US v Pons

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of
wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered
5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the
said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant
(Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation
thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since
the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband
material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said
that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the
SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that
the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC
passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Mabanag v Lopez-Vito
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could
have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending
the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case
because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether
or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from
each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal
of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved
in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy,
be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.
2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies
or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the
case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies,
it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled
bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill
shall prevail over those of the journals.
Astorga v Villegas
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
“Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the
3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which
referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities
headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill
was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations,
Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by
the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter
approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became
RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing
was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto.
It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the
Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines
withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that
the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal
can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC
can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and
the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into
law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
People v Purisima
Facts:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in
this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the
accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree
#9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after
which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said
informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence
of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,
connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081
which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the
aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to
the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned
that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was
intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is
not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum
prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and
that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.

Issue:

Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal

prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of
such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to
suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is
not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble
and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.The petition is
DISMISSED.
Lidasan v COMELEC
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act
No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that
certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur
pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted
in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then
filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred
that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it
would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located
in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here
presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members
of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in
the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
PEOPLE V. CARLOS,
Decided: June 30, 1947
FACTS:
The appellant Apolonio Carlos was found guilty of
Treason by the People’s Court, sentence to reclusion perpetua
(lifetime/permanent imprisonment) and to pay a fine of P 7000.The lower
court wsa able to find one day of July or August 1944 at around 2 or 3 in the
morning a truck pulled up in front of a house in Constancia St., Sampaloc
Manila where a certain Martin Mateo lived. Carlos together with Japanese
military alighted together broke into Martin Mateo’s house then later to
Fermin Javier’s house. Martin mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier were
captured by biding hands, they were put inside the truck and were brought
to Fort Santiago, tortured and released after 6 days.
Reason: they refused to talk about the whereabouts of Marcelino Mateo, a
guerrilla that was able to escape the Japanese FerminJavier on the other
hand was also arrested because he was a suspected/ confirmed by Carlos as
a guerrilla.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

MERE QUESTION OF THE LAW.- why PCA is unconstitutional: 4 errors1. The
lower Court cannot convicted of treason because there is a settled principle
in international law when a territory is under the governance of an enemy,
all political laws of the previous government are suspended. Thus our laws at
that time have no binding effect because crime of treason is a political
complexion. Likewise Philippine laws are inconsistent and suspended,
without force and effect. Allegiance (legal obligation) distinguishable from
loyalty. Thus, decision should be reversed because the law that created it is
unconstitutional.-law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force
therefore making it unconstitutional-PCA contains provisions entirely foreign
to the subject matter-Second provision: retaining the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance (it should try and decide cases against threats to)-
Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution
1. PCA deprives persons similarly situated of equal protection of the
laws2. Political offenders accused by PC are denied of preliminary
investigation while others are entitled to.3. PO accused by PC have a
limited right to appeal while the accused charged by courts of first
instance have an absolute right toappeal.4. Appeals involving person
who held public office under Phil. Exec. Comm and Phil. Rep or any
branch are to be heard anddecided by a substantially different SC
thus lacking uniformity in rulings over the same subject matter.5.
provision change the existing rules of Court on the subject of bail6.
Art 125 of RPC: Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authority (shall be allowed upon request
tocommunicate confer any time with his attorney or counsel)ISSUE:
Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. v.City of Cagayan de Oro, G.R.
191761,November 14, 2012
DOCTRINE: Failure to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within the statutory period
of 30 days from the effectivity of the ordinance is fatal to one’s cause.
FACTS: On January 10, 2005,the SangguniangPanlungsod of Cagayan de Oro (City
Council) passed Ordinance No. 9503-2005 imposing a tax on the lease or rental of
electric and/or telecommunication posts, poles or towers by pole owners to other
pole users at ten percent(10%) of the annual rental income derived from such
lease or rental. The City Council, in aletter dated 15March 2005, informed Cagayan
Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO), through its President and Chief
Operation Manager, Ms. Consuelo G. Tion, of the passage of the subject ordinance.
On September 30,2005, appellant CEPALCO, purportedly on pure question of law,
filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 9503-
2005 before the Regional Trial Court.
HELD: The Court ruled that CEPALCO failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Section 5 of said ordinance provided that the “Ordinance shall take effect after 15
days following its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation for at least
three (3) consecutive issues.” Gold Star Daily published Ordinance No. 9503-2005
on 1 to 3February 2005. Ordinance No. 9503-2005 thus took effect on 19 February
2005. CEPALCO filed its petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court
on 30September2005,clearly beyond the30-dayperiod provided in Section 187.
CEPALCO did not file anything before the Secretary of Justice. Thus, the Court
found that CEPALCO ignored the mandatory nature of the statutory periods.
Mirasol v Ca
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM
1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgageempowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine

Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB
real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had
a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific

performance, and damages against PNB.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have
agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing
the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not
limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions
involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in
the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity
of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the
Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void
for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to
exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe
for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
 VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.V SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION (4 SCRA 627)
September 10, 2016
by: Christelle B. Amil

G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

Facts
• The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958
requiring all employers in computing premiums to include employee’s
remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of
other media remuneration.
• The petitioner(Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as
it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
• Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers’ and the employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
• The counsel questioned the validity of the circular
• Social Security Commission overruled the objections
• Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission
“to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act”

Held
 Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash. Except:

• that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;
• bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
• dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not
legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f)
Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of
any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned
with the interpretation of the law as amended which was Social Security
Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission simply stated their opinion as
to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity. Whereas if it renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of law is at best
merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby

affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Pelaez. Auditor General
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality…
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for
the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar
and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may
require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the
public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.”
Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare
so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially
and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
Alba v Evangelista

Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the
vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar
was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alajar
telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then
declared as the acting mayor. Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a quo
warranto case before Judge Jose Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.

Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:

Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines,
the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said
officers . . .

Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the
constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two
provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the
president upon displeasure.

HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or
during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of
which Congress could not deprive him.

The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and
fixing the “term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise
of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing,
among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which
the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the
logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure
of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar
was appointed by the pleasure of the president and can also be removed when that
pleasure ceases.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.