108.) The Heirs of the Late Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer vs.
CA RULING:
May 26, 1981
FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint made by Haberer against respondents for
recovery of possession of parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong, Rizal. The
lower court dismissed the complaint. On motion of Haberer the case was
reopened on the ground of newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the complaint for being filed out of time. The SC reversed the CA and
ruled that petitioner duly perfected her appeal and in compliance with the
material data rule requiring the Record on Appeal. Hence, the cases were
remanded back to the CA. Three days before the period to file an appellant’s brief
(June 18, 1975), a MOTEX was filed. The court granted the MOTEX.
Prior to the filing of the MOTEX (May 26, 1975) Haberer died, accordingly
appellant’s counsel gave respondent court notice of death of their client and
asked a motion (June 28, 1975) for the suspension of the running of the period
within which to file the appellant’s brief pending the pending the appointment of
an executor of the estate left by their client. Respondents in turn contended that
the lawyers of the deceased ha “no longer any relationship had been
automatically terminated or severed” and asked that the appeal be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
The motion remained unacted upon and the original extension granted was about
to expire, her counsel filed on September 18, 1975 a manifestation and/or motion
asking either for an extension of sixty (60) days and/or resolution suspending
the running of the period. Still, the CA remained silent.
CA dismissed the motion and denied the request for extension. An MR was filed
by the counsel for the deceased explaining their predicament that the requests
for extension/suspension of period to file brief was dues to the uncertainty that
their services may no longer be retained by the heir or legal representatives of
their deceased client, but they felt obligated to preserve the right of such
heirs/successors to continue the appeal pursuant to Rule 3, Section 17, pending
the settlement of the question of who among them should be the executor of the
deceased’s estate and presented therewith, for admission, the “brief for the
appellant” which they had deferred “for professional and ethical considerations”
pending the court’s action on the request. CA denied the MR. It ruled that
“litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter
of course”.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal in requiring the appearance of the
legal representative of the deceased
Yes. Respondent court, however, denie reconsideration, per its Resolution of
January 15, 1976 citing the general principle that “litigants have no right to
assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course.” But
respondent court erred in applying this general principle and summarily denying
reconsideration and denying admission of the appellant’s brief conditioned upon
the administrator of the deceased’s estate making his appearance upon his
appointment and being granted leave to file his supplemental
brief/memorandum, in view of the intervening event of appellant’s death and the
interposition of the equally established principle that the relation of attorney and
client is terminated by the death of the client, as acknowledged by respondent
court itself as well as respondents. In the absence of a retainer from the heirs or
authorized representatives of hi deceased client, the attorney would thereafter
have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in the
case, save to inform the court of the client’s death and take the necessary steps to
safeguard the deceased’s rights in the case.
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court sets the rule on substitution of parties in
case of death of any of the parties. Under the Rule, it is the court that is called
upon, after notice of a party’s death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to
order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear
within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of
the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still
pending determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion
of the deceased’s counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file appellant’s brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have
set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal
representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased at the cost of the deceased’s estate, and such representative shall then
“immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.”
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no
order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of
the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact
no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without
such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are
null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the
legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would
be binding.
Respondent court likewise gravely erred in dismissing the appeal on “(its) belief
that the supervening death of the appellant Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer
rendered the continuance of the appeal unnecessary” on the basis of a totally
inapplicable citation of a ruling in Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214 that
“If pending appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate
court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed.” Manifestly, the appellant’s
death in no way impedes that the deceased’s appeal to recover the parcel of land
registered in her name be continued and determined for the benefit of her estate
and heirs.
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. A
liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not
only because appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given
every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice
can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are in actual
possession of the disputed land.
109.) Fabiana C. Vda. De Salazar vs. CA and Primitivo Nepomuceno and
Emerenciana Nepomuceno, November 23, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondents filed an ejectment complaint on the ground of personal
cultivation and conversion of land for useful non-agricultural purposes against
petitioner’s deceased husband, Benjamin Salazar. The Agrarian Court of Malolos
and the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
Almost a year after the termination of that appeal, the same trial decision subject
thereof was once again assailed before the CA through a petition for annulment
of judgement. Salazar assailed that the trial court has no jurisdiction over her and
the other heirs of the deceased, because notwithstanding the fact that her
husband had already died, the trial court still proceed to render its decision
without effecting the substitution thereby depriving her day in court. The CA
denied the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the failure to effectuate a substitution of heirs before rendition of judgment
would render such judgement jurisdictionally infirm
RULING:
No. The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process
accruing to every party in any proceeding.
We are not unaware of several cases where we have ruled that a party having
died in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of
the deceased’s legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment
rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule
notwithstanding, in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when
the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented
evidence in defense of deceased defendant.
Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the defendant in an ejectment
case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its
failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of
judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves
appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and
presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident
that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to
due process.
Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that ejectment, being an action
involving recovery of real property, is a real action which as such, is not
extinguished by the defendant’s death.
There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party, which
death did not extinguish the deceased’s civil personality. More significantly, a
judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.
110.) Gochan vs Young, March 12, 2001
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
FACTS:
Gochan Realty was registered with the SEC with Felix Gochan, Sr. (Felix), Maria
pan Nuy Go Tiong (Maria), Pedro Gochan (Pedro), Tomasa Gochan (Tomasa),
Esteban Gochan (Esteban), and Crispo Gochan (Crispo) as its incorporators.
Felix’s daughter, Alice, mother of herein respondents inherited 50 shares of stock
in Gochan Realty. Alice died, leaving the 50 shares to his husband John Young.
The RTC of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children. The children
reached the age of majority, hence their father, requested Gochan Realty to
partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name
and issuing in lieu thereof, in the names of respondents. Gochan Realty refused,
citing the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the
Article of Incorporation. John Young died leaving the shares to respondent.
Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the
rightful owner, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property
impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages.
A notice of lis pendeds was annotated as real properties of the corporation.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that (1) the SEC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) respondents were not the real
parties-in-interest and had no capacity to sure; and(3) causes of action are barred
by the Statute of Limitations. The SEC hearing office granted the MD and ordered
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
On appeal, the CA ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case insofar as
the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet
stockholders of the corporation. It also held that the intestate Estate of John
Young was an indispensable part. Hence, this appeal
Issue:
1. WON Spouses Uy could properly bring a derivate suit in the name of
Gochan Realty to redress wrongs allegedly committed against it for
which the directors refused to sue
2. WON the intestate estate of John Young is an indispensable party in the
SEC case considering that the individual heirs shares are still in the
decedent stockholders name
RULING:
1. Yes. As early as 1911, this Court has recognized the right of a single
stockholder to file derivative suits. In its words: “[W]here corporate directors
have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy
the wrong, a single stockholder may institute that suit, suing on behalf of himself
and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a
redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders.”
In the present case, the Complaint alleges all the components of a derivative suit.
The allegations of injury to the Spouses Uy can coexist with those pertaining to
the corporation. The personal injury suffered by the spouses cannot disqualify
them from filing a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. It merely gives rise
to an additional cause of action for damages against the erring directors. This
cause of action is also included in the Complaint filed before the SEC.
2. Yes. It would be useful to point out at this juncture that one of the causes of
action stated in the Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration, in the
name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan Young, of 6/14th of the shares still
registered under the name of John D. Young, Sr. Since all the shares that belonged
to Alice are still in his name, no final determination can be had without his estate
being impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect
to the cause of action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of
the heirs of Alice.
Section 3 of Rule 3, and Section 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, while permitting
an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the
deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. —The above-
quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to
bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing
the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator
has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to
protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do
nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put
undue hardships on litigants For the protection of the interests of the decedent,
this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper
representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator
appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this
case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper
representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them
from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been
appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see
nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who
represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC.
111.) Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag vs. Sps. Diosdidit and Menendez M.
Literato; and Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo, June 18, 2008
This is a petition for review under Rule 45
FACTS:
Josefa filed a complaint for the nullity of the deed of sale or real property executed
between her as vendors and respondents spouses as vendee before the RTC of
Leyte. Respondent spouses in its amended answer with counterclaim denying
that the deed of sale was falsified. They impleaded petitioner with Josefa as
counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at the instance of
Josefa occupied said lots without the Spouse Authority. The counterclaim was
dismissed
Menendez filed a complaint for the declaration of the inexistence of lease
contract, recovery of possession of land, and damages, against petitioner and
Josefa. Mendez averred that petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in entering
the lease as they both knew that Josefa did not own the leased lots. Josefa died.
Atty. Pura, Josefa’s counsel, filed a notice of death and substitution of party,
praying that Josefa be substituted by petitioner. It alleged that Josefa executed a
Quitclaim Deed in favor of Maglasang who in turn sold this to petitioner. Mendez
opposed. He argued that Josefa be substituted by her full-blood sister Michaeles.
RTC denied the motion for substitution and instead ordered the appearance of
Michaeles as representative of deceased.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was transferee pended lite who courts should recognize
pursuant to Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the ROC
RULING:
No. The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: Section
16. Death of a party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs
A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil
Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are actions that survive the death of Josefa. We said
in Gonzalez v. Pagcor, 429 SCRA 533 (2004): “The criteria for determining
whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated
upon in Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), as follows: . . . The question as to
whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained
[of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to
the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of Go.
Vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C. Zarate, Perlita
A. Urbano, and Atty. Edward Martin property affected being incidental. . . . Since
the questions involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then
we are dealing with actions that survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must
necessarily apply.
The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel
properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of the
deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not. The “legal
representatives” that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law—
the administrator, executor or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of
estate of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased.
Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that “the heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator . . . .” Significantly, the person—now the present
petitioner—that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned
under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-defendant of the
deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the
transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young, 354 SCRA 207 (2001): For the protection of
the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the
heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an
administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as
the proper representatives of the deceased.
Josefa’s death certificate shows that she was single at the time of her death. The
records do not show that she left a will. Therefore, as correctly held by the CA, in
applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving sisters (Michaelis, Maria,
Zosima, and Consolacion) and the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes
(Manuel, Cesar, Huros and Regulo) who should be her legal representatives.
Menendez, although also a sister, should be excluded for being one of the adverse
parties in the cases before the RTC.
112.) O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation
Vs. Adelina S. Tan And Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez
G.R. No. 180325; February 20, 2013
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated May 24,
2007, refusing to recall its entry of judgment, and its Resolution 2 dated October
19, 2007, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, be reversed and set
aside.
FACTS:
Petitioner leased out two of its properties in Cabanatuan City to Alfredo S. Tan
and herein private respondent Adelina S. Tan (the Tans). Due to the failure of the
Tans to comply with the terms of the lease, petitioner filed a complaint against
the Tans for cancellation and termination of contract of lease with the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (RTC). On December 10, 1996, the RTC
rendered a Decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Oscar
Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation and against the defendants Alfredo S.
Tan, Sr. and Adelina S. Tan.
Both Alfredo S. Tan and private respondent Adelina S. Tan appealed from said
Decision. However, herein petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal
and the same was granted by the trial court. Several properties and bank
accounts of private respondent and Alfredo S. Tan were levied upon. The Tans
decided to pay the amounts as ordered in the RTC Decision, and on September
24, 1997, the trial court issued Orders lifting and cancelling the Notice of Levy on
private respondent Adelina Tan's properties and also on several bank accounts
in the name of the Tans. Both orders stated that after the court allowed the writ
of execution pending appeal, defendant tendered payment in the amount of
₱9,073,694.76 in favor of herein petitioner, who through Mr. Moises C. Ventanilla,
acknowledged receipt of said amount as complete and full satisfaction of the
adjudged obligations of the Tans to petitioner in this case.
The appeal filed by Alfredo S. Tan was dismissed by the CA, but the appeal filed
by herein private respondent Adelina S. Tan (docketed as CAG. R. CV No. 58817),
proceeded in due course. On October 21, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision,7
the dispositive portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. For lack of legal and factual
justification, the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall be
DELETED. Likewise, the award of liquidated damages under paragraph 23 of
the lease contract is further REDUCED to 25% of the unpaid rentals. All the
other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion (for recall
and reconsideration of order and quashal of alias writ of execution, levy, and
notice of sheriff's sale, etc.), but this motion was denied in an Order dated March
10, 2004. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA (docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 82608) to assail the trial court's denial of the Very Urgent Motion,
but as admitted by petitioner in the present petition, said action for certiorari was
denied due course and dismissed by the CA on March 12, 2004.
As to petitioner's Omnibus Motion (with entry of appearance) filed with the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, the appellate court issued a Resolution dated March 19,
2004, merely noting petitioner's motion because its Decision dated October 21,
2002 has long become final and executory. Undaunted, petitioner again filed on
October 2, 2006, a Manifestation and Motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, praying
that its Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motion be resolved on the merits
instead of merely being noted as the CA did in its Resolution dated March 19,
2004; that the petition for certiorari be resolved and granted; and that the
proceedings in the trial court with regard to the execution of the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, be annulled and set aside.
On May 24, 2007, the CA promulgated the Resolution denying the above-
mentioned Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner on October 2, 2006. The
CA pointed out that the separate petition for certiorari which petitioner sought
to be resolved had already been dismissed on March 12, 2004. The CA also ruled
that petitioner's prayer for the recall of the entry of judgment cannot be granted,
as petitioner's bare assertion, that its former counsel had not received notices of
orders, resolutions or decisions of the court because said counsel died while the
appeal was pending, does not qualify as one of those cases where the court
allowed such recall. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said Resolution, but
the CA issued a Resolution denying the same. The CA reiterated that it could not
find any reason to recall the entry of judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA should recall the entry of judgment because of petitioner’s
contention that its counsel had died while appeal was pending.
RULING:
NO. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in
this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case.
The reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA
Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is
too tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial
Security Service Agency, Inc.,17 the Court explained that it is the party's duty to
inform the court of its counsel's demise, and failure to apprise the court of such
fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further,
the Court stated:
x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case,
whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues
to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are
still connected with the firm.
x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the
changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel.
xxxx
In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the vigilance that must be
exercised by a party:

xxxx

Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to
do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case
plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due
process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due
process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party,
such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.

Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of its counsel of record
and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the place or
law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice.
The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed within the reglementary period therefor.