Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the
claiming party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that
purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error
for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the
defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the order issued on November 23, 2011 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, in Manila, denying its motion for judgment
on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical
Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines.2
Antecedents
b. Deed of Undertaking dated July 5, 2006 for the installation of medical gas
pipeline system valued at P8,500,000.00;4
c. Deed of Undertaking dated July 27, 2006 for the supply of one unit of
Diamond Select Slice CT and one unit of Diamond Select CV-P costing
P65,000,000.00;5 and
According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,357,683.23 of its total
obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of
Page 1 of 231
P54,654,195.54.7 However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the
respondent, respectively represented by Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T.
Maglaya, Sr., entered into an agreement,8 whereby the former agreed to reduce its
claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation
on installment basis within 36 months.9
In the letter dated May 27, 2009,10 the respondent notified the petitioner that its
new administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts
defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was
consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of
the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya
whose term of office had expired.
On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. 11
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its
complaint for sum of money in the RTC,12averring as follows:
xxxx
4. On July 27, 2006, plaintiff supplied defendant one (1) unit Diamond Select
Slice CT and one (1) unit Diamond Select CV-9 for and in consideration of
P65,000,000.00 thirty percent (30%) of which shall be paid as down payment
and the balance in 30 equal monthly instalments as provided in that Deed
of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C";
9. In a letter dated May 27, 2009, defendant claimed that all of the first four
(4) agreements may be rescissible and one of them is unenforceable while
the Agreement dated February 11, 2009 was without the requisite board
approval as it was signed by an agent whose term of office already expired,
copy of which letter is hereto attached as Annex "F";
10. Consequently, plaintiff told defendant that if it does not want to honor
the February 11, 2009 contract then plaintiff will insists [sic] on its original
claim which is P54,654,195.54 and made a demand for the payment thereof
within 10 days from receipt of its letter copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "G";
11. Defendant received the aforesaid letter on July 6, 2009 but to date it has
not paid plaintiff any amount, either in the first four contracts nor in the
February 11, 2009 agreement, hence, the latter was constrained to institute
the instant suit and thus incurred attorney’s fee equivalent to 10% of the
overdue account but only after endeavouring to resolve the dispute amicable
and in a spirit of friendship[;]
12. Under the February 11, 2009 agreement the parties agreed to bring all
actions or proceedings thereunder or characterized therewith in the City of
Manila to the exclusion of other courts and for defendant to pay plaintiff 3%
per months of delay without need of demand;13
xxxx
After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, 16 the respondent
filed its answer (ad cautelam),17averring thusly:
xxxx
xxxx
On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings,20 stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of
its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations.
The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing
that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint,
particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12.21
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner, to wit:
At the hearing of the "Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings" filed by the
plaintiff thru counsel, Atty. Jose Mañacop on September 28, 2011, the court
issued an Order dated October 27, 2011 which read in part as follows:
xxxx
Page 4 of 231
Considering that the allegations stated on the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, are evidentiary in nature, the Court, instead of acting on the same,
hereby sets this case for pre-trial, considering that with the Answer and the Reply,
issues have been joined.
xxxx
In view therefore of the Order of the Court dated October 27, 2011, let the Motion
for Judgment Based on the Pleadings be hereby ordered DENIED on reasons as
abovestated and hereto reiterated.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.22
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,23 but its motion was denied on
December 29, 2011.24
Judgment of the CA
On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the
respondent had admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009
agreement, viz.:
xxxx
Obviously, Private Respondent’s special and affirmative defenses are not of such
character as to avoid Petitioner’s claim. The same special and affirmative defenses
have been passed upon by the RTC in its Order dated July 19, 2010 when it denied
Private Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. As correctly found by the RTC, Private
Respondent’s special and affirmative defences of lack of jurisdiction over its
person, improper venue, litis pendentia and wilful and deliberate forum shopping
are not meritorious and cannot operate to dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint. Hence,
when Private Respondent subjected its admission to the said defenses, it is as
though it raised no defense at all.
Not even is Private Respondent’s contention that the rescission case must take
precedence over Petitioner’s Complaint for Sum of Money tenable.1avvphi1 To
begin with, Private Respondent had not yet proven that the subject contracts are
rescissible. And even if the subject contracts are indeed rescissible, it is well-
Page 5 of 231
settled that rescissible contracts are valid contracts until they are rescinded. Since
the subject contracts have not yet been rescinded, they are deemed valid contracts
which may be enforced in legal contemplation.
In effect, Private Respondent admitted that it entered into the subject contracts
and that Petitioner had performed its obligations under the same.
In its letter dated May 27, 2009, Private Respondent made reference to the
Agreement dated February 11, 2009, viz.:
Also, Private Respondent averred in page 5 of its Complaint for Rescission, which
it attached to its Motion to Dismiss, that:
"13. On 6 February 2009, when the terms of office of plaintiff’s Board of Trustess
chaired by Dominador Cabasal, as well as of Atty. Guillermo C. Maglaya as
President, had already expired, thereby rendering them on a hold-over capacity,
the said Board once again authorized Atty. Maglaya to enter into another contract
with defendant FMEI, whereby the plaintiff was obligated to pay and deliver to
defendant FMEI the amount of Fifty Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php50,400,000.00) in thirty five (35) monthly instalments of One Million Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00), representing the balance of the
payment for the medical equipment supplied under the afore-cited rescissible
contracts. This side agreement, executed five (5) days later, or on 11 February
2009, and denominated as "AGREEMENT", had no object as a contract, but was
entered into solely for the purpose of getting the plaintiff locked-in to the payment
of the balance price under the rescissible contracts; x x x"
From the above averments, Private Respondent cannot deny knowledge of the
Agreement dated February 11, 2009. In one case, it was held that when a
respondent makes a "specific denial" of a material allegation of the petition without
setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial,
when such matters where plainly within its knowledge and the defendant could not
logically pretend ignorance as to the same, said defendant fails to properly tender
an issue.26
the CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the
outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of
Page 6 of 231
the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in
Cabanatuan City, to wit:
"16. To date, plaintiff had already paid defendant the amount of Seventy Eight
Million Four Hundred One Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P78,401,650.00)"
Issue
The petitioner posits that the CA erred in going outside of the respondent’s answer
by relying on the allegations contained in the latter’s complaint for rescission; and
insists that the CA should have confined itself to the respondent’s answer in the
action in order to resolve the petitioner’s motion for judgment based on the
pleadings.1âwphi1
In contrast, the respondent contends that it had specifically denied the material
allegations of the petitioner’s complaint, including the amount claimed; and that
the CA only affirmed the previous ruling of the RTC that the pleadings submitted
by the parties tendered an issue as to the balance owing to the petitioner.
Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTC’s denial of the petitioner’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings?
The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court, which provides thus:
Page 7 of 231
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x
The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether
or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings.28 Whether issues of fact
exist in a case or not depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with
the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The defending party’s answer either
admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being
undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the
allegations of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed, will
require evidence.
The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party’s
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but
also when it omits to deal with them at all. 29 The controversion of the ultimate
facts must only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an
issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting
forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The
second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an
averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the
material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the
remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made
in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the
complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of
the amount of unliquidated damages.30
In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2,
3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint. The admission related to the petitioner’s
allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and installation of various
hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the respondent; (c) the payments made
Page 8 of 231
by the respondents; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution
of the February 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the various agreements,
especially the February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner’s
complaint. To recall, the petitioner’s cause of action was based on the February
11, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in the case. The
complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11, 2009 agreement, and
contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on
the pleadings became proper.33 As held in Santos v. Alcazar:34
There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party.
With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny
the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication,
identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners’ admissions
in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent,
the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and there
is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt,
is valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing
the loan agreement they had entered into. The absence of rebutting evidence
occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence renders the
Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions between the parties and
the consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of the admission is
such that a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the
necessity of evidence on his part and entitled him to a judgment on the pleadings
unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
defendant.35 (citations omitted)
The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof,
inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of
the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines." Was the manner
of denial effective as a specific denial?
We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent’s
total obligation as of February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00, but its balance
thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid
P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the petitioner had
agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the balance to only
P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36 months through 36
postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the respondent then issued for
the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling
P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped payment of the rest, rendering
the entire obligation due and demandable pursuant to the February 11, 2009
agreement. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred
matters that the respondent ought to know or could have easily known, the answer
Page 9 of 231
did not specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that denials based
on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or
ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and
constitute ineffective36 or sham denials.37
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its
special and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper
venue, litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence because the
affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of
the petitioner’s claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the
complaint.
Lastly, we should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner’s Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of
the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of
the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint’s material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the
respondent’s averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner
made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of
the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a
factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through
trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer
in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the
P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of
its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as
insincere.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on July 2, 2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to
resume its proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical
Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, and to forthwith act on and
grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the proper
judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 10 of 231
13. G.R. No. 144635, June 26, 2006
PROGRAMME INCORPORATED v. PROVINCE OF BATAAN
SO ORDERED.[4]
BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge, both located
in Mariveles, Bataan.
On May 14, 1986, BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease over Piazza
Hotel at a monthly rental of P6,500 for three years, i.e., from January 1, 1986 to
January 1, 1989, subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the parties. After the
expiration of the three-year lease period, petitioner was allowed to continue
operating the hotel on monthly extensions of the lease.
In April 1989, however, the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) issued a sequestration order against BASECO pursuant to Executive Order
No. 1 of former President Corazon C. Aquino.[5] Among the properties provisionally
seized and taken over was the lot on which Piazza Hotel stood.
On July 19, 1989, however, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for
non-payment of taxes to respondent Province of Bataan. The title of the property
Page 11 of 231
was transferred to respondent. BASECOs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
59631 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-128456, was issued to the Province
of Bataan.
On July 21, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and
collection of sum of money against BASECO (Civil Case No. 129-ML).[6]Respondent,
as the new owner of the property, filed a motion for leave to intervene on November
22, 1990. After its motion was granted, respondent filed a complaint-in-
intervention praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel
and Mariveles Lodge for lack of legal interest.
During the pre-trial of the complaint-in-intervention, the parties agreed that
the case[7] be tried on the sole issue of whether respondent province, as
complainant-intervenor, was the legitimate owner of the Piazza Hotel
and Mariveles Lodge.
On February 3, 1995, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent.
On appeal, the CA addressed the issue of ownership of Piazza Hotel
and Mariveles Lodge as follows:
Page 12 of 231
Transferred by virtue of a final bill of sale executed by the
Provincial [Treasurer] of Bataan in favor of the Provincial
Government on Feb. 13, 1989[, a] year after the expiration of the
redemption period from date of auction sale held on Feb. 12, 1988 of
all real property declared in the name of [BASECO].[14] (emphasis ours)
Third, petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. In the lease contract annexed to
the complaint, petitioner in fact admitted BASECOs (respondents predecessor-in-
interest) ownership then of the subject property. A stipulation in the contract read:
The Rules of Court states that [a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[16]
Page 13 of 231
The benefits granted to a possessor in good faith cannot be
maintained by the lessee against the lessor because, such benefits are
intended to apply only to a case where one builds or sows or plants on
land which he believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands
wherein ones only interest is that of a tenant under a rental contract,
otherwise, it would always be in the power of a tenant to improve his
landlord out of his property. Besides, as between lessor and lessee, the
Code applies specific provisions designed to cover their rights.
Petitioners assertion that Piazza Hotel was constructed at (its) expense found
no support in the records. Neither did any document or testimony prove this
claim. At best, what was confirmed was that petitioner managed and operated the
hotel. There was no evidence that petitioner was the one which spent for the
construction or renovation of the property. And since petitioners alleged
expenditures were never proven, it could not even seek reimbursement of one-half
of the value of the improvements upon termination of the lease under Article
1678[24] of the Civil Code.
Finally, both the trial and appellate courts declared that the land as well as
the improvement thereon (Piazza Hotel) belonged to respondent. We find no reason
to overturn this factual conclusion.
Since this petition for review on certiorari was clearly without legal and
factual basis, petitioners counsel should not have even filed this appeal. It is
obvious that the intention was merely to delay the disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49135 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. Same costs against Atty. Benito R. Cuesta I,
petitioners counsel, for filing this flimsy appeal, payable within ten (10) days from
finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Page 14 of 231
14. G.R. No. 212196 January 12, 2015
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. DC
02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil Doria Dahil (Dahil) and
Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5
and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate
Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro
were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of
26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to a poseur
buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX
GRAMS AND EIGHT THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A
GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642
grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the
Information which reads: That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in
the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of
dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642), which is a
dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Page 15 of 231
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286
grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the
Information which reads: That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in
the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form
wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without
authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on
the other hand, filed a motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was
deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented PO2 Arieltino Corpuz (PO2
Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through
inadvertence.6 The RTC informed the parties of the situation and the defense
counsel did not interpose any objection to the reopening of the case and the
arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was adopting all the evidence
already adduced.
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents
of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted
surveillance and casing operations relative to the information they received that a
certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On
September 29, 2002, the Chief of PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers, namely, Sergeant
Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1
Licu and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseur-
buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Upon
arriving, PO2 Corpuz together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which
was within the TB Pavillon compound. When PO2 Corpuz and the informant were
in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then introduced
PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would
he be buying and the latter answered that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of
marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) plastic sachets
of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items, PO2
Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills to Castro.
Page 16 of 231
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been
consummated. The rest of the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and
arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and recovered from his
possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected
marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by
the buy-bust team to the PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2
Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana which were
sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters
"RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from
Dahil were marked with "B-1" to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and
"EML." Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked "C-
RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory examination,
affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized
items7 was also prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter,
PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive results for
marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential contents
of the prospective testimony of the forensic chemist, to wit:
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory,Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7, 2007.9 After
much delay, the public prosecutor was finally able to orally submit his formal offer
of exhibits after almost two years, or on January 6, 2009.10 He offered the following
documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation
Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked money, (4) Brown envelope containing the
Page 17 of 231
subject illegal drugs, (5) Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination
Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002.
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came
looking for him after he had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another
man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the unknown man whether he
knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many persons
named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his
house and dragged him into one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base
and was charged with illegal selling and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of
Marisol, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he
was approached by some men who asked if he knew a certain Boy residing at
Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and then
the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where
he was charged withillegal possession of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for
violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 each for the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of ₱300,000.00 each for the crime
of illegal possession of marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling
and possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes
were established. To the trial court, the evidence proved that PO2 Corpuz bought
marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the marijuana purchased and then
handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled
that the same was not fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked money
was presented and identified by the arresting officers.12 It did not give credence to
the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could easily be
concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-
Appellants,13 they argued that there were irregularities on the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from them. The
prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
Page 18 of 231
which generated clouds of doubts as tothe identity of the seized items presented
in evidence.14
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As
to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that the prosecution witnesses were
able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the time the buy-bust
operation was conducted until the time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its view,
the prosecution was able to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually
took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, there was an
actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets containing
marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills, after
they agreed to transact ₱200.00 worth of the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal
possession of marijuana, was also thus established by the prosecution. 17 Another
five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were recovered from Dahil’s possession while
one (1) brick of marijuana from Castro’s possession.18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused during
the buy-bust operation were the same drugs presented before the RTC. As testified
to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana, which were sold by
Dahil toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC,"
"ADGC"and "EML," the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in the possession of Dahil
were marked "B-1" to "B-5" and with the initials "ADGC" and "EML," while the
marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked "C-RDRC."19
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody.
PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that the said drugs were marked at the police
station. An inventory of the seized items was made as shown by the Inventory
Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The Request for
Laboratory Examination revealed that the confiscated drugs were the same items
submitted to the PNP crime laboratory for examination. On the other hand,
Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002 showed that the specimen gave positive
results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to show that the confiscated
marijuana items were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to
the crime laboratory for examination.20
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement officers
substantially complied with the chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No.
9165.
Page 19 of 231
Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 21 Considering
that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has
meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and
finds that there is merit in the appeal. The Court holds that that there was no
unbroken chain of custody and that the prosecution failed to establish the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation
has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are
otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a
significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law.
It is susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.22
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.That proof is vital
to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply
with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are
substantial gapsin the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise
doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section
1(b) of Dangerous DrugsBoard Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements
R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Page 20 of 231
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1)
of R.A. No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR)of R.A. No. 9165 enumeratesthe procedures to be observed by the
apprehending officers toconfirm the chain of custody, to wit:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrantis served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items;
xxx
The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.
Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of the Property Seized
signed by the arresting officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided
in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not observed. The said provision requires the
apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a
physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official who shall be required tosign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
Page 21 of 231
First,the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure
and confiscation as it was only done at the police station. Notably, Article II,
Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim
that the PDEA Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the
drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for the
delayed conduct of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for
the preparation of the documents so, we invited him to our office. 25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to immediately conduct an
inventory because they did not bring with them the material or equipment for the
preparation of the documents. Such explanation is unacceptable considering that
they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of weeks. 26 They should
have been prepared with their equipment even before the buy-bust operation took
place.
Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory
of Property Seized. According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruzwho
prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the other hand, testified that it was
their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony was
that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.28
Page 22 of 231
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were
photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After you arrested Ramil
Dahil,did you conduct the inventory of the alleged seized items?
Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with Ramil Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this was:
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an
inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the
inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz
testified that no pictures of the seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that
pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague statements of the police
officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs were indeed taken.
The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of the seized items.
The Court notes that SPO1 Licu could have misunderstood the question because
he answered that "pictures were taken on the accused" when the question referred
to photographs of the drugs and not of the accused.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items were preserved.
Page 23 of 231
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that
substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the law does
not necessarily render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible.30 The issue of non-compliance with the said
section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be given on the evidence.31Moreover,
Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are preserved as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 32
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, the proper chain of custody of the seized items must be shown. The
Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of custody or movement of
the seized evidence should be maintained and why this must be shown by
evidence, viz:
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution must
establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the
seizure and marking, ifpracticable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized bythe
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending
Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking"
means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her
initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
Page 24 of 231
markingsas reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
markedevidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of
evidence.35
It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from
the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long
before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court had consistently held
that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. 36
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their
initials on the seized items. They, however, gave little information on how they
actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless, that the marking was not
immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at the
police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: Q: So, after recovering
all those marijuana bricks and plastic sachets of marijuana and the marked money
from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to our
office, sir.
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for crime
lab examination, joint affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all other documents
necessary for the filing of the case against the two (2), sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you
confiscated from the accused, what did you do with those?
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items
were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs
were handled. The Court must conduct guesswork on how the seized drugs were
transported and who took custody of them while in transit. Evidently, the
alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking
thereof.
Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the
marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused
in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent application of the requirement,
Page 25 of 231
however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused in this case. Aside
from the fact that the police officers did not immediately place their markings on
the seized marijuana upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no
showing that the markings were made in the presence of the accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when they
were about to send them to Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This damaging
testimony was corroborated by the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA Office: (1) Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of Property
Seized, and (4) Laboratory Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory
Examination Request cited the markings on the seized drugs. Thus, it could only
mean that when the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had
not been marked and the police officers did not have basis for identifying them.
Considering that the seized drugs wereto be used for different criminal charges, it
was imperative for the police officers to properly mark them at the earliest possible
opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and critical task. The seized drugs
were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the RTC,
Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39 Exhibit A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have
the initials of the apprehending officers on the back. Bearing in mind the
importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the procedure are too
conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to the identity of
the corpus delicti from the moment of seizure until it was belatedly marked at the
PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of the
seized drug by the apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the case. The
officer testified that he marked the confiscated items only after he had returned
tothe police station. Such admission showed that the marking was not done
immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of a significant
intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the
Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who
seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who will then
send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. 42 This is a necessary
step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall
conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the
developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have possession
of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents.
Page 26 of 231
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin. 43 Surprisingly,
there was no testimony from the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items
to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a drug-related
case toeffectively perform his work without having custody of the seized items.
Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as
to whether PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin
as the investigating officer or they had custody of the marijuana all night while
SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish
the chain of custody as the apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items
to the investigating officer. The apprehending officer kept the alleged shabu from
the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic chemist.
The deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal of the
accused in the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic
Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist.
Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory
technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance. In this case, it was
only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some information on
the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit:
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought to the
crime laboratory, who brought the same to the crime lab?
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered
on how the seized marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office
in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga.
PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight without giving detailson
the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would
be the lack of information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the
subject drugs, did not appear in court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to
her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the essential
points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony of the
forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp
Olivas. One of the stipulations was "that said forensic chemist conducted an
Page 27 of 231
examination on the substance of the letter-request with qualification that said
request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic chemist has no
personalknowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken." 47 This
bolsters the fact that the forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received
the seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link. The
police officer, who both served as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed
that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no
showing who received the drug from him. The records also showed that he
submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining
how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight. All those facts raised
serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item have not
been fatally compromised. Hence, the accused inthe said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist
to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist
to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case. No testimonial or
documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept while
in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the court. The
forensic chemist should have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs
but the parties resorted to a general stipulation of her testimony. Although several
subpoenae were sent to the forensic chemist, only a brown envelope containing
the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links
in the chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the
location of the misplaced marked money, which was not even indispensable in the
criminal case.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no
compliance with the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
because of the inadequate physical inventory and the lack of photography of the
marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro. No explanation was offered
for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution cannot apply the saving
mechanism of Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed
to prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were
Page 28 of 231
preserved. The four links required to establish the proper chain of custody were
breached with irregularity and lapses.
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the
presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties could apply in favor
of the police officers. The regularity of the performance of duty could not be
properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records were replete
with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity will never be
stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a
mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused
to be presumed innocent.52
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the
seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In
effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. 53
For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by the
accused. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and Rommel Castro y
Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some other
lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Page 29 of 231
15. G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018
DECISION
This is an appeal of the Decision1 dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Teng Manery
Adam, which affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-05-133982
and Q-05-133983. Anent Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982, the trial court found
appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the same
judgment, Moner and his co-accused were acquitted of the charge of violating
Section 11, Article II (possession of dangerous drugs) of the same statute which
was the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983.
The crime of which Moner was convicted is described in the Information dated
April 25, 2005, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.3
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals presented the factual milieu of this
case in this manner:
On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF) had arrested a certain Joel Taudil
for possession of illegal drugs. Upon investigation, they gathered from Taudil that
Page 30 of 231
the source of the illegal drugs was Teng Moner (herein accused-appellant) who
hails from Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a team that
would conduct a buy-bust operation for the apprehension of accused-appellant.
The team was composed of himself, SP04 Arnold Alabastro, SPO1 Warlie Hermo,
PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes, PO3 Edwin Lirio, PO2 Rodel Ordinaryo, PO1 Erwin
Sabbun and PO2 Joachim Panopio. The marked and boodle money were given to
PO2 Panopio who acted as the poseur-buyer.
Before proceeding with the buy-bust operation, the team prepared the pre-
operation report addressed to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
the authority to operate outside their jurisdiction and the coordination paper.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the Central Police District Office (CPDO), Camp
Karingal, Quezon City for proper coordination. Thereafter, the team together with
Taudil and a CPD-DIID personnel proceeded [to] No. 26 Varsity Lane, Barangay
Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Upon reaching the place they made a
surveillance and assumed their respective positions.
At the target area, P02 Panopio and Taudil went to accusedappellant's house.
While outside the gate, Taudil summoned accusedappellant and the latter came
out after a few minutes. The two men talked with each other in the Muslim dialect.
Taudil introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to accused-appellant and told him
that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio asked for the price of
five (5) grams of shabu. Accused-appellant replied that the same would cost him
₱8,000.00 and asked him if he has the money. When PO2 Panopio confirmed that
he has the money with him, accused-appellant asked them to wait and he went
inside the house. When he returned after a few minutes, he handed a plastic
sachet containing a substance suspected as shabu to PO2 Panopio who in turn
gave him the marked and boodle money. Accused-appellant was about to count
the money when PO2 Panopio gave the pre-arranged signal to his team and
introduced himself as [a] police officer.
Accused-appellant resisted arrest and ran inside the house but PO2 Panopio was
able to catch up with him. The other members of the team proceeded inside the
house and they saw the other accused gather[ed] around a table re-
packing shabu. PO3 Lirio confiscated the items from them and placed the same
inside a plastic bag.
After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded to
the Las Piñas City Police Station. The items confiscated from them were turned
over by PO2 Panopio to PO3 Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the
police operatives, accused-appellant and his co-accused. PO3 Dalagdagan
prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The specimens
were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The specimens yielded
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Page 31 of 231
Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed
against accused-appellant and another for Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
9165 against him and his co-accused.
In refutation of the prosecution's version, the defense presented four (4) witnesses,
to wit: Judie Durado, Fatima Macabangen, accused-appellant and Richard
Pascual.
It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005, accused-appellant and
his co-accused in Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983 were at the house located along
No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam, Tan.dang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for the
wedding of Fatima Macabangen and Abubakar Usman to be held the following day.
While they were inside the house, several armed persons wearing civilian clothes
entered and announced that they were police officers. They searched the whole
house and gathered all of them in the living room.
The police officer who was positioned behind accused-appellant and Abubakar
dropped a plastic sachet. The former asked accused-appellant and Abubakar who
owns the plastic sachet. When accused-appellant .denied its ownership, the police
officer slapped him and accused him of being a liar. Thereafter, they were all
frisked and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their personal effects
and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then they boarded a jeepney
and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police Station.
Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer asked them to call up
anybody who can help them because they only needed money for their release.
Judie Dorado called up [his] mother. They saw the other items allegedly
confiscated from them only at the police station. At around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, they were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went
to Makati for drug testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police Station.
Subsequently, cases for Violation of R.A. No. 9165 were filed against them. 5
After receiving the evidence for both sides, the trial court convicted Moner on the
charge of selling shabu while, at the same time, acquitting him and his co-accused
of the charge of possession of illegal drugs. The dispositive portion of the August
4, 2009 Joint Decision of the trial court reads:
The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM "GUILTY" beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or illegal selling of three
point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
to pay a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php500,000.00).
Page 32 of 231
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983:
The pieces of evidence subject matter of Crim. Case No. Q-05- 133983 are hereby
ordered to be safely delivered to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
proper disposition.6
As can be expected, Moner elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which,
unfortunately for him, ruled to affirm the findings of the trial court and
dispositively held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-05- 133982 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.7
Hence, Moner interposes this appeal wherein he reiterates the same errors on the
part of the trial court contained in his Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, to wit:
In sum, Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proof to sustain his conviction for the charge of sale of dangerous drugs. He
highlights the fact that the prosecution failed to present in court the informant
who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu. He also stresses that the buy-bust
operation was conducted without proper coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Likewise, he derides the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most
importantly, he underscores the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from him.
A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the aforementioned elements
were established by the prosecution. The illegal drugs and the marked money were
presented and identified in court. More importantly, Police Officer (PO) 2 Joachim
Panopio (PO2 Panopio ), who acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified Moner as
the seller of the shabu to him for a consideration of ₱8,000.00.
With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the
informant in court diminishes the case against him, we reiterate our
pronouncement on this matter in the recent case of People v. Lafaran10 :
It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing
accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in
view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested
through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's identity is
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when
the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the
conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. In
the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by SPO2 Aro and
PO3 Pera, their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer.
Thus, we concur with the appellate court's finding that there is no need to present
the informant because PO2 Panopio, who acted as the poseur-buyer, had testified
in court. Furthermore, the other members of the buy-bust team, namely PO3
Junnifer Tuldanes (PO3 Tuldanes) and PO3 Edwin Lirio (PO3 Lirio ), gave clear
Page 34 of 231
and credible testimonies with regard to the criminal transaction that was
consummated by appellant and PO2 Panopio.
Lastly, we can give no credence to Moner's contention that the prosecution failed
to prove an unbroken chain of custody in consonance with the requirements of
law.
To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same material seized from him or that, at the very least, a dangerous
drug was actually taken from his possession, we have adopted the chain of custody
rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has expressly defined chain of custody
involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Section
1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provides the
following:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
Page 35 of 231
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.]
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the
criminal charges levelled against him specifically because of the following serious
lapses in procedure committed by the apprehending officers: (a) the physical
inventory was not conducted at the place where the seizure was made; (b) the
seized item was not photographed at the place of seizure; and (c) there was no
physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of the
accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
Page 36 of 231
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Q Now, Mr. Witness, after your team recovered [the] evidence on top of the table
inside the house, arrested those persons whom you identified a while ago and also
arrested Teng Moner recovered from him the buy-bust money, what happened
next?
A We brought them to Special Action ... SAID-SOTF Las Piñas Police Station.
xxxx
Q Now, I would like to inform you that under Section 21 of the Republic Act 9165,
the arresting officer immediately after the arrest of the accused or the person buy-
bust for possession must prepare the inventory of seized evidence.
A Yes, sir.
Q You do not know that doing an inventory is a requirement under Section 21?
Page 37 of 231
Q Now, you said that you are aware of Section 21 an inventory must be made. Do
you know whether your team complied with that provision of the law upon
reaching the station?
A Yes, sir,
xxxx
This piece of document handed by the witness your Honor, the Inventory of
Property Seized be marked as Exhibit "OOO".
xxxx
Q The signature of PO3 Rufino G. Dalagdagan under the heading "Received By:"
be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-1"; the list of the articles appearing
[in] the body of Exhibit "OOO" be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-
2". This Receipt of Property Turned-Over, your Honor, which states: "I, P03
RUFINO G. DALAGDAGAN OF SAID-SOTF, LAS PINAS CITY POLICE STATION,
SPD hereby acknowledge received (sic) the items/articles listed hereunder
[from] PO2 JOACHIM P. PANOPIO" and may we request, your honor that letters
appearing on the top of the name TENG MONER ADAM, ET AL. (RTS) be marked
as Exhibit "OOO-3"
Page 38 of 231
Q These items listed [in] the body of marked as Exhibit "OOO", who made these
items?
A I, myself, sir.
Q Now, showing to you this Exhibit marked as "OOO-3" particularly on [the] letters
RPS appearing inside the parenthesis, who placed that entry (RPS)?
Q Where were you at the time when this (RPS) marked as Exhibit "OOO-3" was
made?
Q Where were those persons whom your team arrested when this evidence
marked as Exhibit "OOO" was made?
xxxx
Q You said a while ago that in consideration with the buy-bust money, you received
from the accused, Teng Moner, that plastic sachet containing shabu. Upon
reaching the station, what happened to the plastic sachet, subject matter of
the buy-bust operation?
Q To whom?
Q Showing to you several pieces of evidence placed inside the brown envelope.
Kindly look at the same and pick from these several items that plastic sachet,
subject matter of the buy-bust operation?
A (Witness picked from the bunch of evidence the plastic sachet which already
marked as Exhibit "P" and he read [the] markings "TMAU1-23APR05".)
Page 39 of 231
Q Now, you also stated a while ago that you were the one who personally recovered
the buy-bust money used in the operation from the possession of the accused,
Teng Moner. If the same would be shown to you, would you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Now, you also stated that the Request for Laboratory Examination was
made by the investigator, Now, who delivered the plastic sachet subject
matter of the buy-bust operation for laboratory examination?
Judging from the cited testimony, it is apparent that the apprehending officers
were able to substantially comply with the requirements of the law regarding the
custody of confiscated or seized dangerous drugs. When cross-examined by the
defense counsel during trial about the reason behind the buy-bust team's
noncompliance with standard procedure, PO3 Tuldanes, one of the apprehending
officers, gave the following response:
Q Meaning you had no time to make the inventory right at the scene of the alleged
buy-bust?
A Yes, sir, because we were immediately instructed to pull out from the area.
Q Was there any threat on your lives that you immediately pulled out from the
said area?
A It was not our area - Area of Responsibility - so we just wanted to make sure, for
security and immediately left, sir.
Q So this fear for security, you did not follow this photographing/inventory?
A We did not do that anymore, sir, because our security was at risk. 15
Verily, the circumstances that the buy-bust team proceeded first to the Central
Police District (CPD) Station, Camp Karingal in Quezon City and, from there, they
were accompanied by a police officer from the CPD to the target location, aside
from proving that it was a legitimate police operation, supported the existence of
a security risk to the buy-bust team. These additional precautions taken by the
buy-bust team underscored their unfamiliarity with the location of the operation
and, in fact, corroborated the above-quoted testimony that the buy-bust team
believed there was a threat to their security.
Page 40 of 231
With regard to the accused’s allegation that the buy-bust team failed to coordinate
with the PDEA before proceeding with the operation that nabbed Moner, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals declare in unison that the requisite prior
coordination with PDEA did happen. Likewise, our own review did not provide any
reason for us to disbelieve said established fact.
Notably, in the recent case of Palo v. People, 16 we affirmed a conviction for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs despite the fact that the seized illegal substance
was only marked at the police station and that there was no physical inventory or
photograph of the same:
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police
station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the
seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory
nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.17
With regard to the third breach of procedure highlighted by Moner, this Court
cites People v. Usman18 wherein we declared that the chain of custody is not
established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons by
law. In that case, the police officers who arrested and processed the accused did
not perform the prescribed taking of photographs under the law but, nevertheless,
the assailed conviction was upheld. The Court reasoned thus:
[T]his Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally
be perfect, in reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x.19
In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items had been preserved despite the procedural infirmities that
Page 41 of 231
accompanied the process. On this score, we quote with approval the disquisition
of the Court of Appeals:
The record shows that upon the arrest of accused-appellant, the shabu and
marked money were confiscated from him by P02 Panopio. Accused-appellant was
immediately brought to the Las Piñas Police Station where the items confiscated
from him were turned-over by P02 Panopio to P03 Dalagdagan, the investigator-
on-case. The latter received the confiscated items and marked them in the
presence of P02 Panopio and accused-appellant. An inventory of the
confiscated items was also made.
Anent Moner' s allegation that the buy-bust team asked money from him and his
former co-accused in exchange for their liberty, it must be emphasized that the
said allegation only came to light when defense counsel asked appellant what
happened when he and his former co-accused were brought to the Las Piñas Police
Station.21 Curiously, however, defense counsel did not confront any of the
prosecution witnesses regarding the said accusation. More importantly, based on
the record, no criminal or administrative· case relating thereto was ever filed by
Moner or any of his former co-accused against their alleged extortionists.
Nevertheless, on this particular issue, we would like to reiterate our ruling that
the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the
courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.22
This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of
whether or not to uphold the conviction of a person arrested for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs who had been positively identified by credible witnesses as the
perpetrator of said crime but the manner by which the evidence of illegal drugs
was handled did not strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. To reiterate
past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should
be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.24 Unfortunately; rigid obedience to procedure creates
a scenario wherein the safeguards that we set to shield the innocent are likewise
exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment. Realizing the inconvenient
truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved, this Court has
consistently held that the most important factor in the chain of custody rule is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 25
We would like to add that noncompliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly
the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule
128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the court x x x.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to
noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is noncompliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight -
evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be
given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case.
Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the
manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to
inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather
to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case. In the case at bar, the
trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of the
Page 43 of 231
prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning
the corpus delicti.
It should be noted that Section 21(a) of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 provides
that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items. (Emphases supplied.)
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the
previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress'
subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led
the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court's
power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress."28
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts is a traditional power of this Court.29 This includes the power to promulgate
the rules of evidence.
On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court issued
by the Supreme Court. However, the chain of custody rule is not found in the Rules
of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was passed by the legislative
department and its implementing rules were promulgated by PDEA, in
consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and
within the executive department.
In the United States, the chain of custody rule is followed by the federal courts
using the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Court of Appeals
applied this rule in United States v. Ricco30 and held as follows:
The "chain of custody" rule is found in Fed. R. Evid. 901, which requires that
the admission of an exhibit must be preceded by "evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
x x x.
Page 45 of 231
Evidence is defined in Section 1 of Rule 12833 as "the means, sanctioned by these
rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact." Section 2 of the same Rule provides that "[t]he rules of evidence shall be the
same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by
law or these rules."
Furthermore, the said Rule provides for the admissibility of evidence, and states
that "[ e ]vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules." The Rules of Admissibility provide that "[ o ]bjects as
evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant
to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. " 34
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates ·the rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S.,
1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.)
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step
taken in a criminal prosecution.
Page 46 of 231
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme
Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the
constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of
evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650;
Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs.Missouri,
107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443. And there
may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense
available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or
which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within
the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507,
2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial
or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which
operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who
may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted
of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263,
4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the
rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S.,
380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial,
Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for
hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See
Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
570."
xxxx
Page 47 of 231
To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing
them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.36
Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of custody rule is a matter
of evidence and a rule of procedure.1âwphi1 It is therefore the Court who has the
last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Relevant portions of decisions
elucidating on the chain of custody rule are quoted below:
Saraum v. People37:
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who
handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are presented
in court.x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Mallillin v. People38 :
To conclude, this Court has consistently espoused the time-honored doctrine that
where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are
not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and
value, which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case. 39 We
do not believe that the explainable deviations to the chain of custody rule
demonstrated by the police officers involved in this case are reason enough to
overturn the findings of the trial court judge, who personally observed and weighed
the testimony of the witnesses during trial and examined the evidence submitted
by both parties.
In light of the foregoing, we are compelled to dismiss the present appeal and affirm
the conviction of Moner for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 49 of 231
16. G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET
The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
Page 50 of 231
back-up operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the confidential
informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust
operation.
When the team arrived at appellants place, they saw the appellant standing
alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached
appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend,
saying Barkada ko, user. PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three
marked P100 bills.[7] The bills were marked with GT JR, PO1 Tolentinos
initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his
pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1
Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1
Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked
money.
The white crystalline substance[8] in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1
Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos,
Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any
dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2
Maung.[9] Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,[10] the substance bought from
appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who
examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both
prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact
that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for
laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted
and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. [11]
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his
common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:
Page 51 of 231
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house
located in the middle of a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their
liberty. The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police
officers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and
appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and
cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was
detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case against
appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from them.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the
decision reads:
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor
of the government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn over
the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof for proper disposal thereof.[12]
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr.
to be credible and straightforward. It established the fact that appellant was
caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10 December
2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom PO1 Tolentino
bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-
2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced by appellants defense
of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was
merely sleeping and was awakened by the screams of his relatives who were being
mauled by the police officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With the filing
thereof, the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire records of
the case to us.[14] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[15] the case
was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. [16]
Page 52 of 231
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision but
reduced the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as
follows:
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to us for further review. [18]
In our Resolution[19] dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30
days from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a supplemental
brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their
respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a
repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemens failure to strictly comply
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together
with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as
shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1
Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of
the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of
the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to
abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the
evidence adduced against him.
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers alleged
non-compliance with Section 21[21] of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on
Page 53 of 231
appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v.
Sta. Maria[22] in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly
the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule
128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make
the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules.
Page 54 of 231
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there
is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given
by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [24] What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.[25]
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution
clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that
the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur
buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry
Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the
substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from
appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together
with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove the
crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and
impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of
the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of
the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. [26]
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.[27] Finding no compelling reason to depart from
the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their
findings.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject
of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as
Page 55 of 231
seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged,
unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply
fail.[28]Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and
standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.[29] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed
their duties in a regular and proper manner. [30] This, appellant failed to do. The
presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or
that they were inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew,
Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to
be credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without
clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that they
were maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by the
trial court:
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the arresting
policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:
Page 56 of 231
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting
the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellants conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Said section reads:
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity
and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there
being no modifying circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as
sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine
at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both
amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by the
Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more
appropriate.
SO ORDERED.
Page 57 of 231
17. A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05- OF APPEALS, 81-
CA-P) v. CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division,
Court of Appeals (CA) stands charged with the following offenses:
The Facts
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-
H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. [2] On
appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau
of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition
for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution
on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondents unusual interest
in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether
the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the
said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the
records of the case were eventually found.[4] Atty. Madarang then directed the
typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond,[5] and to notify the mailing section that
there were orders requiring personal service. [6] At around 4:00 p.m., the
respondent then went to Atty. Madarangs office and assisted in arranging and
stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers
himself to the Mailing Section.[7]
Page 58 of 231
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain
Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Laguas relative. It was about 2:00 p.m.
The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Laguas
provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the
help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where
the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given
to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang
then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be
Laguas relative.
4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of
Court of RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent
Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City, from which the
original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated.
Disguising myself as accused-appellant Laguas relative, I dialed
[Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora Valdez did not
report for work that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester),
her officemate (who) answered my call. She added that Rhodora
Valdez has been waiting for us (Laguas relatives) to call. Her exact
words were these: Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang siyang nilakad. Pero
kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh.
Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.
5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the
Mailing Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text her
process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries, to which
she answered in the affirmative. While she was in the office, she
texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his
way back to Quezon City. That was before 4 p.m., adding that his
deliveries were ok.
6. That I got Saluds mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and
started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I
represented myself as Arlyn, Laguas relative. Most of his text
messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one
text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis,
(the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423)
in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this
incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:
Page 59 of 231
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO
639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47
Page 60 of 231
17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003
21:15:52
Page 61 of 231
Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art,
allegedly Laguas relative who he claimed approached him at the
Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told
Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised
to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed
to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was
connected with the office of accused-appellants counsel. Because of
this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of
Service, Annex C.
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came
to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word, he
broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, Boss,
patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.[9]
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office.
When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas
release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution
and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. [10] Justice
Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie
L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office
which has nothing to do with cases.
Page 62 of 231
ANNEX B - Certificate of Service signed by Salud, attested by the Acting
Chief of the Mailing Section and Division Clerk of Court Ma. Ramona
L. Ledesma, showing that the parties/counsel in SP-67586 were served
only on November 10, 2003 (not on November 7, 2003).
ANNEX H - Copy of the Order of Release upon Bond, which Salud was
supposed to deliver, among others on November 7, 2003 to the defense
counsel, the appellant and the OSG.[12]
Page 63 of 231
In his counter-affidavit,[13] the respondent vehemently denied the charges.
He never demanded money from Laguas relative; his name had been used by
someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact
that he immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had
no financial interest in the transaction. His version of the events that occurred
that day is as follows:
4.3 That while I was at the NBI, I received a text message from
my boss, requesting me to return to the office immediately
because there is another notice of resolution coming from Atty.
Ledesma which I have to serve to Quezon City and Las Pias;
4.5 That when I received the resolution, I read the same and
found out that the hearing is still scheduled on December 10,
2003 at 10:30 a.m.;
Page 64 of 231
4.10 That Atty. Madarang gave to me the Order of Release at 4:15
p.m.
4.11 That because I am aware that I may not reach [the] New
Bilibid Prison on time, I told Atty. Madarang that I can deliver it
on November 7, 2003, early in the morning. She agreed and told
me THANK YOU Ikaw na ang bahala;
4.14 That while I was standing in front of the building where the
administrative office is located, a certain ART approached me and
asked me if I am the personnel of the Court of Appeals who will
deliver the Order of Release.
4.15 That I said yes, and he told me his name and said that he
is a relative of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) and is connected with
the office of Atty. [Quimpo].
Page 65 of 231
4.18 That because the staff were not around, I went to the
canteen to buy softdrinks to quench my thirst;
4.21 That I delivered the copy of Mr. LAGUA to the staff. But ART
told them he can receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA because he is his
relative so, the staff told me to give the copy to ART.
4.22 That I gave the copy of the Order of Release for the accused
to ART. ART also told me that he is authorized to receive the copy
for Atty. Quimpo because he is also the representative of the law
office. Hence, I also gave the copy for Atty. Quimpo to ART;
4.23 That I was able to finish my duty at the New Bilibid Prison
at around 2:30 [p.m.] and I proceeded to Purok I, 6A Bayanan,
Muntinlupa to serve the Writ of Habeas Corpus in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80238;
4.25 That I left Muntinlupa late in the afternoon and due to the
lack of time I decided to deliver the other documents on the next
working day which is Monday, November 10, 2003;
Page 66 of 231
Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio
C. Garcia[15] referred the matter to Atty. Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk
of Court, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigation
The requisite hearings were held from December 12, 2003 to August 4, 2004.
Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit[16] dated December 8, 2003.
She testified that the respondent later came to her office along with Ms. Secarro.
Amidst his cries, he pleaded, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.
She replied, Wait, wala ka namang kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw ang nagpasimuno ng
lahat ng ito. The respondent repeated, Boss, patawad po alang alang sa aking mga
anak, and Atty. Madarang answered, Okey lang, pinatawad na kita. Hindi naman
ako galit sa iyo.[17]
Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three counts of estafa who
served time at the Correctional Institute for Women in Batangas City. She testified
that the respondent was introduced to her in December 1998 by a certain Crisanta
Gamil.[20] Gamil was also detained at the correctional facility; the respondent had
worked on her appeal bond papers and asked for P20,000.00 to facilitate the
issuance of the appeal bond.[21] The payment was made right in front of her, and
the respondent issued a receipt.[22] The witness also testified that Gamil told her,
O, at least dyan mo ipalakad ang papel mo. Okay ′yan, sigurado.[23] The respondent
visited her in May 1999, as she had asked him to fix her appeal bond. During the
visit, the respondent took the pertinent documents from her.[24] The witness also
stated that she gave the respondent a partial payment of P7,000.00[25] on May 16,
1999 and he issued a receipt.[26] They then proceeded to the Documents Section
where they secured copies of the court decision, certificate of manifestation and
Page 67 of 231
her picture. She made the last payment of P13,000.00 in June 13, 1999, and also
issued a receipt. The respondent was also asking for an additional payment
of P15,000.00, which she was unable to give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee to the respondent,
Dalawangbayan, whom the latter was also able to help. She stated that according
to Dalawangbayan, the respondent asked for P200,000.00. She further testified
that she knew the respondent as Joselito M. Salud, and not Cielito Salud.[27] After
the incident, she wrote a letter to Associate Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. to ask
for assistance regarding her appeal bond.
Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Laguas counsel, testified that it was Engineer Art
Baluran who hired him as counsel of the said accused. He stated that he gave an
oral authorization to Baluran to get the CA resolutions or orders; Baluran was the
one who furnished him a copy of the resolution.[28] He called Mr. Baluran to say
that an order for Laguas release had already been issued by the appellate court.
The witness stated, however, that he had never seen the respondent before. [29]
The respondent testified that he has been a CA employee since 1991. He
admitted that he knew Flores, and met her in January 1999 when he brought
Gamils order of release in the Batangas City Jail. He claimed that he was waiting
for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who would pay for his fare home,
and while waiting, he talked to the jailguard/warden. Flores then approached him
and asked him if he was from the CA. When the respondent answered in the
affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her neighbor in Bian, Laguna.
The respondent admitted that he was in the Correctional Institute for Women
in Mandaluyong City on May 16, 1999, as he was then visiting Vilma
Dalawangbayan. He also saw Flores.[30]When asked why he visited
Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores had written a letter to him
(which he dubbed as maintrigang sulat)[31] addressed Lito Salud, Mailing Section,
Court of Appeals. In the said letter, Flores asked him to help Dalawangbayan, just
like he had helped Gamil. The respondent then showed the letter to then Chief of
Office Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told him, Puntahan mo yan, Lito at maintriga
′yang sulat na yan, baka tayo mapahamak dyan.[32] Thus, he went to the
Correctional Institute in Mandaluyong City to sort things out with Dalawangbayan
and Gamil. The respondent, however, stated that he could not find the letter
anywhere and had already been lost.[33]
During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional facility, Flores approached
him in the visiting hall, and said suddenly, Sandali lang, Kuya, then left. He then
talked to Dalawangbayan about the controversial letter, explaining that his job in
the Court of Appeals was only to remand the records and deliver the Orders for
release, just like what he did in Gamils case. [34] He again visited Dalawangbayan
on June 13, 1999[35] as evidenced by the entries in the visitors logbook. He was no
longer able to speak to Flores, but made five other such visits to Dalawangbayan
in the correctional facility.
Page 68 of 231
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong found that the
respondent was guilty as charged, and made the following recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION:
Page 69 of 231
Supreme Court for appropriate action, pursuant to Circular No. 30-91
of the Office of the Court Administrator.[36]
Page 70 of 231
First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text
messages in Atty. Madarangs cellphone: bkit, C rhodora to; CNO KAMAGANAK AT
ANONG PANGALAN MO; and SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI. The respondents
testimony on the matter is as follows:
ATTY. ROSERO:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Oo. I will just refer to your admission through your counsel that
Cellphone No. 6392044390[8]2 is yours. You admitted that?
ATTY. ROSERO:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.
ATTY. ROSERO:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Do you also admit that you called Atty. Madarang several times on
November 7, 2003?
ATTY. ROSERO:
Page 71 of 231
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Let me see the affidavit of Atty. Madarang. After this question, may I
ask for a continuance?
ATTY. ROSERO:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say that you are Rhodora?
A: Justice, nung ma-receive ko po ′yong text niya apat na beses ko pong
na-receive ang text ni Arlene.
INVESTIGATOR:
Who is Arlene?
Page 72 of 231
para ibigay ko sa inyo. Si Rhodora ba kasama? Hindi ko po
sinagot yon. Pangalawa, ′yun din po ang message nya. Ano ito?
Sa akin pong kuan, sa pag-iisip ko lang po, bakit dahil si Mr. Art
Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito? Text pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo.
Nang-iintriga na ′to. Pang-apat, intriga ′to. Text ko nga rin ′to,
lokohan lang tayo. Bkit si Rhodora ′to yun po ang sagot ko sa
kanya.
Q: Nakipaglokohan ka?
A: Sa text niya nakalagay dun na Si Rhodora ba kasama kaya po ako
nakipaglokohan dun.[43]
The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence
against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text
messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,[45] and shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that
he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira
Cruz-Apao.[46] In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the
complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a
case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
Page 73 of 231
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.
INVESTIGATOR:
Sino siya?
Page 74 of 231
A: Hindi po siya ′yong tawag po niya sa akin sa telepono nang malaman
po dito sa CA na ako ay kinasuhan ninyo tumawag po siya sa
Personnel.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Who is siya?
A: Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.
INVESTIGATOR:
Lalaki o babae?
INVESTIGATOR:
Sinong kinakausap?
A: Ako po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Hinahanap ka?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
INVESTIGATOR:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Page 75 of 231
Q: Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered the phone, what did you
say?
A: Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, pupuwede mo ba akong matulungan sa
paggawa ng affidavit dahil kinasuhan nga ako ni Justice
Magtolis.
INVESTIGATOR:
Anonymous caller.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
You are very fond of answering calls. You dont even know the name.
Q: That anonymous caller told you that there must be some deals
between Rhodora and someone from the Criminal Section?
A: ′Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang tsismis dyan sa labas.
INVESTIGATOR:
Page 76 of 231
Anong sagot mo raw?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
INVESTIGATOR:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: How about the man, the gentleman or the boy who called?
A: Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
ATTY. ROSERO:
A: Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na ganuon din po na narinig din po
niya sa labas.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q: Alright, you were not the one who answered the call?
A: Hindi po.
Page 77 of 231
Q: When you answered, what was your first word?
A: Hello!
Q: What next?
A: Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin ganito po
Q: Who was the first one who said something other than hello?
A: Siya po ang nauna.
Q: After the conversation with the lady and that gentleman who called
you to offer some help and afterwards did not help at all, what
happened?
A: Wala na po.
Q: Did you not check with Rhodora, What is this they are talking about
that it might be between you and someone in the Criminal
Section? You never asked her that?
A: Hindi ko na rin po
Q: You did not. But I thought you wanted help from those people who
can help you?
A: Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng pangalan dahil po sabi ng
unang babae ayaw nga rin po niyang sumabit sa kaso. [47]
Page 78 of 231
This respondents actuation on this matter, if at all true, is again contrary to
the normal reaction of one who has been administratively charged, and wants to
clear his name of any wrongdoing.
The Investigating Officer also found that the respondent was high-strung
during his testimony, and this finding must be accorded respect. Indeed, when the
issue is the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is primarily lodged
in the investigating judge. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality,
to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal
cases where preponderance of evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt,
respectively, are required, applies a fortiori in administrative cases where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The investigating judge is
in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having
personally heard them when they testified, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying.[48] Thus, the following findings of Atty. Longalong are well
taken:
However, respondent denied receiving P20,000 from Gamil
and P15,000 from Flores and signing LM Salud on Flores notebooks
(Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but admitted visiting Vilma at the Correctional
Institute for Women 8 times from May to August 1999. Respondents
denial here appears self-serving and incredible considering his
admission of going to the Correctional Institute for Women several
times for no valid official reason. Moreover, although Flores is a convict
for estafa, her
testimony on the matter was more consistent and credible. Likewise,
respondent admitted seeing Flores at the Correctional Institute for
Women and that Flores mailed her letter to him on May 16, 1999 which
he called maintriga. He also admitted that he told Flores to seek the
help of Justice Vasquez on her case. The foregoing, plus the fact that
Flores eventually wrote Justice Vasquez, confirms the truth of Flores
testimony on the matter.
Page 79 of 231
their testimonies than the nervous and [high-strung] demeanor of
respondent during his testimony. Moreover, complainant and her
witnesses, including the superiors of respondent, have no reason or
motive whatsoever to testify falsely against him. Respondents defense
of denial is inherently a weak defense. It is well settled that denial, to
be believed, must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability,
otherwise the denial is purely self-serving and with nil evidentiary value
(People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323 SCRA 201). Like the defense of
alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations (People of the
Philippines vs. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652).
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect, a sacred place where
litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed
with. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.
The conduct and behavior required of every court personnel, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must, at all times, be
characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and
keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service. [49] Public service
requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with
other people.[50]
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money
to facilitate the issuance of the appeal bond and release order which he himself
served, the surrounding circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in his
testimony, point towards administrative culpability. The respondents actuations
fall short of the standard required of a public servant. He is guilty of gross or grave
misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior,[51] while gross, has been defined as out of
all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused.[52] Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first offense,
as it is classified as a grave offense. However, considering that the respondent has
not been previously charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that
a penalty of suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose of
disciplining the respondent.
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any
position lower than that of a judge or justice, are involved in the dispensation of
justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon them
as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.[53] Thus, any conduct which tends to
diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
Page 80 of 231
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Cielito M. Salud is
found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a
period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months, effective immediately. He is
further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his receipt of this Decision
to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
SO ORDERED.
Page 81 of 231
18. [G.R. No. 144656. May 9, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRICO
VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy
Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of
Rape with Homicide alleged:
That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality
of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Trial Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child
against the latters will and while raping the said victim, said accused strangled
her to death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the
victims mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo
Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of the Public
Attorneys Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc,
NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station;
and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victims mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to
their neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo,
the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimees house,
where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from
Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was
wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came
back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-
appellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to
her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the
latters house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon
nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter
and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida
that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her
lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma.
Nida looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she was not there,
either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbors
house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her
Page 82 of 231
classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told
that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they
saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also
told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even
watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of
June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, June 11,
1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 oclock in
the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her
daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the
compuerta by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall
when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with
her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and
Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay
officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay
hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen
alive.[3]
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her
house. She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing as their noise was
keeping Jessiemins one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and watched
television instead from the door of Jessiemins house. About five minutes later,
accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of
which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the compuerta.
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon, while she and
her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house, accused-
appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only
his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They noticed both his
shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant left.[4]
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at
about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband
and children were walking towards the compuerta near the seashore of Ligtong,
Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio who said that it was a good
day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason, according to this witness, they
decided to get some fishing implements. She said they met accused-appellant
Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked
troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was
unusual. She also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt (sando) were
wet, but his face and hair were not.[5]
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief
Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia,
SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisys body was already in
the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy
was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white panty with a dirty white sleeveless
shirt wrapped around her neck. The body was afterwards taken to the Samson
Page 83 of 231
Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police showed
that one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit
the body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a
certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen
with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10
1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin
Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accused-
appellant at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the
white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back,
and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-
appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were
turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. [6]
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00
oclock in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination of
accused-appellant. His findings[7] showed the following:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left,
7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect,
24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0
cms.
Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral
Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy
Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings: [8]
Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes
and tongue protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation.
Washerwomans hands and feet.
Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms.
Contused abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower
lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks) anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right
antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd,
1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior
aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle,
ring and little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms.
and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x
2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
Fracture, tracheal rings.
Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. Petechial
hemorrhages, subendocardial, subpleural.
Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
Stomach, contains rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
Page 84 of 231
GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora,
gaping and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations,
complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 oclock positions, edges with blood clots.
[Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was
informed of the rape and murder at past 10:00 oclock in the evening of June 11,
1999. The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where
accused-appellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-appellant at
first denied having anything to do with the killing and rape of the child. The mayor
said he told accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell the
truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he
killed the victim by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under
the influence of drugs. The mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have
the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When
accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his house
and took him to the police station about 11:00 oclock that evening. [9]
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutans testimony. He said that upon
arriving at the police station, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services
as counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva
testified that he sort of discouraged the former from making statements as
anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing
to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia,
the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave
could and might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions
from accused-appellant, who gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After
the statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards
signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any indication that
accused-appellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh.
M), accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to death,
but denied having molested her.[10]
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999,
he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory
examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt
worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victims
clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1
Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence
of human blood and its groups.[11]
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed
accused-appellant to belong to Group O. The following specimens: (1) one (1) white
no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches Grizzlies in front and SAMARTINO at
the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white
small Hello Kitty T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) cut pink short pants
with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) cut dirty white small panty with reddish
brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group A.[12]
Page 85 of 231
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a
conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had
raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to
accept the punishment that would be meted out on him because of the grievous
offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was
remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1
Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.[13]
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc
at around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a
handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail
of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed
the victim but that he had before that raped her. Accused-appellant said he laid
down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He claimed that she did not resist
when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis
into the victims vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he
panicked and killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near
the compuerta and went home.[14]
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office, testified that at
noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc
came together with accused-appellant and some policemen.Prosecutor Itoc asked
Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his confession. Atty. Agbunag
read the document, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and
warned him that the document could be used against him and that he could be
convicted of the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant said
that he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was bothered
by his conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his
signature to the document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc. [15]
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic
Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-
appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim,
namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the
DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on
the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the
victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of
accused-appellant and the victim.[16]
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and
his sister Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister Abigail were
in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola
came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school project. After making the
request, Daisy left.[17] Accused-appellant did not immediately make the drawing
because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the
drawing at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon and gave it to the victims aunt,
Glory. He then returned home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go
out of the house until 7:00 oclock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was
Page 86 of 231
looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that he had not seen
Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the pilapil and talked with
some friends, and, at about 8:00 oclock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he
was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not know
anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at 11:00 oclock
that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police headquarters for
questioning. His mother went with him to the police station.There, accused-
appellant was asked whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of
Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 oclock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his
house to get the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which
were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of their house. According
to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and killed
Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating
him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted
cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva
went to see him in the investigation room of the police station and told him that
they would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he wanted
him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said he answered in the
affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-
appellant claimed that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the
commission of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated
him. Accused-appellant said he did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had
been tortured because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It
appears that the family of accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna
on July 12, 1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of their
barangay.[18] According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were
not present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the
same. Accused-appellant claims that although Exhibit N was in his own
handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by
the police.[19]
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide, as charged in the Information, accordingly hereby
sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is directed to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY
Page 87 of 231
AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT
TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING
PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME
WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE
LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM
EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE.
We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.[21] In rape with homicide,
the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is
because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have
been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the
perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct
evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is
unreasonable.[22]
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejos house, where accused-appellant was
residing, at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy
went together to the latters house to get a book from which the former
could copy Daisys school project. After getting the book, they proceeded
to accused-appellants residence.
3. From accused-appellants house, Daisy then went to the house of
Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-appellant
thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the latter went
with him towards the compuerta.
4. At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and
Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the compuerta, with
his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair
were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and
Page 88 of 231
troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as
was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for
catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw
accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen
also noticed that accused-appellants clothes were wet but not his face
nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her
daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her
classmate Rosarios house. The information proved to be false.
8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near
the compuerta.
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his
feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were
bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on
Daisys clothes were found positive of human blood type A.
11. Accused-appellant has blood type O.
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well
as that of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were
not proven to have been that of the victim as the victims blood type was not
determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist
Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellants and the victims clothing yielded
bloodstains of the same blood type A.[24] Even if there was no direct determination
as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim
was blood type A since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which
would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing.[25] That it was the
victims blood which predominantly registered in the examination was explained
by Mr. Buan, thus:[26]
ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being
committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood
of the victim and the blood of the assailant might mix in that particular item
like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim
and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant
blood in it, it will be the one which will register. For example, if there is more
blood coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to register, on
occasions when the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A
and no type O blood was found?
A: Yes, sir.
Page 89 of 231
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his
bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the
policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereafter,
they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the back
of the house where dirty clothes were kept.[27] There is no showing, however, that
accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments. Indeed, that
the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police
becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions. A
consented warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the consent of the owner of the
house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality. [28]
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc
is also questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to
show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated,
considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before
they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or
her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct
and unique.[29]
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime
or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect
and the victim.[30]
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample.[31] The samples collected
are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. [32] The test
may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different
sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis
or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the
samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of
reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the
protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(inclusion).[33] In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst
proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity. [34]
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of
accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair
Page 90 of 231
and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human
DNA,[35] because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the
clothing of the victim and of the accused gave negative results for the
presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the reason for this when there
are still bloodstains on the clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological
methods were already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry
from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this case, and we also
interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how was
the state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that these
specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the
laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have
hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. So
when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr. Byron could
have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological
method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So negative results
were found on the clothings that were submitted which were specimens no.
1 to 5 in my report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the
victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the
smear on the slide was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already
informed Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed the state of the
specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that could help
us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative
results and the swabs gave positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did
they show negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any
root. So any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of ones skin would
give negative results as the hair shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails
did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA
analysis also, Sir.
Q: So its the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative
result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used?
A: Yes, Sir.
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and
not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for
the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the
victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the
experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:[36]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Page 91 of 231
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of
the accused in this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the
victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is very definite and conclusive?
A: Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other
conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is
weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only
consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence,
such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in
its effect upon the court.[37] This is how it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written
confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral
confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the
extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt
with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without
the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same
section.[38]
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of
Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for
being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one already under
custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of
counsel. With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva testified: [39]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to confer
with him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Page 92 of 231
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a
lawyer during that investigation?
A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent
him in that investigation, Sir.
Q: And what was his answer?
A: He said yes.
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used against
him, so its a sort of discouraging him from making any statement to the
police, Sir.
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:[40]
Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of
the accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not
inform the accused that the statement that he will be giving might be used
against him in a court of justice?
A: I did that, Sir.
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
PROSECUTOR LU
The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor.
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa
iyo.
COURT
Let the witness answer.
A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and
nothing but the truth.
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor
Renato Abutan,[41] it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as
follows:[42]
ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that document
which you are supposed to have executed and signed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or
narrate all what I know about this case, Sir.
Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give
that statement?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial
confession?
A: Yes, Sir.
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the
consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions
Page 93 of 231
he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva
who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a
lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which
might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed,
counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.[43]
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted
the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. [44] And
counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
where the latter never raised any objection against the formers appointment
during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed
to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. [45]Contrary to the
assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of
Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan. [46]
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan[47] and People
vs. Mantung[48] do not apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and
that of the case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the accused made
extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of
them, the extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the
spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note
further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense.
Indeed, the mayors questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of
an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one
of his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:[49]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what
exactly did he tell you?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told
me. Then I told him that I will not be able to help him if he will not tell me
the truth.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
A: I asked him, Were you under the influence of drugs at that time?
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: I told him, What reason pushed you to do that thing? x x x
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you
what happened.
A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is
why he strangled the child, Sir. (Ang sabi niya po sa kin, nakita niya raw
yung bata na parang walang ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.)
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Page 94 of 231
Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were
you thinking at that time?
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor.
In People vs. Mantung,[50] this Court said:
Never was it raised during the trial that Mantungs admission during the press
conference was coerced or made under duress. As the records show, accused-
appellant voluntarily made the statements in response to Mayor Marquez
question as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in
the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because
they made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt
compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent
or to do deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but he did
not; thus accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[51]
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have
this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was uncounselled and
that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of
the NBI. The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva
has already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to
accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as
part of his tasks. As Buan testified:[52]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with him?
A: It is customary when we examine the accused. During the examination, we
talk to them for me to add knowledge on the case, Sir.
Q: What did you talk about during your conversation?
A: I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola,
Sir.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He said yes, Sir.
Q: What else did you ask the accused?
Page 95 of 231
A: I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling remorse on the
killing, Sir.
....
Q: And it was you who initiated the conversation?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you usually do that?
A: Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
Q: Is that part of your procedure?
A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir. And
any information either on the victim or from the suspect will help me
personally. Its not an SOP, Sir.
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an
ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence.
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant
is also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of
torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by
the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not
sufficient. The standing rule is that where the defendants did not present evidence
of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to
complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute
any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies;
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.[53] Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary,
and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarants consent in
executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained. [54]
Accused-appellants claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by
policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by any
proof:[55]
ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did they further interrogate you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did they ask you?
A: They were asking me the project, Sir.
Q: What else?
A: That is the only thing, Sir.
Q: Who was doing the questioning?
A: The investigator, Sir.
Q: How many were they inside that room?
A: Five, Sir.
Q: They are all policemen?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
A: Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.
Page 96 of 231
Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 oclock in the evening, what did
you do there?
A: They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something, Sir.
Q: In what way did they force you to admit something?
A: They were mauling me, Sir.
Q: The 5 of them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the
questioning?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: In what way did they hurt you?
A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me with
a needle, Sir.
Q: Who did these things to you?
A: Mercado, Sir.
Q: Who is this Mercado?
A: EPZA policemen, Sir.
Q: Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?
A: They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
Q: In what way did they force you to remove your clothes?
A: They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time,
Sir.
Q: Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your pants?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What?
A: They boxed me, Sir.
Q: What else, if any?
A: They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
Q: What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette butt?
A: It was painful, Sir.
Q: In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle?
A: At my private part, Sir.
These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified that
he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 oclock in the morning until
11:00 oclock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed,
tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the
crime. However, accused-appellant was physically examined by Dr. Antonio
Vertido at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of the same day.While the results show
that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his
claim of torture. As Dr. Vertido testified:[56]
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of
the suspect?
Page 97 of 231
A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and feet
of the suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior
aspect and at the same time, a laceration on the left ring finger.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain
physical injuries on his person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior
lateral aspect lower third of the knee, what could have caused this injury?
A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a rough
surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or object
and laceration is the forcible contact of the skin from that blunt object.
Q: I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the left ring finger,
posterior aspect and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what could
have caused those injuries on the accused?
A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring
finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir.
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio
Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left
finger. Dr. Vertidos findings are more consistent with the theory that accused-
appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim
during the commission of the rape in the compuerta.
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed
confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution
witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellants
guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork
of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been
motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever
called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellants
sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that
alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives,
and not by credible persons.[57] It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this
Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case,
it is corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.[58]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that When by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.[59] Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico
Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
Page 98 of 231
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of
the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Page 99 of 231
19. G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias
"KAWIT", appellant.
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in
order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon
stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the
victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,
seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of
their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were
talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel
Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before
Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go
to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay
home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn
was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by
the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside
the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita
asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw
appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang
and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was
Page 100 of 231
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the
back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This
time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told
her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could
use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked
her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s
husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back
of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the
lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba.
The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she
asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that
the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped
in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the
naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her
husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam
and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out
of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter
of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman
was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab
wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals
beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white
shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself.
Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten
meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the
Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel
exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer
Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was
arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
Page 101 of 231
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly,
sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court
in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that
the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight
on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if
not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show
that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness
is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab
and five (5) incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a
portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1,
1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine
(9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?
In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench
and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this
petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated September 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth;
(b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that
he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate
of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f)
clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent
learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial
court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance, issued the Order[3]setting the case for hearing and urging anyone
who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July
30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued
the Order[9] setting aside the courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30,
2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing) be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the
morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[10]
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner
for filing the petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. The court stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum shopping, and
it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition
were not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also
dismissed respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test,
and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It
noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence [11] allows the conduct of DNA testing,
whether at the courts instance or upon application of any person who has legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and
rescheduled the hearing.[13]
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning
the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of
respondent, thus:
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondents special
appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed
only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent.
Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute,
the rule could not really have been intended to trample on the substantive
rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote
disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to
legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the
situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking
of a DNA test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately
available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the
presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result.
Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the
danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test
even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x If at
anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed
order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the
prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for
opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual
sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to
harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children
may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT
ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A
PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE
MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO)
FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN
ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER
ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS
MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of
the petition does not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly
indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the
petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason
for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of
cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should
have simply denied the motion.[18] Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule
on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of filiation
before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the
four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in Herrera v.
Alba.[19]Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this
point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken
up during the trial.[20]
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the
petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners
assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition
was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right
to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary
appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack
of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in
the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is
equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised
before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons.
We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the
first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The
answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is,
whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the
allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioners personal
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their
veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny
the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove
his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the
trial of the case on the merits.[33]
The statement in Herrera v. Alba[34] that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-
called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced.
A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima
facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether,
under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no
such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set
the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In
light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
good cause for the holding of the test. [36] In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must
be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
SO ORDERED.
On 9 January 1990, appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a Criminal
Complaint[4] which reads:
That on or about 9:00 P.M. of July 15, 1989, at Brgy[.]
Daramuangan, Municipality of Naguilian, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who was armed with a fan knife and by means
of force and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeeded in having a sexual intercourse to [sic] the
undersigned who is unmarried woman of good reputation, a woman
who is over 12 but below 18 years old [sic] of age, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
It was only five (5) years later, or sometime in 1995, that appellant was arrested.
It took place when he went to the Municipal Hall of Naguilian to secure a police
clearance.
It was around 9:00 oclock in the evening of July 15, 1989, while
on her way to her grandmothers home, when private
complainant [AAA][6] was accosted by a young male. It was only
Finding that the prosecution had proven appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA in the sum of P50,000.00.[11] In
so doing, the court a quo held that the discrepancies in AAAs testimony did not
impair her credibility. Despite some inconsistencies in her statement, the RTC
observed that AAAs demeanor on the witness stand did not indicate any falsehood
in her narration.[12]
The trial court likewise rejected appellants defense of alibi, ruling that he did
not prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
given the testimonies that he and complainant were residing in the same barrio.[13]
Appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in giving full faith and credence
to the testimony of the complaining witness and in not acquitting him on
reasonable doubt. He avers that apparently AAA filed the complaint against him
only upon the prodding of her mother.[16] This aspect, appellant insists, negates
AAAs claim that he was the one who raped her but rather supports his assertion
that the sexual congress AAA engaged in was with another man, her real lover who
was married to another woman.[17] Appellant further puts in issue the long delay
in AAAs filing of the complaint.[18]
Once again, this Court is called upon to determine whether the prosecution
has successfully met the level of proof needed to find appellant guilty of the crime
of rape.
Among the many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense,
the disharmony on a certain point stands out. Appellant, on one hand, testified
that although he had courted AAA, they were not sweethearts. Therefore, this
testimony largely discounts the possibility of consensual coitus between him and
AAA. On the other, AAA made contradictory allegations at the preliminary
investigation and on the witness stand with respect to the nature of her
relationship with appellant. First, she claimed that she met appellant only on the
day of the purported rape; later, she stated that they were actually friends; and
still later, she admitted that they were close.[20]
The ground work for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was
first laid out in Tijing v. Court of Appeals,[27] where the Court said
The leading case of Herrera v. Alba,[29] where the validity of a DNA test as a
probative tool to determine filiation in our jurisdiction was put in issue, discussed
DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our
jurisdiction. Thus:
xxxx
xxxx
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA
evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of
the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue
of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the
issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on
jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar and In re: The Writ of
Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa. In Yatar, a match existed
between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA
profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The
Court, following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant
because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial
evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa,
the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not
the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the
rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the
convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victims child does not
preclude the convict-petitioners commission of rape.[30]
What should be the proper scope of such hearings? Section 4 of the Rules
spells out the matters which the trial court must determine, thus:
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing.
The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior
court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.[34]
Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar, it shall order
the same, in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules.[35] It is also the RTC which
shall determine the institution[36] to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are
free to manifest their comments on the choice of DNA testing center.
After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who
wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of
evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess
the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules, to wit:
(a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether
the theory or technique can be and has been tested;
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.[39]
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in
the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the
records, i.e.: that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested
parties are appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments; that
the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons
in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for
tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.
A final note. In order to facilitate the execution of this Resolution, though the
parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may
be advanced by this Court if needed.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA
evidence in accordance with the terms of this Resolution. The RTC is further
directed to report to the Court the results of the proceedings below within sixty
(60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of
a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of
a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is
not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August
18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment rendered on
November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil
Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave,
represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev.
Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila dismissing the respondents’ action for quieting of title.2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, 3 the
respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo
S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the property during
their lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession
of the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could
not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of
TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the
original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been
maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase
covering the property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be
cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF:
MARGARITA PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF ₱120,000.00, THE HEREIN
REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO
REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD
OF SIX MONTH (sic) FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET
FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A. RAZON,
NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M. 4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him to travel
from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were
Page 141 of 231
then residing in order only to negotiate and consummate the sale of the property.
This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested
that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in
1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975, or three
days prior to his final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
suffered from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough
productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious" but
"weak" and "bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but
no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered
90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975 could not command belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did
not themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved at best that a
document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was
not conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner
of the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this
is that registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which
an instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated
on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the
instrument.35 It is relevant to mention that the law on land registration does not
require that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of
registration is only to give notice.36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could
only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by
him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the
property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise,
Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised her right to take over the
property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the
repurchase period stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her
name and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an
index of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005
by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita
Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether
these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the
deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such
intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties
that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone
to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity,
and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as
the May 11, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No.
69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.[4]
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396
in the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively,
as they are disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;
SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural
land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties
that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is
the husband[7] of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is
tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged
properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI.RBBI eventually consolidated title to the
properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT
No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained
the following description:
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property
and contained the following description:
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
without any reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from
RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention
the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the property
(TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property. There is no
evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong property, or
demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the
Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the Murong
property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and
brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the
Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any
landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later,
on July 1, 1994.[12]
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor
of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs
described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located
in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title
corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to
RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated
in Barangay Murong. The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
[19]
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the
respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the
petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners
CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the
execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The
complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the
petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as
documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of
Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as
farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good
faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property,
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-
back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the
transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in
conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision[23]
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale
and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the
said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of
sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-
RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the
particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong
property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual
tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants
of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI
to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong
property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts
with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision[24]
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled
that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-
farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the
DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they
issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular
performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by the
respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong property,
hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI,
the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It
gave more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property,
not the Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
SO ORDERED.[25]
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that
they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong
property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds
of conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents
Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what
was sold to them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and
CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be
understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule
130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents,
particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed
of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong
property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with
TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The
additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located
in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled
that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the
subject property since the same particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration,
which were separately denied.[28]
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 163320, with this Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to
appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean hands because they misled
RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also
asked that they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself
at anyones expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of
merit. The said Resolution reads:
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry of judgment
was made in that case on December 15, 2004.[32]
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts
determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review
on Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts
rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best
Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question
that is within the Courts authority to review.[35]
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the
same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only questions of law admits of
exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.[36]
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule
because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous
application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the
disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320
because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The
bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but
simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for allegedly
misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the
two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court
with clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts
Decision. It is the appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the
appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the
clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support
his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not
always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply
be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even
procedural lapses.
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice
petitioners who were not parties to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly
filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and effectively present their
arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just
because another party had already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other
partys separate appeal had already been dismissed.[39]
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against
RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the
commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA was filed,
RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule
on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to
third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment which
may be rendered against the vendor.[41]
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale
between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by
RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land
covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to
determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the contracts
but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their
contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be
applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is
preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by
the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject;
while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as
its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners
(and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually
intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the
petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical error. On the
other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their true
intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects
an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the
instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the
ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and
rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the
contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what
it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at
bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI
and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9
specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.[44]
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the
subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also
describe the subject property as being located in Barangay Murong. Even the
respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers
to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to
sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination
of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the
parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting
parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which
is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life,
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving
the interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the
latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is
likewise enlightening:
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to
transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey
the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the
respondents was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the execution
in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that
could show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong
property. They did not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the
parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and
tilled the same without any objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid
leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support
their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the
Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties
actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it
appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due
to their honest but mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such
a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the
Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the
particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are
bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed technical
description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were
intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why
petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract.[46] A cause of action
for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting parties
manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the
parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs
because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents
and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners
cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling
against RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our
ruling herein. Although the CAs decision had already become final and executory as
against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein
in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the
CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October
7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of
the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985
between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property
under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos.
CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No.
T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs
against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Engr. Bayani Magdayao
of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20549 affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, Branch 8, convicting the petitioner
of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
The Antecedents
An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September
16, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that
he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, Philippine National
Bank, Dipolog Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make,
draw, issue and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to the latter,
PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, which check, however, when
presented for payment with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and refused payment
for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds, and despite repeated
demands made by the private complainant on the accused, the latter, failed to make
good the checks value, to the damage and prejudice of RICKY OLVIS in the aforestated
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to adduce its
evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution, the
court allowed it to adduce evidence. The prosecution presented the private complainant,
Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the
petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967
dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn
against the latters account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in payment
of the petitioners obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on October 1,
1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee
bank dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds stamped
on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that when informed that his check was
dishonored, the petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on
his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again
offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check, but
because of the latters absence and that of his counsel, the direct examination on the
witness could not be terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examination
of Olvis be continued on another date, and that the petitioner be ordered to appear
before the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The
trial court granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In
the meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as
Exhibit A, and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit A-1.
After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his counsel failed
to appear before the court for continuation of trial. They again failed to appear when the
case was called for continuation of trial on November 21, 1995. The prosecution offered
in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, which the court admitted. The
trial court, thereafter, issued an Order declaring the case submitted for decision.[4] The
petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the trial court denied
on January 26, 1996.
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him to Adduce
Evidence alleging, inter alia, that:
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox copy of the PNB Check worth
P600,000.00, and further stressing that the same was paid, the prosecutor insisted,
against the vigorous objection of accused, in filing the case in Court. Plenty of water
passed under the bridge since then;[5]
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it dispensed with the
presentation of the original of the dishonored check because the same had been
returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out that the petitioner failed to object to the
presentation of the photocopy of the dishonored check.
In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the subject
check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecutions failure to produce the
original thereof. On July 8, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the petitioners
motion. The petitioners motion for reconsideration thereon was, likewise, denied by the
trial court.
On January 29, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the
crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused established beyond reasonable doubt,
the herein accused, Engr. Bayani Magdayao is convicted of the crime charged against
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner assigned the following errors:
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WITHOUT HIM BEING
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE COMPLAINANT OR OTHER WITNESS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE DECISION WITH ALLEGED
FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
IV
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In his petition at bar, the petitioner merely reiterates the errors he ascribed to the RTC
in his appeal before the CA, and prays that the decisions of the trial and appellate courts
be set aside.
On the first three assignments of error, the petitioner avers that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because of the following:
(a) the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the prosecution, is
inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence;
hence, has no probative weight; b) the prosecution failed to present the BPI-Family Bank
teller to testify on the presentment of PNB Check No. 399967 and the dishonor thereof;
and (c) the prosecution failed to prove that it was he who drew and delivered the
dishonored check to the private complainant, and that he was properly notified of the
dishonor of the said check. The petitioner also asserts that there was no legal basis for
the award of the amount of P6,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 for which the petitioner was charged, reads:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in
full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
To warrant the petitioners conviction of the crime charged, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the following essential elements thereof:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.[8]
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for payment.[9] As to the second element,
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the
funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the
state of mind of the drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in
evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more
specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the
dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best
evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party
for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat.[10]
As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear
showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren
of probative weight.[11]
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original
of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses
to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving
notice to the said party to produce the document.[12] The notice may be in the form of
a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the
latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for
P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy
his obligation to Olvis:
Q Sometime in the month of May 1991, do you remember that (sic) you have any
transaction with the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q If the photostatic copy of the check [would] be presented to you, would you be able to
identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I am showing to you a photostatic copy of PNB Dipolog Branch Check # 399967 with
a maturity date on September 30, 1991 in the amount of six hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000.00), is this the check issued to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Here is a signature at the bottom corner of this check, whose signature is this?
A Bayani Magdayao[s].
Q In other words, this check was issued for a valuable consideration in connection with
the project you have in Ipil?
A Yes, Sir.
A Sometime in October.
A In 1991, Sir.
Q Within a reasonable period from the maturity date of the check, you caused it to be
deposited?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this check was dishonored by the depository bank, that the account to which it
was drawn does not have sufficient fund, is that indicated in this check?
A Yes, Sir.
A Here, Sir.
ATTY. CO:
We pray, Your Honor, that the photostatic copy of the check be marked as Exhibit A.
The reason why it was dishonored, found at the back of this check, indicated as DAIF
meaning to say: Drawn Against Insufficient Fund be marked as Exhibit A-1.
Q After being informed that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, what did
you do?
A I went to Magdayaos house and asked for payment but he refused to pay.
Q When you say Magdayao, are you referring to the accused in this case, Bayani
Magdayao?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It appears that this is merely a photostatic copy of the check, where is the original of
the check?
Q At the time the accused in this case replaced this check worth six hundred thousand
(P600,000.00), was the case already pending before the City Fiscals Office or before this
Honorable Court?
Q Until now the amount of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00) has not been
paid to you?
A Yes, Sir.[14]
In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he
received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant[15] and
that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check.[16] The petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No.
399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a
photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus
Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special Manifestation filed on
May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation of the best
evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much
less offered to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the
check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence
in his defense, which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified postponements
as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of
the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored
check[17] to testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. The petitioner had already been informed of such fact of dishonor
and the reason therefor when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as
shown by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate
checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored
check.
Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that
of the prosecutions.
The petitioners contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the subject
check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to identify the petitioner
after his direct examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear.
The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to point to and
ATTY. CO:
Considering that the accused is not present, Your Honor, I would like to manifest that
the private offended party be given the opportunity to identify the accused for purposes
of this case.[18]
The trial court issued an Order on June 7, 1995, directing the petitioner, under pain of
contempt, to appear before it to enable Olvis to identify him:
After the declaration of the first and only witness for the prosecution, the private
prosecutor prayed to set the case for continuation of the trial, and ordering the
defendant to appear to allow the prosecution to establish his identity.
Set the case for continuation of the trial on June 13, 1995, ordering the accused to
appear personally for purposes of his identification in court under pain of contempt if
he fails to comply unjustifiably with this order. The defense shall be allowed to cross
examine the witness for the prosecution if desired, otherwise, his right of cross-
examination shall be considered waived completely.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The petitioner defied the Order of the court and failed to appear as directed, and as
gleaned from the records
(14) June 7, 1995 The accused and counsel did not appear; hence, the prosecution was
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The private complainant was presented to
testify in the direct-examination, reserving the right of cross-examination on the part of
the accused, and setting the case for the purpose on June 13, 1995.
(15) June 13, 1995 The accused did not appear, but the defense counsel requested for
a resetting of the cross-examination to be conducted. The request was granted over the
objection of the prosecution, and set the continuation of the trial to August 31, 1995.
(16) August 31, 1995 As in previous occasions, the accused did not appear and defense
counsel requested for another resetting, and despite the vigorous opposition by the
prosecution, the trial was postponed to October 3, 1995, with the understanding that if
the accused will not appear, it would be taken to mean that he waived his right to cross-
examination and to present evidence in his defense.
(17) October 3, 1995 Atty. Narciso Barbaso appeared as a new counsel for the accused
but requested that he be allowed to read first the transcript of the direct testimony of
the plaintiffs witness to be cross-examined. The request was granted, and the trial was
reset to November 21, 1995.
(19) December 7, 1995 The defense filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
November 21, 1995. The court required the defense to file a supplemental motion stating
the nature of its evidence to be presented if allowed to enable the court to determine the
merit of the motion for reconsideration, but despite the lapsed (sic) of the period set by
the court, the accused did not comply; hence, the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, and set the case for promulgation of the judgment on February 19,
1996.
(20) Then came the Omnibus Supplemental Motion, etc., by the accused dated February
8, 1996, and by reason thereof, the promulgation of the judgment set on February 19,
1996, was held in abeyance.
(21) The defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused dated
February 27, 1996, and which was granted by the order of the court dated March 1,
1996.
[(22)] May 28, 1996 A Special Manifestation dated May 21, 1996 in support of the
Omnibus Supplemental Motion filed thru another lawyer appearing as a new counsel
for the accused, now under consideration.[20]
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the trial court did not award P6,000.00 as civil
indemnity in favor of Olvis; it ordered the petitioner to pay him P600,000.00, the amount
of the subject check. Having failed to pay the amount of the check, the petitioner is liable
therefor and should be ordered to pay the same to the private complainant in this
case.[21]
On the second assigned error, the petitioner faulted the trial court for imposing a penalty
of imprisonment instead of a penalty of fine, and cites SC Circular No. 12-2000 to bolster
his contention. He suggests that since he is merely a first offender, he should be
sentenced to pay a fine double the amount of the check.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, objects to the petitioners plea on
the ground that when the latter drew and issued the dishonored check to the private
complainant, he knew that the residue of his funds in the drawee bank was insufficient
to pay the amount thereof.
Considering the facts and circumstances attendant in this case, we find the petitioners
plea to be barren of merit. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides:
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing
to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence
on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
imprisonment.[22]
The records show that despite the numerous opportunities given to him by the trial
court, the petitioner refused to adduce any evidence in his behalf. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals found the petitioners appeal to be devoid of merit. Considering the factual
milieu in this case, there is every reason for the Court to reject the plea for a penalty of
fine and maintain the penalty of imprisonment the trial court imposed on the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum of Money in favor of the plaintiff.
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business
enterprises[3] namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua;
Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy
Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan
Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins
death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.[4]
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio
Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will
use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed
that the loan will be payable within six (6) months without interest. [7] On June 7,
1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking Corporation Check No.
240810[8] for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in Marilao,
Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.
On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale
over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration
of P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.[9]
Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from
respondent within the designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand
letter,[10] dated March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle their obligation with the
warning that he will be constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they fail
to do so.
In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from
him an accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries,
and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right
whatsoever in these businesses that would entitle them to an accounting thereof.
Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by them as
a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber. [13]
With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended
Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the
compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the
respondent has arrogated to himself. They claimed that, despite repeated
demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of
Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her share therein. They then prayed that
respondent make an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to
deliver to petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof, which was estimated to be
worth not less than P500,000.00.[14]
On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio vascular and
respiratory failure.[21]
SO ORDERED.[22]
The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount
of P200,000.00 with interest. It noted that respondent personally issued Check
No. 240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their request to lend them the
aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded that the P200,000.00 was a loan
advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not remunerations for
services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the profits
of their parents businesses.
The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed
of Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy
Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was never impugned. Although
respondent failed to produce the originals of the documents, petitioner judicially
admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her
signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As for
the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-
presentation of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as
well as the truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the documents themselves do
not contest their validity. Ultimately, petitioner failed to establish her right to
demand an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of
her 1/6 share therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when
it considered the amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not Concepcions
share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the
defendant, plaintiffs testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party
under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; and (3) when it considered
admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that
respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.[24]
On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. [25] The appellate
court found baseless the petitioners argument that the RTC should not have
included respondents testimony as part of petitioners evidence. The CA noted that
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following errors:
Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs
treatment of the respondents testimony as adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the
adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be
considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the examination of
respondent as adverse witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound
by his testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his own counsel.[29] In
particular, the petitioner avers that the following testimony of the respondent as
adverse witness should not be considered as her evidence:
(11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on the other hand, was acquired
by the sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial Partition
and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH.
I);
We do not agree that petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment
of the respondents testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence
of one party or the other is only significant in determining whether the party on
whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence
needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the
plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is
that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the
evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined
by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the
calling party will not be bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it
was at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an
ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party,[32] except by evidence of his bad
character.[33] Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness,
although the calling party does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is
nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the
latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other
evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.[35] A rule
that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his
testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his
testimony or from impeaching him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit
the respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The
petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the
transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-
examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that
the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement.
She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action
concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant
that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.
Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the
petitioner and her husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on record.
Hence, we do not agree with the petitioners contention that the RTC has overlooked
certain facts of great weight and value in arriving at its decision. The RTC merely
took into consideration evidence which it found to be more credible than the self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings
of fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even
finality, by this Court. Only errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court
in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[39] A departure from the general
rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by
the evidence on record.[40] There is no reason to apply the exception in the instant
case because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those
of the trial court. These findings are buttressed by the evidence on
record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged in this petition are substantially
the very same questions of fact raised by petitioner in the appellate court.
The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in
the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was
originally owned by the parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on
December 8, 1986, the heirs freely renounced and waived in favor of their sister
Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein, as shown by the
Deed of Partition which the petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua
Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when
the respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7,
1988, Chua Sioc Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that
time, both petitioner and respondent no longer had any interest in the business
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale
were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private document
converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity.[43] It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.[44] A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect
absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects recognized by law.[45] A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally, evidence of the
facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.[46]
The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document
is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document
was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original.[48] Moreover, production of the original
may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does
not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will
be served by requiring production.[49]
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the
instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the
RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner
never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition.[50] As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its
genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the
manner required by the rules.[51] The petitioner merely claimed that said
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and its Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter [9] addressed to
Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President[10] of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel
Corporation], to confirm MCCs and Sanyo Seikis order of 220 metric tons (MT) of
hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan,
on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on
the conforme portion of the letter.[11]
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTSO401[12] containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent
back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature [13] of Chan.
As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would
be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of
Ssangyong.[14] Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made
after the L/C had been opened.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel
was split into two,[16] one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTS0401-1[17] and another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2,[18] both
dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki
and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of
stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office informed Sanyo Seiki,
thru Chan, that it was able to secure a US$30/MT price adjustment on the
contracted price of US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the
goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on that day and the
second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000. Ssangyong reiterated its request for
the facilitation of the L/Cs opening.[21]
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on June 26, 2000, to the
Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it was looking forward to receiving the L/C
details and a cable copy thereof that day.[22] Ssangyong sent a separate letter of
the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the L/C covering
payment of the first 100MT not later than June 28, 2000.[23] Similar letters were
transmitted by Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, 2000.[24] On June 28, 2000,
Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that its principal
in Korea was already in a difficult situation[25] because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki
and MCC to open the L/Cs.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter signed by
Chan, requesting an extension of time to open the L/C because MCCs credit line
with the bank had been fully availed of in connection with another transaction,
and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line.[26] On the same date, Ssangyong
replied, requesting that it be informed of the date when the L/C would be opened,
preferably at the earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was having
problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing costs.[27] To maintain their
good business relationship and to support MCC in its financial predicament,
Ssangyong offered to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO, another
US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered. This was intimated
in Ssangyongs June 30, 2000 letter to MCC.[28] On July 6, 2000, another follow-
up letter[29] for the opening of the L/C was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00
covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice
No. ST2-POSTS080-2.[34] The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped
to and received by MCC.[35]
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by Chan,
requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-
POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was
US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike. [36]
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand
letter[37] to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with
a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000,
Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for
US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference, warehousing expenses, interests and
charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to
breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before
the Regional Trial Court of MakatiCity. In its complaint,[39] Ssangyong alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the
amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision[43] on March 24, 2004, in
favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when plaintiff agreed to sell and
defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860
per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction was evidenced by Pro
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[44]
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of record, Atty. Eladio
B. Samson, filed their Notice of Appeal.[45] On June 8, 2004, the law office of
Castillo Zamora & Poblador entered its appearance as their collaborating counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005,[46] MCC and Chan raised before the
CA the following errors of the RTC:
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision[48] affirming the ruling of the
trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability. The appellate court ruled, among
others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-
2 (Exhibits E, E-1 and F) were admissible in evidence, although they were mere
facsimile printouts of MCCs steel orders.[49] The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts decision reads:
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest, attorneys fees and costs
ordered by the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[50]
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCCs and Chans principal counsel,
Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on September 14, 2005.[51] Their collaborating counsel,
Castillo Zamora & Poblador,[52]likewise, received a copy of the CA decision
on September 19, 2005.[53]
Aggrieved, MCC filed a petition for review on certiorari[56] before this Court,
imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the petition, raising the
following arguments: that the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final
and executory, because MCCs motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the
reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof, and that, in any
case, it was a pro forma motion; that MCC breached the contract for the purchase
of the steel products when it failed to open the required letter of credit; that the
printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or telecopy transmissions were
properly admitted by the trial court because they are considered original
documents under R.A. No. 8792; and that MCC is liable for actual damages and
attorneys fees because of its breach, thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the following:
I Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory;
IV Whether the award of actual damages and attorneys fees in favor of Ssangyong
is proper and justified.
-I-
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora &
Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed both MCCs and Chans Brief and Reply
Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was for the
collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief and subsequent
pleadings in the CA. This explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which
filed the motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so
on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from September 29, 2005, when
they received their copy of the CA decision. This could also be the reason why the
CA did not find it necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of petitioners
motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override or
frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal, as in
this case, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, we gave
due course to the petitioners appeal despite the late filing of its brief in
the appellate court because such appeal involved public interest. We
stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a particular case
from a strict application of the rules of procedure where the appellant
failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in
the appellate courts failure to obtain jurisdiction over the
case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we also held that there is more
leeway to exempt a case from the strictness of procedural rules when
the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed
case. We emphasize that:
- II -
The second issue poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It provides the
occasion for this Court to pronounce a definitive interpretation of the equally
innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis-
-vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents within the
context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we
deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are
indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample
authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the
promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to
support its conclusions.[63]
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792,[64] otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes.[65] The Rules on Electronic Evidence[66] regards
an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and
electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following
terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
xxx
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792,[69] which
was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then Secretaries of the Department of Trade
and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these
Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
xxxx
The phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy in the IRRs definition of electronic data message
is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), [70] from which
majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken.[71] While Congress
deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the
IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and
pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
xxxx
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression
that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic
documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition
of an electronic data message under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL
Model Law, further supports this theory considering that the enumeration xxx
[is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy. And to telecopy is to send a document from one place to another
via a fax machine.[75]
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section
37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that
However, Congress deleted the phrase, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy, and replaced the
term data message (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with electronic data
message. This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the terms
international origin has bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an
inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction
or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law.[77] A construction should be rejected
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the
ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.[78]
xxxx
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please be allowed
to go back to Section 5; the Definition of Terms. In light of the
acceptance by the good Senator of my proposed amendments, it will
then become necessary to add certain terms in our list of terms to be
defined. I would like to add a definition on what is data, what is
electronic record and what is an electronic record system.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the definition
of Data Message which encompasses electronic records, electronic
writings and electronic documents?
The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The
term ELECTRONIC RECORD fixes the scope of our bill. The record is
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose
computer origin is never again called on are treated as paper records. In
that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the record
is irrelevant to its reliability.
xxxx
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term electronic
data message, it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-
generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce. In
explaining the term electronic record patterned after the E-Commerce Law of
Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term electronic data
message. This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Laws
terminology of data message, has assumed a different context, this time,
consonant with the term electronic record in the law of Canada. It accounts for
the addition of the word electronic and the deletion of the phrase but not limited
to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy. Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains
the term electronic record, as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act,
in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiagos explanation during the Senate
deliberations:
Electronic record fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data.
The record may be any medium. It is electronic because it is recorded
or stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is
intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards, or
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, paperless, but verily are
paper-based.
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it
adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Laws definition of data message,
without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the
phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy. The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a
basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative
agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal
a statute is vested in the Legislature.[91] Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between
the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuancean administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.[92] Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be
covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have
easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms electronic data message and
electronic document, as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do
not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
- III -
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence,
this Court finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the
existence of a perfected contract of sale.
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of the minds,
that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.[101]
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the
parties, respondent Ssangyong formally offered in evidence the testimonies of its
witnesses and the following exhibits:
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary
evidence, admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states,
[w]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
Page 203 of 231
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence must
prove the predicates thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original
without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the
proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.[103]
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of the
original fax transmissions of Exhibits E and F, and likewise did not sufficiently
prove the loss or destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be
admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on Exhibits
E and F to prove the perfected contract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of
other documents, as enumerated above, together with the testimonies of its
witnesses. Notable among them are Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-
1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to
MCC. As already mentioned, these invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier
invoices such that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price
reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices
submitted to the court bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits 1-A and 2-C), which
was certified by PCIBank as a true copy of its original,[105] it was, in fact, petitioner
MCC which introduced this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid for the
order stated in this invoice. Its admissibility, therefore, is not open to question.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of the trial court:
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half of the transaction if
there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties, started
with the petitioner and the respondent agreeing on the sale and purchase of
220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract
was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay, adjustments
in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties
slightly varied the terms of their contract, without necessarily novating it, to the
effect that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and
the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its
obligation and failed to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of
both parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale, even if the
writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as explicit
in establishing a contract.[107] Appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient
to establish an agreement, and while there may be instances where the exchange
of correspondence does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was closed,
the actions of the parties may indicate that a binding obligation has been
undertaken.[108]
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when
petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT), despite
numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its
contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a buyer to
furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the contract between buyer and
seller. Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated, the
seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach. Damages for failure
to open a commercial credit may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit
which the seller would reasonably have made had the transaction been carried
out.[109]
This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in accord with
the evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual or compensatory damages
cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty.[110] In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,[111] we explained that:
The statement of account and the details of the losses sustained by respondent
due to the said breach are, at best, self-serving. It was respondent Ssangyong itself
which prepared the said documents. The items therein are not even substantiated
by official receipts. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the said statement of
account is not sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and
on evidence of, the actual amount thereof.[113]
TOTAL: 95.562MT[115]
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit X (the invoice that was not paid):
TOTAL: 100MT[116]
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong did
not adequately prove that the items resold at a loss were the same items ordered
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual
obligation and obstinately refused to pay despite repeated demands from
respondent. Petitioner even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good
its obligation. But in spite of respondents continuous accommodation, petitioner
completely reneged on its contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity,
MCC must be held liable for nominal damages. Nominal damages are recoverable
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has
been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever
have been or can be shown.[117] Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages
of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
As to the award of attorneys fees, it is well settled that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate and not every winning party is entitled to an
automatic grant of attorneys fees. The party must show that he falls under one of
the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.[118] In the instant case,
however, the Court finds the award of attorneys fees proper, considering that
petitioner MCCs unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent Ssangyong
to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its rights.
SO ORDERED.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and
operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and
damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then moored at
the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before
the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioners
power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal
offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits
A to V together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their
respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to
strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that
xxxx
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by the
totality of the record on hand is that the respondent judge acted
correctly and within the pale of his sound discretion in issuing the
assailed order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-
18662.
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary
evidence.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the
respondent judge committed an error in denying the aforementioned
documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the petition for certiorari
filed in this case must fail. Such error would at most be only an error
of law and not an error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397,
the Supreme Court of the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in
case of an error of law. x x x.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually
constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an electronic
document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic document
can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically,
such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: any print-out
or output, readable by sight or other means.
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are
indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the following documents
offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62554 dated January 30, 2004 which set aside
the November 25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
10, Cebu City and reinstated the Decision of RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City dated
May 29, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-16474; and the CA Resolution dated May 26,
2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala
Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and
grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination.[4]
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznars card, Citibanks Credit Card
Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which
contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznars trip.[14]
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznars complaint for lack of merit.[15] The
trial court held that as between the computer print-out[16] presented by Aznar and
the Warning Cancellation Bulletins[17] presented by Citibank, the latter had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by
Citibank.[18] The trial court also held that even if it was shown that Aznars credit
card was dishonored by a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to
have acted with malice or bad faith when the same was dishonored. [19]
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying
that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he himself is a holder of a Citibank
credit card.[20] The case was re-raffled[21] and on November 25, 1998, the RTC, this
time through Judge Jesus S. De la Pea of Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order
granting Aznars motion for reconsideration, as follows:
Judge De la Pea ruled that: it is improbable that a man of Aznars stature would
fabricate Exh. G or the computer print-out which shows
that Aznars Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over
the limit; Exh. G was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of
business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as
she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial
notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities
which readily print out bank account status, Exh. G can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznars Mastercard; no rebutting evidence was
presented by Citibank to prove that Aznars Mastercard was not dishonored, as all
it proved was that said credit card was not included in the blacklisted cards; when
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibanks appeal
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed order of
the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in
Civil Case No. CEB-16474, is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision,
dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 20, Cebu City in this case is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card
and only presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments;
such dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by
Citibank; Exh. G is an electronic document which must be authenticated
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence [26] or under
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[27] by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. G,
thus it must be excluded; the unrefutedtestimony of Aznar that his credit card was
dishonored by Ingtan Agency and certain establishments abroad is not sufficient
to justify the award of damages in his favor, absent any showing that Citibank had
anything to do with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control over the
actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it should not be held liable for the dishonor
of Aznars credit card by said establishments.[28]
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution
dated May 26, 2004.[29]
Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la Pea was activated and
on April 29, 2005, the Courts Third Division[30] found respondent judge guilty of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and ordered his suspension for six
months. The Court held that Judge De la Pea erred in basing his Order on a
manifestation submitted by Aznar to support his Motion for Reconsideration,
when no copy of such manifestation was served on the adverse party and it was
Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review alleging that: the CA
erroneously made its own factual finding that his Mastercard was not blacklisted
when the matter of blacklisting was already a non-issue in the November 25, 1998
Order of the RTC; the RTC found that Aznars Mastercard was dishonored for the
reason that it was declared over the credit limit; this factual finding is supported
by Exh. G and by his (Aznars) testimony; the issue of dishonor on the ground
of DECL OVERLIMIT, although not alleged in the complaint, was tried with the
implied consent of the parties and should be treated as if raised in the pleadings
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; [32] Exh. G cannot
be excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following the Rules on
Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes
of the Best Evidence Rule; Exh. G has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable for the purpose for which it
was generated; the RTC judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the
issuance of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi; said
testimony constitutes the other evidence showing the integrity and reliability of
the print-out to the satisfaction of the judge which is required under the Rules on
Electronic Evidence; the trial court was also correct in finding that Citibank was
grossly negligent in failing to credit the additional deposit and make the necessary
entries in its systems to prevent Aznar from encountering any embarrassing
situation with the use of his Mastercard.[33]
Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar never had personal knowledge
that his credit card was blacklisted as he only presumed such fact; the issue of
dishonor on the ground that the card was declared over the limit was also never
tried with the implied consent of both parties; Aznars self-serving testimony is not
sufficient to prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. G; Aznar did not declare that
it was Nubi who printed the document and that said document was printed in his
presence as he merely said that the print-out was provided him; there is also no
annotation on Exh. G to establish that it was Nubi who printed the same;
assuming further that Exh. G is admissible and Aznars credit card was
dishonored, Citibank still cannot be held liable for damages as it only shows
that Aznars credit card was dishonored for having been declared over the
limit; Aznars cause of action against Citibank hinged on the alleged blacklisting of
his card which purportedly caused its dishonor; dishonor alone, however, is not
sufficient to award Aznar damages as he must prove that the dishonor was caused
by a grossly negligent act of Citibank; the award of damages in favor of Aznar was
based on Article 1170[34] of the Civil Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or delay
in the performance of its obligation; there was no proof, however that Citibank
committed fraud or delay or that it contravened its obligations towards Aznar; the
terms and conditions of the credit card cannot be considered as a contract of
adhesion since Aznar was entirely free to reject the card if he did not want the
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that Citibank assured him that
with the use of his Mastercard, he would never be turned down by any merchant
store, and that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Exh. G is
admissible in evidence.[38]
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that needs to be answered is:
whether Aznar has established his claim against Citibank.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to
establish his case based on a preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a
fact also has the burden of proving it.[40]
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several establishments
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to
prove with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted
his Mastercard or placed the same on the hot list.[41]
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: its entry in the hot list
was confirmed to be authentic.
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred
Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
Q. And after you were told that your card was denied you presumed that
it was blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. G, did not actually see the
document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his testimony are the
following:
xxxx
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went straight to the Service
Agency there and on the left hand side you will be able to
see the name of the person in-charged [sic] there certifying
that really my card is being blacklisted and there is the
signature there of the agency.
ATTY. NAVARRO:
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the signature over the
handwritten name of Victrina Elnado Nubi which I pray,
your honor, that the Computer Print Out be marked as our
Exhibit G and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion
of Victorina Elnado Nubi with her signature thereon be
encircled and be marked as our Exhibit G-1.
xxxx
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect
on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the
authentication of Exh. G would still be found wanting.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction of the
judge. The Court is not convinced. Aznars testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge
Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it was
issued by IngtanAgency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to
secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific
business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name
of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected
in the print-out.[45]
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
pertains to entries in the course of business, to support Exh. G. Said provision
reads:
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there
appears on the computer print-out the name of a certain Victrina Elnado Nubi and
a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were
handwritten the words Sorry for the delay since the records had to be
retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario. It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who
encoded the information stated in the print-out and was the one who printed the
And even if Exh. G is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the
credit card of petitioner was denied because it was already over the limit. There is
no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence
on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the
limit.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or
gross negligence is likewise effectively negated by the evidence of Citibank which
was correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department
of defendant Bank, presented documents known as Warning
Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1994 (Exhibits 3, 3-
1 to 3-38, 4, 4-1 to 4-38 5, 5-1 to 5-39 and 6, 6-1 to 6-39), for August
7, 1994 (Exhibit[s] 7, 7-1 to 7-37), for August 8, 1994 (Exhibit[s] 8, 8-
1 to 8-20) which show that plaintiffs Citibank
preferred mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not
blacklisted.
Petitioner next argues that with the additional deposit he made in his
account which was accepted by Citibank, there was an implied novation and
Citibank was under the obligation to increase his credit limit and make the
necessary entries in its computerized systems in order that petitioner may not
encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his credit card. Again, the
Court finds that petitioner's argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
COURT:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the account was augmented
or before?
xxx
ATTY. NERI:
For the record, your honor, the deposit of P450,000.00 was made
as per exhibit of the plaintiff on June 28. The purchase of
the tickets amount to P237,000.00 was approved and
debited on the account of Mr. Aznar on July 20, your
honor. The deposit was made about a month before the
purchase of the tickets as per documentary exhibits, your
honor.
COURT:
So, Atty. Navarro, what do you say to that explanation?
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out by the records, your
honor. (Emphasis supplied)
The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is Citibank liable for
damages for the dishonor of Aznars Mastercard?
xxxx
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action arising from this
agreement or any incident thereto which [the cardholder] or any other
party may file against [Citibank], [Citibanks] liability shall not exceed
One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] or the actual damages proven,
whichever is lesser.[53]
On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of
Citibanks Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion, so-
called, because their terms are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.[54]
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that [Citibank
is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by any merchant affiliate for any
reason x x x. While it is true that Citibank may have no control of all the actions
of its merchant affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect,
however, to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is dishonored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the statement vague and
as the said terms and conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity
in its provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the
contract,[55] in this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which limits
its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven, whichever is lesser.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from
a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be
awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury.[57]
SO ORDERED.