CUARTEROS, PEE JAY T.

September 28, 2015

Section E
CASE DIGESTS
CLEAN AIR ACT

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-

II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE
PORT TERMINAL, INC., AND REGHIS ROMERO II, G.R. No. 164527,
August 15, 2007

FACTS: At the time the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan

Manila Waste Management Plan was issued, Smokey Mountain was a
wasteland in Balut, Tondo, Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided
in subhuman conditions, collecting items that may have some monetary
value from the garbage. Pursuant to such issuance, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) prepared the feasibility studies of the
Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the
formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and
Reclamation of the Area Across R-10. The NHA then entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for such
project. However, as a preliminary step in the project
implementation, consultations and dialogues were conducted with the
settlers of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite Area. As a result the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published on April 29 and
May 12, 1993 as required by the Environmental Management Bureau of
DENR, the evaluation of the DENR, and the recommendations from
other government agencies, it was discovered that design changes and
additional work have to be undertaken to successfully implement the
Project. Thus, on February 21, 1994, the parties entered into another
agreement denominated as the Amended and Restated JVA which
delineated the different phases of the Project. Phase I of the Project
involves the construction of temporary housing units for the current
residents of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite, the clearing and leveling-
off of the dumpsite, and the construction of medium-rise low-cost
housing units at the cleared and leveled dumpsite. Phase II of the
Project involves the construction of an incineration area for the on-site
disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
ISSUE: Whether or not Phase II of the project is valid.
HELD: No. On June 23, 1999, the Legislature passed the Clean Air Act.
The Act made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively
barred the implementation of the planned incinerator project under
Phase II. Thus, the off-site disposal of the garbage at the Smokey
Mountain became necessary. Based on the issues raised in this petition,
the Court finds that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI
and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to
the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to it,
including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain
Asset Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as
well as all other transactions which emanated from the Project, have
been shown to be valid, legal, and constitutional. Phase II however has
been struck down by the Clean Air Act.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL
CORPORATION AND JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, G.R. NO. 163663, June
30, 2006

FACTS: In 1994, Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued

by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating an Executive Committee to
oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal
sites in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Jancom International Development
Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the San
Mateo Waste Disposal Site. It subsequently entered into a partnership
with Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name JANCOM Environmental
Corporation. On February 12, 1997, the aforementioned Executive
Committee declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder for the San
Mateo Waste Disposal Site. On December 19, 1997, a Contract for the
BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the
San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal Site was entered into by the Republic
of the Philippines and JANCOM. On March 5, 1998, President Ramos
endorsed the contract submitted to him to then incoming President
Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the
Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill.
GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract
with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefor the passage of Republic Act
8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-
availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees. MMDA also
called for bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the
Metro Manila waste management.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GMMSWMC Resolution and MMDA’s act of
calling for new bids is valid.
HELD: Yes. Although the contract between JANCOM and the Republic
is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and
unless it is approved by the President. Since the contract covers only
3,000 tons of garbage per day while Metro Manila generates at least
6,000 tons of solid waste a day, MMDA may properly bid out the other
3,000 tons of solid waste to other interested groups or entities.
Moreover, the amended agreement which requires JANCOM to make
adjustments in the Contract in accordance with existing environmental
laws and other relevant concerns, and thereafter forward the Amended
Agreement for signature and approval by the President is not yet
perfected. While there was an initial offer made, there was no
acceptance.

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION

FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD AND DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. NO. 158290,
October 23, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) - complex

mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and
compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions -
have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure
and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of
certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to
other pollutants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon
monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the
atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood.
With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be
lethal to people with weak hearts. Petitioners add that although much
of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a
number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with
the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and
with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and
transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines'
studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest
among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of
respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent
among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in
Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their
rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the
emissions of PUVs. To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects
of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According
to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which
although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless
and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces
much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90
percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx
emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits
60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Asserting
their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to
use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8749 or the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to
require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel may be issued by the
Court.
HELD: No. A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to
require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No.
290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of
Natural Gas Vehicles based on the results of the DOTC surveys.
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
is inferior to the other. It is the firm belief of the Court that it is timely
to reaffirm the premium they have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the
statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as
they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the
health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures
to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes
an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the
writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared
by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.

AZUCENA O. SALALIMA vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 146360,
May 20, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner’s husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for

twenty-nine years as a route helper and subsequently as route
salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Incorporated. In 1989, during an annual company medical examination,
Juancho was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. His
illness remained stationary until October 1994 when Juancho was
confined at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital to undergo section biopsy. His
biopsy revealed that he had “Adenocarcinoma, poorly differentiated,
metastatic”. Consequently, he underwent chemotherapy at the Makati
Medical Center. On February 1, 1995, he was found to be suffering from
pneumonia. On February 14, 1995, he was confined at the Makati
Medical Center. He died two days later on February 16, 1995 due to
“Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread metastasis to Neck,
Brain, Peritoneal Cavity, Paracaval Lymph Nodes, Abscen; Acute Renal
Failure; Septicemia; Upper Gastrointestinal Bleeding”. A claim for
compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his
surviving wife with the Social Security System (SSS). Her petition was
denied on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the
Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juancho’s job as a route
salesman. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The
petitioner brought the case to the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC), but the ECC relied upon the Quality Assurance
Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis for the SSS
stating that Juancho’s exposure to smog and dust is not associated with
the development of lung cancer. Petitioner cited that Republic Act No.
8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act provides for a
comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the
prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven deleterious
effect on the health of individuals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juancho’s death is due to air pollution so as to
entitle the petitioner to claim death benefits.
HELD: Yes. Medical books list the etiology of lung cancers as follows:
cigarette smoking, occupational exposure, air pollution, and other
factors such as preexisting lung damage and genetic influences. The
respondent government agencies failed to take into consideration
Juancho’s medical history in their assessment of the claim for benefits
filed by petitioner. For a considerable stretch of Juancho’s stay at Coca-
Cola, he was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several
months before his demise, he was diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of
the lungs. A little over two weeks before his death, Juancho was
afflicted with pneumonia. The obvious deduction is that Juancho, from
the time he acquired pulmonary tuberculosis until his passing away,
was predisposed to varied lung diseases. It escapes reason as well as
one’s sense of equity that Juancho’s heirs should now be denied
compensation (death) benefits for the sole reason that his illness
immediately before he died was not compensable in his line of work.
The picture becomes more absurd when we consider that had Juancho
died a few years earlier, when the diagnosis on him revealed only
pulmonary tuberculosis, his heirs would not perhaps be going through
this arduous path to claim their benefits. Denying petitioner’s claim is
tantamount to punishing them for Juancho’s death of a graver illness.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.

CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON vs. HON. JOSE L.
ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, G.R. No.
156052, February 13, 2008

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Movants-
Intervenors

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Movant-Intervenor

FACTS: In an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No.
8027. This ordinance reclassified a particular area in Manila from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies. On June
26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. The
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on
January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending
the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the
mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance passed is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. While police
power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated as may be clearly read from Sec. 16 of the Local Government
Code. The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution. This ordinance was enacted for the
purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public
safety, and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. The ordinance
was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. In the
exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government, i.e., the promotion of the general welfare. Based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. When the state or LGU’s exercise
of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the
former should prevail.
 CLEAN WATER ACT

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BRANCH 127, CALOOCAN CITY, HON. MACARIO A.
ASISTIO, JR., CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN AND/OR THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994

FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our

Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a
letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite
in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful
effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of
the water content of the surrounding area. As a result, on December 5,
1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop, and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite. This was pursuant to an investigation, monitoring,
and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the
nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal
and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan
was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983. The dumping operation was forthwith
stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in
August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held
in July 1992 failed to settle the problem. After an investigation by the
LLDA, it issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991 order
and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area. On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance
of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist
Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cease and Desist order is valid.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in
cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon, and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions
for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality
of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration, and pollution. Under such a
broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to make, alter, or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. The immediate
response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public
interests gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a
proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the
first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

RICHARD HIZON, et al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.119619,
December 13, 1996

FACTS: In response to reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal

waters of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, the city mayor organized Task
Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and
apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing. On September 30,
1992, the Task Force reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a
boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the
shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police and
members of the Task Force immediately proceeded to the area and
found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat
identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the
city. They boarded and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the
boat captain. In the course of thereof, the police saw two foreigners in
the captain’s deck whose passports were mere photocopies. The police
also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish
weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked
the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order.
Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew, and
the fishermen to the City for further investigation. October 1, 1992,
SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish
from the fish cage of the boat for laboratory examination. The
specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
head office. After some tests, it was found that the specimen gave
positive result to Sodium Cyanide, a violent poison. Thereafter, the
fishermen were charged with the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fishermen were guilty of Illegal Fishing
with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance.
HELD: No. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person
catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish,
fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, electricity, obnoxious, or poisonous substances. The
statutory prima facie presumption is that the owner and operator of the
boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing if it is discovered
that the substances and the contaminated fish are found in their
possession or in their fishing boat. This presumption however was
disputed when another test was made by another forensic chemist of
the NBI in Manila. The test presented a conflicting finding with the
first test conducted noting that the specimen from the later test was
gathered from the same source as the previous one. The authorities
found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal
fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order.
It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with
the use of poisonous substances. Moreover, it is suspicious that the
apprehending officers stated that the boat was illegally fishing by muro
ami when muro ami needs two hundred fishermen to execute. This is
made with the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge
in the water with the fishermen surrounding the net. In this case, what
the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28)
fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line.

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, G.R. No. 68166,
February 12, 1997

FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for

foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This
application was denied. Subsequently, Emiliano Navarro filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five
(25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Initially, such application was denied on the ground that the property
formed part of the public domain, but upon motion for reconsideration,
the Director of Fisheries gave due course to his application but only to
the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by
the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. On the other
hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated
in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga,
Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is
bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side
by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The
Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet
at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Pascual claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner. The Director of Lands filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being
a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic.
Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed
that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public
domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a
fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the
Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area
covered by the lease into a fishpond.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion is part of the public domain.
HELD: Yes. The disputed property was brought forth by both the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the
exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and
sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees
planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948. It is undisputed
that in front of Pascual’s land on the northern side is the disputed land
where in 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. The disputed land, thus, is an
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Pascual’s own tract of land
on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of
the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Article 4 thereof provides that lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. In this light,
unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land, the same being an
accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of
Manila Bay.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENERIO P. VERGARA,

ERNESTO T. CUESTA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAÑO AND BERNARDO
 P. CUESTA, ACCUSED. RENERIO P. VERGARA, G.R. No. 110286,
April 02, 1997

FACTS: On 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden

and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association, Police Officers,
and a Fish Examiner of the Department of Agriculture were on board a
pumpboat on preventive patrol along the municipal waters of Palo,
Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat. The boat
had on board appellant Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused. They
were on parallel course toward the general direction of Samar.
Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a bottle known
in the locality as badil containing ammonium nitrate and having a
blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into the water,
could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and
various species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three
seconds after appellant had thrown the badil into the sea, the explosion
occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while
Dagaño and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the
divers. The team then approached and boarded the fishing boat.
Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
filled with about a kilo of bolinao fish scooped from under the water.
Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended
and taken by the patrol team to the Bantay-Dagat station at Baras, and
later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its
paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of bolinao, were impounded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of Violation
of Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1058.
HELD: Yes. Section 33 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058
states that it shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity. The Court is convinced that the
trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the
offense charged.