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Lisa D. Powell
S ince its burgeoning in the 1970s and 80s, Christian feminist theology
has deployed a variety of metaphors and symbols to wrest conceptions
of God from the oppressive structures and formulations dominating
Christian thinking and worship. A significant focus of much of this early
work was on the exclusive use of masculine imagery and language for
God. Feminist theologians sought fresh symbols inclusive of women’s
experience. Quickly the work expanded not only to question patriarchy
in theology and Christian worship, but also to expose currents of white
supremacy in theology and theological institutions. In recent decades,
responding to queer theory, post-colonial theory, and ecology, feminist
theology discovers still more symbols to express the relationship between
God, humanity, and the cosmos in ways that do not perpetuate kyriarchy
but undermine those systems of power and oppression. One such chal-
lenge to rethink Christian systems comes from disability theory, which
exposes the ableist assumptions in theology that consecrate a norm con-
structed against differently abled persons; Christian disability theology
envisions new symbols for God that rebuff conceptions of power modeled
after a militarized ableist culture and fosters an understanding of power
appropriate to a religion in which God is disfigured on the cross, in
which God is even disabled.1
Disability theorists also probe feminist thought to expose the ableism
in its celebration of independence and the idealization of a certain form
of female embodiment, which reinforces the idea of a “normal” female
body. Even as feminism challenges society’s objectification of women and
its standards of beauty, disabled women find they do not embody the
feminist ideal. Susan Wendell critiques the exaltation in feminism of a
woman’s control of her body.2 She quotes Adrienne Rich, who writes in
Of Women Born: “In order to live a fully human life we require not only
control of our bodies (though control is a prerequisite); we must touch the
unity and resonance of our physicality, our bond with the natural order,
the corporeal ground of our intelligence.”3 Rich emphasizes our control
of our bodies and asserts a universal unity among women based in a
shared physiology. Rich’s volume, and many texts influenced by it, con-
tains this glorification of woman’s ability to control her body, particularly
when speaking about conception and birth, maintaining that women are
universally connected in their corporeal fertility. Wendell writes “Until
feminists criticize our own body ideals and confront the weak, suffering,
and uncontrollable body in our theorizing and practice, women with dis-
abilities and illness are likely to feel that we are embarrassments to femi-
nism.”4 Rosmarie Garland-Thompson makes a similar charge, instead
noting the idealization of self-sufficiency: “One of the most pervasive fem-
inist assumptions that undermines some disabled women’s struggle is the
liberal ideology of autonomy and independence that fuels the broader
impulse toward female empowerment.”5 Doreen Freeman brings these
critiques to thealogy and feminist theology, arguing that disabled women
“embody all that the blossoming feminist does not want to be,” as they
often “reinforce the stereotypes as ‘passive, dependent, needy’ recipients
of care.”6 She asks if thealogians can celebrate the body as an image of
the divine if it is a “deformed, leaky, sometimes smelly, constantly fati-
gued, psychotic, [and/or] dysfunctional body.”7 She charges that in its
emphasis on “wholeness of mind, body and spirit,” feminist theology cen-
ters on “goals of competence, wisdom and well being, [and] the flourish-
ing of the woman’s physical cycle,” which then marginalizes disabled
women. In the process, the disabled woman is “negated, isolated and
alienated.”8
Disability theory has yet to lay bare the implicit ableism in some
accounts of the doctrine of God in feminist theology, namely the image
of God as mother in the face of infertility. This essay exposes how Chris-
tian feminist theology glorified female fertility, grounding reconstruction
of the doctrine of God in this notion of a shared physiological capacity
for childbearing, thus negating the infertile woman, rendering her an
Disability theory
Current disability theory operates in three different models: medical,
social, and cultural models. The medical model, typically rejected by theo-
rists in the humanities and social sciences, views physical impairment as
a problem to be cured or fixed. It does not consider how social context
impacts the individual’s experience of impairment, such that the physical
condition may or may not be experienced as a disability. It does not
acknowledge how lack of accommodation in society makes some impair-
ments disabling and how cultural ideals and “norms” make disability in
some cases. For example, a strictly medical approach would identify a
person with temporal lobe epilepsy as one with an illness to be treated,
with the intent of stopping the seizures. However, in certain societies,
such an individual may be considered a visionary and not in need of a
cure.9 In contrast, the social model, which is used primarily by sociolo-
gists in the U.K., focuses solely on how society makes impairments into
disabilities, such as a person in a wheelchair has a different mode of
movement than an ambulatory person, but it is the lack of ramps or un-
dropped curbs that make the former embodiment into disability. The cul-
tural model, which is preferred in disability studies in religion and the
humanities generally, considers how the individual experiences different
embodiment in her social and cultural context. It will include the impact
society has on a person’s ability, the experience of impairment itself, and
cultural valuations of impairments as either “normal” or disableing: the
need for corrected vision vs. the need for hearing aids, for example. The
cultural model considers how society constructs the Normal in opposition
to difference,10 and how it prescribes the way in which one is to navigate
society as different: “whether or not to show shame, whether or not to
pass, whether to minimize or maximize the difference, and so on.”11
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s work in disability theory and feminist
disability studies challenges our cultural categories of able-bodied and
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LISA D. POWELL
considered able-bodied are most likely nothing more than temporarily so,
and so are often referred to as “temporarily able-bodied” in the work of
disability theory.19 “Unless we die suddenly, we are all disabled eventu-
ally,” says Wendell. “Most of us will live part of our lives with bodies that
hurt, that move with difficulty or not at all, that deprive us of activities
we once took for granted, or that others take for granted. . .”20 Addition-
ally, all fertile bodies will lose their fertility. Our paradigm for feminist
theology should not be of a young, healthy, fecund, independent female
body. The physiology of female bodies is not fixed and constant and can-
not serve as a ground for the unity of the female body or women’s expe-
rience. Female bodies are different from one another, bearing different
capacities based on context, societal expectations, and physiology.21
Infertility as disability
Legally, according to the U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in 1998, infertility is
included as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.22 According to the ADA for something to qualify as a protected dis-
ability there must be: “(1) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2)
a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” The document further lists what are considered “major life
activities,” including “reproductive functions” in this list as a “major bod-
ily function.”23
In the discipline of religious studies, biblical studies attends more to
disability studies than do other sub-disciplines. This is particularly true of
studies in the Hebrew Bible, though a growing body of work engages the
New Testament and disability.24 There is little doubt infertility is a disabil-
ity in the context of the Ancient Near East; numerous studies confirm
this and agree that this corresponds with the cultural expectation that
the normative role for woman was wife and mother.25 Rebecca Raphael,
for example, writes that “an understanding of disability as bodily impair-
ment in the context of social environment reveals that female infertil-
ity. . . is the defining female disability in the Hebrew Bible (and in other
ancient Near Eastern literature).”26 Carole R. Fontaine concurs, calling
infertility in ancient Israel “an ultimate handicap in a cultural perfor-
mance of woman.”27 Also working within the cultural model, Jeremy
Schipper notes that in biblical literature, the experience of infertility is
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never sought pregnancy and so do not even know if their body is thus
“impaired.” However, in cultures where women’s primary social roles
continue to be mothering, caretaking of family, and work in the home, it
is likely that infertility will be experienced as disability. Many industrial-
ized Western societies are also still pronatalist, where women are espe-
cially valued for their function as mothers. In the U.S., this is evidenced
in the attention given to the so-called “mommy-wars” and the ongoing
legislation over women’s reproductive rights, where the focus in govern-
ment, society, and culture remains on women’s wombs. This includes cul-
tural obsessions with celebrity pregnancies, the debate on whether or not
women can “have it all,” and the peculiar scrutiny given to female CEO’s
maternity.39
For some percentage of women, maternity may be a choice; they
desire pregnancy and offspring, and they gain both, yet it is not some-
thing women work at, can control, or claim as their own.40 It either is or
is not part of one’s particular bodily capacity at a given point in time. Per-
haps modern technology may help some bodies nurture life that other-
wise could not, but in and of itself, whether or not one’s womb can
foster life and bring another human into the world is beyond one’s
control. But as disability studies expose, our culture likes to believe we
control our bodies, that our health and our bodily capacities are some-
thing for which we work and something in which we take pride. Speak-
ing of this illusion of control, Wendell writes: “Like many myths, the
myth of control contains a significant element of truth; we do have some
control over the conditions of our bodies, for example through the physi-
cal risks we take or avoid and our care for our health. What makes it a
myth is that people continue to cling to it even where there is over-
whelming evidence against it.”41 We have no control over our genetic
composition and have little control over debilitating illness, disease, and
the general process of aging itself. While feminists have “criticized and
worked to undo men’s control of women’s bodies,” they have not con-
fronted and subverted “the myth that women can control our own
bodies.”42 Female embodiment, idealized in much work as that of inde-
pendent and autonomous subjects, cannot be the base for feminist theol-
ogy. The idea that a “normal” woman possesses control over her fertility
is false.43 She cannot simply choose to conceive and to bring forth life;
that is not a female power as much as we may like it to be.
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which this model derives its power,” as “in the acts of conception, gesta-
tion, and birth,” all the great “symbols of life and of life’s continuity” are
involved.49 McFague stresses here that this model springs from the female
corporeal experience of gestation, birth, and lactation. A sampling of other
early feminist theologians building on this image include Elizabeth John-
son who devotes a chapter to “Mother-Sophia” in her groundbreaking study
of Sophia, She Who Is.50 Rosemary Radford Ruether’s foundational text Sex-
ism and Godtalk, introduces God as the Primal Matrix, also described as
“womb” within which all is generated and has life.51 Margaret Hebblewaite,
whose reflection on her own experience as a mother, produced Motherhood
and God.52 Finally, Concilium dedicated a volume to investigating the links
between motherhood and theology, responding to Adrienne Rich’s impor-
tant feminist text, Of Woman Born.53
Oftentimes, the proposal of a mothering metaphor coincides with a
rejection of another model labeled “masculine.” This is evident in
McFague’s Models, where she rejects the artist-model of God’s creation,
which pictured creation as “an intellectual, aesthetic ‘act’ of God, accom-
plished through God’s word and wrought by God’s ‘hands’, much as a
painting is created by an artist or a form by a sculptor.”54 She submits her
model of God as mother to contrast this. Similar critiques of orthodox
descriptions of creation are levied by process theologians Monica Coleman
and Catherine Keller. At a recent meeting of the American Academy of
Religion where theologians debated creatio ex nihilo, Coleman and Keller
denounced the doctrine as a masculine image of creation.55 According to
creatio ex nihilo, God creates outside of Godself, separate from Godself, by a
fiat of power; this is deemed a masculine way of viewing God’s act of crea-
tion. In contrast, the above theologians explore images that closer reflect
female experience of life growing in the womb and birth. Keller in Face of
the Deep, for example, likens the primordial chaos of Genesis 1 to “a hetero-
geneous womb” and “maternal floods.”56 She expounds the development
of the doctrine of creation in explicitly gendered terms and submits her
proposal using intentional gendered imagery and language. Keller contrasts
the “unilateral, masculinizing creativity”57 of creatio ex nihilo with her
watery, wet, chaos of “beginning-in-process” or becoming.58 Even the term
“creator” itself is too masculine for Keller as it connotes “a great supernatu-
ral surge of father-power,. . .[and] a mankind ruling the world in our manly
creator’s image.”59
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the continual substance of the cosmos from God’s body, without use of
the terms “mother” or “womb.”76
Similar to McFague resisting the identification of the womb with a
particular sexed embodiment, other theologians focus on parenting more
generally, not identifying traits, roles, or features with a particular sexed
parent. Karen Baker-Fletcher, for example, in Dancing with God: The Trinity
from a Womanist Perspective, analyses the “first person” of the trinity as
“Provider/Nurturer,” noting that both a mother and a father function in
this way as parent, and that “neither term refers to one gender or
another.”77 Initially, she seems to simply bracket the discussion of sex
and gender, saying: “Rather than wrestle with gendered language, this
theology refers to the first relational agent of the Trinity as Parent.” How-
ever, she does eventually talk about God as a mother, but she does so
uniquely, highlighting the communal aspect of raising a child. She says
God “is like the poor mothers of the globe, who with other women in
their families or communities pull a scarcity of resources together to pro-
duce a context of substance for the young.”78 In her trinitarian frame-
work, she describes mothering as a community, distancing it from the
image of the solitary mother who gives birth, nurses at her breast, and
raises her child. Here, neighbors, relatives, and friends mother together,
and too God, as mother, work with others to provide and care for the
community. Equally important to our argument here is that her model is
one of inter-dependence; neither mothers, nor God, are solitary figures of
power and independence, but exist in networks of inter-dependencies.
Disability theologian, Nancy Eielsand also constructed an influential
interpretation of the doctrine of God highlighting inter-dependence, by
considering the humanity that the Son returns to God at the ascension.
She notes that in the book of John, Jesus’ resurrected body remains bro-
ken. Jesus’ wounds are not healed or erased. He takes his broken body to
God so that the humanity of God is broken, marred, disfigured. She con-
cludes, then, that God is disabled, and she elucidates what this means for
the being of God.
“The disabled God is God for whom interdependence is not a possi-
bility to be willed from a position of power, but a necessary condi-
tion for life. This interdependence is the fact of both justice and
survival. The disabled God embodies practical interdependence, not
simply willing to be interrelated from a position of power, but
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Notes
1. See Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1994).
2. Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (New York:
Routledge, 1996).
3. Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company,1976), 21.
4. Wendell, The Rejected Body, 93.
5. Rosmarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Cul-
ture and Literature (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1997), 26.
6. Doreen Freeman, “A Feminist Theology of Disability,” Feminist Theology 29 (2002): 71–85,
quotation on 77.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. This example comes from Rebecca Raphael, Biblical Corpora: Representations of Disability in
Hebrew Biblical Literature (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 116.
10. I use a capital “Normal” here and elsewhere to indicate the sociologically constructed
ideology of “normal,” following Rebecca Raphael, Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical
Literature.
11. Rebecca Raphael, Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical Literature, 9.
12. Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 6.
13. Ibid., 7.
14. Ibid., 32, quoting Erving Goffman Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 128.
15. Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 7.
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LISA D. POWELL
and Jeremy Schipper (Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 185–195, quotation on
189.
31. See Arthur L. Greil, Kathleen Slauson-Blevins, and Julia McQuillan, “The Experience of
Infertility: a review of recent literature,” Sociology of Health & Illness 32, no. 1 (Jan 2010): 140–
162.
32. M. Moura-Ramos, S. Gameiro, M.C. Canavarro, I. Soares, T.A. Santos, “The indirect effect
of contextual factors on the emotional distress of infertile couples,” Psychology & Health 27,
no. 5 (May 2012): 533–549.
33. Jim Monarch, “Stress and Distress,” Therapy Today 17, no. 8 (Oct. 2006): 24–27. See also
James H. Monarch, Childless: No Choice: The Experience of Involuntary Childlessness (London: Routl-
edge, 2003).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 6.
37. Laura M Miles, Merle Keitel, Margo Jackson, Abigail Harris, Fred Licciardi, “Predictors of
distress in women being treated for infertility” Journal of Reproductive & Infant Psychology 27,
no. 3 (Aug 2009): 238–257, quotation on 238.
38. Ibid. See also Minden B. Sexton, Michelle R. Byrd, William T. O’Donohue, and Negar
Nicole Jacobs, “Web-based treatment for infertility-related psychological distress” Archives of
Women’s Mental Health 13 (August 1, 2010):347–358.
39. Media outlets’ focus on Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer’s pregnancy instead of her qualifica-
tions serves as an example.
40. Here I do not mean child-rearing, which is certainly a choice, something at which one
does work, but pregnancy, gestation, and healthy birth.
41. Wendell, The Rejected Body, 94.
42. Ibid., 93.
43. I am not making an argument here in the ongoing debate between feminism and dis-
ability activism over abortion.
44. Augustine, City of God, Book XIV. Chapter 26.
45. Raphael writes, “Normal is an ideological construct, not our colloquial sense of normal
as roughly average or typical. However, these terms are related in that a desired portion of
human experience is selected, idealized, and elevated to form the ideologically Normal,”
(Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical Literature,136).
46. Raphael, Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical Literature,137.
47. Ibid.
48. Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1987), 110.
49. Ibid, 105.
50. Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York:
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1992).
51. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and Godtalk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1983).
52. Margaret Hebblethwaite, Motherhood and God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1984).
136 . CROSSCURRENTS
LISA D. POWELL
53. Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. Concilium: Mother-
€ ssler Fiorenza (Edin-
hood: Experience, Institution, Theology, ed. Anne Carr and Elisabeth Schu
burgh: T& T Clark, 1989). Recall that Rich’s book is directly critiqued by Susan Wendell’s
assessment of feminist thought from the perspective of disabled women.
54. McFague, Models of God, 106.
55. Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion 2011. The video recording of their
prepared statements for the session is available at http://www.ctr4process.org/media/
56. Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: a theology of becoming (London: Routledge, 2003).
57. Ibid., 17.
58. Ibid., xvii.
59. Ibid, 6. See also Mary Grey, Introducing Feminist Images of God (Cleveland: The Pilgrim
Press, 2001), pp. 20–28.
60. Moria Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (New York: Routledge, 1995),
68.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid, 69. Gatens: “difference does not have to do with biological ‘facts’ so much as with
the manner in which culture marks bodies and creates specific conditions in which they live
and recreate themselves” (71).
63. Iris Marion Young, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comport-
ment, Motility, and Spatiality,” in On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42.
64. Wendell, 15.
65. For an important consideration of Sojourner Truth’s speech and her “rhetoric of ability”
here, while she was disabled due to an injury to her hand during her enslavement, see Mere-
dith Minister, “Religion and (Dis)ability in Early Feminism,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Reli-
gion 29.2 (2013) 5–24.
66. For more on the construction of female and male embodiment and experience of
embodiment see Denise Riley, Am I That Name?: Feminism and the Category of “Women” in His-
tory, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). For a consideration of the difference
in female embodiment from the perspective of body theology, see Paul Reid-Bowen, “Why
Women Need to be Ripped, Shredded and Sliced: Political, Philosophical and Theological
Reflections,” in Controversies in Body Theology, ed. Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood
(London: SCM Press, 2008), 207–226.
67. Freeman, “A Feminist Theology of Disability,” 84.
68. Among them are the following: (1) Not everyone has a good experience with his/her
mother. (2) Sentimental rhetoric around women’s mysterious and tender nature, establishes
the idea that to be a true and fulfilled woman one must have children. (3) The way mother-
hood is described promotes pathological self-sacrificing. (4) For women without children it
suggests they haven’t measured up. And (5) lifting motherhood to the exclusion of other
vocations, circumscribes the range of life experience. Elizabeth Johnson Quest for the Living
God: Mapping Frontiers in the Theology of God (New York: Continuum, 2008), 100.
€ ssler Fiorenza, “G*d—the Many-Named: Without Place and Proper Name,”
69. Elisabeth Schu
in Transcendence and Beyond, eds. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Uni-
versity of Indiana Press, 2007), 109–26.
70. In her 2010 essay she writes: “[W]e are called forth from the womb waters.” Catherine
Keller, “Tangles of Unknowing: Cosmology, Christianity and Climate” in Through Us, With Us,
In Us: Relational Theologies in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Lisa Isherwood and Elaine Bellcham-
bers. (London: SCM Press, 2010).
71. Catherine Keller, “The Apophasis of Gender: A Fourfold Unsaying of Feminist Theology,”
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 76, no. 4 (December 2008): 905–933. And also Cath-
erine Keller, “‘And Truth—So Manifold!’—Transfeminist Entanglements,” Feminist Theology 22,
no. 1 (2013): 77–87.
72. Keller, “The Apophasis of Gender,” 927.
73. Sharon Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh: Feminist and Disability Theologies on the
Edge of Posthuman Discourse” as part of a roundtable honoring the work of Nancy Eiesland,
Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 26, no. 2 (2010): 107–139, quotation on 115.
74. Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
75. Ibid.,151.
76. Sallie McFague, “The World as God’s Body,” in Concilium: The Body and Religion eds. Regina
Ammicht-Quinn and Elsa Tamez (London: SCM Press, 2002/2), 50–56.
77. Karen Baker-Fletcher, Dancing with God: The Trinity from a Womanist Perspective (St. Louis,
Chalice Press, 2006), 58.
78. Ibid., 71–72.
79. Eiesland, The Disabled God, 103.
80. Lisa Isherwood, “Indecent Theology: What F-ing Difference Does it Make?” in Dancing
Theology in Fetish Boots eds. Lisa Isherwood and Mark D. Jordan (London, SCM Press, 2010),
68–78, quotation on 68.
81. Donald E. Hall Queer Theories (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 15.
82. Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: NYU Press,
2006), 2.
83. Marcella Althaus-Reid, “Indecent Exposures: Excessive Sex and the Crisis of Theological
Representation” in The Good News of the Body: Sexual Theology and Feminism, ed. Lisa Isherwood
(NYC: NYU Press, 201), 205–222, quotation on 213.
84. Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, “Thinking Theology and Queer Theory,” Femi-
nist Theology 15, no. 3 (2007): 302–314, quotation on 304.
85. Marcella Althaues-Reid “From Goddess to Queer Theology: The State we are in now,”
Feminist Theology 13, no. 2 (2005): 265–272, quotation on 271.
86. Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, “Thinking Theology and Queer Theory,” 307.
87. Ibid., 308.
88. One might consider this confusion of sexed nouns like mother and father with other
gendered pronouns to suggest intersexed or transgendered language for God.
89. Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 6.
138 . CROSSCURRENTS
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