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Facts: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he
applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the “three-flunk-rule”. He then filed a petition
before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order.
The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education
is not absolute. The Constitution provides that “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply
invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it
because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.
Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of
applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23
August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction,
the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside
the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for
the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of 1959″
defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
“accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to
make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.” The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
Facts: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival,
filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others.
During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.
Issues:
1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and
2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local
government structure.
Ruling:
1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made
by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the
Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit
under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article
XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who,
within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at
the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”
2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political
color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government
code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term,
salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect
until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
Facts: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.
Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET
would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in
his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot
take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Ruling: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to
decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the
5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided
the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the
SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues
of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4,
of Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct
the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution.
Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Ruling: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling
such a convention to the electorate in an election. "Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the
interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15
of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,
may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all theMembers of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may besubmitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of theNational Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may
be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional
Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under
the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support
from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the
1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim
National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already
resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to
a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly)
or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business
of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution
is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.
Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil 612 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS)
Facts: By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of one
million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated,
to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection
with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation
for the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation
act hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of said
sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments
authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds
from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes of
the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers
and other documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the
use of the Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and
documentary proofs.
Issue: Whether or not the Court can compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners
Ruling: Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive department of the
Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere agents of the
Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of the Jones Law
provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all
vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence should be shown to
the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.
Facts: The petioner, Lope Severino, is a resident, a duly qualified elector, and local chief of the Nacionalista party in
the town of Silay, Province of Occidental Negros. He prayed for a writ of mandamus to the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, one of the respondents, to compel him to call a special election for the purpose of electing a
municipal president in the town of Silay, Province of Occidental Negros, and praying also that a preliminary
injunction be issued restraining the respondents, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and the provincial
board of the Province of Occidental Negros, from appointing a municipal president for the said municipality.
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to control by mandamus or injunction the official acts of the
Governor-General
Ruling: No. It has long been a maxim in this country that the legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgment shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. No jurisdiction shall interfere
with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his
official acts
Thus, the preliminary injunction prayed for in this case should not be issued. The facts alleged in the complaint do
not constitute a cause of action and most importantly, the Court cannot entertain a complaint which seeks to control
or interfere with the official duties of the Governor-General. The demurrer is, therefore, sustained, and the complaint
dismissed, without special ruling as to costs.
Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS)
Facts: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments
while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R.
Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day.
At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative
Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by
President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the
Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified
immediately.
On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office
the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers
of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post,
therefore making Castillo’s appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had already been
revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.
Issue: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified.
Ruling: No. Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction
in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such “midnight” or “last-minute”
appointments.
Case dismissed.