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To cite this article: Jostein Askim, Tom Christensen & Per Lægreid (2015) Accountability
and Performance Management: The Norwegian Hospital, Welfare, and Immigration
Administration, International Journal of Public Administration, 38:13, 971-982, DOI:
10.1080/01900692.2015.1069840
Article views: 9
Per Lægreid
Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
This article addresses the following questions: How are administrative and managerial
accountability combined, and to what extent does it depend on agency characteristics? We
study the performance management between parent ministries and five state agencies in
Norway in the area of hospital administration, welfare administration, and immigration.
Four combinations of administrative and managerial accountability are examined: accumula-
tion, substitution, persistence, and absence by applying a structural and a task specificity
perspective. To understand the hybrid forms of public accountability in performance
manage- ment, we have to look at how the tasks agencies perform as well as at their
structural affiliations to parent ministries.
in-depth empirical studies to decide by itself how data basis and method.
are needed to show much funding should be Third, we present our
exactly where the used for operations and theoretical framework
struggle between investments, respectively focus- ing on
competing principles of (Moynihan, 2006b; accountability dynamics.
public organization leaves Lægreid, Roness, & The five agencies’
public- sector Rubecksen, 2006; adminis- trative
accountability. What is Pandey, Coursey, & accountability vis-à-vis
the significance of Moynihan, 2007). parent ministries is
adminis- trative vis-à-vis Ministries’ ability to presented here in order to
managerial accountability secure high manage- rial develop expectations
today (Lægreid, accountability vis-à-vis about managerial
2014)? Under what agencies depends, in our accountability patterns.
conditions can hybrid conceptualization, on Fourth, we present our
accountability forms ministry–agency findings on ministry–
function well, and what performance man- agency performance
might they look like? agement practices. High management practices.
We pose two research managerial accountability Finally, we analyze these
questions: How are is under- stood to require findings in light of our
administrative and a limited number of theoretical expecta- tions,
managerial accountability prioritized objectives discuss their limitations,
combined, or balanced? (goal density), precise and draw some
And: To what extent and unambiguous conclusions.
does the mixture of objectives opera-
administrative and tionalized with a
managerial accountability measurable variable and a
R
depend on agency precise perfor- mance
characteristics, such as target (goal
ESEARCH
the formal affiliation operationalization),
between ministry and performance objectives
SETTING
agency and the tasks oriented toward
agencies perform? controlling agency outputs
Governanc
In our and outcomes (as opposed
conceptualization, to agency inputs and
e of State
ministries secure high processes) (per- formance
adminis- trative orientation), and high
Agencies
accountability vis-à-vis transparency on actual
agencies if they limit per- formance in meeting
in Norway
agen- cies’ decision- goals and targets (goal-
making rights and fiscal results transparency) The Norwegian central
autonomy. We define an (Askim, 2015; Moynihan, government is organized
agency’s decision-making 2008). into 16 ministries and
rights (Verbeeten, 2008) We address the 168 state agencies,
including
206 fourET AL.
ASKIM health otherwise rather informal
authorities. The state executive governance,
agencies are part of the with dialogue and
state as a legal entity discussion as important
while the health features. In the quasi-
enterprises are legally contractual model, parent
independent and are ministries allocate
regulated by a special resources and set perfor-
law. Agencies have been mance targets for each
part of Norway’s civil agency via an annual
service since the 1850s, steering docu- ment called
and today state agen- cies the letter of allocation, a
employ about 140,000 soft performance contract.
full-time equivalents All Norwegian state
compared with about agencies receive one
4000 in the ministries. such performance
(Norwegian Government, contract per year, after
2013; Norwegian Social the state budget has
Science Database, 2015).
Narrowly defined,
agencies are government
entities directly subordi-
nated to ministerial
control. Each Norwegian
state agency reports to
one ministry (the parent
ministry), and the
principle of ministerial
responsibility is strong
(Bezes, Fimreite, Le
Lidec, & Lægreid,
2013). State agencies
are structurally
disaggregated from their
parent ministries and face
less hier- archical and
political influence on their
daily operations than
ministerial departments
do, but some have
more formal autonomy
than others. During the
last two decades, agencies
and state-owned
enterprises have been
given more autonomy
from the ministries
(Lægreid, Roness, &
Rolland, 2013). For
example, financial
regulations have become
more flexible, with more
frame-based budgets.
The price public bodies
have had to pay for their
increased freedom is to
accept a more rigid
performance management
system. A formal, quasi-
contractual steering model
has been introduced to
supplement the
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 207
208
been passed
ASKIM ET AL. by and Care Services. The Directorate (NLWD) using data from the
parliament. As a result, ministry established five was established as a result Norwegian Social Science
performance man- regional health enterprises of a large welfare Data Service (2015). This
agement, or to own hospitals and other administrative reform in source categorizes state
management by local health enterprises. 2005–2006, merging two agencies according to
objectives and results We have looked into the state agencies in charge of how they are structurally
(MBOR), has been governance of one: The employment and and financially “affiliated”
integrated into the Northern Norway pensions. NLWD, which to their parent ministries
budgetary process and the Regional Health reports to the Ministry of (Rolland & Roness,
financial regulation Authority (Health Labour and Social 2011). Agencies cate-
system. The system is North). This agency Affairs, administers about gorized as “core” or
thus a mixed one that employs 289 full-time a third of the national “ordinary administrative
prescribes both employees (FTEs). A budget. It employs 13,000 units” have less fiscal
centralization and regional health authority FTEs, of whom only 516 autonomy than agencies
decentra- lization— is a legal entity separate work in the central categorized, for example,
combining the principles from central govern- ment agency; the rest are in as “units with special
of “let the managers but owned by the Ministry regional and local offices. autonomy,” “public sector
manage” and “make the of Health and Care administra- tion
managers manage.” Services. companies,” “special
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 213
TABLE 2
Combinations of Administrative and Managerial Accountability (AA and MA): Expectations from the Structural Perspective (Left Column) and Task
Perspective (Right)
MA: High Accumulation: N.A. Substitution: IAB, Health MA: High Accumulation: NLWD Substitution: Health North
North
Low Persistence: NDI, IMDi, Absence: N.A. Low Persistence: NDI, IMDi Absence: IAB
NLWD
214
service provision
ASKIM tend to be more ambiguous, often asso-
ET AL. TABLE 3
ciated with professional autonomy, and less suitable for Summary of Agencies’ Administrative Accountability vis-à-vis
performance control. Another parameter for defining Parent Ministries
agency tasks is whether tasks’ consequentiality or political Health
salience
is high, as defined, for example, by whether or not they IMDi NLWD NDI IAB North
involve major financial resources (Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt et
al.,
2004) and whether or not they receive much media attention Fiscal autonomy Low Low Low Low High
(Epstein & Segal, 2000). Decision-making Limited Limited Medium Extensive Extensive
rights
For agencies with relatively high administrative account- Overall High High Medium- Medium- Low
ability vis-à-vis parent ministries, we expect to find the administrative high low
accountability mix denoted by accumulation (high-high) in accountability
cases with fairly easily defined tasks and high political
salience and by persistence (high-low) in cases with
harder-to-define tasks and lower political salience. That accountability vis-à-vis parent ministries and NDI as
medium-
means that we expect to find accumulation in the case of
to-high. IAB and Health North are classified as agencies
NLWD, which has high administrative accountability, rela-
with, respectively, medium-to-low and low administrative
tively easily defined tasks (being a service provider), and
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Health
are occasionally subjected to public debate, but it adminis- IMDi NDI North IAB NLWD
ters very limited economic resources.
Goal density Medium Low High Medium Medium
Goal High High High Medium Medium
operationalization
RESULTS Goal output High Medium High High High
orientation
To sum up factual information from the preceding section, we Goals-results High High Medium Low Low
Goal
performance target was identify both a
operationalization
attained by the agency. measurable variable (e.g.,
If we focus on the Moreover, Health North the number of
third-level performance is most transparent applications for residence
objectives in Health about goal attainment permits pro- cessed by the
North’s performance on the goals whose agency) and a precise
contract—presumably the targets were most performance target (in the
most precise ones—they ambiguous. Targets that same example, that the
all identify a measurable were unambiguously agency should process
variable (e.g., the defined in the 87,000 applications). We
ambulance service shall performance contract therefore conclude that
have expertise to treat (with clear targets in NDI’s goal port- folio is
and transport both addition to clearly well operationalized.
mental and somatic operationalized variables)
ailments). However, only are underrepresented Performance
about a third is precise among the most orientation
performance targets transparent results (e.g.,
About half of NDI’s
(e.g., the target “no patients
performance objectives
20% of patients who being placed in
refer to work processes,
suffered cardiac arrest corridors” is not reported
and the rest refer to
have received upon).
agency outputs and
thrombolysis treatment).
outcomes. The ministerial
For many other
The Norwegian steering’s orientation
objectives, the target is
Directorate of toward agency processes
that some quality “shall
Immigration was even stronger 10 to
increase,” which in our
(NDI) 15 years ago, when NDI
view falls short of being a
was integrated with IMDi
precise target. Overall, we Goal density
(Christensen, Lægreid,
none- theless conclude
Equaling the average & Ramslien, 2006). The
that Health North’s 2012
among Norwegian dominance of process
goal portfolio is relatively
agencies (cf., Askim, objectives sets NDI apart
well operationalized, and
2015), NDI’s 2012 from the general pattern,
more so than in 2008.
performance contract lists not only among our five
21 performance cases but also among
Performance
objectives. These are Norwegian agencies in
orientation
disaggregated into three general (Askim, 2015).
Surveying Health levels. Two top-level The focus on work
North’s performance objectives are processes is, however, no
objectives, 24% refer to operationalized into eight surprise in this case, as
agency inputs or work second-level objectives. NDI is essentially a case-
processes and 76% refer Seven of these are proces- sing agency. The
to outputs or outcomes. operatio- nalized further, focus has also paid off: in
Objectives referring to into 11 third-level 2010 NDI received a
quality management
award from the Agency
for Financial Management
for its efforts to improve
the quality of case
processing.
Goal-results
transparency
NDI’s 2012 Annual
Report documents agency
perfor- mance on all 11
third-level performance
objectives in the
performance contracts. In
all instances, bare one, the
report is clear on whether
or not goals have been
reached. The Annual
Report therefore
contributes to transparent
govern- ance and
accountability for results.
The
Immigr
ation
Appeals
Board
(IAB)
Goal density
IAB’s 2012
performance contract lists
11 performance
objectives, disaggregated
into three levels. Two
top-level objectives are
operationalized into six
second-level objec- tives.
Four of these remain non-
operationalized (e.g.,
regu- lated family
immigration that upholds
privacy rights); only two
are operationalized
further, into three third-
level objec- tives. A
comparison with the 2008
performance contract
suggests ministerial
MBOR of IAB was fairly
stable between 2008 and
2012. One noticeable
development was the
introduction of the third-
level objectives, called
steering parameters.
Goal a minority of the performance target. The reader to glean from the
operationalization objectives were objectives we judge as text whether or not the
operationalized in the precise typically define a performance target was
The three third-level
performance contract, percentage (e.g., 90% attained by the agency. It
performance objectives
and it is difficult to [the target] of refugees should also be noted that
in IAB’s
measure performance if shall be resettled in a the Annual Report
2012 performance
the objectives are municipality within 6 includes several instances
contract are all clearly
ambiguous. However, the months after a residence of IMDI critically
operationalized in the
Annual Report also fails permit has been issued discussing whether
sense that they all
to document goal [the parameter]). The reaching pre-set targets
identify a measurable
attainment for any of the other, less precise half actually consti- tutes good
variable and also define
three third-level includes many instances performance.
performance precisely.
performance objectives where the target is that a
The fact that only a
clearly specified in the parameter “shall increase”
minority of the agency’s The Norwegian
performance contract. (e.g., the share of
second-level objectives Labour and
government employees
are oper- ationalized Welfare
with an immigrant
nonetheless leads us to The Directorate of Directorate
background). All in all,
conclude that the goal Integration and (
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Fourth, there is also shown in Table 6. our have been subject to a lot
significant performance five cases together of organizational reshuf-
reporting going on exemplify each possible fling. Over the past 10
showing that many of the combination. years, they have been
objectives and targets are Both perspectives used shifted between different
not achieved. What the to deduce expectations, ministries. This “merry-
implication of this is for the struc- tural and the go-round” delega- tion
perfor- mance steering task perspective, are (Hood, 2010) might
and the consequences for supported by the findings. produce some
the agencies can- not be Agency tasks successfully ambiguities, less mutual
documented by these predicted accountability trust between ministries
studies. But we know mixtures in two cases out and agencies, and thus
from other studies that of five—Health North and stronger managerial as
performance steering IAB, while agency well as administrative
might be the Achilles structures also provided accountability.
heel of performance two successful A more detailed
management (Breivik, predictions analysis reveals some
2010; Christensen et al., —NLWD and Health differences between the
2006; Lægreid, Roness, North (for which the two two. NDI has somewhat
& Rubecksen, perspectives had identical stronger autonomy and
2007). Evidence of predictions). thus less administrative
whether enhanced It is worth noting that accountability than IMDi.
managerial account- we could not predict two In contrast to IMDi, the
ability is likely to improve of the cases, the ministry cannot instruct
performance is scarce and immigration agency NDI NDI in single cases. NDI
incon- clusive (Bouckaert and the integration also scores a bit lower on
& Halligan, 2008). agency IMDi. Contrary to managerial account-
Fifth, there seems to be our expectations, these ability than does IMDi.
a rather loose coupling two agen- cies score high Thus, the most deviant
between goal density, on both administrative case is IMDi. The fact
goal operationalization, and managerial that IMDi’s goals are
performance orienta- tion. accountability, thereby better operationalized than
and goal-results displaying the mixture expected, and better, say,
transparency (Lægreid et we have than those of IAB, may
al., 2008). The still be linked to the types
performance management of tasks it performs,
T
system is still a rather A suggesting that we need
dis- connected affair B to look more closely at
which has yet to evolve L our understanding of the
E
into a systematic and influence of agency tasks
coherent performance on executive governance.
6
management or Combinations of Some aspects of the
performance gov- ernance Administrative and broader integration field,
system (Bouckaert & Managerial those for which IMDi is
responsible, may be easier are to some extent
to define and measure supported by the findings.
than others, such as It seems, therefore, that if
number of refugees settled we want to understand
in local communities, how hybrid forms of
number and types of public accountability
activities refugees parti- emerge in the era of
cipate in, etc. perfor- mance
management, we have to
look at how the tasks
C agencies perform as well
O as at their structural
N affiliations to parent
C ministries. Variations in
L delegation from parent
U
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O
N
F
U
N
D
I
N
G