LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR.
, LILLIBETH RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-
MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN,
Petitioners,- versus -SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER,
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the
Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial
District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21, 2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic,
married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in
Cubao, Quezon City.[3] Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-
Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.[4] On May
26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5]
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her
daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for
the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. [6] The said
complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr.,
Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and
Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-
05.[7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the
estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the
decedent.[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order,
among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent;
and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following
grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of
the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2)
private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3)
private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to
establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent,
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private
respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr.
was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and
distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.[11]
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.[12] On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court
denied petitioners opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that such
defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading,
and it took cognizance of the said motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also
reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.[16]
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District
Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.[17] The
district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. [18] In its
second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court
ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.[19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following
issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN
CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH
IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO
BE SUED.
III.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF
PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN,
ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A
NOTICE OF HEARING.
V.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT
COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER,
SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that
the Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide
the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine
whether it has jurisdiction.[20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts
jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there
has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears
emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the
decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for
the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the
Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement
of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by
the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or
petition.[21] The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not
necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation.
Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided
by the substantive averments of the pleadings.[22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before
the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such
as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he
is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of
his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable
list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties
sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed
for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1)
the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer
for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the
district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an
allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject
matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer [25] or a
motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render
the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction.[29]
 The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to
dismiss.[30] In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of
jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that
the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to
hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after
hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in
fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that
the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action
against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to
the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated
as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a
quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding.
Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the
decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs,
which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement
and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek
to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his
estate from being a party defendant in a civil action[33] applies to a special
proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and
a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A
civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong [34] necessarily has definite
adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.[35] On the other
hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a status,
right, or a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies
for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is
not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose
of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets
of the estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same.[39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired
for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private
respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which
contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the
conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk
of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private
respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the
docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of
court.[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose
jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment of the docket fees.[42] As every citizen has the right to assume
and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his
duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case
cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment.[43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the
deficiency.[44]
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts
assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this
assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents
correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for
reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a
notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case
constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written
motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of
hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that no written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its
provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[47] Moreover, this
Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of
hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its
face or from the recitals contained therein.[48] In these exceptional cases, the
Court considers that no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities,
and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the
merits rather than on technicalities.[49]
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia
District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a
petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim
would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply
because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on
notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected.
This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is
where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural
due process,[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees
or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to
file a reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and
lack of opportunity to be heard.[53] In the case at bar, as evident from the
Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel
received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners
were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said
motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District
Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order,
petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a
hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the
rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has
not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the
decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and
settled in the said proceeding.[54]The court, in its capacity as a probate court,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case at
bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative
answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction
over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the
Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006
respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,Petitioner,versus -ESTATE OF ALICE O.
SHEKER,VICTORIA S. MEDINA- G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007,
Administratrix,
Respondent.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC)
dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7,
2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under
why the money claim was not filed and served personally. Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Order dated April 9, 2003.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
following questions: the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a
certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to
should be dismissed? bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters
proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
of its filing thereat? collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed
because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
and filing by registered mail?[2] settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees shopping.
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
proceedings only in a suppletorymanner. Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
The Court gave due course to the petition for review the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3] constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees
The petition is imbued with merit. within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore,
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
not entirely correct.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held
thus:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing
be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court
has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of rule is not complied with.
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious
the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a
shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise,
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who,
in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical
in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2)
merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the
way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special disposition of such pleading or other papers.
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in
the present case. If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our
set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable,
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non- service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation
forum shopping? was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
The Court rules in the affirmative. practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is
the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal
service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of
Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires,
service and filing of pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present
case, personal service would not be
practicable.Considering the distance between the Court
of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was
posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would
have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A
written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is
so worded with the use of may, signifying
permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court
discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not
filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary
to secure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be
relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is
Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a
written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a
written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion
under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in
the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money
claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees,
or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of
the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on
the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in
the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively,
are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate
action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
NILO OROPESA,Petitioner,- versus - CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc.
Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a
widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father,
the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc.
No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent)
has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory
and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property
properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the
court a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social
worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker
conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her
report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see
and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition
for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of
his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and
the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated
May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his
written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and
the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally
offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the
Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the
(respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then
filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. [5] (Citations
omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated reads:
September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed
to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo
O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and
to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the
trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that
petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7]
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and
purpose of guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character,
in which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the
ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.
A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of
the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has
been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of
one in loco parentis as well.[11]
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified
guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that
persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the
word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is
incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus,
must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and,
therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already;

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated
February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St.
Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested
one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan
application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to
cover his medical expenses;

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was c.
denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated
September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
d.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this
Court:
Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due
to lack of care and management;
The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain
unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly
compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT
PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE
RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP[9]
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find
the petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings
of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave
and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court
which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him
showing respondents incompetence.
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan
Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing
another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did
not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the
money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account
under his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge
or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a
kitchen knife to stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend
during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his
house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his
children.[14]
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited
petitioners lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to
respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical
and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical
document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run
his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted
by respondent in his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he
enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be
quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke
in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x
x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of
the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform
mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to
copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render
and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to
problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and
able.[19] (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional
circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It
is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and
the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to
evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall
have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.

xxxx A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the

x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. [17] produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.[24]
their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver
(who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed
did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his
the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant
from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing has shown no right to relief.
to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised
mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned Report
of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for SO ORDERED.
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as [G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997]The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA,
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age,
Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was
of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that where declared incompetent by judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] City, Branch 107,[2] in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece,
the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the Amparo A. Evangelista.[3] She was so adjudged because of her advanced
persons state of mental sanity will suffice.[18] age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 person and estate.
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced
role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35)
and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. [4] The
physical and mental state, to wit: complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff,
suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical The amended Complaint[5] pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was
expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147;
mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian,
Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but
they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were)
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they
** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the
incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented
by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year
from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they
had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of
their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family,
and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988
by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's
favor,[6] the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay
Caiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,[7] the decision was reversed by the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96.[8] By judgment rendered on October 21,
1992,[9] the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants'
possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and
legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery
of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of
October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision[10] promulgated on
June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court[11] affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It
ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in
the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants
have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen
Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the
plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the
proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it
is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants
are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so
much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency can not be said to have
vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out."[12]
Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of
the Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter
erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and
not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."[13]
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's
requirement,[14] the Estradas insist that the case against them was really not
one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had
not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of
the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and
hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could
the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because
they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real
owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership
once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate."
They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's
legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994,[15] and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her.[16]
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment
action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the
property in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not
Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and
(c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not
Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.[17] An inquiry into the averments of the
amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.[18]
The amended Complaint alleges:[19]
"6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a
house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now
the subject of this complaint;
** ** **
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were
allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, for free,
out of her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the
defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of
demand were ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the same. **
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
made another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises,
before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa,
Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the result was negative and no
settlement was reached. A photocopy of the Certification to File Action dated
July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex
"D" and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to
vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are
up to this time residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter
of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the
defendants, by her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they are enriching themselves at the
expense of the incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving money
by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as
her house could not be rented by others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so
that funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled
to go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees."
Its prayer[20] is quoted below:
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen
Caiza, represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista, respectfully
prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and
other persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No.
61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the
plaintiff, Carmen Caiza: and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit."
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having
been "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's)
kindness;"
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was)
failing and she ** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several
times, orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to
Caiza, to her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to
vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set
out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that
the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient,[21] and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[22]
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction
of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They
question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been,
to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's)
kindness" -- in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of **
(their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied."
Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim
that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas
to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most
rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly,
but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas
of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this
Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. [23] The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but
who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there
is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of
the date of the demand to vacate.[24] In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or
property the moment he is required to leave.[25] Thus, in Asset Privatization
Trust vs. Court of Appeals,[26] where a company, having lawfully obtained
possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return
it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court
held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession **
became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's
owner) was its proper remedy."
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had
been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand,[27] the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right
of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile
in the premises.[28] Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that
the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord
with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated
February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was
actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second
(last) written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's
express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the
owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made
through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with
authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had
executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that
circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after
demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners
thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the
Estradas had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by
tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of
possession by sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not
assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house;
their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by
which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which
still has to take place; in other words; prior to the probate of the will, any
assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the
proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza
clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and
legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting
them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death,
it may be changed or revoked;[29] and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). [30] An
owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property
by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession
in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship[31] dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as
the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties **
"[32] By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's
person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being,
with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. [33] It
also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control
over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle
that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency.[34] That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the
right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains
it,[35] and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose. [36]
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance
of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward
frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far
as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the
ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real
estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the
proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in
the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the
issue of possession."[37]
III
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of
this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have
legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is
without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward,[38] the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista,
as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs,
the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court[39] of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:[40]
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court
may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest
of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of
the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian.[41] That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial Court's
judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 132223June 19, 2001 BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.HELEN G. BELMES, respondent. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G.
Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its
Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
are:
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country
on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6
years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have
an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension
benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil Jr.
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen
Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819
before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her
opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over
the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed
under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed
Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City,
Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court
rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify
Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead
ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform
her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of
P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was
likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the
RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No.
1618-CEB.
The Court of Appeals held:
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under
the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article
225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal
pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of
Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto
guardian of their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another person be
named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of
any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should
be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian of her minor
children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an
abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets
in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity."2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition,
raising the following "legal points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right
of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the
minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G.
Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the
minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her
daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositor’s
live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact
that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as
judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated
September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter
Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth
Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect
to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.
The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution
dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become
moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by
petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and
grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the
natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner
to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs.
Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that
‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the
parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may
substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.
Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely
insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that
her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she
is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In
fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R.
Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming
back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only
two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:
"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal,
upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the
not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the
there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, court a petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he
charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and
deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84,
difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the
and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before
should not consent to the appointment of persons as said petition for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here." On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-
modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition
will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes. February 29.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint
Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record
G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964 appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-
Negros Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-
vs. HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent. administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959
Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c)
question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the
consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special
as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those of
The pertinent antecedent facts are as follows: respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel
elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator,
First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12
of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-
universal heir and executor. administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of
Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother
and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of
probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary
each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
one another. administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with
the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which
by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the
reason that: On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00,
and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not
the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the
the special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the
Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will, decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before
the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in
than the petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to
partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the deceased.
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null
will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla)
as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the
will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not
Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
counsel orally moved for postponement, because respondent's principal
counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The court We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed
from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the
amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly
co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of
respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate
This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section
of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842).
petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special
that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover,
still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary
jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not
that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions
inventory of the special administrator. relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the
same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total
deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other
that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L- of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by
2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the
Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a
appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more
Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, Supreme Court.
July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June
30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by
proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant case,
involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed
for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in
where the amount or value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred
or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which
an estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it
is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate had originally been brought before it".
proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole
estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special
approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note
on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the
controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely
the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly
the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is
appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of
of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate,
restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v.
It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the
value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount
in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken
no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question. on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the
will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount on the matter.
of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the case, upon
authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set
inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court
estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the Without costs. So ordered.
estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the
United States Supreme Court held:

Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit
court, in a suit to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their
subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00,
this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that