CASE DIGESTS: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

SUBMITTED TO:

ATTY. IRENE D. VALONES

Professor of Law
OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS [CHR] (MANDATE,
POWERS, AND FUNCTIONS)

1) Besid, John Evan Raymund O.

 Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights - G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
 Simon v. Commission on Human Rights - G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
 EPZA v. Commission on Human Rights - G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992
 PBM Employees Org. v. PBM Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973 51
SCRA 189 (1973)

2) Caparino, Joselito Narciso B.

 Government of HK v. Olalia, GR No. 153875, April 19, 2007

3) Diapana, Karl Rodrigo L.

 Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 152 (1976)
 David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)
 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632
SCRA 146 (2010)

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

A. Domestic State Responsibility

4) Ebuen, Jaya P.
 Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016
 David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)
 People v. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
 Waterhouse Drug v. NLRC, GR 113271 (16 Oct 1997)

5) Gargaritano, Angelo I.

 Zulueta v. CA, 253 SCRA 699

 Gamboa v. Chan, 677 SCRA 385 (2012)
 In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946)

Rights of the Accused

5) Gargaritano, Angelo I.
 People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray, [G.R. No. 117472. June 25, 1996]

6) Liangco, Adrian Paul P.

 Imbong vs Ochoa, et al GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014
 Basa vs Workmen’s Compensation Commission and Republic of the Philippines,
GR No L-43098, March 30, 1981

7) Nuez, Taddsly Jiro

 Biscarra v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, GR No. L-43425, January
 22, 1980
 People v. Casio, GR No. 211465, December 31, 2014
 People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 320
 Valmonte v. de Villa, 178 SCRA 211

8) Ronquillo, Frankincense Joy M.

 People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
 People v. Bason, 219 SCRA 404
 People v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312

9) Caparino, Joselito Narciso B.

 Guanzon v. del Villla
  Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

10) Anarna, Sarah Mae D.

 Marcos v. Manglapus
 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778

11) Barsabal, Rizel C.

 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 490 Phil 70
 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent School of Cebu, 219 SCA 256

12) Calaca, Norjanizah Airah R.

 German v. Baangani, 135 SCRA 514
 Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, 137 SCRA 628

13) Diaz, Angelica Shane C.

 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 802
 Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529

14) Itable, Michelle Joy M.

 Ayer Production v. Judge Capulong, 160 SCRA 861
 Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256

15) Javier, Ma. Claudine Fae F.

 Francisco Chaves v. PCGG
 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker's Union

ROLE OF JUDICIARY IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

16) Magtajas, Bianca Paola R.

 Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, 568 SCRA 1
 Razon vs Tagtiis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), 612 SCRA 685 (2010)

17) Malubay, Karol Pauline C.

 Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Boac v. Cadapan

18) Pabilla, Jomarie R.

 Navia vs Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012)
 Canlas vs Napico Homeowners Association, 554 SCRA 208 (2008)
 In the matter of PetitionPetition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in
Favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011

19) Piansay, Joanna Christine A.

 The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, vs Raymond Manalo andReynaldo Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,
October 07, 2008
 Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao-Strugar and Beverly Longid vs
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, , G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

20) Salomon, Charity S.

 Chairperson Siegfred Mison in his capacity as Chairperson of Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation vs Paulino Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015
 In the matter of Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of
Melissa Roxas vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010
 Gamboa vs Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012
 Lee vs Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They

complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in
fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC
on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to
do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving
civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.Hence it is that the CHR
having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits”
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.

Simon vs. CHR G.R. No. 100150 (1994)

FACTS :Petitioner, Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and
investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North EDSA.

ISSUE :Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and
to impose a fine for contempt
.
RULING : No.

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of
stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights".

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are
the same in all parts of the world.

Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech,
of the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law),
political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services.

Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of
his humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but
can only be recognized and protected by it.

Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of
his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.

CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.

POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the

establishment or administration of the government.

EPZA vs. CHR

G.R. No. 101476 (1992)

FACTS: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation,
and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered
the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or
its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted
the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro,
filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying
for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the
information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights.
CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such
acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed
private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and
fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another
injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.

EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to
issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the
Commission (CHR).

Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that
the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A
temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining
order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the
1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among
others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection.

ISSUE: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order
against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from
continuing the acts complained of.

Held: No.

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the
CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.”

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.

The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in
which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals,
or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district."
(Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy.
It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973 51 SCRA
189 (1973)

Facts:

Petitioners claim that on they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in

protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers.
That company learned of the projected mass. That a meeting was called by the Company
and asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration.
Petitioners confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or
rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded
with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company a charge against
petitioners with a “violation of the CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ After
considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Salvador found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence,
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company

Issue:

Whether Civil and Political Rights is treated with the same weight as Property Rights

Held:

No, While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing
space to survive,” permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions

Dominador C. Baldozavs. Hon. Judge Dimaano

A.M. No. 1120-MJ
May 5, 1976

Facts
On Sept. 9, 1975, the municipal secretary of Taal, Batangas, filed a verified letter-
complaint against Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the municipal court to
secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order
conditions of the said municipality.
In answer to the complaint, Respondent stated therewas no intention to refuse access to
official court records. Although, court records are among public documents open to
inspection by the parties directly involved and by other persons who have legitimate
interest to such inspection the same is subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when,
where and how they may be inspected. A court has unquestionably the power to prevent
an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may
be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate
interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to
promote public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and
report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among
officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but
after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
Issue
Whether or Not Respondent Judge abused his authority.

Held
No,the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the
respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision. Complainant
admitted that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when
he went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his
communication. He also agreed that he is amenable to such rules and conditions which
the respondent may impose. Under these conditions, therefore, the Court finds that the
respondent has not committed any abuse of authority
As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and
view the docket books of respondent under certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the
respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of
the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the
Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office.
Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain
degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the
Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring
to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such
power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official
records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to
such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. x xx However, restrictions on access to certain records may be
imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been
permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary
means of control inadequate to maintain order.

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL.
VS.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and
call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related
to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to
hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven
(7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it
encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the
dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid.

3. Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in

the petitions.

4. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the

constitutionality of the proclamation.

5. Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming

powers incident to Martial Law are used.

RULING:

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call
by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes
necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there
were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power:

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law
defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police
or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they
suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed
by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over
a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is
congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers
that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

G.R. No. 178552 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-
Terrorism Council October 5, 2010

Facts
Petitioners assail RA 9372 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in
that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and
“coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue
Whether or NotRA 9372be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and over
breath doctrines?

Held
No, The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct.
In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent
and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute
(under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim
of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of
vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or
act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As
distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Sandoval-Gutierrez

Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged of offenses before Hong Kong court. Petitioner
Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for extradition of Munoz. A petition
for bail was then filed by Munoz because he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. This was initially denied but was granted by
respondent judge on motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing for a potential extraditee’s right to bail.

Issue:
Whether a potential extraditee like Munoz is entitled to post bail to guarantee his right to
liberty despite the fact that no express provision of law granting the same in extradition
case.

Held:
Yes. A potential extraditee is entitled to post bail. The Supreme Court reviewed the
Government of United States v. Purganan and took cognizance of the following trends in
international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their
treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The
Court stressed that while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by
the following: (1) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee
and (2) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of
criminal law.”

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

A. Domestic State Responsibility

Saturnino Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez

G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in
reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte. Respondent AFP Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General
for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,
in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as
defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal

capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation
and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of
the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-
sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and
several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several
others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson
of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial
law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies

and hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites
for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political
questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the
public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result

of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of
the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to
show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this
case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President
to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely
claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified
to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the
laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to

seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give
the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,

petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it
has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting
against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial
Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-
dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the
Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support
their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of
Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the
Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective
history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles
to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed
Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not
self-executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state
policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic
political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are
not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and
call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related
to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to
hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven
(7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it
encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the
dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid.

3. Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in

the petitions.

4. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the

constitutionality of the proclamation.

5. Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming

powers incident to Martial Law are used.

RULING:

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call
by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes
necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there
were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power:

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law
defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police
or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they
suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed
by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over
a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is
congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers
that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

PEOPLE v. ANDREI MARTI
FACTS:

On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth
of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in
Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the packages could be examined and inspected,
appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books cigars, and gloves. The
packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with masking tape for shipment.

As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs

and/or Burueau of Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emitted therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He
brought samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the shipment containing bricks of
dried marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked
underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant in
violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty. Appellant
assailed the decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court
erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized packages.

ISSUE:

May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional

rights be invoked against the State?

HELD:

No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State in the absence of governmental interference. This
constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government; and the search
and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made
search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. The NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one.
Thus, the alleged act of the private individual in violation of a constitutional right cannot
be invoked against the State.

NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997

WATEROUS DRUG v. NLRC

FACTS:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a
supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384
per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was
found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.YSP, Inc. Accounting Department
(Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of
ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check
was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.Catolico denied receiving the same.
However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open
envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC
dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

HELD:
Yes. In People vs. Marti, it was ruled that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true,
as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults.
On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal
and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

ZULUETA v. CA
G.R. No. 107383,, 20 February 1996

FACTS
1. Zulueta is the wife of Private Respondent Martin. On 26 March 1982, she entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the opresence of her mother, a driver
and Martin’s secretary forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in the clinic.
2. 157 documents were taken consisting of private correspondence between Martin and
his alleged paramour, greeting cards cancelled checks,, passport and photographs.
3. The documents and papers were seized and used for evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the opractice of medicine, filed by Zulueta.
4. Martin brought an action for the recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta.

ISSUE
Whether or not Martin’s right to privacy of communication and correspondence were
violated by Zulueta.

RULING
Yes.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or her.

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between spouses by making it

privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may they be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But
one thing is freedom of communication, quite another is a compulsion for each other to
share what one knows with the other.

GAMBOA v. CHAN
G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS
1. Gamboa, then Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, alleged that the Philippine National
Police conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides.
2. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, the PNP forwarded the
information gathered on her to Zeñarosa Commission.
- This resulted to her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining a Private Army Group.
3. Subsequently, ABS-CBN on its evening news named Gamboa as one of the politicians
alleged to be maintaining a PAG.
4. Gamboa maintained that she has been tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the
basis of unverified information.
5. Contending her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, she filed a Petition dated 09 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents and prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP;
(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNO officials;
(c) rectification of the damage done to her honor;
(d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her
(e) restraining respondents from making basesless reports

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to
the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING
No.

The Writ of Habeas Data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. The state interest in
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied.

IN RE: YAMASHITA
327 US 1, 1946

FACTS
1. General Yamashita, Petitioner, was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands during the World War II.
2. On 03 September 1945, he surrendered to the United States and became a prisoner of
war in Baguio.
3. Respondent, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Styer, was the Commanding General of the United
States Army Forces, Western Pacific, whose command embraced the Philippine Islands,
appointed a military commission to try the petitioner on a charge of violation of the law
of war.
4. The gist of the charge was that petitioner had failed in his duty as an army commander
to control the operations of his troops, “permitting them to commit” specified atrocities
against the civilian population and prisoner of war.
5. Yamashita was found guilty and sentenced to death.
6. He then filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and a prohibiton against Lt. Gen. Styer. He
also prayed for a reinstatement from a confinement as a war criminal back to a prisoner
of war status. He argues,
(a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Military Commission;
(b) That the Philippines is not an occupied territory and thus the military
commission cannot exercise jurisdiction
(c) Spain, the “Protecting Power” of Japan has not yet been given notice of trial
contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention
(d) That there was no charge against him for an offense against the laws of war
(e) That the Military Commission denied him a fair trial
RULING
The Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the Petition.

The Military Commission appointed to try Yamashita was lawfully created.

(a) Nature of the authority to create military commission for the trial of enemy
combatants for offenses against the law of war, and principles governing the
exercise of jurisdiction by such commissions, considered.
(b) A military commission may be appointed by any field commander, or by any
commander competent to appoint a general court-martial, as war respondent by
order of the President.
(c) The order creating the military commission was in conformity with the Act of
Congress.

Trial of the Petitioner by the military commission was lawful, although hostilities had
ceased.

To hold the Petition for Habeas Corpus is untenable. It seeks no discharge of Petitioner
from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war to
be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such
cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of
civil courts.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

PEOPLE v ECHEGARAY
G.R. No. 117472, 07 February 1997

FACTS
1. Echegaray was charged and convicted of the crime of rape committed against his 10-
year old young daughter.
2. The crime having been committed sometime in April of 1994, Republic Act No. 7659,
the Death Penalty Law was already in effect,
3. He was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
4. Echegaray appealed the conviction and raised the constitutionality of the Death
penalty.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment

RULING
No.

The Death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplines
and honest cititzenry, and because they have caused irreparable and substantial injury to
both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to
the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so.

Imbong v Ochoa
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society beckons it to wields the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention.
A perusal of the petitions shows that the petitioners, among others, are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection
of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for
indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
The Right to Life
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a)
of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that
take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has
life.
For the respondents, RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate
the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to
the public.
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to
life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins
from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not
prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.
Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts
to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against
their will.
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege
and not a right.
ISSUE: Among others, whether the RH law is unconstitutional: 1) Right to Life; 2)
Involuntary Servitude
RULING:
Right to Life
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.Even
if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent
and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It
precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
When Life Begins*
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of.
Plain and Legal Meaning
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization.
It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of
life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should
be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is reckoned from Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation.
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete
with DNA and 46 chromosomes.Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting
the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion.
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection
be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounden duty to protect it.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized
ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device
that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Involuntary Servitude
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. A fortiori, this power includes the power
of Congress to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should
they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will.
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Among others,
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Basa v Workmen’s Compensation Commission

Facts: On July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered a heart attack that incapacitated him from
further performing his function as municipal judge, and which forced him on October 16,
1969 to retire from the service. Consequently, he filed a claim for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was awarded on October 26, 1970
permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses incurred.

On January 26, 1975 or after a period of almost six (6) years his initial heart attack on
July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered his second heart attack which proved more severe,
causing loss of his power of speech and the weakening of his body.

On June 26, 1975, he filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of
Labor, Regional Office No. 5, at San Pablo City, a claim for reimbursement of medical
expenses incurred in connection with his aforesaid second heart attack; but the same was
denied on October 14.

On December 27, 1976, respondent Commission rendered a decision affirming the

decision of its acting chief of unit.

Hence, this recourse.

Issue: the sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover
subsequent and further medical expenses for the same permanent and total disability
which had already been the subject of a maximum compensation benefits under Section
15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and for reimbursement of medical
expenses already then incurred under Section 13.

Ruling: Consequently, petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with his first
heart attack which was already declared compensable by the Workmen's Compensation,
may be the source of a claim for further compensation benefits.

Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment,
unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own
negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that
flow from the primary injury are compensable.

Section 13 of our compensation law mandates the employer to provide the employee
medical benefits immediately after he has suffered an injury and during the subsequent
period of disability 'as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may
require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity', regardless of whether the disability is permanent or temporary.

To underscore this obligation of the State, Section 9 of Article I I likewise directs that:
The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and 'employers. The State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration' (1973
Constitution, emphasis supplied)

Finally, the New Labor Code itself commands that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor' (Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended).

In the instance case, the government is the employer against whom such liability for
continued hospitalization, medical services and medical supplies, is being raised. The
government can always appropriate the necessary funds for the purpose.

In this case of petitioner who served the government as municipal judge from 1947 to
1969, risking his health and life, and who prays for a second reimbursement of his
medical expenses, ... this Court has the singular opportunity to afford him relief from his
misery and not let him deteriorate until his body is finally and totally decomposed and
dissolved into dust. Any gratuity that he might have received, aside from the first
compensation for wage loss and the first refund for hospitalization and medical
treatment, would not even be sufficient to maintain his family for the remaining few
years of his life. With his retirement gratuity and disability compensation already
exhausted by now (after eleven years from 1969), he and his family are exposed to
complete misery. The government or the court that does not lift a hand to rescue the
ailing employee and his family from such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an
agency of social justice, much less pretend to be compassionate.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS

HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT
(NOW MINISTRY) OF JUSTICE IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER
THE SUM OF NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY (P9,880.00)
PESOS AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES

Biscarra v. Workmen's Compensation Commission

Facts
Due to ailments of diabetes mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
arteriosclerosis, and chronic pyonephritis, Assistant District Forester Julio Biscarra
retired at age 58 on October 31,1970.His claim for compensation to Regional Office No.
1v of Department of Labor was not converted.On May 19, 1972, The Regional Office
granted Biscarra 6,000 Pesos disability compensation after declared him totally and
permanently disabled for labor. Later September 15,1972, The Regional Office awarded
him 7,183.14 reimbursement of medical fees.
On January 3, 1975, Biscarra once again filed for reimbursement of medical expenses
and was awarded 4,965.41 Pesos on a decision dated September 24, 1975.However due
to the volume and pressure of work of the undersigned Trial Attorney in charge of the
case, the decision in question was not acted upon immediately or within the period
required for filing a motion for reconsideration.A Petition for relief was filed by Bureau
of Forestry from judgment dated January 29, 1976, with workmen's compensation
commission arguing that Biscarra be no longer entitled for further reimbursement of
medical expenses.
The commission made an en banc decision making Biscarra no longer entitled to further
reimbursement.

Issue
Whether or not the respondent commission made an error on deciding that the petitioner
is no longer entitled to further reimbursement of medical expenses.

Decision
In Itogon Suyoc case, this Court made a decision pursuant to Section 13 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act ordering the petitioner of the case to provide Dulay
continues medical and hospital service and supplies until his illness is cured or
arrested.As long as the illness was contracted during the employee's employment, the
employer's obligation subsists.In this case, the declaration of the petitioner’s permanently
disability for labor qualify him to receive reimbursement for medical service should not
be denied.Thus, the supreme court decided on reversing respondent commission’s
decision allowing the reimbursement of medical expenses of the petitioner.

People v. Casio

Facts
NGO International Justice Mission (IJM) and Philippine National Police in a coordinated
entrapment. Shirley A. Casio, the accused offered the decoy policeman two minor girls.
The accused claim that the girls are good at sex. Following the acceptance of the marked
money a signal was given and the police intervened and arrested the accused.

Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of trafficking personsunder RA 9208.Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC’s ruling with modifying only the awarded moral damages.

The accused claimed that the entrapment was not valid and the lack of evidence pointing
to the history of human trafficking or any other offense of the accused. The accused
further stated that the alleged prostitute she offered to the police has consented to the
work.

Issue
Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid.

Decision
Since the prostitute in this case are minoreven without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent will not prosper due to lack of own free will under
the law.The accused is deemed to fulfill all elements of the offense by mere handing of
marked money.RA 9208 do not require for actual sexual intercourse to consummate the
offense.

Using the objective test, the court found that the entrapment operation is valid as no
inducement by the police to the accused to commit a crime. In fact, it was the accused
who approached the police offering the girls.

Thus, the supreme court affirms the ruling of RTC and CA.

People v. Cuizon

Facts
The Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation gathered an information
regarding drug activities by Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon.They
were arriving at Ninoy Aquino International Airport potentially carrying large amount of
shabu.The couple were later found at Manila Peninsula Hotel with the possession of
illegal substance.The Regional Trial Court, Branch 116 of Pasay City found the couple
guilty of violating Section 15 of RA 6425.

Issue
Whether or not there is a valid search and arrest.

Decision
When the arrest was done by the NBI, the plaintiffs was merely resting at the hotel
room.The findings of the RTC that the plaintiffs was caught in flagrante delicto could not
be appreciated. Theopportunity where the plaintiff could have been lawfully arrested was
during the transporting of the drugs in the presence of the arresting officers.However,
during the travel from the airport to the hotel, the NBI agents failed to make an
intercept.Had they do so, the plaintiffs would be caught flagrante delicto for transporting
the illegal substance.The Supreme Court based on this findings acquitted the plaintiffs of
the crim under RA 6425.

Valmonte vs De Villa

Facts
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters.The NCRDC as part of their
operations, installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Petitioners
argued that such check point resulted to fear of harassed by searches and
checkupswithout the benefit of a search warrant nor a court order.In an instance,
Benjamin Parpon was gunned down allegedly on cold blood by members of the NCRDC
assigned to a checkpoint.

Issue
Whether or not the right against unreasonable searches and seizures of the petitioner has
been infringed.

Decision
The court finds that the searches made my NCRDC even if it may cause some discomfort
to citizen do contained within the reasonable limits provided by the constitution.
The petitioner in this case despite citing many cases about his experience with the check
points, was unable to provide any details of such experience.
In order to determine any abuse by the NCRDC, such evidence must arise from factual
evidence.
Thus, with this findings, the supreme court dismiss the petition.

People v. Bolanos

Facts:

Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat.
Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the
previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased.
When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair
where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay,
other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the
vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the
appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

Held:

Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on
the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.

People v. Ramos

Facts:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and
P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed
one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada
Street. 1 The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect
and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. 2 The police officers thereafter
placed Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that
he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN,
alias "Balanchoy". The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police
team with suspect Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant
Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in 2366 Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrestedhim. The
police operatives immediately brought appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section
Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.During the custodial
investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating
the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. The accused,
after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt.
E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise
admitted that he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00.
Issue:

The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or admissible evidence
in the record to justify the conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos

Held:

The lower court in convicting appellant of the crime charged, Partly relief on the verbal
admission made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the
custodial investigation. Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly
apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, 19 We are not fully
convinced that this apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood and
accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's verbal
admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting
extrajudicial admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation.

People v Basay

Facts:
Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned
their house after.Both accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court
because when they signed a joint waiver, they were not represented by a counsel. Basay
was Acquitted, however, Jaime Ramirez was sentenced with life imprisonment because
the court admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial confession of jaime Ramirez as
part of the res gestate the alleged statement of Bombie Toting (victim) to the police
constabulary SGt. Tabanao.
Jaime Ramirez is a farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he doesn’t know how to
read. He, however,
understands the Cebuano dialect. The referred sworn statement in English was taken on
March 7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge
Teopisto Calumpang.

Issue: W/N the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent during
custodial investigation were violated

Held:
The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to
remain silent and to counsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctoryrecitation of an abstract constitutional
principle”. Thus it is notenough for the interrogator to merely repeat to theperson under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former
must also explains the effects of such provision in practical terms. The right “to be
informed” carries with it a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subjects understanding of what is conveyed

Guazon, et al. v. De Villa, et al.

G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts: 41 petitioners wanted the Court to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or
“Saturation Drives” in Metro Manila where subversives were hiding. They claimed that
the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses such as no specific
target house to be searched and no search warrant or warrant of arrest was served;
residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their houses; residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows; men
were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks;
homes were ransacked; money and valuables disappeared; and reported incidents of
mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Respondent countered that they were all lies.

Issue: Whether the allegations of petitioners in the conduct of saturation drives would
have constituted violations of human rights.

Held: Yes. It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited but the procedure
used or methods which “offend even hardened sensibilities.” It appears that there were
no impediments to secure search warrant or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. All police actions are governed
by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same
reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the
enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic
institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through
violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Kapunan

Facts: Petitioner Ramirez taped the conversation with private respondent Garcia when
the latter scolded her in the office. She later filed a civil action against Garcia attaching
as evidence the transcript of said taped conversation. In turn, Garcia filed a criminal case
against Ramirez for violation of RA 4200 or the Anti-Wire Tapping Act. Ramirez
countered that the law prohibits other parties only or third persons, who are not part of
the conversation, to record the same using the instruments enumerated in the law. The
trial court granted Ramirez’ motion to quash, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue: Whether Ramirez is correct in contending that RA 4200 or the Anti-Wire Tapping
Law prohibits the secret recording only of a party other than or different from those
involved in the private conversation.

Held: No. The provision of the law makes it clear that it is illegal for ANY person to
secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
congressional records show that the intent was that permission must be sought from all
parties in the conversation. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties. This provision seeks to penalize even those
privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.

Marcos v. Manglapus
FACTS

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a
profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency
via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead,
Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr.
Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by
Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the
Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft
chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened
the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the
fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the
1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the
constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody
challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the
major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people,
both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser
significance, but the message they conveyed was the same - a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the military and brought
to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in
the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also
the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which
gained groundduring the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set
up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control while
the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up
in these groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through
resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have theybeen successful in
creating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy
devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed
office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economyis just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to
bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE
Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:
The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art.
VII, Sec. 1). However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in
the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the
power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power
to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress
and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23)
The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did
the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific
powers and no other?

According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare and the common
good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration :

It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested,
has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers
of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

Villavicencio v. Lukban
Facts

Justo Lukban, respondent and then Mayor of Manila, sent 170 women to Davao. The
women were confined to their houses in the district by the police from October 16 to
October 25, 1918. The vessels reached their destination at Davao only on October 29,
1918. Lukban claims that the women were to be laborers and was received by Feliciano
Yñigo, a haciendero, Rafael Castillo, and Francisco Sales, the governor of Davao. The
women thought that they were being transported to another police station, while Yñigo,
the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to them as laborers
him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes then filed charges against
Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Sales. They prayed for a writ for
habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court to be issued against the respondents to
compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their
will. The stipulation of the parties was made to include all of the women who were sent
away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The SC granted the writ, however, the
mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

ISSUE

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao.
Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in
deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Ruling:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further
that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and
claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom
the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

FACTS:
Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from
Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these
Islands. His entry into the Philippines was not unlawful and he was brought by the armed
and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the
occupation. On March 18, 1948, he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there was an order for his release; but the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration declared that he had entered the Philippines illegally then
ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. He was then
transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison and filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus which was denied . After years of the promulgation of the decision, the
Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country,
and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it
was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. He then
filed for another petition for writ of habeascorpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer
than a reasonable time?

HELD:
YES. The writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed
adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to
deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall
be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case
of abuse.

He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient
surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact
by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.The protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land
is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens,
regardless of nationality.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution
entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All
human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9);

His unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if
the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual,
present, or uncontrollable. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger
of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

FACTS: The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required under Republic Act No. 1265 or An Act making
flagceremony compulsory in all educational institution, and by Department Order No. 8-
Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that
by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contended that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. They relied on the precedence of Gerona
et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the expulsions. Gerona doctrine
provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid
of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of
Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They
have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will
disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

HELD:YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not
justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious
freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.Petitioners stress that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior
that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the
flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the
solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant
for their expulsion.

GERMAN, ET AL, petitioners V. BARANGAN, ET AL, respondents

(G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985)
ESCOLIN, * J.

FACTS:
On October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office
employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing
Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same
street. They started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of
anti-government invectives.
Along the way, they were barred by respondent Major lsabeloLariosa, upon orders of his
superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.
Allegedly, petitioners’ purpose is to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. Responders,
however, maintain that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very
residence and offices of the President of the Republic.

ISSUE:
Whether the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom to
religious worship?

RULING:
The Court ruled in negative. The Court said that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P.
Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the
manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.

Further, while it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that
matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every
person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe
honesty and good faith."

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION &
COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON,
COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET
AL., respondents.
(G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere
allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no
hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the
closure.
The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that
the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from
the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the
airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 1985, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a
motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition because EBC sold its radio broadcasting to
Manuel Pastrana. That Espina, as well as Pastrana are not interested in pursuing the case
any further. The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the
guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals, the Court issued its decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of

Expression?

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Court finds that the closure of the Radio
Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional
Rights.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The Court added that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the
broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations
on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule — that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners
to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be
informed. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection. Thus, Broadcast
stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

JOSE BURGOS, SR ET. AL. vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

FACTS:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin
the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using
the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items.

RULING:
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant
had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the
building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer
may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched."
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. The premises searched
were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked
and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set
aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to
petitioners.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990

FACTS:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region" was enacted into law. The City of Baguio
and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region,
shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled
last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of
Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.The Comelec, by virtue of the
power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims
to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During
the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of
the press.

RULING:
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of
the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise
and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.Anent respondent
Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against
the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not
absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of
the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to
justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right
to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces
and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee
full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to
either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.

Ayer v. Capulong
FACTS:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. It is designed to be viewed in a
six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor
McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a
script.
Juan Ponce Enrile, private respondent declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name
of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue
Whether or Not freedom of expression and right to privacy was violated

HELD :

No, these rights were not violated.

Freedom of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter, as
set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to
the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile
The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film,
may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film
a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened
to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent
or that of any member of his family. His participation therein was major in character, a
film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played
by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical.
The right of privacy or “the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not
an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character. 7
Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest.8 The interest sought to be protected by the
right of privacy is the right to be free from “unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the
realm of legitimate public concern."9
The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship.
he continues to be a "public figure."
Valmonte vs. Belmonte

FACTS
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that respondent Belmonte in his capacity as General
Manager of GSIS be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June
20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue
our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
Respondent refused to disclose these information invoking the privilege of
confidentiality.

ISSUE
WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD
Yes. Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest
they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG GR No. 130716 December 09, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Chavez, impelled to bring this action regarding several news reports on: (1) the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government through Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) and the
Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Chavez is invoking his constitutional right to information, he demands that

respondents make public any negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. Chavez claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest,
since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino People. Hence, they have the right to
know the transactions effected by the Government.
Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s action is premature, because
there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details
of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and

2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

HELD:

First Issue

YES. The Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, whether perfected or not.

Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized, such f restrictions are as follows: a)
national security matters and intelligence information; b) trade secrets and banking
transactions; c) criminal matters and; d) other confidential information.

The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character which refers to
assets and properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former Pres. Marcos, his family
and relatives through or as a result of improper of illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of
powers or influences resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage
and prejudice to the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines.

Thus, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any
agreement that may arrived at and any proposed settlement concerning the Marcoses’
purported ill-gotten wealth.

Second Issue

YES. There are Legal Restraints existed against the compromise agreement between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs.

Generally, law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: 1) the civil status of persons, 2) the validity of a marriage of a legal
separation, 3) any ground for legal separation, 4) future support, 5) the jurisdiction of
courts, and 6) future legitimate. A Compromise must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order.

In Republic & Campos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the power to grant criminal immunity was
conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which
provides:

Section 5. The PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution

to any person who provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted
by the Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired the properties in question in any case where
such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter’s guilt
or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect
the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required
 to do so by the latter or by the Commission.

In the case at bar, the compromise agreements revealed serious flaws. First, the
agreements did not conform to the requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity
under section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in
the ill-gotten wealth cases. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide
information against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.

Second, under the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation
of the Constitution. Sec. 28(4), Art. VI of the Constitution specifically provides: “No
law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Member of the Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant such
exemptions.

Third, under the Agreement, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of
all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court.
This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers of the court which has the jurisdiction
on dismissal. Hence, PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases
against the Marcoses.

Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past,
present, or future against the Marcoses. This stipulation is contrary to the Civil Code
which states that “an action for future fraud may not be waived.” Further, the
Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties
shall fulfill their respective prestations.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that the Agreements which
PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs violated the Constitution.

VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER’S UNION GR NO. L-

25246
SEPTEMBER 12, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of

Elizalde Rope Factory and a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Under
Republic Act No. 875 (particularly Section 4(a), paragraph 4), prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer is free to make an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment, membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees. When, Republic Act No. 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) of section 4(a) of Republic Act
No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Being a
member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the
Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation to the said union.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. Company notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless he could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the union, the company would have no choice but to
dismiss him from the service. Victoriano, thus file an action to enjoin the company and
the union from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground
that:

1) prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor
union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and,
consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join
 lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution;

2) Impairs the obligation of contracts;

3) discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to

labor unions;

4) violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for
the exercise of a civil right;

5) violates the equal protection clause; and

6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social
justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which
ban their members from joining labor unions.

HELD:

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements.

Congress acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden
that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that
burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly,
Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. The means adopted
by the Act to achieve that purpose- exempting the members of said religious sects from
coverage of union security agreements- is reasonable.

It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to
contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
Religious freedom is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred
position in the hierarchy of values. It enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional
system. Infringement of religious freedom may be justified only if there were an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent or avoid such danger.

ROLE OF JUDICIARY IN THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo & Manalo (GR180906, 2008)

FACTS: The case involves the petition for a writ of amparo pursuant to the protection of
the life, liberty, and security of a person. Brothers Manalo were abducted by several
armed men in fatigue uniforms and were detained in some place for several months.
They were questioned and asked about their alleged membership in the New People’s
Army. Every time they decline or answer in the negative, they were beaten up. The
interrogators were said to be high-ranking officials known to the Manalo brothers since
they were called “Sir” every now and then. They were transferred from one place to
another and were continuously tortured in between interrogations. Months of being
captive, the brothers had the chance to escape upon seeing that their guards had fallen
into deep sleep. They proceeded towards the highway and boarded a bus bound for
Manila. Brothers Manalo executed their affidavits alleging abduction and torture of
herein petitioners. Petitioners then filed a return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying the other account of involvement alleged by the brothers.
Petitioners questioned the appellate court’s assessment under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving
full faith and credit to the incredible, uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed, and self-serving testimony of respondents.

HELD: Petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
RATIO: The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls. The amparo rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."
"Enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law."
The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo
butour charter has guaranteed the five Amparo protections of Mexico. An example would
be the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987Constitution, the Grave
Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality ofthe Government."

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the

recommendations that resulted from atwo-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by theCourt on July 16-
17, 2007.Court promulgated the Amparo (Mexican term meaning “protection”) Rule on
October 24, 2007. It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to
promulgate rulesto protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its appearance
in the 1987 Constitution as a responseto the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.

Lastly, the swiftness required resolving a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary
proceedings was borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience on abuses of
basic human rights. It is a hybrid writ of both the common and civil law traditions as a
remedy to the extralegal killings and enforced disappearance of threats thereof. This
remedy providesrapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make theappropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyondreasonable doubt, or
liability for damages required preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.

Therefore, the writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings andenforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of theseoffenses; and it is curative
in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators, as it will inevitably yield
leadsto subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deterthe further commission of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.

Gen. Avelino Razon v. Mary Jean Tagitis (GR 182498, 2009)

FACTS:The case involves the question of the CA confirmation regarding the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Tagitis and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his
wife Mary Jean Tagitis.Engineer Tagitis was a consultant for the World Bank and the
Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Program. He was alleged to have taken and carried away more or less PhP5,000,000.00
intended for the scholarship program. He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. His wife, Mary
Jean, filed a writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals granted the petition finding that it was
a case of enforced disappearance. Likewise, the appellate court directed the petitioners to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts in protecting the life, liberty, and security of
Engr. Tagitis as well as extending the privileges to his family. Petitioners questioned the
sufficiency of the writ in form and in substance. They contend violation of Section 5(c),
(d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ was defective in form and substance.

HELD: Petition was DISMISSED. CA decision was affirmed.

RATIO:Under Philippine Law, the Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances orthreats thereof." It must be noted
that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept
isneither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.

Enforced Disappearance under International Law is an involuntary or enforced

disappearance is considered a flagrant violation ofhuman rights. It does not only violate
the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects theirfamilies as well
through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the
disappeared familymember. It is a “double form of torture," with "doubly
paralyzingimpact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while
family members are deprived of knowingthe whereabouts of their detained loved ones"
and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow
the disappearance of the household breadwinner.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among
others (in terms of the portion the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well
as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved partyand the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission

The court ruled that it was never the intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule
particularly Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatenedor actual
violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state theultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details. In this type of situation, to require thelevel of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to makethis Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security.

The requirement laid down in the Amparo Rule must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation ofuncertainty. The petitioner may
not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or whoactually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because
these information maypurposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. Therefore, the petition should be read in its totality, rather than in terms of
itsisolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or privateaction, and the actual or threatened violations of the
rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

LOURDES D. RUBRICO, et.al vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, et.al.
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force
Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the
petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy RubricoCarbonel and Jean RubricoApruebo
were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men
following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security
of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President,
et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-
members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision
on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for
the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON, vs.ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E.
EMPEO

FACTS:

On June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño
(Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) (abductees) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped
towards an undisclosed location.Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court, impleading then Generals
Romeo Tolentino and JovitoPalparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col.
Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents.
The Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals. By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied
that abductees are in the custody of the military. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate
court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The Court, however,
further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations
and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court
with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken
thereon. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Erlinda
Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo
With Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff
Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon
(Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then
President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from
suit while in office. By Resolution the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to the
Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of
the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the appellate
court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;

2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army,
as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the
abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the
aggrieved parties; and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as party respondent in this case.
HELD:

1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of

respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted
on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured while
in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col.
Jimenez to be the “Division Training Unit,” firms up respondents’ story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility. The corroborative testimonies, in the
same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s
graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the
Court to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners
Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.

2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest
terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable
for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of
individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as
opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied). It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability
of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative
suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals. An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion
for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and
security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of
any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even
for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The
Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo
proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the
writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing
the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for
execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by
an amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For
that would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions.
Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to
further appeals that may be taken therefrom.

4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then
President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas
corpus and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from
any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by
the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. Parenthetically, the
petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or
performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

Navia v Pardico
G.R. No. 184467
June 19, 2012

Facts: In March 2008, a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation arrived at the
house of Lolita Lapore at Barangay Lugam in Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle
awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore and Benhur Pardico who were both staying in her
house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two guards disembarking from the
vehicle. One of them asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita
could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to
the security office of Asian Land because there was a complaint lodged against them for
theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
At the security office, Ben and Bong clarified that they were only transferring it to a post
nearer to the house of Lolita. Afterwards, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that
the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no
complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement
for his release. His mother signed the logbook which states that she will never again
harbor or entertain Ben in her house. After that, Lolita and Bong left the security office
and Ben was left behind.
Due to the disappearance of her husband Ben, Virginia filed a petition for Writ of
Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Said Writ was accordingly issued and served.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in ruling that the respondent is entitled to the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Ruling: Yes. The petition for Writ of Amparo is dismissed. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances in the country.

Section 1 of this statute provides that “the petition for a Writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The Writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress. A significant development
affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA)
No. 985148 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary
disappearances as the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.

In a petition for Writ of Amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It
is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct
or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that
the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo
petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance
or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court
will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable
persons.

In the matter of petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H.
Rodriguez v Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011

Facts: Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas. In September 2009, four
men forcibly took Rodriguez to get inside a car where the men started to punch him, and
forced him to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez
remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17 th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army (PA).

Rodriguez was subjected to several beatings and torture by members of the PA for its
members wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA
members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten
and tortured.

In September 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him and insisted to take
Rodriguez home with them to Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila in the same month.
Callagan and two military members went inside their house and took pictures for around
30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them. In November 2009, Rodriguez and
his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following them on the
streets. Therefore, in December 2009, Rodriguez filed petition for the Writ of Amparo
and petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection
of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. Said petition was filed
against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major
General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De
Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

The Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged
the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. The CA
ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found the respondents liable for his abduction and
torture.

Issue: Whether or not a Writ of Amparo should be granted in favour of Rodriguez.

Ruling: Yes. The respondents are held accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right
to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and
effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Therefore the
privilege of the writ of amparo must be granted to Rodriguez.

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner
It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative
in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action

Canlas et. al. v Napico Homeowners Association

G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011

Facts: The petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing
of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.

The petitioners desire to help the government to reveal the so-called "syndicates" in the
government. According to the petitioners, the government must be the first one to cleanse
its ranks from these unscrupulous political protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin or
destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is
therefore the initiative of petitioners that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned
to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles. The
threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the Section 1 of Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. The petitioners’ claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite
the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty
and security. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the issuance of such writ.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a Writ of Amparo is an appropriate remedy.

Ruling: No. The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. It covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security.
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of said writ. The factual and legal basis
for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court
can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled
in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.

G.R. No. 180906: The Secretary of National Defense, The Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines versus Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo

Facts:

According to Raymond Manalo,before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed
soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they
were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he
passed by the barangay hall. On February 14, 2006, at past noon, Raymond and his
brother Reynaldo were abducted by several soldiers on the suspicion that they were
members and supporters of the New People’s Army. Among the men who came to take
them were all members of the CAFGU. Both of them were beaten up.

After three months, they still failed to escape and eventually they found out that their
abductors were led by General JovitoPalparan. They also discovered that there were
students from University of the Philippines namely Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan
who were also detained. And after 18 months of detention and torture, the Manalo
brothers were now finally able to escape and due to their restraint liberty, they filed for a
petition for writ of amparoasserting that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Issue:

Whether or not the Manalo brothers can avail of petition for a writ of amparo on the
grounds that their right to life, liberty and security were violated or threatened with
violation.

Held:

Yes. The Manalo brothers can avail of petition for a writ of amparo on the grounds that
their right to life, liberty and security were violated or threatened with violation. After
careful perusal of the evidence presented, the Supreme Court affirms the findings of the
Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in SitoMuzon, Brgy.
BuholnaMangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously
detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007.

Section1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy

available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment

and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-
to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security,
and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

G.R. No. 186050: Arthur Balao et al. versus GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo et. al

Facts:

James M. Balaois a graduate of the University of the Philippines-Baguio and was among
those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) for the cause of indigenous
peoples in the Cordillera Region. In 1988, while working for the CPA, he was arrested on
the charge of violation of the Anti-Subversion Law but the case was eventually dismissed
for lack of evidence.In May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his
family, particularly to his sister Nonette and to CPA Chairperson Beverly. James
supposedly observed certain vehicles tailing him and suspiciously parked outside his
residence. He also claimed to have received calls and messages informing him that he
was under surveillance by the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU.

It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008,Nonette received a message from
James informing her of his intent to go home but Nonette discovered that James never
reached their house at Benguet, she started contacting their friends and relatives to ask
about James’s whereabouts but no one had any idea where he was. Thus, the Balao
family tried to locate James. One of the teams also went to the office of the AFP-
ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of the Military Intelligence Group in Camp
Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in said offices denied any knowledge on
James’s whereabouts. The family likewise went to Baguio Police Station 7 to report
James’s disappearance. The report was duly entered on the blotter but there have been no
developments as of the filing of the petition.

Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect James
life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparoordering
the respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release James, and to
cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person.On the other hand, the
respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo that claims must be established by substantial evidence considering that:
(1) petitioners allegations do not mention in anyway the manner, whether directly or
indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported abduction of James;
(2) Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the abduction of James, hence, their statements are hearsay with no
probative value; and (3) the allegations in the petition do not show the materiality and
relevance of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents to be produced,
specifically the requirement that the prayer for an inspection order shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the whereabouts of
the aggrieved party.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is fulfilled with the evidentiary standard
provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

Held:
No.The Supreme Court holds that such documented practice of targeting activists in the
military’s counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard
provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this
Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two
situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law.

In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between
the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding
previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial
court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James
from past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA
and other left-leaning groups.

Chairperson Siegfred Mison in his capacity as Chairperson of Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation vs Paulino Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015

Facts:

On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of

Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the
location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money
allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. In this regard, Hon. Siegfred Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportatio n
of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired. Thereafter, the BI Board of

Commissioners which, issued a Summary Deportation Order.12 BI officers, with the
assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku.
Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained.

On 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC
granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED and ordered
immediately released from BI’ custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper
remedy to extradition.

Due to the complexities involved, BI filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in the
Supreme Court, essentially assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.

Issue: Whether or not Ku should be granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo

Ruling:

The Supreme Court assailed the decision of the RTC and ruled that the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo shall not be granted to Ku.

Ratio:

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
Amparo Rule is a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or
involuntary disappearance.’

It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence. In this case, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was
exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center.

The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku
and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty
and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party.
As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the
privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

In the matter of Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of
Melissa Roxas vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010

Facts:

Melissa C. Roxas, petitioner in this case, alleged that she was abducted and tortured by
members of the military because she was mistakenly linked to the Communist Party of
the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She further alleges that after her release
from the alleged abduction she still receives calls and threats to her and her family. This
prompted her to file a petition for the issuance of Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas
Data against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as head of the military.

Issue: Whether or not the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data be granted to Roxas

Ruling:

Issuance of Writ of Amparo:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner.

Supreme Court ruled that the Writ of Amparo shall not be granted in this case due to the
failure of the petitioner to establish a concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military
camp to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed by the military.

On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the

part of the military, therefore, cannot be made. Thus, the Writ of Amparo cannot be
granted.

Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly
in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. The main
problemis that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner.

Disposition of the Case

The Supreme Court, although did not grant the Petitions, recognizes the fact that the
petition is premature due to lack of impartial investigation. The Supreme Court notes that
extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the
conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court ordered the CHR to further investigate the case.

Gamboa vs Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Facts:

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative

Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country” referred as the Zeñarosa Commission. It was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a
view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.

Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) who was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte was
classified as one of those who keeps a PAG.

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted the portion of the Report naming Gamboa
as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa’s association with
PAG also appeared on print media.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against.

On the other hand, PNP-Ilocos alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their
mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. The information
stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was
implicated. They likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply
with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.

The RTC dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that
they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification. Thus, Gamboa appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the Petition for issuance of writ of habeas data be granted to
Gambao

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition of Gambao and affirmed the decision of the RTC

Ratio:

According to the Supreme Court, clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental
right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. Howerver, this right is not
absoulute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Therefore, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.

The Supreme Court cited the ruling on the European Convention of Human Rights that
an interference to the right to respect for private life was justified on the following
grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection
of national security, and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate
indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection,
recording and release of information by the authorities.

Applying this in this case, the Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private
armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It is
clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently.

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.

Nevertheless, the court emphasized that these information are confidential and shall not
be leaked to third parties and the media. However, in this case, Gamboa failed to identify,
through substantial evidence, the party responsible for the leakage. Hence, her petition
was denied.

Lee vs Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) and respondent P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN were
former common law partners. Dr. Lee allegedly took the digital camera of Ilagan which
contains a purported sex video involving the latter and another woman. When Ilagan
learned that Lee was in possession of the digital camera, he denied the video and
demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office.

Thereafter, Lee filed a Violence against Women and Children case and administrative
complaint against Ilagan and reproduced said video to be used as evidence in the cases
she filed.

On the other hand, Ilagan filed a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data in the
Regional Trial Court. Ilagan claims that Lee will use the subject video and threaten him
by distributing the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to
the internet. Thus, it will violate not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman.

However, Lee contends that she will use the video as evidence in the cases she filed
against Ilagan.

The RTC granted the writ of habeas data. It opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as
evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its
reproduction.

Dissatisfied, Lee filed a petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of
Lee.

Ratio:

According to the Supreme, Court the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus,
in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other.

In accordance to the rule, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in
support of the petitions are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. As the records show,
all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which
hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas
Data Rule.