HANDOUT NO.

73

Survey of SC DecisIons In
CI VII. LAW 2008-2009
Judge ED VINCENT & ALBANO

HUMAN RELATIONS

Abuse of right

In Oe,f Pulls. (no. v. Spa. Cslogcog, G.R. No, 149241, August24, 2009,
there was a distributorship agreement between the parties which was extended
after its expiration, There was a notice of second audit review of its accounts but
there was refusal of the party, hence, the principal accepted respondent's
purchase orders on pre-paid basis. Prior to this, the principal found out that there
were violations committed on the distributorship agreement, hence, there was a
written commitment to comply with the agreement, sighed by the respondent.
Before the expiration of the distributorship agreement as extended, the
respondents flied a complaint for Damages with' application for .TRO and
Injunction alieg!ng that there was abuse of right when it caused the audit of their
account and when it only honored their orders if they were pre-paid and wher, it
refused to renew the dealership agreement. The RTC ruled that the second audLt
was unreasonable ands merely Intended to harass the respondents and that
the shift from credit' tO pre-paid basis in the purchases and the refusal to renew
were pieces of evidence of bad faith of petitioner. The CA affirmed the decision.
Is the Judgment correct? Explain.

Held: No. Bad faith cannot be attributed to the ' acts of petitioner.
Petitioner's exercise of Its rights under the agreement to conduct an audit, to vary
the manner of processing purchase orders, end to refuse the renewal ot the
agreement was supported by' legitimate reasons, principally, to protect its own
business. The exerIso of Its rights was ngfjrnpaIILby any evil rnotvedeJgn4,
hfrnsically .nd bap r gIy 1njyie9r prjdic respondents. The ribta
exercised were all, k,. c,twlth the terms md càndltions of the diStributorship
agreement, ,hich, has the force..aUbetweenthern. Clearly, petitioner could
not be said to have coñmitted an abuse- of its rights. It may not be amisS to tats
at this Juncture that a complaint based on jjJpf the Civil Code must
necessarily fail If it has nothing to. support it but InnuendOs and ..çor4ectures.'
(Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259,Februa6 28, 2005, 452
SCRA 53")

Uhcipr AtIL 1 9.Qf the.QJyi. Qode, eyry,,peraQri jtust,Jn the exercise of

hi P and In p a cLb du S ct.wltb justice, give-everyone his
due. and a nrvjicneaty and gg&.falth To find the existence of abuse of right
under the said article, the following,AWMI&must be present (1)'there !3,a.eaat
JgiLgr ty, (2) which is eçg ectin b*4JaIW, (3) for the sole intent of
prejuJpJg or , LnkWZjgp01er. Accordingly, the exercise of a right shall always
be In accordance with the purpos,,fo wlic ha1Oe)n:e5tab1A8hed, and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh—there must be no Inteiflion to Injure another-
(Heirs of Purisima Nala v; Cabánsag, G.R.. No. 161188, June 13, 2008, 554
SCRA 437) A person will be protected only when he aats in the leglthnate
Qxet.cise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudencaand.in good, faith, not
when he acts with negligence or abuse. (NPC v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.,
421 Phil. 647 (2001). .. 0
 Survey or SC Decisions in el\,IL LMVV 2O0b-2uu

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code.,,qQipdjaith

refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is grqpuriqd. Thus he who alleges
d.,tath.-has the duty to çp.the same. ('bP v. CA, G.R. No. 137916,
December 8, 2034, 445 SCR.A 500). Bad faith does not simply connot€ bad
judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral
obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Mpliqq connotes
iILWUL or pjt and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harni is ,motiy.e. (Saber v. CA,
G.R. No. 132981, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 259).

When there Is or there Is no unjust

enrichment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. CA, .ef b!. G.R. No. 160379, Augu:3t 14,
2009, a property consisting of 663 square meters was taken by the government
for the construction of the Osmefla Street in Cagayan de Oro City. At least 297
square meters of the lot was not occupied, but the owne- sought for
consequential damages because of the impairment of its value. The State,
however, contended that it was not liable as there was no taking of the same. To
award the same would result in unjust enrichment. Is the contention correct?
Why?

Held: No. An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not
tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust,,.
gwhen a persdn unjustly retains benefit to or
when a person money or property of another agtrist the fundamental
principle of jut qyi,y,, gqe.Øpnien." (Benguet Corp. v. DENR-Mine
Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 160101, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 196, citing
Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 138088, 23
January 2006, 479 SCRA 404, 412). Ajtt 2Z,pf the Civil Code provides that
"every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, 3cqlJires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." The prinr.iple of
unjust onrichr*under Ar,icie 2equires two conditions: (1) that a person is
gr ftcjtjpn and (2) that su I' benefit is derived
There is no unjust enrichmerit when the person
who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.

CpA as a result of the expropriation,

the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to the
property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.

BIRTH

ARTICLES 40, 41, 42, NCC

BIRTH AND PERSONALITY; EFFECT OF DEATH

Acquisition of personality.

One question has been asked in a case where a fetus died. Are the
parents entitled to bereavement benefits under the CBA with the employer? But
 Survey qf SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

before the question can be answered, we must determine whether the fetus cen
be considered a dependent within the meaning Df the term under the CBA. The
answer is, Yes because is child does not need to be born to ba4na1dured a
dopindent because even duping thapsU onaptloi where the fetus is still
Jnsk em. rijf the,.qpr it Is aleadY,pQnder upon her for aVMnaric
l vlve ln ,nrçahMJhaJetusbt Darn inofdeLthatho may
cannot eaId.tnly,oa&.with.jutldical.parsonality, cao.diaØ a dead.
fiagquku41ca perpnaity. That is not quite correct, for even the
fetus shisady attains life during conception and can die in the womb of the
mother.

The unique situalIor occurred In a case where the parents of an unborn

f.tur were demanding bereavement leave with pay and other benefltt because
of the death of the fetus. It was contended however that no such benefits are du',
as no death of an employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stag, of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage cf the CBA amos
what, was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a fetus which, did not
acquire any Juridical personality, It was further contended. But as said ear ler,
even a fetus has a personality, especially so that the CBA can be considered as
a contract between the parent and the employer and the bereavement benefits
can be considered as a stipulation where the fetus lathe subject.

Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it

Is born, and Article 41 defines when a child Is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death

Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be

applied in relation to Arbcle '37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art, 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness

to be the subject of legal relations,. Is inherent In every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which Is the power to do acts with
legal effect, Is acquired and may beiost.

d9,4pJpve aLaiLadetintion of
deeIb. Moreover, Upv)J$cçp exp a 4sthat CMI pensopail1y
my e etjngjijsbe' by 4atb It oea not $jIçj tap th 6 those who
have acqIr j.ir)4lcI 4opaUty col

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. (Black's Law Dictionary),
Life Is not synonymous with civil personality. On&jieunot acqurs çyIl
Evn.a..bIJdJnsIds,t$,.womb. already
.iijlf. No less than th.Q Qti qnti,n, recognizes, the life of thu unborn from
conception. (Art, II, Sec. 12, Constitution) that the Stati must protect equally
with the life of the mother.: life, then the cessaticn
thereofvprjo( to the child, ere&qualflies as,deeth.

The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. A

dependent Is qr suppqr one not able. to exlst'oi
sustain oneself whot4t poçr,Qr aid of someone Under said general
definition, even an unborn child Is a dependent of its parents. The child could nt
have reached 38-39 weeks of Its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, for sustenance. Additionally, it is 'explicit 'In the CBA provisions in
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did
 t.jre, ui , %s it ist.ni JIVIL LII

not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have
been born or must have acquired civil personality, as employer averred. Without
such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's womb.

The term /egitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in

relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. N. 153798, September
2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363, It was said that a legitimate child is a product of, and,
therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parenta and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Conversely, in ariones v. Miguel, 483 Phil. 483 (2004) an illegitimate child

was defined to be as follows: ' .

The fine dIstInctions among the various types of illegitimate

children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and
illegitimate, All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate
status.

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited

jurisprudence, the tgitjj -ny. orjgjt,j,cyof a child attaches upon h,s/her
con.ception
In the present case, the parents of the unborn fetus were validly
' manned and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making
said child Jjti( .(QVpQrher c,q.nception. '(Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp.
v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, et al., G.R. No. 182836, October 13,
2009);

MARRIAGE

License issued in a place not the

residence of parties; marriage valid.

In Alcantara v. Alcantara, et al., G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, there
was an action to nullify a marriage alleging that without securing a marriage
license, the marriage was solemnized on December 8, 1982. They went through
another marriage ceremony on March 26, 1983 in Tondo, Manila at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church. This time, there was a license secured in Carmona, Cavite
but they never went there and they never resided there, hence, it was contended
that the marriage was void. In holding that the marriage was valid, the SC

Held: A mrqage license is ,r &jt,.pj marriage, the ,absence of which renders

the marriage jt.eJnJfIQ,. The requirement and issuance'o 'a marriage license
is the Je demon,St4pn of Its nivclvemnt aoq..p.a.tt11patIQn in very marriage
in the ,r p.terap .,fw eripic .isJnteestc,d (Nlal v. Bay.dog,
384 Phil. 661 (2000)). .

The petitioner invoked Rep. V. CA, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994,
236 SCRA 257; Cariño i,. Car/no, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA
127; Sy v. CA, 385 Phil. 760 (2000) to support the contention of invalidity of tleir
marriage. These cases are not applicable since in all of them, at the time of the

4
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2000

etraiQn. of theJrErjage.s, there were no licenses. In this case, there wa

ariageJcs_
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage lieense, the
law requires that the abseac4a,of such marriage license must be.appggpt on tbe
marri?ge contract, or at the very least, suppptby aqrjjjcJ.9n from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

This, certification enjoys the that tügtaI.,djty..has been

and theJsrce çf the r maRe license was done in the
(Sec. 3, Rule 131, Rules of Court). The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or fIlure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until
it is overcome bt' no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable Intendment will be In support of the presumption and, In case of
doubt as to an officers act being lawful and unlawful, construction should be in
favor of its lawfulness. (Mugsuicang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217 (2003)).

Effect If license I. issued In a place

- where parties do clot reside.

Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence

of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to. the completion of the 10-day period fr
publication are considered mere 1wagulaiLdwWhat dQQ,t l(fct the validity of the
marriage. Any irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
cr,y,and 4dprstrativeIyliable (Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161 (1)),

Presumption of authority to solemnize.

The church ceremony was qqpIgaFQU pf their civil marriage, thereby

cleansing whatever Irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. (Ty V. CA,
399 Phil. 647 (2003)).

he authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a

marria(,j ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrar. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
• civil registrar. At the solmnizing officer need to know is that licen has been
wcLPy the cg )LpfljI, and it may be presumed from the. issuance of
the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirement of law.

• Simper praesumifur pro matrimcnio

(Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896,
October 27, 2004; 441 SCRA 441; Sevilla v. Candènas, G.R. No. 167684, July
31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428).

False affidavit on 5-year period of

cohabitation; as if marriage
celebrated without a license; void.

-- S
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW UU•20Uu

In Rep. v. Jose Dayot G . R. No. 175561, March 28, 2008, Nazario, J, the
SC once again had the occasion. to rule that the requirement of , a marriage
llo,nse for the validity of marriage is mandatory. One exception is, if the parties
have live together as husband and wife without any legal impediment to marry
one another. In lieu of the license, an affidavit of cohabitation would be sufficient.

In this case, Jose and Felisa were introduced to each other in March
198, In June 1988, JOse lived in the house of Felisa as a boarder or. they lived
together barely 5 months before they got married. In 1986, FelIsa asked him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall to claim a package where he was asked to
sign documents. He Initially refused but he was cajoled by Felisa, hence, he
signed 'e same, only to find out that he contracted marriage with her. He filed a
complal it for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the marriage alleging that
it was a sham marriage as no marriage ceremony was held; that he did, not
execute an affidavit stating that they lived as husband and wife for at least 5
years. Felfra contended otherwise and defended the validity of their m a rriage.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that a person in his right mind
would easily suspect any attempt to make him other sign a blank sheet of paper.

The Court of Appeals however, declared their marriage void.

The Court of Appeals relied on the ruling in Nina/ v. Bayadog, 384 Phil 661
(2000) and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Badayog, where the contracting parties to a marriage

solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their ffdavit that they had
attained the age majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at
least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other; the Supreme Court
ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five year common

- law cohabitation period,
which is counted back frdm,the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and if
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by, jy.yjt meaning no
-

third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and citjuyly— ha is..
upl2i/. Otherwise, if that continuous five year cohabitation period is computed
without an distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
oilier during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctionin& immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Ma rriage being
a spci1, ,(pjQis.hip must bejpQçd as sucji,.arcI its requirements must be
The presumption that a man and, a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based oh the approximation of the
requirement of the law. The parties should be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a cerJs required in order to
that the IQeteifi, gJat9mc8qd
th,yone who is aware or who has any 4coWIQU= ofjjjJjjw.çjmpiitJo the
union of the tv~o .shzL11jRqk,,Vjtk

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized Wifhqit
a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from
the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Fe/isa is not covered
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

by. the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore void ab.
iriitiobeçause of the absence of marriage. license.

The reason for the law, (Ninal v. ayadog) as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status.

It is not contested that the marriage, of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license, in lieu thereof they execute an 'affidavit declaring
that "they have attained the age-maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least live years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other. One of the central issues in the Petition at
bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab iuuitio for lack of a marriage license.

The exception of a marriage license wider Article 76, NCC applies only to
those who have live together as husband and wife for ati y,easanq
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period he had, since the language of Article 78 is precise. Th'
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 78 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.

It is indubitably established. that Jose and Feiisa'have not lived together

for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic acmitted that Jose and Felisa started lived together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.

The insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in Ihe
parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essencial and
formal requisites were complied with is not quite correct. The argument deserves
scan merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they shoui
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be
expected from the requirement of a marriage license,

Reliance on the presumption of marriage.

Reliance on the presumption of marriage, finds no applicability to the case

at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prime fade presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of mrriage.
(Vda. de Jacob v. CA, 371 Phil. 693 (1999). Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence or any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
present case does not involve an apparent question that they actually entered
into a contract of marriage, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Peclaration of Nullity of Marriage.

Falsity of statement, not more irregularity.

 Survey of SC Decisions In CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

The ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not

invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
,cohabited for at least five years as required by law; is not correct. The contract is
flagrant , The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license,
and not to the absence of one. Hence, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of the parties' cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as
an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to
be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

Estoppel Is Inapplicable.

The Republic further averred that Jose is deemed estopped from assaiing
the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It was claimed that Jose
and Feiisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's
subSequent marriage to Rufirra Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set
In, 0

This is erroneous. An actionfor nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose

and Felrsr's marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab in/ho. In this case, the right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time

Meaning of the 5-year cohabitation.

Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. (Niflalv. Bayadog). It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third pr rty was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity th't is unbroken.

ARTICLE 36
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Once aga.n in Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007 had
the occasion to rule that the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36
of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychologica, ;ncapacity as
understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In this case,
the testimonies of both parties as well as the other witnesses rsgarding the
spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are
limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact,
respondent herself, in the memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that
their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their business.,
This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioners sister who lived with the
spouses for a considerable period of time. However, a mere showing of
 Survey of SC Decisions in (VIL LAW 2008-20

irreconcilable and conflicting personalities in no wise Cotlitutes psychoioglc

incapacity.

In addition, It is true that the marital obligations 08 husband and wlf

eniImerat€d under the Family Code Include the mutua responsibility of th3
spouses to manage the household and provide support or' the family, which
means that ccrnplianco with this obligation necessarily entls the disagreements
on money matter would, no doubt, affectthe other aspe.tr of one's marriage as
to make the wedlock unsatisfactorily, this Is not a sufficert ground to declare a
marriage null and void. In this case, the wife's disagreeneit with her husbands
handling of the family's business and finances and herrospeity to start a tight
as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapcity coitemplated under
ArtIcle36 of the Family COdI. In fact, the COurt took judclal notie of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters are a cormon, ard even normal,
occurrence between husbands and wives. -

Marital obltgtlons Include not only a spous(s obIlgatIo to the other

spouse bu, also one's obligation toward their childrei in the preent case, no
evidence was presented to show that respondent hatheen remiss n performing
her obligatkns toward their children as enumerated i Article 220 Cf the Family
CQde.

It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code i not to be confused with a

divorce that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manlfsst
themsolver. (Rep. v. Juyon). It refers to a serious psthologlcal ilines afflictIng a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It isa malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the cities and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one Is about to assume.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent Is sffering from a psychological

disorder. However, the totality of the evidence preonted in the present case
does not show that her personality disorder is of thednd contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as render ner psychologically
incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obllijatlons of
marriage.

Spouse convicted of adultery; right

to share conjugal properties;
compromise agreement equivalent to
voluntary separation of properties.

In Ma gui/an v, Maguilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007, there was a

blissful married life of the spouses, but their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when the man discoveradthat the wife was conrrtting adultery. He sued
her and the paramour for adultery where they were convicted. Thereafter, he flied
a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity with Dissolution and Liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains
and damages. They, however, entered Into a Compromise Agreement where
they separated and divided their properties. Judgmert was rendered approving
the compromise - agreement but later on he filed a motion to repudiate the.
Compromise Agreement as he was not properly advised by his lawyer: it was
denied. In a petition for Certiorari before the CA, he contended that: (1) It was
made within the cooling-off period; (2) the proceedings were conducted without
thö participation of the OSG. The CA dismissed the Petition ruling that con-, iction
for adultery did not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property;
that ne cooling-off pariod under Article 58, Family Code has no bearing and tiat
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

the presence of the OSG is not indispensable to the execution and validity of the
Compromise Agreement since the propose of his presence is to curtail any
collusion betwen the parties and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated.

Iho issue in this case involves the right to share dnupite conviction for
adultery.

The contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a

circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do nnt impose such
disqualification.

Under Article 134 of the Family Code, separatior of property may be

effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly
such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true
even If the proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
This voluntary separation of property is subject to the right of all creditors of the
conjugal partnership of gain and other person with pecuniary interest pursuant to
Article 136 of the Family Code.

Effect of absence of the OSG.

Petitioners claim that since proceedings before the RTC were void in the
absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solic.tor, the voluntary
separation made during the pendency of the case is also void. The proceedings
pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties Y the
spouses, The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity
of their marriage. Nor did the settlement amount to collusion between the partis.

In short, the Compromise Agreement can be treated, as a contract

contemplated by the parties separating their properties which was submit.ed to
the court for approval as contemplated by Article 136 of the Family Code.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Orrg-Gutierrez Yu-Te

G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
(Nachura, J)

Facts: Edward ard Rowena met in January 1996 at a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He courted her and in March 1996,
Rowena asked Edward that they eloped to which proposal, he refused at fir3t but
due to her persistence, her relented. They sailed to Cebu but their travel nioney
of P80,000.00 lasted for only a month, so they went back to Manila with Rowena
staying at her uncle's house and Edward going home: She kept on calling 'him,
threatening that she would commit suicide if he would not stay with her, hence,
he went to stay with her where he was treated like a prisoner and could not go
out unaccompanied. He was shown the guns of her uncle and warned iot to
leave her. He tried to convince her to stay at their house but Rowena re'used.
Rowena's uncle brought them to a court on April 23, 1996 to get married. In June
1996, Edward was able to escape and his family had to hide him. Then, they
parted ways. He filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, but Rowena did notfile an answer, hence,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was ordered to conduct an
investigation, but there was an investigation report stating that it could not be
deternlined if there was collusion, hence, it recommended trial on tne merits. The
 Survey of Sc Decisions in CIVIL LAW 200-200

cnicuI psychologist conducted an examination and dubbed them to be

emotionaly immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing their marital vows
as each of them were motivated by different notions on marriage. Edward was
found to be unsure and unready to commit himself to marriage; an introvert as
against the aggressively dangerous moves of Rowena, who was found to be
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She was exploitative in her plight for a life
of wealth and glamour, taking more on marriage as she thought it would bring her
dream, she gladly found her way out of the relationship. She was suffering from
grave, severe, incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
Disorder that started since childhood but only manifested during the mart'iaue.
Both of them manifested or displayed psychological incapacities that mace
marriage a big mistake for them to take.

The RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground that both
parties are suffering from psychological incapacities that they could not comply
with the essential marital obligations. On appeal the CA reversed, saying that the
psychological incapacity of Rowena was not proven.

The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and

relied only on the information provided by Edward. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedenc& and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997), needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Edward contended that the morrige is

'rd on the ground of psychological incapacity of both of them, not of Rowena
alone. He pointed out that there is no need for the psychologist to examine
Rowena.

The OSG contended that the annulment petition contained no statement

of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply With. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity was not alleged in the petition; neither was
it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parti€s was
not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the liical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG
concluded that the requirements in Molina were not satisfied.

The singular basic question in this case is whether, based on Article 36 of

the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.

Held: Yes, The Court, in this case, found as decisive the psychological evaluation
made by the expert witness; and thus, ruled that the marriage of the parties is
null an,' void on ground of both parties' psychologcal incapacity. Petitioner, who
is affliuted with dependent personality disorder cannot assume the essential
marital obigations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, ha difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning In order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
Petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

II
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent Her
being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for
the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others with jut
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, respondent is impulsive Lnd
domineering, she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological

Incapacity, the precipitous marriage was declared null and void.

Role of psychological export.

The Court considered as important the role of the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties in declaring the marriage
void. It cited Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, 0. D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen -
Dagupan in Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 edition who explained that
"standard practice shows that marked advisability of Expert Intervention in
Marriage Cases of persons accused of nullity on the ground of defective
matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor
causative of lack c sufficient use of reason, grave lack of discretion and inability
to assumi' essential obligations - although the law c..tegorically mandates said
nterventioi only n the case of impotence and downright mental disorder.
(p 106).

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320

SCRA 76, emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. (S4e also: Rep. Quintero.-Hemano, G.R.
No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735). And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychological
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity: (397 Phil.
840 (2000). Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychologicel incapacity and the p'ychological disorder
itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth

assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, sevee and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Parenthetically, it is fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, A.M.
No. 02-11-10 SC, effective March 15, 2003), an option for the trial judge to refer
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expeit for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties' prerogative to present their own expert witne;ses.

Types of personality disorder.

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner --

(7
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and

submissive behavior, Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and, frequently
belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others'
comments. At time they actually bring about dominance by others through a
quest for overprotection.

D&oenden personality disorder r.sually begins In. early adulthood.

Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions
without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of
their importent decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from othr people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandonec.

And antisocial personality disorder is described, as follows -

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of

the conventional behavioral limitations Imposed by a society, an Inability to
sustain a job over a period of yeas, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitivaness or criminal behavior), frequent physical figh and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a facade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may

befit some individuals who are prominent in, business or politics whose habits of
self-c3nteredrless and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.

During the 190 century, this type of personality disorder wasreferred to as

moral insanity.' 'The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

Molina case used as straight-Jacket;

should not be.

In ruling on the invalidity of the marriage of Edward and Rowena, the

Supreme Court traced the history of the concept of psychological incapacity
based on Canon Law and the proceedings of the Committee that was drafted by
the Family Code. The net effect Is that, the impositions of Republic t . CA ed
Molina were considered as inappropriate as cases of psychological incapactt be
decided on a case to case basis. Molina should not be used as a guide in
nullification of marriages even if the guidelines do not fit the facts of other cases.
In short, each case must be judged, not on the basis of prior assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision.ona case to case basis; guided
by experience; the findings of experts and researchers In psychological
disciplines; and by decisions of church tribunals.

A reading of a lot of decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject merely

referred to Republic v. Molina as guidelines in denying actions for declarations of
nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity even if the Molina case is not
applicable, thus, Forcing spouses in a marriage with personality disqrder and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders to stay together for life as

13
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

marriage couple even if they cannot compt with the jesential duties to the
marriage bond. ..

Due.to the conditions t3et forth in Molina the courts, including the Supreme
Court have decided cases on psychological incapacity practically in a uniform
manner, denying such actions without too much regard for the law's clear
intention.

In fact, it can be said that the imposition in Molina can be considered as

judicial legislation and considered as inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
sot of rules, In resolving all cases of psychological incapacity Understandably,
the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the
'most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
Institutions. Far from what was Intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and be bound by It. Wittinglycr unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has .nnulleU
marriages on account.of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remeciy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against thi contingency,
among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
safeguard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological

incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a p'chological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bomj. It may be
stressed that the inflidtion of physical violence, constitutional indolenca or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article
36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a, possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not

pose too much of a concern for the Court, First and foremost, because it is none
of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse 01 . the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter's disorder recurring in
their marriage.

DIVORCE

Validity of foreign divorce in the Philippines.

 Survey of Sc Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009
V .

In Beyat v. CA, etal., G.R. N. 155635; 1ayot v. Bayot, G.R. No. 163979,.
November 7; 2008, Vicente and Rebecca were married on April20, 1979.
Rebecca was identified as an American citizen, born in Guam and of American
parents. In 1996, she initiated divorce proceedings against Vicente before the
Court of First Instance of the Judicial District of Sto. Domingo in Dominican
Republic. Both parties were represented by counsel. The Court granted the
petition, ordering the dissolution of their marriage, leaving them to remarr' again
but giving them joint custody of their child. There was also resolution o their
property relations by virtue of an Agreement which was approved by the same
court. On March 14, 1996, Rebecca filed an action for declaration of nullity of
their marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378), but it was withdrawn. On March 21. 2001
she filed another action for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity (Civil Case No. 01-094). Vicente filed a Motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and by prior judmerit
of divorce, Rebe;ca opposed on the ground that the divorce decree was void as
she was a Filipino and has been recognized as such by the DOJ. The RTC
denied the motion as the divorce judgment was a matter of defense, heice, a
petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which ruled that the RTC should have
granted the Motion to Dismiss.

• Rebecca filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,

Rebecca filed a petition for certiorari with the SC where the determinative issue,
was the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellatn court,
and resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citi.'.en at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is
valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effect?

In dismissing the petition, the SC

Held: The divorce decree in Dominican Republic is valid. First, at the time of the
divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argume.it that she was
in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. Atthe very least, she chose, before, during,
and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Seco,d, she secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen.

Third, beng an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws
of the Jnited States of America, a country whk;li allows divorce. Fourth,' the
propert' relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96
was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No.
406/97 issued on March 4, 1 997.Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca A as valid.

In Garcia v. Redo, it was ruled that a foreign divorce can be recognized

here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated ay the foreign court issuing
said decree is, sufficient.

The existence of the divorce decree has not been deniad, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court not challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
 Survey t4 Sc Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-209

coUu8Iofl1 fraud rotear Tflistajce of fat ø1aw abelt both appeared to have the
QpporUn to!a oans partition
of their cugal pe'tyA* ixpkn$ O1IIdi
t!

Befôr Mr g1ve the eecol rsjuØata

cQUt I
forci4h j6d9ment dlvorc6 cX kmU9tt*howhatthapai4S
06 IJ? :-
doso Cit ou
Court 06wR41et39 Sctl&n4, I 91 RIe Of'Cnt t'roedure) tO
wit

SeçttOn 50 Effect of foreign judg(nenfs - The effect of a

JudmeT* O bibu tirIgti country, hVing jurisdichon to
pronouthdditikt i $ EfOIlowa

(a)in ease of the judgmeit upon a specific _thin he

jtment is conclusive upon tht. title to the thing

(b) In case of a judgttiont agaLnt a pert on the judgment is

presumptive evidence of a right as betWeen the parties
arid., tlelr succsspr4n nteresf by SUbspqi.iep title but
thtime*rj .b epeied by ide ofca. want of
Jurl*dotlØn want o noLloto the part eO1Iup Trud
ocTea'nilstake of Iaw'bfacj /

It is essential that there should be. an6pQrtunty. to..

challenge the foreign judgment, in- order for the court n .this
jurisdiction to properfdetennine its efficacy In this ju risdictioncur
Rules of court cleiy provide that with respect Ic actiqn in
personem, as distiflgU1hed from actions in rem a foreign judgment
mereiy constituesppma feateidepè of the justness of the caim
-of a parij? an''ôh;I sibjctto-proóf to the contrary.

Rebecca, assisted 'by counsel_: personally ecured ,the

fqr1ndivore whilO -Vicene was duly represented, by his counseL.
A.41 lhgvstancf the foreign divorce decree rendeted and issued by
the .Oop,lnican Republic court is valid and, consequently, bind both.,
Rebecca and Vicenté:.

Fin afly tfefactthafRbecca may eqi as -,a FJjpino

to
citizen on F
secured abroad iyoij
RM
oqe, Within the pale of i-the cout
*!p a storc
pqli?y aint
absolute point is the citizenship of the artJest the tIe a
valid divore Is'obtaned -

Legal effectS cf the valid divorce

Given the - alidity and efflcay of divorce secured by febecc the same
shall be given ares judicota effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious resUlt cf the
divorce decree qtaIfled the , rilantal vThcuum between Re&icca and Vicente
'was p;deM eefed 'they a- re both freed from the bpnd of matrimony, In
pIaIii ranuae tcehhd Rebecca'.are n Ion. ger husband and wife to each
other.
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008 2009

The divorce decree In question also brings into play the second paragraph
Of M. 26 of the Family Code, providg as follows:

Article. 26. xxx

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended byE.O. 227).

in Republic v. Orbocido Ill, the twin elements for, the applicability of the
second 'paragraph of Article 26, were spelled out, thus:

(1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and

(2) A valid divorce. Is obtained abroad by the alien spouse caacitating him or
her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebitIon of the marriage, but their citizenship at 'the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouss capacitating the latter to remarry.

No cause of actioh In the petition for

nullity of marriage. . S ..

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear that Rebecca

lacked a cause of, action, since an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
presupposes the existence of a marriage.

With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more

marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolve
or nullified. In short, Rebecca did not have the personality anymore to file an
action for nullity of her marriage.

Homosexuality ii not a ground to annul marriage.

- The case of Manuel Almelor v. RTC of Las Piñas City, of al., G.R. No.
79620, August 26, 2008 is a story of a desperate man determined to salvage
what remains of his' marrige.. Persistent in his luest, he fought back all the
heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at 'um.

The trial court denied his wife's petition for nullity of their marriage as it
had "no basis at all because' the supporting grounds relied upon cannot legally
make a case under Article 36 of -the Family Code.'

But instead. of dismissing th'e petition, the trial court nullified the mai'riage
between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud.

Evidently, no.sufficient proof was presented to subtantiate the allegations

that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the tine of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Matiuel's

'-7
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2006-2009

sexual prefthence without the .6orroboration of witnesses. Also, it 'took

cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it agair.st his sexuality.

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC decision and

Held: Even assuming, ox gratia argUrnenti, that Manuel is ,a homosexual, the

lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida.'
The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of eitherparty
wao obtained by fraud (Art. 45(3), Family.. Code), such as concealment of
homosexuality (Art. 46(4), Family Code). Nowhere in the said decision, was it
proven by preponderance of evidence,that Manuel was a homosexual at the
onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the
concealment of homosxuaIity, and not homosexuality per so, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and
intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid mrriage. To be valid (t must

be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven
by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive
list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per so is not among thos
cited, but its concealment.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for

divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply as one of
the basic 'elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses (78 ALR 2d807). In Cruicher v, Cru(cher, the Court held:

'Unnatural practices of' the kind charged here

' are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would
*#' make the marriage. relation so revolting to her that it
would become impossible for her to discharge the
duties of a wife, and.would defeat the whole purpose
ol the relation. In the natural course of things, they
would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting
her health.' (38 So. 337 (-1905).

However, although there may be similar sentiments here' in the

Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce lu not
recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a
healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and
board (See also: Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 200, 505
SCRA 565). .

The Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen

the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by
fabricated evidence. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.

Judçjrr•tint declaring a spouse

presumptively dead is unappealable;
remedy lu special civil action for
certiorari.
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

If a spouse is declared presumptively dead, the judgment cannot be

appealed from, The reason Is that, the proceedings are uurnmary in nature. This
Is exemplified by Article 253 of the Family Code which provldós:

The foregoing rule in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof

shall likewise govern summary proceedings tiled
under Articles 41., 51, 69, 73, 96, 124, and 217,
.inapfar as they are applicable."

Article 247 of the Family Code further saysihat judgment of the, couit shall
be immediately tnal and executory.

In Republic v. Fe,venfino Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, after
one night together as husband and wife Maria informed her husband that her
family was migrating to the USA. She assured him that she would file a etltion
for him so they can live together In the USA or return to the Philippines if the
petition would be denied. They had correspondencesfor one (1) year, until Maria
did not answer his letters anymore. He Inquired from close relatives of her
whereabouts but nobody knew. He sought the help of a friend in the USA but to
no avail. Hu filed a petition to declare her presumptively dead which was granted.
The Of')G filed a notice of appeal to the RTC invoking as one of the groundsihe
.Constitutional provisions that advocate the State policy of preserving marital
institution. The appeal brought to fore the Issue as to whether such a judgrient is
appealable or not. The Supreme Court ruled that It is not appealable As the
judgment is Immediately final and executory. More specifically, the SC ruled,
thus:

"Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY

JUDICIAL-PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govei n summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART, 238. Until modiflod by the Supreme

Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Cede requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall oe decided in an
exeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases

covored by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
states:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules In Chapters 2

and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under.Aiicles 41, 51, 69, 713, 98,
124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

In plain text, Article 247.in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247. Thu judgment of the couri shall be

immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary

proceeding shall be Immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. it goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to

19
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in

accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Apeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricte.' freedom of choice of court forum. (Flamiriano v. Adriano, G.R. No.
165253 February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 605). From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit In the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the rroper subject of an appeal. (Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R.
No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406).

Role of the prose . epting attorney in

actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage.

When the Supreme Court resolved the case of Repabllcv, CA and Molina,
G,R. No. 108763, February 13, 1907, 288 SCRA 198, it imposed restrictie
requirements in actions for nullity of marriage, like the certification by the OSG
before a judgment was rendered. In fact, that was never intended by the framers
of the Family Code. That is why, in Rowena Padilla-Rumbaoa v. Edward
Rwnbaoa, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, there was a contention that the
judgment was premature without such certification. The SC promulgated A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, but it was contended that
such administrative matter cannot overturn Molina. More specifically, Molina
decreed that:

"The trial court must order the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to a?pear
as counsel for the state. No decision shell be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to' the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which was promulgated on March 15, 2003 by the
Supreme Court and duly published - is geared towards the relaxation of The
OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial reg'lation
provides:

SEC. 18. Memoranda. - The court may require

the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file
its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the.State. No other pleadings or papers
may be submitted without leave of court. After the
 Survey,of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

lapse of the period hren provided, the case wit be

considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-1 1-10-SC Is procedural or

remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only
operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already oxisting rights. The
settled rule Is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, as held In Do
Los Santos v. Vda. do Mangubat:

'Procedural Laws do riot come within the legal

conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues - they may
be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure. (G.R. No. 149508,
October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411),

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory

pature of an QSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending
matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural
lapse on the certification priorto its promulgation. The rulings in A,',tonio v.
R.yes, OR, No,, 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353 and Navciies v.
Nova/es; G.R. No.' 167523, June 27, 2008 have since confirmed and clarified that
A.M. No, 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline, on the matter of
certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thu3, what is
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that
he be certified to be present.

Sale of conjugal property by a spouse

without consent of the other; effect

In Sps. Lita Do Leon & Folio Rid Tarmsa v. Anita do Loon, of al., G.R. No.
185063, July 23, 2009, it was again over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code
(now Article 96, Family Code) is very explicit on the consequence of the nusbarid
alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife's consent. To a, specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by th
husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wife's consent. Else, the
sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases it has been ruled that the sale by
the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity proceeds from
the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of
the Code. (Now Article 98, Family Code). Since the Code requires the consent of
the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed, against this
mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized ther validity.
(Article 5, NCC).

The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the

partnership Is void. Prior to the' liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal 'assets is Inchoate a mere expectancy,
which constitutes reither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into

21
 Survey of Sc Decisions In CIVILLAW 'ui.'-2uu

a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. (Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No. 155043,
September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 649). The interest of each spouse is limited to
the net remainder or "retnanente llquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. (Manuel v. Losan,
41 Phil. 555 (1918); Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713 (1916). Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the,conjugal assets does not ves until
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of
the marriage, when It is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses
or their respective heirs. (Abalos v. Macatangay, supra.)..

Liability of the wife based on crime,

got dhargeable against the conjugal
partnership.

As a rule, if there are obligations contracted by the spouses redounding to

the benefit of the family, the same are chargeable against the properties
comprising the conjugal partnership or the absolute community of properties. But
if one of the spouses committed the crime of slander and held liable for damages
in a damage suit, Is it chargeable against the conjugal partnership?

This question arose because after the judgment in arf action for damages
against the wife, her personal properties were levied upon but since they were
not sUffi ierit to answer for the judgment liability, real properties were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff. The husband filed a complaint for annulment .f the
certificate of sale and damages. Arnotion to dismiss was filed alleging that the
court where the case was filed did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
contending that the same should have been filed before the court that rendered
the judgment and which issued the writ of execution. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the case, but on appeal, it was reversed by
the CA. The basic issue devolves on whether the husband of the judgment
debtor may file an independent action to irotect the conjugal pcoperty subject of
execution. In short, is the husband considered a stranger?

In Sps. Roberto and Venus Buado v. CA, at al.', G.R. No. 145222, April 24,
2009, made a distinction, whether the parties are governed by the conjugal
partnership or absolute community of property regin'e as well as the character of
the property.

In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character

of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Coon' of Appeal.c, (G.R.
No. 51283, June 7, 1989, 174 SCRA 59 which was later adopted in Spouses
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 124642, February 23, 2004, 423 SCPA 365,
it was ,ield that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
"stranger" to the case prosecuted and adiudged against his wife for an obligation
that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand,
in Naguit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 7675, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 60
and Sy v. Discaya, G.R, No. 86301, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 378 the Court
stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of
execution was issued and is therefore jUstified in bringing an independent action
to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or parapternal property

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the

obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not.

22
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2Q08 2009

Petitioners argued that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is cargeablè to the conjugal partnership. The SC said no.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article

122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.

Effect if spouses are governed by the

absolute community.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by

either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-d eliot is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the cebtor-spause, the same advantage is nof accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to
make adiance payments for the liability of the-debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be .concluded that the

civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by the wife redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

To reiterate conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal

obhgatior, contractedby one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown
to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Go v. Yamans, G.R. No. 160762,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107.

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, 81 SCRA 605 (1978), it was held that the car
which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was
being levied upon to enforce "a jucgment for support" filec by a third person, the
third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is prson2l to the
husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property.

FAMILY HOME

To be a family home, the house must

be built on thee property of the
spouses, not on the property of
another.

In Simeon Cabarig, etal. v Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Ba.ray, G.R. No 180587,
March 20, 2009, a controversy over the possession of a parcel of land started all
these controversies. While there was a pronouncement that the respondents had
a better right of possession and the case was remanded for the enforcement of
the judgment, subject to Article 445, 546, 547, 548, NCC, the issue that it cannot
be executed because it was a family home was raised. In fact, the decision
decreed that the remand of the records of the case was for the court of origin to
determine the rights of the defend9nts-appel[ants under aforesaid articles of the
New Civil Code and to render judgment thereon in accordane with the evidence
and decision. In the . process, the petitioners interposed the issue that the
improvements introduced on the lot which was in their possession by tclerance.
In brushing aside the contention that the judgment cannot be execued, the SC
even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the improvenents
 SUrvey Of UeCISIOfl8 in U iV IL LMV' UVO

Introduced by petltIriers on 16 subject land are famIly homes will not extricate
then, from their predicament

As defined [T]he family home is a sacred symbol of farr0y-.Ipve and is the

repOsltgry of cherished memones that last durIig ones lifetime It is the dwelling
house where the husband and Wife, or en I'(" unmarfied head of a family reside
Including the land on Which it Is Iltuatedfl -46:.wrstltuted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmairried head of a trnhIy" (Patricio v Dario ill G R No
170829 November20 3006, 507 SCRA 43$)

A family home is deemed coristituteØ n a house and a lot from-the time itis
occupied as a family rsldenoe There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or. e4ra-judicially. Manácopv.'CA, 342. ?hil. 73 5(19 . 07)

There can.be rio:questlonthat a family homeis generally exempt from execution,

(Rule 3U Sec 13(a)) proyided4waa duly cistituted as such it is likewise a
given that the family home must' be ConItltutd on proprty owned by the
por5nsoonVJtutiflg.st,. .hdeed, as pointed Ou&bólley,. Jr. v. Planters Products,
Inc 0 R No 172283 July 9 2008 57 StRA 499) [t]he family home must be
part of the prpertIes of the absolute cOmmunity or the conjugal partnership or of
the exclusivepropertlee oføitlier spouse., with the latter's consent, or on the
I

property'ofthe unmarried headof the ía n•Art..

It 156, F.C) In other words:

The farnlly:home'rnuit be istab!ish,d on the pmertlei

of (a) thet ab8ol6te comu,
mnity
or (b the conjugal pa 'tnership or
(c).the exclusive propertj of either spouse with the consent of the
I
other. It cannot be established on property held in co
ownership with' third persons. However, it can be establisned
paTtly on commUnity property or conjugal property and partly on
the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
latter. : •'•

lf:Xtt!tlituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there

Js no qammunal Or conjugal property existing it can be constituted
• only on hl$:br her own property. 0

Therein IIà:'the'látal flaw in the postulate of pOtitôners, For at their

arguments to . the contrary the stark and u)irnutable fact is that the property on
Which their alleged family home stands 'js owned by respondents aiid the
question of owntrshlp had been long laid to rest with the Ilnabty of the apellate
court's judgment Thus petitioners coritm 1ued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents

All told, it is too late-16 theday, for petitioners to raise this issue Without
doubt the Instant Case Where the family home issue has been vigorously
pursued by:petlioners1s but a clear-cut ploy meant to forestall thp enforcernnt
of an otherwise final rud'executort/ decision. The execution ofafinat judgment is
a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose inlplernent2ti6n IS
mandatory and ivinistedal on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.
•0
i.?.. ' . .

Family homg Is answerable for

lIabIlItIes Incurred :. bofoti
conaflWUonf. . ..

In Josephine Gomez, t*t oh, v. Roe! $h. inei et (3,R, No, 132537,
October 14, 2005, a coinplaIiil for da,iiees wn filPd to nook , ádietin tin

IF
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

damages suffered by the owners of a parcel of land due to the acts or omissions •
committed in the management and supervision of their mother's rice land as
early as 1977, For failure of the defridantto file an answer, she was cedared in
default. Judgment was rendered and in the execution of the fame, a property
was lived upon arid, sold. The husband and the children later on filed a complaint
to annul the sale contending that the property was a family homo/residunce,
hence, exempt from the execution. They claimed, that the h9use and lot wa
constituted by the spcuses in 1972 as family home from the time they occupied it
and that under Article 153 of the Family Code, there is no longer a need to
constitute it as a fathily home Judicially or extra judicially since It became such by
operation of law.

In brushing aside the contention, the Supreme Court held:

It is not correct to say that the obligation sought to, be satisfied by the levy
of the property' was Incurred only upon the lsuance of the judgment in the
original case In January of 1989. The complaint was Instituted on 17 June 1986
to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts and omissions
committed by as early as 1977 when she assumed maiagement and supervision
.of their deceased mother's rice land. This means to say that her liability, which
was the basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied property was
cpnstltuted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under 'the
circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred falls under the exception
provided by law exempting the family home from execution, forced sak, or
attachment, as provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularlj, to
answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

Duties of the court when there is

Invocation of exojiptton of family
homes from attachment, etc.

Albino Josef v. Otelic Santos

G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008

After a judgment for collection of sum of money became final and

executory, a motion for execution was filed and a writ of execution was issued.
The house and lot of the defendant-petitioner was levied upon, hence, he
questioned the levy as void. In fact in his opposition to the motion for execution,
he claimed that the 'house where he was residing was a family home bu. the
lower court did not inquire into the nature of the same. In ruling that the order of
execution was Improper and void, the S

Held: TI a above order did not resolve nor take into account petitioner's
allegatiois in his Opposition, which are material and relevant In the resolution of
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This isserious error on the part of
the trial court. It should have made an earnest determination of the truth to
petitioner's claim that the house and lot in which he and his children resided was
their duly constituted family home. Since It did not, order Is thus null and void,
where a judgment or judicial order Is void it may be said to be a lawless thing,
which cn bi) treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.

The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the ind on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be

25
 Survey of SC Decisions in 1AVIL L,'VV UUb-UU9

seized by cr'ditors except in certain special cases (Taneo, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No,
108532, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 308),

Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly

constitutes petitioner's family home, the trial court should have observec the
following procedure:

(1) Determine if petitioner's obligation to respondent fails under either of the

exceptions under Article 155 of the Family Code.

(2) Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner's claim that the property was
his family home; conduct an ocular inspection of the premises, an
examination of the title; an interview of members of the community where
the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner
a"tually rslded within the premises of the claimed family home; order a
s' bmisslon of photographs of the premises, jepositions, and/or affidavits
of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the petition, his
children and other witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given
the ooportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary.

(3) If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner's family home,

•tle court should determine:

(a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or
after, the effectivity of the Family Code;

(b) if petitioner's spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other

beneficiaries of the family home;

(C) if the petitioner has more than one residerve for the purpose of
determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and

(d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the
provisions of Article 157 and 160 of the Family Code.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person and nis family, a sacred
symbol of family , love and repository of cherished memories that last during one's
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a
sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where
both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which
uitimatIy forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home
is just as necessary in preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and
since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect, the trial court's failure to observe the proper
procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner's allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold
at auction. Despite petitioner's allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did no'.
make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether the items were
exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to
someone else.

Exemption most be claimed,

otherwise party may be estopped.
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2006-2009

A claim for exemption from execution of the family home should be set up..
and proved before the sale of the property at public auction, and failure to do so
would estop the party from later claiming the exemption since the right of
exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment.dbtOr which must be
claimed by the judgment debtor himself it the time of levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter, the circumstances of the instant case are different, Petitioner
claimed exemption from execution of his family home soon afteL respondent filed
the motion for issuance of writ of execution, thus giving r utice to the trial court
and respondent that a property exempt from execution may be in danger of being
subject to levy and sale. Thereupon, the trial court Is called to observe the
procedure as herein laid out; on the other hand, the respondent should observe
the procedure prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an
order for the sale on execution of the petitioner's family home, if so, and apply
the proceeds —less the maximum amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the
Code which should remain with the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home
- to his judgment credit. Instead both the trial court an respondent completely
ignored petitioner's argument that the properties subject of the writ are exempt
from execution.

Family home, when it cannot be partitioned.

In Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008, the basi';
question is whether the family home may be the subject of partition after the
death of the father where heirs became co-owners. Answering the question in the
negative, the SC

Held: The family home is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 pf
the Family code which provides:

"Article 159. The family home shall continue

despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons thereof. This rule shall apply,
regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home."

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the
physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the foCowing
restrictions on it,- partition; first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partitioi it for
a period of 10 years from thp death of one or-both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor benficiary
residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the
aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefore.

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the

immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies
that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the
heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone dispel the protection
cast upon t by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner of the family home
cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
family home.
 s)UI V Ji *,)iS w V

When family home constituted.

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by th'2 husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and
their family reside, and the land on which It is situated.

Article153. The family home ls deemed constituted on a house and lot

from the time Jt is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its .beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family borne continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the valde ailowed
by the law.

One significant innovation introduced by the Family Code is the automatic

constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family
residence without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial proeesses
provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of
the Rules of CDurt. Furthermore, Article 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family
resides but also to the lot on which it stands, Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the spouses from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 year.; back.
(Sps, Versola v. CA, G.R. No, 164740, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 385),

ARTICLE 172

In Victoria Tayeg v. Felicidad Tayag-G&lor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24,

2008, Tinga, J, - there as a petition for the issuance of letter of administratiDn over
the estate of Ismael Tayag alleging that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of Ismael, who diedintestate and left real properties. The respondent
moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit failed to state a cause of action,
alleging that the propertis are her exclusive properties. She further alleged that
it is necessary to allege that she was recognized and acknowledje by Ismael as
his illegitimate child and since she did not allege it, the action has become one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death o' the putative father
especially so that it v,as filed in 2031. The motion was denied and the lower court
was directed to proceed with the trial by the Court of Appeals on appeal The
Court of Appeals ruled that the allegation that petitioner is an illegitimate child
was sufficient for a cause of action so she can prove it in the trial and the
respondent can refute it too in the course of the settlement proceedings.

Before the Supreme Court the petitioner asserted that respondent should
not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag's estate. If
following the case of Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, OR. No. 76873, October
26, 1989, 178 SCRA 684, the claim of filiation may no lcxnger be proved in an
action for recognition, with more reason that it should not be allowed to be
proved in an action for the settlement of the decedent's estate. Thus, petitioner
claimed, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove that she is the
illegitimate child of the decedent after the latter's death

The main issue is whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters
of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent
merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate cnild of the decedent, without
stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The
appellate court held that the m.re allegation that respondent is an illegitimate

28
 • .',- .

Survey of SC Decisions In CIVIL LAW 2008 209

child suffices. In ruling In the affirmative upholding the Court of Appeal's ruling,
the Supreme Court

Held: Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration must be flied by an Interested person. In Saçjuisln V.
LJridayag, L-17759, December 17, 1962, 6 SCRA 874; TrIllana V. Crisostomo Eind
Espinosa v. Barrios, 70 Phil'. 311 (1951), the Court defined an interested party as
one who would be benefited by the estate, such as creditor. This interest,
furthermore, riut be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.

Essentially, the petition for the Issuance of letters of administration is a, uit

for the settlement of the Intestate estate of lsmael Tayag. The right of respondent
to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional
rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established
through voluntary .or compulsory nedognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express, such as that in a record of birth

appearing In the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private
handwritten instru'nent signed. by the parent concerned. The voluntary
recognitior of an Illegitimate child by his or her parunt needs no further court
action and s, there Fore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition
be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent. (Divinagracia v. Bellosillo,
143 SCRA 350; In Re: Delgado, at al, G. -R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480
SCRA 334). Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be
demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parents.

Petitioner's thesis is essentially based on her contention that by lsinael

Tayag's death, respondent's illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest In
the decedent's estate which the Rules require to be material and direct, may no
longer be established. Petitioher, however, overlooked the fact that respondent's
successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also.by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and
recognized as an illegitimate child.

In Uyguangco v Court of Appeals, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be

an illegitimate child of the decedent,, filed, a complaint for partition against the
latter's wife and legitimate children. However, an admission was elicited from him
in the course of his pre.3entition Cf evidence at the trial that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278 of the 1950 Civil Code tosiow that he was
the illegitimate son of the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the
docod€nt thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he
could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provision of the
Civil Code.

The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which has then
already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation
tinder the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family code, i.e., open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was
already barred by the death of the alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to
present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and
acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner's opposition to her
petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way
to determine if her petition Is actually one to compel recognition which had
already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed &e has a

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 Survey 01 S(. Usoistons in Mt. LWV uQ-uu

material and direct Interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent's
voluntary acknowledgment th recognition vi her illegitimate filiation.

The allegation therefore, that respondent is an illegitimate child of the

decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
Assuming the fact alleged to be jue, I.e., that responrint is the decedent's
illegitimate child, her interest In the estate as such would definitely be material
and direct. The appellate court was, therefore, correct In allowing the
proceedings to continue, ruling that, 'respondent still has the duty to prove the
allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner
has the right to disprove it in the course of the settlement proceedings.'

Unsigned autobiography of the father

Js suffIcIent evidence of filiation,

lii Jenie San Juan do/a Cruz and Christian Do/a -Cruz "Aquino", etc. V.
Garcia, G.R. No, 177728, July 31, 2009, (Carpio.Morales, J), Jenie and Christian
Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit oi marriage.
When Jenie was pregnant,. Dominique wrote his autobiography and stated
-therein the following statemnt
s:, "Jenle deha Cruz Is my wife as we fell in love
with iach other and now she is pregnant and for that we lived together. Before
the child was born, Dominique died. Jenie sought to register the child's birth with
Dominique as the father, but the local civil registrar denied the same stating that
the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more
capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 - Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity -
or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of

name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
alleging that the denial of registration of the child's name is a violation of his right
to use the surname.of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code,
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255, the law that allows the' illegitimate
child to use the surname of the father, amending Article 176 of the Family Code.

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique

constituted an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument", within
the contemplation of the law.

For failure to file ..a responsive pleading or answer despite service of

summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-pa rte. She testified on the
circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her
declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet
unborn child. She offered Dominique's handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit' 'A")
as her documentary evidence-in-chief. Dominique's lone brother, Joseph Btch
ST. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie's declarations.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action" as the
Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations
Governing the implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten
document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child.

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 Survey of SC Decisions in ClVL LAW 2008-2009

The trial court held that even If Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition
of paterniry.

Direct resort to the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising purely legal issue contending that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly requird that the private handwritten instrument
containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him.
They added that the deceased's handwritten Autobiography, though uniigned by
him, is sufficient, for' the requirement In the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the
Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the
father Is void as It 'unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of
the Family Code.

They further contended that Dominique's handwritten Autobiography

contained a "clear and unmistakable" reogrdtion of the child's paternity.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Dominique's

Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie's pregnancy but not his paternity of
The child she was carrying in her womb." Is the contention of Jenie correct? Why?

Held: Yes, Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly
recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in ituelf, a
consummated adl of acknowledgment of the child's paternity; hence, no separate
action for judicial approval is necessary. (De Jesus v. Estate of Juan DIZQre, G.R.
No.142877, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 499).

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly
state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child's paternity
must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be 'ead in
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that
recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175, Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as l&gitirnate
children.

xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register

or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public

document or a private handwritten instrument and signed cy
the parent concerned.

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child tirough a written

instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176of the
Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely

3/
 urvey ci U00610111il hi Ju-Uui

articulated such requirement; it did not 'unduIyepand" the import of Artble 176
as claimed by petitioners.

In this case, however, special circumstances exist to hoid that

Dominique's Autobiography though unsigned by him, substantially satisies the
• requirement of the law.:

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child's birth. .3econd,
• the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie
proffered. (Reyes v. CA, 135 SCRA 439 (1985); Vane v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248
(1954). Third, Jeriie's testimony Is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique's father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances
indicating Dominique's paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography.

In Herrera v. Alba, G.R, No. 148220, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 197, the
Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprucionco

Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide s

follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation In the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

XXXX

ART.'172. The filiation of legitimate children is established

by any of the following: .

(1) The recordof birth appearing in ihe civil register or a

final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiatbn in a public

document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate

filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of

a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The

relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39, Act or declaration about pedigree. - The act or

• S
'survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

deiaratinn of a person deceased, or unable to testify, In respect to

the pedigree of another person related to, him- by birt martiag,
may be received Inevidence where it Occurred. before the
controversy, and the reia1Onshlp between' the two" persons is
jhown., by evidence other than such act or declratlon. 'he word .
"pedigreV. .indudes relatl6nah.iIi, frnlly gan.alogy, btrth,.'rnarrtago,
• dàath, the dates when and the places' Where these -facts . occurted,"
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also: facts of family.
• history intimately connected with pedlgree.

SEC 40 family reputation or tradition regarding

pedlgree..-7-'The reputation ortraditlon existing in a fainliy.prevlous
to the controversy, in resecf to the pedigree of any One of Its
members,' may be received im evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member 'of'the family, either by consanguinLt or
affinity. 'Entries. In family, J,ibles or other family ., books or charts,
'engraving on rings,, family portrait* 'and the like, may be received as
evidence Of pedigree. ; .

The Court's'ruiirigs fUrther specify .whát incriminating acts

- ' are acceptable as OIdence to establish fihiation, In pa Lim V. CA V It
was said that the. issue of paternity' still has to be "resoiyOd by such
conv,nlionsl avideflo9 as the rol.vant:incrlminating verbal afl4,
written acts by the pitative father:. Under Article 278 of the New
Clvii Code, voluntary recognition by. a parent àha!l be made 'n the
record of birth, a will, a staternent'befOre a court of record, or in any
• . authentic writing. To be .ff.ctLve the claim Of flilatlon must be
madi by.the putative father himself and the wilting must be
the-Writing of the putativ•fathOr. A notarlal agreement to support.,
A wchlld whose flujation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. 'Letters to the mother vowing to
be a good father to the child and pictures of the put tive fathor
cuddling the..hi1c on. various together with the certificate
of live, birth, proved fiuiation. however, a stUdent permanent record,
a written consent 'to a fathers operation, or a marriage, contract
'where the ..putative father gave consent, cannot' be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate' of baptism
nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.

There is no dispute that the statements in Dominique's AutObigraphy

have been made 'and written by him. Taken together With the other iOievant facts
extant herein - that Dominique, dunng his lifetime and Jen,e were living together
as" commonlaw spouses fOr several months In 2005: at his. parents' hOuse 'in
Pulang-lupa, Dutumbayan, TereSa, Izal; she was. pregnant when Dominiq is
died on September 4 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave
birth to the child - they sufficiently Cstablish that tite child of Jenie is
Dominique a

Along tle same vein the Court adopted rules respecting the reqiurement
of affixing the aignature o(the 'acknowledging parent in dny,pth ate handwritten
instrument wherein an OdmissiDn'of Nation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made

1) ".,. Where the ':prlvate Jiandwntten instrument is the lone' piece of

.,
OVkIonce submitted ' to frovo& filiation, the'ró'shoUld 1'e strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent;.and

S • 3'3•
 Survey of SC Decisions jr CIVIL LAW QUb-OU

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other

relevant, and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and hapdwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corrobcrative of such other
evidence.

• Our laws Instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by

public or private social welfare institutions, cour 4s of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration. (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children x x x." (Herrera v. Alba, supra.). Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.'

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the
surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate..

CHANGE OF NAME

Gender classification of a person

with ir)tersox when he/she reaches
age of majority depends upon what
he thinks of his or her sex.

The case of Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676,

September 12, 2008 (Quisumbirig, J) is one of first impression. in this case, the
SC had the occasion to say that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority with good reason thinks of his/her
sex.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition

for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan,
Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
affliqd possess both male and female char&cteristics. She further alleged that
she/was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
uiderwent an ulrasound where it was discovered that she had small ovaries. At
e thiisen, tests revealed that her ovarian strucure had minimized, she has
/stopped growin and has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
/ for all lntens and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she had beáome
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that

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her gender be'd,anged from female to male and her first nari,e be changed from
Jennifer to Jot " •.. •'O'

To prove her claim,respondent testified and presented the testimony. o

Dr. Michael 'Slonzon' of 'the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines - Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Siozon issued a medical cenificate
stating that the respondent's condition was known as CAH. He explained .that
genetically respondent ws female: but because her body secreted male
'hormones, her emale orgals did nOt develop normally and she. ha'two 'sex
organs - female and male. H. 'testified that this condition. is very , ran that
respondents uterus was nbt.fully developed. because of lack of female hormones
and that she had 'no monthly period; He 'further testified that' respbr4ent's
condition was permanent and recommended' the 'change of gender ;bucauae
respondent has made up her'mind, adjusted to her chosen role as mál,'and,,the
gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted the. petition as it presented clear - and convincing

evidence that her body produced male hormones and'that her feeling and actiOnS
are that of it male He has chosen to be male and wanted to be known and
acknowledged a su ch The OSG appealed, and argued 'that Rule 108 doe e not
eUow change of sex or gender inthebirth' certifldte and respondent's claimed
- medical ccndltion'known as CAH does not make her a male.

on the c ther hand,, respotdent;countered that* he is actuallya male person

and hence his ith certificate fs td be corrected to reflect his true sec1ender,
change of sex or gender Is alio ed under Rule 108, and respondent substart1aI1y
compiled with the requirement p1 Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court

in upholding the respondent contention as correct, the Supreme Court

Held'. Responc ent undisputedly has CAH This condition causes the early or
Inapproprlatew appearance of ma Ia characteristics

here the peison is blo ogically or naturally intersex the determining

factor ili his gender c1 asslflçation would be what the Individual, like respondent,
having reached the age Of majc rity, with good reaSon thinks of his/her sex
Respondent here..thIn W of himself as ,a mai& and consldeilng that -his body'
produces high ':leveie of maleonnones ..(androgen) there is preponderant
• biological uupport 'for '.consldeiing Iim as 'being. maté. Se*uai. deyeioprneht in
cases of intersex person makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive it
is at matunty that the pander of such person, hke respondent, is fixed

In the abseno of a law on the matter the court will not dictate on
respondent concernir g, a matter so: innately, p rivate as one's seuaIity and
lifestyle preference, m .ich' lesson whether or not to undergomedica!'treatment.to
reverse the mall tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent'
as having erred in n4 choosing to undorgo treatment in order to :b me or
remain as a female Neither will the court force responcent to undergo treatment
and to take medicatiot't lii otder to fit the nioJd of a female, as souety commonly
currently knows thisgi nder the human species Respondent Is the one who has
to live with interse c ai iatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
'happiness and of health. 'Thus, to him,ghould 'belong the prlmbfdlal hoiøe of
what courses of actloii to take alongthe path of 'his sexi at development and
maturation in the abs orice that respordent is an incompetent' and
f eylde
In the absence of evic lenpe to shpw that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members 4 socty ho are equafly entit'ed to protectioi under the

1.

35:-

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 Survey of SC Decisions in.CIVIL.LAW 20Ui-2009

law, the court affirm as valid and justified the respondent's position his person?l
judgment of being a male.,

As for his change of name under Rule 103, it has always been held that a
change a name is not a matter of right but of judiciai discretion, to be exercised
in the light, of the reasons added and the consequences that will follow. (Yu V.
Republic, 123 Phil 1108 (1996), The trial court's grant of respondents change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implied a change,of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Cànsiiering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognized his preferred gender, there is merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certhicate
from female to male. H

ADOPTION

Consent of SpOU8e necessary In

adoption.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Micriael Jude P. Lim
Monina Urn, petitioner, G.R. Nos. 168892-93, May 2:1, 2009

facts; Moriina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were
unknown and whose wher.abouts were unknown were brought to thorn. They
reared and took care of the two kids. Prirno died in 1998 but Monina got married
to Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the children were brought to them
they registered them making it appear that they were the natural parents. Moniria
decided to adopt the two (2) children by availing of the amnesty under RA 8552
to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she filed the
petition on April 24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the
time of the filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of
Michelle gave his consent to the adoption The DSWD issued a certification that
they were abandoned children. After trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the husband of Monina did not join her in the petition as required by
Section 7(c), Article Ill, RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. She tiled a
Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of the exceptions
provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c), Article Ill, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the
contention that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency
and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made
a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated anc oint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled
that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority
because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, she tiled a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue
of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can siny adopt.

She contended that the rule on joint adoption trust be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. She argued that the legal maxim "dura lex sod
lex" Is not applicible to adoption cases. She argued tha joint parental authority is
not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitiort i were filed, Michelle was
25 years old and, already married, while Michael was already 18 years oi age.

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Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated
having attained tho a g e of majority. Is the petition proper? Explain.

Held: No. The husband and wife should have jointly filed the petition for adoption.
The principle of dura lox sod lax Is applicable as the law is explicit that the
husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

The use of the word shall" means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which Is the Ideal situation, As the cnf Id to be adopted Is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt Jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. (Rep. v,
Toledano, G.R. No, 94147, June 8,1994, 233 SCRA 9).

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having

remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband, the trial court was correct in denying the petftioni for
adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fail under any of the three exceptions enumeated
in Section 7. First, 'the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband. Second, the children are not the illegitimate crilldren
of petitioner. And third, petitioner and her husband are pot legally Separated from
each other.

The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that her
husband must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualificationn
set forth - In Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines: (2) he must havts been
living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5)
the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter's country as the iatters adopted
child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien's

qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 1 The .

children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of her husband. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner,

~ ffects of adoption and parental authority.

'Petlioner contended that joint parental , authority is not atiymore necessary

g
since the children have been emancipated having reached the a e of majority.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contention-is untenable'.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the ,children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their morai,'mental and
physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children, (All. 210,
Family Code). Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect th)
Parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to
be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (Art. 212, Family Code),

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It Is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation - that. is,
when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age - emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental
authority is rnerel.y just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552
enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Exceptin cases where the

biological parent is the spouse of the adopter all legal ties between
the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Logitimcy. - The adoptee shall be considered the

legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.

• SEC. 18. Succession, - In legal and intestate succession, the

adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights o
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. Howver, IT
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between
the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the r,tionship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adoptur to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
a Iegitimte child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from
their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successioral rights.
Conv:rsely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.

The Supreme Court went on to explain that adoption statutes, being

humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law, (Bobanovc v. Montes, 226 Phil 404
(1986). But, as ruled in Republic v. Vergara, 336 Phil 944 (1997):

"We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption

statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.

38
 Survey of Sc DQcisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009
-I

Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that

will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law, must also bi
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of
• the fact that It is Intended to provide homes, love, care ani
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not h
a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in th3
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
Until such time however, that the law on the matter is tmended, we
cannot sustalu the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption."

Petitioner, being married at the time :he petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. The Supreme Court said
that it aannot make our own legislation to suit petifloner.

Effect of filing of action for

dissolution Qf the marriage in the
LJSA

- She contended further that joint adoption could no longer be possible

because her husband has filed a case for dissolution of his marilage to petitioner
in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

In disagreeing, the Supreme Court ruled that filing of a case for dissolution
of the marriage between petitioner and her husband Is of no mom€nt. It Is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and her
husband, the marriage still subuists. That being the case, joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is required.

PROPERTY

Builder In good faith.

In Arogantè v. Spa. Mag/unob, etal., G.R. No. 178908, February 18, 2009.
the SC had the 'occasion to rule on the rights of a buiider in, good faith and that of
the owner of the land.

In the context that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448
of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being thti owner of the
land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any
defect In his title or mode of acquisition. (PNB v. De Jesus, 454 SCRA 459
(2003).

Under the law, the builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make
•a choice between appropriating the bulldlrg by paying the proper Indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the ownrr
of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of a,ce.sslon, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option
lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must
choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead
remove It fromthe land. ln,order, however,, that the builder can invoke thai
accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choke be
made by the landowner; he should be able to prove good faith on his part.

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 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 200€-2009

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract qualit' with no

technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an uMconscionahle advantage. An individual's personal good
faith Is s concept of his own mind arid, therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upOn
Inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's
right ignorance of it suoerior claim, and absence oi intention to overreach
another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware
that there exists In his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

EASEMENT

Q When Is there Impairment of the easement by the dominant estate?

Answer: There is impairment of the easement if the owner of the dominant estate
violates the following restrictions on is rights over the servient estate:

(1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;
(2) It cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
property originally contemplated;
(3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;
(4) it cannot construct anything which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement,
(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;
(6) it must notify' the servient estate owner of its intention to make the
necessary works thereon;
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works
so as to cause least inconvenience to the owner of servient estate.

By erecting an office structure on the Iinited commori area of a

condominium despite its exclusive right to use the same, it impaired the
easement and illegally altered the condominium plan. It likewise breached Lie
right when it leased the structure as the lease and the structure are not
necessary for the use and preservation of the easement. (Golden Realty Corp. v.
Cypress Gardens Condominium, Corp., G.R. No, 171072, April 17, 2009).

0 - What is a loreshore land?

Answer: Foreshore land, is defined as that strip of land that lies between the high
and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tided. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately covered
and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable lard of the
public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
Foreshore land remains part,of the public domain and is outside the commerce of,
man. It is not capable of private appropriation (Rep. v. CA, 432 SCRA 593
(2004); Manese, et al. v. Sps. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 164024, Jar.uary 29,
2000).

0 - Who may file an action for reversion of lands of the public domain? Explain.

Answer: In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of tne public
domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philipoirres is the real
party-in-interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the

40
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

officer acting In his stead, In behalf of the Republic of the Philippines Moreover,
such action does not prescribe. Prescription and lathes will not bar actions filed
by the State to recover its property acquired through fraud by private individuals
(Rep. v. Heirs of Felipo Alejaga, Sr, 393 SCRA 361; Maness, at al. V. Sps.
Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 164024, January 29, 2009).

DONATION

Requisite of donation of real property.

Q - Esperanza executed an Affidavit where she renounced, relinquished, waived

and quitclaimed all her rights, shares, interest and participation over a parcel of
land unto Spouses Ray and Eivlra Arogante, their heirs, successors, and
assigns. What is the nature of such affidavit and is it valid? Explain.

Answer: The affidavit is in the nature of a donation, a simple/pure donation

covered by Article 749, NCC which provides:

An. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may b

Valid, it must be made In a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donei
must satisfy.

The acceptance iTtay be made in the same deed of donation

or in a separate public cocurnent, but It shall not take effect unlesu
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance Is made in a separate Instrument, thu

donor shall be notified thereof In an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both ina ruments.

From the aforesaid provil aon, there are three requisitea for the vallilty of a
simple donation of a real property, to wit: (1) It must be made In it public
instrument; (2) it must be acceped, which acceptance may be made either in the
same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the
acceptance Is made In a separ3te instrument, the donor must be notified in an
authentic form, and the same mi st be noted in both instruments.

The donation, however suffers from legal infirmities, as it failed to cumply

with the aforesaid requisites of the law, that h, the lack of acceptance.

n Sumipat v. Banga, G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004, 346 SCRA 521,
it was ,aid that title to Immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless It has boon accepted
in a pubIc Instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made In the very same Instrument of donation. If the acceptance does
not appear in the same document, It must bp made In another. Where the Deed
of Donation failed to show the cceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made In a separate I 'istrumont, was either not given to the donor or
else not noted in tte Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, tho
donation is null and void. (JLT A ro, Inc. v. Balansag, 43 SCRA 211(2005).

The Affidavit, which Is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first

requisite', as It was notarized; thus it became a public instrument. Nevertheless,
it failed to meet the second and third requisites. The accoplance of the said

41
 Survey or L)eClSlOflS in t-AVIL LfcVi iJuO-i.u'J'

donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband either in the same
Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of
the said donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the
donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor
of petitioner and her husband is null and void.

The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23 September 2000,

as well as the notice of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure
the dfect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner several years after the
Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its Decision
dated 12 September 2000, although It was still during Esperanza's lifetime.
Evidently, its execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what
was a defective donation.

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time

durlig the lietime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance
may itill he admitted In evidence on appeal, tho Is still need for proof that a
form il notica of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in
both the Daed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. (Lagazo v. CA, 350 Phil, 449 (1998). At the very least, this last legal
requisito of annotation In both instruments of donation and acceptanue was not
fulfilled ly the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears
the act that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by
petitioner. For this reason even Esperanza's one-third share in the subject
Property cannot be adjudicated to th€ petitioner. (Arogante v. Sps. Maglunob, et
al., G.R. No. 178906, February 18, 2009).

Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states that a certificate of title

shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cainot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The judicial action required to challenge the validity of title is a direct

attack, not a collateral attack.

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or

set aside such procteding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a differert relief, an attack on the
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incicient thereof. Such action to attack
a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a
certificate of title is assailed as void. (Arcigante v. Sps. Maglunob, et al, G.R.
No 178906, February 18, 2009 citing Leysoui v. Bontuyan, 453 SCRA 94).

PRESCRIPTION ' LACHES

In Imuan, at al. v. Cereno, of al., G. R. No. 107995, September 11, 2009,

Pablo got married twice. In his first marriage he had three (3) children. After the
death or the first wife, he got married to Jiiana with whom he had three (3
children. After his death, he left 2 parcels of land. Juana and her children
continued possessing the parcel of land i n dispute since he died in 1936. Juana
sold the property in 1970 and the same was registered with the Register of
Deeds. The buyers declared the property for taxation purposes, paid the tax and
enjoyed exclusive, open and uninterrupted possession of the property. In 1999 a
complaint for annulment of document was filed alleging that P)blo's Estate has
not yet beensettled; that Juana merely pssesed the property by terance and
that the sale was void. Juana interposed the defense of prescription of action

42
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

The RTC declared the document void but the CA reversed It on the ground f
prescription and lathes. Is the ruling correct? Why?

Answer: Yes, because the property, has been acquired by aciulsitive

prescripliori.

Prescription Is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights

over immovable property. It Is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and
under condltlons'lald down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adv3rse. Possession is
open when It Is patent visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It Is
continuous when uninterrupted, Unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it
Is so conspicuous that it. Is generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighbornood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription. (Director of Lands v. lAO, 209 SCRA 214 (1992).

Kinds of prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordliary or extraordinry.

(Art. 1117 NCC). Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith and with just title for ten years. (Article .1134, NCC). in extraordinary
prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property Eire
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need
of title or of good faith. (Article 1137, NCC).

The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership. (Calicdan v. Cendana, 466 Phil. 894 (2004). For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right. (Article 1129, NCC).

Action for quieting of title is

Imprescriptible if plaintiff is In
possession; reason.

In DBT Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. v. Panes, of al., SR. No. 167232, July
31, 2009, a complaint for quieting of title with cancellation of title and all titles
derived therefrom was filed alleging that they were the heirs'of Ricaredc Panes
and his sons. He alleged that he was the lawful owner of a parcel of land, having
been in possecsion of the same as early as prior to the Second World War. To
perfect his title he filed an application. But DBT contended that it is the leqitimate
owner and occupant of the property pursuant to a dacion an page executed by
B.C. Regalado in its favor for services rendered by it,

In holding that DBT has a better right over the property In question, the SC

Held: It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land

in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession,

43
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

Article 1126 of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46 of Act No. 496
(The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 (Tl)e
Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is
unavailing not only against the registered owier but also against As hereditary
successors. Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has
been registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which
must be protected. Prescription Is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose
objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great
distances of time.and surprising the parties or their representatives when the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or
death or removal of witnesses. (Gallardo v, IAC, 155 SCRA 248 (1987).

Thus, respondents claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject

property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive
prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as arnendc1 by PD
No, 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the
instant base, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and.
inconsequential,

There was no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. To
add, DST is an Innocent purchaser for value and good faith which, thiough a
dacron en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired ownership over
the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under Section 32 of
P.D. No. 1529.

Concept and effect of claciori en pago.

Dacion en pagois the delivery and transmission of ownership of a hing by

the dbtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing
to the cr€dito, who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an out.tanding
debt. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion an pago is an
objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the
contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. (Agag v.
Alpha Financing Corp., G.R. No. 154826, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA61O).

It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already
been sold to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in gooa faith
and for value, relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no
knowledge of eny defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a
reasc'ably prudent man to inquire into the staiiis of the subject property. To
disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and
adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the
aforemenioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of
the Torrens system of registration.

Actioi for reconvoyance is

equivalent to quieting of title; when it
prescribes.

Once again, in IJBT Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. v. Ricaredo Psnes, et al.,

G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009 the SC had the occasion to say that an action for

44
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 200C-2009

réconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an actin for reconveynce is

based on fraud, it must be flied within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud,
and such discoery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the
original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes In ten (10) years from the (late of
the Issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. The rule
Is that the registration of an Instrument In the Office of the RD constitutes
constructive, notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud, Is
deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. (Miliena v. CA, 361 Phil.
132(2000).

However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual reed to

reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the proprty. If
the plaintiff, as the realowner of the property also remains in possession of the
property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconvoyarice, If
nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action
that is imprescriptible. (Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, 524 SCRA 492
(2007),

The reason for this is that otto who Is In actual possessIon of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner therdof may wait until his possession Is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason vor the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of'a third party and Its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who is In possession. (Vda. de Gui5erto v. Go, 463 SCRA 671
(2005).

Although proscription and laches are distinct concepts, nonetheless, the

doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the
prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this case,
because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered their right
to brinu an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, henc€, not barred by
aches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct aieged to
constitute the same must be intentional arid unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.
Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but
rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly,
Inequitable situation,

SUCCESSION

Perpetual trust Is void.

In Orondain ',. Th.istee,ship of the Estate of Doña Margarita Rodriguez,

G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009, (Nachura, J), in the last will and testament of
the decedent, particularly Clause 10, she enumerated properties to be placed in
trust for perpetual administration. There was a motion to dissolve the trust
applying Articles 867 and 87G of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled that only the
perpetual prohibition to alienate or mortgage is void. Is the ruling correct? Why?

Answer: No. Quite categorical from the last will and testament of the decedent Is
the creation of a perpetual trust for the administration of her properties and the
Income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The decedent, in Clause
10 of her will, listed a number of properties to be placed under perpetual
administration of the trust. In fact, the decedent unequivocally forbade the

45
 Survey of SC Ueclsions in CIVIL LAW 21.100-2Ou

alienation or mortgage of these properties. In all, the decedent did not

contemplate, the disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the
income derived therefrom to varioys sets of beneficiaries.

It was held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 137 Phil 371 (1969) that the
perpetual prohibitiOn was valid only for twenty (20) years. The trust stipulated in
the decedent's will prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the properties
vjolate. Articles 567 and 870 of the Civil Code. Th' decision which declared that
that poi non of the decedent's estate, the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will,
ought to be distributed based on intestate succession is not correct there being
no institution of heirs to the properties covered by the perpetual trust.

Apparent from the decedent's last will and testament is the creation of a
trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere
In the will can It be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trust's
designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The decedent's will did not
institute any heir thereto.

Duo to the invalidity of the perpetual

trust the rules of intestate
succession apply.

Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners' motion to dissolve

and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10 according to the
testatrix's wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the
decedent did not institut€ an heir therefor. Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2,
Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either

by the provision of a will or by operation of law.

xxxx

Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

xxxx
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose
of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal
succession shall take place only with respect to the property of
which the testator has not disposed;
xxx

It is erroneous for the RTC to hold that paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the
same code specifically allows a perpetual trust, because this provision of l.w is
inapplicable. Suffice it to state that the article is arçong the Civil Code provisions
on intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a decedent, in
default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this article, the allowance for a
permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the
State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void
testamentary provision which did not Institute an heir. Accordingly, the article
cannot be applied to dispose of the decedent's properties.

In Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province, et al., No. L-24302,

August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 354, it was ruledthat:

46
 Survey of SC Decisior G in CIVIL LAW 2008-200

Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than 20 years, Is not violated by the trust
constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator
does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. The will
merely directs that the Income of said two parcels be utilized for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of the high school,

Said Article 870 was designed 'to give more Impetus to the
socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the
perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles.*
The trust herein involved covers only two lots, which have not been
shown to be a large landholding, And the income deived therefrom
Is being devoted to a public and social purpose - the education of
the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a
sense socialized. There is no hint in the record that the trust has
spawned agrarian conflicts.

In this case, however, a different conclusion was reached as the testatrix

specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two .(2) properties in the aforecited case. The testatrix's
large landholdings cannot be subjected. Indefinitely to a trust because the
ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even In the aftei life.

CONTRACTS

Heirs of Trariquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Laniste, et al.

G.R. No. 162033, May 8, 2009

A conveyance of land made In a private document does not affect its

validity. Article 1358, NCC does not require the accomplishment of the acts or
contracts in a public instrument In order to validate the act or contract but only to
ensure Its efficiency. (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CA, 233 Phil. 178 (1967); Aiano v.
Babasa, 10 Phil.'511 (1908).

SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS

Liability may be direct but not

necessarily solidary.

In The Hei rs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R.

No. 156302, April 7, 2009, the SC once again had the occasion to rule that a
solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor Is liable for the
entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In
a joint obligation., each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to
each Dbligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. Welt-entrenched is the
rule that soildary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. There is solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when
the nature of the obligation so requires.

It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity

against liability to third persons, the liability of the Insurer is direct and such third
persons can directly sue the insurer, The direct liability of the insurer under
indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean, however, that the
insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties

47
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found at fault, since they are being field liable under different obligations. The
liability of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code; (Art. 2178, NCC) while that of the insurer
arises from contract, particularly, the insurance policy. The third-party liability of
the insurer is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and that required by
law, and it cannot be held solidarily liable for anything beyond that amount.
(MMTC v. CA, 359 Phil. 18(1998). Any award beyond the insurance coverage
would already be the sole liability of the insured and/or the other parties at facjlt.
(OSIS v. CA, 368 Phil. 36 (1999); MMTC v. CA).

In Vda. de Máglana v. Conso/acion, G.R. No, 60506, August 6, 1992, 212

SCRA 218 it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for third-party,
liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in he
agreement, but It cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount, FollOwIng
Vda. do Maglara, petitioners would have had the option either (1) to claim he
amount awarded to them from respondent, up to the extent of the insurance
coverage, anc the balance from Rhoda; or (2) to enforce the entire judgment
against Rhoda, subject to reimbursement from respondent MlCl to the extent of
the insurance coverage.

PAYMENT

Tender of payment; unjustified

refusal to accept payment Is not
extinguishment of obligation.

If an obligation is due and demandable and there is unjustified refusal to

accept payment, does such act constitute extinguishment of the obligation by
payment? Why?

No. Ic have the effect of payment, the law requires the twin acts of tender
of payment and consignation. If there is tender of payment but there is no
consignation, it does not have the effect of payment. If at all there is an effect of
the tender, the debtor must be freed from the obligation to pay interest on th
outstanding amount from the time the unjust refusal took place. (Go Sinco V. CA,
et al., G.R. No 151903, October 9, 2009).

State the effect of an unjustified refusal of the creditor to accept payment.

Explain.

The creditor can be liable for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code
which requires. a person to act with honesty and good faith in the eercise of
rights and in the fulfillment of his duties. (Go Sinco v. CA, et al., GR. No
151903, October 9, 2009).

NOVATION

Extension of payment; no novation

that extinguishes the obligation.

What is the effect if there is a 45-day credit extension in the payment of an

obligation? Explain.

Answer: There is no novation that would extinguish the obligation.

48
 urviy, of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 20084009

Novation is oriaof the modes of extinguishing an obligation. It is done by

substitution orcnange of the obligation by a subsequent oe which extinguishes
the first, either by changing the, object or prldpaI condItions, or L', substituting
tie person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person In the rig hts'of the
creditor Novation rrlay

Either be oxtinctive or modificatary, much being dependent on the

• n?ture of the chance and the intention of the parties.;ExtlncUve.
nóvatlop is, never'presumed;',there must fig. an , express
Intention to novate; in cases where It I. Implied,, the acts'of the
prtIes must clearly demonstrate their hitent to çlIssolve the
0110bIigtIó e thó moving conaid.r*tlon for the emergence
of the now, ono implied novation: necessitates' that the
• . incompatibility between 14e old and new obllgatiàn be total on every
point such that the old 'oligatlon Is completily. iuperceded by the
new one, The test of incompatibility is . whether..they can stand,
ta4n4 ii . ndettdsterce ycWtnot
• ad are trreconcllable, like, subsequesf obligatIon 'would *!s
• extlngutshthefirat. . . .•

An extinçtive noveton would thus have the twip efieota of, first,
• , extinguishing-an 'existingobiigatIqp and," second, creating a nw-
one in its stead. This kind of nova ion presuppc see a confluence of
four essential requisites (1.) a previous valid 'o$llgalion, (2). an
agree mn of all '°paes cncemed to a new oonthct, (3)thà.
extlngulshment.ofthè,oldobftgatlorj, and (4) the blith of a valid new
obHatlon, -Novatlon -is merely modificatory where the change
brought about by any suseuent agreement Is merely IrçldentaI to
the main obligation (e g a change In Interest rates or an extension
of time to..pay; In this Instance ,' the. new agreement lii not have the
effect of .extlngulhlng the' fist but would merely upplement It or
supplant some 6ut not all. of Its provisions). . •- . " -

eobllgaUon. apayasuni,çrnony- I qptedbyai(stu,nt that

expressly recognizes thootd'angesonIy;the terms,Ofpaymont, ad4a Other
obligatkins iotijttcprnpatlia dhthe oldpneW ie copti- ,ct merely
suppirient the oidt one *PIlaYee i. t R No
11 0,'R.
14984041 March 01 2QQ8$3&SRAi276) Is,vtttl r they tc
tJffrLI" 'lt* r-t I
ta 'gaarit tofac45,4dayri& extensiqnøW eQtiQete QntS so as
to extingtiis uthetiattfiraffhere was no Incompatibility between them. There was
nd interttlon'by the parties to superñede the'obligatións under the'contracts. In
fact, the old
grant
of a 45Bridteditp tkgt0ftqjngetIw period
within f6iob8tiasqa1Iaiwed (to, se' oblatlOnlnce 4bp Zopritracts
tht fltó'i3O% pa.
interest aid cblgation d 4' i irt of vliid 'i
oblitior £'iOv5 ion is mti-aiy lifkitry ih. - the cban&
hrought tiboL by riy sub eqieflt ogieirnent is merely iri4dentai to
1- he main a Itatian (e j a CQNIRAOII&cest res ci an extMnefr,r
'of tlmto y;'inttsit t'ce,.àQreerrlentwill ei rif have the
Loas.*ithopttourfiie8ett.qinewi auid tno'Iv cuprnenf it
ftmustteIxereIs.dl.,ut ri5t all Of k..

qtyias .entare& in pi eeecQrneIjQ 4atrteasQIt nd

Jaidø a tproved pibioagei!n sal oB'tJjrØ pereonaod

5U th5fl$ ls
'he old zr,r ftj y1 irii
1404t.4 Mrct ç3 I i4d r
• , ' • - .• •' •-
ott bto &" &Mracl Oriãiido"diéd n't'4ovembe '7
set to explre,çn December 3 983 when Orlando died
unless reiewOr!ando s he fo qqther four (4) years The heirs never
.11"

renewe446 ;1 ct" Thesale was'mderilanuary 2 1987, The heirs of

QrianddtiIp d the validity of the sale coending that it violated the
prohibiticn'gainst sale td third persdri, is th contentIon correct? Why?

Answer,: No, because" the heirs of Odando to whom the right to renew the
contract wae; transniltted after his death did not exercise the option to renew the
lease, As a result, there was no obstacle for Corneliq'to sell, since the prohibitory
clause was no longer existing at the time, of the sale.

While the option to renew is eq enforceable right, it must riècesèarily be

first exercised to be given effect. (Mercy's Inc. V Verde, 18 SCRA 171 (1966), As
the Court explained in Dloqulno v. lñtermeaIa1á'Appe1ate Court, G.R No 8580-
81, November71 98g,'179 SCRA 1: ,

"A.clause found in•an agreement, relative to the

renewal of the lease agreement at the botiort áf the' :
lessee 'gives the.latt0 an enfárceable right to rénw
clause sfoud for such time

tel g li
viae 7h areemerit is understood as
e. lessee, and the latter Is
tit ,,UtiorIzed,ó eneii the contract and to continue to
ccipe4èased propeft after notifying the lessor
9 frat ect A lessor's cvonant or agreement to
renw ,gives a pvilege jo the tenant but is
nevertheless an executory contract, and until the
tenant hs exercised the p,rivllee by Way of some
.affirmative'act, he caMot be held for the additional
terii". In the absence of a stipulation in the lease
requiring notice - of the exercise of an option or an
•
' ,• election to.' o renew to"be given within a certain time
before the expiration 'ofl the lease, Which of course,
the lessee mUst comply with, the general rule is-that a
re must exercise an option or election to renew
• his léase'and notify the lessor thereof before, or of
least at the time of thp expiration of his original term,
unless there is a waiver' or special circumstances
warranting equitable relief.",,

• Thre is no dispute that in' the instant case,' the

'. : ,lsQs (pcivateJesp9pdents) Werê,granted the option
t9 ree the lea oxanpther fIe (5) year after the
termination of the original period of fifteen years Yet
there was never any, positive act on' the part of'private,
rosppndents ,bfore or afr the termination Of the
• original p&riod to show their exercise of such optkn.
• The silence of the lessees after the termination of the
original period cannot be taken to mean that they
opted to renew the contract by virtue of the promise
• by the lessor, as stated in the original contract of
• •' 'lease, to allow them' to rqrew. Neither can the
exercise of th option'to renew be inferred from their
• pMsistence to remain in the premises despite
petitioners .demand for them to acate. (Estate of'

'50'
 Survey ofDecisions in CIVIL . LAW 2008 2009

Orjandö Lienado, at aL . v: Eduardo Lienado, at aL,

G.R. No. 145736, March 4, 2009).

-. mur
Express trust; need to repudiate.

In Heirs of Tranqullno 4abiste, of at v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, at al., G.R.

No. 10203, May 8,.2009, Epifanlo Labiste, together vylth his brothers and sisters
purchas@d a property, with the use of their money. The seller executed a cntract
of cpnvoyance in favor of Epifanló and his brothers and sisters. He Itter on
executed an affidavit that he 'co-owned the property with his co-hirs. In fuct, the
property was subdivided between him and his brother, Tranqullino. After the war,
the reapçndents filed a petition for reconstitution of the title which was initially
opposed by the petitioners but since there was a compromise agreement
between. them the opposition WU8 withdrawn to expedite the reconstitution. They
agreed that the title be deposited with the Clerk of Court to pave the way for the
filing of an action for re, cQnveyance,. but it was violated, hence, petitioners filed a
complaint, for annulment of title wjiich was oppOsed citing that the action 'was
barred by laches, The RTC held, thit it has not prescribed since the We was
• limited to the reconstitution of the certificate ! 'hence, did not give them any more
right than what theirpredecessors had. The CA reversed the ruling that It has
prescribed due to ladies, ruling that the' cause of action has prescribed for the
same must be brought within .10 years from the time the right of action accrued
when the predecessors-in-interest lost possessions over the property after the
war, I

Resolving-the sole i8se.Qf prescription and laches, the SC

Held; Trust is the right to the benfidal enjoymeit of property, the legal title to
which is vested in another It Is a fiduciary relatIonship that obliges the truste to
deal with the property for the benefit of the teneflclàry. 'Truit relations between
parties may either be express or implied. An express trust Is 'created by the
intent,iOn of the trutor or of tFe parties, , ,An Implied trust comes into being by
operat. n of law. (Article 1441, N(,C). .' .
Express trusts are created by direct 'and 'positive acts of the parties, by
some'wrftIrg or deed, or will, or by wards either expressly Or impliedly evincing
an Intention to - create a trust, Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[njo particular
words are required for the creation of an express trust, It being sufficient that a
trust is clearly intended. The Affidavit of Epifanio is in the nature of a trust
agreement. Epifanlo affirmed that the lot brought In his name was co-owned by
him, as one of the heirs of Jose, and hs Uncle Tranquilino. And 'y agreement,
each of them has been in possession of half of the property. Their arrangement
was corroborated by the subdivision. '

As such, prescription and laches will run ont from the time the express
trust is repudiated. For acquisitive prescription to bar the actk'n,of the beneficiary
against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property hold in
trust It must be shown that; (a) the trustee' has performed urequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestul quo trust(b) such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to the cestul quo trust, and (c) the
evldrjce thereon 'js clear and 4tonclusive. Respondents cannot rely on the fact
that the Torrens title wa 4j. issued in the name of Epifarilo and the other heirs of
Jose. It has been, hWd that a trustee whO obtains a Torrens title, over property
held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on .th.a

51
 Survuy,f SC Decsiona in CIVIL LAW 2008 2009

registration, (Sottq v. Teves .175 SCRA 343 (1978). The rule ,requires a .ckiar
rep udiatiór of the truSt duly Communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that
can be construed q.s :epudlatlon was when respondents filed the petition for
r&onstitution In Otóber 1993. And since petitioners filed their borcplaint in
January 1 95,1heir cause' of action has not yet precribed, laches cannot be
attributed them. '

Dot In. of litchesi

It is hori ibook doctrine that laches is a creation. ôf equity and Its application
is controlk d 63 equiabIe considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice
or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be used to
prevent thu rightful pwn&re of a property from recoverInd what has been
fraudulently registered in the name of another.
•

Tru5t.

Fact 'The decedent, Juliana, was married to Jose Lopez Manzario

• (Jose). Their union did .not bear any hildren. Jullanawas the owner of sevOrl
properties, forming parts of her. exclusiv&paraphernal proprties (now known as
exclusive properties).

On 23 March 196b, JulIa'na 'executed a notarial wI'I, whereby she

expressed that she wished to constitute a trust fund for her paraphernal
(exclusive properties) denominated as Fideicomiso do Juliana Lopez Manzano
(fidèicomiso), to be, administered by her husband. If her husband were,tO die or
renounce, the obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to become
administrator and execi,itor of the Fidelco. Two thirds (2/3) of the income from
rentals over thee propertieS were to answer for the education of deserving but
needy honor students while one third. 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses and fees
of the adrninistraôr. As to her conjugal properties, Juliana bequeathed the
portion that she óoul legally disposed to her husband, and after his death, said
properties were to pass to her biznietós or great gràndchiidrén.

Ju]ana Initiated the probate of her will five (5) days after its execution, but
she died before the petition for probate could be heard, hence itwas pursued by
her husband who was designated as executor

The will was admitted. to pr9bato and letters testamentary were lsslied.to
Jose.

-Thereafter, Jobe filed Report which Incl6ded a :ropósed projectf

partition, wherehe explained that as the only compulsory heir of Juliana, ho was
entitled by operation of law to one-half (1/2) of Juliana's paraphernal properties
• as his 1g1time, while the other one-half (1/2) was to be constituted into the
Fideicomiso. . • S S S

The probate court Issued an order approving the project of partition: As to

the properties to be constituted into the Fideicomiso, the probate Court ordered
that the certificates of title thereto be cancelled, and,' in lieu thereof, new
certificates be issued in favor of Jose as trustee of the Fidelcom(so covering one-
half (1/2) of the properties listed in the project of partition; and regarding the thér
half, to be registered In the name of Jose as heir. of Juliana. The properties which
Jose had alleged aà registered In his and Juliana's names, including the disputed
lots, wore adjudicated to Lose as heir, subject to the condition that Jose would

52 -
4
Survey of C Dcskns in CIVIL LAW 2OO82QO9

the obIigation cbared jn th thu,

.&a propø(1a The (probete court 1
direood that new CertfiCa1e5 of title be issued jh,far bJO8$ a the Wgstered
owner thereof . ,

Jpse d l e4, 16avi ng r9pes to

his h&rs The wllflwvas Uwed probate hnce pyr$uänt to JqSó',wUt the RTC
orclereçi the transfer of toOdIspUtd poped to threSpOeflt asthe he(s of
Jou ConequerWy the 0.rtIf1a*t$s of Utt ~ h. dIspUtU prop.I ware
caiiclled and new ones Issued In the names of respondentó
Jose was *bie tQ register i Na name the disputed ppppert1eqj w)iIghwere
the paraphemI propertlea of .Jiit1afla e1iIe dw1n9 th&t coni9aI Unlo'3 or fl. the
course of the perormsnce çf ttedtle4 s xCutr o'tLe tette estate f
Juliana and that upon the death of Jo* The daputed propert1a wetó Jciuded In
the Inventory as If they formed part of Jqe&s estate When II fact Jose was
holding them only In trust for the trust estate ot.Iuilana

Richard i.opez as.. trustee of JUIlan4 estte flied an abtion br

T,OôflVeysflC. *1 *h. poii. of iardeg)tered 1the'nØrpe ofo$ a$ later to
his hairs etIegng that Jc'sevioiatéd the fruit r -

The complaint was dismissed, Ofl( tb ground of preaciiption of action

Petitioner Insisted that the acUoq bes npj pescrlbed sinCe thre wasa 1 express
trust over the di*jtc ptperttesgehnás regI$tfit1ofl iincter . fl of Jose
cannot'givi rIse to pr.,crfptlon of1 ,ctlon The fespfl1dønts do*1thdSd4hnt there
was an Implied trust vhen tle proprte$ wre legl5tered uider thp name of
Jose, the ,:: has niready prescnbeds thrO was repudiation of the trust
when the properties wure registered under th5 fl8me o Jose Is (he contention
correct? Why?

Held Yes 1 here 1 was an implied tr. itsi dispiited propettle conslØtIg Of
the paraphernal or ext lusive proper* of JUtan*, were veIsterad In the nóthaof
Jose instead of IncludLrg the same In tt#kié(bmIsa
A
luHana $ te$aniantary intØnt was to constitute an xptess trut over her
paraphemal proportion which wei cáfld out when the Fldeicprnlso wa
established H avusver, I,hd disputed prpertfes were expr8a&y excluded from the
Fldelcomwo 1 hO prob ito Coirt adjudicated the disputed ,ptopettles to Iose as
the sole heir Of JULIaIa f a mlstke sqa$ made ni exch1dln the disptited
properties from the 1it joomLso and adjudFcating the same to.-Jose IBC864 Jekl `
the mistake was rot roctJfied as nO party dppeaied to oppose or appeal the
exciuion. of the disputed propertes from tte fideicomiso, I Moreover. I e
excktsion 'of the dIsputtrf .propertles frm the Fidelcoml.so bpre the approval ci
the J)robate cdurl.. The Lssuece of th probate COurt8 orde adudkatipg the
dssputed properties t J ae as.th aple heir t .yflanø ahjoy$ the pnssLtption of
regularity implied trusts are thoe wh deducible
from the natuie of the tr nsaction'as thtters af Jpterit ør which *re $UptfflndUc èd
on the traflsacton by oeratlon of law as mafte(Sqfgiy, Jdepender4tiy of thf
particular Intention of the parties Heiri oP(ap v cotrt of Appeals1 '71 ihii 623
530(1999) LopeZ v CA1 t al 0 R No t7B4 Dcember 16 2008)

o —What is the effect 1 the mistake of the'court In adjUdICating the riisuted

properties under the nan i f jose coiskledng that they were ecqluded from the
Fldolcom!so at the outsqt. Jose registered the d)sputed properttas , in hi narpe
partly as his conjugal aba 're and partly a hi* lrhetita%ice front his wite Juana
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2QO13-40u

Answer: The registration of the disputed propertis in the name of Jose was
actually pursuant toa court order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the
disputed properties to Jose created a mere implied trust, of the constructive
ficiaries of the Fideicmiso. (Lopez V: CA, et al. GR
variety in favor of th bene
No. 157734, December 16, 2008). .

Q 7 It w$ Mablished that only a constructive trust was constituted over the

disüted'prbpertles Petitioner asserted that,. if at all, precriptlon should be
reckoned only wheh respondents causéd the . registration of the disputed
properties in their names on 1.3 April 19B.4 and not on 15 September- 1969, when
Jose rgIstered the same In his name pursuant to the probate court's order
adjudicating the dsputed'propertiee to him as the, sole heir of Juliana. Hence, the
prescriptive period hould be counted from the repudiation of the trust 'since Jose
had not performed any act indicative 'of his repudiation of the trust or otherwise
declared an adverse éIaIrn over , the disputed properties. Is the conteition

Answer: NQ; It should, be counted from registration by Jose under his name. The
right to seek reconvoyance based çr implied or constructive trust s not absolute.
It is subect to extinctive,prescriptiori (Spa. Bejoc v. Cabreros, G.R. No. 145849,
July 22 2005), An action for reconve'ance based on implied or constructive trust
.prescribes In 10 years. This period is reckoned from the date of issuance of the
olginal c.rtificata of 'title or transfer 4 certificate of title. Since such Issuance
Operates ass coinstrubtivie notice to the whole world, the discovery of the fraud is
deemed to haye taken, place at that time (Lopez v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 151784,
December 16, 008 citing Bejoc v. Cabreros).

Q - State the effect of the submission of the project of partition ndicating that the
properties in question were parts of the conjugal properties of Juliana and Jose,
thus, excluded from the Fideicomiso. Explain.

Answer: This aitié clearly tantatflourit to repudiating the trust, at which point ,the
period tor pres(.ription is reckoned. (Lopez v. 'CA, et al., G.R. No. 157784,
Doceml".r 16, .008).

Q When is repudiation necessary in order -that a property subject of trust may

be acquired by prescription? Explain. .

Answer: The rule theta trustee cannot acquire by , prescription owrership over
PrQpeitj entrusted to him until and Unless", he repudiates the trust applies only to
express trustsrid resulting i?nplied trusts. However, in consructive implied
trusts, prescription . supervenes even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is iot a condition precedent to
the running of the prescriptive period (Vda. do Esconde v. CA, 253 SCRA 66).
Thus,, for the purpose of counting the ten-year prescriptive period for th3 action to
enforce the constructive trust, the reckoning point is deemed to be on date when
Jose registered the Pisputed properties in his name (Lopez v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
157784, December 16, 2008). .

SALES

Fraudulent transfer of property does

net vest ownership; pxception. .'.
'. • ,

54
 ANT

Survay of SC' Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2003 2009

•Hefr'ofJulian
In Tirov.PhiLEstatesCoip., G.R. No. 170528,.August 28,
2008, a' roperty was fraudulently acquired resulting in, the issuance of a TCT..
Thereafter, there were five (5) 9th6r transfers, A complaint to nullify the title of the
present owner wa filed contending that since the initial transfer of the disputed
larid'\as fraduIet, then all the subsequent transfers Including the last, were all
invalid. in brushing aàidè the contention, the SC

Held: No, insofar as a person who has fraudulently obtained property is

concerd1theconssqueptly fraudulent registration of the propetty in , the- name
of such person would 'not be sufficient to vert In him or her title to the property.
Certifi6atesqf4itJe merely confirm or record title already existing and vested; The
indefeasibility cf the torre'ris title should' not be• used as a means to perpetrate
fraud rtgainst the rightful owner of real property Good faith muss concur with
regtstrtion because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
'However, where 'good faith is established, as in the case of an innocent
purchaser for value, a forged document may become the root of a valid title;

A person'IS considered in iaw•aa'an innocent purchaser for value when he

bUys the p.'operty of another, without notice that some other person has a right or
an Interest in auth property, and pays auil price for the same at the time of such
purchae, or before he has notice of thr , claims' or Interest of come OthEr person
in the property. 'A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness- of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, tind the law will in no
way oblige him,to go behind the certificate to determine the cond?tion of the
• property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of Innocent third persons, for
Ihat would, impair, or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land
registration. ,. Thud, a title. procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still he the
source of a .compieteiy legal and valid title if the same is, in the hands of an
innocent purcIser.for value.

In" Ve1os v. Court' of Appeals, 'the Court enunciated that a title issued to
an innocent purchaser and for value cannot be revcked On the basis That the
deed of sale was falsified, , if he had no knowledge of the fraud committed. The
Court also provided the, person prejudiced with the following recourse:

Even granting for the sake' of argument, that the petitioner's

signature was falsified and consequently, the power of attorney and
the deed of sale were null and 'void, such fact would not revoke the
title subsequently issued In favor of private respondent Aglaloma.
In Tenio-Obsequlo V. Court of Appóais, it was held, viz:

• ; '. ' ' The right ofanlnncent purchaser for value

• '
must be respected and protected, even if the seller
obtained his title through fraud. The remedy of the
person prejudiced is to bring an action for. ' '..
damages against those who caused or employed .
the fraud, and If the latter are insolvent, an action
against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be
flied . for, recovery of damages against the .
Assurance Fund." (Emphasts supplied.) .

Conflict between . previous

unregistered sale and subsequent
'but duly annotated attachment; the
latter prevails. .

55
 Suryey of SC Decisions In CIVIh. LAW 2008-2009

2 .5

Ot, `l'tLtdnk.of2ta, atha Pngasinan,!nc. v. The,Mmi/a Mion of

the Chqh of:Jesus Ch of LafterDay Saints, 'Inc., G . R. No. 130223, August'
1900t)
2 the SC was once 'again confrohted with the issue that If there is a
previous unrecorded sale of a property and a subsequent attachment of the
S
same, which will prevail, the SC. S

Held: The subsequent but duly registered attachment shall prevail. In the earlier
case of Rui, 'Sr. V. CA, 414 Phil. 311 (2001), It was held that in case of a conflict
between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an attachirg creditor whoregisters
the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder
acquires a valid title to the property, as against a vendee who had previously
bought the same property from the registered owner but who failed to register his
deed of sale. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or affects
the land Insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there
is notice to the whole world.

In the-more recent case Valdovieso v. Damalerlo, 492 Phil. 51 (2005) it was said:

S ' , The preference cr,tad by the levy on attachment Is not

S
diminished 'èvèn by. the subsequent registration of the prior sal..
This 1, 80 because.' an attathment-ls -a proceeding in-rem. It Is '
against the, partic&lar, property,er)forceable against the whole
world. The attaching qredltor acquires a specific lien on the
S . attached, property which nothing can subsequently destroy except
S
S the very dIsohutlon of the attachment or levy Itself. Such a
prQceedlnçj, In effect ,, means that the' property attached is an
S
'Indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner's
S S ,
debt. The lien continues until the debt Is paid, or sale Is had under
•,

execution- Issued on the jódgment, or until the judgment Is satisfied,

or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided
by law.

In the reglst, the attachment in favar of respondents

appeared in 'the nature of a real lien when .potitioner had his
purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to
subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the
lien. Petitioner -acquired ownership of the land only from the date of
the recording of his title In the register, and the right of ownership
'which' he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to a'
prior registered lien of respondents, a right which is preferred and
superior to that of petitioner,"

It is. settled, therefore, that a duly registered levy on attachmert takes

preference over a prior unreg istere,6 sale., '

• . Effect of kriowIedgs of the attaching

• '- creditor of the prior unregistered

"But where a party has knowledge of a prior

existing interest which is unregistered at that time he
acquired a right -to the same land, his knowledge of '
' that prlàr'unreciisterod Interest has the effect or
reriistration as to him. Knowledge of an
unregistered sale. Is equivalent to regIstratIon" ' ...

5 -S
56 . S S
 •:- -. ' .:.

Sury of $Q es,ons In CIVIL LAW 200-2009

S

7 t
t'
v Coirt f Appeal, 189 SCRA 780
V.

Psyn-!rt o( sirn,st money,

of sale Is perfected
• .• •'"
•')
Jn'Heli ofP8ngen v..Sps. PQners, G.R;N. 157374, August 27, 2009,
the Spouse Pangàn agreed to sell a 2-door apartment to thu Spouses Perieras,
thus, the latter delivered an earnest money of P20000.00 out of the agreed price
of P540,000.00. Later on, the owners/sellers refused to accept the checks as
consideration on the ground that their children who are co-owners refused 'o sell
the property. A petition for consignation was filed. Later, a complaint for specific
performance was filed-but the sellers contended that the sale was subject tn the
consent of the heirs, her children who became cq-owners after the death of her
tw8bañd. The RTC ruled that there was a porfeted contract of sale wi icli was
affirmed by the CA;. On appeal, it was contended that the refusal of the co-
owners to sell the property amounted to the absence. of the requisite element of
consent..Is the çontent1or corlect? Why?

Answer: No,,.Jhe élrpents of a valid ççntract are preseRt. The consent of the
• owner togetherWith th payment of earnest money would show that a contract of
sale was perfecta. .. . . . . .

The law on sales, specifically Article 1482 of-the Civil Code, provides that
whenever earnest money , Is given in a contract of sale, it shall be consldnred as
Part of the price, and proof of the psrfcCfiQn of the contract Although the
presumption is not conclusive, as 'the pal-ties may treat the earnest money,
differently, there is nothing alleged in the. present case that would give rise to a
Contra rypresumption. In cases where a conclusion contrary. to the presumption
is feached, daiared in Article 1462, the money initially paid was given to
guarantee that the buyer would not back out from the sale, considering that the
p,y(j to thq,$I have yet to a,-iive.at a definite agreement as to its terms - that
situat(on.vhere the contract has not yet been perfected. (Manila Metal
Container Corp,'.v Tolentino, d.R, No, 166882, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA
444; an Miguel Properties Phil,. Inc'. v. Huang, G.R. No. 137290, July 31, 2000,
330 SCRA.737),'

Q - Distinguish the effectof breach due' to non-payment in a ' contract of sale

from thatof a contract to sell.......... , . .• , . .

Answer; In cases of breach due to nonpayment, the vendor may avail of

the remedy a! rescission in .á contract of sale.. Nevertheless, The defaulVng
vendeernay defeat the vendors fight to' rescind the contract of sale if he pays
the amount due befOrehe receives.a demand fór'reaclssion,, either judicially or by
a notarial act,.fróm the vCndor, This right ls'provided under Article 1592 of 'the
Civil Code: .,, . . . .... .. • •

Aticle 1592 in the sale of imrnovab'o property','.even though

it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the
-

time agreed upon the rescission of the contraqt shall of right take
• . . . place,, the vendoe may paY,' even after the explratl'on of the
• period, as long, as no demand for rescission of. the contrat
ham been, mccie upon him either Judicially or by a notarial act.
After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term

• .: •, ,. ,. . .. . •

• . . . •
 Liecisions in LivlL LAVV UUd-2UU

Me n Q e p ur d';$pie In contracts to sell, howeve does

i a conoltion that., prevents the
itfg an results In its cancellation In
1999 1O SCRA I it was s'id that In a
,

ot' JtQf? purcihae price is a positive siispensIv

breath, casual or serio.ts but a situation
pts convey title from a cq uiring obigatory
fQc ng,TttlIn)int,of th pItIon of full payment rendered the contract

for nonpayment of the prce, the

delt,n
fsu ver 1 li a coptact tp sell may defeat the vendor's right to cance l by
vokln thh' granted to him under Republic Act No. e552 or the Realty'
Iflotailmelit rottction Act (also known as the Maceda. Law; this law
period Within whIch the defaulting vendee (who has
of Installments) may still pay the installments due. Only
after 1Ji lapse f the grace period with continued nonpayment of the amounts
due n the ctual canáellafloh of the contract take place.

What Macada Law covers,

The Mac'eda Law covers not only sales on Installments of real estate, but '

also flnanclng of such acquisition; Its Section 3 Is comprehensive enough to

include both contracts of sale and contr a cts to sell, provided, that the terms of
payment of the price require at least two lristallmehts. The contract entered Into
by th 6~p rtiqiii erein cab very w&l flI:upde,r the Maceda Law.
S . •,•' , .5 'S
j :. ' .

Whop' there I s. ownership In a

contr. et of sale dospitodolivery. . S

In Asset Privitizatiôn Trust v, Td. Enterprises, G.R. No. 167195, May 8,

2Og9ther",was pp,!'!tract of sale over certain machin ry and refrigeration e
• equip rrieriti he büyef*as able to pull out some, but failed Initially to Oull out
others, although ultimately, it was able to finally pull out all. Upon inspection,
however, it found out that machinery and equipment were damaged and had
missing parts. It filed a complaint for damages but petitioner cor'tended that upon
the execution of the deed of sale it had complied with its obligation to deliver the
object of the sale since there was no stipulation to the contrary. It further argueti
that being a sale onan as-is-where-is basis, it was the duty o f respondent to take
possession of the property 1 Petitioner claimed that there was already a
constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment. . S

The RTC ruled, that the execution of the cledd of sbsolute sale did' not
.
result)n constructive delivery ot,the machinery and .equipment,..It found that at
the:. time. of the" sale,' petitioner 'did not have control over the ma'chrtery and
bquipment and, 'thus, càuld not ha v e transferred ownership' by constructive
delivery. The RTC ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract and should
pay for the actual damages suffered by respondent,

O,n' appeal, the CA affirmed the. decision in toto, hence, a petition for
review was filed with the Sp raising the i s sue of whther.there was aconstructive
delivery of the machinery and equipment upon thu ex e cution - of the deed of
absolute, sale between petitioner and respondent, Decide.

58
 i SOf.SC . DeCJSionS In CIVIL LAW bUUU

Held: N. 1heónership of a thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon

the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The thing sold shall be understood as
delivered when it ispaced In the control and possession of the vendee.

As a general rule, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof Ahall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is. th3
object of the contract, If from the ded the contrary does not apar or cannot
clearly be Inferred. And with regard to movable property, Its delivery may also be
made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or
kept. In order for the execution of a public Instrument to effect tradition, the
purchaser must be placed In control of the thing sold. (Santos v, Santos, 418
Phil, 68 (2001). .

However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima

fade presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery
Is not effected because of a legal Impediment. it is necessary that the vendor
shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, lté material
delivery could have been made. Thus, a person who does not have actual
po8sesion of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive posnesslon by the
execution and delivery of a public instrumnt.

• In this case, there was no constructive delivery of the machinery and

equipment upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale or upon the Issuance
of the gate pass since it was not petitioner but Creative Lines which had actual
• possession of the property. The presumption of constructive delivery Is not
applicable as it has to yield to the reality that the purchaser was not placed In
possession and control of the property.

Nature of the phrase as-Is-where Is basis

Q - Petitioner positri that the sale being in an as-is-where-is basis, respondent

agreed to take possession of the things sold in the condition where they are
found and from the place where they are located. State the nature of the phrase
as--where-is basis. Explain.

Answer. The phrase as-is whero4s basis pertainssolely to the physical condition
• of the thing sold, not to its legal situation. (NOC v. Madrigal Wan Hal Lines Corp.,
458 Phil. 1038 (2003). It is merely descriptive of the state of the thing sold. Thus,
the as-is where-Is basis merely describes the actual state and location of the
machinery and equipment sold. The depiction does not alter petitioner's
responsibility to deliver the property to respondent.

Q - Does the presence of the disclaimer of warranty in the deed of absolute sale
absolve It from all warranties, implied or othervise?
•
Answer: No. The vendor Is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as
well as warrant the thing which is the abject of the sale. Ownership of the thing
sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of
the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner slgnifjing an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. A
perusal of the deed of absolute sale shows that both the vendor and this vndee
represented and warranted to each other that each had all the requisite power
and authority to enter into the deed of absolute sale and that they shaI perform
each of their respective obligations under the deed of absolute sale in
accordance with the terms thereof. As previously shown, there was no actual or

59
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2000-2009

constructive delivery of the things sold, Thus, petitioner has not performed its
obligation to transfer ownership and possession of the things sold to i'espondent.

Q - It was contended that the refusal of Creative Lines to allow the hauling of the
machinery and equipment was unforeseen and constituted a fortuitous event? Is
the contentWh correct? Why?

Answer: No, because there was fault of the seller.

A fortuftous event may either be an act of God or natural occurrences

such as floods or typhoons, or an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars.
However, when the loss is found to be parUyr the result of a person's
participation–whether by active Intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole
occurrence Is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to a fortuitous
event (Sloan, v. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 443;
MinezResources 0ev. Corp., 482 Phil. 934).

Moreover, Art. 1504 of the Civil Code provides that where actual delivery
has been delayed through the fault of either the buyer or seller the goods are at
- the risk of the party In fault. The risk of loss or deterioration of the goods sold
does not pa,s to the buyer until there Is actual or constructive delivery thereof.
As previously said, there was no actual or constructive delivery of the machinury
and equipment. Thus, the risk of loss or ceterloratlon of property Is borne' by
petitioner. Thus, It should be liable for the damages that may arise from th
delay.

Assuming arguondo that Creative Lines' refusal to allow the hauling of the
machinery and equipment Is a fortuitous event, petitioner will still be liable for
damages.

Effect If there,aro purchase orders.

- In Manila Mining Corp. v. Tan, G.R. No. 171702, February 12, 2009, there
was a contract 'of, sale of electrical materials. There were deliveries and pértial
payments, but there was failure to pay the balance, hence, a complaint for sum
of money was filed. The defendant contended that there was failure to comply
with the requirements of payment by stating that the standard procedure for a
supplier is to present the original sales invoices and purchase order when
claiming payment. It was claimed that the absence of stamp marks on the
Invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents. It further
claimed that the Invoices were not sent to the accounting department hence, they
were not verified. Thus, the claim for payment was premature. FinaIy, ii was
claimed that the mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its
obligation to pay, citing Article 1545, NCC that if the obligation of either party.tc a
contract of sale Is subject to any condition which Is no performed, such party ma
refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the
condition. In brushing aside the contention, the SC

Held: The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of

minds upon the thing which Is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment,' the parties may reciprocally demand performance,

subject to the provisions of the 'lawgoverning the 'form of contracts.

60
 Survey ot SO Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

In this case, ie purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan

supplied the eiectrkJ materials, to MMC, (Amante V. Serwelas, 471 SCRA 340
(2005) Hence, the uyer, cannot evade Its obligation to pay by claiming lack of
consent to the perfrted contracts of sale. The invoices furnlsted the details of
the transactions.

Q - What Is an ophrl? Explain..

Answer; An optior i contract by which the owner of the property agrees with
another person tht the latter shall have the right to buy the former's property at a
fixed price within certain time. It Is a condition offered or contract by which the
owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the
Property at'a flxJ price within a certain time, or under, or In compliance with
certain terms ancoonditlons; or which gives to the owner of the property the right
to sell or demanca sale. An option Is not of Itself a purchase, but merely secures
the pr1vege to biy. It Is not a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase.
It is simply a cctract by which the owner of the property agrees with another
Person that he iheill. have the right to buy his property, t a fixed price , within a
certain time. Hedoas not sell hisiand; he does not then agree to sell it; but he
does sell somoiIng, i.e., the right or, privilege to buy at the election or option of
the other parts. Its distinguishing characteristic Is that It Imposes no binding
obligation on te person holding.the option, aside from the consideration for the
offer (Eulogio v Spa. Apeles, OR, No, 167884, January 20, 2009).

Note: It is also sometimes called an "unaccepted offer and Is sanctioned by

Article 1479 o the Civil Code:

Article 1479. A promise to buy and sell a

determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally
demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell

a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon
the promissory if the promise is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.

The second paragraph of Article 1479 provides for tho definition and
consequent rights and obligations under an option contract. For an option
contract to be valid and enforceable against the promlssct, there must be a
separate and distinct consideration that supports it (Bible Baptist Church v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No, 126454,28 November2004, 444 SCRA 399, 405).

Q When Is an option contract binding upon the prornssor? Explain.

Answer. An accepted unilateral promise can only have a. binding effect If

supported by a consideration, which means that the option can still be withdrawn,
even if accepted, If the same is not supported by any consideration. if the option
Is without consideration, It can therefore.. be withdrawn notwithstanding the
acceptance rrade of It by appellee (Southwestern Sugar and Molasses Co. v. Ag
& PCo.,9? Phil. 241 (1955).

Without consideration that Is separate and distinct from the purchase

price, an option contract cannot be enforced; that holds true even If the unilateral
promise is already accepted by, the optionee (Eulogio V. Sps. Apeles, C.R. No.
167884, January 20, 2009).
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

Note: The consideration is Othe why of the contracts, the essential reason
which moves the contracting parties to enter Into the contract' This defInition
lliustrtes that the consideration contemplated to support an option contrat need
not be monetary; Actualcash need not be exchanged for the option. However, by
the very nature of anptIon contract, as defined in Article 1479, the same is an
onerous contract for which the consideration must be something of value,
although its kind may vary (Vlllarnor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97332, 10
October 1991,202 SCRA 607, 615).

There Is no consideration distinct from the price in .the Contraot of Leese

with Option to purchase. The only consideration agreed upon by the Parties In
the said Contract Is the' supposed purchase puce for the subject property In the
amount not exceeding P1.5 Million, which could not be deemed. to be the sama
consideration for the option contract since the law and Jurisprudence explicitly
dictate that for the option contract to be valid, It must be supported -by. a
comic.-ration separate and distinct from the price.

In Slblo Baptist Church v. Court of Appeals (444 SCRA 399), it was

stressed :hat an option contract needs to be supported by a separate
consideration. The consideration need not be monetary but could consist of other
-things or undertakings. However, if the consideration is not monetary, these must
be things or undertakings of value, in view of the onerous nature of the option
contrat. Furthermore, when a consideration for an option contract Is not
monetary, said consideration must be clearly, specified as such in the option
contrac or clause.

Reliance on TCT.

Q - Does a person who wants to purchase a property covred by the Torrens

System need to rely merely upon the face of the title? Explain..

Answer: Yes, as a rule, because of the protection afforded by the Torrens

System, otherwise, there would be no relying on the title. The rule, however, is
not absolute. An ordinarily prudent man should inquire into the authenticity of the
certificate of title, the property's location and its owners. Although it is recognized
principle that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond its
certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where circumstances
exist which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him to investigate
further, such as the presence of occupants/tenants on the property offered for
sale, It is expected that the purchaser would Inquire first Into the nature of
possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land
In the concept of an owner. Settled is the rule that a buyei of real property that Is
in the possessipn of a person other than the seller must be wary and should
Investigate the rights of those in pOssession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the
buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith (Rufloe, at al. v. Burgoc, et
al., GR. No. 143573, January, 30, 2009).

Possession In good faith.

The Civil Code describes a possessor In good faith as follows:

Art. 526. He is deemed a. possessor in good faith who is not

aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.
 \

• ""'
Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

He li deemed a posseuorlfl bad faith who possesses in

any case contrary to the foregoing

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult questiàn of law may be

the ba&is of good faith.

Art. 117. The good faith of the pcssessor consists in the

reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the.thln9.
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. '

Possession In godd faith cóasea from the moment defects in the title are
ma'e known to the possessor by etraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of
the property thj the Vu. owner. Every possessor in good faith becomes a
possessor In bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he
believed to be true 15 not so. (Aroganta v. Spa. Maglunob, at al., G.R. No.
178906, Iebruary 18, 2009, citing Bailesteros V. Abion, 482 SCRA 23 (2006).,

Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house thei eon in 1989 they
cannot be considered to have acted In good faith as they were fully aware that
when Esperanza executed 'an Affidavit relinquishing In their favor the subject.
property the only proof of Esperanza's ownership over the same was a mere tax
declaration, This fact or circumstance 'alone was enough to put the petltionór
and ' her husband trncler Inquiry. Settled is,the rule that a tax declaration does not
prove ownership. It is merely an indlciurn of a claim of ownership. Payment of
taxes Is not proof of ownership; Us, at 'best, an md/c/urn of possession In the
L

concept of.'ownershlp. Neither tax receipts nor A declaration of ownership for

taxation purposes Is evidence of ownership or'of.a right to possess realty when
not supported by Qther effective proofs. •

AGENCY S '

Sale of real property without written

authority Is void.

In Pahud, at a!, v. CA, at al., G.R. No. 160348, August 25, 2000, a
property was the subject of co-ownership. The same was sold p full by four (4) of
the co-owners to the exclusion of three (3) other co-owners as they Were nut.
authorized to sell the shares of the three (3) other co-owners, Is the sale of the
shares of the three (3) co-owners without authority valid? Why?

,Answer: The authority of an agent to execute a contact of sale of real estate

must be conferred' In' writing and must give him specific authority, either to
conduct the general, business of the piinclpai or to execute a binding contract
containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A
• 8pecial power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the
ownership of an Immovable Is transmitted Or acquired 'either gratuitously or for a
valuable "consideration. The 'express mandate required by law to enable an'
appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that
expressly mentions a sale or that 'includes a sale as a necessary Ingredient of the
• act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell ieal
estate, a power of attorney must so'express the powers of the agent In clear and
unmistakable language. When 'there is any reasonable doubt that the language
so used conveys such power, no such consfruction shall be given thQ document.
(332 Phil, 948 (1996). , , '. •', . ,• ' ' .• '

• 63
 1
/': '' 1
: '

I
4

l
'4
(

Survey of SC Decisions In CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

S
it has been repeatedly held that the absence of a written .authorlty to sell a
piece of land Is, ipso Jure, void, (Estate of Lino Olaguer, etc. V. CA, et al. G.R.
• No. 173312, Augyst 26, 2008) precisely to protect the Interest of an unsuspecting
owner from being prejudiced by the unwarranted act of another. S

Application of the principle of estoppel,

While the sale with respect to the 3/8 portion is void by express provision
of law and not susceptible to ratification, the Court nevertheless upheld Its validity
on the basis of the common law principle of estoppel.

Article 1431"of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1431, Through estoppel an admission or representation

is rendered conclusive upon the person making It, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

True, at the time of 'the stale to the Pahuds, Eufemla was not armed with
the recuisite special power of attorney to dispose of the, 3/8 portion of the
property. 'InitiaHy, in their answer to the complaint In Intervention, Euferria and
her other co-heirs denied having sold their. shares to the Pahuds. During the pro-
trial corference, however, they admitted that they had indeed sold 7/8 of the
S
.proporty to the Pahuds sometime in 1992.Thus, the previous denial was
, superseded, If not accordingly amended, by their subsequent admission.
Moreover, in their . Comment, the said co-heirs again admitted the sale made to
petitioners.

Interestingly, In no instance did the three (3) heirs concerned aseall the
validity of the transaction made by Eufemla to the Pahuds on the basis of v,antof
S written authority to sell. They could have easily' filed a case for annulment of the
sale of their respective shares against Eufemla and the Pahuds. Instead, they
opted to remain silent and left the task, of raising the validity of the sale as an
issue to their co-heir, Virgule, who Is not privy to the said transaction. They
• ' ', cannot he, allowed to rely on Eufomia, their attorney-in-fact, to impugn the validity
of the first transaction because to allow them .to do so would be tantamount to
giving premium to their sister's dishonest and fraudulent deed, Undeniably,
therefor, the silence and passivity of the three co-heirs on the issue bar them
from making a contrary claim.' '

It Is a basic rule In the law'of agency that a principal is subject to liability

for loss caused to another by the,latters reliance upon a deceitful representation
• by an agent In the course of his employment (1) If the representation is
authorized; (2) 'If It Is within the Implied authority of the agent to make for the
principal; or (3) If it is apparently authorized, regardless of whether the agent Nat'
1
' , authorized by him or not to make the representation..

By their, r;ontinued silence, Zenaicja, Milagros and Minerva have caused

the Pahuds to believe, that they have Indeed clothed Eufemia with the authority to
transact on their behalf. Clearly, the three co-heirs-'are now estopped from
Impugning the validity of the sale from assailing the authority pf Eufemia to enter
into such transaution. . .

Accordingly, the subsequent sale made by the seven co-heirs to Virgilio

was void because they no longer had any interest over the subject property
which they could alienate at the time of the second transaction. Nemo -dat quod
 Survey of SC Decisions in CIVIL LAW 20082009

non habot. - Virgilio, however, could still alienate his 1/8 undivided share to the
Belarminos.

The Belarmirios, for their part cannot argue that they purchased the
property from Virgillo in good faith. As a general rule, a purchaser of a real
property is not required to make any further inquiry beyond what the certificate of
title indicates on Its face. But the rule excludes those who purchase with
knowledge of the defect in the title of the vendor or of facts sufficient to Induce a
reasonable and p'udent person to Inquire into the, status of the property. Such
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
guard, and later claim that he acted in good faith on the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. H15 mere refusal to believe that Such dofect
exists, or his obvious neglect by closing his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect In the 'vendor's title, will not make him an Innocent
purchaser for value, if afterwards it turns out that the title was, In fact, defective.
In such a case, he is deemed to have bought the property at his own risk, and
any injury or prejudice occasioned by such transaction must be borne by him.

INTEREST

When 6 interest is imposed; when

judgment is rendered.

In Crystal, etml, v. 8P1, G.R. No. 180274, September 4, 2007, Morales, J,

a loan in the amount of P3M was obtained from the bank, for failure to pay, there
was an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the, real property used to
secure the payment of the obllgatlpn. There was however a deficiency after the
sale, herce acompIaintfor'surn of money was filed for collection ofdeficlency of
mortgage obligation. The basic issue Is he Interest that shouldb imposed,
whether 12%, or 6% and what is the reckoning point of the imposition? Explain.

Answer: The imp sition of 6% interest per annum it to be computed from the
time the l al court rendered the judgment, not from the date of the auction sale.
After the lnaIity of the decision, the judgment award inclusive of interest shall
bear. Interest of 12% per annum until full satisfaction thereof.

Note: .,

LCK Industries Inc. v., Planters Dev. Bank, G.R. No. 170306, November
23, 2007 teaches under the principle of unjust enrichment - nemo cum al/onus
defrimento locuplotarl p0 test - no person shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of others. This prircIple of equity has been enshrined in
our Civil Code, Article 22 of the Civil Code. ..

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or

any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the' same to him.

The Court held that there is unjust enrichment when 'a person un,ustIy
retains a benflt to the loss of another, or when - a person retains the money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

NEGLIGENCE

65
 Survey of Sc DecisIons In CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

Test of ngllgence. '.

Gaid v. People
G.R. No.' 171636, April 7,2009

Negligence has been defined as the faflure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. (Fernando v. CA, G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 714).

1 he elements of sirnpienegiigence: are (1) that there is lack' of precaution

on the part of the offender; and (2) that he damage impending to be caused is
not Immediate or the danger Is not clearly manifest.

The standard test. in determinlhg whether aperson is negligent in doing an

act whereby Injury or damage results to the person or property of another Is this:
could a prudent man, In the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the pe-on injured as a reascnable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the Jaw Imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the Ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, Is always
necessary before rieg)igrice can be held to exist. (PNCC V. CA, G.R. No.
159270, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 569).

In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the

petitioner, was the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the
North and South Luzon Toil Expressways. It failed to exercise the requisite'
diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane
dividers on the highway 'were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay
scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the
flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition
of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours
of the morning, Consequently, It was held liable for damages.

In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas, 432 N.E. 2d. 1028, a motorist

traveling within the speed limit and did all was, possible to avoid striking a child
who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood
where children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court ruled
that it must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due care. The evidence
showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful manner within the 3peed limit
when the child ran into the street and was struck by the driver's vehicle. Cl'sarly,
this was an emergency situation thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.,

In the same vein, In Lany, Jr. -v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, it
was ruled that in general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in
a particular case In exercising reasonable care Will vary with and must be
measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that It must be
commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries
which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle. In other words, he must
observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks
attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road which are open to ordinary
observation. The ultimate test, in other words, is to be'found in the rqasnable
foreseabIiity that harm might result if commensurate care is not exercised. it is
not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of harm

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or thatthe particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that
he, In t , het position of an ordinary prudent maii, knowing what he knew or should
have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that suffered was to
materialize. The evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner
had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he
entered the junction in question especially considering that his lateral vision at
the intersection was blocked - by the structures on the road. in the same way, h
failed tg solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking on the
road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that'he was running at
a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the physical facts of
the case.

Doctrine of proximate cause.

In Lambert Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corp., G.R. No. 184905, August 28,
2009, barricades were placed along the intersection of Katipunan Ave. and Rajah
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue
Nonetheless, Aquilino the driver of the respc.ndant crossed Katipunan Avenue
through 'certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus violating the
MMDA rule. A vehiethar accident happened when the petitioner's car which was
-then moving at a high speed in a busy area that was then subject of an ongoing
construction smashed into the rear door and' fender of the passenger's side of
Aqullino's car, sending It spinning in a 180-degree turn. The RTC dismisd the
complaint for damages but the CA modified it on appeal holding the petitioner
and the driver of the expedition car liable solidariiy. The CA ruled that Aquiino's
violation of MMDA,prohlbition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident but declared Ramos
vicariously liable for his driver's contributory negligence in driving the Ford
Expiditlon at high speed along a busy intersection. Ramos however contended
on appeal that since Aqullino's willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was the
sole proximate cause of the accident, then, respondent alone should Buffer the
consequences of the accident and the damages it incurred. Respondent insisted
that Ramos 18 vicariously liable for the contributory negligence of his driver.
Whose contention Is correct? Why? .

Hold: The contnt1on of Ramos is correct. Aquilino's act of crossing Katipunan

Avenue via Rajah Matanda Street constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was' the proximate cause of the, accident, and
thus, precludes recovery for any damages suffered by respondent frorr the
accident; This Is based on the principle that if the master is injured by the
negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his
own servant or agent the latter's negligence is imputed to his, superior nd will
defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, of which ccmplaint
Is made. (AM Jur. 2d, Vol. 58, Negligence, Sec. 464 cited in Ford Phils, Inc. v
Citibank, ItLA., G.R. No. 128604, January 29, '2001, 350 SCRA 446).

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan

Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for.
Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident
would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since
such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the

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principle embodied In Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs owr
neUgencô was the Immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.

No contributory negligence.

in NPC v. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27,

2008, a pocket miner from Itogon; Benguet was walking along a trail where the
NPC put up hIh tension wires which have already sagged and dangled -reducing
their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. He was carrying
bamboo which touched the high tension wire, resulting in a buzzing Found,
resulting in the electrocution of the miner and his eventual death. In a suit for
damages, NPC contended that there was contributory negligence of the miner,
hence, its liability if ever should be reduced especially so that pocket mining is
prohibited by the DENR. Is the contention of the NPC correct? Why?

Held; No, The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to hppen.
As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation
of the, required distance of 18 to 20 feet. if the transmission lines were properly
maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have
touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.

Petitioner cannot excuse Itself from its failure to properly rnaintan the
wires by attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., . nc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 83491, August 27, 1990, 189 SCRA 88, it wau held
that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of prevnting
derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have
been negligent In ascertaining that the rails were-fully connected than to wait until
a life was lost due to an accident.

There was no qontributo,ynegligence on the miner's part.

Negligence is the failure to oterve, for the protection of the Interest of

another person, . that degree of care, precaution, and vigiance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the
other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he Is required to conform for his own protection.
There Is contribt'tory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary
care anu foresight that such act could cause him harin or put his life in danger. It
is an act or omls'.ion amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
Injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause
of the Injury.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who Is

partly responsible for his own Injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the
award fov damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that
liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the
injured party.

NPC further faulted the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is

prohibited by the DENR in the area,

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In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004,

4i SCRA424,. It was ruled that the ylolation of a statute is not sufficient to hold
that the violation as the proximate cause of the injury unless the very injury that
happened waprecIseIy what Wad Intended to be prevented .by the statute. In
said cae, the allegation of contributory negigenoe oh the part of the injured
party who violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicyca or
install saety gadgets thereon was struck down.

Pr.sumptloi, of n.Ilg.nc.. . .. . .".

in Sofia Go/lang, et al. v. Redo/to Badanla, at at., G.R. No: 162987, May
21, 2009, a ten-wheeler cargo truck was traveling along the hlghvay going to'
Tagaytay and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course wheo it negotiated a
U-turn. When the truck untered the opposite lane Of the highway, Genaro's car hit
the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged the oar some five meters to the
right of the road. At the time it execuod a U-turn there were no signal lights, a
violation of traffic rules. After the collision, the driver abandoned the truck. Are
the owner and &K er liable for damago? Why?

Hold:' Yea, Under Astiole 2185 of the QiIl Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person, driving, a vehicle Is presumed negligent If at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

In this case, the report showed that the truck; while making the U-turn,
failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stateci that,
after the collIsion, Bedariia escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck.
This is another violation of araffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises
that Bedariia was negligent at the time of the mishap.

Bedania's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which

• claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proxlmptè cause is that
which, In' the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the Injry, and without which the result would not
have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to .the necIigent act of
Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap In
all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without
signal lights pOsed a 'serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to
prevent or minimize that -isk. The truck's sudden U-turn triggered a series of
events that led to' the collision and, ultimately, to the death 31 Antero and ,the
injuries of petitioners. S

The owner of the vehicle is also liable for thu damages suffered by,'
petitioners, since he failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good.
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees;

Teat of negligence.

In Corintfilen Gardens Association, Inc. v. Sps. Tanjangco, of &., G.R. No.

160795, June 27, 2006, the house of the Cuasos was 'cpnstructed but the
• perimeter fence encroached on the TanJangco's property. Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspection to determine compliance with the approve plan
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Demard was
made for tne demolition of the fence but to no avail,' 'henue a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages.

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Corinthian claimed that the approval of.the building plan of the Cuaso8
was not tainted with negligence as it did not approve the survey relocation plan
but merely the architectural, structural and sanitary plans for Cuasos'. house;, that
the purpose of the said approval Is not to ensure that the house to be erected on
a particular lot i constructeU within its boundaries but only to ensure compliance
with the Manual of Rulàsnd Regulations; that white Corinthian conducts actual
site inspections, the inspection and approval of the building plans are limited to
"table Inspection' only; that the survey relocation plan was_never submitted for
Corinthian's approval; that th acceptance of the builder's bond did not make
Corinthian automaoaily liable for, the encroachment and for damages; and that
Corinthian approved the building plan with the good faith and due diligence
required under the circumstances.

The lower courts held Corinthian liable for damages. ir upholding the
deciin the Supreme Court

Held: The Instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of
the CIvWCode,yvhlch provides;

ART, 2176, Whoever, by act or omission cay sea damage to

aflothér, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
Is governed by the provisionspf this Chapter.

In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1).the damages 4uffered by the plaintff; (2) the fault
or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages Incurred. (Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio,
G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236).

UdeniabIy, the perimeter fençec the Cuasos encroached on Lot 69

owned by the Tanjngcos by. 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC
and the CA In accordance with the 'evidence on record. As a result, the
Tanjangoos suffered damage in having been deprived of the use of thai portion
of their lot encroached upon. Thus, the primordial issue to be resolved in this
case Is whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if So,
whether such negligence contributetho the Injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be nerely carelestly 'done

from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation
involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from
which an ordiraty prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such.. in' appreciable, risk of harm to others as to
cause hirri not to do the act or to d 'it in a more careful manner.

The test todeterrnine the existence of negligence in a particular cse ma

be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an;ordinary person would have used
in the same' situation? If not, then he'ls guilty of negligence. The law, in effect,
adopts' the standard supplied by the imaginaçy conduct of. the discreet
paterfar1Ia8 in Roman law. The existence of negligence In a given caae Is not
determined by .reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
bef&e him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
In a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence,.and determines liability according

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"PI standard., (Fernandez v. CA, G,R.'NO92087 Mèy 8,1992, 208 SCR.

to thi$
714 ca rtV. Smith, 37 Phil, 809). . . .

By this t#st, Corinthian Is negligent because It failed to exercise the

requist&dIllgence In Insuring that the Cuasos abide by Its Manual of Roles and
Regulations thereby resulting In the encroachment on the Tanjangcos' property.

When the doctrine of . labt clear.. ...

chance Is inapplicable, '• . .• , .

in Echev8ra, of a!, v. Ramos, of al., .G.R. No. 175172, September 29,

• 2009, Peralta, J, a complaint for damages under Article 2176, NCC was filed by
the heirs of Amulfo Ramop due to a vehicular accldait that happened In Candon,
[locos Sur.

In their Complaint, they alleged,that in the.momlng of April 22, 1995,

Benlgno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national
highway In Berangey Tablac, Condon, Ilocos Sur In a reckless, careless, anc
negligent manner, He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger Jeep
to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the'oncomlng vehicle driven by
Arnuifo Ramos. The injuries, sustained by Amulfo Ramos caused his death,
notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that
Crescenda Achsvara failed to exercise due diligence In the selection and
supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger' jeep. Respordents
sought to recover actual damages for medical expenses. In the sum Of
933,513.00 and funeral expenses In the um of 4230,000.00, as well as moral
and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorneys fees and litlgation.expónses.

After trial, judgment was rendered holding that the passenger jeep did not
encroach on the lane 'of the owner-type jeep on the left side of the rcad to
cvertake the motorcycle. The collision took place at the lane of the passenger
jeep: It was held by the trial court tht the doctrine of last clear chanco was
applicable. . .

It cited Picartv. Smith, (37 Phil 809 (1918) which applied the said doctrine,
thus, wheru both parties are guilty, or negligence, but the negligent act of one
succeeds that of the other by an appreciable Interval of time, the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the Impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences,, without reference to the prior nogligencu of the other
party. . . . '. . . .

The doctrine of last clear chance applies, to a situation where the, plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant - who had the
last fair chance to avoid the Impending harm and failed to do , so - is made liable
for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff. (Pantranco v. North Express, Inc., G.R. No. 7905. November 14,
1989, 1 '9 SCRJ 384). However, the doctrine doec not apply where the party
charged is required to act Instantaneously, and the Injury, cannot be avoided, by
the application of all means at hand after, the peril is or should have been
dlsbovered. 'Ong V. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397(1958).

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because
even if it cai be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to.
avoid, tho,yrii shap when the owner-type jeep' encroached on the western lane of
the paBaengerjeep,'Valdez no longer had the opp'rtunityto avoid the coIllIon,

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(.. • H. '''

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

Whqn the pjalntIs 'on negligence was the Immediate and

proim*ti.ayec ofs hi Injury, he 'cannot recover , damages. But If
h4 negligence was only contilbutory,, the impedlate and proximate
C81.130 of the Injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez fa1id to exercise
reasonable care and cutlon that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to
prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence f Arnulfo Ramos
• and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the .proximate cause of
the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article
• 2179 of the ClvU.Codé.

LIabIlit' of registered owner of motor.

vehicle alr.ady sold.'

Cadientev, Macao ,
G.R. No 101948, November 14, 2006

Is the registered owner of a motor vehicle still Iiablefor the damage or

injury oused by the vehicle even if he has already sold it to somone else who
has not yet trar,sførred the. regIstration when the Injury occurred? - .: '

Answer: Yes. The registered ownerf any vehicle is primarily responsible to the'
public for whateier damage pr injury the vehicle may cause even if he had
already sold it to someone else. Were the registered owner allowed to, evade
responsibility by proving Who the supposed transferee or owner. .ls, it woild be
easy fpr him, by.collusjon with others or otherwie, to escape said responsibility,
by transferring the same to an lnieflnite person or to one who. possesses no.
property with Which to respond financially for the damage or Injry cone.

The policy behind the vehicle registration is the easy identificatioh of the
owner who can be'held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused
by the vehicle. This Is so as not to inconvenience of prejudice a third party Injured
by one whose identity cannot be secured.

DAMAGES
• When ;ivli Indemnity ox riellcto mandatory.

In People v.Gragasin, G.R. No. t86496, August 25, 2009, the SC ruled.
that tivil,lndemnity ox de/icto isriiandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape.
Moral damages are automatically awarded upon such finding without need of.
further proof, because It is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered
moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.. Exemplary damages are
awarded under ArtIcle 2230 of the Civil Code If there Is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. There being no aggrvatIrig
circumstance that can be considered, the award of exernplry damages wOuld
have to be deleted.. . •

• in People v. 'Garchitorena, G. R. No. 17560, August 28, 2009, the civil'

Indemnity in case the perialty'.of reclusion perpetua is imposed is P75,000.00.

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In People v: Angeles, G.R. No. 177134, August 14, 2009, Morales,

J, it
was said that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravatlnfl circumstance, In this case, treachery. This is Intended to serve as
deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton Invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct, The Imposition of eAemplary damages Is also justified Under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the public good.
P78,000.00 as award; civil Indemnity ex delicto.

In People v, Go/ida, G.R. No. 175322, March 4, 2009, the SC once again
said that if an accused is found guilty of the crime of murder and the penalty of
reclusion pe,petua is Imposed, the award of P50,000 a moral damages Is in
order In view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grthf of his family.
(People v, Tubongbariva, 800 SCIA 727). The award of exemplary damages of
P75,000 is in order too, the crime having been committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.

in line with prevailing Jurisprudence, civil indemnity ex delicto is, however,

Increased tO P75,000, (People v. Dela Crux, Q,R, No. 171272, June 7, 2007, 523
SCRA 433, 452).

Exemplary damages, when

recoverable In criminal cases.

Once again, the SC In Sombilon, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175528,

September 30, 2009, had the occasion to rule that Article 2230 of the Civil Code
provides that In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability
may be Imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Since the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantagti
of public position was not alleged In the. lnfo.rnation against petitioner It cannot
be appreciated In the Imposition of the penalty. But as regards the award.of
exemplary damages, in the case of People v. Catubig, G.R. No. , 137842, August
23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, the Court declined retroactive application of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

The retroactive application of procedural rules,

nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the
private offended party that have become vested prior
to the effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at
bar, although. relationship has not been alleged In the
Information, the offense having, been committed,
however, prior to the effectivity of the new rules, the
civil liability already Incurred by appellant remains
unaffected thereby.

Thus, in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement, the Court may

award of exemplary damages to the victim.

LAND REGISTRATION

Forged or fraudulent çlOcument is a

source of.a valid title.

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Q— The owners of parcel of land covered byaTCT found out one day that a
house was being constructed on It. They discovered that their title was cancelled
due to a Deed of Sale to which they did not participate and a title was issued
under the name of *nther. The same was likewise stud to a couple and's tlte
was issued under th&r names and who In turn sold It to another where a title was
likewise issued. The last buyer Inspected the property at the Office of the
Register of Deeds and found It to be clean. The original owners filed a complaint
for nullity of title, recpnveyance and damages but the last buyer contended that
he was a buyer in good faith and for value to which argument the CA agreed. Is
the ruling of the CA correct? Why?

Answer: Yes, because while the document from which the property came f'om
may be forged or fraudulent, It may be the root of a valid title If the sarn has
passed to a buyer in good faith and for value.

An innocent purchaser for value.ls one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or Interest In that same
property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase and
before receiving any notice of another persons Claim.

The honesty of Intention that constitutes good faith implies freedoit, from
knowledge of circumstances that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry. Good
faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons from whom they
received the thing are the rightful owners who could convey their title. The
burden of provng the status of purchaser in good faith lies on the one who
asserts that status,

In this case, Larry had successfully discharged such burden, There were
no traces of bad faith on Larry's part in acquiring such property by purchnse. He
merely responded to an Ad for the sale of said land and performed every act that
a reasonable cautious man would do under the circumstances. Every person
dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefore and the law will In no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. (Spouses VillamlI, etc. v.
Villarosa, aR. No 177187, ApriI7, 2009). -

Effect if property Is registered based

on a forged document.
In Reyes v. Montemayor, at a, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009, a
real property was registered under the name of a person based on a forged
document of sale. Can the owner recover the property? Explain.

Answer: Yes, because a forged deed Is a nullity conveys no title. (Fredot v.

Cattleya Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 50).

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the

registration of the property In said person's name would not be sufficient to vest
In him or her, the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or
record., . title al - eady existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title
should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise,
registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not 'furnish a
shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a
constrictive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is

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that if thei. regitration f. the land Is fraudulent, the person in whose. rarne' th
land,(sregistered holds It as a mere trustee. . .-.

It has on been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's namo is to
bring an ordinary qction In an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed Into the hands of an Innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it Is entirely a different
matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be reworded by allowing the
perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed." Reconveyance Is all about
the transfer of the property, In this case the title thereto, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and
legal owner, orto one with a bettor right. Evidently, petitioners, being the rightful
owners of the to property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the titi3 over
the same. . .

Jffaot of actual, physical possession

of alienable 'and.

In Urn V. Republic, G.R. Nos, 158630 and 162047, September 4, 2009,

Morales J, the SC had thà occasion to rule that while a property classified as
alienable and disposable public land may be converted Into private property by
reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at IWiSf 30
years, public dominion lands become patrimonial . property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retalne(4 for public use, public service or the de.olopmet1t of national wealth.
(Arts. 40; 422, NCC). And only when the property , has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public .donlnion begin,
to run. .. . . . . . ..
While the subject lots 'ware declared, alienable or disposable on March 15,
1982, there is no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public
use or for public service. The classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain dons not change Its statuij as propurtles of
the publi dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to thorn by prescription
as yet.

It was further held that for'án application for land registration to prosper,
the applicant must present sufficient , proof that he had open, continuous and
adverse possession over the land or his predecessors-In-interest as early . as
June 12, 1945' or. earlier. In the absence of. such evidence, 'the apolication shall
fall. S '

Requirement of possession and •.

occupation of lard.

In Republic v. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607 (2004), The law speaks of

posussion and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear. Intention of the law is not to make one synonymous-with the other..
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, It seeks to
delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possesslon Tak3rl together
,with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation
servos to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must

75
 iuveyot SO Decisions in CIVIL LAW 2008-2009

not 6e e mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists In the .manl!estatlon of

• aOts of ominionover it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over
his own poperty. (Mistica v, Rep., G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009 citing
• Ong v, Rep., 548 SCRA 160 (200). -

MORTGAGES -

In china Banking Corp. y, Martlr, G.R. No. 184252, September 11, 2009,
the SC once again said that in effecting redemption, the mortgagor has the duty
of tendering payment before the redemption period expires. While the complaint
alleged that respondents made an offer to redeem the subject properties within
the period of redemption, It did not allege that there was an actual tender of
payment of the. redemption price as required by the Fules.. The letter dated May
11,. 1 999 - is only a formal offer to redeem, unaccompanied byin actual tnder Qf
• the redemption price.

The gneral rule In redemption 18 that it 18 not sufficient that a person

offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must
be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This
constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase. (BPI v. Sps. Veloso, 47 9
. Phil.
.627 (2004). .

In several cases decided by the Court where the right to repurchase was
held to. have been properly exercised, there was an unequivocal tender ol
paymentfor the full amount of the repurchase. price. Otherwise, the offer to
redeem i$ ineffectual. Bone fide redemption necessarily Implies a reasonable
and valid tender of the entire repirchase price, otherwise the rule on the
redemptjon period fixed by law can easily be cirCunWented.

The law: allows respondents the. right to redeem their foreclosed

properties. But in so granting that right, the law intended that their offer to
redeem be valid and effectjve, accompanied by an actual tender of the
redemption price. Fixing a definite kerrn within which the pr9perty should be
redeemed Is meant to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership
bf the thing sold. (BPI v. Sps. Veloso).