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The paradigmatic behaviorism theory of emotions: Basis for unification

Article  in  Clinical Psychology Review · December 1990

DOI: 10.1016/0272-7358(90)90096-S

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Staats, A.W., & Eifert, G.H. (1990). A paradigmatic behaviorism theory of emotion:
Basis for unification. Clinical Psychology Review, 10, 539-566.

A Paradigmatic Behaviorism Theory of Emotion: Basis for Unification

Arthur W. Staats (University of Hawaii)
Georg H. Eifert (James Cook University of North Queensland)

Abstract
This article presents a multilevel framework theory of emotions that includes theory
bridges by which to unify the various concepts and mini-theories across a diverse
literature. The integration of knowledge of the biological foundations of emotions with
behavioral principles is made possible by defining emotions as central nervous system
responses that must be distinguished from the physiological indices commonly employed
to measure emotions. Emotion is considered to provide a basic definition of
reinforcement and also of the incentive function of stimuli. Unlike traditional
behavioristic approaches, the theory states that more than the basic principles are required
for a unified theory of emotions that applies widely to human behavior. To achieve this,
various levels of theory development are necessary. Following this conception, the theory
elaborates additional principles and concepts that allow the treatment of such topics as
cognition-emotion relationships, cognitive reward and punishment and cognitive
incentives, the emotional-motivational aspects of personality. Finally, the role of these
aspects of personality in abnormal behavior is exemplified in recent theory developments
applying paradigmatic behaviorism's theory of emotion to the clinical problems of
depression and anxiety. This article defines, by example, what a framework theory is:
more detailed and connected to empirical events at some points than others, but with its
"interstitial spaces" stated in a manner intended to be heuristic to enable the integration of
a widely diverse literature as well as generate new theory and research.

This research was conducted during a period when the second author was Visiting Scholar in the
Clinical Studies Program at the Psychology Department of the University of Hawaii. Funding for
this visit was provided by a James Cook University Special Study Leave Travel Grant. Please
send correspondence to Arthur W. Staats, Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, 2430
Campus Rd., Honolulu, Hawaii 96822.
 2
The rules and principles governing the interplay between affect, behavior, and
cognition are crucial to an understanding of human behavior and have indeed been
discussed since the beginning of psychology as a science by researchers like Wundt,
James, and Titchener. Hence, it is not surprising that there have been many theories of
emotion, under a variety of names. Most theories of emotion, however, do not cover the
wide variety of emotion phenomena but focus on certain aspects (e.g., the physiological,
cognitive, or the behavioral component) or certain types of emotions such as fear and
aggression. In part because they deal with different issues, the various theories are
incommensurate and largely unrelated. The main purpose of this article is to formulate a
framework theory that incorporates elements of physiological, behavioral, and personality
knowledge to produce a structure that is unifying and heuristic. Constructed within what
has been called social or paradigmatic behaviorism (see Staats, 1975), it elaborates that
prior theory and its research support. However, with novel concepts and prinicples, and
extending to various basic and applied fields, the Staats-Eifert theory is new, too. One of
our aims is to illustrate the heuristic value of this framework theory in helping to solve
conceptual and clinical problems that have traditionally inspired a multitude of separate
and frequently competitive mini-theories of emotion.

Requirements of a Unified Theory of Emotion

Generally, theories of emotion have arisen in a local area, characterized by
particular problems, concepts, and a research methodology unique to that local area.
Therefore they have not confronted other theories of emotion that have been constructed
to account for different phenomena and other problems using quite different concepts and
research methods. To illustrate, concepts of emotion have arisen within the basic study of
neurophysiology (e.g., in the early works by Bard, Cannon, James, and Lange as well as
more recent studies, see Kolb & Whishaw, 1984), animal learning (e.g., Rescorla &
Solomon, 1967), human learning (Martin & Levey, 1978, 1987), cognitive theory
(Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and attitude research in social psychology (Greenwald, 1968).
Moreover, different theories of emotion and emotional concepts have arisen in the
different schools of psychotherapy (e.g., Freud, 1949, Greenberg & Safran, 1989) as well
as in the field of psychological measurement with concepts such as values and interests
(Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1951; Strong, 1952), and emotional stability and
neuroticism (Eysenck, 1981).
Our position--and the reason for this article--is that an important need for
psychology is the construction of a theoretical structure, a framework, that can extend to a
wide range of interests in emotion. The present effort is considered a framework theory
and not the detailed theory structure that additional work must elaborate (see Staats,
1988a, for a description of the character and method of framework theory). Although
there is already a solid empirical foundation for some theory parts, important studies
remain to be conducted to support, elaborate, and refine the principles. At this stage, the
framework theory cannot aim for completeness. We will, however, utilize the knowledge
from different areas of study of emotion to construct a heuristic guide to further thinking
and research and a vehicle for integrating diverse areas of the literature. In doing so, we
will avoid eclectic combinations of elements that are left inconsistent or unrelated and
cannot be derived from one another. Moreover, not all available elements of knowledge
will be used because each theory of emotion has typically grown in the context of local
interests, therefore including elements that are neither necessary nor relevant for the
construction of a general theory.
A major aim of our unifying theory is to resolve the schisms and controversies that
have arisen in the context of the various, frequently antagonistic mini-theories of emotion.
A typical example is the nature/nurture schism dividing those who consider emotions to
 3
be biologically determined and those espousing behavioral formulations of emotion who
consider emotions to be learned and determined by environmental variables.
Furthermore, there are theories in the context of psychotherapy (e.g., Greenberg & Safran,
1989) that have no relationship to those that study the physiological bases of emotion.
Another type of schism concerns the relationship of emotion to cognition. For instance,
Zajonc (1980, 1984) takes the position that affect is primary, can be generated without
extensive prior cognitive processing, and that affect and cognition are separate and
partially independent systems. Lazarus (1984), on the other hand, argues that emotions
are the result of more or less elaborate cognitive appraisal processes--this position has also
been adopted in cognitive theories of anxiety and depression (Beck, 1976). Similarly,
Fishbein (1967), in treating the concept of attitudes--one of a number of emotional
concepts that must be systematized within a general theory of emotions--combines the
emotional component with cognitive appraisal and behavioral predispositions into one
concept. Our view is that different theoretical terms should define different phenomena,
and any relationships between the phenomena should be reflected in the relationships
between the theoretical terms.
Finally, a requirement of any theory of emotions that aims to be general is that it
must be useful at the basic level as well as the human and applied levels. In order to
achieve this, a theory must incorporate and link systematically the biological foundation
of emotion, basic behavioral study, basic human learning study, personality and
psychological measurement, abnormal personality, and clinical treatment study. This has
to be done in a level-by-level analysis where the findings and principles of one level are
the basis for elaboration at the next higher level (see Table 1). The present theory
establishes a framework where there is a theoretical bridge from biological to
psychological study by its definition of emotion that incorporates and utilizes both
biological and behavioral findings and is heuristic with respect to each (as an eclectic
theory would not be).

Table 1. Summary of the Multi-Level Theory of Emotion

___________________________________________________________________________
Levels (Fields of Study) Areas and Phenomena of Study (Examples)
___________________________________________________________________________
1. Biological Mechanisms of Emotion Neurophysiological foundations of emotions
Nature and characteristics of basic emotional responses

2. Basic Learning of Emotion Emotion as a stimulus

Unlearned emotion-behavior relationship
Environmental elicitation of emotions
Emotion-reinforcement relationship
Emotion and motivation (e.g., deprivation)

3. Human Learning and Emotion Language and cognition in emotion:

learning of verbal-emotional repertoire
cognitive creation of emotion
cognitive reward and punishment
cognitive-emotional determination of behavior
cognitive-emotional incentives
Social and cultural human emotional stimuli

4. Personality and Emotion Individual differences in emotional-motivational repertoire

Interactions: person (repertoires) x environment x person

5. Measurement of Emotion Tests, psychophysiological indices, behavioral observation

 4

6. Abnormal Behavior and Emotion Deficit and/or inappropriate personality repertoires

Person-environment interaction in emotional dysfunctions

7. Clinical Psychology and Emotion

Development of treatments for disorders involving
inappropriate and deficit emotion (e.g., anxiety, depression)
___________________________________________________________________________

Biological Study of Emotional Responses

Neurophysiological Foundations of Emotions

The central purpose of this section is to spell out our basic biological conception of
emotions: Emotions are central nervous system responses that have to some extent been
localized in brain areas such as the hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, septum, and
cingulate gyrus of the prefrontal cortex, all of which comprise what is often referred to as
"the limbic system". Many studies have shown (cf. Kolb & Whishaw, 1984) that strong
emotional responses--such as rage, fear, aggression, sexual approach--can be elicited in
laboratory animals (monkeys, cats, dogs, rats) depending on which of these brain areas are
electrically stimulated. Although human studies, limited as they must be, are not quite as
dramatic as those of animals, they are supportive. For instance, when humans received
brain stimulation which they described as "pleasant" they often reported feelings of a
sexual kind of pleasure (Delgado, 1969) but they did not refer to them as 'ecstatic'.

The Nature of Emotional Responses and their Measurement

There have been various attempts to measure emotional responses through the use
of physiological indices, such as skin conductance, heart rate, muscle tension, and blood
pressure (we will consider psychological test approaches to the measurement of emotion
later). Some controversies and confusion have resulted from confounding these measures
of emotion with definitions of emotion.
As a consequence, Martin and Levey (1978, 1987) have felt it necessary to
introduce a new concept--the evaluative response--as partly different from the emotional
response. Martin and Levey introduced this concept to indicate that a subjective response
may occur to stimuli that will not elicit an emotional response, by which they mean the
peripheral indices of emotion. Rescorla and Solomon (1967) have similarly been led to
conclude that an emotional response could not be a mediator of overt behavior in two-
process learning experimentation, because overt behavior continued to occur despite
surgical and other means of preventing the occurrence of the emotional response.
However, they also defined the emotional response peripherally, not centrally! We would
like to emphasize that such theoretical positions (and what are considered anomalies) arise
from the incorrect equation of emotions with the measurement of peripheral emotional
arousal. There are often peripheral concomitants of the central emotional response, but
those peripheral concomitants are related to the central response in complex ways, not in a
one-to-one manner. For one thing, the same peripheral response--as is the case with heart
rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance--may be a concomitant of different (positive
and negative) emotional responses. This does not mean a peripheral response cannot be
used to index an emotion nor does it preclude research endeavors to establish patterns of
autonomic nervous system activity distinguishing different emotions. For instance, in a
much acclaimed article published in Science, Ekman, Levenson and Friesen (1983) have
been able to single out patterns of autonomic nervous system activity that can actually
distinguishes between disgust, anger, fear, and sadness
 5
There may be unclear relations between peripheral and central responses, for
instance, when a central response does not register on any one of the peripheral response
measures. An example is the work of Martin and Levey (1978, 1987) who focus on the
role of evaluative (central emotional) responses in classical conditioning. The major
purpose of using weak UCSs (e.g., art reproductions) in their experiments was to show
that positive or negative evaluative responses can be conditioned in the absence of any
peripheral arousal. They concluded that the evaluative response they studied was
different from an emotional response since no physiological arousal was elicited.
Physiological arousal, however, is not a necessary prerequisite for successful conditioning
and the extensive experimental work of Martin and Levey supports this notion. Even
though the central emotional event is quite likely to be of an evaluative nature--a very
basic response in terms of like/dislike, good/bad--our differentiation between a central
emotional response and peripheral arousal makes the introduction of the new concept
"evaluative response" unnecessary because emotional responses (centrally defined) need
not necessarily have peripheral effects. Only if and when the central emotional response
exceeds a certain degree of intensity--which is largely determined by the salience of the
eliciting stimulus--will it lead to peripheral physiological arousal and behavioral action.
In view of the distinction between central emotional responses and peripheral
arousal, how can we establish in any situation whether or not an emotional response is
occurring in the individual, and what type of emotional response? That is a crucial
problem. In fact, Lee (1987) criticized the concept of a central emotional event on the
very ground that it basically cannot be measured and therefore any theory using such a
concept cannot be tested. A satisfactory resolution of this measurement problem is indeed
essential as it will ultimately determine the testability and falsifiability of the theory.
Tests and other self-report measures (e.g., like/dislike scales and other "hedonic" scales as
suggested and used by Martin and Levey, 1987, and Eifert, Craill, O' Connor and Carey,
1988) are not entirely satisfactory as the only type of measure because such verbal reports
may be biased for a number of reasons. Ekman and his associates and Lee suggested that
more unbiased direct measures and observations such as facial expressions and changes in
facial muscle tension could provide additional useful sources of information on the
occurrence and intensity of an emotional response. Nonetheless, all of these measures are
indirect, they are indices, but they do not tap the central event directly. Hence, a more
satisfactory resolution of the measurement problem remains a formidable challenge and a
major research effort has to be directed toward the development of more direct and
unbiased measures of the emotional response.

Emotion as a Stimulus and the Unlearned Emotion-Behavior Relationship

Although we have so far defined emotions as a response process, it is important
that the definition of emotions also include the stimulus properties of an emotion.
Without that stipulation there are many phenomena concerning emotions that cannot be
understood fully. Ultimately, it is because an emotional response has stimulus properties
that it can further elicit overt motor behavior.
Before we continue, however, it is important to clarify two important and related
sources of misunderstanding. Traditionally it has been argued that a salient stimulus
elicits a peripheral emotional response first, like the GSR, and that after that response
occurs, it produces an internal stimulus which then elicits overt behavior. This conception
has been criticized because the operation of such a mechanism would be much too slow to
explain the types of behavioral phenomena that occur. The conception of the central
emotional response solves this problem. In the present view, when a stimulus elicits an
emotional response in the brain, this produces at the same time a stimulus event in the
brain--with a quickness that is unlike the slowness of peripheral emotional responses such
 6
as the GSR. This quickness allows the central (brain) emotional response to be the
mediator of overt behavior. Overt behavioral responses do indeed occur immediately
upon the presentation of salient emotional stimuli and are executed with great speed and
confidence (Zajonc, 1980), and this is consistent with the present theory.
As we will see with the other basic elements of the definition of emotion, there
appears to be an innate as well as a learned aspect to the emotion-behavior relationship.
On the innate side, research by Ekman and his associates (1983) has shown that when a
stimulus elicits a substantial emotional response in the individual, this will result in the
occurrence of a particular type of facial expression. Such facial expressions are motor
responses that are very similar across cultures and are easily recognized as well. Other
stimuli of an aversive nature elicit an emotional response and then the complex of
glandular and motor responses we call crying.
Similarly, stimuli which elicit fear will also elicit one or two of a limited number
of protective/defensive motor responses, such as flight, fight, or avoidance. Once again, it
should be noted that this emotion-behavior link as such is unlearned. What is largely
learned in cases of phobic fear are the specific stimuli that actually elicit the emotion-
behavior complex. The unlearned behavior-directive function of emotions is of central
importance and is increasingly being recognized by clinical researchers. For instance,
Barlow (1988) and Lang (1984) concur with the principle, pointing out that emotions
primarily represent response information: the foremost function of emotions is to
predispose the individual to act. This function has also been described as the "hard
interface between affect and motor behavior" (Zajonc & Markus, 1984).
Finally, the subjective feeling that often accompanies an emotional response is the
experience of the stimulus aspects of emotion (see also Izard, 1984). Without considering
this the only type of evidence that is called for, we may take the universality with which
subjects report feelings of emotion as evidence for the stimulus aspect of emotions. This
notion is important because it provides an avenue for integrating subjective,
phenomenological, and cognitive concerns into an objective behavioral formulation,
although further analyses and empirical support are needed.

Environmental Elicitation of Emotions and the Learning of Emotions:

The Biological-Behavioral Bridge
The physiology of emotions focuses on the investigation of the organs that are the
site of emotions but also on the physiological avenues by which emotions have an effect
on behavior. Moreover, most approaches to the study of emotions--even those that are
biologically focused--generally recognize that environmental events can elicit emotions.
The present theory is systematic in this area and provides specification of what is
involved. Paradigmatic behaviorism has suggested that learning itself is an evolved
ability that owes its appearance and impact--increased to a maximum in humans--to its
functional value in adapting to the environment in ways that enhance survivability. This
applies to emotions as well as other responses (Staats, 1963, 1975; see also Skinner, 1966,
for a related analysis concerning motor responses). The fundamental (and simple)
principle involved in learning emotions is that of classical conditioning where a stimulus
that elicits an emotional response is paired with a stimulus that does not. Because of the
pairing, however, the latter gains the ability to elicit the emotional response because the
emotional properties of the original stimulus have been transferred onto the contiguously
presented stimulus formerly neutral with respect to that emotion. The notion that
emotions are learned through classical conditioning appears in Pavlov's original work but
also in many later works which have followed. New avenues of understanding were
opened by these studies stipulating how the environment can affect emotional responses.
 7
Moreover, if emotions are important to behavior, then the extensive ways by which
learning affects emotions provides a basis for understanding that behavior.

The Unlearned Emotion-Reinforcement Relationship

In our basic definition of emotion, we have emphasized the relationship of
emotion and reinforcement. We have already pointed out that the the brain areas involved
for the two are the same or at least closely connected (primarily in the "limbic system").
Stimulation of these areas can lead to different emotional responses. Moreover,
stimulation of the same areas, following some response, can change the strength of the
response, that is, act as a positive or negative reinforcer (see Atrens & Curthoys, 1982).
The purpose of our analysis concerning emotion-reinforcement is not just to
address biological evidence but also the more advanced levels of study of human behavior
To understand human emotional and motivational phenomena demands a set of principles
that relate the emotional properties and the reinforcement properties of stimuli. However,
radical behaviorism and contemporary behavioral psychology in general have followed
Skinner's learning theory which considers emotional conditioning and the conditioning of
behavior to be quite separate. Skinner (1974) stated clearly that emotions do not
determine behavior although he is now edging toward the admission of a connection
(Skinner, 1986; Powell, 1987; Staats, 1988b). The basic learning theory of paradigmatic
behaviorism establishes a systematic position in this area clearing up anomalies and
weaknesses in human level theory that result when emotions are neglected as a
determinant of behavior. Our position is that the stimuli that serve as emotion elicitors in
basic classical conditioning are the same stimuli that serve as reinforcers in instrumental
conditioning. This relationship is seen to be fundamental and built into organisms on the
basis of biological structure. Stimuli that elicit positive emotional responses will also
have the reinforcing function, positive or negative as the case may be. The reinforcement
value is thus defined by their ability to elicit emotion. A stimulus that can serve as a UCS
and elicit an emotional response, can also serve as a reinforcing stimulus that will
strengthen behavior (if it is presented after the behavior). Classical conditioning
experiments, thus, only study the transfer of emotion-elicitation but neglect the fact that
the conditioned stimulus is also becoming a reinforcing stimulus in the conditioning
process. And any time an emotional-reinforcing stimulus is presented to an organism
following behavior, as in an operant conditioning study, two types of learning result: the
behavior is strengthened and the elicited emotional response is conditioned to the stimuli
present in the situation. A learning theory that does not recognize the two effects of each
type of conditioning will only give a partial account. Since a major foundation of
paradigmatic behaviorism has been to relate the concepts of emotion and reinforcement, it
is important to note that human research supports the connection between emotion and
reinforcement (see Finley & Staats, 1967; Harms & Staats, 1978; Hekmat, 1974; Hekmat
& Lee, 1970; Silverstein, 1973; Staats & Hammond, 1972; Staats & Warren 1974;
Zimmerman, 1957).

The Learned Emotion-Behavior Relationship

There are emotion-behavior relationships that are built into the biological structure
of the human organism so that the elicitation of certain emotional responses will result in
certain motor behaviors without any prior learning. However, those emotion-behavior
relationships that are built into the biological structure of the organism are few in number
and simple (e.g., facial expressions) in comparison to the huge number that are learned.
For humans, emotion plays a great role by the manner in which various behaviors are
affected. The learning principles involved are of central importance and yet simple and
typically overlooked: a person generally learns to approach stimuli that elicit a positive
 8
emotional response because positive emotional stimuli are also positive reinforcers.
Approach behaviors are thus reinforced and learned. People have a huge number of such
learning experiences and will learn to approach--with many different types of motor
behaviors (including verbal behaviors)--any stimulus that elicits a positive emotional
response. As the next section will indicate such stimuli are commonly called incentives.
The same type of learning pertains to stimuli that elicit a negative emotional response. In
many different experiences a person will learn to avoid and escape from stimuli that elicit
a negative emotional response (and its stimulus) with a large variety of motor behaviors
(see Staats, 1975). These approach and avoidance behaviors become so well learned we
frequently believe they are part of the organism's biological set-up--that people just
naturally withdraw from painful and unpleasant stimuli.

Emotions and Motivation

Although we are not primarily concerned with clarifying the relationship of
emotion to motivation, some development is necessary, because it is often not clear how
emotion, motivation, and learning are defined and relate to one another. Although
motivation has some different concerns, the concepts of emotion and motivation are
inextricably interrelated in paradigmatic behavioral theory. Paradigmatic behavioral
research (e.g., Hekmat & Lee, 1970; Staats, 1968b) has shown that the strength of
behavior is greatly influenced by the intensity or magnitude of the emotional response
elicited in the individual. This relationship can be elucidated further by examining the
important motivational concept of incentive. When a person behaves in such a manner as
to attain a not-yet-achieved stimulus (the incentive), the person's behavior is considered to
be motivated by the incentive. We have seen how positive emotional stimuli have
incentive value as a consequence of the learning described. It may be added that as a
stimulus elicits more strongly an emotional response, the more strongly it will elicit
approach behavior. Anything that can increase the intensity of the emotional response to
a stimulus, hence, increases its incentive value. One important motivational variable that
influences the strength of a positive emotional response is deprivation. A person, for
example who elicits a "sex-type" emotional response in another person will do so more
strongly if the latter has been deprived of sexual stimulation for a time. As the emotional
response is stronger, it will also elicit more intense approach behaviors. In the example,
the person will because of the deprivation experience the emotional response more
intensely and will "try harder" and be more persistent in engaging in those social, verbal,
and non-verbal behaviors that are likely to lead to the desired close contact. In addition,
the reinforcement value of sex-related stimuli will have increased strength because of
deprivation. This means that the strength of those behaviors which are followed by closer
contact with the emotion-eliciting person will be learned (that is, be more likely to be
performed again under similar conditions.
These general basic principles account for a great deal of human goal-directed
behavior since they apply to a wide variety of stimuli that elicit emotional responses and
thus have incentive and reinforcement value, for example, music, art, and material
possessions. More complex forms of human emotion and motivation, however, require
that those principles be developed further, as later sections will indicate.

Cognition and Emotion: The Human Learning Level of Study

Need for More than a Basic Theory

Why are most psychologists concerned with human emotions dissatisfied with a
behavioristic analysis? One source of contemporary dissatisfaction is Skinner's (1953,
1986) rejection of the concept of emotion as a causative variable in the determination of
 9
human behavior. In addition, behaviorism usually presents only the basic principles of
conditioning without developing them further so they could be employed to treat the
human phenomena which interests most other psychologists. While the classical
conditioning procedures that Pavlov used with his dogs are involved in human emotional
learning, the principles by themselves do not provide sufficient explanation of the various
phenomena concerning emotions. For example, no one follows a person around in church
and pops food powder into his/her mouth. Yet that person may there receive intense
emotional experiences and thereby learn positive emotional (attitudinal, value) responses
for religious stimuli of various kinds. Similarly, no one gives people electric shocks in
conjunction with political and social issues of various kinds (and their proponents), yet
they often feel and express extremely negative emotions to such stimuli.
The traditional form of theory construction in psychology is to establish one's
basic principles within the level of study dealt with by the theorist and then to generalize
in a conjectural manner to the more advanced levels. This approach, however, has led to
many problems and schisms because the principles need extension and development as
they are applied to successive levels (Staats, 1983). As an example, the animal learning
theorist composes a theory of fear and avoidance learning and may consider that these
principles can be generalized to explain all human fear phenomena as well. In this
particular case the inappropriate generalization from one level of study to a more
advanced level of functioning has resulted in divisive controversies and led some
psychologists to abandon conditioning theory altogether (see Eifert, 1990).
Similarly, the clinical psychologist derives a theory on the role of emotions in
clinical disorders from the statements of patients in psychotherapy, and applies this theory
to all types of emotional behavior--a good example is Freud's approach to theory
construction. Other clinical psychologists talk about cognitive processes, and how
cognitive appraisal determines the type and intensity of an emotion that will be elicited
(e.g., Beck, 1976; Lazarus, 1984). Yet these positions are often vague and lack explicit
heuristic value (see Neisser, 1976, for a detailed critique) because they do not draw on and
relate to the basic fields of animal learning or physiological psychology (nor to
experimental cognitive psychology for that matter).
The main thrust of these arguments is to emphasize the need for a proper
methodology of theory construction that takes account of the different levels of study and
psychological functioning in a systematic way. Experimental study has produced
important knowledge of basic principles. Clinical study has produced important
knowledge and concepts of human behavior. Each by itself is incomplete and when cut
off from other knowledge, and inappropriately generalized, produces a misleading
conception. What is needed are the necessary theory bridges by which the several areas
of knowledge can be productively unified. Building those theory bridges is a complex
task and requires multiple steps of development. An important example is the linkage of
emotional learning and emotion-instigated behavior with the language-cognitive processes
and other essentially human mechanisms that are responsible for producing, expressing,
and communicating emotions. The purpose of the following sections is to summarize
these more advanced levels of theory development.

The Specifically Human in Emotion: Language and Cognition

This section will emphasize how humans learn more of their emotional
characteristics cognitively, through language, than they do through primary classical
conditioning. How is basic conditioning related to the cognitive causation of emotions?
To make the bridge it is necessary to understand that an important part of language--the
emotional part--is learned through the basic principles of classical conditioning. Once a
person has acquired this language-based emotion-mechanism, emotions can be aroused
 10
cognitively, new emotions can be acquired cognitively, and emotional behavior can be
cognitively determined. Let us indicate first how humans learn their cognitive-emotional
mechanism, the verbal-emotional repertoire.

Emotional Language Learning: The Verbal-Emotional Repertoire

One of the most significant differences between animal and human learning is that
language serves important symbolic functions by providing humans with emotional
experiences without exposure to the actual physical stimuli or events that would ordinarily
arouse those experiences. The basic process by which words gain the power to elicit
emotional responses is that of classical conditioning. This learning process begins very
early in life. For example, when a mother says, "no" and "bad" to her child as she applies
some aversive stimulus (slapping the child's hands), the mother is conditioning her child
to respond with a negative emotional response to the words. The child will learn a basic
repertoire of such words through primary conditioning.
The great significance of language for human emotions is that through higher-
order conditioning words can transfer their emotion-eliciting power to other words and to
other non-verbal stimuli: If emotion-eliciting words are paired with another stimulus, this
stimulus will also come to elicit an emotional response. This means that once a basic set
of emotional words has been acquired, these words can serve in a variety of ways to
produce new emotional learning. Pairing those words with other stimuli will condition
the emotional responses the words elicit to the new stimuli. Thus, new emotional learning
can take place on a verbal-symbolic basis--just through reading magazines, newspapers,
and books through lectures and sermons, through conversation, radio, television, and
movies, but also through self-talk.
Through these processes of higher-order classical conditioning, humans acquire a
verbal-emotional repertoire consisting of a large number of words that serve as emotional
stimuli and produce learning in all kinds of social experiences. This repertoire sets the
individual up to learn emotional responses to new stimulus events and objects easily,
without cumbersome procedures and extensive apparatus, to respond emotionally in a
typically human way. Over the last four decades, an impressive amount of research
evidence has accumulated demonstrating both the primary conditioning of emotional
responses to words and higher-order conditioning of emotional responses to new stimuli
using words (Maltzman, 1977; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Razran, 1971; Staats,
1963, 1968a; for a more recent analysis, see Eifert, 1987).

The Cognitive Creation of Emotion

When one realizes the ubiquity of words that elicit emotional responses, the
importance of emotional learning through language can be seen. The objects, events,
people, activities, ideologies, and values that will elicit positive or negative emotional
responses for the individual (or groups) are learned through words and the principles of
language conditioning--at times by means of first-order classical conditioning but more
frequently by means of higher-order conditioning. For example, if verbal references to
sexual contact are repeatedly paired with words like evil, dirty, immoral, sinful, and
disease, verbal sexual stimuli will come to elicit a negative emotional response--and so
will the actual objects and activities referred to. The same mechanism is also involved in
the learning of emotional responses to abstract stimuli such as God, liberty, justice, and so
on. It is not necessary that the words denote an actual object for a person to learn a strong
emotional response to them. All that is necessary is that these stimuli be frequently paired
with emotional stimuli, such as emotional words. When this process occurs in a political
realm, it is apt to be referred to as propaganda, when it occurs in promoting a product, it
will be called advertising, and in verbal interactions between therapist and client it is
 11
called psychotherapy. Considering the potential conditioning trials that are available in a
person's life, intense emotional responses can easily be accounted for on the basis of what
we may call language conditioning. We call this process the cognitive creation of
emotions, for it is cognitive in nature, far removed from primary conditioning. Because
the learning takes place through language--and therefore with an almost unlimited supply
of emotional stimuli--humans learn emotional responses to a vast variety and number of
stimuli. This is one way of distinguishing humans since this is characteristic of no other
species.

The Emotion-Eliciting Function of Words as a Self Mechanism

A particularly striking example of the emotional power of words can be seen in
verbal abuse and insults. Not infrequently, these emotional responses lead to aggressive,
even violent behavior, often producing intense anger and sadness. Such extreme
emotional reactions are produced in a prominent way by verbal means--although they may
be supported by other stimuli such as particular facial expressions and body posture.
Cognitive arousal of emotions is infinite in capacity and variability. All kinds of
emotions, positive and negative, can be aroused by words. It is very important to
understand that this function of language applies to the individual's "self-language", what
persons say to themselves, for their own benefit (or to their detriment). "It may be
additionally noted...that the same conditioning results from language stimuli whether the
stimuli are produced by someone else or by oneself....It is in part by showing that their
own language (behavior) affects our later behavior that a rapprochement between learning
theory and cognitive theory...may be achieved" (Staats, 1968a, p. 40). A theory of
language and emotions must therefore indicate how self-language operates. One function
of self-language is to elicit emotions. Humans can anticipate future consequences in part
by their self-language. The teenager who pauses during a chore and says, "The Saturday
night dance will be lots of fun" can experience emotionally, in anticipation, an emotion
that is in the direction of that which the dance itself will elicit. This self-mechanism can
work in both directions, however, and it may have adjustive or maladjustive effects.
Individuals who frequently describe themselves in negative terms will experience
negative emotions as a result.
It may be added that individuals can condition themselves through self-language.
For instance, when a tennis player says to herself, "I played lousy today, tightening up on
every important point...a real choker", the negative emotional responses that are elicited
will be conditioned to the word "I" and all the self-stimuli that are involved. We learn our
self-concept in part from the things that we say to ourselves. Thus, our habits of self-
language are very important to our own personality development.
Our central statement is that words that individuals say to themselves may elicit
emotions and individuals may use their own words to condition themselves to new stimuli
through self-verbalization. Following on from that is the clinically very relevant
implication that persons may also change (countercondition) their learned emotional
responses to given sets of stimuli by means of self-statements. For instance, if persons
who fear and dislike a particular animal systematically and consistently pair self-
statements which elicit positive emotional responses with these stimuli, their emotional
response will change over time to become less negative and more neutral, and at times we
have even found it to become moderately positive (Eifert, 1984a; Eifert & Schermelleh,
1985).
The Reinforcement Function of Emotional Words. What other people say to us
can elicit positive or negative emotional responses in us. Any stimulus that elicits an
emotional response has reinforcing properties Hence words are used as reinforcers, and
this occurs very extensively and in complex ways. For instance, the positive effects of
 12
praise are widely known and applied in educational as well as clinical settings (cf. Eifert,
1987). Basic research has shown clearly that emotion eliciting words can serve both as
positive and negative reinforcers (Finley & Staats, 1967; Harms & Staats, 1978). Since
there are so many single words that elicit emotional responses, humans have a limitless
supply of reinforcers to apply in affecting one another's behavior. Within radical
behavioristic approaches, verbal reinforcement has been considered too narrowly to
consist of praise and criticism. When it is realized that words elicit emotions, and
emotion is the basis for reinforcement, it becomes clear that language reinforcement is not
limited to praise and criticism. Any language that elicits an emotional response can serve
as a reinforcer and the reinforcement value is proportional to the intensity of the
emotional response that is elicited. A prominent reason why emotional words are so
important for the understanding of human emotions depends upon this reinforcing
function.

The Reinforcing Function of Words as a Self Mechanism

The concept of self-reinforcement is widely used in contemporary behavioral
literature. The concept, however, has been vaguely defined and used in a loose fashion
with no specification of what that self-reinforcement consists of. One frequent error is
that the term self-reinforcement is used in describing someone's self-statements when no
reinforcement is involved for there is no behavior occurring for which a contingency has
any significance. It must be remembered that reinforcement refers only to the case where
it occurs following a behavior and there is an effect on the strength of the behavior. When
a tennis player berates herself between points, saying how badly she is playing, how
stupid she is, and so on, the behavior that is occurring may simply be standing between
points, or sitting having a drink. In such a case the words have only an emotion eliciting
function but they do not reinforce the behavior immediately preceding it (e.g., sitting
having a drink). This point is an important one that radical behaviorists have not
understood.
Words that elicit emotional responses, however, can have a reinforcing function
when presented following a behavior. And this applies to self-language as well as the
language of others. In fact, the most prominent form of self-reinforcement is when
individuals reinforce themselves by their own language stimuli (Staats, 1963, 1968a). The
medical student who pauses in her work and says, "Two more months and I am off for a
week in Hawaii" will elicit a positive emotional response in herself and hence the words
will act as a reinforcer. Incidentally, the words may also elicit the image of a beach scene
which may have additional reinforcement value (Staats, 1968a). Eifert (1987) analyzed
several lines of research which show that an individual's ability to visualize and imagine
may moderate and amplify the effects of language conditioning.
Cognitive-Emotional Incentives: The Incentive Function of Words. Words that
elicit an emotional response will also determine or direct behavior. This principle derives
from the basic three-function learning theory that states that a positive emotional stimulus
will elicit approach behaviors and a negative emotional stimulus will elicit avoidance
behaviors. Positive emotional words will therefore elicit approach behaviors and negative
emotional words will elicit avoidance behaviors. For instance, when a religious leader
repeatedly states that abortion is murder, a female adherent to that religion will come to
have a very negative emotional response to abortion. As a consequence, she will behave
in various different "avoidant" ways: she is less likely to have an abortion when she falls
pregnant and does not want a child; she may vote against support of family planning
clinics that conduct abortions; she may demonstrate against such clinics; she may argue
against abortion and attempt to direct other people's behavior away from having an
abortion. The basic principle involved is that words that have emotional value will also
 13
have directive (or incentive) value. Similarly, telling a student "If you don't study tonight
for tomorrow's test you will fail" will elicit a negative emotional response in the student.
The stimulus properties of that emotional response--subjectively experienced as fear,
shame, discomfort--are likely to elicit a set of avoidance behaviors, one of which may be
studying, to reduce the aversiveness of the emotional response.
Merely relegating the directive function of language to the "emotion-free" concept
of rule-governed behavior (see Zettle & Hayes, 1982) - the position taken by radical
behaviorism - fails to recognize and study these important behavior-directive functions of
language stimuli as a result of their capacity to elicit emotions (Staats, 1968a). A theory
that does not relate the reinforcing functions of words to their ability to elicit emotions
does not permit the full understanding of the reinforcing and motivating effects of self-
language provided by the paradigmatic behaviorism analysis. The principles have also
been demonstrated in our laboratory and clinical studies (Eifert, 1987; Hekmat, 1990;
Staats & Burns, 1982; Staats & Warren, 1974).

The Incentive Function of Language as a Self-Mechanism

We have already indicated how words that individuals say to themselves may elicit
emotions and how individuals may use their own words to condition themselves to new
stimuli through self-verbalization. In addition, self-statements can be reinforcers, when
they have ben made following a response of the individual. The third function, that of
emotional words eliciting approach or avoidance behavior, would also be expected to
apply to the individual's self-language. Using the above example, the student could say
the same thing to herself, that is, "If I do not study tonight, I will fail the examination
tomorrow". The words "not study" as a consequence of being paired with "fail the
examination" will elicit a negative emotional response in her as will the actual activity of
not studying. The point is that the individual's own self-language, as it elicits an
emotional response, can then bring about overt behaviors. Add this function of emotional
words and we can see that language is at the heart of self-control and self-direction. In
fact, behavior therapy techniques that aim at increasing client self-control (see Kanfer &
Gaelick, 1986) rely on this ability of humans to produce effective emotional self-
stimulation, self-reward and punishment, and positive and negative self-incentives.

Other Human Emotional Stimuli

In the previous section, we have emphasized that much of human emotional
learning occurs on the basis of language conditioning to a variety of personal, social and
cultural stimuli and events. This is not to say, however, that words are the only emotional
stimuli which are typically human. One of the characteristics that separates humans from
the lower animals is the gigantic scope of learned stimuli that elicit emotions. For
instance, various kinds of art stimuli (music, paintings, sculpture, literature) may elicit
emotions but so can material possessions such as fine cars, jewelery, clothes, and houses.
All these stimuli may serve the functions of emotional stimuli, that is, produce new
emotional learning, reinforce behavior, and act as incentives.
Music. Music is an interesting class of emotion-eliciting stimuli as it is used
across cultures to express, evoke or augment feelings of sadness, happiness, and at times
even ecstasy (cf. Sloboda, 1985). Music has also been applied in the treatment of clinical
disorders (Davies, 1978) but apart from some controlled and successful applications as a
reinforcer in behavior therapy (see Hanser, 1983), music has frequently been used in a
very haphazard and uncontrolled fashion. A recent experiment (Eifert et al., 1988)
demonstrated that music can function as an unconditioned stimulus that elicits an
emotional response which can be conditioned to previously neutral stimuli. Gorn (1982)
showed that music can also serve the other functions of emotional stimuli and reinforce
 14
and direct behavior. These studies support the notion that many of the emotional effects
of music are indeed learned through processes of classical conditioning by constantly
pairing particular types of music with certain types of emotive events (Davies, 1978;
Staats, 1975). Examples are martial and funereal music but also certain types of film
soundtracks. Goldstein (1980) looked at the "thrill-producing" effects of music and found
that of all stimuli listed by his subjects, thrills occurred most frequently in response to
music, primarily to musical passages with special emotional meaning for a person. Often
subjects reported that "what makes a certain musical passage able to elicit thrills is some
associations with an emotionally charged event or person in the past, as though the music
had become a conditioned stimulus for the emotional response" (p. 127). Goldstein also
showed that the thrill-producing effects of music were effectively attenuated by naloxone,
a specific antagonist at the opiate-endorphin receptors. This finding suggests the
involvement of endorphins and the limbic system in the emotional response to music,
supporting our position taken in earlier sections. Moreover, this study is a good
illustration of how human behavioral research of emotions may be strengthened by
including basic biological mechanisms--even in the case of a complex and culturally
determined phenomenon such as music appreciation.
Pictures. Pictures may also be potent sources of emotion elicitation, reinforcers,
and incentive stimuli. During war times, for instance, cartoons and photos have been
frequently used to condition a negative emotional response to people and policies of
another country (e.g., pictures of "enemy" soldiers shooting citizens, or Uncle Sam
depicted as a monster). Such uses attempt to create negative emotional responses that in
turn guide various negative and destructive behaviors toward the people and institutions
of that country. Martin and Levey (1978) conducted a series of ten experiments using
more peaceful stimuli such as art reproductions to elicit an emotional response. They
were able to show that positive or negative evaluative responses can be conditioned in the
absence of all but the central emotional component. Other studies (e.g., Silverstein, 1973)
have also used pictures as stimuli to elicit emotional responses that were conditioned to
other stimuli. In doing so, all these studies have provided experimental demonstrations
that pictures and other representational stimuli can be employed in the place of the "real"
stimuli to affect emotions and thereby behavior.
The enormous breadth of natural and culturally learned stimuli that can elicit
emotional responses is related to the great diversity of human behavior and its variations.
It means that there will be considerable individual differences in the type of stimuli that
elicit emotions and in the intensity of these emotional responses. Any theory of emotion
that does not adequately account for such differences by including a personality level of
theory will therefore be incomplete.

The Emotional State

The concept of the emotional response has wide acceptance. Most psychologists
would agree that certain stimuli elicit emotional responses which can be learned through
classical conditioning. On the other hand, it is recognized that humans can have deep
emotional experiences that are of a profound and lasting nature and do not seem to be
associated with any specific environmental stimuli. For example, depression is clearly not
an individual discrete emotional response. We usually refer to emotional episodes,
especially if they last, as moods and states. In the case of an episode such as depression
the term used is dysphoria, without distinguishing the difference between a negative
emotion and dysphoria or how they are related. The present theory specifically defines
the difference between the emotional response and the emotional state and their
relationship. That is, the emotional state involves a complexity of stimulus circumstances
that continuously elicit emotional responses so that it acquires an enduring, pervasive,
 15
profound character (see Rose & Staats, 1988). Let us take the case where a parent has lost
an only child. The child is gone and with the child all the interactions and activities, the
thought, planning, anticipations, ambitions, and so on, that involved or were based on
having the child. Many sources of positive stimulation, a major part of the parent's life,
may be removed. At the same time, very major sources of negative stimulation may be
inserted. The parent may have pervasive thoughts that the child would still be alive if the
parent had only. . . . The parent's self-concept (thoughts about him/herself) may turn
negative and become a source of extensive negative self-stimulation. In such cases
multiple negative emotional stimuli, multiple withdrawals of positive emotional stimuli
(loss of a loved one involves multiple withdrawals), and combinations of these conditions
occur. Many negative emotional responses result, which as a conglomerate will result in a
negative emotional state--a state that is deep, of some duration, and that itself produces
further behavioral symptoms in its clinical manifestations (Rose & Staats, 1988). The
same type of state can occur on the positive side, as in cases of extreme euphoria (e.g.,
associated with mania).
It is important to note that such emotional states are also involved in conditioning
processes. For instance, Kimmel and Gardner (1986) examined the properties of non-
discrete long-lasting 'tonic' stimuli and found that conditioning effects can be obtained
with them. Our own study (Eifert et al., 1988) supports these findings. The emotional
state concept and its differentiation from the concept of emotional response is central in
dealing with cases of pervasive and lasting human emotions.

Individual Differences in Emotions:

The Personality and Measurement Level of Theory
The basic principles of emotional learning, the functions of emotions, and the
specifically human mechanism for relating cognition and emotion generally apply to all
humans. We have already pointed out, however, important individual differences in all
these levels. There is a major theory jump to be made in moving from the statement of
general principles to the statement of principles that account for individual, personality
differences that much of psychology is concerned with. Behaviorism has never made that
jump. Radical behaviorism has simply rejected the concept of personality, and the need
for a personality level of theory construction, instead expecting to deal with human
behavior using only its basic statement of general principles. Tolman (1932) attempted to
introduce a concept of individual differences in his general theory but later abandoned the
whole attempt (Tolman, 1959). Rotter (1954) later followed this approach by treating
personality as an intervening variable, but left the definition largely unspecified.
Paradigmatic behaviorism, however, has taken the position that there is much
valuable knowledge in the fields of personality theory and measurement that must be
incorporated into a general theory of emotion (Staats, 1963, 1975, 1986; see also Burns,
1990). Moreover, its multilevel theory-construction methodology makes it possible to
deal with the emotional aspects of personality within an objective framework that
employs conditioning principles but also includes a cognitive mechanism of very general
scope (the verbal-emotional repertoire). This approach provides a bridging theory
intended to meet the needs of psychologists who consider personality as a causal
determinant and for whom that conception is of central importance in psychology. We
will now indicate how principles and concepts from the preceding levels of theory
development provide the necessary building blocks for a theory of the emotional aspects
of personality.

Basic Behavioral Repertoires: The Building Blocks of Personality

 16
The central notion in the paradigmatic behavioral conception of personality is that,
beginning from birth, the human begins to learn constellations of behaviors that can be
classified in three basic behavioral repertoires or personality systems (cf. Staats, 1975,
1986). For example, the infant begins to learn an exceedingly complex repertoire of
sensory-motor skills which are built upon and extended throughout life in a cumulative-
hierarchical fashion to become the sensory-motor personality system. Similar
developments occur with respect to language-cognitive personality traits where--
beginning in infancy--a person learns a complex language repertoire (composed of various
subrepertoires) which is involved in many activities that are commonly labeled 'cognitive'
such as reasoning and problem-solving. Because these repertoires are involved in such
cognitive activities the repertoires are considered to constitute the language-cognitive
personality system.
The third--but in many ways the most basic repertoire--is the emotional-
motivational personality system. It is composed of all the stimuli that elicit a positive or
negative emotional response in the individual. There are the many types of emotion-
arousing stimuli mentioned earlier, and listed in the next section. Add the thousands of
words and word combinations that will also elicit an emotional response in the individual
and we end up with an almost infinite source for stimulation.

Individual Differences in the Emotional-Motivational Repertoire

People learn different emotional responses to the various stimuli surrounding us all
the time: foods, recreational stimuli, sexual stimuli, work stimuli, religious stimuli, social
issues, aesthetic stimuli, material possessions, and to types of behavior as stimuli. There
are individual differences in terms of what stimuli elicit emotional responses, variations in
how intense the emotional responses are, and in the relative intensity of responses elicited
by the different groups of stimuli. The variations are so many that each individual must
be considered to have a unique emotional-motivational system, a product of unique,
complex experience, much of it generated by the individual's own actions.
Such individual differences constitute true aspects of personality in the sense that
they help determine the individual's experience, behavior, and learning. This theory of
personality is schematized in Figure 1. Through a person's experience (S1) he/she
acquires the three personality repertoires. In any later situation (S2) the individual's
behavior is jointly determined by the nature of the situation and the nature of his/her
personality repertoires. This analysis applies to the individual's emotional-motivational
repertoire, that is to the nature of the huge number of stimuli that are emotional for the
individual. The nature of the emotional-motivational system will help determine what
individuals experience, how they behave, and what they will learn--for what stimuli are in
the emotional-motivational system will determine what in the world will elicit emotion for
the individual, what will serve to reward or punish the individual, and what the individual
will "approach" or "avoid".
-----------------------
Place Figure 1 about here
-----------------------
Let us take the example of two youths that have learned different sexual emotional
responses to members of the same sex--for one, other men elicit a positive sexual
response, while this is not so for the other. This difference in the emotional-motivational
system will result in different experiences; for example, pictures of nude men will be
sexually arousing for the one and not the other. Moreover, it is likely that the behavior of
the two will become different. Approach to and sexual behavior with other men will be
reinforcing for the one youth and not for the other so that the two will learn different
 17
things. As an illustration, the one youth may be reinforced for behaving in a feminine
manner and learns this type of sensory-motor and language-cognitive behavior, while the
other would not. Furthermore, the two youths' behavior will be guided in different ways
because sexual stimuli will have different incentive (directive) value for the youths. The
one who has a positive sexual emotional response to men is more likely to approach
shows and literature involving homosexual interactions, while the other youth will not.
This illustrates another feature of the paradigmatic behaviorism theory of
personality, that is, the emotional-motivational personality difference, as in this example,
may result in differences in the sensory-motor and language cognitive personality
repertoires. This type of interaction is typical and central in the present personality theory
(Staats, 1963, 1968a, 1986): individual differences in one personality repertoire result in
differences in the other two personality repertoires.
In general there is a continuing interaction between the individual's several
personality repertoires, the behavior that is produced, and the environmental development
that ensues (Staats, 1963). There are other interaction conceptions (e.g., Bandura, 1969,
1977; Mischel, 1979) but the theoretical advancement in our theory is that it not only
postulates a reciprocal interaction between person and environment variables, it also calls
for and provides specification of the mechanisms and principles underlying these
reciprocal processes by linking them to more basic principles of the emotional-
motivational and the other personality repertoires (see Staats, 1980). Whether we want to
raise a child or treat a patient, we need a theory that specifies what the environmental
events are that produce a particular type of emotional-motivational repertoire. We also
need to know how that personality repertoire interacts with other repertoires to affect the
individual's experience, behavior, and future learning (in ways that cannot be treated here,
see e.g. Staats, 1986). Finally, we need to account for individual differences in the
emotional-motivational system and their effects. Neither radical behaviorism nor any
other behavioral theories have adequately dealt with these issues (see also Evans, 1986).

Measurement of the Emotional Aspects of Personality

As a personality level of theory is essential in a general theory of emotions, it is
also necessary to advance the theoretical and practical development of personality
measurement and behavioral assessment with a view of integrating these two important,
but largely separate and unrelated, areas of research. Paradigmatic behaviorism has
developed a theoretical and practical formulation which provides a basis for the conduct
of basic research on psychological measures of emotional traits (see Burns, 1980, 1990;
Staats, 1986; Staats & Fernandez-Ballesteros, 1987).
Our studies have shown that various psychological tests of interests, preferences,
and values--traditionally treated as different--actually deal with different aspects of the
emotional-motivational repertoire (Staats & Burns, 1982). The theory thus provides a
more profound knowledge of these emotional aspects of personality than the traditional
psychological measurement theory. We also have tests of negative emotions such as fears
and phobias, anxiety, depression, stress, anger, and so on which have not been well related
within a unified theory. This raises the question of what establishes the difference
between them. Preliminary analysis suggests that--as with the positive emotions--there
are differences in the particular stimuli that elicit the negative emotions, and in the
ubiquity, strength, duration, explicitness, and frequency of the occurrence of those stimuli.
This theoretical formulation calls for various types of new research (e.g., Staats & Burns,
1981).
Finally, we have to relate test measures of emotion to the commonly employed
psychophysiological indices of emotion (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance,
muscle tension). A frequently raised problem refers to the desynchrony between some of
 18
these measures. For instance, while there are correlations between the physiological, self-
report, and behavioral aspects of fear, there is no one-to-one correspondence between
them (Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987; Hugdahl, 1981). Evans (1986) points out, however, that
these differences can be better understood and analyzed if they are seen to reflect
differences in the several behavioral repertoires involved rather than viewing all as
measures of a unitary concept such as fear. Our differentiation between the central
emotional response and its peripheral indices can further reduce the confusion
surrounding the desynchrony problem which is partly a result of constantly confounding
what is measured with how it is measured. These are all open questions which research
must resolve, but they indicate again the heuristic characteristics of the present theory in
pointing to new questions and directions of research in emotions and their measurement.

Abnormal Behavior and Emotions

Many variations in persons' emotional-motivational systems are considered to be
in the normal range, particularly if they help persons to adjust to the demands of their
social and cultural group. Some of the more extreme differences in the emotional-
motivational system, however, will produce behavior that is considered abnormal and
have outcomes that are not adaptive. A man who has a sexual emotional response to
children, a person who has a fear response to being on an elevator, an autistic boy who has
little emotional response to his parents, illustrate such cases.
We take the position that a multi-level theory of emotion must extend into the
abnormal psychology realm and connect with the knowledge that exists in this area. A
theory of emotion should include a part devoted to the explanation of abnormal emotions
and the abnormal behavior that is produced. Moreover, such a theory should be heuristic
and indicate new directions of research. For example, the Pleasant Events Schedule, used
in measuring depression, lumps together the frequency of pleasant events and the strength
of their pleasantness (Lewinsohn & Libet, 1972). The more detailed paradigmatic
behaviorism theory, however, predicts subtypes of depression (Heiby & Staats, 1990).
For example, some individuals feel strongly about positive emotional events but
experience those events infrequently, whereas others experience the events infrequently
but care little about the events as such. Our research shows that this typology
differentially predicts depression (Rose & Staats, 1988).
Paradigmatic behaviorism, with its introduction of personality as basic behavioral
repertoires, has provided a framework theory in abnormal psychology (see Staats, 1975,
chapter 8; Staats & Heiby, 1985). The basic theory is an elaboration of that schematized
in Figure 1. It adds, however, that the original learning circumstances of the individual
may be deficit or inappropriate and thereby produce deficit or inappropriate development
of the individual's personality repertoires. Abnormal personality repertoires, in interaction
with the later situations the individual encounters, can produce abnormal behaviors,
abnormal experiences, and abnormal learning. Those later environmental situations may
also be deficit and inappropriate, and independently contribute further to the individual's
abnormal experience, behavior, and learning--and there is a personality-environment
interaction involved, too. Emotional disorders are seen to involve deficits and
inappropriate aspects of the emotional-motivational repertoire which frequently produce
or interact with existing deficits and inappropriate aspects of the language-cognitive and
sensory-motor repertoires. In various ways, the frequently postulated interaction between
person and environmental variables in the origin and maintenance of emotional disorders
is not only postulated but integrated into a systematic framework theory. This general
framework can be used heuristically in more specialized areas, as has been demonstrated
in formulating a theory of depression. It has also heuristic value for the treatment of
abnormal behavior by means of behavior therapy (Eifert & Evans, 1990; Staats, 1988a).
 19
This is particularly important because behavior therapy is in need of a unifying framework
to guide its further practical and conceptual development.

Clinical Psychology and Emotions

Despite the extensive basic research on classical conditioning, contemporary
behavioral clinical psychology has not dealt well with emotions. A central reason is that
radical behaviorism has never granted emotions (and thus classical conditioning) a causal
role in the determination of behavior--and thus has not been interested in treatment
methods directed towards changing emotions, notwithstanding that this is exactly what is
involved in much behavior therapy treatment. In the field of behavior therapy there are
presently cognitive-behavioral approaches that link emotions to "maladaptive cognitive
processes" (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1983). However, these formulations do not provide
the bridging theory that would connect them with basic behavioral analyses of emotions
and language (cf. Eifert, 1984b, 1985; Staats, 1972, 1990). The multilevel paradigmatic
behavioral theory of emotions provides a basis for understanding the acquisition of
emotions through primary as well as specifically human forms of learning--such as
language learning and observational learning--as well as why it is important to treat
emotions in solving behavior problems. What is central, however, is the demonstration
that this theoretical formulation has heuristic value in clinical psychology. It is thus
important to describe two lines of research that have begun to extend the approach and
indicate its value in the areas of anxiety and depression.

Anxiety
Let us first mention the formulation of a multi-level theory of anxiety and its
cognitive-behavioral treatment (Eifert, 1987, 1990) and the development of new
intervention techniques based on the theory (Hekmat, 1977; Hekmat, Deal, & Lubitz,
1985). The two major principles in the theory are that: (a) a central emotional response is
at the core of anxiety problems (cf. Eifert et al., 1988); and (b) this emotional response
can be acquired directly through aversive classical conditioning or indirectly through
language-symbolic experiences (Eifert, 1984a; Eifert & Schermelleh, 1985). In other
words, while sufficient, it is not necessary for an individual to have an actual traumatic
experience to develop a phobia. The association of inappropriate or negative emotion-
eliciting verbal-symbolic stimuli with objects or situations is sufficient for those objects to
acquire aversive properties. Hence phobias with no history of overt aversive conditioning
can be acquired vicariously and/or by means of language conditioning. Our research
(Eifert, 1990) shows that agoraphobic clients constantly pair negative thoughts and verbal
stimuli with images of panic and disaster in potentially frightening situations. It follows
that such persons do not need to have direct re-conditioning experiences to remain phobic
and continue to avoid these situations. They may condition themselves by providing their
own verbal-symbolic stimuli which elicit negative responses. Moreover, as the emotion-
eliciting, reinforcing, and directive functions of emotive verbal stimuli are interrelated, it
means that, once established, a phobic stimulus will not only elicit a negative emotional
response (anxiety) but directly elicit various types of avoidance behavior and also serve as
a negative reinforcer for every behavior that reduces the fear.
The above theory relates and integrates the basic forms of direct aversive classical
conditioning (e.g., fainting in a crowded stuffy bus) with the specifically human types of
learning involving language and imagery in the origin of anxiety disorders. It therefore
helps to overcome the schism in clinical psychology between 'traditional' conditioning
theorists and 'cognitive' theorists and therapists. When the two mechanisms are truly
linked in a multi-level approach--each accorded its proper place--they make such divisive
controversies between 'scientific camps' superfluous and create greater unity in
 20
psychology (Eifert, 1985, 1987; Evans, Eifert, & Corrigan, 1990). It may be added that
this paradigmatic behaviorism theory makes unnecessary the introduction of the special
concept of "fear incubation" (see Eysenck, 1987) to deal with the phenomenon that
phobias typically increase over time despite no overt traumatic reconditioning
experiences.

Depression
As has been indicated, the paradigmatic behaviorism theory of abnormal behavior
has been elaborated in the area of depression (Heiby, 1985; Heiby & Staats, 1990, Rose &
Staats, 1988; Staats & Heiby, 1985). Central in this theory is the concept of dysphoria as
the negative emotional state that elicits the behavioral and physiological symptoms of
depression. The state occurs as a consequence of an interaction between the individual's
environmental situation (especially in terms of losses of positive emotional stimulation or
the occurrence of negative emotional stimuli) and the individual's personality repertoires
(especially the emotional-motivational system). In its most recent form (Heiby & Staats,
1990) the theory also stipulates ways that biological factors (e.g., biochemical
imbalances) affect the etiology of depression and how these factors may combine with
psychological deficits such as low levels of self-esteem and self-reinforcement interact to
produce depression. Heiby and Staats have also stipulated how bipolar depression can be
considered in the paradigmatic behaviorism framework. Moreover, the theory includes a
classification scheme which recognizes that there are multiple possible subtypes of
depression based on numerous potential etiological factors. Rose and Staats (1988) have
demonstrated empirically that there are different subtypes produced by an interaction
between personality and situation variables, and Heiby (1985) has shown that different
clinical treatment is effective with these different subtypes. Heiby's study also
demonstrates the close relationship that should exist between research on
psychopathology and treatment--a relationship that is possible when the analysis of
psychopathology is made in terms of principles that specify the interaction of particular
environmental influences and person variables.
One further point should be made in the context of depression. An important
reason that the principles involving emotional conditioning have not been seen as basic in
depression is that dysphoria does not have the specific, immediate, ephemeral
characteristics of an emotional response. For example, the phobic person experiences an
emotional response that--although intense when confronted when the feared stimulus--is
more specific and short-lived and hence different from the continuing, pervasive
dysphoric state of a depressed individual. For such reasons more discrete emotional
responses have been differentiated from emotional states, as they should be, but that
differentiation should not imply separate and independent processes. Rather, we see the
emotional state as a conglomeration of stimulus circumstances that in their complexity
produce a deep, pervasive, lasting negative emotional responding or state (see Rose &
Staats, 1988). This theoretical formulation suggests further analysis of the circumstances
that serve to differentiate the negative emotional responses and states, such as phobias,
anxiety, stress, depression, and so on. For example, simple phobias can be seen to be
negative emotional responses to specific stimuli whereas (generalized) anxiety involves
more general stimulus elicitation and the stimuli tend to be more subtle, not always clear.
Stress appears to involve a particular type of stimulation found in particular situations that
involve a person's performance (such as work). A complex of stimuli is involved and the
individual's personality repertoires will play an important role. Depression, as has been
indicated, involves another complex of environmental stimuli and personality repertoires.
Paradigmatic behaviorism's theories of anxiety and depression begin to provide a
framework within which such analyses can be made.
 21

Conclusion
We have presented our theory of emotion in what must presently be considered a
framework form. This means that, while the theory is explicit and closely reasoned, it
needs further elaboration. While the theory is well supported by research at some of its
points of development, at others this has yet to be accomplished. In particular, the
implications of the theory for the various and different clinical problems need to be
derived and validated. Moreover, it has not been possible to go into the detail that is
possible at some points, and to indicate controversy that exists at yet others. In the former
case, for example, a great deal of experimentation and theory elaboration has taken place
in the area of emotional responding (attitudes) to social stimuli and the manner in which
social interaction is affected (see Berkowitz, 1970; Berkowitz & Knurek, 1969; Staats,
1968a, 1986). Many studies of attitudes, attraction, prejudice, and aggression have been
conducted within the present theoretical framework, and the findings and concepts
constitute an important addition to the theory.
A good example of controversy within the theory that we could not address
involves the debate as to whether emotional word stimuli can really be employed to
produce an effective therapy. The argument is that while emotions can be generated and
maintained by verbal means, verbal-cognitive methods are not very effective in changing
existing emotional responses (cf. Rachman, 1981). We have addressed these problems
elsewhere in more detail (e.g., Eifert, 1987; Eifert & Craill, 1989) and indicated that
language stimuli may at times produce weaker effects. After all, words and thoughts are
only higher-order stimuli, they cause no tissue damage, reduce no drives, and so on. That
does not mean, however, they are useless in changing emotions. The effectiveness of
language conditioning in changing emotional responses depends on the intensity of the
emotions involved, whether there are strong primary emotional stimuli involved (e.g., in
sexual dysfunctions, addictions, fear), and whether the individual involved is still
subjected to other conditioning strengthening the unwanted emotional response while in
treatment (Tryon & Briones, 1985). It may be added here, however, that a full analysis in
paradigmatic behaviorism principles remains to be made in this area.
While a framework theory in its first statement cannot be detailed, it must present
heuristic possibilities at the various problem areas it addresses, and provide a structure
which allows for creative elaboration. A primary test and potential strength of the
framework theory is its ability to stimulate additional theoretical and empirical
elaboration. Although the framework theory cannot be as detailed, the multiple levels of
theory in the framework structure also make the theory richer than more specialized
theories that typically deal with only one or two levels. We have exemplified this in our
dealing with depression where the multi-level theory provides conceptual elements that
range from biological knowledge, through behavioural principles, and into personality.
Consequently, this theory can be more detailed and cover a wider range of phenomena
than is usual. Most theories of depression do not include the various levels of the present
theory, and thus are less rich in concepts and principles with which to face the task of
analyzing the various phenomena.
The multilevel structure of our theory allows it to deal with emotion in a unified
way covering aspects of emotion that ordinarily are left separate. It has not been possible
in the present space limitations to indicate more problems areas and conceptual material
that could be incorporated into the framework with mutual enrichment and heuristic
implications. These are objectives for future research. However, we hope to have laid the
foundation for a paradigmatic theory of emotion that can serve to unify the different
concepts, fields of study, and research relating to the wide range of emotional phenomena.
 22
Finally, these qualities provide the framework theory with additional heuristic
characteristics which are not traditionally recognized. Psychology contains a huge
amount of unrelated literature, presented in different theoretical languages which makes it
difficult for the user (for example, clinicians) to pull from this morass the knowledge that
they need. The framework theory serves an important function in this respect. By placing
diverse materials within a common framework of principles and concepts, a structure is
provided with which to deal with the literature and to make sense of its discrepant
elements. "One of the important functions of framework theory is to guide us in the task
of interpreting the various findings of psychology and of making them meaningful in a
related way" (Staats, 1988a, p. 244). We have attempted to provide this type of
implement in this statement of the paradigmatic behaviorism theory of emotion.

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Figure 1. The paradigmatic behaviorism conception of personality.

The individual's learning experiences (S1) result in the development of the personality
repertoires (BBR, or basic behavioral repertoires) in the three general areas. These
personality repertoires interact with the individual's present environmental situation to
produce the individual's experience, learning, and behavior. These elements, then, may
further affect the later situations the individual faces and the personality repertoires the
individual has (but these developments are not depicted).

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