01 Lopez vs Villanueva

FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay,
San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor
of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from
running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of
Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
elections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and
assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying
petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took
his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los
Angeles, California; the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate
of law.

02 Rimando vs Naguilian Emission Testing Center Inc.

FACTS
1. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. was operating an emission testing center in Naguilian,
La Union (surprise!) on land owned by the government, but was subsequently declared alienable and
disposable by the DENR.
2. From 2005 to 2007, the business operated without any problem. In 2008, the business applied
for a renewal of its business license and paid the fees therefor.
3. Abraham Rimando, mayor of Naguilian, La Union, refused to issue the license until the
business executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian.
4. The business was amenable to this condition, subject to some proposed revisions. (What these
revisions were was not mentioned in the case.) However, these revisions were not acceptable to the
Mayor.
5. A petition for mandamus was filed by the business with the RTC against the Mayor.
6. The RTC denied the petition, based on the following findings:
a. That the Municipality of Naguilian was the declared owner of the subject property as evidenced
by the tax declaration over the property;
b. Under Sec. 6A.01 of the Revenue Code, the municipality has the right to require petitioner to sign
a contract of lease; and
c. A mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature.
7. The Court of Appeals, while declaring the issue moot and academic since the period for which
the business permit was sought (year 2008) had already lapsed, and Mayor Rimando’s term had already
ended. Nonetheless, it proceeded to rule on the merits and found that the issuance of a write of
mandamus was justified. It reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
a. The CA held that the tax declaration was insufficient basis to require the execution of a
contract of lease as a sine qua non condition for the issuance of a business permit.
b. Also, the resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2007-81), upon which the mayor
anchored his imposition of rental fees, was void for its failure to comply with the requirements of
the Local Government Code. (the case fails to mention which requirements)
c. The mayor, however, may not be held liable for damages as his refusal was done in the
performance of official duties.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. W/N a writ of mandamus to compel Mayor Rimando to issue a business license to
Naguilian Emission Testing Center should have been issued by the court.
a. No. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power, hence discretionary in nature.
i. This was the pronouncement of the Court in
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, where a determination was made on the nature
of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government
Code.
ii. The Court in that case held that such power to
grant permits is a manifestation of delegated police power. Necessarily, the exercise
thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.
iii. The proper remedy is a writ of certiorari, not
mandamus.
iv. The grant of such power under the Local
Government Code is found in Sec. 444. Such section states that the municipal
mayor’s power to issue licenses is pursuant to Sec. 16 of the same law. Section
16 of the LGC is the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated
police power to local governments. This is exercised through their respective
legislative bodies.

03 League of Cities vs COMELEC

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were
filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became
effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated
income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the
particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
ISSUE: Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

RULINGS:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any
other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in
sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in
determining the “just share” of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.”
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the
Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on
Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be
outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159
proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are
concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but
not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of
RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through
would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a
legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications
for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.
NOTE: TheNovember 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the
Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. “Undeniably, the 6-6
vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior
majority en bancResolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second
motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision,” the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that
the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no city…
shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.” It
stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The unconstitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of
the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged
Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.
The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it
were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.”
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High
Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that
the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the
considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping
its imprimaturto the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain
collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the
Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income
requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of
the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood
Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient.
By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills
pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before
June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the
said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to
prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and
fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate,
the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the
clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No.
9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.”
04 Mandanas vs Executive Secretary Ochoa
FACTS:
The petitioners hereby challenge the manner in which the just share in the national taxes of the local
government units (LGUs) has been computed.
This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the manner the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs. Certain collections of NIRTs
by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) — specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and
documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not been included in the base amounts for the computation of
the IRA.
The procedural issue is the propriety of the remedy of mandamus in violation of doctrine of separation
of powers.
The substantive issue is whether Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to
Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Mandamus Improper Remedy
• Mandamus only lies to compel a ministerial act. The burden of proof is on the
mandamus petitioner to show that he is entitled to the performance of a legal right, and that the
respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act.
• Determination of what constitutes the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes
under the 1987 Constitution is an entirely discretionary power. The discretion of Congress
thereon, being exclusive, is not subject to external direction; otherwise, the delicate balance
underlying our system of government may be unduly disturbed. (VIOLATION OF DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS)
HOWEVER, the allegations of the petition shows that this is also a Petition for Certiorari:
• The petition, while dubbed as a petition for mandamus, is also a petition for certiorari
because it alleges that Congress thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
o That the non-release of some portions of their IRA balances is due to alleged congressional
indiscretion — the diminution of the base amount for computing the LGU's just share. The insertion by
Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes.
• The actual nature of every action is determined by the allegations in the body of the
pleading or the complaint itself, not by the nomenclature used to designate the same. Moreover,
neither should the prayer for relief be controlling; hence, the courts may still grant the proper
relief as the facts alleged in the pleadings and the evidence introduced may warrant even
without a prayer for specific remedy.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
(1) Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Section 6 of Article X of the
1987 Constitution
• The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more
restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the
words of a statute there should be no departure).
• According to Garcia v. Executive Secretary, customs duties is the nomenclature given to taxes
imposed on the importation and exportation of commodities and merchandise to or from a foreign
country. Although customs duties have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of
economic or social activity as their moving purposes, it is often difficult to say which of the two is the
principal objective in a particular instance, for, verily, customs duties, much like internal revenue taxes,
are rarely designed to achieve only one policy objective.
• Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes because they are exactions whose proceeds
become public funds.
• Further, Section 102 (oo) of R.A. No. 10863 (Customs Modernization and Tariff Act)
expressly includes all fees and charges imposed under the Act under the blanket term of taxes.
(2) Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the base amount for the
computation of the IRA only if a Constitutional provision allows such exclusion
• Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in the
national taxes, Congress cannot disobey the express mandate of the Constitution for the just share of
the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes.
• The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the phrase just share, and
cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people
in respect of Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs should includes
all national taxes.
• To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in the national taxes shall
be determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized revision of the Constitution.
PAYMENT OF THE ARREARS OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE CANNOT BE GRANTED
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot
always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains
its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect.
AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES
• The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress having established
the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion of the just share of the
LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not superfluous. Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the
national taxes shall be released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
• Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the just share of the LGUs in
national taxes shall be automatically released to them. The term automatic connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the LGUs are not required to
perform any act or thing in order to receive their just share in the national taxes.
• This is because Congress not only already determined the just share through the LGC's fixing
the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs to constitute such fair share, but also explicitly
authorized such just share to be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions and regularity
set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of annual appropriation. To operationalize the
automatic release without need of appropriation, Section 286 of the LGC clearly provides that the
automatic release of the just share directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as
the case may be, shall be "without need of any further action.”
• As compared to the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on Judiciary, Constitutional Commisions, Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human
rights which shares to aspects: The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns
the automatic release of funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic release
of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of the annual appropriations of the offices or
agencies concerned.

05 League of Provinces vs DENR

FACTS:
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998, MGB-RO denied Golden
Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the
denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).

On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the PENRO
of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's
FTAA application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal on July 16, 2004.

AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit covering the same
subject area on September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of
AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits – the contention was the date the area of Golden
Falcon’s application became open to other permit applications from other parties

On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos
stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days
after Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s
application became open to permit applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that
the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998
(MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation
of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.

Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry permit,
now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan.
PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications. Eventually, the
Governor issued the small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.

The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s
issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was
open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the
applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when the area
was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was
already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining
permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the
Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the small-
scale mining program.

The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying that that this is not
an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a
favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.

ISSUES
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not
merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary
substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-
Scale Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of
supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs

RULING
[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked under Section
504 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; adopt
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; and exercise
such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the provinces.]

DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA 7076 and its
IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not
unconstitutional.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three
statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small
Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision
is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance
with law.

The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make
local governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it
is still subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards and those provided by the
Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of
powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to
Congress under Article X Section 3.

It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources, pursuant to
the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining
law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The
LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law.

RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of
the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control of the
Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the same.

Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral
reservations.

DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that
the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall
be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised
IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits
shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory
Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in coordination with the
Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx
and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.

Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial
Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit because the
DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24
of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the
Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its
power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of what the law is
and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and on
the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power
of the DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial Governor in
issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the
grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii) of the LGC and
Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of the law.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

06 Ganzon vs Santos
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because
the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the
present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of
our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.