83. SEBIAL v SEBIAL
SANTERO v CFI
Gelacio Sebial died leaving three children with his first
wife and six children with his second wife. Benjamina
Sebial, his child by second marriage, filed a petition for
the settlement of Gelacio’s estate, praying that she be
appointed administratrix thereof. This was opposed by
Roberta Sebial, a child of the first marriage of Gelacio,
contending that the properties had already been
partitioned. The court granted the petition and prayer. An
inventory was filed by Benjamina, opposed by Roberta,
prompting the probate court to order the two parties to
submit their respective suggested inventories. The court
approved that which Benjamina submitted. Roberta
appealed, contending that the probate court no longer
had jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it had been
file beyond the three-month period mandated by Section
1, Rule 83.
I: W/N the court has jurisdiction to approve the inventory
submitted beyond the three-month period.
AFFIRMATIVE. The three-month period under Rule 83 is
not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the
issuance of the letters of administration and publication
of notice of hearing, the probate court acquires
jurisdiction over the estate and retains the same until the
proceeding is closed. The only effect of filing beyond the
period is that the same may be a ground for the
administrator’s removal.
83.
The late Pablo Santero left 3 children by his first wife
Felixberta Pacursa and 7 children with his second wife
Anselma Diaz. All children are natural as Pablo was not
married to either wife. Anselma Diaz prayed in the
proceedings for the settlement of Pablo’s estate that
support be granted for the matriculation of 3 of the
children of Pablo, and another prayer for the grant of
support for the matriculation of the other children not
included in the earlier prayer. She contends that all her
children are entitled to support ebem of of age and
gainfully employed. The trial court granted the prayers.
I: W/N the children of Anselma who are gainfully
employed and of age are entitled to support.
R: AFFIRMATIVE. The controlling provision is not Rule 83,
Sec 3 but ART 290 and 188 of the NCC, which states that
support shall be given to the surviving spouse and
children during liquidation of inventoried property until
what belongs to them is delivered, the same to be
deducted from the amount that is ultimately pertaining to
them.
While Rule 83 limits support to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the same
procedural law cannot impair the aforediscussed
substantive law in the NCC.
83. LESACA v LESACA
Baldomero Lesaca died survived by his second wife Juana
Felix and two minor children wth her, and two children by
his first marriage, and three natural children with a third
woman.
Proceedings for the probate of his will pending, the CFI
granted, despite opposition of all other parties, a monthly
living allowance of P100 and P300 for matriculation and
uniforms to the two minor children of Baldomero from his
first marriage. The co-executrices refused to deposit the
same on the ground that the same should be chargeable
against the hereditary portion of the aforesaid minors.
I: W/N the allowances for support granted to the minors
pending estate liquidation is collationable and deductible
from their share of inheritance.
R: AFFIRMATIVE. ART 188 of the NCC provides in clear
language that while the widow and children are entitled
to support during the inventory and liquidation of a
decedent’s estate, the support should be deducted from
their portion insofar as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income. ART 1041 does not
apply as the same refers to properties or rights received
as donation during the lifetime of the decedent, which
does not improverish the donor or enrich the donee, since
it is not taken from the capital but from the fruits thereof.
Allowances for support, on the other hand, is of a different
nature compared to collationable donations.
83. CHUA TAN v DEL ROSARIO
This case is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Chua Tan and
others, from the judgment of the RTC which dismissed
their complaint and absolved the defendant as
administratrix of the estate of Chua Toco. They assign that
the lower court erred in appreciating Del Rosario’s
contention of res judicata.
I: W/N this case is barred by res judicata.
R: NEGATIVE. There is identity of parties. Previous case:
Benedicta Juana, judicial administratrix of the estate of
Chua Piaco, filed a case against Del Rosario, administratrix
of the estate of Chua Toco. Present case: presumptive
heirs of Chua Piaco filed a case against Del Rosario. It is
the duty of the administrator to protect not only the
estate but also the creditors, heirs and legatees, so that
they may receive what is due to them. While there is no
actual identity of parties, there is identity through legal
representation.
There is identity of subject matter: the former case is a
petition to render accounting of funds allegedly delivered
in trust by Chua Piaco to Chua Toco; the present case is a
petition for the partition of the same funds between the
heirs.
There is identity of cause of action. Both cases concern the
same alleged trust concerning funds which was delivered
in trust by Piaco to Toco, which the administrator of the
latter’s estate refuses to render an accounting on.
83. REYES v MOSQUEDA
Dr. Emilio Pascual died survived by his sister, Ursula, and
the children of his other late sisters. The heirs of Emilio
filed a petition for the administration and settlement of
his estate. Ursula moved to exclude some properties from
the inventory of the estate and that the same be devliered
to her, pursuant to a donation mortis causa executed by
Emilio. The trial court ordered the exclusion of the real
properties identified by Ursula. The petitioners asked
reconsideration of the same order as one of the lots
excluded belonged to them, by a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by Emilio during his lifetime. The RTC ruled
in favor of Ursula, as affirmed by the CA. The petitioners
now assail the jurisdiction of the RTC to exclude the
properties it so excluded.
I: W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to exclude the properties
it excluded from the inventory.
R: AFFIRMATIVE. The order specifically stated that the
exclusion be without prejudice to the final determination
in a separate action; the probate court has no power to
adjudicate with finality title to properties equally claimed
by two parties, but it may, however, rule as to whether or
not it shall be included or excluded in the inventory of the
estate fo the deceased. Whatever order is given is not
conclusive and is subject to final determination in a
separate action regarding ownership.
83. VDA DE RODRIGUEZ v CA
Beatriz Bautista adopted Carmen Bautista. Beatriz’s
husband, Jose Valero, although unable to adopt her as he
was disqualified to adopt because of his first marriage,
consented to her use of the surname Valero. Jose donated
to Carmen ½ pro-indiviso shares of two conjugal lots.
Upon death of Jose Valero, the executor of his will
included in his inventory the 2 lots donated to Carmen.
She moved for the exclusion of the lots. The executor
opposed, citing prematurity of the motion as the same is
an issue of collation. The probate court excluded the lots
from inventory, and ruled that the same is subject to
collation. Carmen moved for reconsideration, that the lots
were not subject to collation as she was the actual owner
thereof. This was granted by the court.
I: W/N the lots are subject to collation.
R: The issue is premature. The decision of the RTC was
interlocutory and did not settle with finality title to the
lots. The general rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a property should be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon title thereto,
but such determination is not conclusive and subject to
final determination in a separate action regarding
ownership.
To rule therefore as to whether or not it is subject to
collation is premature and not necessary for the
resolution of the case which merely involved inclusion to
or exclusion from the inventory. An issue of collation is
not yet justiciable in the early stages of the proceeding,
since the same concerns distribution of the estate—it is
not yet justiciable since the debts of the estate had not
yet been paid.
84. SAN DIEGO v NOMBRE
Nombre was the administrator of an estate subject of a
settlement proceeding filed before the RTC. In his capacity
as administrator, he leased one of the lots under
administration to Escanlar, without authority or approval
from the court. He was then removed as administrator by
order of the court and replaced by Campillanos. Escanlar,
meanwhile, refused to surrender the leased lot, prompting
the court to cite him in contempt.
Campillanos filed a motion asking authority to lease the
same lot in favor of petitioner San Diego. Nombre
opposed on the ground that the same had been leased to
Escanlar. He argues that his previous authority to lease the
same must be recognized and assumed valid unless
declared by the court as void.
I: W/N the administrator had power to lease a property
which forms part of the estate under administration.
R: NEGATIVE. Under Rule 84, a judicial administrator has,
among others, the power to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed of by will, without authority from
the Court. Lease is deemed to be an act of administration
under our jurisdiction, supported by jurisprudence.
Moreover, an administrator is required to file a bond prior
to assumption of the position. This serves as sufficient
protection to the persons he represents.
84. MANANQUIL v VILLEGAS
Mananquil charged Villegas, the counsel of Leong, who is
the administrator of the estate of the deceased Filomena
Cerna, for gross misconduct and malpractice. It appears
that a lease contract was executed by Leong and Villegas’
partnership involving lots under Leong’s administration.
I: W/N respondent committed acts of misconduct in
failing to secure the approval of the court before leasing
properties under his administration.
R: NEGATIVE. Rule 84 Sec 4 allows an administrator to
perform acts of administration without approval from the
court, including the power to enter into lease contracts as
long settled in jurisprudence.
His counsel is, however, subject to disciplinary sanction, as
having participated in the renewal of the lease contracts
in favor of the partnership of which he is a member and
at one point managing partner, as per ART 1646 of the
NCC: a lawyer is disqualified by public policy from leasing
the properties under their administration in view of the
fidiuciary relationship involved and the peculiar control
they have over the properties of others that they hold.
84. LAT v CA 84. PHIL TRUST CO v WEBBER

In the settlement of the estate of Mariano Lat, the CA
rendered a decision reversing the order of the RTC and
ordered the delivery to the administrator of a sum of 4700
pesos by Cleotilde Lat, without prejudice to the rights of
the compulsory heirs thereto.
The RTC approved a final accounting of the estate of the
deceased Frankel, filed by the administrator Phil Trust. The
appellants, however, objected to the accounting on the
ground that the estate had not been invested in a bank
with a higher rate of interest.

A motion forexecution was filed by the administrator of I: W/N the administrator can be faulted for not investing
the estate, to which Lat opposed, on the ground that there the estate in a bank with higher interest.
had been an agreement by all parties prior to the decision
R: NEGATIVE. The conduct by the administrator in
that the appeal shall be withdrawn. Nevertheless, the CA
depositing the estate in a current account of a solid and
issued the writ of execution prayed for by the
responsible bank over depositing in a fixed account with
administrator.
higher rate of interest, with a view of having them subject
I: W/N the CA erred in issuing the writ of execution. to withdrawal at the court’s notice, is not unlawful or
improper, but worthy of approval. In default of
NEGATIVE. Regardless of whether or not the agreement
instructions to the contrary, the administrator is not called
amounts to renunciation of the heirs of their shares to the
to speculate with funds in his custody or place them
inheritance, the legalization of the execution thereof by
where they may nt be withdrawn at the order of the court,
the CA remains to be correct as the decision was rendered
but rather managing them in accordance with the law,
in favor of the administrator, not the heirs.
always keeping them subject to the orders fo the court.
Moreover, the case is filed prematurely as there is no
showing that the settlement of the estate is in its latter
stages; the net assets available for the distribution had not
yet been determined.
84. BADILLO v FERRER
Macario Badillo died intestate survived by his widow,
Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children. Each of the children
inherited ½ of his estate, or 625 pesos each, less than the
two thousand pesos mentioned under ART 320 of the
NCC. The widow, on her behalf and as guardian of the
minors, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and sale
of the minor’s participation to a real property left by
Macario in favor of Soromero and Rana.
Modesta Badillo, sister of Macario, obtained guardianship
over the children as their mother cannot be found, and
filed a complaint in their behald to annul the sale of their
participation in the property so sold; that as co-owners,
they be given right of redemption.
I: W/N the sale of the minors’ participation is a voidable
contract.
R: NEGATIVE. It is not voidable as ART 1390 contemplates,
that for a contract to be voidable, the parties’ consent
must have been vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation
or fraud or undue influence. In this case, the minors were
not parties to the contract involved; their names were
merely dragged into the contract by their mother who
claimed a right to represent them.
The deed is therefore, unenforceable, as it is an
unauthorized contract under ART 1317 of the NCC; the
power given to the mother as guardian covers only matter
of administration and does not cover disposition, unless
she obtains a prior permission from the court. Neither is
there ratification, as the minors in fact question the
validity of the sale entered into in their behalf.
84. MATUTE v CA
Matias Matute is the duly appointed co-administrator of
the estate of the late Amadeo Matute. Carlo Matute filed
a petition praying that Matias Matute be removed as co-
administrator, alleging neglect in the exercise of his duties
as administrator, failing to render a complete accounting
of the account of the administration. This was opposed by
Matias. The court removed Matias and ordered him to
submit a final accounting of the administration, and
Carlos Matute was ordered to take his place.
I: W/N the probate court may remove Matias as co-
administrator, in this case.
R: NEGATIVE. While Rule 82 gives the court the power to
remove an administrator, giving wide discretion as to the
sufficiency of the ground of removal, in this case, the
Supreme Court is constrained to nullify the order of
removal as the same had been ordered by the probate
court without affording the administrator of his day in
court, denying him of his right to due process.
Moreover, assuming that the removal is valid, the
appointment of Carlos is also improper; there was no
showing that any hearing was conducted, nor was there
notice sent to the heirs and interested parties regarding
such appointment. The requirement of hearing and
notification to all known heirs and interested parties are
essential to the validity of the proceeding for
appointment of a judicial administrator, in order that no
one be depreived of their rights or properties without due
process of law.
84. LINDAIN v CA
The minor plaintiffs are the owners of a parcel of land.
Their mother, a widow, sold the land to the defendants,
acting as guardian of her minor children. The plaintiffs
assailed the validity of the sale, contending it was null and
void as it had been made without authority and/or court
approval.
I: W/N the mother, as guardian, can unilaterally dispose of
the properties of her minor children.
R: NEGATIVE. Under ART 320 of the NCC, the parent acts
as a mere legal administrator of the property of his minor
children, and does not have the power to dispose of or
alienate the same without judicial approval. This lack of
judicial authority, being known to the respondent-
vendees, negate their contention that they are buyers in
good faith.
84. LITONJUA v MONTILLA
Pedro Litonjua obtained favorable judgment in a civil case
against Claudio Montilla for the payment of sum of 4000
with legal interest. A writ of execution was issued but
there exists no property of Montilla which can be levied.
In the estate proceedings of Agustin Montilla, Pedro filed
a motion that the shares of Claudio be sold and from the
proceeds thereon, the judgment debt to him be paid.
I: W/N the remedy availed of by Litonjua is proper.
R: NEGATIVE. An execution cannot be legally levied upon
property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the
heirs of the deceased, until all credits held against the
latter at the time of his death had been paid, and only
after the debts of the estate had been paid can the
remaining property that pertains to the debtor be
attached.