II.

BILL OF RIGHTS

• CONCEPT AND ORIGIN

• CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS

ARTICLE III. – THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Art. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

From Nachura:

A. Bill of Rights In general.

1. Definition. The set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the
enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles” [quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189].
Generally, any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also
generally self-executing.

a) Civil Rights. Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. They are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action. '
b) Political Rights. They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-visthe
management of government [Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January
5, 1994].

2. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003, the Supreme Court held that the
Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the adoption, on March
24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution. During this period, the directives and orders of
the revolutionary government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
at the time. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
remained in effect during the interregnum.

• DOCTRINE OF PREFERRED FREEDOM (HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS)

Q. Do life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution?

A. No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. "The superiority of these
freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose —that the law is neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory nor oppressive —would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent." [Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,50 SCRA 189,202-3(1973)].
Q. What is the extent of the authority of the state to regulate public assemblies?

A. In Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731 (1970), where the petitioner wanted the use of Plaza
Miranda whereas the Mayor would allow only the use of the Sunken Gardens, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Mayor possessed "reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order."
Navarro v. Pilegas, 31 SCRA 721 (1970).
A later case, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973), started when the petitioner labor unions, against the wishes of
management and in order to be able to stage a mass demonstration against alleged abuses of local
police, did not report for work. The Court of Industrial Relations adjudged their "concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
upheld the dismissal of some union leaders. The Supreme Court reversed saying through Justice
Makasiar that: "As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights —freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517."

Q. Do all societies and associations enjoy the same constitutional protection?

A. As already seen, under Section 1, the Constitution recognizes a hierarchy of values. Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189, 2200-3 (1973). Hence,
the degree of protection an association enjoys depends on the position which the association's
objective or activity occupies in the constitutional hierarchy of values. Thus, for instance, where the
object of an association is the advancement of a common political belief such as racial equality, any
law that either has the effect of limiting membership in such association or blunting its effectivity must
satisfy the more stringent standards for allowable limitation of expression and belief. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In the latter cases, the
standards discussed in Section 4 are applicable.

(1) PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc.

51 SCRA 189 (1973)

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police. The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration,
informed the union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the
Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. As such, they
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who will participate in the demonstration and the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA provision on NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE article and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike. However, the Union proceeded to the strike despite pleas from the Company.
PBMEO contended that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration and that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm. PBMEO was charged by the court of industrial relations guilty of
bargaining in bad faith as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company.

ISSUE: Whether the mass demonstration of PBMEO constitutes a violation in the CBA hence, the
dismissal is legal

RULING: No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or
its owners or its management. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to
survive,” permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”
 Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of social
justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.

A. DUE PROCESS

A. DUE PROCESS
• Art. III, Sec. 1
Limitations on police power. — The basic limitations of due process and equal protection
are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

The equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.

The due process clause.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are
supposed to coexist. THE BALANCING IS THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of
life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into
classes and groups provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard,
as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

• Art. III, Sec. 14 (1)

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.

• Definition, Nature, Scope and Evolution

Origin.

By the 39th chapter of the Magna Carta wrung by the barons from King John, the despot
promised that “no man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized or outlawed, or in any manner
destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land [per legemterraef].
 Definition.

“A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial” [Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518], “Responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice” [Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v.
City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849].“The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play” [Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33].

Who are protected?

Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or
nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is
concerned [Smith Bell &Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163]. The guarantee extends to aliens and includes
the means of livelihood [Villegas v. HiuChiong, 86 SCRA 275].

• Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property

a) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from
dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable [Justice
Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.
b) Liberty includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude, x xx (It) includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways x xx”
[Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660],
c) Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of
contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and
dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197]. i)
i) Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action
to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office [Nunez v. Averia,
57 SCRA 726], Indeed, the Court while public office is not property to which one may
acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right [Bince v. Commission on
Elections, 218 SCRA 782]. One’s employment, profession or trade or calling is a
property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Thus, an
order of suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights [Crespo v.
Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66]. But its proper regulation has been upheld as a
legitimate subject of the police power of the State, particularly when its conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State,
the public health and welfare, and public morals [JMM Promotion and Management v.
Court of Appeals, supra.].
ii) A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is
granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the
holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non- impairment clauses of the
Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest [Republic v.
Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004].
Mere privileges, such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are
revocable at will [Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil 123].
iii) The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does
it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be
revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute
as to be placed beyond the reach of police power [Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534],
iv)The mandatory suspension from office of a public official pending criminal
prosecution for violation of RA 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law [Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163].

• Art. II, Sec. 11 (respect for human rights)

The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.

• Writ of Amparo

(2) Sec. of National Defense vs. Manalo

G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008
FACTS: The case at bar is the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:
Feb 14, 2006 - Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo were abducted and physically beaten up by
several armed soldiers. They were taken to a house they didn't know. They were beaten and
interrogated by soldiers. Days later, Raymond's interrogators were high officials.
After three weeks of detention and beatings, Raymond attempted to escape. He managed to
free from the chains and jumped through the window. Women along the way told him that he was in
Fort Magsaysay. However, some soldiers spotted him, he was caught and beaten up and was
returned to where they were detained. For about three and a half months, the respondents were
detained there. The respondents were transferred to another location (Sapang) and same thing, they
were beaten and interrogated.
They were again transferred to another location where Raymond met Gen. Palparan where the
latter made a bargain that Raymond's parents should not attend hearings, rallies and meet with
human rights groups if they want to be safe. Respondent agreed out of fear. Then, they were brought
to their parents’ house. In the presence of soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. They acceded in fear. Soldiers threatened the parents that if they continued to join
human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought
back to Sapang.
From November 2006 to June 2007, the brothers were transferred from one place to another
and were made to work for the soldiers while still being interrogated and tortured every time,
throughout the period.
June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to a farm in Pangasinan. Respondents
started to plan their escape. One night, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway,
leaving behind their drunk sleeping guards. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus
freed from captivity.

DEFENSE OF PETITIONER:
1. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military.
2. That no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the
Manalo brothers.

ISSUE: The CA erred in granting the petition for Writ of Amparo in favor of the respondents by
believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of respondents.

COURT'S RULING: Petition was granted. CA ruling affirmed.

The Writ of Amparo

October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killing and enforced disappearances. It was intended to address the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.

Amparo literally means "protection' in Spanish. The writ originated from Mexico.

1987 Constitution and the Importance of the Writ in cases involving extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances

The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, but some Amparo
protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Amparo libertad (Liberty Amparo) is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition and a petition for habeas corpus, these remedies may not be adequate to
address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the
swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this offers a better
remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats. The remedy provides rapid
judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the
long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Measure of the Court for granting or denying grant of Writ

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action:

"The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. "

Sections 17 and 18, provide for the degree of proof required:

"The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

In this case, the abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless
candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory.

The SC was convinced that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners
were either members or sympathizers of the NPA.

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was
aware of the petitioners’ captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he
or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan)
met them in person in a safe house in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents
to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been
shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands
of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without
probable cause.
 It is clear, through the respondent's affidavits that the participation of some military personnel in
the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established.

In a foreign jurisprudence entitled Ortiz v. Guatemala, similar evidence was considered, in

finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan
government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commission’s findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written
and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.

The personal testimonies therefore of those subjected to torture or those whose rights were
violated in cases like this are the ones in the best position to testify or provide evidence.

Are the respondents entitled to the Writ?

Yes. Even if the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced, and respondents admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense of
the word as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the AFP and are, thus, in a
position to threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security. Respondents claim that they are
under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation
of their right to security of person.

Right to Security and Right of Liberty (Expanded interpretation of Right to Security)

Respondents point out that n; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition
against torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III Section 2, they submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and from
incommunicado detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to
security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that the right to liberty may be made more
meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty such as a
requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty or being
put under monitoring and surveillance.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life
and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Under Art. III Sec. 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one’s person, including the extensions of his/her
person houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state’s
power over a person’s home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity
of the person himself.

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the
home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness
and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity
of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for
the best causes and reasons.

Right to Security vs Right to Life

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee
of the secure quality of this life: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that
his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with
the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It
touches every aspect of man’s existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in
a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded
not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life
according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.

Right to Security in International Laws

The right to security of person is freedom from fear. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.

Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for
the right to security of person: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

What then is the Writ of Amparo and its scope throughout other Constitutional Rights?

1. Under Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights
to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded
as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation
of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus,
in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

2. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. (IN RELATION TO TOPIC ON DUE PROCESS) Article III, Section
12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion. Also under
this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat
as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even
under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.

3. The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity). The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat.

While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty, the right to
security of person can still exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

The right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. However, there is no
evidence that it was intended (in the UDHR) to narrow the concept of the right to security only to
situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee
the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore
known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested
or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats
to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective
the guarantees of the Covenant.

Was there a violation of the respondents' right to security?

Yes. The violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents’ life, liberty and
security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. Then, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to
be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they
were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled
that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a
camp in Bataan, respondents’ captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should
be executed.

With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have
surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but
also in those of other persons known to have disappeared.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection
by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free
will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt
acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo.

Was there a violation of the respondents' right to protection by the government?

 Yes. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting
an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction.

The one-day investigation conducted was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. To this day,
however, almost a year after the policy directive for investigation of the incident was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.

The petitioners directed to comply with reliefs.

ON DUE PROCESS (in connection with the topic)

The taking of the brothers was illegal since there was no warrant. Thus they were confiscated of
their right to due process. They were subjected to extralegal interrogation and all that (you know). Under
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government is provided, not a protection of the government from the demand of the
people such as respondents.

• Writ of Habeas Data

A.M. No. 08-01-16-SC
January 22, 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC
January 22, 2008

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules
of Court submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.

January 22, 2008.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
 SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court
or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where
the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its
justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that
which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent
petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice
to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the
petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue
the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance;
or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to
issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be
punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial
officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to
make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on
substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be
reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such
data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a
respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any
person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be
conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in
question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot
be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or
judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may
warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the
erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three
(3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full
statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information,
or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the
respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service
of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due
notice to the parties and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or
final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas
data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition
for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ
of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of
the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available
to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the
writ of habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
 SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication
in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]

(3) DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254
October 08, 2014

FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her
former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium
and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August
23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera
showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but
she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then
walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic
Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other
woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed
Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of
the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the
memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the
cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and
ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded
Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her
acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to
privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not on its
admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper

RULING: NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in
the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and
any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions
of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security
are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a
habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind
to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it
clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately
utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.
Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

• Purpose of the guaranty

Justice Isagani Cruz - Due process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of
the government, whether committed by the legislative, the executive, or the judiciary.

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental
law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as
the changing times and circumstances may require.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has
to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.

(4) Hurtado v. California

110 US 516, 1884

The purpose of the guaranty is to protect individual’s right to life, liberty, and property
against the encroachment of powers delegated to the government. Hence, it shall also serve
as a limitation to the government’s power.

NOTE: The Constitution of California authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of
the legislature.

Facts: The district Atty. Of Sacramento County (A prosecutor in the case) filed an information against
Joseph Hurtado charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. He
was found guilty of murder in the first degree punishable by death.
Petitioner strongly hold that California denied him an indictment by a grand jury when he was
prosecuted based only on information. Thus, further asserting that he was denied due process, which
is violative of the 14th Amendment’s due process clause.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s prosecution based on an information is violative of the due process
clause?
Held: No, The Constitution is a document written for an expanding and undefined future. The broad
concept of “due process of law” should not be held static by requiring a certain legal process over
another. Thus, even though his case wasn’t presented to a grand jury, nevertheless, petitioner was
afforded due process since the legal proceeding on California afforded him security of his liberty and
justice. It was stated on California Law that;
“…authorizes prosecutions for felonies by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, without indictment by a grand jury, in the discretion of the
legislature.”
The Penal Code of the State makes provision for an examination by a magistrate, in the
presence of the accused, who is entitled to the aid of counsel and the right of cross-examination of
witnesses, whose testimony Is to be reduced to writing, and upon a certificate thereon by the
magistrate that a described offence has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe
the accused guilty thereof, and an order holding him to answer thereto, requires an information to be
filed against the accused in the Superior Court of the county in which the offence is triable, in the form
of an indictment for the same offence.
Moreover, the words "due process of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State
for murder. The 14th Amendment was designed not to confine the States to a particular mode of
procedure in judicial proceedings, and prohibit them from prosecuting for felonies by information
instead of by indictment, if they chose to abolish the grand jury system. And the words ' due process
of law' in the amendment do not mean and have not the effect to limit the powers of State
governments to prosecutions for crime by indictment; but these words do mean law in its regular
course of administration, according to prescribed forms, and in accordance with the general rules for
the protection of individual rights. It would further mean that it shall also serve as a limitation upon the
powers of the government, brought into being by the Constitution, it has now been added as an
additional security to the individual against oppression by the States themselves; that one of these
institutions is that of the grand jury, an indictment or presentment by which against the accused in
cases of alleged felonies is an essential part of due process of law, in order that he may not be
harassed or destroyed by prosecutions founded only upon private malice or popular.

• Void for Vagueness/Over breadth

What are the two facial challenge on the constitutionality of a statute?

1. Void-for-Vagueness Rule
2. Overbreadth Doctrine

What is the Void-for-Vagueness Rule?

When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that man of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application, that law is
deemed void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential requisite of due process of law because
it denies the accused the right to be informed of the charged against him (Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G. R. No, 148560, November 19, 2001)

What is the Overbreadth Doctrine?

A facial challenge of the statute when a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (Ibid)

Does the two facial challenge applies to penal statute? Why?

No. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.It added that, at
any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that
"[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

(5) David vs. Arroyo

G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

“NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed against the
respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.

ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 107 is void because of its “overbreadth”

2. Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

HELD:
1. No. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. That PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.”

Overbreadth doctrine is a principle of Judicial Review that holds that a law is invalid if it
punishes constitutionally protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the
government may limit to further a compelling government interest.
Legislatures sometimes pass laws that infringe on the First Amendment (American Law)
freedoms of religion, speech, press, and peaceable assembly. When a legislature passes such a law,
a person with a sufficient interest affected by the legislation may challenge its constitutionality by
bringing suit against the federal, state, or local sovereignty that passed it. One common argument in
First Amendment challenges is that the statute is overbroad. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute
that affects First Amendment rights is unconstitutional if it prohibits more protected speech or activity
than is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The excessive intrusion on First
Amendment rights, beyond what the government had a compelling interest to restrict, renders the law
unconstitutional. If a statute is overbroad, the court may be able to save the statute by striking only the
section that is overbroad. If the court cannot sever the statute and save the constitutional provisions, it
may invalidate the entire statute.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which seek to
regulate only “spoken words”.

A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains:

“The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some
of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,”
not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the
speech of those third parties.”

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.

In Younger v. Harris, it was held that:

“The tasks of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative
process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-
by-line analysis of detailed statutes ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.”

A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
A facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness is likewise unwarranted.

Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law
is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application.” It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also
an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also
failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of
PP 1017.

2. The Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

(06) ONG v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 126858

FACTS: Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego filed a complaint claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong,
then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth
disproportionately more than his lawful income.
It was alleged in the complaint that Ong declared P750,000.00 as his cash on hand and in
banks. Within a short period thereafter, he was able to acquire prime real estate properties mostly in
the millionaires’ choice areas in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila costing millions of pesos, which
is obviously disproportionate to his income of just a little more than P200,000.00 per year.
Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his SALN for the years 1988-1990, income tax return,
bank certificate showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from
SGV & Co. (SGV) showing that he received retirement benefits from the latter, a document entitled
Acknowledgement of Trust showing that he acquired one of the questioned assets for his brother-in-
law, and other documents explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned
assets.
A Resolution was issued directing the Ombudsman, in collaboration with the OSG to file a
petition for recovery of ill-gotten/unexplained wealth under RA 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and
6770, against Ong and all other persons concerned.
The accused presented several affirmative defenses, such as the Petition allegedly failed to
state a cause of action because RA 1379 is unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently
define ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Whether RA 1379 is vague, violates the presumption of innocence and the right against self-
incrimination, and breaches the authority and prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.

RULING: The law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired property of
a public officer or employee as that which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. It also provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on these
parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law, therefore, does not
offend the basic concept of fairness and the due process clause of the Constitution.
Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that
property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of presumption of
innocence, it is merely required of the State to establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of
proof shifts to the accused.
The constitutional assurance of the right against self-incrimination likewise cannot be invoked
by petitioners. The right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. In this case, petitioners are not compelled
to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may
present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund
sources in their defense.
 As regards the alleged infringement of the Courts authority to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, suffice it to state that there is no showing that the
Ombudsman or the OSG is about to grant immunity to anyone under RA 1379. The question,
therefore, is not ripe for adjudication.

(7) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

FACTS: The undersigned Ombudsman accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659. It was alleged that during Estrada’s term, he together
with the individuals mentioned above willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire
by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth amounting to P4, 097, 804,173.17, thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Under RA 7080, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, usiness associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or a series of acts described in Sec 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least 50M and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Estrada questions the validity of the
law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms and combination and series in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts” found in Sec 1.

ISSUE: Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional because it suffers from the vice of vagueness?

RULING: The Plunder Law does not suffer vagueness. A statute may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. Series could be clearly understood as a repetition of the same predicate act in
any of the acts under Sec.1 (d) and Combination contemplates the commission of act at least any two
different predicate acts.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would
be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Furthermore, the doctrine of
vagueness cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this
case.

(8) BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998

FACTS: The petition at seeks to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy. Petitioner Ople prays
that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996. It was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
Respondents counter-argue that THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS
WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE
EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING
ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; and A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN
INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.

ISSUE: Whether AO No 308 violates the right to privacy

RULING: Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it
ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be
found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments:
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we
held:
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy
of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always
included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the
Bill of Rights: "Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law." Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

• Substantive Due Process

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council Case Doctrine:

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites,
viz:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
 For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United
States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and
Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application
to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA
9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe
the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its
mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both
the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public
right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as
“communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations,
the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double
contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction
to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA
9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.
The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. It added that,
at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not
vague.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that
"[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate
on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.
A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against
a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights.
 The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the
case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before
it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal
statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would
be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,
observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it
was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are
justified by the “transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.”
American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to
the statute's facial validity.”
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has
been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, the Court
brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax
on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and
the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in
these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged
with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled:
(1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and
(3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful
demand.” Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot re-categorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat
of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
“terrorism” is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows
the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

(9) SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

G.R NO. 178552, OCTOBER 5, 2010
FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners.

HELD: No. A limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally
impossible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. A statute or act suffers from the defect
of vagueness when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge. “Facial” challenge is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be
possible.

(10) Knights of Rizal v. DMCI

FACTS: DMCI-PDI 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue,
Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a
"Forty Nine (49) Storey Torre de Manila. City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining
the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing
among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon
completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of
our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from
the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. Knights Of Rizal, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan,
non-sectarian and non-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646. The KOR argues that
the subject matter of the present suit is one of "transcendental importance, paramount public interest,
of overarching significance to society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the desecration of the
Rizal Monument. Torre de Manila structure will stick]out like a sore thumb, dwarf all surrounding
buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in
Luneta Park. The despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoy's or
offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal,

ISSUE: Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?

HELD: There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. In Manila Electric
Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly
prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the
contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the
pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project. There is one fact that is
crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its
effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument. Specifically, In
Section 47 reads:. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. - Historic site and facilities
shall be conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the
educational and cultural enrichment of the general public.
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and
facilities."Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections
47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a historic site. In this
case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and
"cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument
The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and
welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to
the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the
taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists.Torre de
Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.

Bonus: Rizal History by SC

It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for
his family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
[Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
yaong maligayang araw na sisikat
sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109
[I die just when I see the dawn break,
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with
his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked
to face his executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was early morning, but
the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal
forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his
back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and
finished him off with one pistol shot to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with a
cross and a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations;
and interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to
be a burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was
discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal
Monument, countless anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments built
throughout the world.
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; to the point of
reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but
for the country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That Rizal's statue now stands
facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue
the present orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Spanish captain
who refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s
statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the
blue sky above Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal's
dying wish.

(11) MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO

and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA
G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Who are protected under the due process clause?

Due process applies and protects all persons, without regard to any difference of race, color,
or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is
concerned. Smith Bell and Co v. Natividad. It includes aliens and their means of livelihood. Villegas
vs. Hui Cheng

FACTS: Ordinance No. 6537, was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by the herein
petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate
in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit
fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or
in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government,
and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations,
sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to
stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void on the ground
that is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation and it is arbitrary, oppressive
and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Respondent Judge rendered judgment declaring said Ordinance null and void, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.

RULING: The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its
principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. There is no logic or justification in exacting
P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only
because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
Furthermore, Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard
or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the
ordinance. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring
a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent
an activity per se lawful.
Lastly, requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.

(12) Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

What is meant by liberty?

Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use facilities in all lawful ways. Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
 SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor.
— With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore
making it unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to
be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion
may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor
and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge
“when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with
the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of
being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

(17) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao

39 Phil. 660 (1919)

FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,

On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a
permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a
place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on,

The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior which reads:
Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the legislature cannot delegate this power to provincial authorities.
 2) Whether or not section 2145 of the Administrative is unconstitutional because it
discriminates between individuals based on their religious beliefs.

RULING:
1) No. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head. As quoted, “Who but the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified
to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order? Who but they
are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state?”
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

2) No. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade
of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate
between individuals an account of religious differences.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law.
"Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall
be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class."
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class.
It is to be noted that the legislative intent for the resolution is to educate the Manguianes
through obliging them to live in a permanent settlement which was the only successful method, to
introduce to them civilized customs, and to protect the public forests in which they roam.
What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together
the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals. Segregation really
constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Certainly, their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.

(13) BINAY v. DOMINGO

G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month.
The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.
The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400, 000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds
for the implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) The resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of
the inhabitants of Makati;
(2) Government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) It violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn less

ISSUES:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

HELD: 1. Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause.
 The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law).
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the
people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It
is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of
the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so
as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any
definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of
the common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators,
down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss
of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision however must not be
taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

(14) ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship,
and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court
said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be
forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right
of domain.

FACTS: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as
laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the
district of Sampaloc.
 He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero
Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before
being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the
assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero
from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The
families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao.
They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them
to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it
came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly
assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's
deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that, it should be filed in the city of
Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present.

ISSUE: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also
raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their
knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

HELD: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and
place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the
writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

• Procedural Due Process

(15) Tua v. Mangrobang

G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014

RALPH P. TUA, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA,

FACTS: Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have
three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27,
2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. Respondent claimed, among others, that:
there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his
gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed;
she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her
children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop
his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt
unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as
he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of
withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed;
and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
Respondent thus filed a Petition for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act
(RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband,
petitioner. The Petition was for herself and in behalf of her minor children.
The RTC issued ex parte a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262 and sought to lift the TPO. Without awaiting the
resolution of the RTC on the foregoing, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the
TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Section 15 of RA 9262, allowing ex parte application of a TPO, violate the due
process clause?
2. Is there an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to
issue protection orders?

Ruling: 1. No. The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after
ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is
within the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that
the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond
or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required
before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent. SDTaHc
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should
be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. . . . . The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.
 2. No. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary
judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is
in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. — Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the
BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO.
BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent,
or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function
of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."

Doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court.

Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Court’s authority to settle
justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A. 9262
allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court
and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with
the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress
of wrongs for violations of such rights.

(16) SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015

FACTS: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two
(2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in
the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be furnished with copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s
request was made “[pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3b, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and
to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present
certiorari case.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD: NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.
 First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, for ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation
that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent
with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit
the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "After such affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits." At this point, there is still
no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-
affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave
abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014
Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for
the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the
rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient
to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by
the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation
could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the
evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in
administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the
establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which
would justify conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause,
the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely
or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations
will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood
or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-
affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held
in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen.
Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made
by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary
investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the
Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere
statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional
requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures
for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of
parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in
the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required.
To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer
must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In
preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the
same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and supervision
of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay,
as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines
in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary
investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of
constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending
in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates
a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those
serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction
violated constitutional due process.

(17) Diona v. Balangue

G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan of ₱45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property. Respondents failed to pay
notwithstanding demand. Petitioners then filed a complaint against them for the payment of the
principal obligation, for actual damages, attorney’s fee, foreclosure of the said land, and costs of the
suit.
Respondents were served summons and despite their motion to extend period to answer, they
failed to file any responsive pleadings. RTC then declared them in default and decided in favor of the
petitioners. They granted the interest rate of 5% monthly when the petitioners merely sought 12% per
annum. In a following order, RTC granted respondents’ order and modified the interest rate from 5%
monthly to 12% per annum.
Respondents were displeased with the previous Order and elevated the matter to the CA. CA
pronounced that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. The part of this judgment by the RTC was
then annulled including the transfer of title for the land.

ISSUE: Whether CA committed grave and serious error of law when it granted the annulment of
judgment despite the fact that said decision has become final and already executed.
RULING: No. We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to
due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is an exception to the final
judgment rule where the other party is without fault on his part, failed to avail of the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. It also recognizes due process
as additional ground to annul a judgment based on jurisprudence. Also in this case, the respondents’
former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case, it is not through the own fault of the
respondents. Said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an answer. He also
did not question the awer of 5% monthly interest rate.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.
When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed
from P45,000 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. She did not allege or pray for the
disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the
RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It
violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that
the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and
present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was
seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.
To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the
Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action.43
Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly
alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence.

(18) MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMELEC and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN

G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013

FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision
of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of
Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for
execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided
to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it
issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray
the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated
April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and
declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption
proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had
not been preserved. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion
for reconsideration.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections. On March 12,
2013, the Court dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not
been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division
directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value
as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and irregularities had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
Thus, Maliksi filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on
appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards.

RULING: The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the
decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied
to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with
the use of the printouts of the ballot images.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the
ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by
the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact,
the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Division,
while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount
proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First Division did
not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance
to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition
for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount
proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash
deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s
decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due process
because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did
the orders offer the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on
the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play,
because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the
party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and
recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at such
proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First
Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state
the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had
no intention of giving the parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings.
The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the
2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to
countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.
After all, it is the Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-vis government
actions.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013;
and DIRECTS the COMELEC en banc to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture
images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by
using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their
representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.

(19) ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI v. The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR

FACTS: PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and

PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their oath of
office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court. Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor
was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a
controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to
Judge Blancaflor to assure the acquittal of the accused. Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion.
Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. Also
summoning Rodriguez. Then he filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge
Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been
promulgated, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for
direct contempt and violation of their oath of office.

PETITIONERS DEFENSE: Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for
contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and
present their own evidence

HELD: Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.The power to punish a person in contempt of
court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly
administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that
the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the
vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being
drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between
him and the accused.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the
contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished
summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront
witnesses are absolutely unnecessary; the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge
Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as
correctly concluded by the OSG. Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing)
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by
pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind
that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The
contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt.
Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or
prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition
provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned
that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him

(20) TAÑADA v. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

PUBLICATION AS PART OF DUE PROCESS

In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, the Court held that publication is imperative to the
validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and
is an indispensable part of due process. Thus, in Republic {National Telecommunications
Commission) v. Express Telecommunications, G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002, the National
Telecommunciations Commission, in granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate, applied
the 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, and not the 1993 Revised Rules, because the latter had
not yet been published (although the same had already been filed with the National Administrative
Register).

MAY A LAW BE GIVEN EFFECT IF IT WAS NOT PUBLISHED? WHY?

No. The publication requirement goes into the due process clause. It is unfair to the people if
law would take effect without them knowing the said laws through their publication Tañada v. Tuvera,
for publication gives the people presumptive knowledge of the law.

Q. May the publication of laws prior to their effectivity be dispensed with?

A. No. Publication in every case is indispensable. Total omission of publication would be a denial of
due process in that the people would not know what laws to obey. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
(1986).
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot
be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive
law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

[ALTERNATIVE DIGEST]

Tanada v. Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,”
as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law of
public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication”? Where is the publication to be
made? When is the publication to be made? the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette

ISSUE: Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of
General Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?
HELD: Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that
under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did
not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less
important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

(21) PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. HON PRESIDING JUDGE

ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC.
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996

Q. What is the rationale of the grant of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers to

administrative bodies?

A. "[A]s a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in
the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice." Philippine International
Trading Corporation v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 421,444-45 (citing
Solid Homes Inc. v Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 [1989]).

FACTS: The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic
of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine
Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in
an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one
is to one ratio. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner
PITC from private respondents, such that the latter both barred from importing goods from PROC.
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on January 20, 1992,
against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58.[4] The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to process applications of
goods from PROC.[5] Hearings on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone,
both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippines laws, individually applied for
authority to import from PROC with the petitioner, They were granted such authority after satisfying
the requirements for importers, and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their
importations from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Firestone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992,[6] thus
joining Remington in the latter’s charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the questioned
Administrative Order is an undue restrictions of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
The court ruled that PITCs authority to process and approve applications for imports from
SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already
been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by the PITC is valid

HELD: No. While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly
recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now limited only to new or non-
traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is no
indication in the law of the removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in
the area of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory
power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted
under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to DTI as one of its line
agencies, and was given the focal task of implementing the departments programs. The absence of
the regulatory power formerly enshrined in the Special Provisions of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO
133, and the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean,
however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view
that PITC still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under
the supervision of, the Department of Trade and Industry.
The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. It has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its
ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the
courts of justice. Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One
thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by
our regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R.
No. L- 50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give them
broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue
regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases powers that had
previously been reserved to the legislatures and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by
Administrative Agencies, p. 166.)
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of
such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it
is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The fact that the amendments to
Administrative Order were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement
an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

(22) REPUBLIC V. EXTELCOM

GR 147096, January 15, 2002

FACTS: On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation (now Bayan

Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional
Authority (PA). Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case No.
92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application.
Bayantel was awarded with the PA. In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS,
the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition
or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own
initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and
supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after
completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant of
authority asked for. (underscoring ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own initiative; accordingly, a provisional authority may be
issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.

ISSUE: Whether the grant of PA to Bayantel should be based on 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure
for it to be valid?
RULING: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation before it can take effect. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification
by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly
indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional
authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on
February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies
that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and
effect.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the
records show that the amended application filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance
of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional authority motu
proprio. In the case at bar, the said application was ordered archived because of lack of available
frequencies at the time, and made subject to reinstatement upon availability of the requisite frequency.
To be sure, there was nothing irregular in the revival of the application after the condition therefor was
fulfilled.

• IMPARTIAL COURT TRIBUNAL

(23) TANADA V. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

G.R. No. 70632

FACTS: The PAEC, now the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is a government agency
under the DOST mandated to undertake research and development activities in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, institute regulations on the said uses, and carry out the enforcement of said
regulations to protect the health and safety of radiation workers and the general public. The PAEC
exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.
The objects of dispute in this case are the pamphlets issued by PAEC which clearly indicate
the pre-judgment that Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) in Bataan, the only nuclear plant
under construction in the Philippines, is safe. The pamphlets were in relation to the NPC’s motion for
a license to operate the said power plant.
One pamphlet gives an overview specifically of PNPP-1, lauds the safety of nuclear power,
and concludes with a statement of the benefits to be derived when the PNPP-1 start operation.
“…When the PNPP-1 starts operating, it will generate a power of 620 megawatts enough to
supply 15 percent of the electricity needs in Luzon. This is estimated to result in savings of US $ 160
million a year, representing the amount of oil displaced.
Aside from being a reliable source of electricity, nuclear power has an excellent safety record
and has been found to result in lower occupational and public risks than fossil fired (coal or oil)
stations.”
Another pamphlet states that nuclear power is working now in other countries and "it should
work for us too" because it is "safe" and economical".
A third pamphlet states that the power plant will not adversely affect the public or the flora or
fauna in the area.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents PAEC Commissioners are prejudiced and biased in their judgment
on the safety of the PNPP-1.

RULING: Yes. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners
would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in
judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an
important inquiry.
The Court ruled that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects of PNPP-1 should be
characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by technical rules
of evidence, and in keeping with the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, the
Court Resolved to Order respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1.

Dissenting Opinions:
 1. The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be dismissed because the petitioners have no cause
of action for prohibition and injunction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction.
Prohibition does not lie against it.
2. The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as
to which the Executive Department has discretional authority.
3. The pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of nuclear plants which
have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners themselves can be taken
as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the nuclear plant in question.
The said articles refer to the safety of nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan
nuclear plant. The respondent Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the
petition pending before them and can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented
during the continuation of the hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to
the Intermediate Appellate Court.

(24) Anzaldo vs. Clave

119 SCRA 353 (1982)

FACTS: The Science Research Supervisor II position was vacant and both Dr Felicidad Anzaldo and
Dr Eulalia Venzon were next-in-rank for the said position. Venzon was recommended for the position
to which Anzaldo protested. The position was not filled up until National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) Officer-In-Charge Doctor Pedro G. Afable appointed Anzaldo to that position
(Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after a
thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and
61 points to Doctor Venzon ). The same was approved by Civil Service Commission. Venzon
contested this and appealed to the Office of the President. This protest was sent to Civil Service
Commission and was decided in favour of Venzon by CSC Chairman Jacobo Clave. CSC Chairman
Clave and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23,
1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in
conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the
Civil Service Commission.
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides
that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil
Service Commission."
Anzaldo filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and she appealed to Office of the
President to which Clave is concurrently Presidential Executive Assistant. Appeal was revoked
and ruled as “as recommended by the Civil Service Commission.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Clave denied due process to Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion?

RULING: Yes, it is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service
Commission. It was held that the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave affirming
his own decision when he is still Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was void because
it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice as
per the court’s decision in Zambales Chromite Mining case (where it was held that the decision of
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a
mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
and was a mockery of administrative justice).
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon
should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different
from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a
contested appointment. In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same
person in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C.
Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the
Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.
 Decision of respondent set aside and Anzaldo’s appointment declared valid.

(25) CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. v. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of

government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: Tejano (Petitioner), and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G was alleged as
persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. During the initial preliminary
investigation, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, participated herein by concurring the
approval of Ferrer (Deputy Special Prosecutor) in the recommendation for the filing of the information
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. Few weeks later,
after the information was filed. Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period
of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation. Subsequently, the reinvestigation was approved.
Reinvestigation ensue, Special Prosecution Officer III Micael was convinced that no probable
cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, He then
recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. However,
Now Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation
as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the
marginal note assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.
Thus, the present case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto exhibited partiality in exercising his judgment?
HELD: Yes, Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be
the same person whose decision is under review. Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during
the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of
Rep. Act No. 6770.
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already
convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a
farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a
turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on
appeal. We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. V. Court of Appeals which
succinctly explained that: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not
turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case.
The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view
since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability
of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the
judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the
case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when
appearance is as important as reality.
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desiertos disapproval of the 03
November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not
cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC: . . . The
infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner
was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of
petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only
entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right
is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review
of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. (Underlining supplied)

(26) Tumey vs. Ohio

273 US 510, 7 March 1927

FACTS: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of
North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal
because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied
the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and
costs were paid.
Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas
of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the
mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First
Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor.
On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey’s application to require the Court of
Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right,
asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional
grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason
that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought
to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme
Court, to which it was rightly directed.

ISSUE:
Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.
HELD: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus, matters of
kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely
of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the
person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor
thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for
trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had
been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and
the ordinance.
The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or
in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so
small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat lex. The Court
cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote,
trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for
the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective
loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the
result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the
defendant here.
The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in
which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of
the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state
and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a
mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law
presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment
on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court.
Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an
impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the
disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial
needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification.

(27) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA,
CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE
ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA and JANE GO

FACTS: This is a petition for restraining order which seeks to:

(a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's prayer to
inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the RTC of Tacloban City from hearing
Criminal Cases entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of
the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and
(b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal
cases.
In view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219, Judge Espina enjoined
the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent
Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go.

ISSUE: Should the petition be granted.

RULING: One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that
there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in
the following words:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated, they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point
in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to ensure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade
of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denoucement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the
pertinent law.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly
assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous
decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in
the killing of her husband Dominador Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable
basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it
would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch
7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared
disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further
ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.

(28) Luis A. Tabuena, et al. v. Sandiganbayan

268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of
government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
 stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in
cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated
in a Presidential memorandum.
In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and
Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA,respectively,
caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs.
Fe Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she
received from Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCCnever received the money.
The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta.
They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds inthe
amount of P55M.
Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in
the amended information, but it would appear that they were convicted for malversation with
negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional
right to be informed of the accusation.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted as an impartial court in the conviction of the accused.

RULING: Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum and in good faith.
The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President
himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued.
And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation
illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without
question.
However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the accused's basic
constitutional right to due process. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena
and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the
court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an
appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the
subject of assignments of error or not. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due
process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness,
assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due
process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only
be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due
process.
HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

• PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

Cite two (2) tests in determining whether a court was prejudiced by an over publicity of a
crime.

1. Possibility of Prejudice test where the day-to-day or gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his partiality. The
test was rejected in People v. Teehankee, Jr, and in Martelino v. Alejandro, where it was said that
our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

2. Test of actual prejudice where, to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. The totality of the circumstances in a case must be considered in order to determine the
prejudice in the mind of the court through the barrage of publicity.

(29) Sheppard v. Maxwell

384 U.S. 333 (1966)

FACTS: In 1954, Cleveland-area physician Sam Sheppard was arrested for the murder of his
pregnant wife Marilyn. During the entire pretrial period, virulent and incriminating publicity about
petitioner and the murder made the case notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges and
countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried. The case came to trial two weeks before
the November election. The chief prosecutor was a candidate for municipal judge, and the presiding
judge was a candidate for reelection. Judge Edward J. Blythin allowed free rein for the media. This
included publication of the addresses of the witnesses, photographs of all 12 jurors, prominent
seating in the courtroom for the press, and radio and television broadcasts from the courthouse.
Radio and press pundits aired all sorts of gossip as if it were credible evidence. Even as they
deliberated, jurors were allowed to phone their friends. Despite his claims of innocence and what
some saw as a lack of physical evidence, the jury found Sheppard guilty of second-degree murder,
and he was sentenced to life in prison. Sheppard petitioned for habeas corpus on the grounds that he
was denied a fair trial due to the prejudice to jurors caused by pretrial publicity.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial publicity interfere with defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process right to
a fair trial

RULING: The court found that Sheppard had been denied due process and reversed his murder
conviction. The decision noted that “the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard
from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive
influences in the courtroom.” The [trial] judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of
the courtroom by newsmen. The decision also noted the balance between the First Amendment’s
freedom of the press and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial: “Collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to
regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.”

(30) HUBERT J. P. WEBB v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON

G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO v. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995

FACTS: June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the
crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith a preliminary investigation was conducted of those charged
with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the
documents.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime
at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October
27, 1992. To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidences.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to
hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed
against petitioners and their co-respondents, On the same date, it filed the corresponding
Information against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The
case was presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge
Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid
any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment
to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995,
petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in
Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities
after filing their petitions before us.
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22,
1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro, the principal witness is inherently weak and uncorroborated.
They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-
blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the
witnesses for the NBI.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious
prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended
their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them;
(2) Whether the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide;
(3) Whether the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and
(4) Whether the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

RULING: We find the petitions bereft of merit.

1. No.
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put
in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over
the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
2. No.
In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of
the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do
not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search
warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of
an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused."
3. No.
The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. No.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
Panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently
explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately
made to distort the truth.
 Petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of
the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality
of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

(31) PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001

FACTS: This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Court’s decision on the “Allan Gomez-
Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay” case that drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the
middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, all those charged appellants herein
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and
sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court
ordered all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims’ respective families by way of civil
indemnities.

ISSUE: Whether the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial of the appellants?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they were denied the right to impartial
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high-stake criminal trials, but the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a
fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records
herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., because
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.

• NOTICE AND HEARING

What are the minimum requirements of due process?

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the
exceptions?
1. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between
the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.
2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed.
3. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals.

Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing?

Because of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the
general welfare from a clear and present danger.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS.

 The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its
totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has
to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are
a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.
There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these
requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which
may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the
nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.

Q. Does the Comelec have jurisdiction over intra-party disputes?

A. The COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its
legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such
power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal"
and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections." To
resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so
far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need only resolve such questions
as may be necessaxy in the exercise of its enforcement powers. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
161265, February 24,2004; Atienza, et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,2010.

(32) ATIENZA v. COMELEC

GR No. 188920

FACTS: Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced his party withdrew support
for the administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, Atienza, LP Chairman,
alleged that Drilon made the announcement without consulting first the party.
Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza
as LP President. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election
claiming that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were
not properly convened. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since
the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Subsequently, the LP
held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the
election of Roxas as the new LP President. As for the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP
members, they argue that it is a violation of their constitutionality-protected right to due process of
law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing
before expelling them from the party. The COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that
related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party
matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

ISSUE: Whether Roxas, et al violated Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due process by the
latter’s expulsion from the party.

RULING: No, political parties is a private organization not a state instrument. The discipline of
members by a political party does no involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of
due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to
prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that the party members may have
correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter.
Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts for the
enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its
agencies.

(33) SUSIE CHAN-TAN v. JESSE C. TAN

G.R. No. 167139

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married and were blessed with two children but later on, the
former filed for the annulment of their marriage. They presented to the court a compromise
agreement between them containing provisions regarding custody, support, visitation rights etc. which
was later on granted by the court including the grant of the annulment of the marriage. But the
petitioner violated some of the provisions of the said agreement which made the respondent to file a
omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children as well as the turnover of titles and
documents in possession of the petitioner to the respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due process on account of
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence
because of the negligence of her counsel. Such motion, which was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period, was denied by the court.
Again, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the prior
resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. She prayed that an order be issued
vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit.
The trial court denied both the motions filed by petitioner. It held that the prior decision had
become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely
appeal having been filed by either party.

DEFENSE OF THE PETITIONER: She contends that she was denied due process when her counsel
failed to file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondents’ omnibus motion

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the court which was made final and executory due to absence of an
appeal within the 15-day can be vacated

RULING: In the present case, the previous resolutions of the trial court had become final and
executory upon the lapse of the 15-day period to appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel
resulting in petitioner’s loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts
judgments. Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have
lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she
was denied her day in court as the records show that her counsel tried to call her, regarding the
motion filed by the respondent, but failed.
Clearly, despite her counsels’ efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the
hearings on respondent’s motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was
left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the
evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to the Court crying denial of due
process.

(34) SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD VS TORCITA

330 SCRA 153 (2000)
Police officer Torcita was charged on twelve counts of conduct of unbecoming an officer. The
twelve counts were dismissed but he was convicted of Simple Irregularity in the Performance
of Duty of having alcohol in his breath. Proper?

No. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing, a
finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried
cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Summary
Dismissal Board v. Torcita

FACTS: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2
Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-
up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4)
passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina
Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision
almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation
owned by the congressman.
The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita
and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified
himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around
them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up.
Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt.
Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints
were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation
took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of
violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was
"in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a
simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of
duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita
appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP,
Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a
petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of
the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law).
The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for
certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita
guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by
petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent
could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed.
The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: May Torcita be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the
original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban?

RULING: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while
in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in
his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges
initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).
It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court (ABD
Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically
prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the findings of
the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The records do not bear
out the specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were
consolidated at the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police
Officer." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that
C/Insp. Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties.
The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal
discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by
factual findings referring to this particular offense. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that
even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have
the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time
that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

(35) SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, and MARK B. JIMENEZ

G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of
government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Availability of due process in extradition proceedings

Neither the treaty nor the extradition law precludes these rights from a prospective extradite.
An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty
or the implementing law. (Sec. of Justice v. Lantion)
FACTS: On January 13, 1977 President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The
Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation.
On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon signed RP-US Extradition
Treaty. On June 18, 1999, U.S. sent a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez
to the United States. Attached to the extradition request is the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based
on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation
of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contributions in name of another
Private respondent wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 requesting petitioner to furnish him copies
of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private
respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Petitioner denied requests because it is still premature to give respondent copies of the extradition
papers. Petitioner is merely determining whether the procedures and requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1069 and RP-US treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available. The preliminary investigation that petitioner is doing is not akin to preliminary investigation
of criminal cases.
When can he request? It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person
sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to
evaluate said documents.
Private respondent filed with the RTC a petition against the Secretary of Justice
for mandamus (to compel petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give
him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari and
prohibition.

ISSUE: Is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings.

HELD: Yes, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of
notice and hearing will not go against the RP-US Treaty or the Extradition law. Neither the Treaty nor
the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition
proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied
the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 530)
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondent’s liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does
not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent’s due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true
to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation
of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice,
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the
opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public
servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337),
the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments
which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport
of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is
not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to
the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had
not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?

(36) People vs. Estrada

G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000

FACTS: In November 1994, Roberto Estrada entered St John’s Cathedral in Dagupan City. He sat on
the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop was leading a confirmation service. The assistant requested
Estrada to vacate the chair but the he declined. Someone called the security guard Rogelio Mararac
to assist. Upon approaching and tapping Estrada to vacate the chair, he was then stabbed to death
by the same.
Counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been
exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. This was denied and during hearing did not take the
witness stand. His counsel presented instead testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident
physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital. She confirmed that
appellant had been confined at the BGH and that he suffered from “Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
Regional Trial Court found Estrada guilty of the crime murder.

ISSUE: Whether the hearing/ proceeding is null on the ground of violating the requirements of due
process?

RULING: SC vacated the RTC decision and remanded the mental examination of accused. The fact
that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive
evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it
solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state
of a person’s mental health. To determine the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the
court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant,
especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental illness.
By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a
fair trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore nullified. He who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. The absence of direct proof
however, does not entirely discount the probability that accused was not of sound mind at that time.
In passing the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the test is found in the
question whether the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance which the law secures or
gives. There are 2 distinct matters to be determined under this test (1) whether the defendant is
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a
defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests
generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court took it solely upon itself to
determine the sanity of the accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or
some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s
mental health. The court should have ordered the examination of the accused, especially in the light
of the latter’s history of mental health.
 (37) Lim vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 11397, 2002

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of
government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said
that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down
the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license.
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Mayor Alfredo Lim. Policemen
under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and
health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant
operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work
permit applications of Bistro’s staff. At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of
their respective positions. The trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction. However Lim issued closure of Bistro operations, even sending policemen to
carry out his closure order and filed motion to dissolve the injunction order. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case. However, on
July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western
Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police
implemented at once.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory
preliminary injunction [NO] and whether Mayor Lim violated the due process clause of the constitution
on the acts he ordered {YES]

RULING: SC uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals. In denying Lims petition, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after
hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced. The Court of Appeals reasoned thus: A writ of
preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the
movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to
by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency
of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing
prior to the filing of the case.
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business
licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to
issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer
to the violation of the condition(s) on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power
to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for
the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However,
the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or
investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business
or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in
these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The
due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the
instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are
protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.

• OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND DUE PROCESS.

It is doctrinally settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but
is merely a right conferred by statute [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,
2003]. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render the same defective.
The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust
the court of its jurisdiction over the case [Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22,
2006].
The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it [Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001].
It may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal [People v.
Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8, 1997].

(38) Budiongan v. De la Cruz

G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for
allegedly misappropriating P450,000.00 funds, originally for the purchase of a road roller for the
municipality, which was then realigned for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto
Bernaldez Street. Thereafter, upon the commencement with the project, it was discovered that there
was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.
 A complaint against the petitioners was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was
no fund appropriated for the purpose. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found
probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and
Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the charge was modified from
violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
against petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information charging them with violation of
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and remanded the case to
the Office of the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. Finding that the Amended
Information contains all the material averments necessary to make out a case for the first mode of
violating Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its
Resolution.

Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity
to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying the motion but granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a motion for reinvestigation) which was denied for lack of
merit.
Hence, petitioners filed a petition. They maintain that the modification of the charge from
violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No.
3019 denied their rights to due process since they were not given the opportunity to answer and
present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue
that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolutions finding probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were denied their rights to due process?

RULING: No, the petitioners were not deprived of due process.

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over
the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not
come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same
alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute
commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a
reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even
without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their
rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned
in Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the
petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt."

(39) Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr. v. Alexis C. Almendras

G.R No. 179491
FACTS: Petitioner sent letters with similar contents on February 7, 1996 to House Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr., and on February 26, 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The
letter contains malicious words against respondent. These letters were allegedly printed, distributed,
circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and
Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’
good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against
petitioner.
(Ruling of the RTC): Petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his answer, despite
several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. RTC ruled that respondent was libeled and
defamed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial
court.
(Ruling of the CA): Petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was given
full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by
merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. He was, as maintained by the
respondent, sending open libelous and unsealed letters, duly published and circulated in
Digos. Consequently, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived due process

HELD: Petitioner was NOT deprived of his right to due process.

On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his own
counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment
and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of
his own volition, but because of his doctor’s strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple
coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on July 16,
2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel
represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in court to present his
side. The SC found no reason to depart from the general rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of
his counsel.
Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his
medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a
pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the
progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he rightfully
expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of
the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative “of making
the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case.” For his failure to
do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general
rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will
set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or
negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation
of law.

(40) EDELBERT C. UYBOCO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: The petitioner was the President of Gaikoku a private individual and his co-accused
Rodolfo G. Valencia as a public offer authorized by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan to purchase
dumptrucks from Gaikoku Company were found guilty for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan for
conspiring with the overpricing in the purchase of dump trucks from Japan and not considering due
process in accordance with Section 369 of the Local Government Code on negotiated purchase,
which required that there must have been at least two failed public biddings before a contract for a
negotiated purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to present any substantial evidence of
the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented evidence that the alleged failed biddings
were merely simulated.
Uyboco though a private individual bear to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019
Uyboco aggrieved, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari alleging that his constitutional
rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.
He further contends that:
1. his former counsel failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because
counsel was absent on the trial date.
 2. Counsel failed to prepare and file a memorandum
3. Counsel merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused
Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings
and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense."

ISSUE: Whether Uyboco is denied the opportunity to be heard.

HELD: NO, Uyboco was never denied of due process and opportunity to be heard due to his former
counsel’s error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm
of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel withinthe scope of a
"general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general
rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions
recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require. UYBOCO'S CASE DOES NOT FALL IN ANY
OF THE EXCEPTIONS.
In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance
relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in
due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard
is the very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel,
the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the
client’s cause.
In the present case, Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the opportunity to
present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present
any evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that
"after earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it
unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further
testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and
hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an
opportunity tobe heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process.

(41) Roxas v. Vasquez

G.R. No. 114944, June 19, 2001

FACTS: Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the PC-INP. The PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of sixty five (65)
units of fire trucks. Accordingly, the public bidding was held. By majority vote, Nikki-Hino of the Tahei
Co., Ltd. was voted as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of sixty-five
units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and
Tahei Company, Ltd.
The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchase
of the sixty-five fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint
for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Ombudsman. The Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where respondents submitted their
respective counter-affidavits and it recommended the indictment of all respondents, except for one.
On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of the
complaints against petitioners.
This latter recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a
Memorandum and filed before the Sandiganbayan. However, a reinvestigation was conducted by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor. Without any notice to or participation of petitioners, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order, recommending that herein petitioners be likewise
indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation, while
Ombudsman Vasquez approved the recommendation.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved
the recommendation in the second assailed Order. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan impleading petitioners as additional accused.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners indictment, on reinvestigation was without notice nor participation of
petitioners, null and void for being violative of their constitutional right to due process.

RULING: Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at the reinvestigation render
the questioned issuances of respondent Office of the Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly
settled in the recent case ofEspinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as follows -- xxx.
And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that under the
Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec.
7, in relation to Sec. 4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
actively participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a matter of right in
the stage of the reinvestigation. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. (underscoring ours)
At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is
well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective
Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in
Criminal Case No. 18956.

(42) BAILINANG P. MAROHOMBSAR v. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG

465 Phil. 599

Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of
government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
 In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said
that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down
the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing [Chua
v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No.
RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149800,
November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process because he
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted
upon, albeit unfavorably.
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Marawi Regional Trial Court was charged with gross ignorance
of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection with his issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary restraining order in a Civil Case.
Marohombsar was the defendant in the Civil Case. The case was filed on March Yasmira
Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC, Marawi City. In the said complaint,
Pangadapun questioned the legality of Marohombsar’s appointment as provincial social welfare officer
V of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsar’s appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said
position as officer-in-charge.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 6, 1999. Summons, together
with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a preliminary conference would be held on
March 22, 1999, was also served on both parties. On March 18, 1999, Marohombsar filed an ex parte
urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given until March 26, 1999 to comment and,
pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended up to said date. On March 22, 1999, respondent
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived
the raffle of the case. He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction from April 6, 1999 to April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. On March 29, 1999, respondent gave
Pangadapun up to April 5, 1999 to file her comment and again, the TRO was extended to that date.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 5,
1999, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and
issued the preliminary injunction the following day.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge denied the petitioner his right to due process denied due process
because the preliminary injunction was issued without hearing.

RULING: NO. Respondent judge is absolved of all the charges against him.
Complainant’s assertion that she was denied due process because the preliminary injunction
was issued without hearing is untenable.
In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing
before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary
injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is
not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a
party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have
in support of his defense.
In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question,
hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot
claim that he has been denied due process when he was availed of the opputunity to present his
position.

• EXCEPTIONS TO NOTICE AND HEARING REQUIREMENTS

What are the minimum requirements of due process?

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
 Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the
exceptions?

1. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between
the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.
2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed.
3. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals.

Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing?

Because of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the
general welfare from a clear and present danger.

Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989]

RATE FIXING POWER EXERCISED IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER REQUIRES PRIOR NOTICE

AND HEARING.

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other
order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the
applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides: "Section 16.
Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. — The Commission shall have power,
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine
individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public
service"
"Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines — may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same
applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact — based
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more
than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-
examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking
of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing." This
rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. to wit: "It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheiner,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of the administrative
agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The
validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not
involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies
and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing
in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances
involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or
quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

(43) PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

180 SCRA 218

FACTS: Herein petitioner, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, is engaged in providing

for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued
without prior notice and
hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process for
having been issued without prior notice and hearing and that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.

HELD: The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that
there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's
financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular
aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No
rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to
assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its
business requirements.
The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are,
therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in
its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.
Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross examine the inspector who issued
the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other
order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET
ASIDE.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST:

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE CORP. V. ALCUAZ

G.R. NO. 84818, DEC 18, 1989

Without conducting any hearing the National Telecommunications Communication ordered

PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15% Valid?

Changing existing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence it must be preceded by a hearing.

The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical
purposes it is final as to the period covered. PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz
FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted “a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment
and facilities for international satellite communications.” Since 1968, it has been leasing its satellite
circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, and other telecommunication companies. It was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing
said executive order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public
convenience. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services.
Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and
maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
The NTC extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT
assailed said order.

ISSUE: Whether the NTC is required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing
order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s application.

HELD: YES. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact although patently superficial, that
there is merit in a reduction of some rates charged based on initial evaluation of petitioner’s financial
statements- without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or
aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding reduction rate. No rationalization was
offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that
petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements.
The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are,
therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in
its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.
Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice
and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC order violates
procedural due process because it was issued motopropio without notice to PHILCOMSAT
and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,”
which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present
its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its
questioned order. While NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt
from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement
of reasonableness.

(44) Suntay v. People

G.R. No. L-9430; 29 Jun 1957; 101 Phil 833
 Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of
government.

REQUISITES:

i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the petitioner attributed
partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant
case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same
when he was Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it
is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review judges.
In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in Imelda Romualdez
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that
when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process
of law.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28, 2004].
Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation
stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co- equal branch of the government, the Executive,
which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our
foreign relations [Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,
2000; Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said
that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down
the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing [Chua
v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No.
RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149800,
November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process because he
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted
upon, albeit unfavorably.
There are cases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating
due process. Among these are the cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the
commission of a crime [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 833].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is necessary, because
otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art.
VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FACTS: On or about June 21, 1954, the Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon
City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City
and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years.
On January 10, 1955, petitioner Emilio Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs. On January 20, 1955, he left the Philippines for San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. The respondent Secretary on March 7,
1955 instructed the Ambassador to the United States to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer
the criminal charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his
constitutional right to due process.

RULING: NO. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing
a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held
to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and
the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of
the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due
process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would
be violative of the said clause.

(45) GEORGE DE BISSCHOP v. EMILIO L. GALANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-18365, May 31, 1963

FACTS: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this
country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag
Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with
the Bureau of Immigration.
In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of Immigration Office, Benjamin de
Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise
for promotions of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that De Bisschop is suspected
of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication
advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by
the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de
Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the
Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September 1959.
No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall
his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, De Bisschop filed the present
case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein respondent-
appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee. During the hearing, only
documentary evidence was presented.
In his brief, appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred (a) in
holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearing on all
applications for extension of stay of aliens; and (b) in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to
promulgate written decisions in such cases.

ISSUE: Whether the due process clause (notice and hearing requirements) is violated in this case.

RULING: NO. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of
the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part
of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippines
Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to
uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of
immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may
warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency.
This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular
case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a, mere
formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation
proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in
court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
"The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and
not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law,
has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of
which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process of law as is judicial process. While a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest
upon different principles. * * * in certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may
be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due
process of law." (Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194)
There is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must
render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay.

(46) Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso

161 SCRA 232 (1988)
G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988

FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication Office,
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents, crew
members of the MPV “Silver Reefer,” for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with
the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After
joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their
respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private
respondents submitted a position paper. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda the public
respondent rendered a decision on September 9,1987 the dispositive part of which Dismiss of the
instant case.A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the
petitioners’ counsel through the receptionist but According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the
envelope containing the decision. Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ
of execution was served on them by NLRC Deputy Sheriff.
Petitioners, through new counsel, filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution’ on the
ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and
executory.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner were denied due process of law because the respondent POEA
Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing?adrianantazo.wordpress.com

HELD: NO, the petitioners’ allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature
because the decision had not been received by their counsel is unconvincing. Petitioners failed to
submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which
she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator’s ruling that the
decision had been properly served on petitioners’ counsel and that it is now final and unappealable,
should be sustained. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied due
process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they
would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This
procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private
respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed
a motion to resolve. The petitioners’ counsel did not oppose either the “Motion to Resolve” or the
respondents “Motion for Execution of Decision” dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished
them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in
the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST:

Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso

161 SCRA 232 (1988)
G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988
FACTS: Var-Orient Shipping Co filed a complaint with POEA against crewmembers for having
allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners that supposedly resulted in
damages. the case was heard and the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and
thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda,
Tomas Achacoso, POEA Administrator rendered decision in favour of the crew. A copy of the
decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners’ counsel.
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them
by the Sherriff. Petitioner filed filed an ‘urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution’ on the ground that
the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing?

RULING: Petition denied. Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners ‘allegation that they were denied
due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. The fact is that at the hearing of the case it was agreed by the parties that they would
file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This
procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.

• ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

In AngTibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635, the Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due
process, as follows:
(a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
in support thereof;
(b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(c) The decision must have something to support itself;
(d) The evidence must be substantial;
(e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
(f) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision; and
(g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decision.
Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires notice and hearing.
The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion
to set aside his proclamation. In Namil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003, the
COMELEC issued the questioned order annulling the proclamation on the basis of private
respondent’s allegations and the recommendation of the law department, without giving notice to the
candidate proclaimed. Thus, the COMELEC order was declared void.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Q. What are the essential requirements of procedural due process before administrative
agencies?

A. Briefly, the following are required:

"(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected."
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 256, 267 (citing Air
Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489, 492 [1971]); Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69
Phil. 635 (1940).
 (47) Ang Tibay vs. CIR
GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it
averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the National Labor Union, Inc. was denied a due process by the Court of Industrial
Relations.

RULING: The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents
and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. have something to support the decision
4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as
adequate to support a conclusion."
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them.
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them.
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
The motion for new trial is granted.

(48) MONTEMAYOR v. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION

Q. Montemayor was a full-time professor. Charged with immoral advances he was investigated
with the assistance of counsel, and dismissed in accordance with the Manual of Policies of
the University. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Board he was ordered reinstated.
Should he be reinstated?

A. No. Removal was with due process. Montemayor v. Araneta University, L-44251,31 May 1977
(77 SCRA 321).

NOTE: The Court later clarified that the Montemayor decision did not find Montemayor guilty of
immoral conduct. Its sole import was that there was no violation of due process in the labor
proceeding but that it did not preclude Montemayor from suing the University for damages. Araneta
University v. Argel, G.R. No. 48076, March 13,1980.
Later, on November 9, 1983, in a suit for damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan, Montemayor won a judgment for damages against the University. The case later went to
the Intermediate Appellate Court and Montemayor won it there on September 3,1985 and again on
March 21,1986. Thus ends Montemayor's struggle for vindication of his honor.

FACTS: Felix Montemayor was a fulltime professor of respondent Araneta University Foundation. A
complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta University Foundation
was instituted. President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such charge. The
first hearing as scheduled was moved by the petitioner to a later date where it was conducted and the
accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed against the person of
Leonardo de Lara. The report and recommendation of the investigating committee found the
petitioner morally responsible for the act complained of and recommended for his demotion in rank by
one degree.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1974 new charges was instituted against the petitioner for
conduct unbecoming of a faculty member, another committee was appointed. Then came his
preventive suspension, ordered to last until the administrative investigation was concluded. There
was a motion by petitioner for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974,
but the same was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. The University, on December 12,
1974, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a report of his suspension and application
for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1974, petitioner in turn
lodged a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against private respondents for
reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and
increments attendant thereto. Both the labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
found in favor of petitioner. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back wages and
without loss of seniority and other privileges. Private respondents appealed to respondent Secretary
of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement. Dissatisfied,
the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the case of petitioner was handled with administrative due process.

RULING: It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee failed to show
full awareness of the demands of procedural due process. A motion by petitioner for postponement of
the hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied. What is worse, in his absence the matter was
heard with the committee losing no time in submitting its report finding the charges against petitioner
to have been sufficiently established and recommending his removal. If that were all, respondent
Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained. certiorari would lie. But such deficiency was remedied, as
pointed out in the same comment of the Solicitor General, by the fact "that petitioner was able to
present his case before the Labor Commission " The entire record of the administrative proceedings,
including the transcript of the stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor
Commission for review.
The legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then summarized
by the Solicitor General thus: "All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in
court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the
proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC
wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case."

(49) MERALCO v. PSC

11 SCRA 317, 1964

FACTS: The Manila Electric Company (Meralco for short), filed two applications with the Public
Service Commission for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other non-residential
customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (P.S.C. Case No. 85889) and the other
for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate (P.S.C. Case No. 85890). These applications
were approved by the Commission in a decision. On August 24, 1955, the Meralco filed another
application for revision and reduction of its general power rate, Schedule GP-2 (P.S.C. Case No.
89293), which was provisionally approved.
On June 9, 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor
General to cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing
Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of May 11, 1956 and presented a
report which was submitted to the Commission. On May 30, 1956, the Commission, thru
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of case Nos. 85889, 85890 and 89893, for June
22, 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found
reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical
Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the Commission, who was duly authorized to
receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its
purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the
hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing".
Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco
an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report
dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having
given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to
refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the said
Commission handed down a decision that the reductions adverted to are just, reasonable and
equitable among the various groups of customers and thus, the petition for reduction of rates in these
cases should granted.
According to MERALCO, Th PSC erred in the rendering its decision without a previous
hearing; without giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of its answer; and in
basing its decision on the report of the General Auditing Office dated May 11, 1956, without having
given petitioner an opportunity to refute the facts (In holding that for rate base purposes, the
appraised value as of petitioner's pre-war property, plant and equipment should be considered as the
present fair value of said properties, GAO's readjustment of the reserves for depreciation of
petitioner's property, plant and equipment, In disallowing legitimate operating expenses in the
determination of petitioner's working capital, In not taking into consideration the value of materials and
supplies carried in stock in the determination of petitioner's rate base, In not giving effect to the
contract between petitioner and the Philippine Power and Development Company, In ordering
petitioner to reduce its rates) alleged in the said report of the General Auditing Office and
controverted by petitioner.

ISSUE: Was there a due process of law?

RULING: It was alleged therein that: The decision was null and void having been
rendered without any hearing; the Commission could not validly make findings of fact without
affording petitioner the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses, as well as the right to present
its evidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and at any event, the decision was based
on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the submission of the audit report of the GAO, on whose
allegations the decision was predicated, there had occurred recent developments which had
substantially altered the situation of the Meralco and which have to be taken into account by the
Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates, such as:
(1) Government restrictions and changing policies
(2) higher rate base
(3) higher cost of production and other changes.
These grounds were and still vital to the issues in the case, even if taken only on their face
value. They should have merited the attention of the Commission. But two of the Commissioners
denied the motion stating, among other things, "The desire of the Meralco to cross-examine
witnesses and present oral testimonies may just lead to more years of protracted and delayed
hearings, which will undoubtedly affect adversely the public interest. Hence, the procedure followed
by the Commission in deciding these cases was the usual practice long adopted by the Commission
in fixing rates of electric power plants".
If the practice of the Commission alluded to is what is revealed in the record of this case, then
it is not a good practice, nay, it is unlawful, because it breaches the guarantees of due process. There
should be no short cuts in the disposition of the time-honored principle that no one should be
deprived of his life, liberty and property, without due process of law. Considering the fact that the
reduction of rates herein sought might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to
have been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only the right of the petitioner but also public
interest, it would have been a better part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final
resolution of the controversy. And moreover, when the Commission finally decided the cases, making
its decision effective as of 1958, indeed many great changes (as enumerated in the petitioner's brief),
had already taken place.
Acording to the PSC, their proceedings are administrative, not judicial, and administrative
agencies have three functions — adjudication, rule-making and enforcement; that in legislative or
rule-making function there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever; that rate fixing is a
legislative function; that the requirement of "proper notice and hearing" provided by section 16, par.
(c) of the Public Service Act had been complied with, not in "auditory hearing", but in the "canned
method" or the submitted of prepared forms issued by the agency, or the submission of pleadings,
briefs, and memorandums or even by mere inspection; that the Commission is not bound by strict
rules of evidence and it can make use of its own independent surveys of the situation to acquire an
understanding of the problem before it.
But the cold fact remains, after a panoramic perusal of the record and circumstances
surrounding these cases, that the petitioner had not been given its day in court.
We need not be reminded that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative
proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered
by the tribunal (Comm. of Immigration vs. Fernandez, et al., L-22696, May 29, 1964 and cases cited
therein). "Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its
head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of
law", which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its
branches, agencies, etc. "Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to
persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated"

(50) ATENEO v. CA
145 SCRA 100 (1986)

Q. How does due process for students affect the academic freedom of schools?

A. "While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and, in the process, has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
"True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious
breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual
right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities." Licup v. University of
San Carlos, October 19, 1989, citing Magtibay v. Garcia, 120 SCRA 370 (1983) and also Ateneo de
Manila University v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 100 (1986).

NOTE: The right to education is also limited by the right of schools to dismiss, after due process, for
disciplinary reasons. Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 100 (1986).

NOTE: Non v. Judge Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990, reversed the doctrine in Alcuaz v.
PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (May 2,1988) which had said that students enroll from semester to semester and
may be denied re-enrollment in any given new semester. The Court said that the established rules for
due process must be observed together with the right of students to free speech and assembly.
Although the relation between student and school is contractual, the contract is for the duration of the
course until graduation, subject to the right of the school to dismiss students for academic or
disciplinary reason.

FACTS: On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and
Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck
at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him
from striking again, but the boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an
investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was
dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for
damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Occidental at Bacolod City.
The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial
in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of
Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied the material
allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his
unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior
subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the
university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found
to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning.
 After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them
P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay
the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision
was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons,
the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The motion
for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach
unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
Hence, the University filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed student’s parents negates the compliance of
the requirements of administrative due process.

HELD: Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the incident,
due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and
the existence of evidence to support the decision. Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision
(penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the
reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful
motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of
the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The investigating board acted fairly and
objectively.
All requisites of administrative due process were met. It cannot be negated by the fact that the
parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time
was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his
responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if he
could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the Board
of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. The fact
that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went home
to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University.

(51) ALCUAZ v. PSBA

161 SCRA 7 (1988)

THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GUARANTEE OF DUE

PROCESS.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not
be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991
hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that
respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration
of our previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch, 161 SCRA 20.

FACTS: Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide
students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22
March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would
govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold
dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was
turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances.
Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform
letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any
administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of
tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7.
On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter.
During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission
for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council
filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the
PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously
on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written
statement of the school’s final decision regarding their enrollment.
Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to
the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no
relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

HELD: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no
more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is
sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of
students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such
proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof.
Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an
investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well
settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific
matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to
factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the
factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating
Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the
absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition
was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.

(52) ARIEL NON v. HON. DANES

G.R. NO. 89317, May 20, 1990

FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte,
were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition stating the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz
vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this case but the authority of the school regarding
admission of students is a matter of compassionate equity. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but
this was denied by the trial court
According to the trial court, Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of
their failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were given all the
chances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988
during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the date
of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though
without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby
disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present
in their classes. Also, the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form which states that the
Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance
are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution
and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Lastly,
the case being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled,
respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings.

ISSUE: Whether there was due process.

RULING: In Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. Thus: There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated
in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes."
It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed
in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not
denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in
February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to
possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of
the basic tenets of fair play.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken
against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's ruling
in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with
the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be
commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after
the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be
imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules
and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and
who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already
been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when
they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption
of classes.