CASTILLO v. PADILLA, JR.
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was
[127 SCRA 743 A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984]
PLANA, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo was the counsel for the defendants
in Criminal Case for forcible entry before the MeTC of Caloocan.
Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. was counsel for the plaintiff. At the
hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while Castillo was
formally offering his evidence, he heard Padilla say "bobo." When
Castillo turned toward Padilla, he saw the latter looking at him
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many
people, Castillo was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence.
The court proceedings had to be suspended. Thereafter, Atty.
Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of
judicial proceedings.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having
directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said
was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was
trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into
the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the Atty. Padilla, respondent, should be
disciplined?
HELD:
Yes, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his
misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and
restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt
with more severely. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and
(2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The
Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel.
Use of intemperate language uncalled for in the case at
bar, whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner
of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was
offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable
addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not
only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm
of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all
the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that
respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to
refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be
more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.
In Re: ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970]
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar
since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case
as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino
Tiburcio, et al. He alleged that sometime during the first week of
October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him
to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this
terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs.
Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their
conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty.
Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the
Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27,
1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of
hearing thereof was yet undetermined. He also relied to Atty.
Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending
in this Court.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Soriano be granted the plea of appearance
HELD:
No. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which
has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides
being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted
annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore
deviation from normal judicial processes. We find Atty. Clemente
M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the
practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the
hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he
made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he
must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further
likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier
disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to
forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief
counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
US v. Ney
[8 Phil 146 G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907]
TRACEY, J.:
FACTS:
In 1902 this court decided that J. Garcia Bosque, was not
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, on
the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to
remain Spanish, as such was not qualified for admission to the bar.
In 1904 he made an arrangement with Ney, a practicing attorney,
to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney
& Bosque". The paper was headed "Law Office — Ney & Bosque.
Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney, abogado
americano." Since then papers from the office were signed with
the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on
September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so
singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being
repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent
to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he
thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and
defend their acts as being within the law under Section 102 of the
Code of Civil procedure.
ISSUE:
WON either of these defendants be thus punished for
contempt?
HELD:
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes
contempt as follows: 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge; 2. Misbehavior of an officer
of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions.
In the case, no direct order or command of this court has
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order
that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying
him the right to practice law. Even had he been entitled under the
statute to practice law without any license from the court and
without an application to it, yet its order made on his own petition.
A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had
his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in
practice. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish
lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character
in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is
not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law.
Consequently, the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to
disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a
party.
TAPAY v. BANCOLO
[A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013]
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
In October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia
received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Divinagracia, a co-employee in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that
he represented Divinagracia and declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his,
which was later alleged to be forged by the secretary- Mary Jane
Gentugao. Hence, a complaint was filed against Atty. Bancolo and
Atty. Jarder for violation of the Canons of Ethics and
Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment. The Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the filed cases. Thereafter complainants filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder.
The IBP’s resolution, regarding the report of Atty. Lolita
A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, pronounce that Atty.
Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder case was dismissed. Thereby,
recommended Atty. Bancolo be suspended for one year from the
practice of law. Hence the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the IBP is correct finding Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable and dismissed Atty. Jarder case.
HELD:
Yes. The court agreed with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to
hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable. Atty.
Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: Canon 9 A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly,
Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer
shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing. On the other hand, the complainants did not
present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of
Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from
the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper
the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
BONIFACIO v. ATTY. ERA and ATTY. BRAGAS
[A.C. No. 11754 October 3,2017]
TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
An illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio
and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation
Complainants therein Abucejon Group were represented by Era
and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter
found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal
and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group. Thus, a
Writ of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment were issued to
implement decision. Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was
filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests entitled
Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, where the Court
found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years from 2013-2015.
On the scheduled public auction Atty. Era actively participated
therein. As the parties were not able to settle regarding the payment
of judgment, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's
business establishment together with their clients and several men,
and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned
properties. This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint
for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing.
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in
pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court during his
suspension. Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.
Investigating Commissioner Cabrera recommended the dismissal
of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the
Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions,
pronouncing Atty Era of unauthorized practice of law and thereby
suspended for 3 years and Atty. Bragas for her assistance of
unauthorized practice of law suspended for a month. No motion
for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on
the instant administrative case.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas ars subject to
disciplinary action
HELD:
Yes. We sustain the findings and recommendations of the
Board of Governors. Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
It is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1)
appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of
the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his
clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said
document to the corporation's officers and employees present in
the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the
new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed
entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties;
and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as
regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of
pulling out the properties. Atty. Era was engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. As mentioned,
Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year.
Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law
practice. Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the
lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his
unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's
suspension from the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to
participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty.
Bragas violated the CPR, specifically: CANON 9 - A lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not
to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded
upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice
be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. Hence, shall be subject to disciplinary action.
ALAWI v. ALAUYA
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa
& Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, they were
classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that
his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of
Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of
“attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the
assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-
law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding
that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often
mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term
“consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can
use the title of Attorney
HELD:
No, He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass
the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya’s use of the title of
“Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.”
The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it
is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
GUBALLA v. CAGUIOA
[G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977]
SANTOS, J:
FACTS:
Jose Guballa is an operator of a public utility vehicle
which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting
to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. A
complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner. An
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida
Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates.
Because Guballa and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial
conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was
treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present
his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered in favor
of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration,
signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm was
then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default,
was denied. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals handled
by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm,
however was likewise denied and was then remanded to the lower
Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. A Motion for
Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower
Court which was granted by respondent Judge.
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L.
Santos, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his
discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the
Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that
consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his
properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon
without due process of law. Judge Caguioa denied the Petition and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Hence the instant
Petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge’s denial of the Petition for
Relief is proper
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition
for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this
Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the
person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the
litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings,
turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to a denial
of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent
stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by
default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of
the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been
amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate
courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover,
petitioner himself was at fault, not only on the alleged counsel's
failure to attend the pretrial conference but likewise on his own
failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this
petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding
which has already taken well over six years to resolve.
In sum, the law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado &
Associates" is hereby ordered to explain why Irineo W. Vida Jr.
was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil when he is not a
member of the Bar.
FIVE J TAXI v. NLRC
[G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994]
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon were hired by Five J Taxi, petitioners as taxi drivers and,
as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting
schedule. They were required to pay the daily boundary of P700.00
for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi,
P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to
answer for any deficiency in their boundary for every actual
working day. Maldigan in less than 4 months, he already failed to
report for work and later learned that he was already working for
Mine of Gold Taxi Company. On the other hand, Sabsalon, while
driving a taxicab was held up by his armed passenger who took all
his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and
after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
Thereafter Sabsalon was re-admitted, however, on several
occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak
Company." Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement
of his daily cash deposits for 2 years but was denied. While
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners
terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay
for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
Private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
However, was dismissed. The NLRC concurred with modification
by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards
stated. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the
NLRC. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the NLRC erred in ordering petitioners to pay
private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon
their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment
to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and
for attorney's fees.
HELD:
The questioned judgment of respondent NLRC was
modified by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent
to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of
the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits,
plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this
resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. The accounting
shows that Sabsalon was able to withdraw his. With respect to
Maldigan's deposits, he should be reimbursed the amount of his
accumulated cash deposits.
On the matter of the car wash payments, private
respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. There was nothing to prevent private
respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted
to save their P20.00. Also car washing after a tour of duty is a
practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents'
authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that
non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only
(1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their
organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that
Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a
reasonable compensation for his services necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
MASINSIN v. ALBANO
[G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994]
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
An ejectment suit was filed by Vicente Caneda against
Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the case, the trial court
ordered the spouses to vacate the premises, to remove their
house/apartment, to surrender possession of the subject land, and
to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as
compensation for the use of the premises until the land is actually
vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment
became final and executory. On August 22, 1985, the Masinsins
filed before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the
decision of the ejectment case but was dismissed. On October 7
1985, a complaint for “Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract
and Damages” was filed by the Masinsins asking for the
nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint
was dismissed due to res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA
but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. When
petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was
issued. But before the completion of the demolition, a restraining
order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari,
with preliminary injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition
again was denied. Petitioners again filed the same suit before a
different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately
dismissed on August 23, 1990. In this present petition for certiorari
and prohibition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has
lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when
the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority
development by the National Housing Authority on December 1
1987 by authority of PD 2016.

ISSUE:
WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its
decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016
HELD:
No. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and
therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus, the MTC of Manila has
jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case. What
immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the evident
predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file
pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has
been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complainants and
petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to
prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has
long become final and executory. The petitioners through different
counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different
branches of the court. The lawyer’s oath is a sacred trust that must
be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyer’s
oath involved in this case: I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money
or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation
voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer
of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and
degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for
both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application
of the contempt power.
HUEYSUAN-FLORIDO v. FLORIDO
[A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-
Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and
living separately from each other. Respondent went to is asserted by counsel. A lawyer's language should be forceful but
complainant's residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
demanded that the custody of their two minor children be keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer's
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. properly addressed by one gentleman to another.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that
he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed
by respondent. In January 15, 2002, while complainant was with
her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City,
respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children.
In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the
children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that
he would not take them away from Tanjay City. On the same day,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his
right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of
Appeals' resolution. At the hearing, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed. As pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was
presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus which he filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he
sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent can be held
administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a
spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Yes. Since it was respondent who used the spurious
Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
The records show that respondent used offensive language in his
pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. Candor and
fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what