18 U.S.C.A.

§ 1112

United States Code Annotated Currentness

Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 51. Homicide (Refs & Annos)
§ 1112. Manslaughter

(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:

Voluntary--Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

Involuntary--In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the

commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act
which might produce death.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

Whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both;

Whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 8 years, or both.

CREDIT(S)

(June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 756; Sept. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXII, § 320102,
Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(H), 108 Stat. 2109, 2147; Oct. 11, 1996, Pub.L. 104-294, Title VI, §
604(b)(13), 110 Stat. 3507; Jan. 7, 2008, Pub.L. 110-177, Title II, § 207, 121 Stat. 2538.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1948 Acts. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 453, 454 (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, §§ 274, 275,
35 Stat. 1143).

Section consolidates punishment provisions of sections 453 and 454 of Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provision was added in view of definitive section
7 of this title.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

1994 Acts. House Report Nos. 103-324 and 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-
711, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1801.

1996 Acts. House Report No. 104-788, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4021.

2008 Acts. House Report No. 110-218(Part I), see 2007 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p.
827.
Amendments

2008 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 110-177, § 207(1), struck out “ten years” and inserted
“15 years” in the first undesignated paragraph.

Pub.L. 110-177, § 207(2), struck out “six years” and inserted “8 years” in the second
undesignated paragraph.

1996 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 104-294, § 604(b)(13), repealed duplicative amendment
by section 320102(2) of Pub.L. 103-322, which required no change in text. See Repeals and
Effective Date notes under this section.

1994 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 103-322, § 320102(1), substituted “shall be fined under
this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both” for “shall be imprisoned not more than
ten years” in the first undesignated paragraph.

Pub.L. 103-322, § 320102(2), (3), substituted “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than six years” for “shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years” in the second undesignated paragraph. See Repeals note set out under this section.

Pub.L. 103-322, § 330016(1)(H), directed that “under this title” be substituted for “not more
than $1,000” in the second undesignated paragraph. Identical amendment was made by section
320102(2) of Pub.L. 103-322.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

1996 Acts. Amendment by section 604 of Pub.L. 104-294 effective Sept. 13, 1994, see section
604(d) of Pub.L. 104-294, set out as a note under section 13 of this title.

Repeals

Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXII, § 320102(2), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2109, appearing in the
credit of this section, was repealed by Pub.L. 104-294, Title VI, § 604(b)(13), Oct. 11, 1996, 110
Stat. 3507.

CROSS REFERENCES

Acts on aircraft in violation of this section special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, see 49
USCA § 46506.

Extradition of fugitives from country under United States control, see 18 USCA § 3185.

Homicides and attempted homicides involving firearms in Federal facilities, see 18 USCA § 930.

Indian country,
Jurisdiction of offenses committed by Indians, see 18 USCA § 3242.
Law governing offenses, see 18 USCA § 1153.

Particular persons killed, punishment as provided herein,

Death penalty for gun murders during federal crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes,
see 18 USCA § 924.
Death penalty for murder of federal witnesses, see 18 USCA § 1512.
Drive-by shootings, major drug offense, see 18 USCA § 36.
Members of Congress, Executive Branch heads, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, or
Justice of United States, see 18 USCA § 351.
President, Vice President, Presidential staff, see 18 USCA § 1751.
Protection of court officers and jurors, see 18 USCA § 1503.
Witnesses, victims and informants, see 18 USCA § 1513.

Persons killed while engaged in or on account of performance of official duties under,

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, see 42 USCA § 2283.
Egg Products Inspection Act, see 21 USCA § 1041.
Horse Protection Act, see 15 USCA § 1825.

“Serious violent felony” defined as having same meaning as robbery under this section for
purposes of mandatory life imprisonment for persons convicted of certain felonies, see 18 USCA
§ 3559.

Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, definition, see 18 USCA § 7.

Venue, see 18 USCA § 3236.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

See Federal Sentencing Guidelines §§ 2A1.3, 2A1.4, 18 USCA.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

American Digest System

Homicide 31 et seq.

Corpus Juris Secundum

CJS Criminal Law § 28, Concurrent and Exclusive Jurisdiction--Federal Assimilative Crimes Act.
CJS Motor Vehicles § 1618, Proof of Intoxication or Being Under the Influence of Intoxicants.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

69 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 1, Construction and Application of Extradition Treaty Between United
States of America and United Mexican States, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.

1 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 415, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal Courts.

36 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 95, Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5k2.8, Providing
for Upward Sentence Departure for Extreme Conduct.

89 ALR, Fed. 13, Propriety, Under Federal Rule of Evidence 607, of Impeachment of Party's Own
Witness.

121 ALR, Fed. 323, Increase in Base Offense Level Under Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3) for Abuse of Position of Public or Private Trust Significantly Facilitating
Commission or Concealment Of...

131 ALR, Fed. 363, Construction and Application of Horse Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.A. §§
1821 et seq.).
132 ALR, Fed. 525, Test of “Dual Criminality” Where Extradition to or from Foreign Nation is
Sought.

184 ALR, Fed. 107, Validity, Construction, and Application of Indian Major Crimes Act.

175 ALR, Fed. 293, Assimilation, Under Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 13), of State
Statutes Relating to Driving While Intoxicated or Under Influence of Alcohol.

109 ALR, Fed. 488, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provisions of Federal Aviation Act
(49 App. U.S.C.A. § 1472(i)-(L), (N)) Punishing Air Piracy and Certain Acts Aboard Aircraft in
Flight, or Boarding...

101 ALR, Fed. 615, Propriety of Lesser-Included-Offense Charge to Jury in Federal Homicide
Prosecution.

71 ALR, Fed. 94, Propriety of Federal District Court's Allowance or Denial of Introduction of
Surrebuttal Evidence in Criminal Trial.

84 ALR 6th 427, Establishment of Negligence Within Meaning of Statute Penalizing Negligent
Homicide by Operation of Motor Vehicle--Speeding or Driving at Unsafe Speed.

18 ALR 4th 961, Modern Status of the Rules Requiring Malice “Aforethought,” “Deliberation,” or
“Premeditation,” as Elements of Murder in the First Degree.

54 ALR 4th 149, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Directly Proscribing Driving
With Blood-Alcohol Level in Excess of Established Percentage.

19 ALR 4th 861, Propriety of Manslaughter Conviction in Prosecution for Murder, Absent Proof of
Necessary Elements of Manslaughter.

15 ALR 4th 118, Modern Status of Law Regarding Cure of Error, in Instruction as to One Offense,
by Conviction of Higher or Lesser Offense.

15 ALR 4th 983, Accused's Right, in Homicide Case, to Have Jury Instructed as to Both
Unintentional Shooting and Self-Defense.

8 ALR 4th 886, Criminal Liability for Injury or Death Caused by Operation of Pleasure Boat.

14 ALR 3rd 1297, Power of Court to Make or Permit Amendment of Indictment With Respect to
Allegations as to Time.

98 ALR 3rd 357, Attorney's Conviction in Foreign or Federal Jurisdiction as Ground for
Disciplinary Action.

93 ALR 3rd 925, Spouse's Confession of Adultery as Affecting Degree of Homicide Involved in
Killing Spouse or His or Her Paramour.

61 ALR 2nd 1141, Conviction of Lesser Offense as Bar to Prosecution for Greater on New Trial.

8 ALR 1052, Drunkenness as Affecting Existence of Elements Essential to Murder in Second

Degree.

77 ALR 1211, Right of Court to Hear Evidence for Purpose of Determining Sentence to be
Imposed.

79 ALR 897, Voluntary Intoxication as Defense to Homicide.

84 ALR 294, When May Payment of Tax or Assessments be Regarded as Involuntary or Made
Under Duress.

102 ALR 1019, Absence of Evidence Supporting Charge of Lesser Degree of Homicide as
Affecting Duty of Court to Instruct as To, or Right of Jury to Convict Of, Lesser Degree.

161 ALR 10, Test or Criterion of Term “Culpable Negligence,” “Criminal Negligence,” or “Gross
Negligence,” Appearing in Statute Defining or Governing Manslaughter.

169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to Explain and
Define Offense Charged.

172 ALR 1053, Acquittal or Conviction of One Offense in Connection With Operation of
Automobile as Bar to Prosecution for Another.

121 ALR 1088, Error in Naming the Offense Covered by Allegations of Specific Facts in
Complaint, Indictment, or Information.

Encyclopedias

76 Am. Jur. Trials 213, Litigating a Driving While Intoxicated Case.

82 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Defending Against Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 48, Generally; Definitions of Offense.

Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 61, Generally; Definitions of Offense.

Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 196, Jurisdiction of United States as to Offense Committed in State or
Foreign Country.

Am. Jur. 2d Military and Civil Defense § 211, Prosecuting Offenders--Assimilation.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Federal Law § 68:2, Interference With Duties of EEOC
Employees.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:23, Double Jeopardy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 35:579, Criminal Penalties.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 53:288, Jurisdiction.

Immigration Law Service 2d PSD 1991 GEN COUNCEL OP, General Counsel's Opinions.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Admissibility of evidence 26
Comments or conduct of counsel 27
Constitutionality 1
Defenses 17-20
Defenses - Generally 17
Defenses - Double jeopardy 18
Defenses - Intoxication 19
Defenses - Self-defense 20
Double jeopardy, defenses 18
Excessive recklessness, involuntary manslaughter 10a
Extradition 23
Habeas corpus 36
Harmless or prejudicial error 33, 34
Harmless or prejudicial error - Generally 33
Harmless or prejudicial error - Instructions 34
Historical 2
Indictment or information 24
Instructions 29
Instructions, harmless or prejudicial error 34
Insurance proceeds 15
Intent, involuntary manslaughter 8
Intent, voluntary manslaughter 12
Intoxication, defenses 19
Involuntary manslaughter 7-10a
Involuntary manslaughter - Generally 7
Involuntary manslaughter - Excessive recklessness 10a
Involuntary manslaughter - Intent 8
Involuntary manslaughter - Knowledge 9
Involuntary manslaughter - Negligence 10
Knowledge, involuntary manslaughter 9
Law governing 3
Lesser included offenses 16
Malice 6
Murder and manslaughter distinguished 5
Negligence, involuntary manslaughter 10
New trial 31
Questions for jury 25
Remand 35
Resisting arrest 14
Scope of review 32
Self-defense, defenses 20
Sentence and punishment 30
Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 21
State regulation or control 4
Sudden quarrel or heat of passion, voluntary manslaughter 13
Venue 22
Voluntary manslaughter 11-13
Voluntary manslaughter - Generally 11
Voluntary manslaughter - Intent 12
Voluntary manslaughter - Sudden quarrel or heat of passion 13
Weight and sufficiency of evidence 28

1. Constitutionality

Trial counsel's performance in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter in Indian country was
not rendered deficient by counsel's failure to argue that an FBI agent's warrantless entry into
defendant's hospital room constituted a violation of Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures, where there was no controlling authority on question of
whether a patient had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital. New v. U.S., C.A.8
(S.D.) 2011, 652 F.3d 949. Criminal Law 1926
Congress has power to proscribe killing of an American citizen by another American citizen within
diplomatic compound located in foreign country. U. S. v. Erdos, C.A.4 (Va.) 1973, 474 F.2d 157,
certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 42, 414 U.S. 876, 38 L.Ed.2d 122. International Law 7

Defendant would not be deprived of due process in being prosecuted, on basis of superseding
indictment brought after his first trial, for first-degree murder in Indian country, ended in a
mistrial, for second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and negligent child abuse resulting
in death, under New Mexico law, even though Government's theory in second trial relied on a
different mens rea than that asserted in previous trial; there was no use of inherently factually
contradictory theories. U.S. v. Ganadonegro, D.N.M.2012, 854 F.Supp.2d 1088. Constitutional
Law 4583; Criminal Law 1983

2. Historical

Subsec. (a) of this section is the direct descendant of Act Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 274, 35 Stat.
1143, differing only in the provisions relating to involuntary manslaughter. U. S. v. Alexander,
C.A.D.C.1972, 471 F.2d 923, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 541, 409 U.S.
1044, 34 L.Ed.2d 494.

3. Law governing

Secretary of Interior's regulation providing that Maryland traffic laws were applicable to traffic on
federal park area in Maryland unless otherwise provided dealt specifically with traffic control and
governed over regulation providing generally that laws of state within which federal area is
located shall be invoked and enforced in accordance with Assimilated Crimes Act, section 13 of
this title, in prosecution arising out of automobile accident on federal portion of parkway. U. S. v.
Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Automobiles 335

Under Act May 7, 1884, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, declaring that the general laws of Oregon should be the
law in Alaska so far as applicable, and not in conflict with United States laws, and Crim.Code, Or.
§§ 509, 518, punishing manslaughter with ten years' imprisonment and $100 fine, with power to
impose additional imprisonment until the fine is paid, and Act Mar. 3, 1875, c. 116, 11 Stat. 250,
punishing manslaughter with 10 years' imprisonment and $1,000 fine, without giving power to
imprison until fine is paid, one guilty of manslaughter in Alaska could not be imprisoned under
the state law until he paid the fine for there was a conflict, within the meaning of the statute, not
only when the laws contained different provisions of the same subject, but when they contained
similar or identical ones and in the latter case it was the law of Congress that applied, and not
that of the state. Kie v. U S, C.C.Or.1886, 27 F. 351, 11 Sawy. 579. Territories 18

4. State regulation or control

Government property applied Assimilative Crimes Act when it charged defendant under Florida's
driving under the influence (DUI) manslaughter statute, in addition to federal charge of
involuntary manslaughter, where precise act prohibited by state statute was neither defined nor
prohibited by federal law. U.S. v. Sasnett, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 925 F.2d 392. Criminal Law 16

Because there are no enactments of Congress which prohibit driving while intoxicated, failing to
stop at intersections, or driving in excess of speed limit on Indian reservation in South Dakota,
South Dakota traffic laws regarding those offenses are assimilated into federal enclave law under
Assimilative Crimes Act, and violations of these South Dakota traffic laws could serve as
underlying “unlawful acts” for purpose of federal involuntary manslaughter statute. U.S. v.
McMillan, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1987, 820 F.2d 251, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 234, 484 U.S. 898, 98
L.Ed.2d 193. Criminal Law 16
Defendants' conviction of involuntary manslaughter of their infant child under section of the
federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112, did not preclude their additional conviction under
Texas child abuse statute applicable by reason of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 13;
criminal acts charged were distinct in that state penal code required that victim be 14 years or
under while there was no such requirement in federal offense, and death of a human being,
essential to a federal involuntary manslaughter conviction, was not required in the state
offense. U.S. v. Fesler, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 781 F.2d 384, rehearing denied 783 F.2d 1063,
certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1977, 476 U.S. 1118, 90 L.Ed.2d 661. Criminal Law 16

In view of fact that offense charged against defendant, involuntary manslaughter, was defined
and punished by federal law, so that United States law preempted New Mexico manslaughter
law, trial court erred in instructing jury as to intoxication under New Mexico law, since New
Mexico law of intoxication was inconsistent with federal law requiring a finding of gross
negligence to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. U.S. v. Benally, C.A.10 (N.M.)
1985, 756 F.2d 773. Homicide 1506

Where Congress had classified manslaughter as a felony and fixed punishment, offense was
beyond scope of Assimilated Crimes Act, section 13 of this title, which is applicable only to acts
or omissions which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed within jurisdiction of state, so that Code Md.1957, art. 27, § 388, was
preempted by this section in prosecution arising out of fatal automobile accident on federal
portion of parkway in Maryland by virtue of applicable federal traffic regulations. U. S. v. Pardee,
C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Criminal Law 16

5. Murder and manslaughter distinguished

“Manslaughter” is distinguished from murder by absence of malice, one of murder's essential

elements. U.S. v. Paul, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 37 F.3d 496.Homicide 657; Homicide 665

Manslaughter differs from first-degree murder in that there is no element of “malice

aforethought”; malice is negated by heat of passion. U.S. v. Scafe, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1987, 822 F.2d
928. Homicide 665

Crime of manslaughter is in some sense “irrational” by definition in that it arises out of person's
passions, but provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter must be such as would arouse
reasonable and ordinary person to kill someone. U. S. v. Collins, C.A.5 (La.) 1982, 690 F.2d 431,
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1447, 460 U.S. 1046, 75 L.Ed.2d 801. Homicide 672

“Manslaughter occupies the middle ground, between excusable, or justifiable, homicide on the
one hand, and murder on the other.” U.S. v. Hart, C.C.N.D.Fla.1908, 162 F. 192.

Manslaughter is clearly a general intent crime, requiring proof of no specific mental state as an
element; murder, on the other hand, is a specific intent crime, requiring for its proof that the
homicide be done with premeditation. U. S. v. Marshall, D.C.Mont.1979, 470 F.Supp.
194. Homicide 535;Homicide 656; Homicide 662

6. Malice

Manslaughter is distinguished from murder by the absence of malice, one of murder's essential
elements. U.S. v. Quintero, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 21 F.3d 885. Homicide 657; Homicide 665

Malice was not an element of manslaughter as defined by R.S. § 5341 [now this section]. U.S. v.
King, C.C.E.D.N.Y.1888, 34 F. 302.
7. Involuntary manslaughter--Generally

In involuntary manslaughter cases involving the speed of an automobile or driving under the
influence, prosecution must prove that defendant's act or omission was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim; “proximate cause” is one which played a substantial part in bringing
about the death, so that the death was the direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the defendant's speed or condition or manner of driving. U.S. v. Main, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1997, 113
F.3d 1046. Automobiles 344

Evidence supported delinquency adjudication based on district court's finding that 12-year-old
juvenile committed act of involuntary manslaughter; juvenile's having unscrewed gun's cylinder
after first firing at rocks, dropped spent casing, and put remaining bullet in his pocket
demonstrated sufficient understanding of cause and effect of firing loaded weapon, and his next
having pointed unloaded gun at another child and pulled trigger, and then loaded gun, pointed it
at third child and pulled trigger without gun going off, before repeating same conduct and killing
seven-year-old victim, showed that juvenile reasonably foresaw that his acts created peril to
victim. U.S. v. Eric B., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1996, 86 F.3d 869. Infants 2640(6)

Necessary elements of proof of involuntary manslaughter under federal statute are: that
defendant inflicted injuries upon deceased from which deceased died; that defendant acted with
wanton and reckless disregard for human life; that defendant was at the time committing an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony; that defendant knew that his conduct was a threat to
lives of others or had knowledge of circumstances as could have enabled him to reasonably
foresee peril to which his act might subject others; and that it occurred within special maritime
or territorial jurisdiction of United States. U.S. v. Sasnett, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 925 F.2d
392. Homicide 659

Definition of involuntary manslaughter, as in part, commission of an unlawful act not amounting

to a felony is not intended to deviate from universal concept of the crime. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4
(Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Homicide 659

Manslaughter may consist of an affirmative act, but omission to act may also constitute
manslaughter within this section defining involuntary manslaughter. U. S. v. LaBrecque,
D.C.N.J.1976, 419 F.Supp. 430. Homicide 656; Homicide 710

8. ---- Intent, involuntary manslaughter

“Involuntary manslaughter” is unintentional killing that evinces wanton or reckless disregard for
human life, but not of extreme nature that will support finding of malice. U.S. v. Paul, C.A.9
(Ariz.) 1994, 37 F.3d 496. Homicide 659

Manslaughter may result from an accidental or unintentional act. Thomas v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1969,
419 F.2d 1203, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 222. Homicide 656

Neither intent nor malice is a factor in involuntary manslaughter. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.)
1966, 368 F.2d 368. Homicide 662; Homicide 665

There are no elements of involuntary manslaughter; the term “involuntary” implies the absence
of intention to kill. Perkins v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (S.C.) 1915, 228 F. 408, 142 C.C.A. 638.

9. ---- Knowledge, involuntary manslaughter

To warrant conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the slayer must be shown to have had
actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to lives of others or to have had knowledge of
such circumstances as could reasonably be said to have made foreseeable to him the peril to
which his acts might subject others. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d
368. Homicide 662

10. ---- Negligence, involuntary manslaughter

Conviction of involuntary manslaughter requires adequate proof that defendant was grossly
negligent in that he acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for human life, with knowledge
that his conduct was a threat to lives of others or with knowledge of such circumstances as could
reasonably have enabled him to foresee peril to which his act might subject others. U. S. v.
Schmidt, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1980, 626 F.2d 616, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 278, 449 U.S. 904, 66
L.Ed.2d 136. See, also, U.S. v. McMillan, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1987, 820 F.2d 251, certiorari denied 108
S.Ct. 234, 484 U.S. 898, 98 L.Ed.2d 193. Homicide 708

That defendant committed with gross negligence the action causing death and that defendant
had actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to lives of others or had knowledge of such
circumstances as would have made reasonably foreseeable to him the peril to which his acts
might subject others are essential elements for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under
this section. U. S. v. Keith, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1979, 605 F.2d 462.Homicide 662

The awareness of tendency to danger or foreseeability of injury from act or omission of one
charged with involuntary manslaughter is an indispensable element of the gross negligence as
required for conviction. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Homicide 708

Any unlawful and willful killing of a human being without malice, including a negligent killing,
which is also willful, is manslaughter, and it may exist where there is no evidence of sudden heat
of passion. U.S. v. Meagher, C.C.W.D.Tex.1888, 37 F. 875. Homicide 656

Essential element of involuntary manslaughter is that defendant acted with gross negligence
amounting to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life and that defendant had either actual
knowledge or reason to know that his conduct was a threat to lives of others. U. S. v. Parisien,
D.C.N.D.1981, 515 F.Supp. 24. Homicide 708

For government to prevail under this section defining involuntary manslaughter, it must prove
gross negligence on part of defendant. U. S. v. LaBrecque, D.C.N.J.1976, 419 F.Supp.
430. Homicide 708

Charge of manslaughter by negligence is not made out by proof of ordinary simple negligence
that would constitute civil liability but amount or degree or character of negligence to be proven
in criminal cases is gross negligence, to be determined on consideration of all facts of particular
case, and existence of such gross negligence must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. State of
Md. v. Chapman, D.C.Md.1951, 101 F.Supp. 335. Homicide 708; Homicide 1148

10a. ---- Excessive recklessness, involuntary manslaughter

In light of contradictory statements in presentence report (PSR) regarding the speed at which
defendant was driving when she let go of the steering wheel, resulting in the accident, an
insufficient factual basis existed for sentencing court's finding that she was driving over 100
miles per hour, requiring remand to determine whether defendant's conduct amounted to
excessive recklessness sufficient to remove her case from the heartland of convictions for
involuntary manslaughter occurring in Indian country and warrant an upward departure at
sentencing. U.S. v. Wolfe, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2006, 435 F.3d 1289. Criminal
Law 1181.5(8); Sentencing And Punishment 300
11. Voluntary manslaughter--Generally

To convict defendant charged with murder of voluntary manslaughter, government must prove
that defendant intentionally inflicted an injury upon another person from which other person
died, and that homicide was committed without justification or excuse. U.S. v. Quintero, C.A.9
(Ariz.) 1994, 21 F.3d 885. Homicide 655

“Voluntary manslaughter” is an unlawful, intentional killing committed without malice

aforethought and while in a sudden heat of passion due to adequate provocation. Wakaksan v.
U. S., C.A.8 (N.D.) 1966, 367 F.2d 639, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1312, 386 U.S. 994, 18
L.Ed.2d 341. Homicide 658

12. ---- Intent, voluntary manslaughter

An essential element of voluntary manslaughter is that defendant intentionally caused death of

victim. Wakaksan v. U. S., C.A.8 (N.D.) 1966, 367 F.2d 639, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1312,
386 U.S. 994, 18 L.Ed.2d 341. Homicide 658

13. ---- Sudden quarrel or heat of passion, voluntary manslaughter

If defendant killed with mental state required for murder, but killing occurred in “heat of passion”
caused by adequate provocation, then defendant is guilty of “voluntary manslaughter.” U.S. v.
Paul, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 37 F.3d 496. Homicide 668

Sudden quarrel or heat of passion are not essential elements of voluntary manslaughter, and
thus they need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.U.S. v. Quintero, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 21
F.3d 885. Homicide 667; Homicide 1152

Fact that distinguishes manslaughter from murder is existence of malice, and in case of
voluntary manslaughter, onset of “sudden passion” is deemed to demonstrate absence of
malice. U. S. v. Collins, C.A.5 (La.) 1982, 690 F.2d 431, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1447, 460
U.S. 1046, 75 L.Ed.2d 801.Homicide 665; Homicide 667

Manslaughter requires a finding of killing upon sudden quarrel or heat of passion but does not
require either premeditation or malice. Beardslee v. U. S., C.A.8 (S.D.) 1967, 387 F.2d
280. Homicide 665; Homicide 667

Heat of passion may be produced by fear as well as by rage, and if the provocation therefor is
adequate, the resulting killing may be manslaughter.Kinard v. U.S., App.D.C.1938, 96 F.2d 522,
68 App.D.C. 250. Homicide 672

The provocation which is allowed to extenuate in the case of homicide (that is, reduce the killing
from murder to manslaughter) must be something which a man is conscious of,--which he feels
and resents at the instant the act which he would extenuate is committed and all the
circumstances of the case must lead to the conclusion that the act done, though intentional of
death or great bodily harm, was not the result of a cool, deliberate judgment, and previous
malignity of heart, but solely imputable to human infirmity. U.S. v. Lewis, C.C.W.D.Tex.1901,
111 F. 630.

If two fight with deadly weapons in a mutual combat, begun in hot blood, and death ensues, it is
manslaughter. U S v. Mingo, C.C.Mass.1854, 26 F.Cas. 1270, 17 Law Rep. 435, No.
15781. Homicide 690

14. Resisting arrest

Where revenue officers searching for illicit distilleries came upon a furnace from which the still
fixtures had been recently removed and a man was seen observing their movements, who
afterwards offered to conduct them to a certain house, and walked in front of them for that
purpose and soon he began to run towards the house, and the officers ran after him, when he
seized a gun, fired upon and wounded one of them, and was shot by another, the officers were
warranted in suspecting him of an intention to warn guilty parties, and, although they had no
warrant for his arrest, were justified in running after him to frustrate that design, and the officer
shooting deceased was not guilty of manslaughter. State of North Carolina v. Kirkpatrick,
C.C.W.D.N.C.1890, 42 F. 689. Homicide 754

Homicide in resisting an arrest substantially illegal will, at most, amount to manslaughter. U S v.

Travers, C.C.Mass.1814, 28 F.Cas. 204, No. 16537.

15. Insurance proceeds

Person guilty of voluntary manslaughter, as the crime is defined in this section committed a
wilful and felonious homicide so as to preclude his right to collect as beneficiary of life insurance
policy on deceased victim. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, N.D.Miss.1974, 376 F.Supp.
280. Insurance 3484

16. Lesser included offenses

In prosecution for voluntary manslaughter, defendant's claim of self-defense in stabbing of victim

did not negate any theory that victim's death was accidental, and thus did not preclude trial
court's sua sponte giving lesser-included-offense instruction for involuntary manslaughter; self-
defense theory was not mutually exclusive of involuntary manslaughter, even though defendant
argued that she intentionally had delivered stab wound that ultimately caused victim's death,
since defendant did not argue that she had intended to use deadly force in striking victim. U.S.
v. Crowe, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2009, 563 F.3d 969. Criminal Law 824(3)

Voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and second-degree murder are not lesser
included offenses of felony murder. U.S. v. Miguel, C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 2003, 338 F.3d 995, on
subsequent appeal 425 F.3d 1237, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 1664, 547 U.S. 1060, 164 L.Ed.2d
405. Indictment And Information 189(8)

On retrial, defendant could only be retried on charges of voluntary manslaughter because jury's
guilty verdict on lesser included offense of manslaughter constituted “implicit acquittal” on
charges of second-degree murder. U.S. v. Paul, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 37 F.3d 496. Double
Jeopardy 166.1

Involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence was lesser-included offense of voluntary

manslaughter. U.S. v. Browner, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1989, 889 F.2d 549. Indictment And
Information 191(4)

Manslaughter is lesser included offense within second-degree murder. U. S. v. Celestine, C.A.9

(Wash.) 1975, 510 F.2d 457. Indictment And Information 189(8)

Evidence in prosecution for second-degree murder authorized submission of crime of

manslaughter as lesser included offense. Richardson v. U. S., C.A.D.C.1964, 338 F.2d 552, 119
U.S.App.D.C. 212. Homicide 1451

17. Defenses--Generally
Mistake or inadvertence of defendant in turning his automobile to north while in southbound
roadway would not necessarily excuse him in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising
out of fatal accident which resulted. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d
368. Automobiles 344

18. ---- Double jeopardy, defenses

Prosecution of defendant, an Indian, for involuntary manslaughter resulting from automobile

collision on Indian reservation following prior prosecution in tribal court for driving while under
the influence of alcoholic beverages arising out of same incident did not give rise to double
jeopardy. U.S. v. DeCoteau, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1975, 516 F.2d 16. Double Jeopardy 150(1)

Prosecution of defendant, who, during operation of his automobile in Indian territory, struck and
killed an Indian, and who subsequently pled guilty before tribal court of driving while under
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and of having an open receptacle containing alcoholic
beverages in his vehicle, for involuntary manslaughter did not place defendant in double
jeopardy, in view of fact that different proof was required to convict of manslaughter than to
convict of offenses to which defendant had pled guilty. U.S. v. DeMarrias, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1971, 441
F.2d 1304. Double Jeopardy 150(1)

Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, indictment was not multiplicitous in charging defendant with
voluntary manslaughter in Indian country and negligent child abuse resulting in death under New
Mexico law; each count required proof of one or more additional facts that the other did not,
child abuse was not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the counts' mens rea
requirements were different, and child abuse count required that the victim was a child. U.S. v.
Ganadonegro, D.N.M.2012, 854 F.Supp.2d 1088. Double Jeopardy 150(1)

Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, indictment was not multiplicitous in charging defendant with
voluntary manslaughter in Indian country and negligent child abuse resulting in death under New
Mexico law; manslaughter count required proof that defendant acted upon a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion, which abuse count did not require, whereas abuse count required proof that the
offense was committed against a child, that defendant knew or should have known that his
conduct would endanger the child's life or health, and that he acted in reckless disregard of that
danger, child abuse resulting in death was not a lesser included offense of second-degree
murder, manslaughter count had a greater mens rea requirement, and abuse count required that
the victim was a child. U.S. v. Ganadonegro, D.N.M.2012, 854 F.Supp.2d 1068. Double
Jeopardy 134; Indictment and Information 130

19. ---- Intoxication, defenses

Undisputed findings that at time of acts resulting in victim's death, defendants knew that their
conduct was threat to victim's life and were able to foresee consequences of their acts precluded
involuntary intoxication defense in trial for involuntary manslaughter, even if defendants had
unknowingly ingested PCP that had been added to their marijuana cigarettes without their
knowledge. U.S. v. F.D.L., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1988, 836 F.2d 1113. Homicide 823

Evidence in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter that victim himself was intoxicated and
that victim did not apply brakes or make any attempt to swerve before hitting defendant's
automobile was properly admitted for purpose of enabling jury to determine whether, under
circumstances, defendant's actions were grossly negligent and, if so, whether there was a
sufficiently close causal connection between defendant's negligent act and victim's death to hold
defendant accountable under this section. U. S. v. Schmidt, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1980, 626 F.2d 616,
certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 278, 449 U.S. 904, 66 L.Ed.2d 136. Automobiles 354(13)
Included crimes of murder in second degree and voluntary manslaughter do not require a
specific intent, as distinguished from criminal intent to kill, and therefore, as to them,
exculpatory rule as to drunkenness is inapplicable. Kane v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1968, 399 F.2d
730, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct. 698, 393 U.S. 1057, 21 L.Ed.2d 699. Homicide 821

20. ---- Self-defense, defenses

Evidence did not support defendants' requested self-defense instruction on charge of voluntary
manslaughter of federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agents attempting to
execute search and arrest warrant at compound occupied by members of religious sect who had
allegedly been stockpiling weapons and ammunition; reasonable juror could not doubt that
defendants knew their targets were federal agents, and defendants responded to agents' lawful
force with deadly barrage of gunfire. U.S. v. Branch, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 91 F.3d 699, rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1466, 520 U.S. 1185,
137 L.Ed.2d 681, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1467, 520 U.S. 1185, 137 L.Ed.2d
681. Homicide 1403

Evidence was sufficient to support manslaughter conviction of defendant, whose claim of self-
defense was negated by testimony that victim was held by another inmate while defendant
stabbed victim repeatedly. U. S. v. Castillo, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1980, 615 F.2d 878. Homicide 1193

Where defendant charged with voluntary manslaughter contended that the killing was committed
in self-defense, his possible motives and mental attitude toward victim were especially
important. Wakaksan v. U. S., C.A.8 (N.D.) 1966, 367 F.2d 639, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1312,
386 U.S. 994, 18 L.Ed.2d 341. Homicide 1001; Homicide 1050

Provocation sufficient to produce a heat of passion and a resulting absence of malice may give
such character to a homicide as to make it manslaughter, but the same provocation may, under
slightly varied circumstances, justify a person in killing in self-defense. Kinard v. U.S.,
App.D.C.1938, 96 F.2d 522, 68 App.D.C. 250. Homicide 673; Homicide 768

21. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

The courts of the United States had no jurisdiction, under Act Apr. 30, 1790, c. 9, § 12, 1 Stat.
115, of the crime of manslaughter, committed by the master upon one of the seamen on board a
merchant vessel of the United States, lying in the river Tigris, in the empire of China, 35 miles
above its mouth, off Wampoa, about 100 yards from the shore, in four and a half fathoms water,
and below low-water mark. U S v. Wiltberger, U.S.Pa.1820, 18 U.S. 76, 5 L.Ed. 37, 5 Wheat.
76. Admiralty 4; Criminal Law 97(3)

District court had jurisdiction to try American citizen for homicide occurring within American
embassy located in foreign country. U. S. v. Erdos, C.A.4 (Va.) 1973, 474 F.2d 157, certiorari
denied 94 S.Ct. 42, 414 U.S. 876, 38 L.Ed.2d 122. Criminal Law 97(4)

Where a seaman was killed aboard an American vessel in a German harbor, German authorities
were called, defendant was taken into custody, defendant was judicially committed to a state
mental institution in Germany, defendant remained in German institution until after his ship
returned to German harbor, a judge of appropriate German county court refused to issue a
warrant of arrest for crime of murder sought by German prosecutor, and defendant was
released, and returned to the United States, such preliminary proceeding did not constitute an
“assertion of jurisdiction” by local sovereign which would operate to oust jurisdiction of flag
sovereign, and thus the United States district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over
manslaughter prosecution subsequently commenced by American authorities. U. S. v. Reagan,
C.A.6 (Ohio) 1971, 453 F.2d 165, certiorari denied92 S.Ct. 2049, 406 U.S. 946, 32 L.Ed.2d
334. Criminal Law 100(1)

Act Apr. 30, 1790, c. 9, 1 Stat. 113, relating to manslaughter was in force within the District of
Columbia, since the District was a district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States. U S v. Ninety-Five Barrels of Distilled Spirits, D.C.Mass.1870, 27 F.Cas. 168,
No. 15889.

Under an indictment for manslaughter on board a vessel on the high seas or in a foreign port,
the prosecutor had to prove that the vessel belonged to a citizen of the United States. U S v.
Imbert, C.C.E.D.Pa.1827, 26 F.Cas. 465, No. 15438. Criminal Law 335

22. Venue

Venue of prosecution of crew member of United States merchant vessel for assault and
manslaughter allegedly committed while vessel was leaving a port in Spanish Morocco was
properly laid in the district where defendant was found or into which he was first brought,
notwithstanding victim died ashore in Morocco. U.S. v. Dixon, E.D.N.Y.1947, 73 F.Supp.
683. Criminal Law 113

The place where the death happened and not that where the mortal stroke was given,
determined the jurisdiction of the court on an indictment for manslaughter, otherwise where the
indictment was for assault and battery. U.S. v. Bladen, C.C.Dist.Col.1809, 24 F.Cas. 1160, 1
Cranch C.C. 548, No. 14605, 1 D.C. 548. Criminal Law 97(1)

23. Extradition

Evidence established probable cause to believe that defendant committed Canadian offenses of
criminal negligence causing the death of another where a firearm was used, for which her
extradition to Canada was sought; there was competent evidence that defendant, who allegedly
shot her husband as he was emerging from the bushes during a hunting trip, was aware that her
husband was in the woods at time she fired, that she admitted to Canadian authorities she
should not have fired, that she knew her husband was not wearing orange hunting clothes, and
that there was no bear in the area. In re Extradition of Harshbarger, M.D.Pa.2009, 600
F.Supp.2d 636, stay denied 2009 WL 702925. Extradition And Detainers 14(2)

Extradition was not necessary merely because master of United States merchant vessel put
wounded crew member ashore in Spanish Morocco after he allegedly committed assault and
manslaughter on board vessel and, in absence of United States consul, sought assistance of
British consul in restraining him, since he was never in the custody of British consul as such and
had not sought asylum in any country. U.S. v. Dixon, E.D.N.Y.1947, 73 F.Supp. 683. Extradition
And Detainers 6

24. Indictment or information

Any error in denying motion to dismiss voluntary manslaughter counts of indictment on basis of
alleged grand jury error and inconsistent cause of death evidence was rendered harmless by
petit jury's finding defendant guilty of manslaughter. U.S. v. Taken Alive, C.A.8 (S.D.) 2008, 513
F.3d 899, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Criminal Law 1175

Indictment charging that defendants, by act or omission, intentionally engaged in conduct that
caused serious bodily injury to their child was sufficient notwithstanding that it did not specify
the act or omission that caused the injury, where it tracked language of statute, specified dates
and places and charged elements of offense. U.S. v. Fesler, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 781 F.2d 384,
rehearing denied 783 F.2d 1063, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1977, 476 U.S. 1118, 90 L.Ed.2d
661. Indictment And Information 110(17)

Indictment charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter was defective where if indicated
that grand jury was informed only that a violation of the traffic code was sufficient to indict
defendant, and failed to allege essential element of criminal intent, and defect was fatal and
required dismissal even though trial judge properly instructed jury that gross negligence and
actual knowledge were essential elements of involuntary manslaughter. U. S. v. Opsta, C.A.8
(N.D.) 1981, 659 F.2d 848. Automobiles 351.1; Criminal Law 1167(1)

Indictment was not required to allege that defendant “wilfully” committed manslaughter, where
word “wilfully” did not appear in this section and specific intent was not part of offense as
defined by this section. U. S. v. Holmes, C.A.1 (Me.) 1980, 632 F.2d 167. Homicide 834

Although indictment charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter tracked language of this
section in charging that defendant operated his automobile “without due caution and
circumspection” resulting in death, indictment was insufficient and conviction could not be based
on such indictment where it failed to allege that defendant committed with gross negligence the
action causing death and that defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to
lives of others or had knowledge of such circumstances as would have made reasonably
foreseeable to him the peril to which his acts might subject others. U. S. v. Keith, C.A.9 (Ariz.)
1979, 605 F.2d 462. Indictment And Information 110(4)

Indictment for manslaughter by striking with automobile was not wanting in definiteness. Story
v. U.S., App.D.C.1926, 16 F.2d 342, 57 App.D.C. 3, certiorari denied 47 S.Ct. 576, 274 U.S. 739,
71 L.Ed. 1318. Automobiles 351.1

Although involuntary manslaughter indictment tracked language of this section it was insufficient
because it failed to allege an essential element of the crime, i.e., gross negligence amounting to
wanton or reckless disregard for value of human life. U. S. v. Parisien, D.C.N.D.1981, 515
F.Supp. 24.Indictment And Information 110(4)

True bill returned by grand jury presented an anomalous charge which could not be sustained by
proof and one which could not be properly defended, in that the true bill impermissibly
introduced an element of murder, “willfully,” into the operative language of this section;
furthermore, to amend the indictment by deleting the word “willful” from the manslaughter
charge would be to effectuate a substantive change and thus infringe upon defendant's
protection under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 and her right under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. U. S.
v. Marshall, D.C.Mont.1979, 470 F.Supp. 194.Homicide 834; Indictment And
Information 159(2)

Indictments charging a member of crew of United States merchant vessel with assault and
manslaughter committed aboard vessel while leaving a port in Spanish Morocco charged crimes
under former sections 451, 453, and 455 of this title. U.S. v. Dixon, E.D.N.Y.1947, 73 F.Supp.
683. Assault And Battery 74; Homicide 833

An indictment for manslaughter need not contain the words, “in the fury of his mind.” U.S. v.
Frye, C.C.Dist.Col.1835, 25 F.Cas. 1222, 4 Cranch C.C. 539, No. 15173, 4 D.C.
539. Homicide 849

25. Questions for jury

Whether driving north on southbound road, in itself, constituted the knowingly and needlessly
doing of an act in its nature dangerous to life or a wanton or reckless disregard for human life
within this section was question for jury. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d
368. Automobiles 356(13)

Primary beneficiary's plea of guilty to charge of voluntary manslaughter under this section with
respect to killing of deceased insured and judgment of conviction thereon, although admissible
as a declaration or admission against interest in interpleader action to determine right to
proceeds of life insurance policy, did not conclusively establish that the homicide of insured was
wilful and felonious, and it was for the trier of fact to determine the weight and effect of guilty
plea and conviction in light of full record. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Strickland, N.D.Miss.1974, 376
F.Supp. 280. Evidence 265(11); Insurance 3498

26. Admissibility of evidence

In voluntary manslaughter prosecution, any error in federal district court's admission of evidence
of prior incident in which defendant had struck victim with bottle was harmless, given that
defendant ultimately was acquitted of voluntary manslaughter and convicted of involuntary
manslaughter; evidence was admitted to show intent, but conviction for involuntary
manslaughter precluded finding of malice aforethought and intent to kill, rendering unlikely any
effect on verdict. U.S. v. Crowe, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2009, 563 F.3d 969. Criminal Law 1169.11

District court did not plainly err, in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter in Indian country
arising out of a motor vehicle collision, by admitting evidence of defendant's blood-alcohol
concentration, which was obtained in a warrantless search; police officers had probable cause to
suspect defendant was intoxicated, based on a call and a statement from a convenience store
clerk who said he had seen defendant intoxicated, marks on roadway suggested that the vehicles
collided in the same lane, and there was danger that the alcohol in defendant's blood would
further dissipate if a sample was not drawn. U.S. v. Eagle, C.A.8 (N.D.) 2007, 498 F.3d
885. Criminal Law 1036.1(4)

Slight probative value, if any, of physician's courtroom demonstration with rubber doll as to
amount of force necessary to cause injuries to infant allegedly resulting from shaken baby
syndrome was overwhelmed by its unfairly prejudicial effects in homicide trial arising out of
death of seven-month-old infant from shaking; by displaying greater degree of force than level
required to produce shaken baby syndrome in seven-month-old infant and by arbitrarily selecting
number of oscillations, demonstration tended to implant vision of defendant's actions in jurors'
mind that was not supported by any factual basis for demonstration. U.S. v. Gaskell, C.A.11
(Fla.) 1993, 985 F.2d 1056. Criminal Law 650

Exclusion of testimony of pediatric nurse as to general lack of public awareness of danger of

shaking infant in trial on homicide charges arising out of infant's death as a result of shaking was
reversible error, where excluded testimony related to determinative issue of defendant's intent in
shaking child to resuscitate her and error was compounded by improper admission of state's
expert's demonstration using doll as evidence of amount of force necessary to create shaken
baby syndrome. U.S. v. Gaskell, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1993, 985 F.2d 1056. Criminal Law 1170(1)

In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting two photographs of victims where photographs were small and not unnecessarily
gory. U.S. v. Jackson, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1983, 712 F.2d 1283. Criminal Law 438(5.1)

In prosecution for voluntary manslaughter, trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
into evidence photograph of victim, even though defendant contended that photograph was
overly alarming because colored photograph so emphasized bloody condition of victim, where
photograph was used by medical examiner to give opinion as to sequence of wounds. U. S. v.
Holmes, C.A.1 (Me.) 1980, 632 F.2d 167. Criminal Law 438(6)
Where one of the principal issues of voluntary manslaughter prosecutions was cause of death,
photographs of decedent lying on floor and showing that someone had recently battered,
bloodied, and bruised decedent's face were admissible by trial judge in exercise of his discretion,
despite claim that they were highly inflammatory, presented merely cumulative evidence, and
were unnecessary to prove any issue in case. U. S. v. Brady, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1978, 579 F.2d 1121,
certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 849, 439 U.S. 1074, 59 L.Ed.2d 41. Criminal Law 438(6)

In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising from automobile accident, admission, over
objection, of testimony as to extent of injuries of one of passengers killed in accident was not an
abuse of discretion on ground that the testimony was inflammatory and prejudicial, where,
although defendant had stipulated to cause of death, the testimony had some relevancy as to
establishing point of impact of automobile and its speed. U.S. v. Bruno Makes Room For Them,
C.A.8 (S.D.) 1974, 496 F.2d 507. Criminal Law 338(7)

In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, wherein defendant's credibility and his reputation
for veracity were of great significance and defendant had five character witnesses available,
court erred in limiting defendant to a single character witness and to a stipulation, to which he
did not agree, that the four others would give identical testimony, especially where his witness
testified very briefly and was not cross-examined, the others could have all testified without
unduly prolonging trial and identity of other character witnesses was withheld from jury. U. S. v.
Escamilla, C.A.4 (Va.) 1972, 467 F.2d 341. Criminal Law 676

Testimony by witnesses who had personal knowledge of prior beatings of defendant by decedent
while he was intoxicated should have been admitted in homicide prosecution to corroborate
defendant's testimony that decedent was aggressive and that she was acting in self-defense
when shotgun went off. U. S. v. McIntire, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1972, 461 F.2d 1092. Witnesses 413

As to defendant's claim that he did not intend to kill victim, that he communicated withdrawal
from entire affair to victim, and that victim had knocked him to ground and was standing over
him with an up-raised tire iron, it was within province of jury to believe or disbelieve claim and,
in so doing, jury had right to consider testimony of a qualified pathologist who performed an
autopsy on victim that victim sustained a blow to the head and was probably unconscious at time
fatal shot was fired. Iyotte v. U. S., C.A.8 (S.D.) 1968, 402 F.2d 698, certiorari denied 89 S.Ct.
1214, 394 U.S. 936, 22 L.Ed.2d 468. Homicide 1325

Where defendant was arrested on Tuesday for liquor violation and was charged on Friday with
homicide, his detention was legal and his rights were not thereby violated so that statements
taken during detention were not inadmissible under McNabb rule of United States Supreme Court
rendering inadmissible confessions obtained as result of an illegal detention. Wakaksan v. U. S.,
C.A.8 (N.D.) 1966, 367 F.2d 639, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1312, 386 U.S. 994, 18 L.Ed.2d
341. Criminal Law 413.12

In a prosecution for manslaughter, by recklessly driving an automobile so as to throw deceased

therefrom, it was not error to exclude testimony that similar accidents had occurred at the same
place, since those accidents may have been the result of recklessness, but evidence as to the
condition of the street and that there was a “right mean turn” there was properly
admitted. Sinclair v. U.S., App.D.C.1920, 265 F. 991, 49 App.D.C. 351.Automobiles 354(13)

27. Comments or conduct of counsel

Record in voluntary murder prosecution, which merely showed, at worst, prosecutor's inept
preparation for trial and lack of good judgment in argument, did not show that defendant was
denied fair trial because government called individual as a witness whose testimony was so self-
contradictory that it had no probative value, since record did not show that prosecutor knew that
another was going to testify that such witness was asleep during entire incident; prosecutor's
handling of case presented only harmless error. U. S. v. Brady, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1978, 579 F.2d
1121, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 849, 439 U.S. 1074, 59 L.Ed.2d 41. Criminal Law 1166.9

Remark in closing argument of prosecuting attorney who had during trial elicited statement from
defendant that victim had stabbed him that defendant's wounds allegedly caused by deceased
might have been self-inflicted was not prejudicial to defendant charged with voluntary
manslaughter and fell within permissible grounds of legitimate responsive argument so that
overruling of motion for mistrial was not error. Wakaksan v. U. S., C.A.8 (N.D.) 1966, 367 F.2d
639, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1312, 386 U.S. 994, 18 L.Ed.2d 341. Criminal Law 2117

28. Weight and sufficiency of evidence

Evidence that decedent was fighting outside with defendant when last seen alive, that decedent's
injuries were consistent with severe beating that would have made moving or breathing nearly
impossible, and that defendant died from exposure was sufficient to support voluntary
manslaughter conviction. U.S. v. Taken Alive, C.A.8 (S.D.) 2008, 513 F.3d 899, rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied. Homicide 1149

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for voluntary manslaughter; government presented
testimony that defendant approached the victim, who was unarmed, and stabbed him numerous
times, that the victim was acting as a peacemaker, in an altercation that erupted between
defendant's group and a rival group, and that defendant could have avoided the altercation. U.S.
v. Chase, C.A.8 (S.D.) 2006, 451 F.3d 474. Homicide 1149

Sufficient evidence existed to support voluntary manslaughter conviction in prosecution for

murder committed on Indian reservation; defendant's son testified that his father had hit his
sister with his hand, that she fell to the ground, and that after she fell, she was dead, but
evidence as to defendant's state of mind was lacking. U.S. v. Quintero, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 21
F.3d 885. Homicide 1149

Evidence of defendant driver's deviation or lack of care, causing the death of his passenger, was
sufficient to establish jury question on charge of driving under the influence (DUI) manslaughter;
another passenger testified that defendant was traveling 40 to 45 miles per hour on 35 mile per
hour road, that he was driving in middle of road, and that, although he had time to react to
oncoming vehicle, he took no evasive action. U.S. v. Sasnett, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 925 F.2d
392. Automobiles 356(13)

Evidence that juvenile defendants voluntarily consumed alcohol and marijuana, assaulted victim
and left victim alone and intoxicated in abandoned automobile in subfreezing temperatures at
night was sufficient to sustain finding that defendants committed involuntary manslaughter on
Indian reservation. U.S. v. F.D.L., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1988, 836 F.2d 1113. Homicide 1150

Evidence as to defendant's intoxication caused automobile accident resulting in victims' deaths

was sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter convictions, even though prosecution
produced no direct evidence of intoxication, such as blood test or breathalyzer test. U. S. v. Kills
Ree, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1982, 691 F.2d 412. Automobiles 355(13)

Evidence, in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising out of automobile accident,

including evidence of driving under influence of alcohol at an excessive speed, substantially
supported independent findings that defendant committed unlawful acts not amounting to
felonies within meaning of this section and such evidence could also be deemed to constitute
gross, criminal negligence and, thus, to support conviction. U. S. v. Tresvant, C.A.4 (Va.) 1982,
677 F.2d 1018. Automobiles 355(13)

Evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant was intoxicated when a motor vehicle he was
driving struck and killed a pedestrian, where only possible proof of defendant's intoxication was
expert's extrapolation based on breathalyzer text taken two and one-half hours after the
accident, and after the undisputed consumption of an unknown amount of beer. U. S. v. DuBois,
C.A.8 (N.D.) 1981, 645 F.2d 642. Automobiles 355(13)

Evidence as to savage assaults on decedent by each of the defendants formed adequate basis for
jury finding of specific intent necessary to support finding of guilty of crime of voluntary
manslaughter. U. S. v. Brady, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1978, 579 F.2d 1121, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct.
849, 439 U.S. 1074, 59 L.Ed.2d 41. Homicide 1149

Legislative history shows no indication of intent by Congress to make “sudden quarrel or heat of
passion” an element of voluntary manslaughter, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. U.
S. v. Alexander, C.A.D.C.1972, 471 F.2d 923, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct.
541, 409 U.S. 1044, 34 L.Ed.2d 494.

Preponderance of evidence showed that defendant was reckless, and not merely criminally
negligent, and, thus, base offense level for defendant's conviction of involuntary homicide
resulting from driving while under the influence of alcohol was 18; on day of accident, defendant
began drinking at approximately 10:30 in the morning and continued drinking sporadically until
the accident, his blood alcohol content was 0.14, and he was traveling in excess of 85 miles per
hour. U.S. v. Jojola, D.N.M.2005, 375 F.Supp.2d 1251. Sentencing And Punishment 691

That pickup truck struck human being on clear stretch of highway during daytime with good road
conditions although defendant driver had been drinking did not establish defendant's guilt of
unlawfully killing another human being in commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony and did not constitute substantial evidence upon which jury might reasonably base finding
that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. U. S. v. Demontigny, D.N.D.1968, 286
F.Supp. 568. Automobiles 355(13)

Evidence, including that defendant and his wife regularly slept with their infant in their bed, was
insufficient to show that defendant was subjectively aware of risk posed by putting infant son in
his bed and going to sleep with him while intoxicated, and thus to show that defendant acted
with requisite reckless or wanton state of mind to support conviction of involuntary
manslaughter. U.S. v. Red Eagle, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2003, 60 Fed.Appx. 155, 2003 WL 1194189,
Unreported. Homicide 1150

29. Instructions

The failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that before they could convict of manslaughter it
must appear from the evidence that the killing was not only intentional, but was unlawful and
willful, is not error where the charge was otherwise, in bringing out the distinction between
murder and manslaughter, for the benefit and not to the prejudice of the accused. Addington v.
U.S., U.S.Tex.1897, 17 S.Ct. 288, 165 U.S. 184, 41 L.Ed. 679.

Giving self-defense instruction was warranted in defendant's murder trial, arising from his uncle's
killing, in which defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter; regardless of contradictory
testimony by law enforcement officer, defendant testified that, on night of incident, he feared
that his uncle would grab or choke him when his uncle rushed at him with raised hands, and that
his potential escape route of climbing over fence did not allow for sure retreat, so that
reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant formed reasonable belief that deadly force
was necessary. U.S. v. Toledo, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2014, 739 F.3d
562. Homicide 1484; Homicide 1485

Instruction given in federal voluntary manslaughter trial erroneously permitted the jury to
convict defendant even if they found that he acted with a less culpable mental state than intent
or depraved heart recklessness, so long as he acted in the heat of passion; instructing the jury
that voluntary manslaughter required only an unlawful killing “in the heat of passion” was
insufficient to convey mental state requirement of murderous intent or recklessness. U.S. v.
Serawop, C.A.10 (Utah) 2005, 410 F.3d 656. Homicide 667; Homicide 1385

Jury's guilty verdict on lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter constituted an implicit
acquittal on charge of second degree murder, and thus, on remand due to trial court's failure to
give requested instruction on lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, defendant
could only be retried on the charges of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. U.S. v. Brown,
C.A.10 (Okla.) 2002, 287 F.3d 965. Double Jeopardy 166.1

Murder defendant was entitled to requested instruction on lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter, as jury could have convicted defendant of involuntary manslaughter while
acquitting him of voluntary manslaughter under theory of imperfect self-defense, based on
evidence that defendant's actions constituted criminally negligent exercise of nondeadly
force. U.S. v. Benally, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1998, 146 F.3d 1232. Homicide 1458

Miscarriage of justice would have resulted if Court of Appeals did not exercise its discretion to
correct error caused by district court's failure to instruct on different mental state requirements
of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, where defense counsel vigorously denied that
defendant intended to kill his wife, where evidence was presented in support of defense's
accidental death theory, and where instructions improperly deprived defendant of his right to
have jury determine essential element of voluntary manslaughter. U.S. v. Paul, C.A.9 (Ariz.)
1994, 37 F.3d 496. Homicide 1380

Defendant charged with first-degree murder of another federal prisoner was not entitled to have
jury instructed that it could return verdict for lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter
upon finding that defendant acted upon a “sudden quarrel,” even assuming term retained historic
meaning distinct from heat of passion; defendant did not qualify as one of two persons who
willingly engaged in mutual combat, but rather entered ongoing encounter for purpose of aiding
one of the combatants, ultimately causing attack to become something very different from
sudden quarrel. U.S. v. Martinez, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1993, 988 F.2d 685, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct.
125, 510 U.S. 841, 126 L.Ed.2d 89, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 127, 510 U.S. 841, 126 L.Ed.2d
91. Homicide 1458

Instruction that involuntary manslaughter required that defendant act with gross negligence was
not necessary, where no rational juror could have found that defendant was responsible for
child's fatal injuries without also finding that defendant's conduct was at least grossly
negligent. U.S. v. White, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 974 F.2d 1135. Homicide 1380

Trial court, in instructing on federal involuntary manslaughter count, erred by failing to instruct
jury on meaning on statutory term “due caution and circumspection,” thereby allowing
defendants to be convicted on a lesser showing of mens rea than the law permits in an
involuntary manslaughter case. U.S. v. Fesler, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 781 F.2d 384, rehearing
denied 783 F.2d 1063, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1977, 476 U.S. 1118, 90 L.Ed.2d
661. Homicide 1387

In prosecution for second-degree murder, district court erred in rejecting defendant's requested
involuntary manslaughter instruction on the ground that defendant had also requested self-
defense instruction since the two instructions were not necessarily inconsistent. U.S. v. Manuel,
C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1983, 706 F.2d 908. Criminal Law 795(2.90)

In prosecution for second-degree murder, evidence warranted instruction on lesser-included

offense of involuntary manslaughter even though the instruction was not requested by the
government and was objected to by defendant, who raised defense of self-defense, and
supported verdict finding defendant guilty of the included offense. U.S. v. Iron Shield, C.A.8
(N.D.) 1983, 697 F.2d 845. Criminal Law 795(2.90); Homicide 1150;Homicide 1458

In involuntary manslaughter prosecution, district court adequately instructed that conduct of

defendant was required to be cause of victims' deaths in automobile accident in order for
defendant to be found guilty. U. S. v. Kills Ree, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1982, 691 F.2d
412. Automobiles 357(13)

In order to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter under this section, government was
only required to establish that defendant inflicted injury on another from which he died and that
homicide was committed without justification or excuse, and thus there was no need for trial
judge to instruct jury with respect to terms “sudden quarrel” and “heat of passion.” U. S. v.
Holmes, C.A.1 (Me.) 1980, 632 F.2d 167. Homicide 1385; Homicide 1402

Availability of a lesser included offense instruction is to be decided in practical terms of the

evidence developed in the trial of the offense charged and availability does not depend on
showing that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser
offense; hence, instruction on lesser offense of careless driving was not to be denied in
prosecution for involuntary manslaughter which arose out of operation of a motor vehicle, on
ground that the greater offense could be committed in a number of ways other than by operating
a motor vehicle. U. S. v. Pino, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1979, 606 F.2d 908. Criminal Law 795(2.55)

In absence of evidence of any sudden quarrel between defendant and wife and certainly none
provoked by more than mere words which were inadequate provocation, emphasis on heat of
passion caused by adequate provocation was justified in instruction on voluntary manslaughter;
in light of defendant's testimony that he and wife were both laughing at time of shooting, failure
to emphasize “sudden quarrel and adequate provocation” aspect of voluntary manslaughter did
not prejudice defendant. U. S. v. McRae, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1979, 593 F.2d 700, rehearing denied 597
F.2d 283, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 128, 444 U.S. 862, 62 L.Ed.2d 83. Homicide 1385

Crime of involuntary manslaughter is inconsistent with theory of self-defense, and thus where
defendant in murder trial asserted self-defense, there was no error in refusing to instruct on
involuntary manslaughter. U. S. v. Smith, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1975, 521 F.2d 374. Criminal
Law 795(2.90)

In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter arising from automobile collision, instruction that, to
warrant conviction, the death must have resulted from defendant's commission of crime of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor adequately conveyed
concept of proximate cause to jury. U.S. v. DeCoteau, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1975, 516 F.2d
16. Automobiles 357(13)

Defendant in second-degree murder prosecution was not entitled to instruction on involuntary

manslaughter, where, even assuming that victim was still alive after defendant beat her and
inserted stick into her vagina, defendant hid victim and did not seek medical aid for her, thus
showing wanton and callous disregard of human life. U. S. v. Celestine, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1975, 510
F.2d 457. Homicide 1458
In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter occurring while defendant was brandishing rifle in
his trailer on glacial ice island, fact that on the island there was no recognized means of law
enforcement so that each man was required to look to himself for immediate enforcement of his
rights should have been considered by jury in determining whether defendant was grossly
negligent and jury should have been so instructed. U. S. v. Escamilla, C.A.4 (Va.) 1972, 467 F.2d
341. Homicide 1380

Action of trial court in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction to effect that specific
intent is a necessary element of crimes of murder (not delineated as to degree) and
manslaughter was not error. Kane v. U. S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1968, 399 F.2d 730, certiorari
denied 89 S.Ct. 698, 393 U.S. 1057, 21 L.Ed.2d 699. Homicide 1387

In a prosecution for manslaughter for causing the death of a person by the negligent operation of
an automobile, it is not error for the court to refuse to charge that, if the jury find that the
proximate cause of the death was the breaking of a part of the steering wheel of the automobile
thereby rendering it useless, they should acquit, since such a charge omits the element of the
defendants' carelessness, nor is it error for the court to refuse to give an instruction substantially
covered by one already given on its own motion. Sinclair v. U.S., App.D.C.1920, 265 F. 991, 49
App.D.C. 351.

Conviction of manslaughter by shooting with a pistol was reversed principally for error of the trial
court in instructing the jury that there was no evidence of delirium tremens except the testimony
of a physician that the symptoms described to him by the defendant, and his attitude at the
time, made him think he was on the verge of delirium tremens. Perkins v. U.S., C.C.A.4 (S.C.)
1915, 228 F. 408, 142 C.C.A. 638.

For purposes of judging whether manslaughter instruction should be given in homicide

prosecution, sudden quarrel is only one form of provocation within concept of “heat of passion,”
and is not separate and apart from “heat of passion;” provocation, whether it be “sudden
quarrel” or some other form of provocation, must be sufficient to cause ordinary man to lose
control of his actions and his reason. State v. Coop, Kan.1978, 573 P.2d 1017, 223 Kan.
302. Homicide 668; Homicide 671

An instruction defining manslaughter under R.S. § 5341 [now this section], which omitted the
word “willfully,” was improper. O'Barr v. U. S., Okla.Crim.App.1909, 105 P. 988, 3 Okla.Crim.
319, 139 Am.St.Rep. 959.

30. Sentence and punishment

Defendant's sentence to 262 months in prison for his conviction of causing death of victim while
depriving him of civil rights was appropriately calculated by basing his sentencing guidelines
offense level on underlying offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than involuntary
manslaughter; district court found that defendant had intent to cause bodily harm, which was
qualifying mental state for voluntary manslaughter, upon considering defendant's entire
involvement in events leading up to victim's death, including defendant's kicking and beating of
victim and then misleading hospital staff as to source of victim's condition, to be such gross
deviation from reasonable standard of care that defendant must have been aware of serious risk
of death or serious bodily injury. U.S. v. Moore, C.A.5 (La.) 2013, 708 F.3d 639. Sentencing and
Punishment 653(2)

Voluntary-manslaughter Sentencing Guideline applied to defendant's felon in possession of

firearm offense, even if defendant did not fire the fatal shot during gun fight from which the
charge arose; court found that defendant precipitated the gun battle that led to victim's death
and that he had the requisite intent for voluntary manslaughter. U.S. v. Cherry, C.A.10 (Okla.)
2009, 572 F.3d 829. Sentencing And Punishment 653(2)

Federal district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence for involuntary
manslaughter that was within and near high end of applicable Sentencing Guidelines range,
contrary to defendant's request for downward departure based on victim's conduct; jury's verdict
had already determined that defendant's act was not excused by victim's conduct, district court
treated Guidelines range as baseline and considered statutory factors, and sentence imposed
was only five months longer than Guidelines minimum which defendant conceded would be
appropriate under those factors. U.S. v. Crowe, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2009, 563 F.3d
969. Homicide 1568; Sentencing And Punishment 857

Prosecutor breached plea agreement, under which government promised to recommend that
defendant receive a sentence within advisory Guidelines range and stipulated to adjusted offense
level of 12 for involuntary manslaughter in Indian country, by expressing misgivings about
application of Guidelines at sentencing; prosecutor undermined government's promises by
arguing that there were problems with a Guidelines-based sentence and that such a sentence
was “way too low” for involuntary manslaughter. U.S. v. Cachucha, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2007, 484
F.3d 1266. Criminal Law 273.1(2)

In the absence of any factual finding beyond the occurrence of two passengers' deaths,
imposition, at sentencing for involuntary manslaughter occurring on an Indian reservation, of
upward departures for excessive recklessness and serious danger to the public welfare, based on
defendant's conduct of taking her hands off the steering wheel while driving at high speeds while
intoxicated, constituted impermissible double-counting under Sentencing Guidelines; departure
for excessive recklessness took into account any threat to the public welfare caused by
defendant's driving. U.S. v. Wolfe, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2006, 435 F.3d 1289. Sentencing And
Punishment 909

Sentence imposed upon inmates for ten years each for voluntary manslaughter and five years
each for conveying a knife within a prison did not constitute an abuse of discretion where
evidence indicated that defendants viciously stabbed another inmate over 50 times. U. S. v.
Fountain, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1981, 642 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 2335, 451 U.S. 993, 68
L.Ed.2d 854. Homicide 1568; Prisons 435; Sentencing And Punishment 82

Legislative history of this section manifests a congressional intention to differentiate between

voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and to provide a more severe penalty for the former. U.
S. v. Alexander, C.A.D.C.1972, 471 F.2d 923, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct.
541, 409 U.S. 1044, 34 L.Ed.2d 494.

Sentencing defendant for involuntary manslaughter with sentence to run coincidentally with that
for included offense of wrong-way driving was not error in prosecution arising out of fatal
automobile accident in federal parkway area and did not render wrong-way driving verdict and
sentence void although that conviction would not stand when and if involuntary manslaughter
conviction became final. U. S. v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Sentencing And
Punishment 534

31. New trial

Defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter was not entitled to new trial on basis of affidavit
of juror to effect that instruction given after jury had deliberated for more than a day caused her
to join in returning a verdict of guilty when she did not believe defendant was guilty. Medina v.
U.S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1958, 254 F.2d 228, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 72, 358 U.S. 846, 3 L.Ed.2d
80. Criminal Law 957(2)
32. Scope of review

Role of Court of Appeals in reviewing voluntary manslaughter conviction in murder trial is

confined to determining whether jury could reasonably have found that government presented
sufficient evidence to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally committed
unexcused killing of human being. U.S. v. Quintero, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1994, 21 F.3d 885. Criminal
Law 1159.2(7)

A verdict of the jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it,
taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the government. U. S. v. Schmidt, C.A.8
(S.D.) 1980, 626 F.2d 616, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 278, 449 U.S. 904, 66 L.Ed.2d
136. Criminal Law 1159.2(5)

33. Harmless or prejudicial error--Generally

In prosecution for voluntary manslaughter, loss of skull X rays of victim taken at postmortem
examination by physician who conducted examination at government's request did not prejudice
defendant, in that there was no evidence that victim had been killed by a ricochet, thereby
supporting theory of accidental death, theory which defendant desired to bolster by use of skull
X rays. U. S. v. Longee, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1979, 603 F.2d 1342. Criminal Law 1171.1(1)

34. ---- Instructions, harmless or prejudicial error

Error in instruction permitting the jury to convict defendant of federal crime of voluntary
manslaughter trial even if they found that he acted with a less culpable mental state than intent
or depraved heart recklessness, so long as he acted in the heat of passion was not harmless
where only issue actually in dispute was the very subject of the instruction's error, whether
defendant's mental state warranted conviction for involuntary or voluntary manslaughter. U.S. v.
Serawop, C.A.10 (Utah) 2005, 410 F.3d 656. Criminal Law 1172.1(3)

District court committed plain error in involuntary manslaughter prosecution arising from fatal
traffic accident by giving instruction defining involuntary manslaughter as an unlawful killing
occurring in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or a lawful act done
either in an unlawful manner or with wanton or reckless disregard to human life, where
indictment allegedly solely that defendant had committed an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony; however, error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and did not warrant relief, as
he received fair notice of evidence and jury was admonished that it could not convict of any
conduct not charged in indictment. U.S. v. Hugs, C.A.9 (Mont.) 2004, 384 F.3d 762, certiorari
denied 125 S.Ct. 1680, 544 U.S. 933, 161 L.Ed.2d 500. Criminal Law 1038.1(4)

Failure to instruct on gross negligence in involuntary manslaughter prosecution was plain error
which would be corrected where defendant contended throughout trial that he was not driving
truck involved in accident and that his only act of negligence was falling asleep behind wheel of
parked vehicle; under district court's instructions, which permitted finding of guilt upon a finding
that defendant committed act in unlawful manner or without due caution, jury could have easily
found defendant guilty. U.S. v. Shortman, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1996, 91 F.3d
80. Automobiles 357(13); Criminal Law 1038.1(4)

In prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, wherein there was evidence that defendant
brandished gun which fired, but there was uncontroverted evidence from government's experts
that the gun was defective and could be discharged other than by pulling the trigger, omission
from charge of statement that jury must find, as necessary element of involuntary manslaughter,
that defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to lives of others was
reversible error. U. S. v. Escamilla, C.A.4 (Va.) 1972, 467 F.2d 341. Criminal
Law 1173.2(2); Homicide 1380; Homicide 1387

Giving of erroneous instruction defining second-degree murder was prejudicial error, even
though evidence was sufficient to support verdicts of guilty of first-degree murder, where
evidence was sufficient to raise for jury questions whether defendant killed premeditatively or
with malice. Beardslee v. U. S., C.A.8 (S.D.) 1967, 387 F.2d 280. Criminal
Law 1172.1(3); Homicide 1378

Failure to instruct jury in involuntary manslaughter prosecution arising out of fatal accident,
which occurred on federal portion of highway when defendant turned automobile to north while
in southbound roadway, that act of driving in wrong direction must have had one or more of
characteristics of creating inherent danger to life or gross negligence was reversible error. U. S.
v. Pardee, C.A.4 (Md.) 1966, 368 F.2d 368. Automobiles 357(13);Criminal Law 1173.2(2)

35. Remand

Remand for resentencing was required, in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter occurring on
an Indian reservation, where district court departed upward by nine levels without giving a
sufficient explanation; court did not explain why each of the three departure factors it relied
upon warranted a three-level increase, and in stating that defendant's conduct fell halfway
between the Sentencing Guidelines for involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder,
failed to explain why defendant's conduct should be treated as more like second-degree murder
involving malice aforethought. U.S. v. Wolfe, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2006, 435 F.3d 1289. Criminal
Law 1181.5(8); Sentencing And Punishment 996

Having concluded that there were infirmities in the district court's subsidiary fact findings, in
determining that voluntary manslaughter was the underlying offense of prison guards' violation
of civil rights, and conspiracy to do so, in fatal beating of inmate, or being an accessory after the
fact, remand was warranted to afford the district court an opportunity to eliminate, if possible,
the legal infirmities, but whether increased sentences could be imposed on remand, when the
Government did not cross-appeal, would not be ruled on prior to the remand and, because of the
distinct risk that defendants' “victory” in having their sentences vacated might ultimately result
in increased sentences, they would be afforded the opportunity to withdraw their appeals. U.S. v.
Velazquez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2001, 246 F.3d 204. Criminal Law 1024(11); Criminal
Law 1131(1); Criminal Law 1134.75; Criminal Law 1181.5(8)

Where evidence was insufficient to establish malice aforethought necessary to constitute second-
degree murder, but was sufficient to justify conviction for lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, jury had been instructed on elements of manslaughter, implicit in its finding of
guilt on second-degree murder charge was finding of guilt on manslaughter charge and none of
alleged errors would affect validity of manslaughter conviction, case would be remanded for
resentencing on voluntary manslaughter charge as appropriate means to accomplish substantial
justice. DeMarrias v. U. S., C.A.8 (S.D.) 1972, 453 F.2d 211. Criminal Law 1181.5(8)

36. Habeas corpus

Affirmance of involuntary manslaughter conviction on direct appeal, despite defendant's claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, was without prejudice to defendant's raising ineffective
assistance claims in habeas corpus proceeding. U.S. v. Dubray, C.A.8 (S.D.) 1984, 727 F.2d
771. Criminal Law 1182

18 U.S.C.A. § 1112, 18 USCA § 1112

Current through P.L. 113-145 (excluding P.L. 113-121, 113-128, and 113-143) approved 8-4-14

Westlaw. (C) 2014 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

END OF DOCUMENT