Separation of Powers or Check and Balance

The purpose of Judicial Review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect
substantive rights of parties affected by its act, rule or decision. The review is part of the system of checks and
balances which is a limitation on the separation of powers among the three branches of government and which
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudication.

FUENTES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

 Exception to the substantial evidence rule; Appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive.
 Factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court
unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.
 As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are
deemed conclusive. As such the Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This rules, however, is not without exceptions. The
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by
this Court:
1. when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
2. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
3. when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;
4. when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
5. when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
6. when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
7. when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion;
8. when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9. when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and
10. when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
 Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.

PNB VS. SAYO

 The availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari or
prohibition where appeal is not adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient.
 Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
 There is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of a court to order immediate execution of a final order
without awaiting the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom and without even a motion having been
filed for execution pending appeal.

TAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

 As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. However, this rule admits of
certain recognized exceptions such as:
a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
 e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
Trial Court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
 Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, a writ of certiorari has been allowed when the
orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction.
 Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient and that to
strictly observe the general rule would result in a miscarriage of justice.
 A motion for new trial is the appropriate remedy when the defendant discovers that he has been declared
in default and that a judgment has already been rendered, which has not, however, become final and
executor as yet.
 The filing of a motion for new trial suspends the reglementary period for the attainment by the decision of
finality. (Rule 41, Section 3; PCIBank vs. Ortiz, 150 SCRA 383)
INDOYON, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
 Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the Court of Appeal’s
judgment, final order or resolution, is a petition for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from; or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
 Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals by a
wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal.
 In Ybanez vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that the Court cannot tolerate this ignorance of law
on appeals.
 Paragraph 4(e) of the Supreme Court Circular 2-90:
 Duty of Counsel – it is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a
judgment or order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of errors he proposes
to assign, whether these be of fact or law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court
has appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by
law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client’s cause.
 A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. To
warrant the issuance thereof, the abuse of discretion must have been so gross or grave, as when there was
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of
power was done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.
The abuse must have been committed in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
 An appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Thus, an appeal may be availed of only in
the manner provided by law and the rules. Failure to follow procedural rules merits the dismissal of the
case, especially when the rules themselves expressly say so. While the Court, in certain cases, applies the
policy of liberal construction, this policy may be invoked only in situations in which there is some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not when the application of the policy results in the utter
disregard of procedural rules.
 For a proper invocation of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, one of the
essential requisites is that there be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
 A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case
fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.

CSC VS. SEBASTIAN

 The parties in the proceedings before an agency or in the lower court are the parties in a petition for review
in the Court of Appeals.
 While it is true that petitioner Mayor acted in his official capacity when he dismissed the respondent from
the service, nevertheless, he was entitled to be heard on the petition. He is entitled to due process.
 Section 6 of Rule 43 provides that petitioner “should state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents”
 If petitioner Mayor is not impleaded as a party-respondent in the CA, he cannot be compelled to abide by
and comply with its decision, as the same would not be binding on him. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by
the court. Ergo, res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicrium facint. A person who was not impleaded
in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by any
proceeding in which he is a stranger.
 If an employee was illegally dismissed, he may, by his inaction or by sleeping on his right, in law, be
considered as having abandoned the office to which he was entitled to be reinstated. In case of
unreasonable delay, he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to recover its
emoluments. There must be stability in the service so that public positions may not be unduly retarded;
delays in the enforcement of a right to positions in the service must be discouraged.
 Case law has it that one is barred from asserting a right if he fails to do so for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time which by the exercise of diligence, he could have or should have done earlier. By
 sleeping on his right for almost 4 years, the respondent is now barred from claiming his right to be
reinstated to his position as Municipal Secretary.
 Relief has been denied to those who, by sleeping on their rights for an unreasonable length of time, either
by negligence, sheer folly or inattention, have allowed their claims to slumber. The laws aid the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights.

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. DELOS REYES, JR.

 Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the
Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
 Grave abuse of discretion involves a “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.” It must be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner – which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law – in order to
exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.
 The remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman is
available only in the following situations:
a. in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or
where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and
b. in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation.
 The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted when “there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
 In Balbastro vs. Junio, Supreme Court held that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The remedies
of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
 It is settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Only arbitrariness will warrant judicial intervention of the
Office of the Ombudsman’s findings.
 Misconduct has been defined as a “transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behaviour or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.”
 Gross neglect of duty is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." It denotes a
flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public
officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
 In administrative cases, it is sufficient that “there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is
guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.”
 In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, SC held that heads of offices may rely to a certain extent on their subordinates.
As held in Cesa vs. Office of the Ombudsman, when there are facts that point to an irregularity and the
officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable.”
MIRO VS. MENDOZA
 Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute.
- It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported
by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect,
if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction.
- This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect
given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate
the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency’s findings if not supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies
 (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.

a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law

- It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this
Court is not a trier of facts. xxx The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the
province of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
- There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal questions.

b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court

- Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are
those of the CA, and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. It is imperative that we refrain
from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert
this Court into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and
Maria Altamirano etc. et al. our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the
appellate court, to wit: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited
to the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not
obliged to review all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo.
Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the CA
and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.
- In Montemayor vs. Bundalian, the Court laid down the guidelines for the judicial review of
decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers,
as follows:
1. The burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint.
2. In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the
findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.
3. Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set
aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

 Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman
when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final
and unappealable.
 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness.
- It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own
Personal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on
what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and
may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is
evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only
limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.
- Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
 Non- hearsay - the fact that utterances or statements were made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or
statements is offered not as an assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only as to the fact of
the utterance made (not covered by hearsay rule)
  Legal hearsay - consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains to extrajudicial
utterances and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted (covered by hearsay
rule)

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. VS. PEREZ

 A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial
question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it.
 A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution
has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A
challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question
on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate
questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension
until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.
 To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so
placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the
matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence
of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered,
suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.
 Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to
distinguish.
PALATINO VS. COMELEC
 COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the 10
May 2010 elections on 31 October 2009. Voter registration for the 2010 elections is extended until 9
January 2010.
 The clear text of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election. By this provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make
ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections. And the COMELEC’s rule-making
power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
 Both Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 grant the COMELEC the
power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held
within the period provided by law. There is no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter
registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by Section 8 of Republic Act 8189. There
is, thus, no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
 The present case is different from Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC. Petitioners in Akbayan filed their petition
with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8
of R.A. 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on 17 and 18 February 2001, also within the
120-day prohibitive period. In the present case, both the dates of filing of the petition (30 October 2009)
and the extension sought (until 9 January 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period.