats, and six deep-sea patrol vessels. Personnel
would have to more than double to man this expanded force, from the present
60
strength of 7,000, to 15,000 personnel.
India deploys a capable, modernizing navy marked by balance and integral

airpower. Naval planners will continue to face stiff competition from the army
and air force, however, given the past and current strategic priority given to
potential Pakistani threats. The coast guard may well become the force
primarily assigned counterterrorism and other nontraditional military tasks, in
a paradigm similar to that in Japan.
PAKISTAN
Few nations possess Pakistan's combination of very difficult maritime strategic
situation and limited geographic maritime assets. Its coastline is less than 500
nm long, while Karachi and Ormara offer the only naval bases of significance.
The recently expanded and improved port of Gwadar has been the subject of
much press speculation, as a result of Chinese financial and engineering
assistance. As of 2008, however, the port is under the management of the
Singapore Port Authority and its utility to the Pakistani Navy remains to be
61
determined.
Pakistan's navy includes still-capable ex-British Amazon-class frigates and

conventionally powered submarines purchased from France. These latter are
led by three Agosta-class boats commissioned between 1999 and 2006, armed
with antiship cruise missiles capable of submerged launch and posing a serious
ASW challenge. The last of these submarines may be equipped with an AIP
system. They are augmented by two much older Agostas, acquired in 1980,
and four even older—early 1970s—Daphne-class boats, also of French
construction.
The six Tariq-class frigates are CODAG-powered, operate a single helicopter,
and are armed with U.S. Harpoon antiship cruise missiles. These 3,700-ton
displacement ships are more than thirty years old, but have been modernized
to enable them to compete in the potentially hostile Indian Ocean environment
in the face of the large, capable Indian Navy. A singleLeander-class frigate
built by the British in 1970 also remains in the fleet.
Additionally, Pakistan's surface combatant force includes a half-dozen small

patrol craft; the mine warfare force is very limited, with three French-
designed, Munsif-class mine hunters. The surface force is supported by two
RAS oilers: a Fuqing-class acquired from China in the late 1980s, and a Dutch-
built Poolster-class built in 1964.
Pakistan's navy operates sixteen helicopters—three Lynx and six Sea King
aircraft built in Britain, and four French-built Alouette III units. All are
dedicated to shipboard operations and capable of multiple warfare missions.
The navy also flies thirteen land-based reconnaissance and patrol aircraft, led
by two P-3C Orions acquired from the United States. Twelve Mirage-IIIaircraft
were acquired from France and are operated by the Pakistan Air Force,
although capable of maritime strike with Harpoon missiles.
The Pakistani Coast Guard is operated by the army and is responsible to the
Ministry of the Interior. It includes five small patrol boats and the Customs
Service, which uses naval personnel to operate approximately twenty small
craft.
Additionally, the Maritime Safety Agency, which is responsible to the Ministry

of Defense, operates an ex-U.S. Gearing-class destroyer commissioned in
1945, and two Shanghai II-class patrol boats and four Barkat-class patrol craft
acquired from China. The MSA also operates two small maritime patrol aircraft.
Pakistani's maritime forces are geostrategically limited, perhaps fatally so. The
navy operates a plethora of platforms and systems that must pose
maintenance and interoperability nightmares. The coast guard is under the
operational control of the army, so its ability to conduct effective operations
with the navy is problematical.
IRAN
Iran looms over the crucial Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Navy is a formidable
force, featuring three Kilo-class conventionally powered submarines acquired
from Russia. These capable ships, operating in the very difficult ASW waters of
the Persian Gulf, would offer a serious threat to opposing forces in the area.
Iran also operates a surface force of two 1,335-ton displacement Byandor-class
corvettes, sold to the pre-1979 Iranian government by the United States. They
will likely be replaced by 1,200-ton displacement corvettes reportedly under
construction in Iran. Three 1960s-eraAlvand-class frigates are also operational
and have been refitted with Chinese-built C802 antisurface ship cruise
missiles.
Patrol forces include well over 100 craft of varying displacement and capability,
many operated by the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards). Ten Chinese-built
Thondor-class craft of 171 tons displacement are armed with C802 antiship
missiles; similar armament is featured by the eleven or more, 249-ton
displacement Kaman-class.
Iran operates a significant amphibious force, featuring four 2,540-ton

displacement Hengam-class landing ships acquired from Great Britain in the
1970s. Three Hormuz 24-class landing ships displacing 2,014 tons have been
built in Iran; six smaller LSTs and at least seven hovercraft have also been
used prominently in Iranian operations. A single British-built RAS ship, the
Kharg, supports the Iranian fleet. This is an impressive, 33,000-ton
displacement vessel, with four replenishment stations, twin hangars, and
designed to operate three SH-3 helicopters.
Iran's lack of a significant minesweeping force is significant, given the history

and future possibility of mine warfare being conducted in the Persian Gulf. A
single minesweeper may indicate Tehran's intention to engage only in
offensive mine warfare.
Iranian naval aviation consists of six British-built Agusta-204 helicopters for

shipboard operations, and eight SH-3 helos normally based ashore. Land-based
maritime aircraft include three P-3F Orions, five Lockheed C-130s, and five
Dornier-228s. Six MH-53 helicopters are flown; these were designed for aerial
minesweeping, but apparently are used only for logistics. Additionally, an
antishipping role is assumed by six thirty-five-year-old F-4 Phantoms acquired
from the United States and seventeen Russian-built Su-24 Fencer tactical
attack aircraft.
UNITED STATES
Asian naval modernization is occurring in the shadow cast by the still
dominant U.S. Navy. American large-deck aircraft carriers and nuclear-
powered submarines remain the arbiters of the freedom of the seas in Asia.
The current American force, however, is shrinking in size and facing global
challenges that reduce its ability, on a day-to-day basis, to command the seas
of Asia.
The U.S. Navy's primary organization in Asia is the Seventh Fleet, home-
ported in Yokosuka, Japan, nineteen nm south of Tokyo. The fleet is built
around aircraft carrier strike groups (CVSG), usually featuring the carrier
home-ported in Yokosuka. An additional CVSG is usually under Seventh Fleet
operational control, en route between the U.S. West Coast and the Western
Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, is responsible for much of the western
Indian Ocean, but is almost totally preoccupied with enforcing control of the
seas in the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. Furthermore,
this fleet has no integral assets, other than its flagship, a converted
amphibious vessel, and is assigned forces by other U.S. naval commands, as
events require. In 2007 these included one aircraft carrier, one large-deck
amphibious helicopter carrier, and supporting surface combatants, submarines,
aircraft, and logistics ships, totaling approximately twenty ships and 20,000
62
personnel.
In addition to carriers, the battle groups usually include one cruiser, one–two
destroyers or frigates, one nuclear-powered attack submarine, and one or two
supply ships capable of replenishment-at-sea. Also homeported in Yokosuka
are three Aegis-armed cruiser/destroyers, two additional destroyers, and two
guided-missile frigates. This group is augmented by an amphibious assault
group homeported in Sasebo, Japan. Located on the southern Japanese island
of Kyushu, the city hosts an LHD, a very large amphibious assault ship capable
of launching helicopters, VSTOL fixed wing aircraft, and landing craft. This
minicarrier is accompanied by three additional amphibious assault ships, two
LSDs, and an LPD. Two mine sweepers are also homeported in Sasebo.
Three nuclear-powered attack submarines are homeported at Apra Harbor,

Guam. The island also serves as homeport for the four civilian-manned RAS
ships that support Seventh and Fifth Fleet units full time. Finally, the Third
Marine Expeditionary Force is based on Okinawa, while U.S. Air Force
squadrons are stationed on Okinawa and Guam, as well as in Japan and South
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Korea.
This means, on average, that operational U.S. naval strength in East Asian
waters is one or two carriers, seven or eight Aegis ships, three to five
submarines, and two RAS vessels. That is a formidable force, but one
responsible for missions throughout not only the Western Pacific Ocean, but
also the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.
CONCLUSION
The naval forces of the Pacific and Indian Oceans range from the powerful
navies of the United States, Japan, China, and India, to the small forces of
Southeast and Southwest Asia. All are characterized by modernization
programs and an increasing awareness of the necessity of maritime airpower.
Additionally, submarines are becoming more widespread, while antiship cruise
missiles are ubiquitous.
What is striking about the naval modernization that is ongoing throughout the
region is the dominance of certain countries of origin for the design and
manufacture of almost all new technologies being applied to naval systems.
The United States is the leader in the development and spread of naval
technology. This is not surprising, given the global lead of American scientific
and technological institutions and the spread of that technology is attributable
for the most part to conscious policy decisions by Washington.
Several European nations contribute to the spread of new naval systems, with
France the lead proliferator. French naval-armaments’ makers have attained
positions of global leadership in several areas of naval technology, especially in
the vital area of cruise missile development. Russia, despite the problems
suffered since it emerged in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, remains an important naval arms supplier, and China is rapidly
emerging as a notable contributor to the Asian naval armaments race. Beijing
is following Paris's lead in not conditioning arms sales on the purchasing
country's internal conditions, no matter its record of abusing human rights or
proliferating WMD (weapons of mass destruction).
Has the recent and still ongoing naval modernization in Asia contributed to
current or near-term instability in the region? Probably not, although the
spread of submarines is particularly troubling, since their stealthiness—their
chief characteristic, and most valuable war-fighting quality—almost completely
precludes the transparency that allows opposing navies and nations to make
the most rational decision in a crisis. This is a particularly sensitive area also
because of the region-wide move to acquire submarines, with an attendant
64
ASW arms race possible.
Should conflict erupt, however, the prevalence of capable cruise missiles—

launched by submerged submarines, surface ships, and airplanes—may lead to
heavy ship losses and concomitant personnel losses far in excess of previous
maritime battles.
MARITIME SECURITY AND MULTILATERALISM IN ASIA
The Asian political situation does not lend itself to multilateralism on the scale
of Europe. The equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or
the European Union (EU) will not likely evolve, it may be argued, because the
political, economic, social, ethnic, and religious diversity in Asia is too stark to
allow the formation of close, effective multilateral organizations. That view is
being eroded as Asian nations, especially on a subregional basis, are
recognizing that multilateralism provides the best and in some cases the only
path to resolving contentious issues.
UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations (UN) remains the most important multilateral organization
in which the Asian nations participate. Its most important role in maritime
security to date has been delineating and promulgating the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This agreement had been signed and ratified
1
by 149 nations as of August 2005, including many landlocked states. Even
those who have not completed the ratification process—including the United
States—follow its dictates.
UNCLOS is administered by the UN's Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea (DOA); several important commissions have been established under
the DOA. Perhaps most critical are the deliberations of the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Its conclusions should directly affect
resolution of the sovereignty disputes between Japan and Korea, and between
Japan and China, among others.
Since the Commission's recommendations are only advisory in nature, its

ability to resolve disputes is limited. That said, it still serves as an arbiter of
disputes about the limits of nations’ claimed Continental Shelves (CS). These
are defined in the UNCLOS as follows: “the coastal State shall establish the
outer limits of its continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles
(nm) on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission. The Commission
shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the
establishment of those limits; its recommendations and actions shall not
prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts.”
The functions of the Commission are to
1. consider the data and other material submitted by coastal states

concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those
limits extend beyond 200 nm, and to make recommendations in
accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on
August 29, 1980, by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, and
2. provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State
concerned during preparation of such data.
The CLCS is empowered only to “make recommendations to coastal States on

matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental
shelf.” Its limits are clearly stated by the phrase that even following
Commission recommendations, a nation's “limits of the shelf established by a
2
coastal State…shall be final and binding.”
The CLCS has met more than one dozen times since its first meeting in 1997,
but appears to have had little effect on clarifying CS issues that would lead to
resolution of sovereignty disputes. That status may well change in the near
future, as the CLCS continues its efforts to gain international agreement on
defining the outer limits of the CS, especially as pertaining to contested waters
3
and sovereignty issues.
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) was organized in 1994 as an

autonomous international organization under the UNCLOS. Its purpose is to
provide signatories with the means to organize and control activities in
claimed CS areas, particularly with a view to administering the natural
resources. The ISA became operational in 1996, headquartered in Kingston,
Jamaica.
Another UN body concerned with maritime issues is the Food and Agricultural
Organization's Fisheries Division. This division was founded in Rome in 1996;
its current manifesto summarizes the composition and role of various
international fishery bodies concerned with the conservation and management
of live maritime resources. At least thirty-five such fisheries organizations
operate around the world, all concerned with international disputes. The
division provides information for each of these organizations, to include
establishment data, area of competence, species covered, membership,
objectives, and activities. In many cases their coverage areas are depicted on
maps. Part one of the manifesto includes a comprehensive account of recent
events in high seas fisheries, with a view toward their effects on future
developments.
A potentially powerful body under the UNCLOS is the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLS), composed of twenty-one members elected for nine-
year terms by the member states. No two members may be from the same
nation and the ITLS must represent an equitable geographical distribution: at
least three members each from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America
4
and the Caribbean, and Western Europe/other states.
The ITLS's potential is limited by the fact that its opinions are advisory and its
cases must be voluntarily submitted for adjudication; it has no independent
jurisdiction, with one exception: it may entertain an application for the prompt
release of a detained vessel or its crew, providing that the detaining state “has
not complied with the provisions of the Convention for the prompt release of
the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial
security [and] if, within 10 days from the time of detention, the parties have
5
not agreed to submit it to another court or tribunal.”
A subsidiary body is the Seabed Disputes Chamber, which is formed to address

applicable issues. “Special Chambers” may also be formed to address specific
disputes. When such a body is in session, each party makes a single written
pleading; additional written or oral pleadings may be submitted.
Crime on the high seas is a primary concern of the International Maritime

Bureau (IMB), a specialized office of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) that is endorsed by the UN International Maritime Office (IMO). The IMB
was established in 1981 to “prevent fraud in international trade and maritime
transport, reduce the risk of piracy and assist law enforcement in protecting
crews.” It tracks cargoes and verifies shipment arrivals at the scheduled ports.
The IMB also investigates pirate attacks, publishes a weekly report of piracy
incidents, and operates a twenty-four-hour-a-day piracy reporting center at
6
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The UN does not have an impressive record of settling maritime disputes. The
primary reason is disputants’ hesitancy to submit to an adjudication process
over which they have little control. The UN has an important role in assuring
maritime security, but its record to date contains as much frustration as it does
achievements. Nonetheless, it remains the only global venue for addressing
maritime security issues.
ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a Pacific-wide organization
formed in 1989 to which most East Asian nations belong. Its goal is to serve as
the premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade, and
investment in the Asia-Pacific region, and to enhance economic growth and
prosperity for the region by strengthening the Asia-Pacific community.
APEC operates on the basis of nonbinding commitments, conducting “open

7
dialogue and equal respect for the views of all participants.” Its members
incur no treaty obligations; decisions are reached by consensus and
commitments undertaken on a voluntary basis. APEC has twenty-one members
—formally “Member Economies”—numbering 2.6 billion people; total Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of US $19,254 billion, approximately 60 percent of
the world's GDP; and approximately 47 percent of the world's trade. APEC
members also generated nearly 70 percent of global economic growth during
8
its first ten years, from 1989–1999. Members are Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam.
APEC has worked since its inception to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers
across the Asia-Pacific region, while boosting domestic economies, and
increasing exports. Key to achieving these objectives are the “Bogor Goals,”
adopted in 1994 with the objectives of “free and open trade and investment in
the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing
9
economies.” APEC also works to create an environment for the safe and
efficient movement of goods, services, and people through continental and
maritime lines of communication.
To this end, the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) group was organized
at the Los Cobos, Mexico APEC meeting in 2002. The first STAR conference
was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 2003, and focused on how to advance trade
efficiency and trade security in Asia-Pacific. Representatives of all twenty-one
APEC members discussed how to advance trade efficiency and trade security in
Asia-Pacific. A “way ahead” was delineated for future STAR activities to address
maritime security, aviation security, passenger information processing
technology, capacity building, project planning and financing, and supply chain
security. Participants agreed that successful implementation of these measures
10
required strong partnership between government and business.
The second STAR conference took place in Viña del Mar, Chile, in 2004 and
formed four panels: (1) maritime security, which discussed the implementation
of the ISPS Code; (2) air transportation security, including the threat of Man-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MPADs) against civilian aircraft; (3) the mobility
of people including sessions on Regional Movement Alert System (RMAS); and
(4) the gradual establishment of Financial Intelligence Units.
Attendees included more than 300 senior business and government
representatives from APEC members. The meeting initiated five sets of
actions: (1) steps to advance compliance with the IMO's new Ship and Port
Security Standards; (2) financial contributions to the Asia Development Bank's
Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative; (3) progress in implementing
business mobility initiatives, including the Advance Passenger Information
system; (4) development of a Regional Movement Alert List System; and (5)
issuance of machine readable travel documents by 2008.
APEC members also agreed on instituting the International Ship and Port
Security (ISPS) code, and at the Chile conference urged member states to
implement ISPS requirements by the July 2004 deadline. Particular concern
focused on applying ISPS Code requirements to vessels carrying liquefied
natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and chemicals.
The ISPS code contains a comprehensive set of measures designed to enhance

the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived
threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United
States. It is mandatory for the 148 members of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
The code has two parts, one mandatory and one recommendatory. It takes the
approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is a risk-
management activity that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. It aims
to establish a standardized framework for evaluating risk to ships and port
facilities, to include determination of appropriate security levels and
11
corresponding security measures. The 2004 conference participants also
expressed significant interest in the Geographic Information System
(Grafimar) developed by the Chile Maritime Authority; Valparaiso has offered
12
to make information on Grafimar available to other APEC members.
The Third STAR conference met at Inchon, Korea, in 2005, with a continued
focus on developing trade while enhancing security, as well as cooperation and
capacity building through public–private partnership. Maritime security was a
central theme of this meeting.
The fourth STAR conference was held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2006.
Vietnam's Ambassador Tran Trong Toan, Executive Director of the APEC
Secretariat, chaired the meeting and described an ambitious future APEC
program for increasing security under the STAR initiative, including:
1. reviewing progress of and continuing implementation of commitments to

counter-terrorism, secure trade and safe travel, including efforts to
dismantle trans-boundary terrorist groups, eliminating the threat of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
2. striving to achieve human security, trade and investment liberalization and
facilitation, and measures pertaining to counter-terrorism, non-
proliferation, infectious diseases, emergency preparedness, and energy
security
3. developing new initiatives and implementing existing commitments to
secure trade unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally and in APEC, building
on the comparative strengths of APEC
4. sharing the results of the APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP)
Cross-Analysis with relevant donor bodies
5. enhancing public-private partnerships in combating terrorism and work
closely with private sectors and publicizing information on measures taken
to ensure secure trade
6. encouraging more APEC economies to implement the International Atomic
Energy Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive
Sources by the end of 2006
7. encouraging all APEC economies to undertake a man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS) Vulnerability Assessment at international airports by
the end of 2006
8. promoting developing a Multilateral Legal Framework and in examining
legal issues associated with accessing lost and stolen passport data
9. encouraging voluntary start of providing information on lost and stolen
travel documents to the existing database of the International Criminal
and Police Organization - Interpol (ICPO-Interpol) by the end of 2006
10. strengthening further cooperation by all APEC member economies to issue
machine-readable travel documents with biometric information by the end
of 2008
11. while implementing counter-terrorism commitments, to minimize costs
associated with cross-border business transactions; advancing trade
facilitation and application of improved technology and procedures
12. continuing to help developing economies implement improved technology,
procedures, and security measures
13. ensuring that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all
relevant obligations under international law, in particular international
13
human rights, refugee law and humanitarian law
Thus, APEC is serving as a vehicle for states with more-developed economies

to extend maritime security assistance to those less well-developed. Australia
provides significant maritime security aid to a number of other members, while
Canada is providing financial support to the IMO's Maritime Security Trust
Fund, which is used to assist states prepare for international assessments and
to meet maritime security standards. The United States also announced a
major initiative in 2004 to help APEC members meet ISPS requirements.
These donor efforts were further coordinated at the April 2005 Transport
Security Group meeting in Beijing.
The IMO itself has been trying to coordinate international efforts to combat
piracy. After meeting in Malaysia in September 2006, the IMO issued the
“Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and
Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” addressing
development of “mechanisms and programs to facilitate co-operation in
keeping the Straits safe and open to navigation, including the possible options
for burden sharing.” This meeting was attended by Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and thirty other nations, including many from Europe. The
conference's transnational character was emphasized by the attendance of
nine international organizations, including several concerned with shipping
and with the oil industry.
The Kuala Lumpur meeting's closing statement summarized prior multilateral

efforts to increase maritime security, ranging from the UNCLOS to the
“Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG),” and noted agreement to support
“continuous efforts…to improve safety of navigation and environmental
14
protection.” Specifically, the attendees agreed to support in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore:
1. Removal of wrecks in the Traffic Separation Scheme

2. Co-operation and capacity building on hazardous and noxious substance
preparedness and response
3. Demonstration project of Class B automatic identification system (AIS)
transponders on small ships
4. Setting up tide, current, and wind measurement systems for the Straits to
enhance navigational safety and marine environment protection
5. Replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits
6. Replacement of aids to navigation damaged by the December 2004
tsunami
The meeting agreed that the coastal states, user states, the shipping industry,
and other stakeholders should establish a system of voluntary funding for the
15
above projects, to include continued maintenance of aids to navigation.
Perhaps most significantly, APEC has generated a Counter-Terrorism Plan
which includes an effort to standardize electronic customs reporting developed
by the World Customs Organization (WCO), and implementation of the U.S.’
Container Security Initiative (CSI) throughout the Asia-Pacific area. The
Counter-Terrorism Plan also addresses port and shipboard security plans, as
well as cooperative actions to combat piracy.
The CSI was initiated in January 2002 to monitor and protect the global
trading system, particularly the ships traveling on SLOCs to the United States.
The program depends on teams of U.S. officers working with the host nation
counterparts to target all containers scheduled for shipment to the United
States.
In Asia, the CSI had by the end of 2006 been initiated in Kobe, Nagoya, Tokyo,
and Yokohama, Japan; Busan, South Korea; Hong Kong, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen, China; Kaohsiung and Keelung, Taiwan; Singapore; Port Klang and
Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Laem Chabang, Thailand; Colombo, Sri Lanka;
Dubai, UAE; and Port Salalah, Oman.
The CSI addresses threats posed by potential terrorist use of maritime

containers to smuggle terrorist personnel or to deliver a weapon; it has four
core elements:
1. identify high-risk containers. Automated targeting tools are used in a data

identification and mining process to identify containers subject to terrorist
use; advance information and strategic intelligence are used in this
process
2. prescreen and evaluate containers prior to shipment, preferably at the port
of departure
3. use technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening
can be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade; this
includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation
detection devices
4. use smarter, more secure containers, to allow officers at U.S. ports to
16
identify containers that have been tampered with during transit
The program reportedly aims to prescreen approximately 90 percent of all

transpacific cargo imported into the United States. This apparently refers to
the 6 percent of prescreened containers that are administratively identified as
suspect; in other words, only 90 percent of 6 percent of all transpacific
17
containers destined for the United States will be prescreened. It is inherently
multilateral since as a reciprocal program, the United States shares
information with other CSI nations and offers them the opportunity to send
their customs officers to major U.S. ports to target oceangoing, containerized
cargo being shipped to their countries.
The CSI is a technology-intensive program with very ambitious goals. Because

of its technology basis, however, it does offer a path to increasing the security
of the ubiquitous maritime shipping containers that have already been used by
18
terrorist organizations to transfer personnel and material. Progress has been
slow in the face of the huge number of containers in use and the need for
improved technology to conduct the necessary inspections within a reasonable
19
time frame.
The WCO was organized in 1952, currently has a membership of 169

countries, and is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium. It develops standardized
customs procedures, provides advice and assistance to national customs
services, and has published a Risk Management Guide that defines its goal as
“a modern, effective and efficient way” to assist national customs authorities
to:
1. effectively manage Customs’ operational functions, including the control of

cargo and people
2. effectively manage non-operational functions such as information
technology support services
3. deploy an appropriate level of resources to the greatest areas of risk
20
4. deliver better results with the same or fewer resources
Structurally, APEC has two organizational groups that deal directly with
maritime security, both falling under the purview of the Senior Officials
21
Meeting (SOM). These are the Transportation Working Group (TPTWG) and
the Energy Working Group (EWG). The former includes a Maritime Security
Experts Group (MSEG) that is tasked with assisting APEC members in
improving maritime security, such as implementing the ISPS Code.
The EWG established an Energy Security Initiative in 2002, focusing on five

areas, including sea-lane security. The SOM also established a Counter
Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) in 2003, intended to help members identify and
evaluate threats and coordinate preventive measures.
APEC has thus emerged as a vehicle for improving maritime security

throughout the Asia-Pacific. Its security concerns include energy flows and the
SLOCs, but translating discussion into action has not been the organization's
strong suite; instead, APEC's already formidable record as a venue for
important discussions among heads-of-state is likely to continue, while smaller
multilateral organizations prove more capable of instituting improved, practical
security measures.
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may prove to be such an
organization. It is a political and economic group formed in August 1967 by
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines as a display of
solidarity against communist expansion in Vietnam and insurgency within their
own borders. Brunei became a member in 1984, immediately following its
independence from Great Britain; Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma have
since been admitted to the association.
Member states meet at least annually, usually at the foreign minister level,
with security concerns only occasionally on the agenda. At ASEAN's 1976
summit meeting in Bali, the organization embarked on a program of economic
cooperation which floundered in the mid-1980s, began reviving in 1991 with a
Thai proposal for a regional Free Trade Area, was ineffective in dealing with
the Asian economic collapse in 1997, but has since resumed a positive trend.
The 2002 meeting in Kuala Lumpur produced an agreement to cooperate

against piracy; the Bali Accord II adopted at the October 2003 summit meeting
“declared that maritime issues and concerns are trans-boundary in nature and
therefore shall be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated, and
comprehensive manner.” Members were urged to cooperate against terrorism,
22
smuggling, and piracy.
Although the Bali Accord discusses an “ASEAN security community” and

recommends maritime cooperation in the fight against terrorism, it does not
23
mention alliances, treaties, or defense pacts. At the December 2006 summit
meeting in the Philippines’ Cebu City, however, all members signed the “ASEAN
Convention on Counterterrorism.” This agreement provides for cooperative
investigations to locate and track “known terrorists and their funds,” as well as
training camps and other facilities. The convention expanded on and
superseded the antiterrorism coalition founded in 2002 by the Philippines,
24
Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand.
THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

Most of the attention devoted by ASEAN to maritime security falls under the
purview of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which focuses on Southeast
Asian international and maritime security issues. The ARF was established in
Singapore at the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial
Conference in July 1993. Its inaugural meeting was held in Bangkok in July
1994, after which the ARF's objectives were outlined in the Chairman's
Statement, to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and
security issues; and to contribute to confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”
The first ARF conference attendees urged their parent organization, ASEAN, to
“work with its AFR partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive
pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific.” ARF members are Australia, Brunei,
Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Timor
Leste, the United States, and Vietnam.
The second ARF meeting was held in Brunei in August 1995 and adopted “a
gradual evolutionary approach” to security cooperation. A three-stage process
was outlined:
1. promotion of confidence-building measures

2. development of preventive-diplomacy mechanisms
25
3. development of conflict-resolution mechanisms
ARF members have established coordinating agencies to improve maritime

security and have begun programs to enhance at-sea communications
systems, strengthen port facilities, and conduct specialized security training.
Five meetings dedicated to enhancing maritime security have been conducted
since 1998:
1. Maritime specialists met in Honolulu in November 1998

2. A workshop on antipiracy measures met in Mumbai in October 2000
3. A workshop on maritime security challenges was conducted for ARF
members during February–March 2003, also in Mumbai
4. A similar workshop, on regional maritime security, met in Kuala Lumpur in
September 2004
5. A meeting on ARF confidence-building measures to enhance maritime
security convened in Singapore in March 2005
These meetings and workshops have produced modest results, due to the
widely varying capabilities of the member states, the reliance on voluntary
participation in recommended programs, and other national concerns.
Nonetheless, ARF remains the only formally organized Asian subregional
organization with the stated goal of addressing security issues. For instance,
several ARF members have conducted exercises and antipiracy operations on a
bilateral or small-scale multilateral basis.
More meaningful language emerged from the Twelfth ARF summit meeting, in
Laos in 2005. The assembled ASEAN ministers at least “expressed continued
support for the activities of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement
Cooperation, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism, and
the International Law Enforcement Academy.” The ministers also urged
expanded efforts to promote maritime safety and security, noting “four key
areas for future cooperation”: multilateral cooperation, operational solution to
maritime safety and security, shipping and port security, and application of
technology for maritime safety and security.”
They noted the “ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight
Against Terrorism,” adopted at the Eighth ASEAN-plus-Japan Summit in Laos in
November 2004, and the signing of ASEAN “Joint Declarations for Cooperation
to Combat International Terrorism” with South Korea, New Zealand, and
Pakistan in July 2005. This meeting's minutes—admittedly words more than
action—also expressed concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) as “a serious security challenge of our time and the most
dangerous one as they might fall into terrorist hands.” Attending members
urged all nations to sign the “International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” and to continue combating terrorism, to include
immediate adoption of the “Comprehensive Convention on International
26
Terrorism.”
The ARF remains mostly a talking shop, but its advocacy for enhanced SLOC
security is important. The organization has the potential to serve as an
important vehicle for improving SLOC security throughout Asian waters, but its
most critical area of interest is the Malacca Strait. Any effective ARF actions to
increase the security of the SLOCs transiting the Malacca and other Southeast
Asian straits would have a direct effect on global energy security.
A notable gathering occurred in September 2007, when the first Asia Pacific
Intelligence Chiefs Conference convened in Kuala Lumpur, as the result of a
Malaysian-U.S. initiative. The meeting was attended by senior military
intelligence representatives from nineteen nations who focused on maritime
27
security, including terrorism, and disaster relief.
Several other less formal but associated groups are pursuing similar goals with
some effect. The Shangri-la Dialogue convened annually by the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is a prominent example of
Track II (unofficial) academic and commercial conferences, meetings, and
workshops where national representatives address the problems of piracy and
improving maritime security on the SLOCs.
Japan has been one of the Asian nations most active in trying to bridge the
gap between discussion and operational application. This results in part from
Japan's dependency on the SLOCs for approximately 80 percent of its energy
supplies, as well as for its economic well-being in general. Tokyo is especially
concerned about the security of East Asian SLOCs.
Tokyo took the lead in organizing two conferences in 2000 on piracy and
armed robbery at sea. The first of these produced the “Tokyo Appeal,” in which
the fourteen attending nations agreed to “cooperate, devise and implement all
possible measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships.” A
“Model Action Plan” to carry this out was issued at a meeting held the next
28
month, also in Tokyo.
This effort has been supported by the major Japanese think-tank, the National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), which in its annual Security Study for
2000 highlighted the importance of the “formation of a regional order” as key
29
to future Japanese security. A NIDS “security study” that same year spelled
out a possible international regime for “ocean-peace keeping and new roles for
maritime force.” The authors defined this concept as the use of maritime forces
to “assure the stable and sustainable development of the oceans.…to execute
the obligations stipulated in the UNCLOS, and [coordinate] maritime activities
by the regional maritime forces to assure the stable utilization of the oceans.”
30
Two particular points were made: first, “maintenance of regional stability”
depends on naval and coast guard involvement; and second, U.S. participation
31
is necessary.
ASEAN PLUS THREE

ASEAN Plus Three is an informal organization that includes the ten ASEAN
members, China, Japan, and South Korea. The group's First Ministerial Meeting
was held in Bangkok in January 2004; attendees issued a joint communiqué
addressing the threats posed by transnational crime (money laundering and
32
trafficking in drugs, arms, and people) and piracy. Participation by China,
Japan, and South Korea acknowledges that nonregional nations are vitally
concerned with maritime security in Southeast Asia. ARF is the logical
organization to take action in pursuit of these ASEAN recommendations.
Several other ASEAN meetings have addressed terrorism and transnational
crime. Notable was the Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Chief of Police Conference in 2005
in Indonesia. Attendees included Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and
South Korea (as an observer). The attendees signed a joint communiqué,
agreeing to:
1. enhance existing mechanisms of cooperation and coordination

2. strengthen capacities of ASEAN members’ police forces through training,
seminar, dialogue and information-sharing on counter-terrorism efforts
3. exchange accurate and timely information on terrorists, terrorist
organizations and their modus operandi
4. share information on arrested terrorists and facilitate access to member
countries to interview arrested terrorists in accordance with the agreement
of member countries
5. provide member countries with assistance including tracing, freezing and
33
confiscation of assets related to terrorism.
Multilateral efforts at defending and improving the maritime environment

under the ASEAN aegis bear promise, but bilateral and lower level multilateral
efforts have also scored successes.
In Northeast Asia, the 1972 Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement between

Russia and the United States remains in effect, as do Moscow's similar
agreements with Seoul and with Tokyo, signed in 1993. China has met at least
annually with the United States since 1998 under the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA); little of substance has resulted from these
talks, but the agreement offers the potential for future maritime cooperation
34
along INCSEA lines.
The U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise program
has become the most wide-ranging bilateral programs. Under this relatively
loose construct, begun in 1995, U.S. naval warships and logistics vessels
conduct a series of short duration exercises with Southeast Asian navies and
35
coast guards. For example, the U.S. and Thai naval forces conducted
exercises in mid-2007 during the Thirteenth Annual CARAT series. This two-
week training period included navy, Marine Corps, and coast guard forces, and
36
included exercises to counter interdiction of the SLOCs.
Asian nations also conduct exercises on a regular basis; the Royal Malaysian
Navy, for instance, operates periodically with the navies of Brunei, Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand, in addition to participating in the CARAT program with
the United States under the 1972 Bilateral Talks and Consultative Group
(BITACG) agreement. Exercises with Australia are conducted under the
Malaysia-Australia Joint Development Program (MAJDP), while the Five Power
Defense Agreement (FPDA) provides the vehicle for Kuala Lumpur's
participation in military exercises with Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain,
and Singapore.
Additionally, the Malaysia Marine Police and Singapore's Police Coast Guard
have established “direct communications links,” while the Malaysia-Indonesia
Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement (MALINDO INCSEA) was signed in
37
2001. Recently, Malaysia's traditionally contentious relationship with the
Philippines has softened to the extent of the two nations’ navies conducting
38
joint maritime patrols.
Finally, India has become increasingly active in multilateral maritime efforts,

since 2000 conducting naval exercises with Bangladesh and other small South
Asian nations, some of the ASEAN states, Australia, China, South Korea,
Japan, and the United States. Most notable is the Malabar exercise conducted
in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. India was joined by naval units from
39
Australia, Singapore, Japan, and the United States in this major exercise.
THE SHANGHAI COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

The Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) was organized in 1998 by
China and Russia as the “Shanghai Five,” with Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined what became the SCO in 2001, while Mongolia,
Pakistan, Iran, and India have become “observers” at the organization's
meetings. Its charter cites its purpose as “strengthening mutual trust and
good-neighborliness and friendship among member states; developing their
effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy and trade, science and
technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental
protection and other fields; working together to maintain regional peace,
security and stability; and promoting the creation of a new international
40
political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality.”
In recent years, however, the SCO has become dominated by security

concerns, nominally to counter terrorism. A large-scale Russo-Chinese
“counter-terrorism” exercise, “Peace Mission 2005,” was conducted in
northeastern China in August 2005. Meaningful participation was limited to
Chinese and Russian forces and demonstrated Beijing's determination to use
the SCO for its own strategic purposes: China wanted to conduct this “counter
terrorism exercise” in Fujian Province, across from Taiwan; when Russia
objected, the exercise was moved to northeastern China, but still featured an
amphibious exercise which would have little applicability to the SCO's area of
concern in Central Asia. The exercise's actual purpose was, on the part of
China, to intimidate Taiwan and on the part of Russia, to demonstrate various
41
weapons systems it wanted to sell to China.
The most recent exercise in this series, “Peace Mission 2007,” was conducted in
August 2007 in central Russia. This exercise involved all six SCO members,
but was dominated by the 1,600 Chinese and 2,000 Russian troops who
participated. Beijing described Peace Mission 2007 as “comprehensive” and
noted that it marked “the first time a Chinese head of state goes overseas to
42
observe a Chinese military exercise.”
The SCO members are certainly concerned about economic improvements and
fighting the relatively low incidence of cross-border infiltration by radical
Islamic groups that may be occurring; interests that Beijing repeatedly
describes as fighting “terrorism, extremism, and separatism,” the last a clear
43
reference to Taiwan. In the long term, Beijing and Moscow likely regard the
SCO as the latest version of “the Great Game,” as the two nuclear powers seek
44
to restore hegemony over the energy rich region.
THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA

PACIFIC
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a Track II
group of academics and other private sector analysts seeking to provide “a
more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature…to contribute
to the efforts towards regional confidence building, and enhancing regional
45
security through dialogues, consultation and co-operation.” The organization
has met regularly since its founding in 1992 by Australia, Canada, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the
United States; membership has expanded to include China, Mongolia, New
Zealand, North Korea, Russia, and Vietnam.
Five CSCAP Working Groups have been formed, the most notable of which is
probably the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation (WGMC). The WGMC
46
met fourteen times, the last meeting taking place in Hanoi in May 2004. This
group is no longer active, but has been succeeded by the “Study Group on
Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” which first met in
December 2006 in New Zealand, focusing on the topic of “Roles of Maritime
Security Forces.” Six meeting objectives included to “explore the contribution
of maritime security forces to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,” and
to “identify ways and means by which cooperation between maritime security
47
forces might be enhanced.” This meeting included reports on the importance
of “safety, security, and environmental protection in the Malacca and
Singapore Straits,” and a maritime PSI exercise conducted in the Persian Gulf
in October 2006.
COAST GUARD ORGANIZATIONS

Not all Asian nations deploy coast guards, although all have maritime agencies
dealing with the issues typically dealt with by such organizations. The Heads of
Asian Coast Guard Agencies was organized in 2000 and held its second formal
meeting in March 2006 in Malaysia, with seventeen organizations in
attendance.
Concern about piracy and maritime crime was the initial reason for the
organization, but the second meeting also focused on improving information
exchange and disaster relief operations. The North Pacific Coast Guard
Agencies has similar membership, but focuses almost exclusivity on maritime
crime involving smuggling and illegal fishing.
INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL

COOPERATION
One-half of the world's container ships, one-third of the bulk cargo traffic, and
two-thirds of the world's oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean. Its
coastal nations are peopled by almost one-third of the world's population,
which makes it a massive energy market. Mauritius convened a meeting in
March 1995 to discuss the enhancement of economic cooperation among
countries of the Indian Ocean rim. This meeting was attended by
representatives from the governments, business sectors, and academia of
Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore, and South Africa, since
referred to as the “core group states” or M-7. The participants issued a joint
statement, declaring that they had agreed on “principles of open regionalism
and inclusivity of membership, with the objectives of trade liberalization and
48
promoting trade co-operation.”
The result was the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
(IOR-ARC), established in a meeting in 1997, also convened in Mauritius.
Eighteen states are now members: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the UAE, and Yemen. Egypt,
49
Japan, China, France, and the United Kingdom are “dialogue partners.”
The association disseminates information on trade and investment regimes,
with a view to enhancing those processes. Particular concerns are expanding
intraregional trade and addressing maritime security concerns. The
organization has not been notably productive, however, as decried at the most
50
recent (seventh) meeting in Tehran, in 2007.
SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established
in December 1985 by the governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, with its purpose is to accelerate
economic and social development in member states. The SAARC held its
thirteenth summit meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2005, focusing on
terrorism as one of the most critical threats to regional peace and security.
Members’ strong condemnation of terrorist violence was colored by a strong
statement “that there should be no double standards in the fight against
terrorism,” a caveat almost certainly aimed at Israel and the United States.
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE

The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) is a U.S. initiative intended to
organize willing Pacific nations to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational
maritime threats under international and domestic laws. RMSI is focused on
maritime transnational threats and aims to serve as a collective effort to
provide participating nations with timely information and capabilities to combat
maritime threats in their own territorial waters. It is designed as a voluntary
partnership; it is neither a treaty nor an alliance.
Operations against immediate threats normally would be undertaken by law

enforcement or customs forces, although naval and air forces might be
required, especially on the high seas. An associated effort occurred when
seventeen ships of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singapore navies conducted
a “sail past” in July 2004 to begin Operation Malindo, an effort at antipiracy
and antiterrorism protection in the Strait of Malacca. Each participating navy
provided five to seven warships to conduct these patrols. A hotline has been
established to provide for rapid communications, especially when a warship of
one nation is in hot pursuit into waters of another partner. At the same time,
however, the chief of Indonesia's navy played down the piracy threat in the
region, thus demonstrating local sensitivity about international patrolling of
local waters. This continuing nationalistic parochialism will have to be
overcome if effective maritime security measures are to be implemented over
the long term. In fact, while these three nations, plus Thailand, began air
patrols over the Malacca Strait in 2005, regular patrols by a multilateral task
force remain more talked about than conducted.
While rejecting international (read “U.S.”) participation, Indonesia left open a

willingness to accept financing, equipment, and training from others. In July
2004, Malaysia and Singapore announced increased intelligence sharing in
their efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Malacca Strait area. In
August of that year, Malaysia announced that its new Coast Guard, modeled on
that of the United States, would begin providing security along the Strait of
Malacca in the first quarter of 2005. The new Malaysia–Singapore efforts are
linked with the Maritime Rescue Coordinating Center in Kuala Lumpur.
The nations bordering the Malacca Strait understandably resent the fact that
more than 70 percent of the ships passing through these water ways do not
call at any of their bordering ports, while the world holds them chiefly
responsible for maintaining the safety and security of navigation for those
51
ships, as well as preserving the environment. This feeling is deepened by the
failure of the United States—alone among the nations concerned—to ratify the
UNCLOS. Furthermore, only Japan and China have offered monetary
52
assistance to the three strait states to assist in “straits management.”
A basic difference in priorities among these nations continues to inhibit RMSI's

effectiveness. The United States is primarily concerned with preventing the
transfer of WMD and more broadly, terrorism; Japan is more concerned about
piracy. Singapore is also concerned about piracy, but as a subset of
maintaining the overall security over the strait it dominates. Indonesia and
Malaysia simply do not place as much priority on controlling WMD as they do
on their national sovereignty. In fact, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur apparently
consider the U.S. presence in their neighborhood as attracting more than
53
preventing possible terrorist acts.
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is part of an overall
counterproliferation effort intended to apply intelligence, diplomatic, law
enforcement, and other tools to prevent transfers of WMD material, weapons,
and delivery system to countries and entities of concern. The PSI was
announced by President George W. Bush in May 2003; it specifically identifies
maritime interdiction as an area where greater focus is needed.
Eleven countries—Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,

Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—agreed to
and published the PSIStatement of Interdiction Principles in Paris in 2003.
More than seventy countries have at least expressed support for PSI
objectives, which identify specific steps for interdicting WMD shipments and
halting proliferation facilitators. Participation in the PSI is voluntary, but
members encourage all states to support the program, including operations at
54
sea.
Several important nations have declined to participate in the PSI, including

China, India, Indonesia, and South Korea. Malaysia and Indonesia have
actually opposed PSI activities in their maritime area, including the significant
“Deep Sabre” exercise conducted in the southwestern South China Sea in
August 2005. This event was hosted by Singapore, with participation by
Australia, Japan (with units from both the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force and the Japanese Coast Guard), New Zealand, the United States, and
the United Kingdom. A recent report from Beijing indicates, however, that
“China is actively considering participation” in the PSI. This announcement was
almost certainly spurred by concern about North Korea's October 2006 test of
55
a nuclear weapon.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security

Council in 2004, called on all states to take cooperative action to prevent
56
trafficking in WMD. The PSI is one of the most prominent programs
originated by the United States to increase SLOC security.
REGIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON COMBATING

PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN ASIA
The lengthily titled Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and

Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a Japanese initiative
launched in November 2004. It has been ratified by twelve nations: Brunei,
Cambodia, India, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. It entered into force in September
2006, establishing an information-sharing center with a permanent staff in
Singapore. The reluctance of Indonesia and Malaysia to join this important
multilateral effort attests to their sensitivity to issues of sovereignty.
THE UNITED STATES AS AN ASIAN POWER

Maritime security in Asian waters requires U.S. participation. Regional
maritime regimes are a major international component of U.S. strategy to
improve SLOC security, and to strengthen antiterrorism strategies. U.S.
defense treaties and less formal agreements offer a useful vehicle for
multilateral efforts to secure the maritime commons in Asia.
WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was established in 1988; it has
57
twenty-two member nations and four as observers. It convenes biannually,
with the goal of “bringing regional naval leaders together to discuss matters of
importance and interest that lead to enhanced regional security and
58
prosperity.” These include increasing transparency, promoting confidence and
enhancing cooperation among these nations. Member states began addressing
piracy and terrorist threats in May 2005, when Singapore hosted a major
exercise against those threats. The theme of the 2006 meeting, in Honolulu in
October–November, was “Maritime Security: Opportunities for Cooperation.”
WPNS meetings serve as useful venues for discussion among the heads of
navies in attendance and the organization conducted a significant maritime
exercise in May 2007 during International Maritime Defense Exhibition and
Conference (IMDEX) 2007 in Singapore, which included training sessions
ashore and at sea.
CONCLUSION
Maritime security during the Cold War was a fairly straightforward issue in
Asia. The Soviets and their minions—North Korea, North Vietnam, and China
at various times—were the enemy. The threat to the maritime arena was
serious, but the other side's intentions, ships, submarines, aircraft, and
policies were relatively well-known. How to counter that threat seemed equally
straightforward. That is no longer the case in the first decade of the twenty-
first century. Maritime Asia today is threatened by new enemies that are
transnational, often covert, often difficult to anticipate, and hence difficult to
prepare to counter. Terrorism, environmental attack, smuggling, the movement
of WMD, illegal immigration, piracy, and other forms of criminal activity at sea
are all part of the new maritime security paradigm.
Improving maritime security in maritime Asia requires strong individual

national efforts, both domestically and at sea. These problems are multifaceted
and international in both origin and scope, so solutions must almost always be
multilateral. In some cases, only formal international organizations possessing
enforcement authority will be effective. In other cases, voluntary participation
in multilateral efforts in which may suffice. Finally, there will always remain a
place for bilateral and very low-level multilateral efforts in combating threats
to maritime security.
The navigational chokepoints that mark maritime Asia may be as useful for
pirates and terrorists as they are for the region's nations, who depend on long
SLOCs for economic well-being, social stability, and political viability. The
nations of Asia recognize the transnational nature of piracy and other
maritime security threats, but sovereignty concerns have sometimes limited
effective implementation of such measures. Illustrative is ASEAN's plan for
creating a legal framework for antipiracy cooperation. The statement says the
right things, but has not been followed by the operational action required to
bring it into force. A statement by an Australian scholar is worth quoting at
length:
Genuine cooperative enforcement, however, requires sovereignty to be put

aside and other legal arrangements to be made.…Yet the ARF Statement
explicitly states that nothing ‘should prejudice the position of ARF
countries with regard to any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or
other rights over territory. Sensitivity over…sovereign rights at sea
remains high in [Southeast Asia] with many outstanding territorial
disputes and undelimited maritime boundaries, and where post-colonial
nationalist sentiments still rein supreme in many states. This places an
obvious limitation on effective cooperation in straits and other narrow sea
areas where national jurisdiction is either disputed or constrained by
59
political or physical geography.
As maritime security threats increasingly assume a nonstate character, the

efforts of structured multilateral organizations are going to be required to
ensure the safety of the SLOCs. The traditional attitude of states like Malaysia,
preoccupied with safeguarding national perquisites will have to participate in
effective multilateralism if international maritime security—and that is really
the only kind of maritime security—is to be achieved.
Interaction of national and multilateral steps highlights the dynamic

international maritime situation in Asia: regional nations are acting strongly to
carry out their national security goals in their littoral and regional seas, but
the necessary synergistic effect of their policies and operations has yet to be
realized.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE SCENARIOS
This book has addressed two vital elements in the Asian security calculus—
energy and the freedom and safety of the seas. Ensuring the security of the
former depends to a significant extent on the latter. Effective law and order at
sea in turn requires both strong national navies and international cooperation,
ranging from loose groupings of states with perhaps transitory common
interests, to closely written defense treaties.
The military aspect of energy security in Asia is for the most part a maritime
issue. The global economy continues to increase the value of the oceans’ role
as highways for commerce and providers of resources, while technology and
globalization have lessened their role as barriers. Thus, the maritime realm is
a ready medium not only for national security and commercial interests, but
also for terrorists, criminals, and other disruptive elements.
Maritime threats can cause conflict and regional instability among nations over
the control of marine resources. Preserving the safety and productive capacity
1
of the oceans is in the interest of all maritime Asian nations. While significant
regional efforts to accomplish this goal are underway, they are hampered by
differing national priorities, especially those concerning maritime sovereignty
claims, and are difficult to carry out.
SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Concerns about energy security are unlikely to lessen in the near- or mid-
term, and Asia's maritime geography is certainly not going to change. The
maritime expanse from the northeastern to the southwestern extremities of
the Asian continent is marked by many of the world's most important
navigational chokepoints: the straits of the Kuriles, La Perousse/Soya,
Tsugaru, Tsushima, Taiwan, Luzon, San Bernardino, Surigao, Torres, Sunda,
Lombok, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. All are heavily traveled by
seaborne traffic; most of them are vital to the flow of petroleum from the
world's center for those energy reserves in Southwestern Asia to the South
and Northeast Asian economic giants of India, Japan, Korea, and China.
More than 80 percent of the world's trade travels by water, forging a global
network of maritime links. The smooth operation of the global economy
depends on the free flow of shipping through straits used for international
navigation. Safe navigational chokepoints and shore facilities are necessary to
ensure the free flow of energy shipping; many more than half of each of those
in the world exist in Asia. About one-third of the world's trade and half of its
petroleum traverse the Strait of Malacca.
Governance of the seas is a useful concept for describing the management of

the resources, rights, and dangers of the world's oceans. The legal framework
regulating the conduct of nations in international waters suffers from
uncertainties in the early twenty-first century. These reflect the historic
contest between the very idea of freedom of the seas and the desire by
national governments to control not only littoral waters but also international
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) that are believed necessary for national
security.
SLOCs by their nature cross national maritime boundaries. Hence, the ability
to safeguard them effectively requires multilateral cooperation, ranging from
the definitional agreements contained in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to compatible C4I systems and agreements among
maritime forces allied at least to the extent necessary to operate jointly in
defense of SLOC security.
Energy transportation is an important element of energy security, of course; in

Asia this means both pipelines ashore (and on the sea bottom) and tankers at
sea. Asia's merchant fleets lead the world in transporting energy supplies, and
the region is home to the newest and largest shore facilities required to handle
a very large volume of energy carriers. Pipeline construction and plans are
almost ubiquitous across Asia and may indeed some day lead to the creation of
a true “energy land bridge” that would allow the piping of energy supplies from
the Caspian Basin and Australia to Japan, across the vast Asian land and
maritime expanses.
The seaborne element of energy acquisition will remain dominant for the
foreseeable future, however, and means that the SLOCs over which so much of
the Asia's energy is transported must be kept secure. These SLOCs form the
arteries of the region's economies and are of national security concern to all
maritime nations. Piracy, terrorism, navigational hazards, and environmental
dangers all threaten the security of the long SLOCs stretching from the Arctic
to the limits of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden. Potentially most
dangerous, however, are the more traditional great power factors of conflicting
sovereignty claims and wars erupting over political disputes. These differences
also may hamper establishing cooperative maritime security efforts.
Nontraditional threats to the SLOCs are real in the post–Cold War world, but
normally do not possess the capability of interrupting the vital interregional
sea-lanes over which Asia's energy supplies are transported. Sinking or even
disabling a large ship underway at sea is difficult; in fact, no large modern
tanker moving at more than 20 knots (kts) speed is very easy to intercept by
terrorists operating in small boats. This is also a challenging mission for
conventional naval forces, even submarines, since they are effectively limited
to single-digit speeds during an attack phase.
Cruise missiles may pose a formidable threat at navigational choke points, but
of the several that mark the seas surrounding the Asian continent, only the
Strait of Hormuz poses a systemic threat to shipping, because it is bordered by
a contentious Iran. Even here, at least six or more missiles normally would be
2
required to stop a large tanker. Sea mines are a weapon available to terrorists
as well as to organized navies, but the tanker war of the 1980s and the 1991
war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the relative impunity of large ships to
3
mines.
This does not mean that the flow of seaborne energy supplies may not be
threatened, attacked, and even interrupted for a period of time by armed
force; significant, lasting intervention of the SLOCs would be difficult, however,
and would have to be carried out by a large naval power able “to dominate a
4
large area of water over a long period of time” in the face of opposition. In
Asia, only the United States is capable of carrying this out, although others—
Japan, China, India, perhaps Russia—could do so in their respective littoral
waters.
COUNTRY PROFILES
Each Asian nation faces differing conditions of energy resources, requirements,
and reliance on the SLOCs. Maritime capability and naval power also vary from
country to country. The following section will briefly review these conditions in
the major Asian nations, before returning to a regional analysis.
Russia
Russia possesses Asia's largest energy reserves, the sale of which has become
the mainstay of the country's economy. These reserves are primarily
continental, in eastern Siberia and central Russia, but the fields offshore
Sakhalin Island promise huge future returns for Moscow and important energy
supplies for Japan, Korea, and China.
The Russian government under President Vladimir Putin is determined to

control its energy sector, to maximize economic benefit to the nation,
maximize its utility in foreign policy, and to maximize its political survival
5
domestically. Success in these endeavors will be enhanced by the huge proven
energy reserves and Putin's personal power, but is not assured. Moscow faces
daunting problems, including demographic degradation, a shaky domestic
infrastructure rife with corruption, an unbalanced economy, technical and
environmental problems in recovering the Siberian energy reserves, and lack
of a structured polity. Putin's constitutional term in office ends in March 2008,
but uncertainty exists about his intentions and a successor.
Russia's Energy Strategy 2020 may be a seminal document, since it envisages

supplying major amounts of oil and natural gas to China and other Asian
nations, possibly at the expense of Europe, which currently receives more than
6
half of Russian energy production. This would be a major shift in Moscow's
political and economic focus from Western Europe to Asia; it would be an
economic and political gamble that is giving Moscow pause.
Russia has yet to develop a maritime strategy to succeed that implemented in

the 1970s to defend against Western encroachment. Furthermore, its navy is a
shadow of its Cold War self, but retains world-class status due to its nuclear
capability and large submarine force. Even the much-reduced Pacific fleet
remains capable of securing coastal waters and making itself felt in the littoral
waters of the Bering, Okhotsk, and Japan Seas.
This fleet on paper includes more than 100 surface combatants and nuclear-
powered submarines, but the number of these capable of full operations and
manned by trained crews, while unknown, is probably very limited. An
authoritative survey in 2007 credited the Russian Pacific fleet with three or
four Delta III nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines; eleven nuclear-
powered attack submarines, eight surface combatants
(cruiser/destroyer/frigate), and approximately forty smaller combatants and
7
minesweepers. A recent Russian exercise in the Sea of Japan was reported to
have included “over fifteen combat and auxiliary vessels,” which may represent
8
the number of warships actually ready for fleet operations.
In other words, the Russian fleet in the Pacific must be respected for its
remaining nuclear weapons capability, but as an operational force, appears
capable of defending only those SLOCs in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and
perhaps the North Pacific in the vicinity of its major naval base at
Petropavlask. Much greater capability is available through the long-range
aviation assets remaining in Russia's Pacific forces, but those units will have to
recover from almost two decades of resource shortfalls, inadequate personnel
training, and dubious maintenance efforts.
Japan
Japan lacks indigenous energy resources and its national security largely
means maritime security: the nation is dependent on the sea for political
integrity, economic well-being, and military defense. Tokyo is following two
paths to achieve maritime security: first with the mutual defense alliance with
the United States; second with a modern navy capable of defending Japan's
littoral waters and the SLOCs out to a distance of at least 1,000 nm. This
distance, formulated at the height of the Cold War, stretches from Tokyo almost
to the Luzon Strait; Japanese strategists have probably also decided that their
navy needs to be able to defend the SLOCs at least as far as the Malacca
Strait, a distance of approximately 3,000 nm from the home islands.
Japanese strategists were early, eager devotees of Mahan's theories, and

Japan's history since the late nineteenth century has witnessed economic
growth and naval modernization in tandem. Current maritime strategy is
framed in terms of defending the home islands and ensuring the security of
the SLOCs.
Modernization of the navy and the air force, creation of a cabinet-level defense
ministry, andde facto loosening of constitutional restrictions on deploying the
military are recent steps taken by Tokyo to increase its ability to use naval
power to safeguard vital national interests. The defense ministry has
reportedly adopted a slogan describing its maritime defense capabilities as the
9
nation's “First Line of Defense.”
The Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is a twenty-first-century

navy, lacking only nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear weapons
capability. As of 2007, the Japanese Defense Agency has cabinet-level status
as the Ministry of Defense, reflecting an ebbing of the post–World War II
defensiveness about becoming a “normal nation” in military terms.
Japan already deploys a naval escort force equipped with sensor and weapons
systems second only to those of the U.S. Navy; the JMSDF is also moving
toward resuming its place as one of the world's few aircraft carrier-centric
navies. This is not likely to result in huge, flat-deck, catapult-equipped
behemoths, but in the JMSDF acquiring ships of the size and capability needed
to operate increased numbers of helicopters and VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft.
In combination with its small but capable force of conventionally powered

submarines and the most capable mine warfare force in Asia, the JMSDF is
already able to defend its littoral SLOCs—assuming that necessary political
decisions can be reached in time to allow effective action. This capability
results not just from its modern naval platforms and systems, but also from its
personnel expertise—many operations with the U.S. Navy conducted in an
environment of state-of-the-art naval technology—and experience as a
deployed force to the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea under wartime
conditions.
Tokyo is trying to lessen its dependence on the very long SLOCs to energy-rich
10
Middle East by accessing Russian and Australian resources. The former
possibility is influenced by the Kuriles sovereignty dispute; Japan's reliance on
secure energy SLOCs will continue, and will likely outweigh other international
concerns. These would include its sovereignty dispute with Moscow,
humanitarian concerns in Sudan, and political concerns with Iran. Despite
Japan's current reliance on the United States for defense, these issues counter
U.S. policies and may well be a factor in the loosening of those ties.
South Korea
South Korea is almost as energy-starved as Japan in terms of indigenous

resources, with almost 97 percent of its energy requirements imported from
abroad. It is at least part of the mainland, from which it may benefit from
Siberian reserves via direct pipeline.
Seoul certainly recognizes the importance of energy security to its economic

well-being and national security, as indicated by the 2006 National Energy Act
and proposed establishment of a National Energy Commission, but a
11
comprehensive energy strategy has not been published.
As South Korea's economic well-being and national security become

increasingly dependent on seaborne energy imports, it is building a new navy
based on large, air-capable amphibious ships; state-of-the-art conventionally
powered submarines, and Aegis-equipped warships. This ambitious program,
heralded by President Kim Jae-dung's address at the South Korean Naval
Academy in late March 2001 may have been motivated in part by the Bush
administration's abrupt dismissal of Kim's “sunshine policy” toward North
12
Korea earlier that month.
South Korea's defense structure is exhibiting signs of stress, trying to operate

within an environment marked by the nation's historic enmity toward Japan, a
close economic relationship with China, the mutual defense treaty with the
United States, and most of all with the Six Party Talks that are attempting to
deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. Seoul may be able to deal
successfully with each of these factors, but the result is likely to be a decision,
probably unstated, to adjust relations with Japan and the United States as
necessary to obtain the smoothest possible reconciliation with Pyongyang,
probably with Beijing's carefully tendered advice.
China
China possesses imposing energy resources, but even more imposing

demands; the resulting gap is growing annually, as China's economy continues
to expand. In fact, in 2004 Beijing expressed a goal of quadrupling its GDP by
2020, while only doubling energy use in reaching that goal. Fulfilling this very
ambitious plan was already problematic when it was written, since the growth
in energy use had exceeded that in GDP since 2001, including a 60 percent
13
increase in the consumption of electricity between 2000 and 2006.
With almost all its currently imported energy supplies coming by sea, China is
both increasing its fleet of national-flag tankers and pursuing SLOC
alternatives. These include a plan to become the world's number one
shipbuilder by 2015, with enough tankers to transport a majority of its energy
14
imports.
Beijing is also engaged in a very substantial program of building international

pipelines. China's economy may or may not fulfill the usual sanguine
estimates, but the pursuit of energy resources will almost certainly continue to
play a major role in its economic and political future. The Chinese government
confronts significant domestic economic and social issues, but as of mid-2007
appears to be taking a constructive view of the risks and benefits of
international cooperation to secure the SLOCs and achieve energy security.
Beijing is modernizing its navy with a possible mission of defending the SLOCs.
Chinese military think tanks and journals frequently address the need to
develop a maritime strategy; Taiwan is the immediate reason for increasing
naval capabilities, but security of the sea-lanes is also noted, as is the need to
defend maritime energy fields.
China's huge coal reserves provide Beijing with a certain freedom of action
regarding the resources dedicated to securing its SLOCs, but there is no
indication that the current naval modernization will slow, even following
resolution of Taiwan's status. Beijing's strategy of trying to “lock in” energy
supplies around the world, from locating foreign energy reserves to consuming
them, may not be efficient—the largest of China's energy companies ranks no
higher than thirty-first globally and China trades only 4 percent of the world's
crude oil output—but it has assumed a major role in the nation's foreign and
military policies.
The Chinese navy (PLAN) is being modernized in almost all warfare areas, with
particular attention to the submarine force. Most significant during the past
quarter-century of naval improvements has been the overhaul of personnel
accession, education, and training, as the PLAN strives to become a
competitive maritime force for the twenty-first century. Progress during that
time has been impressive; the navy in 2007 is capable of defending China's
littoral waters, threatening timely U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict,
defending some of its regional SLOCs, serving as a global diplomatic
instrument, and executing the traditional naval mission of presence.
Taiwan
Taiwan's state of de facto independence relies almost entirely on U.S. support,

while its economic status grows increasingly dependent on China. Dependence
on the mainland and on the SLOCs is increased by the island's almost total
lack of indigenous energy resources.
Despite those unwelcome factors, Taipei has accomplished little to increase its
energy security, neither making a strong effort to deploy a modern navy nor
maintaining a meaningful strategic petroleum reserve. Despite acquisition of
four large guided-missile destroyers from the United States in 2005–2006, the
navy since 2001 has not been able to fully take advantage of Washington's
decision to make a wide range of modern weapons platforms and systems
available to Taiwan. As presently structured, the navy would not be able to
defend even coastal SLOCs against determined hostile action.
The problem lies not with the navy but with the often-dysfunctional
government in Taipei. Taipei is not likely in the long term to maintain its
present status, but will have to seek a mutually acceptable accommodation
with Beijing—although some Taiwanese and Americans consider that outcome
anathema.
Philippines
The Republic of the Philippines is one of the world's most extensive

archipelagic nations, with more than 7,000 islands. The Philippines possesses
significant energy resources, both on land and at sea, but because of
problematic government effectiveness the nation has not been able to take
advantage—or even to establish an accurate estimate—of indigenous energy
reserves. Recovering known energy reserves continues to be hampered by
administrative inefficiencies as well as by insurgencies on Luzon and in some
of the southern Philippine islands.
The lack of an effective energy program is matched by the government's

demonstrated inability to fund, build, and deploy the naval forces necessary to
defend energy fields in littoral waters and the interisland and regional SLOCs
on which the nation is so dependent. Since at least 1984, Washington has
tried repeatedly to assist Manila in deploying a capable navy; very few of these
15
efforts have been effective, due largely to the latter's shortcomings.
Reorganization of the coast guard in 2002 was a promising step toward

improving the country's law enforcement and defense capability on inland and
16
littoral waters, but cannot substitute for a capable navy. There are few
indications that Manila will be able to succeed in either securing its SLOCs or
significantly increasing its energy security.
Vietnam
Vietnam's concerns for energy security are easily if not comfortingly defined in
a single word: China. Hanoi's is in the unenviable position of having to assert
its claims to offshore petroleum fields that are also claimed by China. Vietnam
also is a party to conflicting sovereignty claims over all the Paracels and some
of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, but these do not offer the
proven energy reserves found within Vietnam's territorial and contiguous seas,
17
and its claimed EEZ.
Hanoi and Beijing are currently maintaining a relatively nonconfrontational

stance over the coastal energy fields, but the latter is in no way conceding
sovereignty to the former. Talks over delineating these conflicting claims have
18
been unproductive but are continuing.
In view of its relatively secure energy situation, which includes minimal

reliance on imported supplies, and the increasing efforts by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
Hanoi is able to take a relaxed view of SLOC defense and, hence, is pursuing a
slow path to naval modernization.
Indonesia
Indonesia may be the most important nation in Southeast Asia in terms of

energy security. It is the world's largest archipelagic nation, composed of more
than 17,000 islands, and its more than 1,500-mile length from the Philippines
to the Andaman Sea west of Malacca makes it the southern boundary of the
19
South China Sea. Indonesia's energy-rich territorial waters and the vital
navigational straits dividing its islands underline its importance to the region's
energy and maritime security regimes.
Indonesia confronts severe environmental and navigational hazards, as well as

threats from piracy, other forms of international crime, and terrorism. Jakarta
has been forced to rely excessively on foreign companies to mine its energy
resources; efforts to expand and modernize its navy have been characterized
by fits and starts, and as of 2007 had resulted in maritime forces of doubtful
capabilities.
Energy security remains a high priority for Indonesia, and one inextricably tied
into domestic, foreign, and military policy decisions. Its security is most
seriously threatened by domestic problems, however, including ethnic and
religious confrontations and equitable distribution of energy industry benefits,
both product and profits.
The country's energy industry is becoming increasingly internationalized as

the government struggles to establish effective governance. The Indonesian
Navy is in the latest of series of hitherto unsuccessful programs to establish
itself as a modern, capable force, the success of which remains undetermined.
These issues will have to be managed successfully before Indonesia will be
able to successfully secure its SLOCs and gain more domestic benefits from its
indigenous energy resources.
The large Indonesian Navy is composed of units from many international

sources. In addition to patrol craft built under license domestically, the navy
includes ships, aircraft, and systems from Australia, the Netherlands, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Yugoslavia, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore,
and the United States. This must pose severe maintenance, supply, and
training problems for the navy, which is also challenged by the huge coastal
areas for which it must provide security, including 34,000 miles of coastline.
The presence of so much of the country's energy reserves in maritime fields
further intensifies the navy's tasks.
Malaysia and Thailand
Malaysia and Thailand occupy the Malay Peninsula, proximate to Indonesia and
separating the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as East and South Asia. The
peninsular nations share similar concerns and are following similar policies in
naval modernization and energy security. Both have joint access to significant
offshore reserves of natural gas, and are cooperating to maximize the benefits
from that resource.
They are expanding their extensive domestic and international pipeline

systems, primarily to satisfy domestic electricity demands. Kuala Lumpur and
Bangkok both have ambitions to become the hub of a regional energy
distribution system.
The most compelling reason that energy security is a vital priority for these
two countries is that of satisfying domestic demand. Malaysia is balancing the
contrasting values of its democratic national regime and the Islamic
governments in two of its provinces. This is a difficult balance to maintain and
to a degree drives Kuala Lumpur's national priorities, to include ensuring that
the population has access to the electricity and other benefits of a satisfactory
20
energy sector.
Thailand's internal political situation remains in flux, following the 2006

military coup against the constitutional civilian government. Additionally,
Bangkok appears to be making little progress at eliminating the deadly Islamic
insurgency that erupted in the country's three southernmost provinces in
21
2004.
Malaysia and Thailand are also modernizing their navies, nominally to increase
the security in their littoral and regional waters against pirate and terrorist
threats. The systems they are acquiring, however, including submarines and
frigates equipped for multiple warfare missions, are excessive to those
missions. Clearly, both nations are concerned about conventional naval conflict
in the future, or may be misusing resources on traditional naval power. More
importantly, modern naval power will not be directly effective in ameliorating
the domestic problems facing both countries.
Australia
Australia is one of Asia's energy-rich nations, with especially plentiful supplies

of coal and natural gas. Canberra is rapidly becoming a primary supplier of
energy to its neighbors, especially China. Concerns over energy security deal
primarily with securing the SLOCs for the mineral exports on which the
economy is increasingly dependent.
The small, but capable Australian navy is modernizing, but at a very moderate
pace. A major step was revealed in June 2007, when Prime Minister Howard
announced the acquisition of three Aegis-equipped warships at a total cost of
US $6.5 billion. These will be delivered between 2014 and 2017. Two large
22
amphibious ships are also being acquired, at a cost of US $2.46 billion.
Energy security should be assured for Australia because of its indigenous

reserves and its natural maritime buffer. The mutual defense treaty with the
United States and its modernizing navy should enable Australia to secure its
littoral SLOCs, while also playing a significant role in safeguarding regional
sea-lanes.
India
India's energy position is similar to that of China; large indigenous energy

resources, especially in coal, but an increasing need to import seaborne
supplies to feed a growing economy. Just four countries—Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
23
Kuwait, and Iran—provide 60 percent of those imports. These energy sources
rely on relatively short SLOCs, but a potentially hostile Pakistan lies between
them and India, which no doubt concerns Indian maritime strategists.
New Delhi is modernizing and expanding its navy, with a stated mission of
defending the long energy SLOCs that cross the Indian Ocean and enter the
South China Sea. India has deepened its economic and defense relationship
with the United States and is moving to do so with the ASEAN and other East
Asian nations; the Indian Navy is playing a prominent role in pursuing these
goals.
That navy is already one of the world's most capable, with the strongest naval
aviation force in Asia. New Delhi seems determined to maintain that status,
with an eye not only on SLOC defense, but also on traditional maritime
challenges, such as an attempt by Beijing to project naval power into the
Indian Ocean.
Pakistan
Pakistan's search for energy security includes recognition of the need for
maritime power, albeit in an inherently losing position against India. Islamabad
is attempting to reduce dependence on the SLOCs by seeking to acquire access
to Iranian and Central Asian energy supplies. Pakistan's navy is expanding and
modernizing, but the nation's short coastline and proximity to its likely enemy,
India, cast serious doubts on it ability to prevail in a maritime conflict.
Even more threatening to energy security is the fragility of the Pakistani state,
rife with internal dissent, corruption, and outright insurgency. Prospects are
not bright.
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
The development and possible eruption of maritime crises will remain a factor
in Asian international relations as naval modernization across the region
accompanies ever-growing dependence on imported energy supplies, the
majority of which will continue traveling by sea. Despite the importance of
these energy SLOCs, maritime sovereignty disputes offer the most likely
venues in which naval conflict might erupt. Most dangerous are unforeseen
issues and developments in long-standing disputes that might lead to
unintended military escalation over sovereignty or energy security issues.
Maritime sovereignty disputes in Asia are quiescent but dangerous. Those

between Japan and Russia, Japan and Korea, and Japan and China are all
relatively minor in geographic scale, but national hubris colors all of them and
poses escalatory dangers.
The Taiwan issue is more serious, posing the potential of war not just between
China and Taiwan, but also between China and the United States, two nuclear-
armed powers. An even more dangerous situation exists between India and
Pakistan, where ethnic and religious divisions form the conflictive framework
within which more substantive issues—nuclear arms developments and the
status of Kashmir—separate the two nations.
Iran offers another potential nuclear problem, with its apparent determination
to dominate the Persian Gulf area and its support of international terrorism.
Especially troubling is Tehran's support of anti-American attacks in Iraq, which
might lead to a U.S. strike on Iran that could, in turn, evoke an attempt to
interrupt the flow of shipborne energy supplies from the Persian Gulf.
Iran is the second largest oil producer in Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) and is determined to use its oil and natural gas reserves as
an instrument of statecraft. To protect those reserves, at least one-third of
which lie offshore, Iran has deployed a formidable maritime force built around
large numbers of small, missile armed craft and fanatic personnel. Conflict in
this area would be especially pernicious, given the volatility of the region's
religious divisions and its importance to global energy security. Probably no
other location so epitomizes the confluence of all three elements of energy
security: availability, affordability, and military assurance.
Should any of the sovereignty disputes in Asia break into actual military
conflict, escalation could occur that would almost certainly involve maritime
forces and would be equally certain to negatively affect energy security for the
entire region.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The 1982 UNCLOS frames the discussion and resolution of maritime

sovereignty conflicts. Island ownership, maritime boundaries, access to biologic
and mineral maritime resources, and regulatory authority all play a role in
these disputes. The UNCLOS delineates four areas of national maritime rights
which define more than they resolve maritime sovereignty disputes.
Procedures for resolving such disputes are contained in UNCLOS Articles 198
and 287. One calls for submission of conflicting sovereignty claims to the
International Court of Justice, a path that has occasionally been followed. A
notable success was resolution of the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia
over the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligatan, small islands located just
24
offshore eastern Borneo.
Additional venues for resolving disputes are the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea established in Annex VI, an arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII, and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
25
accordance with Annex VIII. All maritime nations are vitally concerned with
the UNCLOS, as the most successful international attempt to erect an effective
framework supporting law and order across the ocean commons.
MARITIME STRATEGY
Maritime strategic theory in the twenty-first century still owes a debt to the
classical theorists of a century ago, a relatively short list headed by Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. The writing of the former remains applicable
to the Asian international situation because of his emphasis on linking
maritime power and national power; the latter's writings are still germane
because of his emphasis on power projection and what would be termed today
“joint warfare.”
All Asian maritime nations have at least a de facto maritime strategy, but
surprisingly few Asian coastal states have a formally written, coherent national
maritime strategy. To be effective as a vehicle for the pursuit of national
security objectives, a maritime strategy must provide both operational
objectives and the justification for the naval forces required to achieve those
objectives.
NAVAL MODERNIZATION
As the demand for increased energy supplies is pervasive across Asia, so is the
process of naval modernization. The recent Sixth International Maritime
Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX Asia 2007) held in Singapore
included visits by twenty-two warships from fourteen countries: Australia,
Bangladesh, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and the United
26
States. Analysts attending this event estimated that “Asian countries are
expected to spend about US $108 billion” on naval modernization during the
next decade, with amphibious forces a primary focus.
This trend illustrated an apparent emphasis on nontraditional employment of

naval forces, such as that demonstrated in post-tsunami humanitarian
operations. An associated maritime exercise was conducted under the aegis of
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), in which ships from eighteen of
27
the navies participated.
Japan, South Korea, China, and India are building modern naval and coast
guard forces. Others, including Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Pakistan are also making significant investments in modernizing their naval
forces but not on the same scale as the four countries noted above. This near-
region-wide modernization is significant and tied directly to concerns about
sea-lane and energy security, but the United States remains the region's
dominant naval power.
Asia's modernizing navies exhibit some common characteristics, including

antiship cruise missiles as their warships’ main battery, rudimentary
antisubmarine warfare capabilities, electronic “links” to serve as a force
multiplier, reliance on foreign equipment and training, and a focus on local,
littoral waters. Furthermore, naval modernization is expensive, demanding the
national allocation of extensive material and personnel resources. Navies are
expensive to operate and are perishable, in terms of obsolescence (warships
rarely have an operational life of more than twenty to thirty years) and during
hostile operations (a severely damaged warship is often sunk and
unrecoverable).
The Asian navies also differ in significant ways; first of course in size. It is a
truism but relevant that no matter how capable a single warship, it can only be
in one place at one time: numbers matter. The ability to project air power at
sea is also crucial. China has no aircraft carriers, for instance, but in specific
scenarios, such as one involving Taiwan, its ability to project maritime air
power from the shore compensates for that lack. Differences in mission also
matter, however, and if the Chinese navy's mission concerns not Taiwan but the
Malacca Strait area, then its efforts would be severely hampered by the lack of
air-capable ships. Japan and India deploy such vessels, which would enhance
both the operational range and power of their maritime efforts.
Additionally, a strong navy lacking supporting air power may not be able to
operate successfully in relatively constrained waters, such as the South China
Sea, bordered by states with modern land-based air forces. Navies without
airpower at sea are not capable of operating independently during times of
conflict in the twenty-first century.
The most important mission of navies in Asia, apart from homeland defense, is
safeguarding SLOCs. These may be categorized as littoral, regional, and
interregional. Almost all of the Asian nations have at least some capability to
guard their littoral SLOCs, those within 200 nm of their coastline. Very few—
only Japan and China—have navies capable of providing some degree of
regional SLOC protection throughout East Asia; only India deploys that
capability in South Asian waters. On the highest scale of SLOC defense, only
the United States possesses the naval force necessary to operate throughout
East and South Asian waters, although even the U.S. Navy would be hard-
pressed to safeguard those very long SLOCs with any degree of certainty.
Regional security concerns will certainly continue to drive shipbuilding

programs, but Asia-wide naval modernization does not necessarily equate to a
naval arms race; the advanced capabilities of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian
naval forces present too great a challenge for any other Asian nation to
28
overcome. The presence in Asian waters of dominant U.S. naval power
should dampen any potential naval armaments race. Other nations will
continue building maritime forces to safeguard littoral waters and SLOCs
against lesser threats: the goal of maintaining law and order at sea is every
maritime nation's responsibility.
The absence of a classic naval armaments race will not lessen competition
between Japan and China and between India and China in specific strategic
situations. Similar competition will continue between Taiwan and China,
between India and Pakistan, and between Iran and the other Persian Gulf
countries. U.S. naval strategists may see calamity in a navy of less than 300
ships, but compared to even the most modern Asian force, the American fleet
29
still poses the overwhelming maritime presence in Asian waters.
Not every Asian state is the victim of significantly inadequate energy security,
of course, and not every Asian state needs to deploy significant naval forces.
One vehicle for such countries to confront contentious energy and maritime
issues is with the assistance of other nations, through multilateral efforts and
international organizations. The most notable formal organizations active in
energy security and maritime issues include the UN, APEC (Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation), ASEAN, and the ARF. Less formal multilateral
organizations that focus on maritime security issues include the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT), and several others. The record of such organizations is inconsistent,
but their importance is likely to increase, especially as China has recognized
30
the viability of such organizations.
Multilateral naval operations are important, but pose significant challenges.

“Different supply specifications, different communications, lack of common
language, national pride, different standards of living, different personal
relationships … different tactics and techniques, extra time required for the
establishment of integrated commands and staffs, and lack of knowledge of
capabilities” are some of the problems that must be overcome to conduct
effective maritime operations among different navies. Effective multilateral
31
naval operations take a great deal of preparation and training. Some forms
of naval cooperation are possible without integrating forces, however, such as
working together on sea-lane security.
Energy security and naval capability in Asia are thus both important concerns
for the region's energy giants—Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Indonesia,
Australia, and India. No less concerned is the United States, which has long-
standing treaty commitments with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, and less formal but still significant military
relationships with Taiwan, India, Pakistan, and the most of the Persian Gulf
nations. A different role is being played by the Central Asian states, most of
them former Soviet republics. There, a sometimes enormous reserve of energy
is in a state of development slowed by domestic political instability and
international disagreement.
Future events are difficult to predict, but some scenarios may be surmised
based on current Asian energy security and maritime issues. Despite the
volatility of the China–Taiwan and India–Pakistan confrontations, a South
China Sea divided into a sovereign hodgepodge might well be the most likely
crisis to lead to restrictions on the freedom of navigation over some of the
world's most heavily traveled sea-lanes. Interruption of these SLOCs would be
unacceptable to the United States and would likely result in naval power being
used to maintain the free passage of energy cargoes.
Farther west, disruptive conflicts in the Indian Ocean would more probably
result from traditional international conflict than from territorial disputes.
Another Indian-Pakistani war might lead to the use of nuclear weapons; finally,
the stability of the Persian Gulf area, and most particularly freedom of
navigation through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, is threatened by
an aggressive Iran and war-torn, unstable Iraq.
The geopolitical importance of energy resource location, SLOCs, maritime

distances, ocean bottom gradients, and coastal contours are all factors that
contribute to defining Asia's maritime arena—and its political and military fate.
Energy is a main thread in economic, political, and national security priorities
throughout Asia. Japan, China, and India are the giants of consumption;
Russia, China, Australia, and Indonesia are those of production.
Southwest Asia remains the world's petroleum “breadbasket,” a situation

unlikely to change before still-distant realization of the potential contained in
Russian Siberia and the multinational Caspian Basin in Central Asia. And the
Southwest Asian energy supply depends on seaborne transport to reach its
global markets. The same dependency applies to African, Canadian, and Latin
American oil; Southeast Asian natural gas; and Australian and North American
coal.
Several important factors characterize Asian energy issues. First is increasing

reliance on energy imports to a region possessing significant indigenous
energy resources. Second, domestic and perhaps international security
depends in significant part on continued economic growth and improving
standard of living, which in turn requires continued and increasing supplies of
affordable energy sources. Third, a drive toward acquiring assured energy,
from source to consumption, conflicts with the market forces that drive the
global energy industry: politics and economics do not always provide a
simultaneous path to energy security. Fourth, the fact that almost all Asian
nations are pursuing a finite supply of energy, complicated by similar
campaigns for that same supply by many non-Asian nations, carries seeds of
conflict. How will nations decide between their own security interests and
those that would better support the international energy equation? Might some
of them decide to cooperate in satisfying mutual energy needs rather than
engage in unhealthy competition and possible conflict?
The Asia energy structure includes some nations without any appreciable
energy resources of their own on which they are able to draw; the relatively
few supplier nations, those with energy resources extravagantly excess to
their own requirements; and those nations whose balance of energy resources
and requirements places them in a position of viable independence with
respect to energy security. This last group is not likely to provide the leaders
in either seeking greater energy security or in building modern naval forces to
defend their littoral waters or the SLOCs over which so much of Asia's energy
supplies flow.
All the region's countries are facing decisions demanded by two important
factors in the energy security calculus. First are the needs and costs of energy
security; second is the practicality and cost of modern naval forces. These
factors are different for each nation and the balance will be resolved to various
degrees of satisfaction.
History demonstrates that the answer to that question is obvious; nations will
pursue policies and take actions, including military action, which might seem
counter to economic logic, if deemed necessary in the pursuit of national
security. Hence, as an exemplar of Asian energy issues—increasing demand
and a modernizing navy—China may well hold the key to the role that the
pursuit of energy security will play in future Asian developments: conflict or
32
cooperation.
Asia enters the twenty-first century both dependent on imported energy and
concerned about the SLOCs over which so much of that energy flows. Pipeline
construction, international organization, and cooperative efforts are all
ongoing as efforts to ameliorate that concern. National considerations are also
driving naval expansion and modernization, however, as individual states seek
to provide themselves with their own instrument of energy security.
NOTES
Chapter 1
Sam Bateman, quoted in Dick Sherwood, “Oceans Governance and Its Impa
1.
Sherwood (eds.), Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy(St. Leonard's,
Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Tanking Up: The Commercia
2.
Fleet,” Geopolitics of Energy 29(8) (August 2007): 2. One barrel equals 42 U
Admiral Michael G. Mullen and General Michael G. Hagee, “Naval Operat
3.
Department, 2006): 11ff for the definitions of these terms.
Ibid.; See also Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP)-1, Ch. 4 (Washington, DC: D
4.
athttp://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/Documents/NDPs/ndp1/ndp1
United Nations (UN) Development Program, World Energy Assessment (New
5. Xuanli Laio, and Roland Dannreuther, “The Strategic Implications of China's
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002): 13.
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New Yo
6.
of the onset of the “hydrocarbon” age. The discussion that follows draws on
Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, NJ: Princet
7. valuable source of information about Japanese decision making leading to th
the importance that oil considerations played in that process.
8. Yergin, The Prize, 396.
U.S. early recognition of Israel in 1948 was contradictory to the State Depar
9.
Eastern nations, but reflected President Harry Truman's personal priorities.
See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots
10.
2003) for a dramatic view of this event.
See Cole Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge,
11. this crisis. Also see Wm. Roger Lewis and Roger Owen,Suez 1956: The Crisis
Press, 1991).
The United States had led the world when it established national oil reserves
12. emergency fuel supplies to the navy. Following the 1973 embargo, this reser
thus recognizing its much broader significance.
13. Yergin, The Prize, 558.
“International Energy Outlook: 2007 (Coal),” U.S. Department of Energy: En
14.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/coal.html.
15. Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organiza
16. One nautical mile (nm) equals approximately 1.15 statute miles.
China expressed five “declarations” when it signed the UNCLOS in 1996; the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Peop
17.
jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the c
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention
L. Talaue-McManus, Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the South Chin
18. cited in Pakjuta Khemakorn, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries
November 2006): 18; Cornelia Dean, “Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish S
See “Fishing Ban Starts on South China Sea,” Xinhua (June 6, 2006) at
19.
http://english.people.com.cn/200606/01/eng20060601_270336.htm
The majority of these incidents have occurred in the South China Sea, usual
boats, but see Don Kirk, “South Korea Navy Fires Warning Shot at North,” In
20.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/11/21/a5_23.php, for an incident
patrol boats who were chasing Chinese fishermen out of Korean waters!
“Reports Foreign Navies Fired at Vietnamese Boats,” http://www.radioaus
Pacific Command Virtual Intelligence Center (referred to hereafter as VIC) “A
21.
VIC site gathers information from all available unclassified news sources; tw
Highlights” and “Press Summary”—as are periodic “Special Reports.”
Chapter 2
First presented as “The Geographical Pivot of History,” a paper presented at

1. Geographical Society in London; later published in Democratic Ideals and Re
republished in New York: W.W. Norton, 1962).
Christopher J. Fettweiss, “Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymakin
2. Parameters (Carlisle, PA: Summer, 2000): 58–71, provides a useful descript
his intent is to debunk their utility.
Spykman's major publication was America's Strategy in World Politics (New Y
3. work is described in Francis P. Sempa, “Spykman's World,” American Diploma
2006) at http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/sem
4. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Pre
Tokyo formally annexed the Ryukyus in 1879. When China objected, ex-U.S.
served as arbitrator, ruling in Japan's favor. The claims of the indigenous Ryu
5.
ignored. See George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutla
1958).
6. Source of all maps is the Central Intelligence Agency, unless otherwise noted
The body of water between the Malay Peninsula (and the island of Singapore
accurately divided into the Singapore Strait, the eastern 56.5 nm of the cha
7. to the north and the Riau Islands to the south, and the Malacca Strait, the 4
between the Singapore Strait and the Andaman Sea. For the purpose of clar
used to denote both straits.
From H.O. Publication 151: Distances between Ports (Washington, DC: USGP
8.
1 nm per hour, or approximately 1.15 statute miles per hour.
9. Known variously as the Antarctic Ocean, Southern Ocean, or Southern Sea.
This is especially true for the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as f
10.
gulfs. By comparison, the maritime point most distant from any land is the m
Both North and South Korea insist on calling this body of water the “East Se
the “West Sea.” The international community generally uses the traditional n
11.
Sea), as reflected by the International Hydrographic Organization in Limits o
Publication 28 (3rd ed.), (Monte Carlo: IHO, 1953): 31–32.
“Shell-Led Sakhalin Energy Signs LNG Supply Pact with Japan's Chubu Elect
2006),http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2006/07/12/afx
of international oil companies developing the huge, multiyear Sakhalin proje
initial expectation that Japan would immediately view its natural gas produc
12.
Because of the extensive but fragmented LNG infrastructure that Japan has
the use of Sakhalin-produced natural gas would not be economical or politica
perspective. Hence, Sakhalin's initial natural gas product will be sold to Russ
senior U.S. energy company representatives in May 2007).
South Korean spokesman cited in “Two Koreas Still at Odds Over Disputed S
13.
Presse (AFP), athttp://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapa
in VIC (July 26, 2007).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is at
14.
http://www.univie.ac.at/RI/KONTERM/intlaw/konterm/vrkon_en/
Beijing has already made straight baseline claims over which the United Sta
LeGrand, Rear-Admiral, Judge Advocate General Corp, U.S.N., “Memorandum
15. (Policy) and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, ‘Chinese Straight Baselin
DC: Department of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs, May 21,
baselines within the Chinese declaration are excessive and not in accordance
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA),
16. Malacca” (November
2005),http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoint
Mark J. Valencia, “Burden Sharing in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: S
17.
PacNet12 (Honolulu, HI: CSIS Pacific, March 29, 2007),http://www.ejour
This dispute is described in Kalinga Seneviratne, “Indonesia Tests Ties with ‘A
18.
(March 19, 2005) athttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/
See “Abu Musa: Island Dispute between Iran and the UAE” at
19.
http://www.american.edu/TED/abumusa.htm.
Chapter 3
Partly due to having to shut down seventeen nuclear reactors because of sa

1. 20, 2003) in Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections (referred to hereafter as
8(17) (September 4, 2003).
Petroleum figures will be given in barrels, unless otherwise noted. One bar
2.
0.136 metric tons, or 0.15 short tons.
3. Takeo Takagi, “Japan Update: Japan June Imports Up 23.9 Percent Year/Yea
See “Asia's LNG Demand May Outstrip Supply within Decade,” Dow Jones (M
4.
description of rising LNG processing and shipping costs.
“Japan Offers to Help Develop Russia's Far East,” Agence France-Presse (AF
5.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/2
“Russia: Natural Gas,” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Adm
6.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html.
7. “China's Growing Oil Cooperation with Russia,” Financial Express (June 23,
8. Sergei Ignatyev, quoted in Pravda Online (August 21, 2003) at http://ww
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, quoted in “All Oil Pipelines Under Constru
9.
2003),http://www.english.pravda.ru/economics/2003/01/10/4185
10. Middle Eastern nations together have an estimated 56 tcm in reserves.
11. “Increased Reliance on Russian Oil Could Improve Security of Supply,” DW-
A brief, clear summary of these agreements is in Sergei Blagov, “Arms, En
12.
2007) athttp://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?article
Quoted in Lucille Craft, “Sakhalin Bonanza,” ACCJ Journal (May 2003): 36
13.
Petroleum (BP) effort on Sakhalin. [The American Chamber of Commerce in
This description of the various Sakhalin projects draws on “Oil Exploration
Sakhalin Oil Development Watch, a periodic report by Friends of the Earth-
14.
http://www.slavweb.com/eng/Russia/regions/feast1-e.html. Also
http://www.sakhalin1.com/en/project/overview.asp.
Hasani Misaki, “Russian Energy Roulette Spooks Japanese,” Asia Times (Oct
15.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HJ24Ag01.html.
Ibid.; “Sakhalin 2 Oil and Gas Development Project,” October 2006,
16. http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/europe/whe
Gray Whales,” http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/ataglance.asp?p
See, for instance, “Sakhalin Goes After Exxon, Shell,” The Moscow Times (J
17. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/01/19/046.html
Stake in Big Oil and Gas Project,” New York Times (December 12, 2006): C
Jeremy Beckham, “BP and Rosneft Pushing the Boundaries of Exploration
18. http://www.offshore-mag.com/display_article/247714/9/ARCHI/
exploration-off-northeast-Russia/.
See, for instance, “Moscow Turns Screws on Sakhalin 1,” Upstream (August
19. http://www.upstreamonline.com/incoming/article138210.ece, for
overall project's progress.
Anonymous Russian, quoted in Richard Lourie, “Another Country,” review o
20.
the Washington Post, “Book World” (September 7, 2003): 8.
21. “South Korea: Oil,” EIA (June 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/c
22. “South Korea: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA, June 2007, http://www.eia.d
See David Nguyen, “South Korea Enters the Great Game,” Asia Times Onl
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HE13Dg01.html; an update
23.
Pulse (July 24, 2007) in Alexander's 12(15) (August 21, 2007). This claim
Korea will have contracts and reserves exceeding annual requirements.
24. “South Korea: Natural Gas,” EIA (June 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/
“Russia, South Korea Clinch 20-Year Natural Gas Deal,” People's Daily (July
25.
http://english.people.com.cn/200507/16/eng20050716_196458.h
26. “South Korea: Coal,” EIA (June 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
27. “China Country Analysis Brief,” EIA, (July 2, 2003) in Alexander's 8(15) (A
“China and South Korea to Forge Closer Ties,” Asia In Focus (July 8, 2003)
agreement, while “Russia, South Korea and China Study Kovykta Gas Proje
28.
2003) discusses the gas proposal. The lack of progress is reflected in “Kore
at:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/NaturalGas.h
29. “Korea and Russia to Accelerate Gas Field Study in Irkutsk,” Korea Herald (
Information on North Korea is from “North Korea: Country Profile,” EIA (Fe
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/North_Korea/Full.html. Swede
the west coast of North Korea; Britain's Soco International holds the conce
identified possible oil-bearing geological structures. The two companies hel
30. consortium for joint exploration of the areas, but no new activity has been
also holds a concession for one block off the east coast of North Korea, whi
government awarded its first concession for an onshore block to Sovereign
the Chinese border. In September 2002, the company reported that initial s
modest size.
“China's GDP Growth Hits 11.5% in First Nine Months,” Xinhua (October 25
31.
10/25/content_6941799,htm.
32. “China: Background,” EIA (August 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme
Reported in “Analysis of China's Energy Import and Export,” Xinhua (March
33.
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=
34. “China's Crude Oil Imports Up 11 %,” zoomchina (May 16, 2007) in Alexan
35. These rankings are from the U.S. CIA World Factbook, 2007, https://www
”China: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (August 2006), http://www.eia.doe
36. energy relationship with Africa, see Erica S. Downs, “The Fact and Fiction
68.
Wu Zhong, “China's Oilfield of Dreams,” Asia Times Online (May 16, 2007),
37. Such announcements must be viewed with skepticism, until proven, given
governments.
Ahmed Magzoub (Sudanese Minister of State for Finance and National Econ
38. allafrica.com/The Herald (June 26, 2007) in Alexander's 12(14) (July 27
Relations (New York), May 4, 2007,http://www.cfr.org/publication/13
“China Defends Oil Trade with Africa,” International Herald Tribune (March 1
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/12/business/oil.php; Meen
39.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2403/stories/2007022300050
April 16, 2007, http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/14478.html.
“China Downplays Kazakh Pipeline,” Radio Free Asia (January 5, 2006),
40. http://www.rfa.org/english/features/lelyveld/2006/01/05/china_
InfoPetro (July 13, 2007), http://www.infopetro.com/news/ViewNew
“Iran and Sinopec Close to Yadavan Oil Field Deal,” International Herald Trib
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/09/business/chioil.php. Wh
41.
planning stage; see “Iran to Enhance Energy Cooperation with China,” (Apr
Alexander's 12(9) (May 10, 2007).
42. “Sinopec Buys into Canadian Oil Sands,” China Daily Online (June 1, 2005),
Erica S. Downs, “China's Quest for Overseas Oil,” Far Eastern Economic R
43.
of overseas activities by China's national oil companies.
“Construction of China's Huangdao Strategic Oil Reserve Completed Early,”
44. “China's Strategic Reserve to See Oil By Year's End,” Xinhua (July 5, 2005)
07/05/content_3176510.htm.
This discussion draws on the excellent description of China's SPR plan in Ga
45. Gas Journal 105(31) (August 20, 2007): 20–29. “China to Boost Oil Reserv
(May 31, 2007) cites an initial thirty-day requirement for Phase 1.
National Audit Office, cited in “China Goes 28.5% Over Budget Building Fou
46.
12(5) (August 21, 2007).
47. “China: Natural Gas,” EIA (August 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme
Beijing is discussing establishing strategic coal reserve: see “Coal Reserve
48.
Alexander's 12(14) (July 27, 2007).
Elizabeth Economy, “The Great Leap Backward?” Foreign Affairs 86(5) (S
49.
China's failure to significantly reduce pollution.
“China May Halt Production of Liquefied Coal,” Xinhua (June 10, 2007) in A
50.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts72645.htm.
The Five Principles emerged during Sino-Indian negotiations in 1953–1954
51. respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual no
Equality and Mutual Benefit; and (5) Peaceful Coexistence (see http://eng
Estimated Venezuelan reserves are at http://www.gnb.ca/cnb/Promos
52.
at 1.2 trillion bbls, a figure that is more than 50 percent of known global pe
“China Showing Increased Interest in Orimulsion,” IPS via Newspage, repor
53. http://www.gasandoil.com/GOC/news/ntl01432.htm. This report al
orimulsion.
54. Juan Forero, “For Venezuela, a Treasure in Oil Sludge,” New York Times (J
“Sinopec Wants Venezuela Stake,” Reuters (June 28, 2007), http://www
Abandon Venezuela Investments,”Reuters, in Calgary Herald (June 28, 200
55. http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/sto
Quit Venezuela Oil Project,” CBC News (June 26, 2007), http://ww.cbc.c
Britain's BP PLC, France's Total, and Norway's Statoil accepted Caracas's ter
56. “Venezuela is China's Seventh Largest Oil Supplier,” zoomchina (May 22, 20
57. Found in FBIS-CPP20070503412001 (Beijing), National Development and R
58. Ibid., 4.
59. Ibid., 6.
60. “Taiwan: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (September 2006) at http://www.e
“Taiwan Breaks Relations,” China News Agency (Taipei) August 5, 2006, at
61.
http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2006/08/chadchin
An SPR of thirty days supply of petroleum is specified in Taiwanese regulati
62. doubt on the reserve's actual existence. Furthermore, the disabled tankers
result of environmental pollution concerns.
63. “Philippines: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (November 2006), http://www.
“Agreements Signed in Manila,” China Daily (April 28, 2005) at http://ww
64.
between Presidents Hu Jintao and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo endorsing an ag
Announcement by PNOC president Pedro Aquino, reported in “Malaysian St
65.
Coast of the Philippines This Month,” Upstream (August 9, 2007) at http://
66. Ibid.
67. “Iran and Indonesia to Build $5.6 Billion Refinery,” Asia Pulse (July 25, 200
68. “Indonesia: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia
69. “Indonesia: Coal,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
See, for instance, “Chevron Warns of Indonesia Decline,” Upstream (August
70.
http://www.upstreamonline.com/incoming/article138177.ece, in w
Yee Kai-pin, “Malaysia-Brunei Maritime Deal May Lead to Oil, Gas Windfal
71.
http://realtimenews.slb.com/news/story.cfm?storyid=643796.
72. “Brunei: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (April 2007), http://www.eia.doe.g
73. “Vietnam: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (July 2007), http://www.eia.doe.
74. “Vietnam: Natural Gas,” EIA (July 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme
Seth Mydans, “Big Oil in Tiny Cambodia: The Burden of New Wealth,” New
75. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/05/world/asia/05cambo.html
oilrich.
76. “Cambodia Mobilizes to Ward Off ‘Oil Curse’,” Xinhua (April 12, 2007) in Ale
77. UN report on “Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy,” at http://www.un.org
78. Cited “Malaysia: Full Report,” in EIA, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
79. “Malaysia: Natural Gas,” EIA (March 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/em
80. Ibid.
“Kedah to Host Malaysia's First Crude Oil Depot,” Bernama (Kuala Lumpur),
81.
id=270835. Bernama is Malaysia's national news agency.
“Energy Market Authority: Annual Report for 2005–2006” (Singapore),
82.
http://www.ema.gov.sg/attachments/download/UPLOAD_200611
83. “Thailand: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (April 2007), http://www.eia.doe
84. Ibid.
85. “Thailand's New Gas Pipeline Starts Deliveries,” oil&gasjournal.com (June
86. “Australia: Coal,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
87. Author's interview with senior U.S. engineer engaged in constructing coal-p
88. “Australia: Oil,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ca
“Chinese, Australian PMs Unveil First Ever Gas Project,” Xinhua (June 28, 2
Edward Lanfranco, “China Signs Key Trade Deals in Australia,” UPI (Beijin
89.
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Signs_Key_Trade_Deals
Reserves,” International Herald Tribune (October 25, 2005), http://www.
Reported in Kevin Andrusiak and Scot Murdoch, “China LNG Our Bigges
90.
Australian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22375898-643,00.html.
“Australia: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.
91.
negotiator, May 2003.
For a recent summary of conditions in that unfortunate country, see Jane P
Times (November 17, 2006),http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.h
92. to Thailand Account for 43% of Burmese Exports,” The Shwe Gas Bulletin 2
11.pdf, and “PTTEP Finds Gas with Zawtika-5 Offshore Myanmar,” rigzone.
a_id=47458.
Foreign participation in Burma's energy sector are discussed in the series o
government organization, athttp://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?
(May 4, 2007) in Alexander's 12(11) (June 14, 2007) describes Russia's te
93.
for the Burmese Junta,” Norwegian (July 10, 2006), http://www.norwat
attempts are discussed in Somini Semgupta, “India's Quest for Energy Is
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/05/news/energy.php.
94. See, for instance, Shailesh Palekar, “Burma's Natural Gas Reserves Fuelin
2007),http://www.upiasiaonline.com/economics/2007/07/06/ana
95. “South Asia: Overview,” EIA (March 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/em
96. “South Asia Overview: Coal,” EIA (March 2006), http://www.eia.doe.go

97. “Bangladesh: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (July 2006), http://www.eia.d
98. “Bangladesh: Natural Gas,” EIA (July 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/e
99. “India: Oil,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
100. See report by “Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited” (February 200
These pipeline proposals are discussed in Chapter 8. Videsh's 15 percent o
101. Schaffer and Vibhuti Hate, “India's ‘Look West’ Policy: Why Central Asia M
2007).
102. “India: Natural Gas,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme
The “vital national interest of pursuing a sound energy security strategy” w
103. “India Needs New Concept on Energy Security,” southasiannews.com (Au
“India Readies New Energy Security Plan,” Economic Times of India(March 3
104. “Pakistan: Natural Gas,” EIA (December 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov
105. See discussion of pipeline proposals in Chapter 4.
Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “China Quits $1.5 billion Pakistan Coal Project,” Asia Tim
106. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IE18Df04.html. Secur
Exploration in Pakistan,” Gulf News (August 22, 2007) in Alexander's 12(1
The ups and downs of the potential Japanese purchase of Iranian energy re
107.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=
“Japan Forges New Links with Middle East,” keralanext.com (May 4, 2007)
108.
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts72264.htm.
Heejin Koo, “South Korea to Ship Oil to North Korea by July 14,” Bloombe
109. athttp://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=a4S
Energy Needs,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists(November 14, 2007), http
The comment about the quality of China's remaining coal reserves was pro
110.
Commerce in Beijing, during an interview with the author in July 2005.
111. China's decision-making paradigm is addressed in Erica S. Downs, “The C
Chapter 4
Only a slight stretch is required to include the westernmost of the United St

1.
just 250 miles from Russia's Komandorski Islands—in this subregion.
For recent status of Russo-Japanese negotiations, see “Abe, Putin to Push N
2.
http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/408825.
3. “YUKOS Raises Yugansk Reserves Estimate Fivefold,” Reuters, Houston Chron
See R. James Ferguson, “Siberia, the Russian Far-East, and the ‘Future La
Australia (2003). According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Russia
4. compared to Saudi Arabia's output of 10.7 million barrels per day. DOE, Ene
2006,http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables1_2.html (
East Siberia,” in “Official Says Russia Needs $15 Billion for Prospecting East
5. Time Magazine 146 (10) (September 4, 1995).
“Special Report: Potential Russian Far East Oil Pipelines,” U.S. Pacific Comma
environmental group as a “fantastic landscape with its flora and fauna threa
6.
and cause irremediable damage.” [www.birdforum.org]. Also see Xie Ye, “
CPP20030912000010 for objections to this pipeline by the Russian Ministry
7. Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government has relentlessly sou
For instance, Steven Lee Meyers, “Putin Orders Pipeline Near Lake Baikal t
8. 2006),http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/26/news/baikal.php, a
2006),http://www.templetonthorp.com/en/news1196.
“China, Russia to Jointly Develop Oil Fields in Siberia,” Xinhua (September 2
Project Underway,” China Daily (September 24, 2001) in FBIS-CPP20010924
9. 2001) in Alexander's 6(20) (October 24, 2001), which reported the pipeline
is in “China Voices Confidence Over Sino-Russian Oil Pipeline Plans,” Agence
in Frank Ching, “Trouble in the Pipeline,” South China Morning Post (Septem
This rather confusing situation is explored in Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Ko
10.
are on p. 164.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, quoted in “Russian PM Says 3–4 M
CEP20030924000005; “Oil Pipeline to China ‘Extremely Advantageous and P
amounts as 1.8 million tons in 2003 and “six million tons of oil within the ne
11. Interfax(September 22, 2003) in FBIS-CEP20030922000065, for Yukos CEO
annum by 2005; this proved to be wishful thinking by Yukos, China's primar
Moscow and Beijing about future economic relations. The 2006 report is in “
2006) inAlexander's 11(21) (November 9, 2006).
“Chinese Leader to Bring $4 Billion in Deals,” The St. Petersburg Times (Mar
Exports to China Down 8.9 Percent on Year January to June,” TASS (July 12,
12.
nav03=62570&nav02=58139&nav01=57272. Rosneft's role is described
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=
13. “Dispute between Russian Suppliers May Delay ROK's Import of Siberian Gas
“Russian GazProm Gas Company Opens Office in Beijing,” ITAR-TASS (Mosco
14. Enterprises,” ITAR-TASS (August 24, 2001), in Alexander's 6(18) (Septemb
developing natural gas infrastructure, a “full-scale strategic partnership.”
15. “Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Russian Federation,” Xinhua (Decembe
“Japan Lobbies for Siberian Pipeline,” Associate Press (June 26, 2003) in Ale
16.
20, 2003) in Alexander's 8(14) (July 10, 2003).
17. “Sino-Russian Joint Statement” (March 26, 2007), paragraph 9, http://ww
“Russia and China May Ink Oil Pipe Deal Next Month,” Reuters (November 20
18.
Pacific Daily News Summary” (November 25, 2002).
19. Huo Yongzhe, “Pipe Dream to Come True for Oil/Gas Transfer,” China Daily (B
“Special Report: Potential Russian Far East Oil Pipelines,” VIC: 12; “CNPC to
20.
2007),http://www.upstreamline.com/incoming/article138127.ece.
A good summary of this imbroglio is in “Russia's Potential Far East Pipelines,
2003),http://www.oilandgasinternational.com/departments/develop
have appeared on these pipeline negotiations. See, for instance, Varvara Ag
3, in FBIS-CEP20021024000180; “Russian Minister Views Political Aspect of
21. May Approve Adding Japan to Sino-Russian Oil Pipeline,” China Daily (March
Kyodo News(January 30, 2003), http://www.asia.news.hahoo.com/030
Politics,” Neftegaz.RU(December 24, 2002) in Alexander's 8(2) (January 24
Russia's high prices and China's demands for a share in Siberian oilfields.” Th
(March 18, 2003), despite this article's misleading title.
“Japan Ready to Offer Easy-Term Loan for Russia's Oil Pipeline,” Kyodo Tsush
22. these numbers as $4 billion for the pipeline and $7.54 billion for oil field dev
(August 8, 2003).
23. “Japan May Invest in Russia's Far Eastern Oil Projects,” RosBusiness Consulti
Ching, “Trouble in the Pipeline.” Also see Anatoly Medetsky, “Pacific Pipe Fa
24. 5,http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/04/11/042.html
begin construction, due to “insufficient current oil reserves.”
Several cost estimates have been made; these numbers are typical and com
25.
(January 21, 2003), www.jamestown.org.
Zhang Zhiheng, CCP Secretary in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, quoted in “C
26.
These security concerns are addressed at length in Peter S. Goodman, “A P
Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare forecasts a 2050 population of
27. population in 2050 is estimated by its National Population and State Family
(http://www.cpirc.org.cn/en/eindex.htm; also see “Data: Population G
Huang Yan, president of PetroChina, quoted in “PetroChina May Invest in Ru
28.
“China Fears Russia Will Not Meet Oil Export Commitment,” Moscow Interfax
In June 2007, for instance, the Chairman of Gazprom, Aleksandr Ananenkov
29. instead of 2011. He is quoted by the BBC in “Russia-China Pipeline Project C
clearest explanation of the on-again, off-again Siberian project is in Erica D
December 2006): 34–35.
A 2008 completion date for this section of pipeline is given by Moscow in “Fi
30. 2005),http://pipeliners.blogspot.com/2005/05/first-section-of-east
2007),http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?na
31. “Western China Crude Pipeline Starts Pumping,” CNPC announcement report
32. See “China Sets Route for Second West-East Natural Gas Pipeline,” Xinhua (
33. Numbers are in “China and India Are Courting Myanmar's Energy Supplies,”
34. Ibid. Also see “Construction of China-Myanmar [Burma] Oil Pipeline Expecte
“Asian Countries Agree on Coordinated Response to Oil Supply Emergency,”
five nations, plus ten international organizations; thirteen states agreed to f
35. Press(Tokyo) (September 22, 2002) in FBIS-JPP20020922000059. A useful c
is provided in “China-ASEAN Energy Relations,” China Institute of the Univer
nav03=43616&nav02=43096&nav01=42792.
36. “Natural Gas Pipeline From Sumatra to Singapore Completed,” Kyodo News (
37. Quoted in “Indonesia Inaugurates Trans-Asian Pipeline Grid,” EnergyReview.
Datuk Halim Shafie, Secretary General of the Energy, Communications and M
38. (June 24, 2003), in Alexander's 8(14) (July 10, 2003). Also see “Malaysia t
plan is in “ASEAN Plans Three Gas Pipeline Routes,” Gas Processors Report (J
Thai Energy Minister Prommin Lertsuridej, quoted in “Japan Interested to Ba
39. The most complete description of the TAGP project is probably that at http:/
6378b383d52c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f8025a1-9c8c
40. “ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding on the Trans–ASEAN Gas Pipeline Pr
See, for instance, “Creation of ASEAN Gas Center Expected to Take Off in 20
41.
Manning, The Asian Energy Factor (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 113.
42. “Southeast Asia Needs $180 Billion Investments to Develop Its Energy Secto
43. “Nacap Completes Second Indonesian Gas Pipeline,” Pipeline and Gas Journa
44. Ibid.
45. “Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline – Just a Pipe Dream?”, http://www.usembass
46. “Singapore: Country Analysis,” EIA (July 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/
47. Information in this and preceding paragraphs is from the EIA, http://www
Completion of significant domestic pipeline systems, as well as that linking I
athttp://www.pgn.co.id/ebhtml/pgnportal/about_pgn/profile_new.
48.
“Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors, Pro
RRP.pdf.
49. See status reported at http://www.dmf.go.th/bid19/annaul/08.asp.
Thailand's domestic and international pipeline plans are discussed at http://
50. DOC.
“Thailand: Natural Gas,” EIA (April 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme

51. Journal Online (June 22, 2007) in Alexander's 12(14) (June 27, 2007).
52. “Thailand: Energy Profile,” Spero News (April 3, 2007), http://www.spero

53. “Energy Strategy: Energy for Thailand's Competitiveness,” http://www.ep
Franz Schurmann, “China's Demand for Oil May Make Thailand Canal a Rea
54.
article_id=101ae63ff6a8d30bad62a31cf1624d27.
The SELB is discussed in detail by Moon Bae-lee, “Study on Stability and S
55. 2005),http://cerna.keei.re.kr/nea/e_publications.nsf/b4d31c71f8be
The Thai version is described by the Ministry of Energy at http://www.ene
56. “Thailand in Brief: 2005,” Thai Embassy (Canberra) Paper (August 10, 2005)
57. Phar Kim Beng, “China Mulls Pipelines in Myanmar, Thailand,” AsiaTimes Onli
“Construction of China-Myanmar Pipeline to Start This Year,” Asia Pulse Pte L
58. will link the Andaman Sea port of Sittwe with Kunming, capital of China's Yu
Pipeline to be Constructed This Year,” zoomchina.com (March 27, 2007) in
“Malaysian Oil Pipeline Would Bypass Sea Path,” International Herald Tribune
59.
Strait,”Oil and Gas Journal (July 18, 2007) in Alexander's 12(15) (August 2
“China Gives Green Light to Myanmar Oil Pipeline,” AFP (April 18, 2006), ht
60. see David Fulbrook, “China to Europe via a New Burma Road,” AsiaTimes On
China's renewal and expansion of the old Burma Road, greatly facilitating co
61. “Australia: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.d
62. “Bangladesh: Country Profile,” EIA (July 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/
63. Energy Secretary A.M.M. Nasir Uddin, quoted in “Bangladesh Plans Two Unde
“India Believes Proposed IPI Gas Pipeline Is Feasible,” Dow Jones & Co. (Apri
64. operational by 2012. World Bank funding for the IPI, “notwithstanding U.S. r
2007) in Alexander's 12(10) (May 31, 2007).
“Pakistan Asks Russian Companies to Build Iran-India Pipeline” (April 13, 20
65. Economy” (April 20, 2007), www.iii.co.uk/AssociatedPress, in Alexande
pipeline proposal from Washington and Beijing.
“Breakthrough in IPI Pipeline Contract,” business-standard.com (June 29,
had been agreed to, but then reported that other parameters remained unre
66.
2006),http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/28/top2.htm; “U.S. Repeats O
24, 2007); and “Draft Agreement Wording Puts IPI Pipeline Deal in Doubt,”
“India Says IPI Gas Pipeline Project Will Not Be Jettisoned,” Aki/Asian Age (M
67. headway” because of differences with Pakistan. Also see “India to Focus on O
inAlexander's 12(9) (May 10, 2007).
Kushal Jeena, “India Revives TAPI Gas Pipeline,” UPI EnergyWatch (Novemb
68.
Included in TAPI Gas Pipeline Project,” http://www.keralanext.com (May
69. “Work on TAPI Gas Pipeline to Be Accelerated,” UPI (November 26, 2006) in
70. “Myanmar Prefers China to India for Gas Deal,” Times of India (April 9, 2007
investments in Burmese energy resources, will lose control of natural gas th
Vice-Senior General Maung Aye, quoted in “Gas for India Only if Reserves Pe
71.
1/2007/January/Gas_pipeline/, and “Myanmar-India Gas Pipeline Shelv
“Myanmar Confirms Plan to Export Natural Gas to Yunnan, China,” Asia Bulle
72.
2007),http://story.asiabulletin.com/index.php/ct/q/cid/4a8b544do
73. “India: Country Analysis Brief,” EIA (January 2007), http://www.eia.doe.
74. “Pakistan: Natural Gas,” EIA (December 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/
Zarar Khan, “New Pakistani Deep Sea Port Draws Mixed Reviews,” The Assoc
75. 2919897560_x.htm, provides this data, and also reports that China provid
among the local residents, for whom great economic benefits were supposed
76. “Kazakhstan: Oil,” EIA (July 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs
77. “Kazakhstan Oil Piped into China,” Xinhua (May 25, 2006), http://www.ch
78. “Pipeline Carries Kazakh Oil to China,” Xinhua (July 30, 2006), http://engl
John C.K. Daly, “Kazakhstan Inks Oil Pipeline Agreement with China,” The E
79.
Foundation,http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?vol
80. “Kazakhstan and China to Complete Feasibility Study of Pipeline in 2007,” Ka
81. “Kazakh Oil Coup for China, India Cries Foul,” AsiaTimes Online (August 24,
Tarique Niazi, “China's Foot in India's Door,” Japan Focus (August 21, 2005
82.
Srivastava, “A Relationship in Nots,” AsiaTimes Online (August 24, 2005).
“China Approves Pipeline Project for Import of Turkmen Gas,” Oilnews.com
Kazakhstan Pipeline Project,” Thomson Financial (July 4, 2007) in Alexande
83.
Agreement on Direct Gas Pipeline,” kommersant.com (July 19, 2007) in Al
Russia” to supply natural gas.
Despite the report that “Kazakhstan Ready to Assist in Construction of Turkm
report that CNPC has set up a “working group to establish the Central Asia G
84.
Pipe,”Upstream (August 13, 2007), http://www.upstreamonline.com/in
through Uzbekistan: “China and Uzbekistan Discuss Gas Pipeline Route,” asia
85. Peyman Pejman, “All That Oil and Nowhere to Go,” Inter Press Service, Asia
F. William Engdahl, “China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War,” Asia Times O
Central Asia's Energy 13(5) (London: IISS, June 2007), http://www.iiss.o
86.
“LUKOIL in Offshore Deal with Turkmenistan,” China and Eurasia Forum—We
selected=Situation%20Reports&sitrep=1&id=290282.
87. Caspian Sea estimates are at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Cas
I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. William Hill, for pointing out that Azerbai
88.
as 2015.
For an overall survey of Russian natural gas exports, see Peter R. Hartley
89.
Supply: Some Implications for Japan,” Rice University, October 2004, http:/
90. Janet Xuanli Liao, “A Silk Road for Oil: Sino-Kazakh Energy Diplomacy,” Br
91. Ibid., 48.
Chapter 5
Ship units of measurement are confusing. A long ton equals 2,240 lb; a met
rather its total internal volume, with this ton a unit of internal capacity of a
1.
the ship and everything in it is the displacement, measured in long tons of 2
and Stores—but not the hull or ship structure itself.
2. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA), “World
Data is from Review of Maritime Transport, 2006 (Geneva: United Nations C
2007),http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2006_en.pdf. A somewhat
3.
Implications of the International Expansion of China's Maritime Shipping Ind
Direction for China's Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corpor
4. Data in this section is from “Review of Maritime Transport, 2006,” Report by
5. Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipp
6. Ibid., Table 5, p. 18, does not differentiate between steam and coking coal.
See H.P. Wilmott, A Century of Sea Power: Volume I, 1900–1922 (Bloomin
7.
carried “three-fifths, perhaps as much as two-thirds, of all seaborne trade.”
8. Just 476 ships (of more than 1,000 tons displacement); see the CIA World F
9. UNCTAD, Table 16, p. 33. While U.S. citizens own these ships, most operate
10. UNCTAD, 13.
11. Ibid., 17 (also see Table 5, p. 18).
Speech by Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the Internation
12.
topic_id=847&doc_id=3624.
13. “Asian Shipyards Experience Boom,” Lloyd's List (October 18, 2005), http://
14. “China's Shipbuilding Industry Sees Rapid Growth,” Xinhua (August 31, 2006
15. “China to Produce Five More LNG Tankers to Cope with Rising Import Deman
16. The U.S.-built Nimitz-class; CVN-21 (USS Gerald R. Ford), now under constr
17. See Noel Mostert, Supership (New York: Penguin, 1976) for a fascinating a
18. Described at “Knock Nevis/ex-Jahr. Viking,” GlobalSecurity.org (November
See the discussion by Martin Stopford on tanker investment at http://www
19. section=&news_id=24612&title=Newbuilding+Prices+%96+Where+
market is provided by the International Association of Independent Tanker O
The reader is reminded that gross tonnage is not weight but rather a measu
20.
deductions for exempt spaces such as living quarters measured in hundreds
21. Reported in “China's Shipbuilding Industry Sees Rapid Growth,” Xinhua (Aug
This and preceding data are from the Institute of Shipping Economics and Lo
22.
2004,http://www.isl.org/products_services/publications/samples/C
See “World Tanker Fleet,” Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics (ww
23. 2VAJ:www.isl.org/infoline/index.php%3Fname%3DUpDownload%2
Tankers are scrapped when no longer capable of efficient operation. These n
24. International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulation, December 2003.
25. The double-hull requirement and implementation progress is available on th
26. This information is from “The State of the Industry,” The International Assoc
27. “Orimulsion” is a trade-marked product registered to Petroleos de Venezuela
Wenren Jiang, “China’ Energy Engagement with Latin America,” China Brie
28.
articleid=2373211.
29. “China and Venezuela Sign $11 Bn Oil Deal,” PetroleumWorld.com, in Ale
Tanker data in this section is from Christel Heideloff, Reinhard Monden, a
30.
ISL,http://www.isl.org/products_services/publications/pdf/COMM_
LNG characteristics and potential as a terrorist target are described in Eben
31.
2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/.
See “LNG Tanker History,” Global Security.org (June 9, 2006), http://ww
different units of measurement by different organizations and researchers. F
32.
trillion cubic feet (tcf). When referring to the capacity of LNG carriers, LNG u
natural gas, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
33. Ibid.
34. Data from http://www.worldcoal.org/pages/content/index.asp?Page
35. See information at http://www.ts1.u.se/uhdsg/Popular/CoalBasics.p
David Laque, “China Begins Building Out Its Supertanker Fleet,” Internation
36.
article_id=14399&topicID=63.
37. Author's interviews with senior energy industry representatives: Newport, R
Chapter 6
Technically, an illegal act—theft or assault, for instance—must occur in intern

1. qualify as an act of piracy. In Southeast Asia, almost all such crimes are com
sovereign waters and hence technically do not qualify as “piracy.”
Kuen-chen Fu, “Regional Cooperation for Conservation and Management of
Resources in the South China Sea,” in John Wong, Zou Keyuan, Zeng Hua
2.
China-ASEAN Relations: Economic and Legal Dimensions (Hackensack, NJ: W
2006): 220–221.
Cornelia Dean, “Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish Species,” New York Time
3.
2006).
Fu, “Regional Cooperation for Conservation and Management of Fishery Reso
4.
South China Sea,” 222.
Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipp
5.
Safe,” Foreign Affairs 86(3) (May/June 2007): 8.
6. This author is not related to the U.S. warship's namesake.
al-Qaeda's role in these attacks is discussed in Eric Watkins, “Landscape of
Alliances,” Terrorism Monitor 2(7) (Jamestown Foundation, April 8,
2004),http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?
volume_id=400&issue_id=2933&article_id=23672. Also see Raphael
7.
O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congre
DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 30, 2001), which descri
“heightened state of readiness against terrorist attack,” but also notes the w
status.
These attacks are described in Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in
Naval War College Review 58(4) (Autumn 2005): 71. Banlaoi also categorize
8.
unconvincingly—terrorist kidnappings among various Philippine and other So
islands as maritime terrorism.
Anthony Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organi
9.
Intelligence Review 16(6) (June 1, 2004): 2.
Jeremy Zakis and Steve Macko, “Major Terrorist Plot in Singapore Discove
Believed Well Established in the Asian Region,” EmergencyNet News Service
Emergency Response & Research Institute) (January 7, 2002),
http://www.emergency.com/2002/Singapore_terror02.htm, reporte
fifteen would-be terrorists, some of whom had attended al-Qaeda training ca
10. whom were serving in the Singapore military; thirteen individuals were arre
Malaysian government. The number of arrested terrorists in Singapore and M
to thirty-six by the end of 2002; thirty-one of these were identified as belon
to the Mindinao-based MILF (“Terrorist Cells: How Could This Happen in Sing
Analysis (Australian National University) October 2002,
http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=55
“Co-Chair's Report,” ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Maritime Security,
11.
September 14–22, 2004: Agenda I.
12. The CSI is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
A brief but useful history of piracy in the South China Sea is provided by Xu
13. Cooperation Dilemma: ASEAN and China,” in Wong, Zou, and Zeng, China-AS
75–78.
Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organization”; als
Piracy Attacks Surge to New Heights, Indonesia Worst,” Associated Press (Oc
14. http//www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?
fileid=20031030162652&irec=2. The other high-profile piracy area is off
Africa.
15. Patrick O’Brian, The Thirteen Gun Salute (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989):
The most comprehensive analysis of the piracy issue in the Malacca area is
Catherine Zara Raymond, and Joshua Ho, “Safety and Security in the Malacc
16. Straits: An Agenda for Action,” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Pol
(Singapore: May 2006) available
athttp://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/IDSS%20S&S
The most notorious of these was the 2004 bombing at sea of the Philippine
attack claimed by the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group but may have resulted from
operator's refusal to pay “protection money” rather than from ideological rea
incident was handled remarkably poorly by Philippine security personnel, wh
the passenger list—the individual who carried the TNT-packed box onboard t
his name a well-known terrorist nom-de-guerre. See Simon Elegant, “The
17. Sayyaf,”Time (August 23, 2004),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501040830-6
There was also at least one seaborne attack claimed by Abu Sayyaf on the M
island of Sipidan, near Borneo, that involved the kidnapping and ransoming
tourists (two Americans present were not taken) who were on the island, rep
Stier and Nelly Sindayen, “Trouble in Paradise,” TimeAsia 155(18) (May 8,
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0508/philippine.k
18. Cited in Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organiza
Jane Chan and Joshua Ho, “Report on Armed Robbery and Piracy in South
Quarter 2007,” S. Raaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore,
n.d.),http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/PDF/Armed_Robbery_and_P
19.
1stQtr07.pdf; and “No Pirate Attacks in Malacca Straits in Second Quarter
Xinhua (July 16, 2007),
http://www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6216449.htm
For a recent example, see “Malaysia against ‘Outsiders’ Policing Malacca Stra
News Service (June 14, 2007),
20. http://www.asiaobserver.com/content/view/235768/47.
The state of these negotiations is briefly described in Mark J. Valencia, “Co

21. Malacca and Singapore Straits: A Glass Half-Full,” Policy Forum Online 06-10
12, 2006), http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/06103Valencia.ht
“IMB Conference Addresses Piracy Concerns,” London, June 12, 2007, http:/
22.
ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=88.
“IMB Launches Maritime Security Hotline,” ICC Commercial Crime Services,
23.
2007), http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=90.
See “The Roles of the ReCAPP Information Sharing Center,” Report of the Six
Annual Meeting on Piracy and Maritime Security” (Kuala Lumpur, June 18, 2
24.
athttp://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0508/philippine.kidnappin
description of ISC activities and procedures.
25. This section on piracy draws heavily on Davis.
Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:
26. Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” Congressional Research Service (CRS
32758(Washington, DC, September 26, 2005): 15–16.
“Navies Join Forces to Tackle Malacca Pirates,” The Age (August 3, 2004),
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/07/20/1090089155500.h
27.
“Malaysia Says It Has Not Found Link between Terrorists and Regional Piracy
6, 2005), http://asia.news.yahoo.com/050605/3/21zn8.html.
“Malaysia, U.S. Sign Treaty to Fight Terrorism, Corruption,” Agence France-P
28.
28, 2006), http://www.sg.news.yahoo.com/060728/1/42f11.html.
Vivian L. Forbes and Encik Mokhzani Zubir, “Ensuring Security in the Ma
Solutions Offered and Suggested Implementation,” paper presented at the M
Conference, Langkawi, Malaysia (December 2005),
http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/LIMA05/forbe
present.pdf. Thailand joined air patrols in 2005 but as of March 2007 had y
29.
surface patrols. See “Four SE Asian Nations Launch Joint Patrols Over Malac
RadioAustralia (September 13,
2005),http://www.abc.net.au/ra/news/stories/s1459631.htm, and “
to Join Malacca Strait Security Maintenance Scheme,” People's Daily Online (
2007),http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/31/eng20070331_
See Stanley B. Weeks, “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and
30. Paper of the University of California Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperat
1998) at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/stm02/pp33-5.html.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the U.S. Congress following
American diplomatic recognition of “China” from Taipei to Beijing, states tha
made “upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by
31. and that any effort “to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peacefu
including by boycotts or embargoes, [would be considered] a threat to the pe
of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The T
at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Ac
See Mark J. Valencia, “China and the South China Sea Disputes,” Adelphi P
32. (London: IISS, February 1996) for the best explanation of the complex sove
the South China Sea.
See, for instance, “Palestinians and Al-Qaeda Bond through Ship Container”
at http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=807, and on the general iss
33.
security, see Stephen Cohen, “Boom Boxes: Shipping Containers and Terror
Paper No. 7 (October 13, 2005), http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/
See “Seafarers Identity Documents and Port Security,” ILO, at
34.
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm.
See “Hu Jintao Meets with Botswana and Sudanese Presidents,” Statement o
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (November 2, 2006)
athttp://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t279647.htm; Chinese President
35.
credited with more critical remarks in “China's Hu Discusses Darfur Crisis wi
President,”International Herald Tribune (Asia-Pacific) (November 2, 2006) at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/02/asia/AS_GEN_China_
115 Bbbls, according to “Infoplease,” at
36. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0872964.html, trailing only Saudi A
and Iran.
“Africa Accounts for 30 Percent of China's Oil Imports,” Xinhua (October 19,
37.
http://english.people.com.cn/200610/19/eng20061019_313219.htm
Chapter 7
A detailed list is provided in John Garofano, “Flexibility or Irrelevance: Way

1.
21(21) (April 1989): 80–81.
“Moscow Takes Assertive Stance in Kuriles Dispute,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioL
2.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/09/1fc097de-54d8-4efd
3. One fathom equals six feet, or 1.83 meters.
The 100 fathom figure was provided to the author by a senior U.S. submarin
training for U.S. prospective submarine commanding officers in Arnold Lotr
4. Better,” Undersea Warfare 2(1) (Fall
1999),http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_5/
firings in shallow waters (25–50 fathoms).”
UNCLOS, Article 76; it may be found at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/c
5.
also see the explanation athttp://www.unclosnz.org.nz/naturalprolong
See Jon M. Van Dyke, “The Republic of Korea's Maritime Boundaries,” Willia
6.
Manoa) paper, n.d., athttp://www.hawaii.edu/elp/publications/faculty
Peter Dutton, “Carving Up the East China Sea,” Naval War College Review 6
7.
explanation of this Sino-Japanese dispute.
Mari Iwata, “Co-Development is an Option in China-Japan Gas Row,” Dow Jon
8. (June 29, 2007),http://www.gasandol.com/goc/news/nts72649.htm
Struggle to Resolve Gas Dispute,” Agence France-Presse (AFP) (June 26, 200
Many nations expressed written reservations when signing/ratifying the UNC
9.
matched Beijing's concerns.
10. The UNCLOS definition of the Continental Shelf in Article 76 leaves much ro
China's qualifying declarations are at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention
11.
Also see Yu Hui, “Remarks on China's Ratification of the 1982 UN Conventio
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 5 (Amsterdam: Kluwer Law Interna
Recent status of these talks is provided in “China, Vietnam to Finish Demarc
12. May 18, 2007, Xinhua (Beijing),http://english.people.com.cn/200705/
referred only to the land border demarcation process; maritime boundary re
Each of the disputants has its own name for these islands; see two works by
Troubled Waters: Hydrocarbon Potential, Jurisdictional Issues, and Internatio
13.
and “China and the South China Sea Disputes,” Adelphi Paper 298 (London:
complex sovereignty issues in the South China Sea.
http://www.ciaonetorg/wps/guj01/#note34. Taiwan agrees with Chin
14.
elsewhere.
See Bernard D. Cole, Oil for the Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Sea
15.
Pacific, 2003), Ch. 3, for a discussion of exploration and negotiations in this
Ian Storey, “China and the Philippines: Moving Beyond the South China Se
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=41
Cole, Oil for the Lamps of China, Ch. 9, and “China and ASEAN Sign Spratlys
inAlexander's 7(23) (November 27, 2002), for an account of China and the
16. Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and the Philippines) s
reported in “China, Philippines, Vietnam Sign Joint South China Sea Oil Sea
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/business/2005/03/14/china_vie
the Paracel and Spratly Islands in July 2007, in Le Dzung (MOFA spokesma
Truong Sa” (July 16, 2007), http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pb
Kalinga Seneviratne, “Indonesia Tests Ties with ‘Arrogant’ Neighbor,” Asia Tim
17.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GC19Ae03.html.
“Field Listing-Disputes-International,” The CIA World Factbook, 2006 (Washi
18.
2006),http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2070.h
19. Ibid., http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/at.html.
“Malaysia, Brunei Say Nearing End to Sea Border Row,” Reuters (India) (Aug
20.
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-289689200708
The Chinese position is presented in Ju Hailong, “Can the South China Sea I
(February 1, 2007): 30–32, in “PRC Scholar Discusses South China Sea Issu
21.
1992 law is discussed in detail in Hyun-Soo Kim, “The 1992 Chinese Territo
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43(4) (October 1994): 894–90
SEATO followed the signing of the 1954 Manila Pact, which remains in force;
22.
it signed with Australia and the United States in 1951.
Chapter 8
Hugo Grotius, Freedom of the Seas or the Right That Belongs to the Dutch
1. of the 1633 Latin text by Ralph van Deman Magoffin, edited with an introdu
Press, 1916; reprinted in 2001).
Ken Booth, quoted in Dick Sherwood, “Oceans Governance and Its Impact on
2.
(eds.), Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy (St. Leonard's, NSW, Aust
Any discussion of maritime strategy must begin with mention of Dr. John Hat
“The Conceptual Foundations for Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century,” pap
3.
Naval Co-operation on August 9, 1994, at Nassau Centre, Cape Town, South
Africa,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/ADR18/Hattendorf.html.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” Naval
Defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (in J1-02: Dictionary of Military a
5. some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, o
and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to d
Mahan's book was republished by Dover Publishers of New York in 1987; Cor
6.
(Annapolis, MD, 1988).
A reading of the writings of Mahan and Corbett is enriched by reading Philip
Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclea
Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proce
7.
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993)
From the Writings of Rear AdmiralAlfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis, MD: Na
on maritime strategy by Colin Gray and Jon Tsumida.
Quoted in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
8.
University Press, 1977): 175.
9. Discussed in Crowell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 451.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–178
10.
published in Boston by Little, Brown in 1890.
For a more thorough, intellectually rigorous view of Mahan's theories, see Jo
11.
Command: The Classic Works ofAlfred Thayer MahanReconsidered (Washin
The Nelson quote is in a “Memorandum,” dated October 9, 1805, which may
12.
http://www.wtj.com/archives/nelson/1805_10c.htm.
13. Julian C. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longman's, 191
14. “Imperial Mahan,” Time (May 1, 1939), http://www.time.com/time/mag
Vladimir Lenin, cited in Bruce W. Watson, “The Evolution of Soviet Naval S
15.
Future of the Soviet Navy: An Assessment to the Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: W
Cited in James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Japanese Maritime Thou
16.
(June 2006): 27.
17. Yamamoto later served as Navy Minister during the 1904–1905 war with Ru
John Curtis Perry, “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval P
18. http://www.jstor.org/view/00270741/di995012/99p0262f/11?
frame=noframe&userID=c64c5907@ndu.edu/01cce4405f00501c219
Akihiko Tanaka, “Japan as a Maritime State in the 21st Century,” Keynote Ad
19. “Foreign Policy of Japan as a Maritime State in the 21st Century” (Tokyo, Feb
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/symposium/outline0102.h
20. Panel Discussion at MOFA conference.
Usually described as a factor in economic development; see Barry Eichengr
21. Growth,” Foreign Affairs 77(2) (March/April 1998) at fareviewessay1379/bar
economic-growth.html.
I am indebted here to the article by Holmes and Yoshihara, “Japanese Mariti
22.
17,000 miles of coastline, in comparison to India (4,600 miles), China (11,0
23. At http://www.fas.org/news/japan/b06071997_bt295-97.htm.
“New Maritime Laws Well Overdue,” The Yomiuri Shimbu, Tokyo (April 21, 20
24.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20070421TDY04005.htm.
See John Chan, “Tensions between Japan and South Korea Heighten Over I
25.
athttp://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/may2006/japa-m03.shtml.
26. Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Web site: “Intelligence Resource Pro
Verbatim at “President's Web Page,” quoted in “Navy-South Korea,” GlobalSe
27.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/navy.htm.
Described in Yoo Jae Kun, “Korea's Management of Defense Budget and the
28. at Phuket, Thailand (September 2, 2006) at http://www.parliament.go.t
PHPSESSID=3ea390f740f4a4a9089ce271ff230f48.
29. Admiral Song Young-moo, “Inauguration Address” (November 17, 2007),
Quoted in Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, and Lyle Goldstein, “
30. paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Ass
Chinese language sources and is currently the clearest exposition on its subj
31. Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century (Aldersho
32. See Desmond Ball, “Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Interna
Chen Wanjun, “Interview with Sr. Capt. Yu Guoquan (Director of Division of
33.
Zhishi (Beijing) no. 7 (July 1995): 2–3, in FBIS-CST-96-014, p. 54.
Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, “On Maritime Strategy and the Marine En
34.
Science] 2 (May 20, 97): 81–92, in FBIS-CHI-97-19.
Quoted in China's Navy 2007 (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence,
35. PLAN's role in China's military strategic tenet of “active defense;” the navy—
to launch offensive (i.e., active) operations in defense of China's interests. I
Quoted in “Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng on China's Offshore Defense Str
36.
FBIS-CPP20020824000062. It is not always clear in this report when Shi wa
37. “Taiwan” is used to include the other islands controlled by Taipei, such as Jin
38. Cited in Euan Graham, Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004 (London: Ro
39. Ibid., 207.
Cited in several reports, including Wen Han, “Hu Jintao Urges Breakthrough
40.
2004) in FBIS-CPP20040114000049.
Potential PLAN defense of the SLOCs is examined in David Zweig and Bi Ji
(September/October 2005): 34ff. Also see Ji Guoxing, “SLOC Security in th
41.
Security Studies (Honolulu, HI, February 2002) at http://community.mid
SLOC%20Security%20in%20/OpSloc.htm.
See Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's S
42.
2007): 7–13, for a clear explanation of these facts.
Eric A. McVadon, “U.S.-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Ha
2007),http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=
security think-tank asserted to this author [McVadon] in April that China is l
PLAN. He noted, however, that the task is too large for the PLAN and even fo
be required. (This unprecedented statement interestingly implies that the U.
prospective disrupter of oil flow to China.) Aware of U.S. Chief of Naval Oper
43.
commander Wu Shengli for China to join the “Thousand-Ship Navy”—a freef
chairman offered two minor caveats with respect to initiating exercises and o
favor beginning bilaterally, and then perhaps folding in Japan and South Kor
cooperate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operations would be a ste
By and large, the invitation seems to have been well received by the Chines
pending further discussion.”
44. Quoted in Crowell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 477.
See, for instance, Simon Montlake, “Hard Time for Pirates in Busy World W
athttp://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1030/p01s04-woap.html; and J
45.
Singapore,” Bernama (November 29, 2006) at http://www.bernama.com
“Pirates Not Having It All Their Own Way On the World's High Seas,” Taipei T
Taiwan agrees with China's claims. For a useful description of the claims situ
46.
Law, Military Law, and National Development (NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin
Both nations, but especially Indonesia, have disagreed with certain tenets of
47. States.” The full text of the UNCLOS may be found at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclo
Articles 49–54 all apply to the issue of archipelagic passages. Still germane
straits is John H. Noer, with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Econom
48.
Defense University (NDU) Press in cooperation with the Center for Naval An
Pub. 151, 10th ed. (Bethesda, MD: National Imagery and Mapping Agency (N
Cited in Kwa Chong Gwan, “Singapore,” in Positioning Navies for the Future
49.
Conference 2004 (Sydney, Australia: Halstead Press, 2004).
50. Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “New Policy Directions Announced,” Asian Ana
2007),http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?article
Naziry Khalid, “Maritime Economic Activities: Planning Toward Sustainable
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 2001),http://www.mima.gov/my/mima/htmls
51.
see Iskandar Sazlan Mohd Salleh and Captain Mat Taib Yassin, “Southe
Perspectives and Recent Developments,” Maritime Studies (137) (July/Augus
LTG Teerawat Putamanonda, “The Strategy of Conflict: A Royal Thai Army
52. National Defense University, Washington DC, n.d.,http://www.ndu.edu/in
%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch11.
Preap Prisey, “Hun Sen and the Upcoming Negotiations on the Border Issu
53.
Information Center (October 29, 2005),http://www.cambodia.org/blogs
Discussion of Australia's maritime strategy draws on Alex Tewes, Laura Ra
54. the 21st Century,” Australian Parliamentary Library Research Brief, no. 4, 20
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb04.htm.
Cited in Patrick Walters, “Australia Looks to Future Wars,” The Australian (
55.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21756162-3
“The Cost of Defense: ASPI's Defense Budget Brief,” Australian Strategic Poli
56. aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?
prod=82670&session=dae.27311983.1183301754.6MNNaX8AAAEAA
57. Ibid.
Quoted in C. Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker Than Oil,” in
58.
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 200
Mihir Roy, “Maritime Security in Southwest Asia,” Speech at the Society for
59. paper.pdf. Also see “Shaping India's Maritime Opportunities & Challenges,”
2005, http://indiannavy.nic.in/cns_add2.htm.
See, for instance, “Terror At Sea: Joint India-Russia Exercise to Help Weed T
www.dailyindia.com/show/137206.php; “Trilateral Naval Exercise in Pa
http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/17/stories/2007041703491300.h
60. U.S.,” AFP (New Delhi) (March 29, 2007),
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Indian_Plans_Naval_Wargames
Korea to Hold Joint Naval Exercise,” OutlookIndia.com (New Delhi) (May 3
gid=73&id=477589.
See reports at http://www.ipcs.org/India_articles2.jsp?
61. prtal=india&keyWords=EXTERNAL&action=showView&kValue=2361
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/article/4a.htm.
See Sudha Ramachandran, “India's Quiet Sea Power,” Asia Times (August 2,
62. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IH02Df01.html, for the
in the western Indian Ocean.
“Indian Warships Ready to Head to West Asia,” Times of India (August 1, 200
63.
http://timesofindia.com/India/Indian_warships_ready_to_head_to_W
Quoted in “India Unveils Blueprint for Indian Ocean Dominance,” Defense Ne
http://www.ocean.com/category.asp?CatID=148&locationid=6&tab
64. xfile=;data/subcontinent/2005/December/subcontinent_December6
Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi, India: ICW-Institute for D
See the op-ed, “Maritime Security: Evolve Holistic Policy,” The Tribune (New
65.
newsbehindnews.com/mycgi/asianewsagency/editorials/article/42
Aziz is quoted in “Maritime Deterrence,” The Nation on Web (March 9, 2005)
66.
2005/9/editorials3.php.
Raja R. Nawaz, “Maritime Strategy in Pakistan,” master's thesis, Naval Post
67.
http://www.stormingmedia.us/05/0589/A058924.html.
Tarique Niazi, “The Strategic Implications of the Baloch Insurgency,” James
68.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2
Raheel Junejo, “Pakistan Would Not Allow the Domination of the Indian Oce
69.
http://pakistantimes.net/2005/03/08/top5.htm.
Naval Operations Concept 2006 (U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps publication, 2
70.
filesource=c:%5CMCWL_Files%5CC_P%5CNOC%20FINAL%2014%2
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed in 1979, does not guarantee but imp
71.
may be found athttp://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_R
Probably first described by Admiral Michael Mullen, in an address at the Nav
72.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=2.
73. See comments at http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/07_Jun/web_
See Admirals John Morgan, Jr., and Charles Martoglio, “Global Maritime
74.
athttp://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,81652,00.html.
Chapter 9
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, I
and Security, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of
2007): Appendix, n.p., lists data for 2004 in US$ billion as U.S.-465, China-6
Japan-45.1, and India-19.6. This data should be treated as approximate, giv
1.
categorization used by the different countries. As good case can be made, fo
U.S. defense budget is actually double the amount provided by the Defense
costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are included; a similar multiplier a
applies to the Chinese defense budget.
A version of the Aegis system has also been furnished to Spain and Norway;
2. Australia will soon receive the system, while Great Britain, France, Russia, a
developing similar systems.
Unless otherwise specified, ship specifics used in this chapter are from Steph
3. Jane's Fighting Ships, 2005–2006 (London: Jane's Information Group, 2006)
(ed.), Combat Fleets of the World, 2005–2006 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval In
A good explanation of AIP technology is provided in Richard Scott, “Boostin
of the Non-Nuclear Submarine,” Jane's International Defense Review 32 (Nov
4.
50. Also see Carl O. Schuster and Erik R. Henderson, “AIP Primer,” Cubic
Center (April 4, 2005) at http://www.vic.distributor@vic-info.org.
The Canadian, South Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, Singapore, Brunei, Indone
5. Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Pakistani, Omani, Kuwaiti, and Bahrain nav
with some form of “link” capability, but they are not all necessarily compatib
See report of this incident, with charts and pictures, at
6. http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2003/special01/01_
andhttp://gunnzihyouronn.web.fc2.com/kousaku/kousakusenn.htm
For instance, see “Indian, Japanese Coast Guard Vessels Hold Joint Exercise,
(September 11, 2000)
athttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/09/print20011
Multinational exercises in Hong Kong's waters are described in James C. Wo
SAREX,” at http://forum.apan-info.net/summer99web/hksarex.html,
7.
exercise, and at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/pas_pr_200610260
2006 event. Most significant is the September 2007 “Malabar XII” exercise,
hosted conventionally and nuclear-powered ships from Australia, Japan, Sing
United States. See “India to Hold Biggest Ever Naval Exercise in Bay of Beng
13, 2007) at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00120070713
8. Author's conversation with U.S. Naval Attache to Japan and JMSDF officers,
A description of the JCG's developing role and equipment is provided in Rich
9. Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca,
University Press, 2007): 77–80.
Author's participation in pertinent discussions in the mid-1980s with senior U
10. officers. U.S. naval commanders thought the ROKN should focus on surface
capabilities, as well as on surface forces dedicated to combating possible Nor
aggression.
11. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 442.
Ibid., 429. The Romeos, most at least thirty years old, are a mix of Russian,
12.
Korean construction.
13. Ibid., 433–434.
A fuller discussion of the PLAN is provided in Bernard D. Cole, The Great W
14.
Navy Enters the 21st Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
Ming hull number 361 suffered a catastrophic engineering casualty in 2003 t
15.
its entire crew.
Author's discussion with James C. Bussert, a sonar expert who identified TS
2255 sonars in the Songs; see his “Chinese Naval Sonar Evolves From Forei
Magazine (December 2002) at
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_T
articleid=279&zoneid=73. Among the many reports of German-designed
Songs are Bussert, “Chinese Submarines Pose a Double-Edged Challenge,” S
16. (December
2003),http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Art
articleid=93&zoneid=22; Richard Fisher, Jr., “How May Europe Strength
Military,”International Assessment and Strategy Center 915 (January 2005),
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.61/pub_detail.asp
Class,” GlobalSecurity.org(November 15, 2006),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/song.htm.
A U.S. submariner described the Han's noise level to the author as “like two
17.
inside a tin can.”
Author's discussion with North Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff in May 2000. T
18. headquartered at Ningbo, in Zhejiang Province just south of Shanghai and th
headquartered at Zhanjiang, in Guangdong Province across from Hainan Isla
The best account of China's attempts to sea-base nuclear armed missiles rem
19. Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower (Stanford, CA: St
Press, 1984).
See, for instance, Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and
the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2005): 188. This is a “soft” number, h
many factors, including the amount and type of cargo to be carried by emba
duration and distance of the embarkation, and other factors. The LSTs and L
20. land troops during an opposed assault; the troop transports are more likely
administratively offload troops, pier-side. Also, during an amphibious assault
and LSMs would carry predominantly cargo—such as supplies and vehicles—
troops; others might be loaded only with troops.
See Wertheim, Combat Fleets of the World, 2005—2006, 118–119. The LPD
21. Amphibious Transport Dock 071 LPD” (November 14, 2006) at http://www
defense.com/forum/index.php?showforum=4.
22. Author's conversation with senior PLA officers (2006).
See Wang Shi K’o, “Cross-Strait Underwater Warfare: A Comparison of Mine
23. Minesweeping Strength,” Ch’uan-ch’iu Fang-wei Tsa-chih [Defense Internatio
FBIS-CPP20060504103001 (May 4, 2006).
For the B-6, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59(6) (November/December 2003): 77–
80,http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd03norris.
designation for B-6, that is, H-6, this article states, “Although increasingly o
strike bomber, the H-6 may gain new life as a platform for China's emerging
capability. The naval air force has used the H-6 to carry the C-601/Kraken a
missile for more than 10 years, and Flight International reported in 2000 th
24. would be modified to carry four new YJ-63 land-attack cruise missiles.” Also
athttp://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Badger.html. For the FB-7, see “J
Fighter-Bomber] [FB-7]/FBC-I,” Globalsecurity.org (April 27, 2005)
athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ china/jh-7.htm: “Ch
developing an improved version of the FB-7. The twin-engine FB-7 is an all-
medium-range fighter-bomber with an anti-ship mission. Improvements to t
include a better radar, night attack avionics, and weapons.” I am indebted to
for this information.
See pictures at http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/showthread.php?
25. discussion at MOSNEWS, “China Converts Russian Ship to Build Its First Airc
athttp://mosnews.com/news/2005/08/25/chinacarrier.shtml.
For instance, see “Senior Military Officer: China to Develop Its Own Aircraft
Wei Po (Hong Kong) (March 10, 2006) in FBIS: CPP20060310508004, and “
26. Procure 50 SU-33 Carrier-Borne Fighters from Russia,” Sankei Shimbun (No
U.S. Pacific Command Virtual Intelligence Center (VIC) Web site, November
atwww.vic-info.org.
27. John Moore (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1980–81 (London: Jane's Publishin
28. Briefing presented by U.S. Coast Guard Office of International Affairs (June
Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1999–2000 (London: Jane's Pu
144–146. See “State to Set Up 200,000-Strong Maritime Cruise Unit,” Xinhu
1996) in FBIS-CHI-96-236, for a report of a 200,000-man “maritime cruise
1996, to be manned by reservists and to assume coastal defense duties. A m
“Linhai City of Zhejiang Sets Up Sea-Borne Militia Unit to Ensure Boats for C
29. Able to Come at the First Call,” Zhongguo Tongxun She (May 6, 2000) in FB
CPP20000506000062, reporting that the “province's first armed forces depa
product oceanic administration and a seaborne militia unit was set up.” The “
oceanic administration” is not further identified, but presumably part of the
Administration.
Tang Min, “PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law Praised,” China Daily (A
FBIS-CPP20000403000020, reports that the “amended Marine Environment
came into effect on April 1, 2000. The complexity of coast guard-type respon
obvious, and is shown in “State Council Forms Marine Bureau in Shenzhen,”
27, 1999) in FBIS-FTS19991227000826, which reports that the “Shenzhen
formed [to carry out] marine supervision. It combined the previous “separat
30.
departments under the Shenzhen Government and the Ministry of Communi
bureau is responsible for “managing overseas ships sailing and anchoring in
space, abiding by the related international marine treaty, maintaining order
and transportation, supervising ships anti-pollution facility, handling water p
public navigation facilities and regulating the shipping economy.” No referen
other organizations which seem to have similar responsibilities.
Text of “Marine Environmental Protection Law of the PRC,” Xinhua (Decembe
31.
FTS20000207000268.
Author's discussions with senior PLA officers (1999–2000). Also see Xinhua (
FBIS-CHI-99-0327, which reported that “a three-dimensional border and coa
32. communications network … has been completed and become operational”; X
1999) in FBIS-CHI-99-0647, discusses the command and control structure fo
this coastal defense system.
“PRC Establishes 12 State Maritime Safety Administrations,” Xinhua (Decemb
FBIS-CPP19991228001478. An article in Xinhua (June 18, 1999) in FBIS-CH
that in 1999 the MSA dealt with 1,880 safety violations and “saved the lives
people” in marine waters and on the Yangzte River. The drive to improve ma
following the disastrous passenger ferry sinking in late 1999, was also indica
Steps to Ensure Navigation Safety,” Xinhua (February 21, 2000) in FBIS-CPP
33.
Also see Guo Aibing, “Chinese Transportation Officials Urge Sea Safety Meas
(January 28, 2000) in FBIS-FTS20000128000198, for the report that in 199
died in ship or boat accidents—a 26.9 percent increase over 1998,” as the re
sunk at a cost of more than $30 million. The MSA predecessor, the “Bureau o
Superintendency,” was responsible for antipollution and SAR efforts, includin
Coordination Centers.
“PRC Will Enforce Rules on Coastal Vessels 1 May,” Xinhua (May 29, 2000) in
34.
CPP20000329000034.
35. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 303–304.
36. Author's discussions with senior Taiwan officers (2004–2007).
Author's discussion with senior Taiwan officers (2007). The navy has request
37.
resources necessary to correct these shortfalls.
38. Author's interviews with senior Philippine officers (May 2003).
39. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 932.
40. Ibid., 86.
Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and the Interior Yim S
41. “Cambodia Boosts Navy to Defend Oilfields,” Upstream (August 10,
2007)http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article138795.ece.
Jane's Fighting Ships,2004–2005 (London, UK: Jane's Information Group, 20
42. Seeks Russian Technology for Joint Arms Production,” RIA Novosti (Septembe
2007),http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070905/76881095.html.
Mark J. Valencia and Derek Johnson (eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Sta
43.
Responses (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005): 137.
SeeMarian Wilkinson, “Smugglers Paid Coast Guard, Capsize Survivor Says
44.
2005) at http://sievx.com/articles/daoed/20050521MarianWilkinson
These were launched between 2004 and 2006; all should be in commission b
45. strong resemblance to Taiwan's French-built Lafayette-class and China's Jian
The first ship was built in France and the last five in Singapore.
46. Wertheim, Combat Fleets of the World, 2005–2006, 717–719.
See the report, “Netherlands: Submarine Proliferation” (Monterey Institute o
47. Studies: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006)
athttp://www.nti.org/db/submarines/netherlands/export.html.
48. Ibid., 456.
49. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships, 2005–2006: 466.
50. Ibid., 797.
51. Ibid., 798.
52. Ibid., 45.
The author has not visited a warship in Bangladesh since 1989, but was stru
53. remains impressed by the Bangladeshi naval officers with whom he has inter
—by this professionalism.
Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, quoted in “India Aiming t
Power: Pranab,” Indo-Asian News Service (July 1,
54.
2007),http://www.ians.in/categorynewspreview.php?
topicid=6&topicname=Defence/Security.
55. Saunders, 2006–2007, 314, notes continued strong Russian influence in this
56. Ibid.
57. Two examples are the U.S. Garcia-class frigates and Soviet Sovremenny-clas
58. Saunders, 2006–2007, 333.
See description at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Dhruv#Developm
59. flights occurred in 1992.
Minister of Defense George Fernandes, quoted in “Indian Navy to Have Two

2011,” People's Daily Online (March 9,
60. 2004),http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/09/eng20040309_
Rajat Pandit, Report, Times of India (March 7, 2006). One suspects that this
up against competing Defense Ministry budgetary priorities.
Gwadar is located in Baluchistan, probably Pakistan's least stable and most s
And the port's usefulness as a petroleum-shipping facility—which represents
61.
interest—will only be meaningful if the very problematic pipeline from the C
through Iran and Pakistan to Gwadar.
Fifth Fleet Web site is at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/; also see “Fifth Fle
62.
(April 26, 2005) at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/n
Individual ship assignments to the Seventh (and other U.S.) Fleet are availa
63. aircraft carrier schedules, for instance, may be found
athttp://www.ne.jp/asahi/gonavy/atsugi/gonavy604.html.
“Asia Racing to Build Submarines,” Kyodo News, in JapanToday (May 15, 200
http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/406686, states that “18 subma
programs worth $29 billion are currently being pursued to build 83 submarin
64.
countries—China, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Pakistan,
Taiwan.” It further notes that “14 countries in the region are acquiring 151 v
antisubmarine welfare capabilities in projects worth more than $55 billion, t
Chapter 10
1. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_
2. The Commission is described at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ne
See the record of the “Nineteenth Session of the Commission on the Limits o
3. 2007” (April 27, 2007) athttp://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
OpenElement.
4. See http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html for a description of the ITLS c
ITLS Web site: http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Section II.f. A rece
authorities seized a Japanese fishing boat and crew. Moscow released the cre
5.
(see “International Court Orders Russia to Release Japanese Boat,” NHK (Au
athttp://www.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/index2.html.
6. See information at http://www.geocities.com/cdelegas/PIRACYWEBS
7. http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ is the APEC's home Web site.
Ibid. While China's dramatic economic growth during this period and the Uni
8.
in this increase, it remains impressive in view of the regional economic melt
9. See the APEC “E-Newsletter” 3 (August 2004) at http://www.apec.org/a
The STAR conference results are summarized at
10.
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups
11. Information at http://www.imo.org/Legal/mainframe.asp?topic_id=8
Apparently still pending: Chile listed Grafimar for installation between 2006
12. Plan,” presented at the APEC Counter Terrorism Task Force Meeting at Cairns
http://aimp.apec.org/Documents/2007/CTTF/CTTF3/07_cttf3_018.
13. Cited at http://www.apec.org/apec/news_media/speeches/240206_
The Statement is in an IMO report: IMO/KUL 1/4, September 20, 2006, at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1567
attendees were Australia, the Bahamas, Belgium, Brunei, China, Cyprus, De
India, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
14. Sweden, Thailand, the UK, and the United States. International organization
Shipping, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International As
Lighthouse Authorities, BIMCO, Oil Companies International Marine Forum,
Associations, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, Inter
Strait Council.
15. “International Maritime Organization Briefing 32” (September 22, 2006), ht
This information is garnered from “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact
16.
Homeland Security (DHS), at http://www.cbp.gov.
The DHS, in “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact Sheet” (March 29, 20
“approximately 90 percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo impor
prescreening,” but this figure does not match with information provided to th
17. in May 2006, who cited a figure for that port of approximately 30 percent. W
container shipping port in Asia, indeed in the world. An alternative, passive
University scientists: see John B. Stafford, “Does 1+1= terror? Using Math
3, 2006) at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2006/march8/m
See, for instance, “Palestinians and Al-Qaeda Bond through Ship Container”
18. Stephen Cohen, “Boom Boxes: Shipping Containers and Terrorists,” Researc
http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/RP7.pdf.
Author's discussion with CSI officials (2004–2006). The CSI is described at
19.
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activi
20. Found at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/en.html.
I am indebted to Chris Rahman, of the Center for Maritime Policy of the Un
me to use this information on APEC's activities described in his paper, “Intern
21.
Asia,” since published as a chapter in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Pirac
Routledge, 2007): 183–198.
Quoted in Sam Bateman, “Regional Responses to Enhance Maritime Securit
22.
Analysis XVIII(2) (Summer 2006): 36.
“Bali Concord II—Historic Step Toward Regional Integration,” Xinhua (Octobe
23.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/76827.htm.
24. The pact may be found at “ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism” at http:
Described in Desmond Ball, “Regional Maritime Security,” David Wilson an
25.
Maritime Security (St. Leonard's, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000): 72.
See the “Chairman's Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Region
26.
http://www.aseansec.org/17642.htm.
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, France, Great Britain, India, Indon
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United States,
Chiefs Urged to Share Terrorist Information,” International Herald Tribune (S
27. athttp://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/05/asia/AS-GEN-Malay
Chiefs Discuss Terror, Piracy in Inaugural KL Meet,”channelnewsasia.com (
but opted out at the last minute without giving any reason.”
28. Quoted in Rahman, “International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast
NIDS “1999–2000 Report on Defense and Strategic Studies,” Section III: 21
29.
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/other/studyreport/p
Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, “Ocean-Peace Keeping and New R
30. (March 2000): 1,http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/kiyo/
Rahman for bringing this paper to my attention.
31. Ibid., 75–76.
32. The Joint Communiqué may be found at http://www.aseansec.org/1564
Conference results are reported in “Progress Report on ASEAN-Japan Joint D
33. International Terrorism,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo, June 2005
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/report0506.html.
Author's discussions with U.S. and Chinese representatives to various MMCA
34. Security Regime for Northeast Asia,” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Netw
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/seccurity/07065Vaencia.html.
35. Described at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/carat.htm.
Jessica M. Bailey, “Second Phase of CARAT Ends in Thailand,” Navy News (
http://www.news.navy.mil/local/clwp/. A detailed description of this e
36.
Thailand: Special Press Summary,” VIC (July 3, 2007) at http://www1.apa
info.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2007/07/070703-CARAT2007Th
37. Malaysia's multilateral naval efforts are addressed in Sazlan, Salley, and Yas
Roel Pareno, “RP, Malaysian Navies Conclude Border Patrol,” Philstar (June
38.
http://www.philstar.com/scripts/article_print.php?id=2007062911
This heavily reported naval exercise was summed up in Michael Richardso
Jitters,” New Zealand Herald (September 5, 2007) atwww.nzherald.co.nz/
39.
c_id=2&objectid=10461642&pnum=0. Also see Steve Herman, “Indian
(September 10, 2007) at http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-09-
The SCO Charter is at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t579
40. India Becoming Observers of Shanghai Grouping,” Pakistan Tribune (June 8,
http://paktribune.com/news/indes.php?id-108489&PHPSESSID=f38
See Martin Andrew, “Power Politics: China, Russia, and Peace Mission 2005
41. (September 27, 2005) athttp://jamestown.org/publications_details.ph
volume_id=408&issue_id=3474&article_id=2370274.
See “Peace Mission 2007,” Ming Pao (July 28, 2007) and “PLA Senior Colone
Capabilities,” Xinhua (July 30, 2007), both in VIC Daily Report (August 1, 20
42.
info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/vic, and “Peace Miss
2007), a series of articles at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/
See, for instance, “President Hu's Tour to Central Asia, Russia Fruitful,” Xinh
43.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/19/content_6561418.
The phrase was probably coined by Robert Conolly, an officer of the British E
century, and was popularized by Rudyard Kipling, in his novel Kim, and refer
44. nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for control of south-central Asia, e
See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central As
account.
45. Quoted in Ball, “Regional Maritime Security,” 75. The CSCAP Charter is at ht
46. An account of this meeting is at http://www.cscap.org/documents/WG
“Report of CSCAP Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the A
47. Security Forces,” in Wellington, New Zealand, December 15–16, 2006. I am
for making this report available.
See “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation,” Statement by
48.
http://www.doc.gov.lk/regionaltrade.php?mode=undern&link=ior.
See http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/iorarc.htm. Th
49.
2003.
“Statement by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad,” Seventh Meeting of the Council
50.
2007),http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07031511451003.htm
Mark J. Valencia, “Co-operation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: A Gl
51.
(December 12, 2006),http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/06103V
52. Ibid., 2.
53. Mark J. Valencia, “Ensuring Asia's Maritime Safety,” Far Eastern Economic R
For a useful summary of multilateral efforts at maritime regulation in Asia, s
Maritime Security in East Asia,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII
54.
Sharon Squassoni, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” Congressional Resear
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/other_us/crs011405.
“China Considers PSI Participation,” Korea Times (November 15, 2006),
55.
http://times.hankooki.com/page/nation/200611521220011990.htm
56. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43
Members are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan,
57. Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United Sta
India hold observer status.
U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Gary Roughead, in “Hawaii to Host 10
58.
Fleet Public Affairs News Release (October 29, 2006),http://www.news.n
Rahman, “International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 196.
59.
and Other Threats to Security” (June 17, 2003) is athttp://www.aseanse
Chapter 11
This is not to say that North Korea, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, or ot
1.
not undertake deliberately to disrupt maritime safety and productivity.
The U.S. Navy conducted analyses in the early 1970s on the issues involved
large surface ships; the results indicated that a surprisingly large number of
even achieve a “mission kill” on a large ship; that sort of study is valid in so
“lucky hit,” and would have been of no comfort to HMS Sheffield, the British
2.
Argentine-launched Exocet during the battles in the seas around the Falklan
the U.S. Government Accounting Office Report, “Defense Acquisitions: Comp
Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense (July 2000)
athttp://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00149.pdf.
In 1987–1988, the United States reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and escorted the
chaos of the Iran–Iraq war, in which both sides attacked neutral shipping. Fe
the U.S. escort commander, a cruiser commanding officer, ordered the larges
3.
the convoy through a suspected minefield, rightly confident that it would det
serious damage to itself (no mines were encountered). Two U.S. warships th
1991 Gulf War not only survived, but were only briefly unable to continue th
Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipp
4.
Affairs 86(3) (May/June 2007): 9.
Russia's “Energy Strategy Up to 2020” states that energy will be used as an
domestic and foreign policy,” a statement that was supported by Putin inRom
5.
Marriage of Energy and Security,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (February
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/7428f1aa-b0af-4262
Vladimir I. Ivanov, “Russia,” in Manjeet Singh Pardesi et al., Energy and S
6.
Energy in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Stu
Christopher Langton (ed.), The Military Balance: 2007 (London: Internatio
7.
Studies, published by Routledge, 2007): 195, 197.
See “Russia Starts Pacific Naval Exercise,” RIA Novosti (March 26, 2007) at
8.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070326/62613658.html.
9. Hiro Katsumata, “Japan,” in Pardesi, Energy and Security, 43.
See, for instance, “Woodside Signs Pluto Export Deal,” Upstream (August 24
10. http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article139395.ece, which repo
for the Australian company to sell LNG to Japan; sales will begin in 2015.
11. Chang Youngho, “South Korea,” in Pardesi, Energy and Security, 45, 47.
See Martin Woolacot, “At Least Korea Is United Over One Thing: Anger at
(December 20, 2002) athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0
12. especially Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the E
Naval War College Review LVI(3) (Summer 2003)
athttp://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/pdfs/USnorthKorea.pdf.
The 2020 plan is discussed in Jonathan E. Sinton et al., Evaluation of China
(Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, with the China Susta
13.
16, 2005): 1. Chinese electricity consumption is at “China: Country Analysis
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Full.html.
Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Tanking Up: The Commercia
14. China's Growing Tanker Fleet,” Geopolitics of Energy 29(8) (August 2007): 4
the forty-two VLCCs currently on order in Chinese shipyards are slated to fly
15. The author was personally involved in such efforts (1984–1986).
16. Author's discussions with senior Philippine officers (May 2003).
As described earlier, Territorial Seas are those within 12 nm of Vietnam's coa
17.
those within 24 nm, and the EEZ may be claimed out to 200 nm of the coast
See Stein Tonnesson, “Sino-Vietnamese Rapprochement and the South Ch
Dialogue 34(1) (March 2003)
athttp://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Tonnesson,%20Sin
18. Vietnamese%20Rapprochement%20&%20the%20South%20China%
these talks; present status is in “China and Vietnam in Joint Oil Exploration
22, 2006) in Alexander's 11(17) (September 11, 2006)
athttp://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts63788.htm.
Approximately 6,000 of them inhabited, according to the CIA World Factbook
19.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos
“Islamic Plan Unveiled for Malaysia,” BBC News (November 12, 2003) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3263785.stm describes the a
20. Malaysian Islamic Party. For the practical difficulties of the dual—Western an
currently existing, see Meena David, “Sharia Law in Malaysia,” Australia Ne
http://australianetwork.com/focus/s1991633.htm.
See George Wehrfritz, “Things Fall Apart: Thailand's Muslim Insurgency Is
21. Newsweek (August 20–27, 2007) athttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20
The three provinces—Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala—were acquired by Bangk
Text of Howard's announcement is at
22.
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2007/Speech24373.cfm.
23. Manjeet Singh Pardesi, “India,” in Pardesi et al., Energy and Security, 37.
“Press Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Indonesia]” (Decembe
http://www.geocities.com/kbri_amman/statements/statement1.htm
24. “International Court Finds That the Sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligatan Belo
Release ICJ/605 (December 17, 2002)
athttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/ICJ605.doc.htm.
25. Located at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/te
26. IMDEX 2007 information is at http://www.imdexasia.com/.
27. “International Maritime Defense Exhibition Asia Opens in Singapore,” People
2007),http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Regional_Navies_Launch_
“Asia to Spend Over US$108b for Regional Maritime Security,” Media Corp. N
http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070515/5/singapore276127.html. Also
28.
“Submarine Frenzy in Southeast Asia” (July 2007) at
http://www.adprconsult.com.my/Articles/ADD_Jul07_Commentry.p
The U.S. Navy numbered 278 ships and submarines, and approximately 4,00
August 2007. The navy's shipbuilding plan has been unfulfilled since the end
29.
little promise of being resurrected in the face of the emphasis on the war ag
costs of Iraqi and Afghan operations.
The United States has been the world's leading proponent of multilateralism
the other hand, only since the late 1990s has appeared to recognize the util
30. organizations. An important difference between the two nations is the Amer
informal groupings and joint efforts, while the Chinese seem hesitant to eng
structured organizations.
Cited in James Tritten, “Implications for Multinational Naval Doctrine,” in S
31.
Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2002): 265–
China's decision-making paradigm is addressed in Erica S. Downs, “The Ch
32.
Debate,” China Quarterly 177 (May 2004): 21–41.
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BERNARD D. COLE
(Captain, USN, Retired) is Professor of International History at the National

War College in Washington, D.C., where he concentrates on the Chinese
military and Asian energy issues. Previously, he served thirty years as a
Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy, all of them in the Pacific. Cole has written
numerous articles and book chapters, as well as four books: Gunboats and
Marines: The U.S. Navy in China; The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters
the 21st Century; Oil for the Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Search for
Energy; and Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects.

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Sea Lanes and Pipelines

Energy Security in Asia

Geography of the Region

Getting the Oil: Pipelines Ashore

Getting the Oil: Ships at Sea

Threats to the Sea Lines of Communication

Maritime Sovereignty Disputes

Maritime Strategies in Asia

Naval Forces in Asia

Maritime Security and Multilateralism in Asia

Conclusion: Future Scenarios

About the Author

I alone of course bear the responsibility for any errors of omission or

Asia Development Bank

Agence France Presse

Asia-Pacific Economic Conversation

ASEAN Regional Forum

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Anti-Submarine (Torpedo) Rocket

Billion Cubic Feet

Brunei Shell Petroleum

Billion Ton Miles

British Thermal Unit

UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

Container Security Initiative

Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology

Counter-Terrorism Action Plan

Counter-Terrorism Task Force

UN Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea

Dead Weight Tons

Exclusive Economic Zone

Energy Working Group

UN Food and Agricultural Organization

Formosa Petrochemical Company

Free Trade Agreement

Gulf Cooperation Council

Gross Domestic Product

Geographic Information System

Global War on Terrorism

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

International Chamber of Commerce

International Criminal and Police Organization

Integrated Gas Transportation System

International Hydrographic Organization

International Labor Organization

International Maritime Bureau

International Maritime Organization

International Police Organization

International Ship and Port Security

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Integrated Transmission System

Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

Republic of Korea Coast Guard

Korea National Oil Corporation

Korea Gas Company

Landing Craft Utility

Liquefied Natural Gas

Landing Platform Dock

Landing Ship Dock

Landing Ship Tank

Man-Portable Air Defense System