NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
CHAPTER 1: General Provisions
Succession- mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by will or by operation of law. (Art 774)
ELEMENTS: (ATDAWO)
1. Mode of acquisition (of ownership)
2. Transfer of property, rights, and obligation to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person (grantor,
transferor, decedent, testator, or intestate)
3. Transmission thru death
4. Transmission to another (called grantee, or transferee,
heir, legatee, or devisee)
5. By will or operation of law
BASES: (NSI)
 Natural law- obliges a person to provide for those he would
leave behind; consequence of family relation
 Socio-economic postulate- would prevent wealth from
becoming inactive or stagnant; this would enable the social
economy to be firm
 Implicit attributes of ownership- if a person is not allowed
to dispose of his property, such disposal to take effect when
he is already dead
MARIA USON v. MARIA DEL ROSARIO
Further inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can
it be renounced under the Civil Code, thus the properties which
were left behind automatically transmits to the lawful heir
who attains a vested right therein.
While Art. 2253 of the New Civil Code provided that rights for
the first time shall be given effect, it shall not prejudice vested
rights.
FACTS: Maria Uson filed an action for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land against
Maria del Rosario and her four children all surnamed
Nebreda, who are all minors.
Maria Uson is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda while Maria
del Rosario is the common law wife of the former. Sometime
in 1945, Faustino Nebreda died intestate, leaving Uson as the
sole heir of the properties. Maria Uson alleges that del Rosario
illegally took possession of the disputed lands which divested
her of her right of ownership.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on
February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late
Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration
of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death.
The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to
restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the
lands in dispute. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Uson has vested rights over the properties
RUSSELL JAY M.
ISSUE:
4. Whether Uson has vested rights over the properties
left by the decedent? (YES)
5. Whether or not renunciation of inheritance by the
heir before the death of decedent is valid (NO)
6. Does an illegitimate child prior to the effectivity of
New Civil Code entitled of successional rights? (IT
DEPENDS)
RULING:
4.YES. The Civil Code which operates during the death of
decedent provides that, "The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death". From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
5. NO. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had
relinquished her right over the lands in question because
she expressly renounced to inherit any future property
that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into on February
21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced.
6. IT DEPENDS. Article 2253 of the New Civil Code states
that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right, of the same origin."
In this case, the new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
EDILBERTO NOEL (now PINITO W. MERCADO) as
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF GREGORIO
NANAMAN and HILARIA TABUCLIN, v.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE C. DELESTE
Surviving spouse cannot acquire a title by prescription over
said administered half as an implied trust was created in
favour of the real owners which in this case, are the collateral
heirs of Gregorio.
Under Article 953(Now art. 1001) a spouse like Hilaria, who is
survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters
of the decedent(Gregorio), was entitled to receive in usufruct
the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs.(usufruct
only)
ISSUE:
Whether Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW

FACTS: Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin are legally Since the sale was made on 2 March 1954 and the action to
married but were childless. Gregorio had a child named recover filed on 30 April 1963, it is clear that it has not
Virgilio with another woman. Virgilio was taken care of by the prescribed. Therefore, CA’s decision was upheld. Hilaria
spouses. The spouses acquired a 34.7ha land on which they cannot sell the other ½ as Gregorio’s share. Her
planted sugarcane, corn, and bananas. They lived there along administration of the property created an implied trust in
with 15 tenants. favor of the collateral heirs as real owners who could still
recover as it has not prescribed yet.
Gregorio then died and Hilaria administered the property to
the exclusion of Gregorio’s brother, Juan as well as Esperanza
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI v. COURT OF APPEALS
and Caridad Nanaman who were daughters of Gregorio with
yet another woman.
A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs
Subsequently, Hilaria and Virgilio sold it in favour of Jose
can commence any action originally pertaining to the
Deleste. After sometime, Hilaria died so Esperanza and
deceased as the right to property of the deceased is
Caridad filed intestate estate with regard to Gregorio’s estate.
automatically transmitted to the rightful heirs who attains the
Edilberto Noel then took over as regular administrator of the
right to have it partitioned.
estate. Noel filed action to recover the 34.7ha land from
Deleste.
FACTS: Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo are co-owners of
a plot of land in Lucena City. On March 1986, Lourdes
The trial court held the action for annulment of deed of sale
Sampayo died intestate without issue. A year later, collateral
against Deleste had prescribed in 1958 as the sale was
relatives of the deceased filed a motion for partition of the
registered in 1954 and that Gregorio’s heirs slept on their
plot of land which is co-owned by Ignacio Conti.
rights by allowing Hilaria to exercise rights of ownership over
Gregorio’s share in the property. As for the sale, it held that
The spouses Conti refused to partition the land on based on
some of the purchase price was paid for the debt of the
the ground that the relatives did not present any credible
conjugal partnership and some for medical services and
evidence that would establish they are the rightful heirs and
medicines used by Gregorio.
that the wish of Lourdes Sampayo is that her property be
bequeathed to the spouses since they were the one who paid
Noel appealed to CA. CA held that the action has not
for the necessary expenses for the preservation and tax of the
prescribed and also ruled that Hilaria could not validly sell the
property and that she considers Ignacio as an adoptive
property beyond her ½ share as it was a conjugal property.
brother. It turns out however, that no such will, either
Hence, the present appeal.
testamentary or holographic, was executed by the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the entire
The relatives on the other hand produced evidence such as
property sold to private respondent and assuming that they
baptismal certificates and birth certificates which solidly
did not have full ownership (NO)
established their case and was corroborated by the parish
priest who executed such forms.
RULING: NO. At the outset, Gregorio died (1945) before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code. As a consequence, The
The trial court ruled in favor of the applicants for partition and
Spanish Civil Code applies.
was affirmed in full by the Court of Appeals.
Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse like Hilaria, who is
ISSUE: Whether or not the collateral relatives of Sampayo are
survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
correct in asserting right to partition notwithstanding absence
sisters of the decedent (Gregorio), as is obtaining in this case,
of judicial declaration of settlement of estate? (YES)
was entitled to receive in usufruct the part of the inheritance
pertaining to said heirs. Hilaria, however, had full ownership,
RULING: YES. The general principle laid down by the Civil Code
not merely usufruct, over the undivided half of the estate
along with the Code of Civil Procedure states that upon death
As for Virgilio, he is not an heir of Gregorio as illegitimate
of the decedent, title of the properties immediately transmits
children who were not natural were disqualified to inherit.
to the heirs which can practice acts of ownership, subject
While Art. 998 of the NCC gave an illegitimate child hereditary
however to claims of administration and payment of existing
rights, Virgilio could not benefit because the right of
obligations and legal requirements. This however, still does
ownership of the collateral heirs of Gregorio had become
not prevent transmission of such rights.
vested upon his death.
In the absence that there is an administrator appointed
As for Hilaria when she administered the property, an implied
specifically for that purpose, automatic transmission of such
trust was created on the other half in favour of the real
rights is presumed and partition must take place.
owners. Since there was an implied trust which is an
obligation created by law, the action to recover the undivided
half-interest of collateral heirs of Gregorio prescribes in 10
years. Art. 775. In this Title, “decedent” is the general term applied to
the person whose property is transmitted through succession,
Since the sale was made on 2 March 1954 and the action to whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called
the testator.
recover filed on 30 April 1963, it is clear that it has not
prescribed. Therefore, CA’s decision was upheld. Hilaria
cannot sell the other ½ as Gregorio’s share. Her
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.
INHERETANCE INCLUDES
1. Property
2. Rights
 GR: Rights acquired by a virtue of a contract are
transmissible. Heirs are bound by the contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest.
XPN: When the rights and obligations arising therefor
are not transmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or
by provision of law.
3. Obligations which are not extinguished by death
 Death does not excuse nonperformance of a contract
which involves a property right and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the successors or
representatives.
 Estate of the deceased should answer for the death of
the decedent; if they are made to answer, only to the
extent of the value of the property received from the
decedent.
Intransmissible obligations- purely personal, either by law, or by
the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom.
 Contracts for the payments of money debts are not
transmitted to the heirs of the party, but constitute a
charge against the estate.
AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR. PEDRO LITONJUA v. AGUSTIN B.
MONTILLA, JR. and CLAUDIO MONTILLA
A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or
intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings
brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of
the succession.
FACTS: Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio
Montilla for the payment of P4,000 plus legal interest, and
costs amounting to P39.00. A writ of execution was issued, but
the latter do not have any property which could be levied
upon.
To be able to satisfy the judgment debt, Litonjua filed a
motion praying that the interest, property and participation
of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr.,
in the latter's intestate estate be sold. This motion was
opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr.,
administrator of the intestate estate.
The CFI denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Litonjua can succeed in collecting the
debt against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent. (NO)
RULING: NO. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage
and Yap Tico, it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a
deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the
latter’s property only after the debts of the testate or
RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets
that are divisible among the heirs are known. The main reason
is that the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his
heirs can inherit. It was also held that a person who is not a
creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to
intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection
with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
Moreover, in that same case, an execution cannot legally be
levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the
debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased. The remaining
property that pertains to the said debtors-heirs can be
attached only when the credits held against the deceased at
the time of his death have been paid.
The Ortiga Brothers case is applicable to the case at bar,
because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased
Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of
the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net
assets of the intestate estate have been determined.
LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927
of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who
died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the
said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because the inheritance is received
with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only
answer with the properties received from his predecessor.
FACTS: Socorro Ledesma lived with Lorenzo Quitco which
bore them a daughter named Ana Quitco Ledesma. Their
relationship ended sometime in 1921 but Lorenzo Quitco
executed an affidavit recognizing Ana as his natural daughter
and a promissory note in favor of Socorro which stipulates
that he shall pay the latter a total of two thousand (2,000)
pesos payable by installments.
Lorenzo Quitco subsequently married Conchita McLachlin
with whom he had four children. He eventually passed away
while his father Eusebio subsequently followed two (2) years
later. As a result of Eusebio’s death which left real and
personal properties behind, administration proceedings
began in court.
Socorro likewise instituted an action before the committee
undertaking the administration of Eusebio’s estate so as to
enforce the promissory note executed in her favor by the
deceased Lorenzo Quitco. The commissioners, asserting lack
of jurisdiction upon the matter, denied such petition. On the
other hand, the court handling the intestate proceedings of
Eusebio Quitco made a declaration of heirs of which Ana
Quitco Ledesma was not deemed to be an heir.
The Court of First Instance eventually ruled in favor of Socorro
Ledesma, declaring her daughter as a natural heir and ruling
in her favor that the amount of 1,500 pesos be paid.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding, that the action
for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding, that the action
for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last
installment of the note has not yet prescribed? (YES)
Whether or not the plaintiff is correct in holding that the
properties of her grandfather’s estate must first take into
account her father’s obligations and debts before
distribution?
RULING:
Yes. According to the promissory note, executed by the
deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last
installment of P1,500 should have been paid two years from
the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on
January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed
on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after the
expiration of the said period.
The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal
appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial
action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the
Death- time when the right to the succession are transmitted to
unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should
the heirs. Prior to death, all the heirs have is a mere expectancy
not have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco,
 Adeceased
the said waiver ofnot
thebeing
inheritance
the onemade by the heirs
who executed the prior
same,to
death would be void for lack of valid object
but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have
 For the by
been instituted purposes
the saidof the opening
Socorro Ledesma. of More
the succession,
than ten
death may be actual or presumed.
years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period
 Absentee
for the payment disappeared
of said debtatof75P1,500,
y/o: 5 years
the before
action opening
for its
his succession
recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Absentee disappeared in danger of death: 3 years
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to
the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased
father, who died without leaving any property. While it is
true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the
Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died
before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the
said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition
of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor.
The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not
bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom
they did not inherit anything.
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS,
VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III,
The heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the
liability affecting their common ancestor.
RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
FACTS: Petitioner-corporation entered a contract of lease
with option in to buy with Encarnacion Bartolome on March
1988, the deceased mother of the private respondent on a
14,021 square meter land in Malinta, Valenzuela. The option
must be exercised within the period of two years. In return,
petitioner undertook to pay P3,000 a month for the
reservation of its option.
Petitioner regularly paid the rent until her death in January
1990 which. DKC Holdings coursed the payment to Victor
Bartolome, being the sole heir of the property. The latter
however, refused to accept such tender of payment.
In March 1990, petitioner served a notice stating therein their
right to lease the property. Again, respondent refused to
accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender the property
to the petitioner. Thus, it opened a saving account with China
Banking Corporation and coursed the payment through the
bank account. It also tried to register the contract of the title
of the property but the register of deeds refused to annotate
the same.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds. RTC
Valenzuela dismissed the complaint which CA affirmed as a
whole. Both courts said that the contract was terminated
upon the death of Encarnacion Bartolome and did not bind
Victor because he was not a party thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with
petitioner was terminated upon her death. (NO)
Whether or not private respondent is bound by the contract.
(YES)
RULING: 1. NO. A good measure for determining whether a
contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is
whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by
the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to
perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by
others are discharged by the death of the promissor.
Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that
it may as well be performed by another, or where the
contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was
contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or
excuse nonperformance.
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the
late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of
Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the
subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter
of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by
her heir Victor.
2. YES. Art. 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows — Art.
1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir
is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from
the decedent.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor
legal provision making the rights and obligations under the
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
ROMULO CORONEL v. COURT OF APPEALS
Art. 777 of the New Civil Code provides that succession as a mode
of acquisition upon which the successors automatically stepped
into the decedent’s shoes regarding the subject property wherein
all rights and obligations pertaining thereto become binding and
enforceable upon them.
FACTS: Romulo Coronel and co-petitioners executed a document
recognizing down payment in favor of Ramona Alcaraz and co-
respondents for the purchase of a parcel of land previously
owned and still in the name of their deceased father in the full
purchase price of more or less 1.2 million pesos. In light thereof,
respondents complied and tendered down payment in order that
they could receive the title of the land so that they could secure
further rights. Coronel and co-petitioners however reneged on
their obligations and sold the land in full to Catalina Mabanag and
subsequently cancelled their existing obligations with
respondents.
The Coronels tried refunding the paid amount by Alcaraz back but
the latter did not accept which prompted the former to deposit
it instead in a bank. The Alcaraz sought out the Register of Deeds
and attached a notice of lis pendens as a matter of legal remedy.
Catalina Mabanag then caused a notice of adverse claim. A Deed
of Absolute Sale was then executed in favor of Mabanag wherein
she was subsequently awarded a title over the said parcel of land.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alcaraz and caused the
cancellation of the property of Mabanag. The petitioners
appealed that such decision be reversed, to no avail.
ISSUE/S:
1 Whether or not the obligation was one of contract of sale (YES)
2 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to sell the
property even though the title is still with their deceased father?
(YES)
RULING:
Yes. In examining the circumstances stated, the conditions and
stipulations show that the intent of the parties is one of a
contract of sale wherein they transfer the ownership of and
deliver the thing to the buyer. The purpose of the down payment
is not unequivocal that it states that it reserves ownership of the
thing until a positive suspensive condition happens, specifically
the payment of the full purchase price.
As there is a perfected contract of sale, the petitioners must
convey ownership to respondents.
Art. 777 of the New Civil Code provides that succession as a mode
of acquisition upon which the successors automatically stepped
into the decedent’s shoes regarding the subject property
wherein all rights and obligations pertaining thereto become
binding and enforceable upon them.
RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
SULPICIA JIMENEZ V. VICENTE FERNANDEZ
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the
law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the
governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was
concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated,
or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child — for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit.
FACTS: The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area
of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of
residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay),
Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Sulpicia
Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters,
formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two
(2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. After the death of
Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under
Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle
and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the
registration case Original Certificate of Title was issued on
February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia
Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter,
Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took
possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of
436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square
meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and
defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of Real Properties"
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an
affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property
appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is
the only heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued on October 1, 1969 in Sulpicia
Jimenez's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter
property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband,
instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied
by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora
Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, being an illegitimate child inherent the said land and sell
it (NO)
RULING: NO. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to
prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that
Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos
Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no
right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not
have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no
right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not
have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto
Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.
Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without
a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court”
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso
portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate
of title, died on July 9, 1936, way before the effectivity of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his
estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of
1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman, “To be an heir under the rules
of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos
Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as
the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must
be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child — for illegitimate not natural are
disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)”
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the
common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria
Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered
an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then
legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to
marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was
an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional
rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
LORENZO v. POSADAS
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary,
and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at
that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
FACTS: Thomas Hanley, the decedent, died in Zamboanga,
leaving behind a considerable amount of real and personal
properties which are the subject of the will. Probate proceedings
were instituted which delineates among other things that:
Any money left by him shall be given to his nephew Matthew
Hanley
All real estate shall not be sold for a period of ten (10) years.
Such real estate shall be managed by his executor and that the
proceeds thereof be given to his nephew for the sole purpose
that it shall only be used for the education of his brother, Malachi
Hanley.
After a period of ten (10) years, all property should be
bequeathed to Matthew Hanley.
Malachi Hanley is the decedent’s brother and thus, Matthew’s
uncle.
The court appointed a trustee that would administer the
RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
The court appointed a trustee that would administer the
properties of the decedent until time when it will be turned over
to Matthew Hanley. The trustee eventually resigned and the
present plaintiff, Pablo Lorenzo, was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of Lorenzo as a trustee, the defendant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed an inheritance tax
based on the value of the estate left by the decedent at the time
of his death less deductions with interests due to late payments.
The Commissioner instituted proceedings before the court
ordering that the trustee pay the assessed taxes. The trustee paid
under protest with the condition that unless such payment is
refunded, the latter would not withdraw legal action against him
in order to recover the amount.
The court ruled in favor of the Commissioner which prompted
Lorenzo, the trustee, to appeal the case before the Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be
satisfied?
2. Whether or not the inheritance tax be computed on the basis
of the value of the estate at the time of the testator's death and
not on its value ten years later? (YES)
Whether or not in determining the net value of the estate subject
to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to
trustees? (NO)
RULING: The accrual of the inheritance tax is different from the
obligation to pay the same.
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code imposes tax
upon “every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise,
bequest, gift mortis causa…”. Therefore the tax is imposed due
to the transmission of such properties which was made effective
by his death. In other words, it is a tax imposed based on the right
to succeed or inherit after death which is in consonance with Art.
657 of the Civil Code wherein it dictates that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.
With regard to the obligation to pay the inheritance tax, the
period is not the same with the time the tax was imposed as it is
ruled by Art. 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code which
states that the it shall be paid before it was delivered to the first
trustee or six months subsequent the death of the decedent
unless proceedings shall be first instituted before the expiration
of such period in which the administrator must first pay before
distributing the shares to each beneficiary.
If death is the generating source from which the power of the
estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the
death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the
estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the
value of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedent's death,
regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
subsequent increase or decrease in value.
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary
, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted
at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION
and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at
that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for
his services but from this it does not follow that the
compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at
the net value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in
the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be
deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to
inheritance tax.
PAULMITAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, died in 1953, she left two
parcels of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental, one
was 1,946 sqm (Lot 757) and the other was 69,080 sqm (Lot
1091). From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who was also
deceased, Agatona had two legitimate children, namely: Pascual
Paulmitan, who also died in 1953 shortly after his mother passed
away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third
petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual
Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the
respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona remained unsettled and the
titles to the two lots remained in her name. However, on August
11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself
Lot 757. Claiming that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona
Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, and he was issued a
Transfer Certificate of Title.
Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over Lot No.
1091 in favor of his daughter. However in 1952, due to non-
payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public
auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental
being the buyer. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed
the property from the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.
Respondents, children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on
January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the
properties plus damages. Petitioners set up the defense of
prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, contending that the
Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the issuance of
a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan. As regards Lot
No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed that she acquired
exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale
executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan,
but also by way of redemption from the Provincial Government
of Negros Occidental.
The trial court ordered the partition of the land and directed
petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private
respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in
the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents were
directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in
the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW
the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the sale made by Donato to Juliana made the
latter the sole owner of the land.
2. Whether or not the redemption of the land from the Province
of Negors Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of
taxes, made Juliana the valid owner of the land.
RULING:
1. YES. But only to his undivided share. When Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and
Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article
777 of the Civil Code that "the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent," the
right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over
their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and
by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when their mother
died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual
did not yet have any right over the inheritance since “in every
inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones.” Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to
the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their
mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the
subsequent passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate
remained unpartitioned. Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were,
therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no
partition was ever made. When Donato Paulmitan sold on Lot No.
1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner
with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion
which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents
to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited
from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with
the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in
the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
land until it is partitioned.
2. NO. The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not
terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership. Article 488 states that: Each co-
owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right
owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership. Hence, the property remains to
be in a condition of co-ownership. The redemption by one co-heir
or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and
consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not
give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property.
It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the
entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless,
she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption
NOTES ON WILLS AND SUCCESSION RUSSELL JAY M. MANGLICMOT | UST CIVIL LAW

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the
entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless,
she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption
price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental
on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien
upon the subject property for the amount due her.
 Cumpolsary heirs- those who are entitled to a legitime from
the testator.
 Voluntary heirs- those who are instituted to any part of the
estate for free disposal by the testator.
 Devisees- person to whom a gift of a real property
 Legatees- person whom a gift of personal property
 Legal/intestate heirs- succeed to the estate by operation of
law.

Art. 778. Succession may be: (1) Testamentary; (2) Legal or

intestate; or (3) Mixed Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities required by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate to take effect after this death.
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the
designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form
Will- an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of his
prescribe by law.
property to take effect after his death. It is ambulatory and
revocable through his lifetime.
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and  The formalities to be observed would depend on whether the
partly by operation of law. will is a notarial or holographic will.

Testamentary succession- decedent himself specifies his wishes
with respect to the distribution of his property through a will
which must be executed in the manner required by law.
Legal succession- occurs if there is no will or the will is declared
void for failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law;
or the will does not institute an heir, or all the heirs instituted are
incapable of succeeding the decedent.
Mixed succession- occurs if certain dispositions in the will of the
decedent are invalidated or not given effect either because of an
imperfect description of the property, or when no person or
property exactly answers the description contained in the will of
the deceased.
Subject to Rules on intestacy when:
 The vacancy created by reason of the invalidation
 If the testator failed to distribute his whole estate or the free
portion thereof, and no substitution or accretion takes place,
the balance remaining shall be subject to the rules.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession.
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot
be left in whole or in part to the discretion of a third person, or
accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or
attorney.
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of the
portions of heirs, devisees, or legatees, or the determination of
the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name,
cannot be left to the discretion of a third person.
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the
distribution of a specific property or sums of money that he may
leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the
designation of the persons, institutions, or establishments to
which such property or sums of money are to be given or
applied.
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition
is such manner that another person has to determine whether
or not it is to be operative.

Inheritance- includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a

person which are not extinguished by his death.

Succession- the legal mode of acquisition whereby inheritance of

a person is transmitted to another or others by his death.

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by

the provision of the will or by operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons whom gifts of real and

personal property are respectively given by virtue of a will

CLASSIFICATION OF HEIRS:
Testamentary heirs