The Term Istithnā' in Arabic Logic

Author(s): Kwame Gyekye

Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1972), pp. 88-92
Published by: American Oriental Society
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 BRIEF COMMUNICATIONS
The Term Istithna' in Arabic Logic
The term istithnd' is a term used in Arabic logical
works which has not, as yet, been given a satisfactory
translation. Among the translations of this term which I
have come across in modern works are: (a) "exclusion",'
(b) "exception",2 (c) "choice",8 (d) "interpellation' ,4
(e) "particular mention",5 and (f) "disjunction".6
While the first two (a and b) are the dictionary meanings
of the term which, here, are not helpful towards the un-
derstanding of the term as it is used in the logic of propo-
sitions, the next three (c, d, e) probably arose out of an
attempt to make sense of the passages in which the term
occurs and, are, strictly speaking, not translations as
such. "Disjunction" does not translate istithna' although
we shall find later that istithnd'1 syllogisms included the
disjunctive.
In order to determine the technical meaning of
istithnd', I intend, firstly, to examine passages in the
Arabic translations of Greek works where this term oc-
curs, and inquire which Greek term it translates. (Often
a search for a Greek antecedent for a term used in Arabic
philosophy or logic does prove fruitful in understanding
1(i) Nicholas Rescher: Al-FdrdbZ's Short Commentary
on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Pittsburgh, 1963,
pp. 75 ff. This translation has been found to con-
tain a large number of serious mistakes. See
Dr. A. I. Sabra's review in the Journal of the
American Oriental Society, vol. 85, 1965, pp. 241-
43.
(ii) Israel Efros: Maimonides' Treatise on Logic,
American Academy for Jewish Research, 1938,
p. 45. Efros made his translation from an Arabic
manuscript in Hebrew characters. The Arabic
text was published in 1960 by Mubahat Tiirker
in Instanbul University: Publications of the
Faculty' 1960, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 87-110.
2 S. M. Afnan: Avicenna, His Life and Works, London,
1958, p. 99. He uses also "exclusion", p. 100.
3 A. M. Goichon: Lexique, pp. 32, 33, and Ibn Sina,
Livre des Directives et Remarques, Paris and Beyrouth,
1951, p. 194, footnote 6, and p. 218, footnote 3, although
she regards istithnd' propositions as "hypothetical"
propositions.
4S. A. Kamali: A Translation of Al-Ghazali's Tahdfut
al-Faldsifah, Lahore, 1963, p. 145.
D. M. Dunlop, "Al-FarabV's Introductory Sections
on Logic", Islamic Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4, 1955, p. 270
(Arabic), p. 278 (English tr.).
6 S. Van den Bergh, translation of Averroes' Tahdfut
al-Tahdfut, London, 1954, vol. 2, p. 146.
88
its meaning.) Secondly, I shall examine the Latin trans-
lation of Averroes' Tahdfut al-Tahdfut which, of course,
contains the Tahdfut al-Faldsifah of al-Ghazali. Two
translations of Averroes' work were made: one directly
from the Arabic in 1328 and published in 1529. This is
not only incomplete but is also not so much a translation
as a paraphrase. The other translation of that work of
Averroes was made from the Hebrew and published in
1527. This is complete and is the one that I have used.7
Reference will be made also to the Latin translation of
the logical part of al-Ghazali's Maqdsid al-Faldsifah.
Finally, I shall refer to the works of al-Farabi, Avicenna,
al-Ghazali, Nasir al-Din Tfsi, and Averroes, and then
suggest some other translations for the term istithnd'.
First, then, the Arabic translations of the Greek works.
As far as I know the only Greek work on logic trans-
lated into Arabic where the word istithnd' is used to
translate a Greek word is the De Interpretatione of
Aristotle. This was translated by Ishaq Ibn Hunain (d. c.
910) and survives in three editions.8 The Greek word is
prostithOmi (noun: prosthesis), used six times in the
De Interpretatione. In three places, 16al5 and 19, 17a12,
the Arabic word used to translate it is istathnd (noun:
istithnd'). The Greek word means "to add, to add some
determining word, addition" (Liddell and Scott). It is
interesting to note that in three other places two Arabic
words used to translate the Greek are ictdfa 16b29 and
zdda 21b2 and30. These two Arabic words mean "to add."
Again, in the Anal. Post. 87a35 and 91b27 zdda is used to
translate prostithemi.9 What we learn at this stage, is
that istithnd' (as noun: prosthesis) means "addition",
"addition of a determinant".10 But prostithemi is a syn-
onym of proslambano from which is derived proslepsis
(i.e., "additional assumption") which was used by the
7 1 am
grateful to Emeritus Professor Harry A. Wolf-
son (of Harvard) for the information about the Latin and
Hebrew translations from the Arabic.
8 (a) I. Pollak: Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der
Arabischen Uebersetzung des Ishak b. Honain, Leipzig,
1913. (b) 'Abd al-Rahman Badawi: Organon Aristotelis
in Versione Arabica Antiqua, vol. I, Cairo, 1952, pp. 59-
99. (c) W. Kutsch and S. Marrow: al-Fdrabi's Commentary
on Aristotle's De Interpretatione, Beyrouth, 1960.
9 The Arabic translation of the Anal. Post. is contained
in 'Abd al-Rahman Badawi, op. cit., vol. 2. Badawi's
text has rdda (in 91b27),but this obviously must be zada.
10Thus, Ross translates Aristotle's prosthesis as "ad-
dition of a determinant" (e.g., Metaphy. 1029b30, 1030b15,
1031a4).
 Brief Communications 89

Stoics to refer to the minor premise of the conditional major premise. I shall refer to the Hebrew translation
syllogism: "An argument, according to the followers of again later.
Crinis, consists of a major premise (lemma) a minor The word istithna' occurs several times in the logical
premise (proslepsis), and a conclusion, such as for ex- part of al-Ghazali's Maqdsid. In the Latin translation,16
ample this: 'If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore the verb istathnd was rendered by the Latin ponere: to
it is light'. Here the sentence 'If it is day, it is light' is posit, lay down, assert, while the noun istithnd' was
the major premise, the clause '(but) it is day' is the minor rendered by categoricum. Etymologically, ponere is
premise (proslepsis), and 'therefore it is light' is the con- more akin to the Greek tithemi than to the Arabic
clusion."" Alexander says that what the Stoics called istathnd. And it does not, strictly speaking, translate
proslepsis the Peripatetics called metalepsis.l2 Sir W. D. prostithemi (to add). It seems the use of ponere was an
Ross in his edition of the Prior Analytics brackets attempt to make sense of istathnd and hence should be
proslepsis which occurs in 58b9 because it is "foreign to put in the same category as translations c, d, and e in my
Aristotle and belongs to Theophrastus". It does not oc- opening paragraph. The Latin apponere (adponere)
cur in the Arabic translation of that passage. (It must be would correspond more to the Greek as I have seen it
pointed out that the use of proslepsis to designate the used elsewhere to translate prostithemi.17 (On adponere
minor premise of a conditional syllogism is entirely dif- as a translation of istathnd see p. 91 below).
ferent from the use of the same word by Theophrastus to Now, on to the Arabic authors themselves. First, al-
designate a syllogism different from the categorical and Farabi. The term istithnd' occurs in his work which deals
the conditional. This was correctly noted by Lejewski in with the subject-matter of Aristotle's Prior Analytics,
his article on "Prosleptic Syllogisms".)13 although there is additional material which is not found
Yet in another passage, 17a36, istithnd' is used not to in this work of Aristotle.18Although the term is used in
translate prosthesis but prosdiorismos which means the Arabic translation of Aristotle's De Interpretatione,
"further condition".14 This is a second meaning of yet al-Farabi never uses it in the commentary-section of
istithnd', and we must bear it in mind, as we shall come this work of Aristotle."9 The fact that al-Farabi uses
to a passage where Nasir al-Din Tius says that "istithnd'Z other terms in commenting upon passages where istithnd'
syllogisms are conditional syllogisms". The use of the occurs is of much help to us in getting at his own under-
word here is thus different from its other use as the addi- standing and interpretation of this term.
tional or minor premise of a conditional syllogism. Al-Farabi states a conditional syllogism as follows:
Now let us turn to the Latin translation of Averroes' "If the world is created, then it has a creator, but the
Tahdfut al-Tahdfut16 (which contains al-Ghazall's world is created. It follows from this that the world has
Tahafut al-Falasifah). Istithnd' occurs several times in a creator." Then he says that the major premise is the
the text. The Latin word used here is reiterare (noun: statement: "If the world is created, then it has a creator".
reiteratio): "to re-iterate, repeat". The Hebrew word The first part of the major premise is called the ante-
which was translated by the Latin reiteratiowas, accord- cedent (al-muqaddam), and this is the statement: "If
ing to Professor Wolfson who kindly made this search for the world is created". The second part is called the conse-
me, hishshanuthwhich means "repetition". The Hebrew quent (al-tdal), and this is the statement: "the world
word reflects the root of the Arabic word th-n-y: two, has a creator". The minor premise, he says, is a cate-
double. The minor premise proslepsis = al-mustathndt) gorical (hamliyya) statement to which a particle of "ex-
is, of course, a re-assertion (or repetition) of one of the ception" (harf al-istithna'; here istithna' must be taken
two parts (i.e., either the protasis or the apodosis) of the as in grammar)-which in the above syllogism is the par-
ticle "but"20-is attached. The minor premise is itself
11 Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers,
vol. 2: 7, 76. See also Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyr- 6The Latin translation of the Logical
part of the
rhonism, 2:149, 9. Maqdaidwas edited and published by Charles H. Lohr,
12 Alexander: In Ar. Anal. Priora, Wallies, p. 324, lines S. J. in Traditio, vol. 21, 1965, pp. 223-90.
17, 18. 17Ammonius, In De Interp. (A. Busse) pp. 165, 173 =
13C. Lejewski, "On Prosleptic Syllogisms", Notre Latin tr. ed. by G. Verbeke, Louvain, 1961, pp. 311, 325.
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 2, 1961, p. 170. 18 This is the work that has been given the title "al-
14This Greek word was rendered by the Latin deter- Farabi's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analyt-
minatio, adiectio. (See Indices of the books referred to in ics" and translated by N. Rescher. See Footnote l(i).
Footnote 17 below). The Arabic text was edited by Mlle. Mubahat Turker
15 Latin: Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, in Revue de la Faculte des Langues, d'Histoire, et de
vol. 9, Frankfurt am Main, 1962. Arabic: Averroes' Geographie de l'Universite d'Ankara, vol. 16, 1958.
Tahafut al-Tahdfut, ed. M. Bouyges, Beyrouth, 1930, 19See Footnote 8(c) for
complete title of this book.
Arabic, pp. 436, 548, 562 = Latin pp. 107b (and 108b), 20Dr. Nabil Shehaby of McGill University has sug-
137a, 141 , 143b. gested that it is because the particle "but" (ldkin) pre-
90 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 92.1 (1972)
one of two parts of the major premise, and it is called the
additional premise (al-mustathndt : proslepsis, prosthesis).
Sometimes it is the antecedent, sometimes the conse-
quent, which is postulated as the additional premise.21
Here, we only note that al-mustathnat, which is the word
used to denote the minor premise of a conditional syl-
logism, is obviously the equivalent of the Stoic proslepsis
(= prosthesis): "additional assumption". For al-Farabi's
own understanding of the term we turn to his com-
mentary on the De Interpretatione.
Commenting on 16a9-19 where Aristotle says that a
singular term (al-Farabi: al-ma'qul or al-lafz al-mufrad)
by itself has no truth-value unless "is" or "is not" is
added, (ean me to einai e me einai prostethe: md lam
yustathnd ma'ahu bi-wujudin aw ghayri wujfdin) al-
Farabi says: "An instance of this (combination or separa-
tion) is the word 'man' or 'white'. For these two are
names, one being the name of a substance, the other the
name of an accident. When something which is predicated
of it or attached to it has not been added (as a condition,
or conditioning factor) it (i.e., 'man', or 'white') is as
yet neither true nor false".22 He says (p. 28) that the
word "goat-stag" is neither false nor true unless we add
(as a condition: nashtarit) that "it exists" or "it does not
exist". In commenting on 17a12, al-Farabi, again, uses
ishtarata as an equivalent of istathnd and in explaining
the statement "animal is a walking thing" or "animal
is", he says (p. 57, line 1) that "Aristotle tells us that
'is a walking thing' and 'is' are a condition (shart) or a
predicate of animal". So, that which is added (yustathna)
to a singular term is the predicate which is, in turn, the
condition of the truth-value of the statement. In 17 36,
where Aristotle discusses the "conditions of contradic-
tion" and where istithnd' is used to translate the Greek
prosdiorismos: "further condition", al-Farabi under-
stands istithnd' to mean "condition" (shart) for he talks
of the "conditions (al-shard'it) of affirmation and nega-
tion" (p. 62). For al-Farabi, therefore, istithnd' means
ishtirdt (or shart), a "condition" or "something added as
a condition".
From this we can gather that al-mustathndt which is
used to denote the minor premise of a conditional syl-
logism is so called because it is the minor premise which
conditions or determines both the conclusion and its
quality. For if we say: "if A, then B" and stop there, we
cedes the minor or the additional premise in a conditional
syllogism that the syllogism is called istithnd'i and the
minor premise al-mustathndt. While this suggestion seems
interesting, it does not help us in our translation of
istithnd' and, more importantly, istithnd' occurs also in
passages which are not related to syllogisms. (See, e.g.
below, pp. 91-92.)
21 These statements are found on p. 257, lines 9-20 of
the Arabic text mentioned in Footnote 18 above.
22 Kutsch and
Marrow, op. cit. p. 27, lines 2-4.
have no conclusion. But when we add (nastathni), "But
A," or "but not B", we get the conclusion: "therefore
B", or "therefore not A" (modus ponens and modus
tollens).
It may be surmised that the fact that al-Farabi him-
self never uses istithnd' in his own explanations indicates,
probably, that this word appeared obscure to him. His
copious use of the word in his Prior Analytics which must
post-date the De Interpretatione indicates, it seems, that
by the time he came to write on the Analytics the word
istithnd' had gained some currency in the logical termi-
nology of the time. We must bear in mind al-FarabT's
understanding of istithnd' as ishtirdt as we come to dis-
cuss istithnd'i propositions in Avicenna.
Avicenna, as we know, has a kind of syllogism he calls
istithnd'1 syllogism.23 He does not tell what the word
istithnd' itself means, but on the basis of the examples
that he gives there is no denying that his istithnd'i syl-
logisms are conditional (or hypothetical) syllogisms. One
of his examples is as follows: "If the sun has risen, then
the stars are obscured; but the sun has risen; therefore
the stars are obscured". Avicenna says that "the gen-
erality of logicians directed their attention to the cate-
gorical [syllogisms] only, and considered the conditional
(shartiyydt) to be nothing but istithnd'T".24 It follows
from this that istithnd'z syllogisms are, at least, a species
of conditional syllogism. For the characterization of
istithnd'i syllogisms as conditional syllogisms, we turn to
the evidence of Nasir al-Din Tusi in his commentary on
Avicenna's al-TanbThat wa-l-ishdrdt. Tusi says: "I say:
logicians divide syllogism into what is composed of
categorical or conditional. They characterize the condi-
tional as istithnd'iyydt.. .and the istithnd'iyydt is that
branded as the conditional; that's all."25
In his commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge,26 com-
menting on Porphyry's statement: "But in genealogies
they (i.e., some Greek tribes) generally ascend to one
origin, such as Zeus", Ibn al-Tayyib says: "The reason
for his (i.e. Porphyry's addition (istithnd') of (the word)
'generally' is because a section of the Greeks ascend to
another father different from Zeus; he is Poseidon".
To translate istithnd' in the above sentence with "ex-
ception" or "exclusion" or "choice" would be senseless.
Again commenting on Porphyry's "absolutely" (or
23Avicenna: al-Tanbihdt wa-l-ishdrdt, ed. Mahmud
Shahabi, pp. 47 ff; S. Dunya's edition (1960), vol. 1,
pp. 425 ff. Al-Najdt, Cairo edition, 1938, pp. 32, 50-51.
24Mahmud Shahabi, op. cit., p. 48; S. Dunya, op. cit.,
p. 427.
25 S.
Dunya, op. cit., p. 425.
26 Bodleian M. S. Marsh
28, Fol. 43a The edition, trans-
lation and a study of this manuscript of Ibn al-Tayyib's
commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge constituted the
subject of my Ph.D. thesis at Harvard, completed in
June, 1969.
 Brief Communications
"simply": haplos) Ibn al-Tayyib has this to say (among
other things): "The word 'absolutely' is used in three
senses: (a) in the sense of particularity, (b) in the sense
of universality, and (c) in the sense of preciseness....
As to its sense of preciseness it is like when we state it
without addition, (istithnd') just as we say: man is
animal 'absolutely', meaning that he is not an animal in
virtue of something else. That which is asserted with
addition (istithnd') is such as we way: "If the sun is
above the earth, the atmosphere is illuminated."27
What Ibn al-Tayyib is saying is that when we say "A is
B" we mean, surely, that A's being B is not in virtue of
something else; it is not dependent or conditional upon
any other thing, i.e., "A is absolutely B", and it cannot
be not-B. On the other hand, when we say "If A, then B",
the statement is not absolute or unconditional, and its
definitive conclusion is, unlike the previous categorical
assertion, in virtue of something else (i.e., some other
premise) being added to it.
Al-Ghazali also says: "The syllogism is divided into
what is called categorical (iqtirdni) and what is called
conditional istithnd')"28. He opens a chapter entitled
"On istithnt'i syllogism" by saying: "The istithnda' syl-
logism is of two kinds: (A) conjunctive conditional
(shartZ muttasil), and (b) disjunctive conditional (shartz
munfasil."29 Then he goes on to give examples of both
kinds of the conditional, but apparently taking the
meaning of the word istithnd' for granted, he makes no
attempt to explain it. Averroes in his Tahafut al-Tahdfut
uses the word, but he also takes its meaning for granted.
Simplicius (fl. about A.D. 500) wrote a commentary on
the beginning of Euclid's Elements which is preserved in
al-Fadl Ibn TIatim al-Nayrizi's commentary also of the
Elements. (Al-Nayrizi died about A.D. 922). Simplicius
is quoted by al-Nayrizi as saying: "As for the philosopher
'Aghanis', he defined parallel lines (al-khutut al-muta-
waziyah) as those (lines] in the same plane. Thus he
said: 'Parallel lines are those which are in the same plane,
and when they are eternally30 produced without limit in
both directions, the distance between them would al-
ways be the same'."31 (This definition of parallel lines is
27Ibid. Fol. 28b.
28Al-Ghazlil: Maqdsid al-Faldsifah, Cairo, p. 29. This
sentence was rendered in Latin as: Syllogismus autem
dividitur in categoricum et hypotheticum (Lohr, op. cit.,
p. 259).
29Ibid., p. 40.
30 The Arabic word is dd'iman which normally means
"permanently" or "eternally". Perhaps we could also
use "infinitely" to translate the Arabic word in the pres-
ent context.
31 The Arabic text is found in Codex Leidensis
399, 1.
Euclidis Elementa ex interpretatione al-Hadschschadsch
cum commentariis al-Narizii, Arabice et Latine ediderunt
.... 0. Besthorn et J. L. Heiberg, pt. i, fasc. i, Copen-
hagen, 1893, p. 8.
91
found in Elements, Book One, Definition 23). To this al-
Nayrizi said: "Perhaps that which is added (ustuthniya
bihi) in their definition, namely, that the two lines are
in the same plane, is not necessary. For if the distance
between them (i.e. the two lines) is the same, one of them
would definitely not tend towards the other, because both
are surely in the same plane".32 The Latin translation
of the latter passage reads as follows: "Et fortasse hoc,
quod appositum est in diffinitione, scilicet, 'in una super-
ficie', non tantum est necessarium, quoniam, cum spa-
tium, quod inter eas, sit equale, et una in alteram omnino
non inclinat, sequitur, quod sint in una superficie."33 We
must note here that the Latin apponere (to add) was used
by Gerard to translate istathnd.34
Thus far, we know that the term istithnd' translates
the greek prosthesis and prosdiorismos; it was translated
by the Latin adponere. As such istithnd' means "addi-
tion"; and as prosthesis is a synonym of proslepsis,
istithnd' must also mean "additional assumption" (i.e.,
the minor premise of a conditional syllogism when it
often appears in the form al-mustathnat; and istithnd'i
syllogisms are conditional (or hypothetical) syllogisms.
But the question that still requires to be resolved is
this: why was the Arabic istathnd used to translate the
Greek prostithemi, seeing that the dictionary meanings
(i.e., "exclusion", "exception") of this Arabic word
have nothing to do with the Greek it was supposed to
translate? The following suggestions may be offered.
We would recall an earlier statement (p.92) that "repe-
tition" used in the Hebrew translation for istithnd',
namely, hishshanuth, reflects the root of the Arabic word
th-n-y (two, double). Indeed, another form of the word,
namely, th-nn-y (i.e., the "second form", as it is called in
English books on Arabic grammar and morphology)
means: "to repeat", "to do twice" (Wehr). We know, of
course, that the minor premise (i.e., the additional
assumption: proslepsis, prosthesis, al-mustathndt) is a
repetition of one part of the major premise.
Now let us turn to an interesting statement made by
John Philoponus in his commentary on the Prior Analyt-
ics. Philoponus states a hypothetical syllogism thus:
"If it is day, then the sun is over the earth: but it is day,
therefore the sun is over the earth". He then says: "The
32Ibid., p. 10.
33Anaritii in decem libros priores Elementorum
Euclidis commentarii, ex interpretatione Ghereradi
Cremonensis.. .Edidit Maximilianus Curtze, Leipzig,
1899. Euclidis Opera omnia, ediderunt J. L. Heiberg et
H. Menge, Supplementum, p. 26, lines 17 ff.
341 am most grateful to Dr. A. I. Sabra of the
Warburg
Institute, London, who not only called my attention to
the above passages in al-Nayrizi's text, but also under-
took to copy both the Arabic and the Latin passages and
sent them to me. He read both the first draft and then the
revised version of this article which is an appendix to
my Ph.D. thesis referred to at Footnote 26 above.
92 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 92.1 (1972)

Peripatetics call 'but it is day' the minor premise
(metalepsis) because it is taken a second time (dia to
metalambanesthai ek deuterou), for it was already taken
in the antecedent (hegoumenon)"36. In al-Tahanawi's
"Dictionary of Technical Terms", we have the following
said of istithnd': The word is (thus) used because the
passage indicates a repetition (takrTr) of something twice
(marratayn), or it makes it follow in succession. The word
istithnd' is [thus] used in a chapter on syllogism, for its
mention is repeated (yuthanna) again (marratayn).36 It
seems, therefore, that when a translator used istithnd',
he was not necessarily using it in the sense of "exclusion"
or "exception", but in another sense: that is, the sense of
thand (or thanna). In other words, "exclusion" and "ex-
ception" are not the only meanings of istithnd'. Of
course, "to repeat" is not the same as "to add", but to
repeat implies adding, and, in the context of the condi-
tional syllogism, as I have said before, what is added as
the additional assumption is a repetition of a part of the
major premise.
36 John Philoponus: In Anal. Prior (Wallies), p. 242,
lines 35 ff.
86Al-Tahanawi: Kashf istildhdt al-Funun, vol. 1,
Istanbul, 1317, p. 201.
Now, as to why in some places of the De Interpretatione
prostithemi was translated by istathnd, the following
explanation may be given. In 16a16-19,16b29,17a13Aristotle
says that a single word like "man" or "goat-stag" has no
truth-value unless "is" or "is-not" is added. When "is"
is added to "man", we have two words which have truth-
value: thus, the word "man" is doubled by the addition
of "is".37 In 16b29 he says: "But the single (mia) syllables
of 'man' signify nothing .... In double words (diplois),
as we said, a part does signify ... ." The Arabic th-n-y
corresponds on all fours with the Greek diplos: "two-
fold", "double" (the Greek verb diploo also means "to
repeat"): and doubling implies adding. This could well
have been the reason why istathnd was used to translate
prostithemi, the "tenth form" istathnd thus being taken
in the sense of th-n-y.38
KWAME GYEKYE
UNIVERSITYOF GHANA
37Obviously it is not the word 'man' which is actually
doubled, but the original single element of the potential
proposition.
38The "Tenth Form" in Arabic grammar denotes,
also, the idea contained in the root verb (in this case the
idea of two or being two). See Wright's Arabic Grammar,
vol. 1, pp. 44-45.

Siiulengge - suilengge

Mongol siiilengge, uiilengge, name of a functionary, attested as early as the 1550's, may
well be much older than that. This time factor precludes a borrowing from the Manchu
sulinge 'district functionary'. There is every reason to believe that the Manchu word derives
from the Mongol sialengge, which itself is derived from the Chinese expression shou-ling
(b) 'head and neck, leader', and was even re-transcribed into Chinese as shou-ling-ko.

In this paper an attempt will be made to elucidate the
origin of the Mongol word siiilengge: until recent times
this term was used among the Buriat-Mongols, the
Oyirad of Western Mongolia, and the Qalqas, to indicate
a low ranking official in the administration; the functions
of this official evidently may have differed from time to
time or from one area to another. Recently the word
seems to have disappeared from the language: modern
Qalqa and Buriat dictionaries, as far as I know, no longer
list it.
The word spelled siilengge or suilengge in the written
language has been mentioned and explained by various
authors. In Pallas' days, the siilengge among the Volga
Kalmuck was responsible for a group of forty families:
"Bey den Soongaren wurden diese Aufseher fiber vierzig,
so wie izt noch bey den Mongolen, Schuliinga genannt."'
P. S. Pallas, historischer Nachrichten
Samlungen
In the title of a Buriat manuscript dating from 1877,
the Russian word golova 'head, headman' (written in
Mongol transcription) is put in apposition to siilengge,2
again showing that siilengge was the name of some offi-
cial in the tribal administration. B. Rincen, discussing a
Xori-Buriat text in which the term also appears, says
nothing of its specific meaning among the Buriat, but in a
note he explains that until recent times sifilengge was a
term in the administration of the lay subjects (sabinar) of
the Qutuytu of Urga.3 From the Qalqa Jirum, however,
iuberdie Mongolischen Volkerschaften, I, St. Petersburg,
1776, p. 190.
2 L. S. Puckovskii, Mongol'skie Rukopisi i Ksilografy
Instituta Vostokovedeniya, I, Moskva-Leningrad, 1957,
p. 107.
3 B. Rincen, "Ob odnoi Xori-Buryatskoi Rodoslovnoi"