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PARTIES INVOLVED:
Appellant: Attorney General of Canada
Respondent: Hydro-Quebec
INTERVENERS:
Attorney General for Saskatchewan
IPSCO Inc. Societe pour vaincre la pollution inc. (SVP);
Pollution Probe;
Great Lakes United;
Canadian Environmental Law Association;
Sierra Legal Defense Fund
BACKGROUND TO CASE:
Hydro-Quebec released polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Although the release
of PCBs in small quantities is not illegal section 6(a) of the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act (CEPA) stipulates that it is illegal to release PCBs over a certain quantity.
Hydro-Quebec was charged with “releasing PCBs in a quantity greater than that
permitted by section 6(a) of the Chlorobiphenyls Interim Order, adopted and enforced
pursuant to sections 34 and 35 of the CEPA”. They were also charged with a second
offence of failing to report the incident to an inspector as stipulated by sections 34 and 35
of CEPA.
CEPA is a federal statute. Part II and Part III of the act specifically address the
regulation of toxic substances. They define a toxic substance as one that “is entering or
may enter the environment” under conditions “having or that may have an immediate or
long-term harmful effect on the environment”, “constituting or that may constitute a
danger in Canada to human life or health” CEPA section 11.
Upon being by charged with the two violations of CEPA, Hydro-Quebec pleaded
not guilty and moved to have CEPA declared unconstitutional, on the grounds that the
discharge of effluents was a matter of provincial jurisdiction. The constitutional
argument succeeded in the Quebec Court’s Criminal Division. The decision was
Case Study: R v Hydro
appealed and subsequently upheld by the Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of
Appeal. All agreed that the above mentioned sections of CEPA were ultra vires (beyond
the powers of) the Federal Government. As a result of these decisions the Federal
Government appealed the decisions to the Supreme Court of Canada
RULING :
In a 5 to 4 split decision, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal (overturned
the lower courts’ decisions) and found that the regulatory scheme created by CEPA was
indeed within the constitutional powers of the federal government. The majority found
that the CEPA provisions fell within the definition of “criminal law” in that they involved
prohibitions backed by penalties and were directed at a legitimate purpose of preventing
harm to the public, and were not a “colourable” intrusion into a defined area of provincial
jurisdiction. The majority found that because the law fell within the criminal head of
federal power, there was no need to decide whether it fell under the “peace, order and
good government” power.
The dissent found that the law did not fall within the ambit of criminal law. The dissent
agreed with the majority that the law was directed at a legitimate purpose, but found that
the impugned provisions did not have the form of criminal law—i.e. the creation of a
punishable offense based on a blanket prohibition of some activity. Rather, it created a
regulatory scheme allowing the release of toxic substances in accord with terms and
conditions set at the discretion of the federal Cabinet. The dissent also found that
because CEPA used broad language of protecting the environment and human health, the
object of the regulatory scheme lacked the “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility”
that would clearly distinguish it from matters of provincial jurisdiction, and did not pick
out matters of potentially shared federal and provincial concern that the provinces would
be incapable of effectively regulating on their own. For these reasons the dissent found
that the CEPA scheme was not a valid exercise of the federal government’s residual
“peace, order and good government” power.
powers. Second, he argues that by not upholding CEPA under “peace, order and good
government” the Court failed to build on its previous decisions in Crown Zellerbach and
Oldman River which emphasized federal jurisdiction over the extraprovincial or
transboundary aspects of environmental problems. He suggests that the majority could
have made a convincing case for upholding CEPA on the latter grounds given the lack of
respect toxic chemicals have for provincial and national borders.
REFERENCES:
See also:
Beatty, David M. 1998. “Polluting the law to protect the environment.” Constitutional
Forum 9(2):55-58.