RULE 128

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 137757, August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his
neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice
calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known
him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her,
Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right
hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen
which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the
victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded
in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite
Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident
to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough
courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea
to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the
medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge. In his appeal, Turco argues, among others,
that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering
that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE:

Whether the medical certificate issued by medico-legal officer cannot be admitted as

evidence since he was not presented.
HELD:

No.
In People vs. Bernaldez, the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued,
it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show
his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility by evidence and the
probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence us determined
by it’s by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, an affair of logic and law. On the other
hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down with the Court. Thus, while
evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which
may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.
In addition, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining
physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate stating that there was hymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion as well as “foul-
smelling discharges. The diagnosis was ruptured hymen secondary to rape. In fact, reliance was
made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not
indispensable in the prosecution of rape it is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court
that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient
to convict.
 RULE 129

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA
PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA —
SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ,
LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO
RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA
SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO
BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO
RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN,
LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA —
EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-26053, February 21, 1967

FACTS:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering
Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to
1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They
built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and
without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered were
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract” to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and
Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel
de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which was close, though not contiguous, to the
property had a pressing need to expand. The City Engineer gave the defendands 30 days each to
vacate the premises and to remove the constructions therein. This was followed by the City
Treasurer’s demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the
occupancy. The defendants refused, alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by
reason of the written permits issued them.
ISSUE:

Whether the defendants would benefit from the inadmissibility of the certificate as
evidence.

HELD:

No.
The courts in Manila are required to take judicial notice of ordinances by the City of
Manila.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee
on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00,
had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of
an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say
that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the
decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was
need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document,
Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its
power, to make it formable to law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to
bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not
reopen the case solely for this purpose.
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken-because he was duty
bound to take-judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal
board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100, 000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.
Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits
from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty days’ notice. They
have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the
city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area
cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the
finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below.
 RULE 130

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are the heirs of Maximo Alvarez Sr. while the defendants are the heirs of
Margarita Prodon. The plaintiffs filed a complaint for quieting of title with respect to a particular
land in which they alleged that their parents had been in possession of the land and the registered
owner thereof and they could not locate the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the
original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact.

However, the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done
by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist.

Prodon on the other hand contended that she had become absolute owner of the property
by reason of the failure of Maximo Alvarez to repurchase such.
The RTC opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court
as the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila, its contents could
nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence.

The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the
court. It ruled in favor of Prodon.

On appeal to CA, the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not
established the existence, execution, and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites
for the presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule
naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based on
the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.

HELD:

No.

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject
of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right
to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence
Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the
original document. The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case.

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the
evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.

This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase were not the issue. The lower court should have simply addressed and determined
whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved
by preponderance of evidence.

The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or
unavailability of the original of the deed.

The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral
document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to
produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution
by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end,
however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict
standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for
presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the
loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence.
Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao
had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to
locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants
or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from
Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.

In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the
deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in
question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
 SECONDARY EVIDENCE
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIO LAGMAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011

FACTS:

Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to
engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay in his warehouse
at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded
Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash
bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the
amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than thirty-three and one third
percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be received.

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued Warehouse Bond through its agent,
Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the
Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim
Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter
bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice,
losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney’s
fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bondSantos then secured a
loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his
payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the
bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only
for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never
renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on November 5, 1990, Country Bankers issued
Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no Indemnity
Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders
no force and effect the 1989 Bonds. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and
Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers.
Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. He insisted that the lifetime of the 1989 Bonds,
as well as the corresponding Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months. According to Lagman,
the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the complaint because it was not covered by an Indemnity
Agreement and it superseded the two prior bonds. The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond
superseded the 1989 Bonds. The appellate court rejected the argument of Country Bankers that the
1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason therefor, that the receipts issued for the bonds
indicate that they were effective for only one-year.

Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which
allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the
original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence;
Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by Country Bankers;
Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond. Country Bankers stresses
that the cancellation of the 1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond obligee. Ergo, the
bonds remain subsisting until cancelled by the bond obligee. Country Bankers further assert that
Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989
Bonds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible in evidence.

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court rule as inadmissible such copy.

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as follow:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
 (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that
the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on
the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually
four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is with the
Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his
possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for the non-production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must
appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals.

Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman
merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no
longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did
not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of
the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a
bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the three
other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original
with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly,
Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
 PAROLE EVIDENCE

SPOUSES GUILLERMO AGBADA and MAXIMA AGBADA, petitioners,

vs.
INTER-URBAN DEVELOPERS, INC., and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
BR. 105, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 144029. September 19, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner-spouses Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada borrowed money from

respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. To secure the loan, the parties concurrently executed
a deed of real estate mortgage over a parcel of land and the improvements owned by the spouses.
The spouses failed to pay the loan within the six-month period despite several out-of-court
demands made by respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc.

Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
105, a complaint for foreclosure of real estate mortgage On 2 March 1994, without assistance of
counsel, the spouses filed their unverified answer admitting that they had borrowed the amount
of P1, 500,000.00 from respondent and had executed the real estate mortgage to secure the loan
but denying that it was payable within six (6) months and at three percent (3%) interest per month.

With the assistance of counsel, petitioner-spouses Agbada moved to amend their answer to
allege that the mortgage contract was not reflective of the true intention of the parties since in
reality the loan was interest-free and would mature only after five (5) years from execution thereof
and that consequently they were denying under oath the due execution and authenticity of the
mortgage document, although the proposed answer was still not verified by them. Interestingly,
the amended answer departed from the allegation in the original answer that the loan would earn
interest at the legal rate. The trial court denied the amendment of the answer holding that the
change would substantially alter the gist of the defense.

The trial court promulgated its Summary Judgment in favor of respondent Inter-Urban
Developers, Inc. It held that Simeon Ong Tiam, compadre of petitioner-spouses and then president
of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. could not have obligated his principal by contemporaneous
agreement amending the maturity of the loan from six (6) months tofive (5) years and the interest
rate from three percent (3%) per month to the default or statutory rate, much less interest-free,
since the undertaking was contrary to the express provisions of the duly executed loan and
mortgage contract.
Petitioner-spouses did not appeal the Summary Judgment nor did they pay the judgment
debt. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. moved for a decree of foreclosure which the spouses did not
oppose nor did they attend the hearing on the motion. The mortgaged real estate was sold at public
auction to respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. as highest bidder for P4, 637,092.74 which
was supposed to be in full satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Upon motion of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. and despite petitioner-spouses' opposition
thereto on the ground that the purchase price of the mortgaged property was below its appraised
value according to an appraisal report, the trial court confirmed the sale in favor of Inter-Urban
Developers, Inc. The trial court ruled that it could not have given weight to the appraisal report
since this report was not authenticated nor was the appraiser presented as witness during the
hearing of the motion to allow Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. an opportunity to cross-examine on
the appraised value of the property.
Petitioner-spouses Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of judgment with prayer for preliminary injunction.The petition sought the
annulment of the Summary Judgment for alleged violation of their right to due process arising
from the absence of a full-blown trial on a genuine issue of fact that the loan and mortgage would
mature only on the fifth year following its execution on February 21, 1991. The petition did not
question compliance with legal requirements of the foreclosure proceedings or any part thereof.
Petitioner-spouses argue that they were deprived of due process when their defense, i.e., that the
real estate mortgage carries a default interest rate and matures only on the fifth year following its
execution on February 21, 1991.
On the other hand, respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. claims that petitioner-spouses did
not deny under oath the authenticity and due execution of the real estate mortgage document,
hence, were barred from setting up the defense that the interest rate and maturity provisions of the
loan and mortgage contract were different from those stipulated in the written agreement.
Respondent further argues that the alleged promise made by Simeon Ong Tiam even if true cannot
be enforced against Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. since there is nothing to show that he was
authorized to enter into the alleged contemporaneous agreement. Finally, respondent asserts that
there were other remedies available to petitioners which they failed to exhaust by their own
negligence, thus rendering the petition for annulment of judgment clearly unavailing and that they
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief from the
effects of the assailed Summary Judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not contemporaneous agreement by the parties is an exception to the parole
evidence rule
HELD:
No.
In the instant case, while petitioner-spouses appear to tender a material issue of fact, i.e.,
demandability and interest rate of the loan, summary judgment would nonetheless be proper where
it is shown that issues tendered are sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, or patently
unsubstantial. To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm
the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e.,
issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable findings of fact
could return a verdict for the non-moving party although mere scintilla of evidence in support of
the party opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry thereof. The proper
inquiry would therefore be whether the affirmative defense offered by petitioner-spouses
constitutes genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial.
We rule that the affirmative defense sets up a sham issue which justifies summary
judgment. For one, petitioner-spouses have not explained how their affirmative defense, since it
attempts to vary a written agreement, could be proved by admissible evidence. It would be useless
to avail of a complete trial where the issue proposed by petitioner-spouses could not be resolved
in any manner other than by referring to the explicit terms of the loan and mortgage agreement. To
be sure, where the parties have reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have
made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.Specifically, under Sec. 9, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Evidence, the trial court is barred from admitting evidence which proves or
tends to prove the alleged concurrent agreement with Simeon Ong Tiam which alters or varies the
terms of the deed between the parties.

Sec. 9 Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The
existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement x x x x

While it is true that contracting parties may establish stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of an agreement reduced into writing by testimony purporting to show
that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by
the parties. As applied herein, the alleged terms of the contemporaneous agreement between
petitioner-spouses and Simeon Ong Tiam cannot be proved for they are not embodied in the
mortgage deed but exist only in their faint recollection. Only the terms of the loan and mortgage
agreement providing for six (6) months maturity from date of execution thereof and the interest
rate of three percent (3%) per month are worth considering and implementing.
The instant case is not unprecedented. In Tarnate v. Court of Appeals involving a case of
foreclosure of real estate mortgage that was resolved by means of summary judgment where
neither the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds nor the fact of default on the due
repayments was disputed, we rejected as genuine issue the contention of petitioners therein that
they were misled by respondent bank to believe that the loans were long-term accommodations
since the loan documents admittedly executed by the parties clearly contradicted petitioners
asseverations and the parties must have realized that when the terms of the agreement were
unequivocally reduced in writing, they could hardly be controverted by oral evidence to the
contrary. Similarly, in Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Santos, where we rejected the alteration of
the conditions imposed in the deed of sale, this Court ruled that appellants therein could not be
allowed to introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them other than those
stipulated in the deed of sale because when they reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed
that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not
found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
Petitioner-spouses cannot invoke any of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, more
particularly, the alleged failure of the writing to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms
that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the
instrument, thus necessitating the reception of relevant extrinsic evidence of the contractual
provision in dispute to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument. However,
in the case at bar, the loan and mortgage deed is clear and without ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in specifying the maturity of the loan exactly after six (6) months from date of
execution thereof at interest rate of three percent (3%) per month, and certainly these unmistakable
terms forbid petitioner-spouses from introducing evidence aliunde of the alleged contemporaneous
agreement in violation of the parol evidence rule.