EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: ―The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.‖
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC‘s decision dismissing the
former‘s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last
paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they ―constitutionalized what was
statutory.‖ Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And
under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-
presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides that the power ―shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.‖ The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence,
an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution.
 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members
of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO
284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7
of the Constitution which provides:
―Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.‖
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase ―unless otherwise provided in this Constitution―, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and
as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid
down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override
the constitution‘s manifest intent and the people‘s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER v. ELMA

Facts:
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the
second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that
the appointments contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied
in his case. This provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if
(1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of either
position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation between the two
positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would
allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further add that the appointment
of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

Issues:
1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of CPLC?
2. Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the PCGG
Chairman or to the CPLC?
3. Does the ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional,
for being incompatible offices, render both appointments void?
4. Is there a need to refer the case to the Court en banc?

Held:
1. No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between the
positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent
and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and
to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent
Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any
investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as
PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the
situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
2. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to the
present case, the defect in respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the
PCGG Chairman and the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent
requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. The said section allows the concurrent
holding of positions only when: (1) provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) the second post is required by
the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity [which denotes
an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office]. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration
for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.
Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC,
and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of
graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the
occurrence of corruption. On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different
matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President. And while
respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he
did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate
appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is
acting in an ex-officio capacity.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent
Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or
assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to
respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG appointments
in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are
still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to
the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
3. The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman
when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
4. There also is no merit in the respondents‘ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in
question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma‘s concurrent appointments, and
not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional
provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc.
 ESTRADA v. DESIERTO; ESTRADA v. ARROYO
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the
President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada ―constructively resigned his post‖.
At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition
with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from ―conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
―confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution exercise of people power of freedom of speech
which overthrew the whole government. and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the intra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be sitting President that it caused and the
the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the
proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material
relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and
after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect
on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
 BIRAGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties.
Its job is to investigate, collect and assess evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for
such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
 It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation;
 The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
 The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it
the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
 It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The
Chief Executive‘s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

DADOLE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly
allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the President.
RULING: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise
of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by
the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by
statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
 DENR v. DENR EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional
Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from
Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued
by the DENR Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

GOVERNMENT v. SPRINGER

FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The
law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: ―The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.‖
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the
voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting
right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at
that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said
EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House
Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton
Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf
of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the
Board of NCC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members
of NCC.

HELD:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating
the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a
government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of
Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of
the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed
there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such
exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the
legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
 MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO

FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec‘s EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo
was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment.
While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that ―transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No.
3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also
filed an administrative and criminal complaint Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258,
Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules
and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence
of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING: We find petitioner‘s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress.‖
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs.
Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution
which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can
withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
2. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. Thus, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if
the President renews the appointment.
In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because
the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases,
also, upon ―the next adjournment of the Congress‖, simply because the President may then issue new
appointments – not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during
the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim
appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied
disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint
those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus
clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the
disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that
upon said adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or
reappointments.‖
As to the transfer of Matibag
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution
No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en
banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly
useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to
actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel
during the election period. Thus, Benipayo‘s order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law
Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.

RUFINO v. ENDRIGA
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary
purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. The CCP is to awaken the consciousness of
the Filipino people to... their artistic and cultural heritage and encourage them to preserve, promote,
enhance, and develop such heritage.
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees ("Board") to govern the CCP. PD 15 mandates the Board to draw up
programs and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public interest in, and appreciation of, Philippine
art; (2) discover and develop talents connected with Philippine cultural... pursuits; (3) create
opportunities for individual and national self-expression in cultural affairs; and (4) encourage the
organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural exhibitions. The Board administers and holds
in trust real and personal... properties of the CCP for the benefit of the Filipino people. The Board
invests income derived from its projects and operations in a Cultural Development Fund set up to attain
the CCP's objectives.
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two sets of
CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the
rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold... office. The resolution of the issue boils
down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the
CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from
the "pressure or influence of politics." PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine
trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to
11.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged
that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall... be filled by election by a vote of a
majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the
vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
[CCP]." The Endriga group... claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the
President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one
seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees,
namely, Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili,... Father Bernardo P.
Perez ("Fr. Perez"), Eduardo De los Angeles ("De los Angeles"), Ma. Cecilia Lazaro ("Lazaro"), and
Gloria M. Angara ("Angara"). President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara
as trustees.
Endriga's term was to expire on 26 July 1999, while the terms of Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, and
Fernandez were to expire on 6 February 1999. The Endriga group maintained that under the CCP
Charter, the trustees" fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of... resignation,
incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP
Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in
the Board.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision under review granting the quo warranto
petition. The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP
trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court's Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the
CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not
validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their... fellow trustees, for the latter
would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP
trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the
appointing power.
The Court of Appeals held that Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling vacancies in
the CCP Board is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. Section 6(b) of PD 15 mandates the remaining
trustees to fill by election vacancies in the CCP Board. Only when the Board... is entirely vacant, which
is not the situation in the present case, may the President exercise his power to appoint.
The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration for failure to raise new
issues except the argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals declined
to rule on the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 since the Rufino... group raised this issue for the
first time in the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also held, "Nor may the President's
constitutional and/or statutory power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or
modify the application of the CCP Charter."
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow
members is constitutional

HELD:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President,
such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority. In the case, an
appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both
positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption
from the limitation of delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control
of the President.

Principles: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups
of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or... naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are... not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the... law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of... the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial
branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial
body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or... agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
 ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JBC; SORIANO v. JBC; PERALTA v. JBC

FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that ―vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof‖ from a ―list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy.‖ Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC ―automatically considered‖ for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President‘s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from ―political vicissitudes‖ and its ―insulation from political pressures,‖ such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within
which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy.

ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

IBP v. ZAMORA
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of
the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an ―insidious incursion‖ of the military
in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
 LACSON v. PEREZ

Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as
well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the ―rebellion‖ were thereafter effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would
desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are
allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure
orders were issued against them.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure
orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department
and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner‘s prayer
for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has
adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person
must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer
can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null
and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners‘ prayer
for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints
have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since
its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined
from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
 SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of
the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the
power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion,
none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis.
In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, the President was merely exercising
a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any
person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

DAVID v. ERMITA
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO
5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his
arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected
rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president‘s
calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional. The
issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still
in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence,
the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at
the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional.
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor General‘s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‗on their faces‘
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‗freedom of speech‘
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‗reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.‘ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‗harmful‘ and
‗constitutionally unprotected conduct.‘ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‗spoken words‘ and again, that
‗overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.‘ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the
Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‗sequence‘ of graduated powers. The SC
considered the President‘s ‗calling-out‘ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that ‗this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that from the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‗whenever it becomes necessary,‘ the
President may call the armed forces ‗to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.‘ And
such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‗decrees.‘ Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‗[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.‘ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA‘[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only
―take care‖ of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the
Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion.
The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress.
The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
 FORTUN v. ARROYO
Facts: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response
to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a
―state of emergency‖ in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress
similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the
MILF.
Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance
with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to
that body a report in person or in writing of her action. In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted
based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the
government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality of the
rebels‘ weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the
Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other
municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police"
markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the President‘s action.
But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners‘ contention: Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo‘s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the
following grounds:
1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a state of martial law and suspending the
[writ] in the Province of Maguindanao.
2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for lack of any factual basis.
3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a state of martial law in the province of
Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the same area.
Respondents‘ contention: President Arroyo‘s issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the present petitions
moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the petitions have ceased to present an "actual case or
controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and the restoration of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of which is the subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly a "supervening
event" that rendered of no practical use or value the consolidated petitions.
Issue: WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the writ in the
province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions moot and academic.
Held: Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised moot and academic because
the court has nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ of habeas corpus was
already lifted through Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could perform its duty to review and
validate.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
 PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
FACTS:
On 28 December 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute through Charge d‘ Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations (PMUN). The Rome Statue establsihed the
International Criminal Court which provides ―shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns…‖. However, the treaty‘s provisions
require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioner/s filed an instant petitione compelling respondents to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate for ratification. It is on the theory that ratification of a treaty is a function of the Senate.
Hence, the duty of the executive it to sign the same and transmit it thereafter to to the Senate for
concurrence.
The OSG, representing respondents, contends that the executive department has no duty to transmit the
said treaty to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE: WON Respondents have the ministerial duty to transmit the copy of the subject treaty to the
Senate signed by a member of the PMUN even without the signature of the President for concurrence?
RULING: No. The President, being the head of the Sate, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations with foreign nations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states.
Although it is correct that the Constitution, in Article VII, Section 21, provides for the concurrence of
2/3 of all members of the Senate for validating a treaty and is deemed essential to provide check on the
executive‘s foreign relations, it is not absolute. The power to ratify does not belong to the Senate.
The process of treaty making: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchance of th instruments of
ratification. Petitioner‘s arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Phil. representative with
ratification. However, it should be noted that signature and ratification is two separate steps. Signature is
for authentication, on the other hand, ratification is the formal act of acceptance. the latter is generally an
executive act undertaken by the head of the state.
Moreover, under E.O. 459, issued by Pres. Ramos, provides for guidelines in the negotiation of
international agreements and its ratification. The said Order provides that a treaty, after it was signed by
the representative of the State, shall be subject to ratification by the President. before the Senate can
concur it, the President must ratify it first.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the latter is limited only to giving consent to the
ratification. Hence, the President has the authority to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate, and/or
refuse to ratify it.

LIM v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1‖ on
January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and
the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign
declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed
into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington,
D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11,
2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a
petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future
violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of
fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1‖ and no question of
constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax
spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts.
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each
other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed
on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All
other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing
that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to
verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce
the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the
Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of
interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative,
autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule. The meaning of the word
―activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus,
the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat
itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually
petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United
States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true
nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered
opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this
case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it
provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory
Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign
influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception. International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws Conflict arises then between the
fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: ―Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.‖
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: ―The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in: (A) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.‖
Ichong v. Hernandez: ―provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State‖
Gonzales v. Hechanova: ―our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.‖
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory.

BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on ―the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.‖ Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Issues
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA;
(2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution;
(3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling:
(1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the
VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing
that a taxpayer‘s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and
that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline
that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the
Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes
and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers
exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
FACTS: An extradition treaty between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the
U.S.A. was ratified by the Senate.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jiminez to the United States. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers. The request was denied by the Secretary of Justice
for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which states that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request
for extradition. In the Court‘s ruling dated January 18, 2000, the Secretary was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. However, on February 3, 2000, the
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
RULING: No, private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.
First. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty, provides the time
when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting
papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. There is no provision in
the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from
the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation.
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their
intent. It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize
if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The fear of
the petitioner that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the
experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government
in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-
US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries
with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to
interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight. The executive department of government,
thru the DFA and the DOJ, has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No.
1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process. This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to
the treaty and also by other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines.
Fourth. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As
an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former.
Fifth. With regard to the threat on private respondent‘s liberty, it is merely imaginary and hypothetical
since the US has not yet requested for his provisional arrest, although it is provided that the requesting
party can and since the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents, there is
no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court.
Sixth. Private respondent‘s plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which
cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a
delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The
approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government‘s promotion of fundamental
public interest or policy objectives on the other.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of
the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will
allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice. Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the
President of the Philippines which includes, among others, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements. The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon
the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena.
The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the
President‘s most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of
which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. The deference given to the
executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the
cornerstones of a democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.
In sum, the Court ruled that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is
a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as
long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

BELTRAN v. MAKASIAR
Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the
reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran
also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a ―chilling effect‖ on
press freedom.
Issues: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued
a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by
the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings
Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of
law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the ―chilling
effect‖ point.
 SENATE v. ERMITA
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president‘s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo‘s order barring military personnel from testifying
before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464‘s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress‘ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with
the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress‘ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on
its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect
the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is
‗in aid of legislation‘ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.