G.R. No.

L-21438 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.

Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.

On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.

The case is now before us for review on certiorari.

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila
to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers
got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959);
and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn
the appellate court's decision.

Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is
echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals
shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with
the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a
part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be
so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the
Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to
withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as
this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to
hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the
evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in
the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not
recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of
evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and
that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement
of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this
Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.

3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement
of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket
was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability
of first class seats.

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in
the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon
arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a
reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could
 have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the
corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at
the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. 22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:

On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own
witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the
testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
without any reservation whatever.

Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that
after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket
issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that
the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by
the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was
said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made
the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding
the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that
there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have
long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe
the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.

The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We
perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as
charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
"surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states,
Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the
plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?

4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to
make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which
said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage
on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as
starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .

4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations,
arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff
has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and

embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American
World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32

xxx xxx xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn
from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner
on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in
the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of
Appeals declared:

That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging
to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his
testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the
plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",

and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition;
but defendant did neither. 37

The Court of appeals further stated —

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the
seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to
suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected
from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence
committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the
plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief
that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael
Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of
plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as
follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger
has arranged with you?

A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better
right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline
did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class"
 seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a
corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager
by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under
the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of
the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw
him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager
wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white
man".38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not
use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith?
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse,
he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:

The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff
in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok
went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have
him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to,
again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he
(defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that
this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was
occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued
by the defendant to him.40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. 44

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract
and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the
check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not
insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect
his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that
as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there
was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to
him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable
for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action
as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner
air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?

A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said,
"We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is
tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there
because I am protesting to this transfer".

Q Was she able to note it?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

Q About that purser?

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg
room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told
me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me — because
it was recorded in French — "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."

Mr. VALTE —

I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would
be the notes. Your Honor.

COURT —

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent.
We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It
forms part of the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true
that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral
damages.54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as
attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

 RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in
G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:
I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD
VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT.
IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN
PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.
V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO
ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF
JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION,
ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY
RULE;
4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO GOVERN
CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR
TRIAL.
We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.
I
Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting
to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision,
we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events
that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these
events are facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up
the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign.These are: (1) the expose of Governor Luis Chavit Singson on
October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation
of the speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach
the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding
petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for
petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of
respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the
members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department
of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12)
the transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator
Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the
petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the
impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open the 2nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank
account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue
of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the
country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief
of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of
support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders;
(22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23)
petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior
events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news
accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make
them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all
his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent
Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized
that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts
ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases
involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not
prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the
facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing
his final statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its
content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed
his resignation.[1] These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim
that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past
noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.
We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is
no resignation at all.
x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of
voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government
action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side
involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether
such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a
resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct
in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered,
under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee
understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in
which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this
totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an
objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his
or her only option to be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is
irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for
example, resignation or facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced
by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative to resignation is
facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for
termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation resulting from a choice between resigning
or facing proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the
employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by
an officer charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already
determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the
officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one has the
legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.[2]

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the
holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not
claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis
na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure
completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully
protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff,
General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the
petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of
his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even able to detour
safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in
Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing between a
small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no
tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no
large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.
II
Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara
Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of
his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary
is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara
Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in
their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as
Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February
20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment
of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, [4] and the third
part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his
oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do
so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe
hearsay rule.[6] Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. [7] There are three reasons
for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3)
absence of the oath.[8] Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body
of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. [9] The
emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams
and Berger as follows:
xxx

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons accounts of what
happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or
admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay
evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay
rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to
exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and
to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have
added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize
the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and
probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of being
loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815
(1980) (footnotes omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of
how the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a
subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the
jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule
against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the
evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing,
there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the
evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a
victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by
usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in
their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or
indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is
surely inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and,
in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should
be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is, however, derived
from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount
the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings,
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making
and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary
Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65
(1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits
outweigh the cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on
litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all
the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as
litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is
litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about
the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in
evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the
rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial
Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992). [10]

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay
evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion
will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26
of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.[11] It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired
Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are not
covered by the hearsay rule:[12]
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons
asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission
discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness
impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule,
which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-
examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore
then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself
on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in
Sec. 154, McCormick)

According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that
the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory
of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is
unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath.

A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it
is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil.
578, 583).

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his
proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the
five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the
second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before,
petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The
reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on
him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions
made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other
person had made.[14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when
the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or
resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.[16]
 Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios
acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is
provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he
was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang
Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign,
Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This statement of full trust
was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after
taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to
Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?) [18] Secretary Angara told him to go
and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of
the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of
the presidency. The Diaryshows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary
Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal
(petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract
for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority,
having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then
engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and
admissible in evidence against such principal.[20]
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are
statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1)
those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of
the facts in issue. The second class includes the following:[21]
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that
is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition
against hearsay evidence:[22]
1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues, forming a general class,
in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue
of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example, where
any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct
testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof
available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against
his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against
interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue
as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity.
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are
circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on
hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest
cannot receive our imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were
violated in our Decision, viz:
The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence, such as the rule on
authentication of private writings

xxx
A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated

The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone
who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.

xxx
B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of
dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original
or duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the contents of the diary
are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.[23]

Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in
sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of
the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best
evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.[24]

xxx
In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in which
ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption
(post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an
opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied)

Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:

Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is
essential to bring the best evidence rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been
admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been
taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set
forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that
there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The
objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts consideration. [25]

He adds:
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its
reception.[26]

In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:

A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of
the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294
S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered
instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v.
Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835). [27]
 Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper
accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between
the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the
basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by
way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had
an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February
20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and
Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words
of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara
Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.
III
Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in
that congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the
Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is
unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority
of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily
which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political
question which this Court cannot review.
We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No.
146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[29] We sustained
this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged
temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress
exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the
petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The
recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political
judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as
the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and
the members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will
of the people x x x. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the
people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of
justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this courts
interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is
still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the ultimate authority to
determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one
is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does not
at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or
a de facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue
basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is legal and
ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of
inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate
authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a
political judgment which this Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the
generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question.
 Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed
off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress
should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential
incapacity cannot be implied.
We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration
by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the
presidency. In the cases at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the
resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in
session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be
sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner himself states
that his letter alleging his inability to govern was received by the Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30
A.M. and the Office of the Senate at 9 P.M. of the same day. [30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes
past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker
Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states:[31]
Joint Statement of Support
and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives
We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are called upon to address the constitutional
crisis affecting the authority of the President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the
Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this political reality. While we may differ on
the means to effect a change of leadership, we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line
with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our goals for peace and prosperity to all, we,
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby declare our support and
recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks
despite our political differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.

Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.

Senate President
(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of
respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions
of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the
support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the Constitution. [32] Resolution No. 82 of the
Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring the impeachment
court functus officio.[34] Both Houses sent bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the
Philippines.[35] These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied
recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent
Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are mere circumstances of acquiescence
calculated to induce people to submit to respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency[36] is a guesswork far
divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.
Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made Congress the national
board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the
sole judge in presidential and vice presidential contests.[37] He thus postulates that such constitutional
provision[38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to
the legality of a persons claim to the presidential office. [39] Suffice to state that the inference is illogical. Indeed,
there is no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election
contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a)
the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the
term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of
Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise
from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved
by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction
to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge
the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear
provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply
distort their meanings.
IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution which provides:
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could
be criminally prosecuted. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two
uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot
extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings
considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the
provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his
prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the impeachment proceedings should
be considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case
by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal.[40] He explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to
prove the case, hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[41] He then concludes that dismissal of
a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double
jeopardy.[42]
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners submission.
The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment
cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3
billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the
public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering their resignation. They also filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco
immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was
then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors
or on January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of
the Republic. Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment
court is functus officio.
 Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1)
upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.[43] Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were
complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment
proceeding dismissed without his express consent.Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on
prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be
scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute. As Bernas
points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure
of the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[44]
This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but
for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the
court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt, the
court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.

In a more recent case, this Court held:

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must
be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These
cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial
has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy.[46]

Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him. Even
assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial
is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy
of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong
the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. [47] The following
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:
Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to
the following rights:

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once commenced shall continue from
day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a
weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the
entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Supreme Court.

Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment proceedings was
unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001,
the impeachment proceeding was suspended until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the
resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding without
a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or
January 20, 2001, petitioners resignation supervened.With the sudden turn of events, the impeachment
court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can
the four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned,
constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
 Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the case without
the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the
petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning
from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment case against him,
for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the
dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.[48]
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision,
we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present
time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new
spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his
immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the
presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during
his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the
President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence,
at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from
suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all
his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during
his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to
make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. [50] From
the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure and not his term.
Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at bar were filed not really for
petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus,
derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the Ombudsman.
V

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

 Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial have been prejudiced by pre-
trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial
publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision itself proves the
pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis that doubtless, the national fixation with the
probable guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high circulation newspaper and by the
bully pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh
and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance.[51] To be
sure, petitioner engages in exageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions have been
irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim
that he still enjoys the support of the majority of our people, especially the masses.
Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the transaction speaks for itself) to
support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make
out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. [52] It is not
a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the
requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of
negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. [53]
We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied only in tort cases,
to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to
resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive
publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of
investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v. Teehankee,[54] to resolve this issue, viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is
true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of
the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These
news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned
in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected
this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
 Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove how the impartiality
of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and
we hold it again, petitioner has completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the
members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be
left to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even identify the members of the Panel of
Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as suggested by the
petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the
burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said
publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive
publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure possibility of
prejudice but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea. It is
plain that petitioner has failed to do so.
Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period to allow passions to
subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to
the proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. The
investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our history that a President will be
investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes while a sitting
President. His investigation will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and
historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is important for
the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason,
we have warned the respondent Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary investigation in a
circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused.
VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to EDSA put on record who they
were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those
exerting pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for the cold
neutrality of impartial judges.[56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12) members of the Court who
merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic
event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the
presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first
working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to
wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief
Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an
administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of
the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.

The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It should be clear from the
resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice
Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to
fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To
dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and
emphasized that it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a
proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the
parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President
vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution. Thus, there is
no reason for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion
to inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general disfavor.
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence.[57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.[58]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his Omnibus
Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122290. April 6, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, accused-

appellant,

ARMANDO CAPARAS y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Appellant REYNALDO BAGO was charged with qualified theft, while his co-accused ARMANDO
CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO were charged with simple theft, in an Information[1] which reads:

"That sometime during the period from January 1992 to March 23, 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, being then employed as factory worker of the
Azkcon Metal Industries detailed with the Power Construction Supply Company located
at No. 130 Judge Juan Luna Street, San Francisco del Monte, this City, and as such has
free access to the different departments of the company, with grave abuse of confidence,
in conspiracy with his co-accused ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO y
VEGO, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away assorted cold rolled
sheets and scraps valued in the total amount of P194,865.00, Philippine Currency,
belonging to Power Construction Supply Company, represented by WILLIAM HILO, to
the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Appellant and his co-accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.

Appellant was an employee of Azkcon Metal Industries (Azkcon for brevity) from 1988 to 1992. He started
working as a factory worker and later became a machine operator and a truck helper. From 1991 to 1992,
he served as team leader at the cutting department under the supervision of Material
Comptroller WILLIAM HILO who kept track of all the materials coming in and going out of the companys
plant in Kalookan City.[2]

Azkcon has a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply Company (Power Construction)
whereby Azkcon buys cold rolled sheets from the latter. These cold rolled sheets are also cut by Power
Construction for a fee and Azkcon converts them into drums or containers. Appellants job was to go to
Power Constructions establishment in Quezon City to oversee the cutting of the cold rolled sheets and
ensure their delivery to Azkcon using the trucks sent by Hilo. [3]

On April 21, 1992, appellant and his co-workers[4] went to Power Construction and loaded two cold rolled
sheets in a truck owned by Azkcon.[5] Before entering the premises of Azkcon, appellant presented to
security guard RUBEN DE LA CRUZ MANANGAN two receipts,[6] both dated April 21, 1992, covering the
cold rolled sheets from Power Construction. Manangan inspected the contents of the truck. As everything
was accounted for, Manangan stamped on the two receipts covering the materials. Appellant then
presented a third receipt,[7] with Invoice No. 51111, dated March 23, 1992, for stamping. Manangan
likewise stamped the third receipt. As the third receipt bore a different date, Manangan asked appellant if
the materials covered by said receipt were in the truck. Appellant replied that the materials had long been
delivered. Manangan did not investigate further but later reported the incident to the Chief of Security
Department, AFLOR ONG. Ong checked the third receipt and when he failed to find the materials listed
thereon, he reported to Hilo.[8]

Upon receipt of the report, Hilo discreetly conducted a more in-depth investigation. He found out that the
materials covered by the third receipt, worth P192,000.00, were not delivered to Azkcon. He checked the
third receipt and the gate pass of Power Construction for March 23, 1992 - the date of the questioned
transaction - and discovered that the truck used by appellant on said date did not belong to Azkcon. It
also turned out that the subject materials had already been paid for by Azkcon.[9]

Power Constructions security guard, JUN GAVARAN, confirmed that on March 23, 1992, appellant and
his companions picked up cold rolled sheets from Power Construction and loaded them in a truck. The
truck did not bear the logo of Azkcon. Gavaran noted on a ledger that the truck came at 2:15 p.m. and left
at 3:35 p.m.

Hilo did not immediately report the matter to his superior. He chose to wait for appellant to commit a
similar misdemeanor and catch him red-handed. He waited in vain. He then decided to inform his
superiors about the theft in May 1992. Hilo was directed to report the theft and file a complaint with the
police authorities.

A police team, led by SPO3 ALFREDO ALFARO, investigated appellant at Azkcon. Appellant insisted
that the materials covered by the third receipt had been delivered to Azkcon. The investigation of
appellant continued at the police station. PO3 Andres Balod interrogated appellant. Appellant asked for a
lawyer and was brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where he was assisted by Atty.
Florimond C. Rous. Atty. Rous talked to him and inquired if he was willing to give a statement to the
police. The interrogation then proceeded and appellant admitted his participation in the theft. He
disclosed that his cohorts on May 23, 1992 were ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO,
former employees of Azkcon. He revealed that they usually loaded the stolen materials in a truck rented
by Caparas and Ongseco. He received P10,000 to P35,000[10] for his participation in the different
thefts.[11] Appellant affixed his signature on the written statement.[12] After the investigation, PO3 Balod
referred the case to Fiscal Paragua. h Y

The next day, the police went to Malinta, Valenzuela and apprehended accused Caparas and Ongseco. It
was appellant who pointed out the residence of Caparas and Ongseco to the police. The two identified a
certain Chua as the alleged buyer of the stolen goods. The police invited Chua for investigation.
Inexplicably, the investigation of Chua was not reduced to writing. [13]

Appellant denied participation in the crime charged. He described his job as team leader at the cutting
department of Azkcon. He said that Hilo would order him to proceed to Power Construction Supply to
oversee the cutting and procurement of the materials needed by Azkcon. Hilo would then instruct him to
wait for his call and the arrival of their truck at Power Construction Supply. They would usually use
Azkcons trucks, but at other times, Hilo would rent trucks from others. [14]

As soon as the truck would arrive at the premises of the supplier, the driver would ask for appellant. He
would then load the materials in the truck and would show the receipts covering the materials to the
security guard of Power Construction Supply for stamping. The materials inside the truck would be
counterchecked against the quantity and quality stated in the receipts. Appellant would then return to
Azkcon usually at about 4:00 p.m. Thus, he would mainly stay at the suppliers premises to oversee the
cutting of the cold rolled sheets.[15]

Appellant claimed he does not know prosecution witness Jun Gavaran, the security guard of Philippine
Construction Supply. He also denied knowing accused Caparas and Ongseco. Allegedly, he saw them for
the first time at the police station. He admitted knowing prosecution witnesses Manangan and Ong. He
acknowledged that he had no quarrel with Gavaran, Manangan and Ong.[16]

On May 21, 1992, four (4) policemen in civilian clothes arrested him without a warrant while working in
Azkcon. They told him that Hilo filed a complaint against him. He was detained at the La Loma police
station. Hilo came and pointed him as the one responsible for the theft but without informing him what he
stole. Upon orders of Hilo, the policemen started to beat him. They forced him to admit the crime. They
also compelled him to give a statement but he refused. [17]

The next day, the policemen and Hilo brought him to Valenzuela. Hilo indicated to the policemen the
residence of accused Caparas and Ongseco. That was the first time he saw his co-accused.[18]

Then, the policemen forced appellant to go to the IBP office in Quezon City. They gave him Atty. Rous as
counsel although he insisted on hiring his own counsel. Atty. Rous never conferred with him. No
investigation was conducted at the IBP. The police did not ask him a single question. Without reading his
prepared statement, he signed it as the police threatened to harm him. He acknowledged his signatures
on the invoices marked as Exhibits "A" to "D",[19] but claimed he could not recall the circumstances under
which he signed them.[20]

After seven (7) days at the La Loma police station, he was taken to the Fiscals Office in Quezon City. The
inquest fiscal did not talk to him. He was asked about the voluntariness of his signature in his extra-
judicial confession.[21]

Thereafter, he was brought back to the station.[22]

Appellants father, PABLO BAGO, testified that on June 15, 1992, he went to the NBI to seek protection
for his son as they were receiving threats from Hilo and police officers Balod and Alfaro. Days later, Hilo,
Alfaro and Balod went to his house in Quezon City looking for appellant. Hilo warned that appellant
should admit the crime lest something untoward would happen to him.[23] Again, after his sons
arraignment, a certain Col. Hernandez visited their house and insisted on taking appellant to Azkcon.
Pablo refused, arguing that the case had already been filed in court. [24] On another occasion, Col.
Hernandez and his lady friend dropped by his house and convinced him and his son to talk to Mr. King,
the owner of Azkcon. During their meeting, Mr. King allegedly told Pablo that he knew that appellant was
innocent but asked him to testify against the persons responsible for the crime. Pablo replied that they
would think about the proposal.[25] Mr. Kings lawyer, Atty. Capistrano, also gave him the same advice.
Atty. Capistrano requested them to go to his office where appellant could execute a statement. Instead of
going there, Pablo and the appellant proceeded to the office of appellants lawyer. [26]

Allegedly, appellant was maltreated while in the custody of the police. Pablo claimed that he reported the
physical abuse to the NBI.[27]

Prosecutions rebuttal witness ATTY. FLORIMUND C. ROUS, free legal aid counsel of IBP, testified that
on May 22, 1992, appellant was brought to their office for the execution of his extra-judicial confession.
As a matter of procedure, he first examined the body of appellant to determine any sign of physical abuse
or maltreatment while the latter was in police custody. Finding none, he inquired from appellant whether
he was willing to confess to the commission of the theft. Beforehand, he already informed appellant of the
consequence of his confession, i.e., that it could be used against him. Nonetheless, appellant affirmed his
willingness to execute a written confession. Thus, the policeman proceeded to take the statement of
appellant. Appellant signed his extrajudicial confession [28] in his (Atty. Rous) presence.

Rebuttal witness ATTY. MELANIO CAPISTRANO testified that he was Azkcons legal counsel. He
confirmed that a conference was held at Azkcon premises in connection with the theft. Present were
appellant, Pablo Bago, Mr. King and a former employee of Azkcon. Due to the complexity of the modus
operandi, Mr. King suspected that appellant had other companions in committing the theft. Mr. King then
informed him that appellant had agreed to turn state witness. Appellant confessed that his supervisor
William Hilo, a certain Severino Encarnacion and his co-accused Ongseco and Caparas took part in the
heist. Allegedly, Encarnacion was the brains behind the theft; Hilo took care of the operations on the
Azkcon side, while Ongseco and Caparas took care of the procurement of the stolen goods. Atty.
Capistrano expressed reservations about the involvement of Hilo as he was the one who reported the
theft to the management. After the conference, he advised appellant to consult his own lawyer and
execute a statement so he could determine if they would use appellant as a state witness. Prior to his
arraignment, appellant was told that he should decide whether he wanted to be a state witness. In their
next scheduled meeting, appellant and his lawyer, Atty. Jambora, failed to appear. [29]

On sur-rebuttal, Pablo Bago insisted that on July 1992, Col. Hernandez went to Pearanda, Nueva Ecija
and took pictures of his house. Col. Hernandez invited him and appellant to go to Azkcon. They refused
as appellant had already posted bail at that time. Atty. Capistrano, on the other hand, insisted that
appellant should name the other employees involved in the theft so that they could be dismissed from the
company.[30]

On April 26, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[31] convicted appellant of qualified theft.
Accused Caparas and Ongseco were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of
the decision[32] reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused REYNALDO BAGO
y MADRID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Qualified Theft as
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion
Perpetua as minimum to Twenty-Eight (28) years, Ten (10) months and One (1) day
of Reclusion Perpetua as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law and to
indemnify the complainant in the sum of P194,865.00, representing the value of the
stolen cold rolled sheets, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

"Accused ARMANDO CAPARAS Y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO Y VEGO are

hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

"SO ORDERED."
Appellant moved for reconsideration of the trial courts decision. The motion was denied for lack of
merit,[33] although the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was amended, thus:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

"Pursuant to People vs. Conrado Lucas (240 SCRA 66), [the] dispositive portion of the
decision is hereby modified but only insofar as accused Reynaldo Bago is concerned to
read as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Reynaldo
Bago y Madrid GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of
Qualified Theft as defined and penalized under Article 309, paragraph 1 and
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
indemnify the complainant in the sum of P194,865.00, representing the value of
the stolen cold rolled sheets, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, with costs.

"SO ORDERED."

The Appellants Brief raises two issues, to wit: Misoedp

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS

PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, REYNALDO BAGO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

We affirm with modification.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by circumstantial evidence that he asported
the cold rolled sheets in question. He asserts that these materials were delivered to Azkcon as evidenced
by the receipt[34] duly stamped by the guard on duty. He states:

"x x x [T]he best evidence that the materials were actually delivered at Azkcon Metal
Industries is the receipt duly stamped by the guard on duty. Res ipsa loquitor. To receive
the testimony of the security guard, that he stamped the receipt even without the goods
because he trusted the accused, would set a precedent that will eventually convict an
innocent person. After duly stamping the receipt, it is very easy for the security guard to
claim otherwise to avoid liability."[35]

Appellant also contends that his task was to oversee the delivery of the materials from their supplier to
Azkcon. Allegedly, it was erroneous to conclude that he stole the materials just because they could not be
found in its premises as he was not responsible for any material lost therein.
Lastly, appellant belittles the documents showing that the truck he used in taking out the materials from
Power Construction on March 23, 1992 did not belong to Azkcon. He claims that said documents had no
bearing on his culpability. Scjuris

We reject these contentions. Mis-edp

First. Appellant, in effect, assails the testimony of Ruben Manangan, the security guard who stamped the
receipt marked as Exhibit "C", on the ground that the receipt itself shows that the materials were delivered
to Azkcon. Appellant argues that the receipt is the best evidence and should be given more credence
than Manangans testimony. Appellants argument is bereft of merit for Manangans testimony is
corroborated by another witness, William Hilo, Material Comptroller of Azkcon who kept track of all
materials coming in and going out of Azkcons plant. He testified that on April 21, 1992, he received three
(3) receipts but only two (2) materials were delivered to Azkcons premises. The receipt marked as Exhibit
"C" covered the missing materials. Manangans testimony is further corroborated by two (2) pieces of
documentary evidence: first, by Power Construction Supply Co. Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March
22, 1992[36] which shows that the materials covered by Exhibit "C" were taken out by appellant from the
premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992, about a month before the receipt was
stamped; and second, by a document from Power Construction Supply dated March 23, 1992 containing
information about the truck used in pulling out the materials from Power Construction Supply on said
date. The truck bore license plate no. PRC-513 and was not owned by Azkcon. The truck belonged to a
certain Ruel Fernando who had no contractual relation with Azkcon and said vehicle was not to be used
to take out materials from Power Construction Supply. In view of these corroborations, we hold that the
trial court did not err in giving credence to Manangans testimony despite the receipt. Es m

Appellant can not rely on the best evidence rule which states: Msesm

"SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and Exsm

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office."[37]

The rule cannot be invoked unless the content of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case,
the best evidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains to the admissibility of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of a document. In the case at bar, no secondary evidence is offered to prove the
content of a document. What is being questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the
testimony of Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question were
delivered to Azkcons premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no application on this issue. Es msc

Second. It is well settled that before conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of others, as the author of the
crime.[38] Thus, the following requisites must be met: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[39]

In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on this chain of events: Court

"1. Azkcon Metal Industries is engaged in metal business and for this purpose contracted
a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply whereby Azkcon purchases the
cold rolled sheets from the latter and the cold rolled sheets are cut by Power Construction
Supply;

"2. Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with Power
Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting Department; and that as such he
was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to pull out from
the Power Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the same to
Azkcon;

"3. On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees, Danilo Baylosis
and Candido Querobin entered the Azkcon premises with deliveries of two cold rolled
sheets loaded in the truck. Security Guard Manangan inspected the materials in the truck
and after confirming that the materials were loaded in the truck, he stamped the receipts
upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused Bago brought out another receipt
and requested Security Guard Manangan to likewise stamp the same. Security Guard
Manangan checked the goods covered by the third receipt and found there were no
cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The third receipt carried a different date.
Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago as to the whereabouts of the materials
covered by the third receipt and the latter replied that they had long been delivered.
Nevertheless, Security Guard Manangan stamped this last receipt because he trusted
that accused would not do anything bad;

"4. On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon, discovered
that there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were
delivered inside the company compound. The materials covered by the two (2)
receipts were delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo
conducted an inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials in
question. Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been delivered. Hilo
proceeded with his investigation and was able to secure from the Power Construction
Supply Company Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 (Exh. "D") which
shows that the materials covered by the third receipt were taken out by accused
Bago from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992; J lexj

"5. Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a document dated March 23,
1992 (Exh. "E") which contained information on the truck used in pulling out the materials
from Power Construction Supply on March 22, 1992 (sic). The truck bears Plate No.
PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the certificate of registration
secured from the Land Transportation Office, the truck is owned by a certain Ruel
Fernando who has no contractual relations with Azkcon. Said vehicle is likewise not
authorized to pull out materials from the Power Construction Supply."

The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable conclusion that appellant
asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

We agree. Misact
Appellant cannot rely on the fact that the third receipt was duly stamped by security guard Ruben
Manangan on April 21, 1992. Manangan explained well why he stamped the receipt. He said: [40]

"Q: On April 21, 1992, did you report for work as security guard at AZKCON Metal
Industries?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And was there any unusual incident that transpired on that day, if you recall?

A: There was a truck which was carrying two (2) cold rolled sheets.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: By the way, who were with (sic) the truck which carried the (2) cold rolled sheets
which you mentioned?

A: Bago sir. Esmm is

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Now, when this truck came [in], with Reynaldo Bago with Bailosis and Querubin,
carrying deliveries of two (2) cold rolled sheets, what happened after that, if anything
happened?

A: After I inspected the two (2) cold rolled sheets, I stamped the receipts for them.

Q: Before you stamped the receipts for these two (2) cold rolled sheets, did you make
sure that the goods were there?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: After I stamped the two (2) receipts, he brought out another receipt which they asked
me to stamp also.

Q: By the way, who asked you to stamp the two (2) receipts covering the two (2) cold
rolled sheets loaded in the truck?

A: Bago sir.

xxxxxxxxx

COURT

xxxxxxxxx

Q: And who was the one who brought out this other receipt for stamping?

A: Bago sir.
Q: And what did he tell you, if he told you anything about this receipt?

A: He said "please put a stamp on this receipt".

Q: Did you?

A: Yes, because I trusted him. Lexj uris

Q: And did you also check whether the goods covered by this 3rd receipt was (sic) in the
truck unloaded?

A: Sir there was no cold rolled sheet for that receipt.

Q: And why did you stamp this receipt for cold rolled sheets for that receipt? (sic)

A: Because I trusted him that he would not do anything bad.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Now, in spite of the fact that your personal knowledge of the person Reynaldo Bago
was in the course of your performance of your duty, including Reynaldo Bago (sic), you
would like to impress upon us that in spite of that you trusted him?

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Argumentative, your Honor. Kyle

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A: Yes sir.

Q: In spite of the fact that the 3rd receipt according to you, when you inspected it, there
was no cold rolled sheets covering "Exhibit "C"?

A: No material sir. Mis-oedp

Q: In spite of the fact that you did not find any Cold Rolled Sheets material you still
honored the receipt by affixing you signature after you stamped it, correct?

A: Yes sir, but when I saw the receipt it had a different date.

Q: xxx [D]id you ask Reynaldo Bago "why is it a different date" and "why are there
no Cold Rolled Sheets is (sic) the 3rd receipt"?

A: I asked him "where these materials are" and he told me that it has (sic) long
been delivered.

Q: Now did you ask him where it was (sic) delivered and what place of AZKCON did he
deposit these Cold Rolled Sheets which are (sic) covered by this 3rd receipt?
A: No, sir.

Q: Now with regards (sic) to your duty as security guard, did you call the attention of the
management about this 3rd receipt with no Cold Rolled Sheets and you stamped the
receipt knowing that there was (sic) no materials inside. Did you ask the management,
the president, the manager, the foreman or whoever it is (sic) on duty at the time?

A: I reported it to our chief Aflor Ong. Ed-pm-is

Q: Who is this Aflor Ong?

A: Chief."[41]

The fact of non-delivery of the subject materials to Azkcon was established through the
testimony of two other witnesses, namely, William Hilo and the Chief Security Officer
Aflor Ong. Hilo declared:[42]

"ATTY. CAPISTRANO

Q: On April 21 (1992), would you please tell us what happened on that date?

A: On April 21, the materials arrived and the guard checked it (sic) and I checked it (sic)
also. We found out that there were three (3) receipts but there were only two (2) materials
inside the company.

Q: How did you come to know this, Mr. Witness? Calrsc

A: It was reported by the OIC of the Security Guard, sir.

Q: You spoke of three (3) receipts, did you come to see these receipts?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If I will show you them again (sic), will you be able to identify the same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: I am showing to you these receipts which was (sic) previously marked as Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C", are these the three (3) receipts which you mentioned a while ago?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Would you kindly take a look at these receipts and tell the Honorable Court, which
particular receipt is controversial in the sense that the goods described therein did not
enter your company premises?

ATTY. HAMBON: (sic)

I will object to that, Your Honor, incompetent.

COURT:
The witness may answer.

(The witness is examining the document)

INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to Exhibits "A" and "B", as the one with the materials arrived (sic) and
pointed to Exhibit "C" as the controversial receipt.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: For how long have you known Reynaldo Bago?

A: Since (sic) two (2) years, sir.

Q: What is the specific function of Reynaldo Bago in your company?

A: Reynaldo Bago is in charge of Cutting Department.

Q: As a Material Controller, do you have any supervision of (sic) Reynaldo Bago?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, at the bottom portion of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", there appears a
signature, can you go over this (sic) and tell the Honorable Court, whose signatures
stated (sic) therein?

A: This is a signature of Reynaldo Bago.

INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to a signature on Exhibit "A". Jle-xj

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Which I request, You Honor, to be marked as Exhibit "A-2".

COURT:

Mark it. Esmsc

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Q: How about in Exhibit "B"?

A: The same it was the signature of Reynaldo Bago.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may I request that this portion be marked as Exhibit "B-2".

Q: How about Exhibit "C"?

A: The same Mr. Reynaldo Bagos signature.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

May I request, Your Honor, that the pointed portion of Exhibit "C", be marked in evidence
as Exhibit "C-2".

Q: Why do you know that these are the signature (sic) of Reynaldo Bago?

A: Because I am in charge of Reynaldo Bago, and I know his signature.

Q: If Reynaldo Bago is in Court, can you point to him?

INTERPRETER: Calrky

Witness is pointing to a person who identified himself as Reynaldo Madrid Bago.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Q: You said that this matter was reported to you by the OIC of the Security Guard, (sic)
when this matter was reported to you, what step or steps did you take, if any?

A: I conducted an actual inventory and confronted Reynaldo Bago and asked him where
are (sic) the materials which is (sic) in question.

Q: You said that your (sic) conducted an actual inventory what was your findings
in your inventory?

A: According to my findings the materials did not reach the company.

ATTY. HAMBON: (sic)

Your Honor, may I request that [that] portion be stricken-off the record.

COURT:

The witness may answer, place that on record.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

When you said that according to your findings that (sic) the materials did not arrive, to
what particular receipt are (sic) you referring to? Misedp

This one, sir.

INTERPRETER:
 Witness is pointing to Exhibit "C".

Q: You said that you confronted Reynaldo Bago, what transpired during your
confrontation?

A: He told me that the material arrived long before but when I checked it out, I found out
that it didnt arrived" (sic).

Prosecution witness Aflor Ong testified as follows:[43]

"Q: And would you kindly inform this Honorable Court whether there is any unusual
incident that transpired on April 21, 1992 as you were then performing your duty as chief
security guard.

A: About the receipts of materials delivered, Sir.

Q: Would you kindly elaborate on that?

A: There were 3 receipts but only two (2) items were delivered.

Q: And how did you come to know this?

A: It was reported to me by the security guard on duty.

Q: And who was this security guard who reported the matter to you?

A: Security guard Ruben Manangan, Sir.

Q: And when this matter was reported to you, what did you do, if you did anything?

A: I checked it also and after I checked, I reported it to William Hilo.

Q: What precisely did you check?

A: The items.

Q: Did you find these items for the 3rd receipt?

A: None, Sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Now according to you, on April 21, 1992 you were at AZKCON Metal Industries?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: And your attention was invited on the first two receipts, containing the Cold Rolled
Materials?

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Misleading your Honor.

COURT:

Three (3) Receipts.

Q: Your attention was invited by 3 receipts.

A: After the guard reported it to me, Sir.

Q: Who was this guard who reports (sic) to you?

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Already answered your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A: Ruben Manangan.

Q: What time did he make the report?

A: Four to Five in the afternoon Sir.

Q: And what was the report all about?

A: About two (2) cold rolled sheets, Sir.

Q: What is it?

A: Only two (2) cold rolled sheets were delivered, one is (sic) missing.

Q: And, of course, the security guard showed to you the 3rd receipt which did not cover
the materials in the cargo truck?

ATTY. CAPISTRANO:

Misleading again, your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A: Witness may answer (sic).

Q: You are, of course, referring to Exhibit "C"?

A: Yes, Sir.
 Q: At the time the report was shown to you, did you inspect the truck?

A: Yes, Sir. Scslx

Q: And you did not find actually the materials?

A: I did not find the material covering this Exhibit "C".

Q: Covering the 3rd receipt?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: After you inspected, what action did you take, because it was reported to you by the
security guard?

A: I reported it to Mr. William Hilo, the one in-charge of the materials."[44]

The trial court correctly found that appellant was a trusted employee of Azkcon. He was in-charge of
overseeing the cutting of the materials at Power Construction and ensuring their delivery to Azkcon. Due
to this trust, he succeeded in withdrawing from the said supplier the cold rolled sheets covered by
Exhibits "A" and "B" dated April 21, 1992 and Exhibit "C" (Invoice No. 51111), dated March 23, 1992.
Appellant signed these receipts to signify that he obtained the materials from the supplier. However, only
the materials covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" were delivered to Azkcon on April 21, 1992. Those covered
by Exhibit "C" were not delivered. Significantly, the materials procured on April 21, 1992 were delivered
that same day, as shown by the stamp marks on Exhibits "A" and "B". In contrast, the materials he took
from the supplier on March 23, 1992 could not be found in the premises of Azkcon and there was no
evidence that he delivered them on said date or on any other day thereafter. Inexplicably, appellant
presented the third receipt (Invoice No. 51111) dated March 23, 1992 for stamping only on April 21, 1992.
The reasonable conclusion is that he asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

Clearly, all the elements of theft were established, to wit: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2)
the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was
done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the
person or force upon things.[45] As the theft was committed with grave abuse of confidence, appellant is
guilty of qualified theft.

Third. We now come to the correctness of the penalty imposed on appellant.

The trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In its Comment, the
Office of the Solicitor General opined that the penalty was erroneous. It noted that:

"The present case falls under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph one (1) and
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, for the purpose of determining the penalty to be
imposed on appellant. x x x.

"Since the lower court found that the value of the thing stolen was P194,865.00, the
penalty prescribed in this case, had it been a case of simple theft, is imprisonment of 20
years corresponding to reclusion temporal. Since the offense was committed with grave
abuse of confidence, then the prescribed penalty for qualified theft proven in this case
is death, which is the penalty next higher by two degrees than the given penalty for
simple theft above mentioned. In which event, this case is subject further to the rules
provided in Article 74, in relation to Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. They provide:
 ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases In cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specifically designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be
that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of article 40, shall be
considered as the next higher penalty.

xxxxxxxxx

ART. 40. Death Its accessory penalties The death penalty, when it is not
executed by reason of commutation or pardon, shall carry with it that of perpetual
absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during the thirty years
following the date of the sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.'

Consequently, the penalty actually prescribed in this case for the crime of qualified theft
is twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties of
perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty (30) years
following the date of the sentence.

"Since this case is subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the determination of the
maximum and minimum ranges of the sentence is governed by rules contained in the
analogous case of People v. Pabalan, to wit:

Applying the mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty
shall therefore be taken from the maximum period of said basic penalty in Article
315 as augmented by the additional years of imprisonment, while the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to that provided by law, without considering the incremental
penalty for the amounts in excess of P22,000.00. xxx'

Based on the foregoing considerations, the penalty imposed on appellant should fall
within the minimum range of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and (1) day to six (6) years, and twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties of death, as maximum. It is
respectfully recommended that appellant be sentenced to the penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal with the
accessory penalties of death as maximum."

We disagree.

Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for simple theft. It reads:

"1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be."

The value of the property stolen by appellant was P194,448.00. Under Article 309, the basic penalty
is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period since the
value of the stolen goods exceeded P22,000.00. To determine the additional years of imprisonment
prescribed in Article 309 (1), we have to deduct the amount of P22,000.00, thus leaving the amount
of P172,448.00. Next, the net amount should be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
below P10,000.00. Thus, seventeen (17) years must be added to the basic penalty of the maximum
period of prision mayor minimum and medium periods.[46] The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods has a range of six years (6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the incremental penalty is
seventeen (17) years. Had appellant committed simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years
of reclusion temporal, the maximum penalty allowable under Article 309, subject to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Slxmis

Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence, the penalty is two degrees
higher than that specified under Article 309.[47] In the case of People vs. Caales,[48] we were confronted
with the same issue of determining how the penalty under Article 309 should be increased by two
degrees. In said case, we adopted the disquisition of the appellate court, thus: Slxsc

"x x x. Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two degrees higher than reclusion
temporal is death. This is likewise conformable with Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that:

ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases.In cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specifically designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be
that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be
considered as the next higher penalty. x x x.

"The provision however, proscribes the imposition of the death penalty resulting from the
graduation of the penalty. It bears stressing that Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code
was based on Article 93 of the old Penal Code which provided that if the penalty is
reclusion perpetua, the next higher penalty would be the same penalty but the convict in
such cases cannot be pardoned until forty years had elapsed (Aquino, Comments on the
Revised Penal Code, 1987 ed., Volume 1, page 709).

But there is a pervading divergence of opinion among commentators of the Revised

Penal Code as to what the higher penalty referred to in Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code should be. Some authors are of the view that the higher penalty would be reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties for the said penalty. But then, under Article 74 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accessory penalties under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code should be imposed. Still others, like former Senator Ambrosio Padilla, are of the
view that the higher penalty is reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of death
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code if the death penalty is commuted. But then,
the accessory penalty under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code is perpetual absolute
disqualification and civil interdiction during thirty (30) years following the date of
sentence, whereas, the accessory penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code is civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification. As
aptly observed by former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there seems to be an absurdity
under the latter view (Aquino, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, supra). On the
other hand, Justice Albert is of the firm view that: Esmmis

The Code meant to say here that the judgment should provide that the convict
should not be given the benefit of the provisions of Article 27 until forty years
should have elapsed; otherwise, there could be no difference at all between
reclusion perpetua when imposed as a penalty next higher in degree and when it
is imposed as the penalty fixed by law. (Albert, Comments on the Revised Penal
Code, 1932 edition, page 240).
 to which Justice Luis Reyes subscribes (Reyes, Comments on the Revised Penal Code,
1981 ed., Vol. 1, page 746). Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino likewise is in accord
with the opinion of Justice Albert.

x x x.

Justice Albert believes that the penalty higher than reclusion

perpetua is reclusion perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of
death under Art. 40. Otherwise, as he said there could be no difference at all
between reclusion perpetua, when imposed as the penalty next higher in degree
and when it is imposed as the penalty fixed by law. This opinion is supported by
Art. 93 of the old Penal Code from which Art. 74 was taken. Art. 93 provides that
if the given penalty is cadena perpetua or reclusion perpetua, the next higher
penalty shall be these same penalties but the convict in such case cannot be
pardoned until forty years have elapsed. (Aquino, Comments on the Revised
Penal Code, 1987 ed., Volume 1, pages 708-709).'

"We are likewise in accord with the opinion of Justice Albert as a logical explanation of
Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, Caales should be meted the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua for Forty Years with the accessory penalties of death under Article
40 of the Revised Penal Code. In fine, Caales is not entitled to pardon before the lapse of
the forty-year period (Reyes, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1977 ed., Volume
1, page 747)."

This reiterated our ruling in People vs. Reyes,[49] where we held: Mesm

"In the crime of theft, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
shall be prision mayor in its maximum period and one year for each additional
P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years or reclusion temporal.
However, if that crime of theft is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
which convert the taking into qualified theft, the penalty next higher by two
degrees shall be imposed, that is, at least, reclusion perpetua."[50]

In accord with the foregoing, we hold that appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Missdaa

Fourth. As regards the grant of actual damages, the rule is that actual damages cannot be allowed
unless supported by evidence in the record.[51] William Hilo testified that the value of the missing cold
rolled sheets was P192,000.00 and the incurred cutting cost was P2,448.00, for a total value
of P194,448.00.[52] Thus, the award for actual damages must be reduced by P417.00.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the April 26, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 92),
in Criminal Case No. Q-92-30833, as amended by the Order dated August 15, 1995, is AFFIRMED
subject to the modification that the actual damages is reduced to P194,448.00.Kycalr

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 2696. May 5, 1906. ]

SIXTO TIMBOL Y MANALO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JANUARIA MANALO, ET

AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Gregorio Pineda, for Appellants.

 Gabriel & Borbon, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS, PROBATE OF. — A will executed under the provisions of the Civil Code before the
new Code of Civil Procedure went into effect must be probated in accordance with the
provisions of the latter relating to the administration and settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, if at the time the will was presented for probate the provisions thereof
had not been complied with.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE. — Where the loss of the protocols and records of a notary public has
been proved beyond doubt, a copy of the original will, issued by the same notary before
whom it was executed, bearing his official seal, although such copy may not appear to be
30 or more years old, may be admitted as written evidence; which together with the
testimony of the three attesting witnesses as to the authenticity of such a copy and of the
notary’s signature, is the most complete and conclusive proof of the genuineness of the
will.

3. ID.; LOSS; EVIDENCE. — The loss or disappearance of an original will having been duly
proved, section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the proving of its contents by
a copy of the same and by the recollection of those who witnessed and signed the original
will.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On the 17th of May, 1898, and at about 10 o’clock a. m., Adolfo Garcia Feijoo, a resident
attorney and notary public of the town of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, by request
of the party interested was called to the house of Sixto Timbol, in the barrio of Santo
Rosario of the town of Angeles, Pampanga, for the purpose of taking the acknowledgment of
Cesarea Manalo y Manalo, a resident of Angeles, and the mother of the plaintiff, Sixto
Timbol, to her last will and testament which contained an inventory of that, property
belonging to the testatrix and wherein she named the said Sixto Timbol as one of her heirs.
Timbol was also appointed as executor of the said will, without bond, and given full power to
do all things necessary in connection with the execution of its provisions, the testatrix
declaring that any prior or subsequent will executed by her which did not comply with the
legal requirements should be considered null and void. The will in question was attested by
the witnesses Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio Sugay, and Pablo Torres. Sugay interpreted the will
into Pampango and Torres signed the will at the request of the testatrix who could not
write.

A copy of the aforesaid will bearing the seal and signature of the notary public of the
Province of Pampanga was presented to the Court of First Instance of said province for
probate. Counsel for Januaria, Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and Sinforoso Manalo objected to its
being admitted to probate. The witnesses to the said will were duly examined; the evidence
was taken in the presence of the appellants and the court rendered its decision April 4,
1905, declaring that the will in question had been duly executed in accordance with the law
which was in force in these Islands prior to the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure
and admitted the same to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased, Cesarea
Manalo y Manalo and issued letters of administration to Sixto Timbol, executor under the
will. The contestants were ordered to pay the costs. One of them, Lino Lacson, appealed
from the said judgment to this court.

This case relates, as is seen, to probate of a certain will executed by Cesarea Manalo y
Manalo, now deceased, on the 17th of May, 1898, before a notary public for the Province of
Pampanga during the Spanish regime in these Islands in the presence of three attesting
witnesses, the original of which said will should have been in the protocol of the said notary
public from whom the aforesaid executor, Sixto Timbol, obtained the copy bearing his
signature and official seal and which copy follows page 52 of the record of the Supreme
Court, in this case.

According to the assignment of errors attached to the special proceedings in the matter of
the probate of the will herein referred to, two questions are raised by this appeal, to wit :
Whether the said will inserted in pages 2 to 7 of the record, was executed in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code, and whether, under the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the will alleged to have been left by the deceased Cesarea Manalo y Manalo can
be admitted to probate.

The will referred to was executed three years before the new Code of Civil Procedure went
into effect. There is nothing in the said code which makes it retroactive and, therefore, in
order to determine whether the will is valid we must inquire whether the same was
executed in accordance with the law in force at the time of its execution, and in order to
enforce its provisions it is necessary to comply with the provisions of section 617 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, since the new law requires that a will must be admitted to probate
before the estate can be administered and settled.

The will in question, as will be noted, is a nuncupative or open will and seems to have been
executed in accordance with the provisions of articles 694, 695, and 699 of the Civil Code —
that is, in the presence of a notary public duly authorized by law such as Adolfo Garcia
Feijoo, who was then a notary public of that province, and in the presence of three
competent witnesses, residents of the same place, who saw the testatrix, witnessed the
execution of the will, and understood everything she said to the notary public in regard to
her last will. The will further contains the place, year, month, day, and hour of its execution
and it recited therein that after being drawn up it was read to the testatrix in the presence
of the witnesses, by one of whom it was interpreted to her; that one of the witnesses signed
for the testatrix because she was unable to sign her name; that the will was executed at
one time, without interruption; that the notary was acquainted with the testatrix; that she
has legal capacity to execute the same, she being in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties, and that all the other solemnities required by law in the execution of wills were
complied with.

It was also proved that the notary in question went to the house of the testatrix in the
barrio of Rosario, town of Angeles, Pampanga, at about 10 o’clock in the morning of the
17th of May, 1898, at the request of Eleuterio Paras by order of the testatrix; that the
witnesses, Eugenio Ayuyao, Pablo Torres, and Ignacio Sugay, also called at the request of
the testratrix, arrived shortly afterwards; that half an hour after dinner they began to draw
up the will and finished its execution at half past 3 in the afternoon; that according to the
witnesses the testatrix stated to the notary what her last will was through the witness
Eugenio Ayuyao, who acted as interpreter, and that after the will was completed it was read
in the presence of all and it was signed by all the witnesses, one of whom signed for the
testatrix, the will being thereafter signed by all who were present as well as by the notary,
who signed in the presence of the others, all of whom then left the house of the testatrix.

Article 1221 of the Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Should the original instrument, the protocol, and the original record have disappeared, the
following shall constitute evidence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. First copies made by the public official who authenticated them.

"2. Subsequent copies issued by virtue of a judicial mandate, after citing the persons
interested.

"3. Those which, without a judicial mandate, may have been taken in the presence of the
persons interested and with their consent.

"In the absence of the said copies, any other copies, thirty or more years old, shall be the
evidence, provided they have been taken from the original by the official who authenticated
them or by the other in charge of their custody.

"Copies less than thirty years old, or which may be authenticated by a public official, in
which the circumstances mentioned in the proceeding paragraph do not concur, shall serve
only as a basis of written evidence. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The value of a copy of an instrument as evidence depends upon whether the original
instrument have been lost or not, whatever the cause of the loss might have been. It will be
sufficient to show either by a statement or a certificate to the effect from official who had
the custody of the protocol or by any other accepted means of proof that the original was
lost.

In the case at bar, it was proved that the protocols and archives of the notary of Pampanga
were lost. We must, therefore, given legal force to the copy of the said will presented by the
executor which although not as old as that contemplated in paragraph 5 article 1221 of the
Civil Code, appears to be, however, an authenticated copy of its original, certified to by the
sale notary before whom the will was executed, the said copy bearing the notary’s official
seal. It has not been shown that the copy in question is inexact or not authentic, and, as
written evidence, corroborated as it is by the uniform testimony the attesting witnesses who
testified as to the correctness ad authenticity of the said copy and of the notary’s signature,
it furnishes the most complete proof of the fact that Cesarea Manalo executed the will in the
terms set forth in the said copy, those who opposed the probate the will having failed to
show that the testatrix was unable to execute the same or that the copy submitted to the
court as aforesaid was not authentic.

As to the objections urged by the appellant in this court in regard to the said will, it will be
noted that the notary certifies therein that all the formalities required for the execution of
an open will were complied with.

As a matter of fact, it appears at the bottom of the will that, the testatrix being unable to
sign, the witness, Pablo Torres, signed the same for her and in her name. Assuming that the
testatrix could not understand or speak the Spanish Language, and that in expressing her
last will to the notary she had to do so in the Pampanga dialect through the witness,
Ayuyao, who acted as interpreter, and that the statements made by the notary in the
Spanish language were interpreted to her in the Pampanga dialect and it being an
undisputed fact that the three attesting witnesses to the will were "Pampangas" and
residents of that place who were naturally acquainted with their own dialect there is no
doubt that the intervention of an interpreter was not necessary; since the three witnesses in
question understood the dialect and must have known what the testatrix wished stated in
the will, the contents of which were subsequently ratified in their presence they were able to
judge then whether the provisions of the will were correct or not. (Art. 68l of the Civil
Code.) The hour at which the execution of the will was commenced is of little or no
importance. It is immaterial that it was commenced at 10 or half past 10 o’clock in the
morning since it has been proved that it was completed at half past 3 in the afternoon —
that is to say, that the will was executed, including the preparatory work, between 10
o’clock in the morning and half past 3 in the afternoon of the 17th of May, 1898.

It appears from the testimony of the witnesses for both parties that Cesarea Manalo died
some time after the execution of her will and there is nothing in the record to the contrary.

There being no legal ground upon which to disallow the said will, it becomes necessary to
affirm the judgment of the trial court allowing the same to probate.

Section 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A will executed by a Spaniard, or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the date on
which this act shall come into force shall be valid and allowed, if duly executed in
accordance with the laws before that date prevailing in the Philippine Islands relating to the
execution of wills, whether such will be an open will or a sealed will, or one termed a verbal
will under that law, but such will must be established and the estate administered in
accordance with the provisions of this code."cralaw virtua1aw library

It having been conclusively shown that the will in question was duly executed in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code, and it not appearing that the same has been revoked
in any manner authorized by article 737 et seq. of the Civil Code, or by the provisions of
section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it should be admitted to probate in accordance
with the provisions of the latter code.

Aside from the fact that the due execution of the will in question was proved fully and
satisfactorily, the copy thereof herein presented is the best evidence of its existence. The
law does not require a certified copy. The copy in question contains a literal recital of the
original which was lost. It bears every evidence of authenticity and legitimacy. Its execution
has been further confirmed by the testimony of the three attesting witnesses who were
present at the time the will was being drawn and who signed the same. (Secs. 321 and 324
of the Code of Civil Procedure.)

For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the Judgment of the trial court, dated
April 4, 1905, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant after the
expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered accordingly and the case be
remanded to the trial court for proper action. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-30528 October 25, 1929

MODESTO LIMJOCO and TEODORA HONSAYCO, applicants- appellees, vs. DIRECTOR

OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, SANTIAGO QUIJANO, and RAFAEL
VILLAROMAN, opponents.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Marcelino Aguas for appellees.

VILLAMOR, J.:

The application for registration filed by the spouses Modesto Limjoco and Teodora Honsayco
was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, Santiago Quijano, and
Rafael Villaroman. After legal notice and entry of an order of general default, the application
was set for the taking of evidence; and the evidence having been adduced by the parties,
the judge then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment
denying the application and ordering the dismissal of this proceeding for insufficiency of
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The applicants filed a motion for reconsideration praying the court to set aside the dismissal
of this proceeding and to order the opponents to present their evidence. Later, said
applicants filed an exception and motion for a new trial, praying the court to declare the
case reopened for further evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

By its order on February 6, 1928, the court granted the motion of new trial giving the
applicants an opportunity to adduce further evidence, on condition that the portions claimed
by Santiago Quijano and Rafael Villaroman be excluded, to which the applicants agreed.
Then, with Judge Hermogenes Reyes presiding, the court overruled the oppositions filed by
the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and after entering the general default
decreed the registration and adjudication of the land in question in favor of the spouses
Modesto Limjoco and Teodora Honsayco. The court also ordered the presentation of an
amended plan excluding the lands involved in the oppositions of Santiago Quijano and
Rafael Villaroman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga, in behalf of the Director of Lands, appealed from the
judgment of the court below the Supreme Court through the proper bill of exceptions, and
now alleges that the trial court erred: (a) In failing to hold that the applicants have not
proved the identity of the land they allege belongs to them and which they seek to register;
(b) in holding that the applicants have sufficient right to warrant the registration and
adjudication of the land described in their application in their favor; (c) in holding that the
applicants are entitled to the benefits of paragraph 4, section 54 of Chapter VI, Act No. 926;
and (d) in overruling the oppositions filed by the Director of Lands; in decreeing the
registration and adjudication of the parcel of land in question in favor of the applicants, and
in denying the motion for a new trial filed by the
opponent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the identity of the land in question, the court below held: "The applicant and his
witness Benito Pangan and Fidel Sanguyo explained the difference in the eastern and
southern boundaries, and therefore the boundaries to the north and west being creeks and
rivers of the same name, that is, natural boundaries, except for the certain parts thereof,
the identity of the estate may be deemed proved." We have gone over the record and find
that the evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court. The land in question is
described in plan Exhibit A, and represents the eastern part of the land described in Exhibit
C, which we shall discuss later on. A creek runs through the land from north to south, thus
dividing it into two portions, one to the east of the "Pamicatigan," and the other to the west
of said creek. It is the registration of the portion to the east of the "Pamicatigan" that we
are concerned with in this proceeding. The witness for the applicant identified the land in
question, and the difference in the western boundary is due to the fact that the application
is confined to the portion of land to the east of the Pamicatigan creek. The difference in area
between the land described as the second parcel in Exhibit C, containing some 800
hectares, and the land, the registration of which is here sought, containing about 400
hectares, is explained by the fact that the application for registration refers only to the
eastern portion which is approximately one-half of the land described as the second parcel
in the document Exhibit C.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The applicant's claim is based on a purchase of the land from Meliton Limjoco on May 12,
1926 for P5,400. according to the document of Exhibit B. On September 12, 1911, Meliton
Limjoco acquired the land from Raymundo Pangan for P3,100, as per Exhibit H. In 1906
Raymundo Pangan brought said land from the heirs of Isabel Gatbonton for 2,500 (Exhibit
G). On July 12, 1906 Isabel Gatbonton's heirs acquired the land in question by repurchase
from Adriano Samson for P1,066.45 (Exhibit F). On May 15 of the same year, Adriano
Samson acquired the land in question, together with other lots at a public auction for
P1,000 (Exhibit E). The lands sold at public auction were mortgaged by the original owner,
Isabel Gatbonton, to the sons of Jose Ma. Venegas, and for default in payment of the debt,
were attached and sold at public auction in pursuance of a writ of execution of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Exhibit C is a public document, executed before the notary public, D. Pedro Garcia Enrico,
and noted in the book called " Libro de Anotaciones de Hipoteca de la Ciudad de Manila," on
December 10, 18186. By virtue of said deed, Isabel Gatbonton, it maker, mortgaged eight
parcels of land described therein. It must be noted that the notary who authorized it states
the following: "Which parcels of land are her (Isabel Gatbonton's) exclusive property, as
proved by her composition titles issued by the 'Direccion General de Administracion Civil' on
the nineteenth of last July, which, together with other documents dealing with said estates,
consisting of sixteen pages in all, were exhibited to me, and, upon being read and signed by
me, shall be attached to a copy hereof."chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for the appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding the applicants
sufficiently entitled to the registration and adjudication of the land described in the
application. In our opinion this contention is groundless. The composition title to buy the
notary who certified Exhibit C has not been produced for the reason that said document was
lost during the confusion which followed the change of sovereignty. But we believe that said
title of composition with the State was doubtless issued to Isabel Gatbonton, not only on the
authority of Notary Pedro Garcia Enrico's assurance, but also because of Exhibit D. Exhibit D
is certainly not the composition title issued to Isabel Gatbonton. The applicant do not allege
it, nor the trial court so held. It is simply the true copy of the record of the composition of
lands in the barrio of Calauitan, within the jurisdiction of the town of Candaba, Province of
Pampanga, initiated by Dona Isabel Gatbonton on April 17, 1884, which record is in the files
of the Bureau of Lands, being certified by the Director of Lands. Said Exhibit D narrates the
steps taken in that proceeding, and shows: (a) That on October 31, 1884, the "Direccion
General de Administracion Civil" had decreed to Isabel Gatbonton the composition with the
State of the land she owned in the barrio of Calauitan, within the jurisdiction of Candaba,
Province of Pampanga, in accordance with article 5 of the "Regulations on Composition" of
June 25, 1880; (b) that Isabel Gatbonton had paid the P432.45 which was 10 per cent of
the "assessed value of the land, which had been measured and surveyed by an employee of
the Forestry Department," as required by the decree of the Governor-General of December
12, 1882; (c) that she had obtained and deliver to the "Hacienda Publica" the piece of paper
with the 3d seal of the Ilustres for the issuance of the proper title; and that Isabel
Gatbonton therefore closed the proceeding as far as she was concerned; and (d) that the
receipt and the Ilustres sealed paper having been sent to the Director General of Civil
Administration on April 29, 1886, the latter issued the "proper title" on July 19,
1886.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus it is seen that the original owner of the land in question had a composition title with
the State obtained from the Spanish Government, having paid P432.45 therefor, being 10
per cent of the reglementary assessment of said land. As stated, the ownership of this land
was successively transmitted to several persons until it came to the applicant, Modesto
Limjoco. And these persons as successive owners held possession of the land from 1886,
using the lowlands as fishery, and the elevated portions for the cultivation of rice, corn and
vegetables. In referring to the cultivation of the land, it should be noted that
the talajalgrowing thereon which appears to have been abandoned, was left for the purpose
of shading and keeping the water of the fishery cool. It would not be superfluous to add that
the applicant has been paying the land tax thereon, and that the land is at present assessed
at P13,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the evidence adduced by the applicants, we are of opinion that the lower court
was correct in holding that they are entitled to the registration and adjudication of the land
described in the application.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Failure to present the composition title with the State cannot prejudice the applicant's right,
for, its lost having been proved, its contents could be proved by a copy or a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the collection of a witness. (Sec. 321, Code of
Civil Procedure.) And in the instant case it is evident that the recital of its contents was
made in the authentic document, Exhibit C.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Inasmuch as it has been proved in the record that the applicants have been in possession of
the land the registration of which is sought, as well as their predecessors in interest, Meliton
Limjoco, Raymundo Pangan, the heirs of Isabel Gatbonton, the purchaser at public auction,
Adriano Samson, and the original owner, Isabel Gatbonton, there is no need to discuss the
third assignment of error made by the appellant, inasmuch as the land in question is not
public land, but private land granted by the Spanish Government by means of a composition
with the State, to the original owner, Isabel
Gatbonton.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR,
and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit
(Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger
Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case
06-0854.1

PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29,
2006, he and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang
and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass
shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi
and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but,
having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with
them to the police station in their mobile car for further questioning. 2

Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11
convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down
to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected
robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running
towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-
Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a
taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he
realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.

P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he
and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they
searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3

The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named
Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16
rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body
of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. 4

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile
phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an
entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts
of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5

The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old,
unmarried, and was receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999
for burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for the interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery
lot.6

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case,7 the
accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out
that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the
text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the
possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00 as actual damages,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as compensation
for loss of earning capacity.

Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of
evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court. 10

The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas,
Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead. 11 This may be true but the
prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.12

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for
the conviction of all the accused. Thus:

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the
police station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent
inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the
entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station
where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide.
He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away
from the scene of the shooting.

4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.

5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.

7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group
of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.

8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call
numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of
armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of
armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or
co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance
that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a
homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. 15 Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that
this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence
that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a
point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—
and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were
to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by
accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas,
Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by
increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117221. April 13, 1999]

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC., VIRGILIO L. PEA, and VICTOR V. REYES, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANGEL D. ISRAEL, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision,[1] dated April 15, 1994, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) finding private respondent to have been illegally dismissed and
ordering his reinstatement and the payment of his wages from August 1991 until he is reinstated.
 Petitioner IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling
computers and computer services. Petitioners Virgilio L. Pea and Victor V. Reyes were ranking officers of
IBM during the period pertinent to this case.
On April 1, 1975, private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office
Products Customer Engineer. For the next sixteen (16) years, he occupied two other positions in the
company,[2] received numerous awards,[3] and represented the company in various seminars and
conferences in and out of the country.[4]
On February 1, 1990, private respondent was assigned to the team supervised by petitioner Reyes.
On June 27, 1991, petitioner Reyes handed a letter to private respondent informing the latter that his
employment in the company was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual
tardiness and absenteeism. The letter states, thus:
June 27, 1991

Mr. Angel D. Israel

Present

Dear Angel,

This refers to our previous discussion regarding your habitual absences and tardiness the last of which
was on June 26, 1991.

Your records will attest to the fact that on several occasions, your attention has been called to your
habitual tardiness and non-observance of standing office procedures regarding attendance. Despite
several opportunities given to you, you cannot seem to reform your ways and attitude on the matter of
attendance. Considering that we are a service-oriented company, you can appreciate that we cannot
allow such a situation to continue lest we put the best interest of the Company in jeopardy.

Much to our regret, therefore, pleased (sic) be advised that the Company is terminating your employment
effective July 31, 1991.

You are requested to report to Personnel Department at your earliest convenience for the settlement of
any money or benefits due you.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) V.V. REYES

Business Manager

cc: L.L. Abano

Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private respondent filed a
complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on July 18,
1991.
In his position paper filed on September 6, 1991, he claimed that he was not given the opportunity to
be heard and that he was summarily dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been
duly proven.[5]
Petitioners denied private respondents claims. It was alleged that several conferences were held by
the management with private respondent because of the latters unsatisfactory performance in the
company and he was given sufficient warning and opportunity to reform and improve his attitude toward
attendance,[6] but to their regret, he never did. It was alleged that private respondent was constantly told
of his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the companys internal electronic mail (e-mail)
system. According to petitioners, this system allows paperless or telematic[7] communication among IBM
personnel in the company offices here and abroad. An employee is assigned a User ID and the
corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and, theoretically, known only to
him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, log in to the system by keying in
their respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored in the
computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same
to the intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and
date each message was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver
thereof. All messages are recorded and stored in computer disks.[8]
Attached to petitioners position paper were copies of print-outs of alleged computer
entries/messages sent by petitioner Reyes to private respondent through IBMs internal computer
system. The following is a summary of the contents of the print-outs which mostly came from petitioner
Reyes computer:
(a) Private respondent was admonished when he would miss out on meetings with clients and
failed to attend to important accounts, such as that of Hella Philippines; [9]
(b) Petitioner Reyes conducted consultations with private respondent concerning the latters
work habits;[10]
(c) A new policy of requiring employees to be at the office at 8:30 a.m. every morning was
adopted and employees were no longer allowed to sign out of the office by phone; [11]
(d) Petitioner Reyes would type into his computer the records of the security guard which reflect
private respondents daily tardiness and frequent absences; [12]
(e) Private respondent was admonished when he failed to respond to instructions from his
superiors;[13]
(f) IBM Australia, contacted by Hella Australia, once asked about the reported lack of attention
given to Hella Philippines.[14] Private respondent directly answered IBM Australia, through telematic
memo, and reported that Hella Philippines was deferring its computer plan and decided to use
micros in the meantime;[15]
(g) The said response was denied by Hella Australia which later made it clear that it would be
buying anything but IBM;[16] and
(h) While private respondent showed some improvement after consultations where he allegedly
admitted his shortcomings, petitioner Reyes reported that he (private respondent) would eventually
slide back to his old ways despite constant counselling and repeated warnings that he would be
terminated if he would not improve his work habits.[17]
Through these computer print-outs calling private respondents attention to his alleged tardiness and
absenteeism, petitioner sought to prove that private respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges
against him and was guilty thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges.
On March 13, 1992, the labor arbiter rendered a decision finding private respondent to have been
terminated for cause and accordingly dismissing the complaint. Considering, however, the ground for
termination as well as private respondents long record of service to the company, the arbiter ordered the
award of separation pay at the rate equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case declaring respondent IBM Phils., Inc. not guilty
of the charge of illegal dismissal. However, respondent company is directed to pay complainant Israel the
sum of Two Hundred Forty Eight Thousand (P248,000.00) as separation pay. All other claims are denied
for lack of merit.
 It appears, however, that prior to the release of the labor arbiters decision at 11:21 a.m. on March
26, 1992, private respondent had filed a Manifestation And Motion To Admit Attached New Evidence For
The Complainant which was received by the Arbitration Branch at 10:58 a.m. of the same day. The
evidence consisted of private respondents Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the period June 1, 1990 to
August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period January 1990 to June 1991 showing that private respondent
did not incur any unexcused absences, that he was not late on any day within the period and that no
deduction was made from his salary on account of tardiness or absences.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, on April 15, 1994, reversed the labor arbiters
decision and found private respondents dismissal illegal. The NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer print-outs
which petitioners presented in evidence to prove that private respondents office attendance was poor
were insufficient to show that the latter was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness; and (2) that private
respondent was not heard in his defense before the issuance of the final notice of dismissal. [18] The
dispositive portion of the NLRCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 13, 1992 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal. Respondent (sic) are hereby ordered to reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss of his seniority rights and to pay backwages starting
August 1991 until reinstated at the rate of P40,516.65 a month including all its benefits and bonuses.

Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez dissented on the ground she found that petitioners have
presented strong and convincing documentary evidence that private respondent was guilty of habitual
tardiness and absences. She was also of the opinion that private respondent was sufficiently warned
before he was actually dismissed.[19]

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution, dated July 20,
1994. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contend that
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT NO JUST
CAUSE EXISTS NOR WAS THERE DUE PROCESS OBSERVED IN THE DISMISSAL OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BECAUSE THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS WHICH PROVE
JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT EVEN IF THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS WERE ADMISSIBLE, PETITIONER FAILED
TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS.
We find petitioners contention to be without merit.
First. Petitioners argue that the computer print-outs submitted by them need not be identified or
authenticated according to the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to be admissible
in evidence. They contend that technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative/labor
cases[20] and because of a relaxation of the rules of evidence, private respondent was in fact allowed by
the labor arbiter to adduce additional evidence even after a decision had been rendered.[21]
It is indeed true that administrative agencies, such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules
of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases.[22] This was the reason private respondent was
allowed to submit additional evidence even after the case was deemed submitted for resolution by the
labor arbiter. The practice of admitting additional evidence on appeal in labor cases has been sanctioned
by this Court.[23]
However, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by
basic requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR,[24] the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value. More specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:[25]
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules
of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a
license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before
it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The Statement of
Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying
signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-
serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.

The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of
their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view
in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required
some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
In Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja,[26] this Court struck down the decision of the Director of
Labor Relations which was based on an unsigned and unidentified manifesto. It was held:
From even a perfunctory assessment, it becomes apparent that the evidence upon which said decision is
professedly based does not come up to that standard of substantiality.

It is of course also a sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this so
that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive
manner possible. But what is involved here transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns the
more paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or
expediency...The clear message of [Article 221 of the Labor Code] is that even in the disposition of labor
cases, due process must never be subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon this principle, the
unidentified documents relied upon by respondent Director must be seen and taken for what they are,
mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial evidence of
the election frauds complained of.

Likewise, in the case of EMS Manpower & Placement Services v. NLRC,[27] the employer submitted
a photocopy of a telex which supposedly shows that the employee was guilty of serious misconduct and
which became the basis of her dismissal. This Court ruled that the telex, a single document, totally
uncorroborated and easily concocted or fabricated to suit ones personal interest and purpose,[28] was
insufficient to uphold the employers defense.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held as incompetent unsigned
daily time records presented to prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties:
Indeed, the [DTRs] annexed to the present petition would tend to establish private respondents neglectful
attitude towards his work duties as shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness and
propensity for working undertime for the year 1992. But the problem with these DTRs is that they are
neither originals nor certified true copies. They are plain photocopies of the originals, if the latter do
exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by private respondent nor by any of the employers
representatives...[29]

In the case at bar, a specimen of the computer print-out submitted by petitioners reads:
Date and time 10/12/90 09:23:1

From: REYESVV -- MNLVM1

To: ISRAEL -- MNLRVM Israel, A.D.

SEC: I IBM INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject:
 Angel, have been trying to pin you down for a talk the past couple of days. Whatever happened to
our good discussion 2 weeks ago? I thought you would make an effort to come in on time from then
on? If you have problems which prevent you from coming in on time, let me know because I would
really like to help if I can. The sum of all your quotas is less than mine so I really need all of you
pitching in. Kindly take a look at your proofs in-tray as there are some to dos which are
pending. Acts such as St. Louis U. and NEECO should be worth looking into as theyve been
inquiring about upgrading their very old boxes. If you are too tied up for these accounts do let me
know so I can reassign. By Monday morning please. Lets give it that final push for the branch!

=============================================================
Regards from the APPLICATION MNLVM 1 (REYESVV)
SYSTEMS MARKETING group T (832)8192-279
Victor V. Reyes - Marketing Manager
=============================================================
Not one of the 18 print-out copies submitted by petitioners was ever signed, either by the sender or
the receiver. There is thus no guarantee that the message sent was the same message received. As the
Solicitor General pointed out, the messages were transmitted to and received not by private respondent
himself but his computer.[30]
Neither were the print-outs certified or authenticated by any company official who could properly
attest that these came from IBMs computer system or that the data stored in the system were not and/or
could not have been tampered with before the same were printed out. It is noteworthy that the computer
unit and system in which the contents of the print-outs were stored were in the exclusive possession and
control of petitioners since after private respondent was served his termination letter, he had no more
access to his computer.[31]
Second. Even if the computer print-outs were admissible, they would not suffice to show that private
respondents dismissal was justified.
Petitioners contention is that private respondent was repeatedly warned through computer messages
for coming in late or not reporting at all to the office during the period May 1990 -- June 1991 but he never
denied the allegations. Therefore, he must be deemed to have admitted these allegations. [32] But the
burden of proving that the dismissal was for just cause is on petitioners. They cannot simply rely on any
admission by private respondent implied from his failure to deny the alleged computer messages to him
which he denied he had ever received. On the other hand, private respondents additional evidence,
consisting of DTRs and pay slips, show that he did not incur unexcused absences or tardiness or that he
suffered deduction in pay on account of such absences or tardiness.
Indeed, petitioners could have easily proven their allegations by presenting private respondents
DTRs. Since these were in petitioners possession, their non-production thereof raises the presumption
that if presented they would be adverse to petitioners. This is precisely what the best evidence rule
guards against.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat. [33]

Private respondents DTRs for the period June 1, 1990 -- August 30, 1990[34] show that while his
attendance record may not have been perfect, it was at least satisfactory. The days when private
respondent did not report to the office were credited either as vacation or as sick leaves. On days when
he was away on business trips, his destination was shown. The DTRs were signed by petitioner Victor
Reyes.
It is said that the DTRs presented were only for the period when private respondents attendance was
excellent; he took care not to submit his DTRs for other months during which he was often late in coming
to office.[35] As the Solicitor General has pointed out, however, it was precisely during that period of June
1, 1990 --August 30, 1990 when, according to the print-outs submitted by petitioners, private respondent
was often late or absent.
Nor is there proof to support petitioners allegation that it was private respondents secretary and not
him who often signed the attendance sheet.[36] Indeed, petitioners did not present private respondents
secretary or, at the very least, attach an affidavit sworn to by her to prove their allegations and thus
dispute the DTRs presented by private respondent. This, notwithstanding ample opportunity to do so. On
the other hand, as already stated, the DTRs, showing private respondents good attendance, were signed
by petitioner Victor Reyes himself, and no good reason has been shown why they cannot be relied upon
in determining private respondents attendance.
Third. Even assuming the charges of habitual tardiness and absenteeism were true, such offenses
do not warrant private respondents dismissal. He has not been shown to have ever committed any
infraction of company rules during his sixteen-year stint in the company. Although it is alleged that he
failed to attend important client meetings and gave false representations to a valued client to cover his
tracks, there is no record finding him guilty of such offenses. Dismissal has always been regarded as the
ultimate penalty.[37] The fact that lapses in private respondents attendance record may have occurred only
during his final year in the company, after a long period of exemplary performance, makes petitioners
contention dubious. While it is true that long years of service is no guarantee against dismissal for
wrongdoing,[38] at least the employees record does provide an index to his work. In case doubt exists
between the evidence presented by the employer and that presented by the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[39]
Fourth. The print-outs likewise failed to show that private respondent was allowed due process
before his dismissal.
The law requires an employer to furnish the employee two written notices before termination of his
employment may be ordered. The first notice must inform him of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought, the second of the employers decision to dismiss the employee after he has been
given the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.[40]
These requirements were not observed in this case. As noted earlier, there is no evidence that there
was an exchange of communication between petitioners and private respondent regarding the latters
supposed substandard performance. Private respondent has consistently denied, however, that he was
ever advised of the charges hurled against him. The so-called one-on-one consultations or personal
counsellings mentioned in the print-outs between petitioner Reyes and private respondent concerning the
latters work habits do not satisfy the requirements of due process, as we had occasion to say in Pono v.
NLRC.[41]
Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for the actual holding of a hearing. Every
opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. [42]

In Ruffy v. NLRC,[43] this Court held that what would qualify as sufficient or ample opportunity, as
required by law, would be every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense. No such opportunity was given to private respondent in
this case. He was simply served his termination notice without being heard in his defense.
Fifth. Petitioners allege that the NLRC, after concluding that the evidence submitted by them were
not properly identified or authenticated, should have remanded the case to the arbiter for clarificatory
hearing.
A formal hearing was not de rigueur. The 1994 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, 4 provides:
Immediately after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memorandum, the Labor Arbiter
shall, motu proprio, determine whether there is a need for a formal trial or hearing. At this stage, he may,
at his discretion and for the purpose of making such determination, ask clarificatory questions to further
elicit facts or information, including but not limited to the subpoena of relevant documentary evidence, if
any, from any party or witness.

As held by the NLRC:

Aside from these computer print-outs, respondents have not presented any other evidence to prove
that complainant was ever called for investigation nor his side heard prior to receipt of the
termination letter dated June 27, 1991. In fact, even if we consider these computer print-outs,
respondents still failed to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. . . . In this particular
case, we observe that there is failure on the part of respondents to prove the existence of a legal
cause. The evidence presented before the Labor Arbiter did not sufficiently and clearly support the
allegation of respondents that complainant committed habitual absences and tardiness resulting into
inefficiency.[44]

In spite of this finding, petitioners failed to adduce additional evidence when they moved for a
reconsideration of the NLRC decision or when they filed the instant petition. Despite the opportunities
afforded them, petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations. Neither have they shown sufficient
reasons to convince this Court that, if the case were to be remanded to the arbiter for a formal hearing,
they would be able to present evidence which they could not have presented during the initial stages of
this case. As we held in Megascope General Services v. NLRC:[45]
As regards petitioners contention that a hearing has to be conducted to fully ventilate the issues in
the case, . . . [s]uffice it to state that nonverbal devices such as written explanations, affidavits,
position papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely an aggrieved partys
defenses. Petitioner was amply provided with the opportunity to present evidence that private
respondents were not its employees. Indeed, it was petitioners failure to present substantial
evidence to buttress its claims that worked to its disadvantage and not the absence of a full-blown
hearing before the public respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC, dated April 15, 1994, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. CA-05-18-P. April 12, 2005]

ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling
influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the
disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called bad eggs in
the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an
administrative case is meted to erring personnel.[1]

The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza vs. Tiongson[2] is applicable to the
case at bar.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct [3] against Elvira Cruz-Apao
(Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15 th) Division,
Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the
latters pending case in the CA,[4] more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460 entitled PAGCOR vs. Zaldy
Nuez.[5] Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television
program Imbestigador of GMA Network,[6] the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime CommissionSpecial Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacaang where he filed a
complaint for extortion[7] against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by
elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the
Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, [8] the
place where the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place.
Respondents apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation
prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office
Order No. 297-04-CG[9] (Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee).[10] The
Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of
respondents case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence
may warrant.[11]
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case
and issued a Resolution[12] dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of
Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended
respondents preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges
against her.[13] On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report[14] to the new CA Presiding
Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service.
Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the antecedent facts
are as follows:
Complainants case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two
years.[15] Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainants reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not
reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case.[16] Desiring an expeditious decision of his
case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latters
employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone
conversation[17] and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, [18] complainant
informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that
respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that
a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision
was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[19]
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a
long time, to which respondent replied, Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera,
pasensiya na.[20] Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm
asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the
decision.[21] Respondent even admonished complainant with the words Wala tayo sa palengke
iho![22] when the latter bargained for a lower amount.[23]
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the
decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador.[24] The crew of the TV
program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion.[25] Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for
the money[26] and to set up a meeting with her.[27] Upon learning that respondents offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
 On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor
of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,[28] the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia
Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-
law.[29] During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter
together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. [30] Respondent
also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision
only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.[31]
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male
researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth
(5th) Division where complainant case was pending.[32] She also claimed that she will not get any part of
the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.[33]
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent
asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their second transaction and the
reason why the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous
occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that
the amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,300,000.00).[34] Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will
be paid once the decision had been released.[35] However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she
and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no
longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come
out.[36]
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting.
After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, Ah, panalo ka.[37] The parties set the next
meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed
over by complainant to respondent then.[38]
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang
(Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny
Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes[39] arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. [40] Nuez and
Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2)
agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten
(10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. [41] The envelope
did not actually contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead
contained paper money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs.[42] There were also ten
(10) authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet
powder by the PAOCTF.[43] The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away[44] and there
were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that
was secretly recording the whole transaction.[45]
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.[46] She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the
meeting.[47] Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that
were shown on Imbestigador.[48] She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she
proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where
she would receive the money.[49]
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was
afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested
and handcuffed.[50] At one point, she even said, Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila
umaalis?,[51] referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondents suspicion, the two
agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was
going on.[52]
 Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour.[53] Complainant and Siringan
bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the
unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to
the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for
questioning.[54] Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant. [55]
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to
the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[56]
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found
positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.[57] She was later detained at the
WPD Headquarters.
At seven oclock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes
Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latters house.[58] She tearfully
confessed to Atty. Gepty that she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police officers and
the media.[59] Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which
respondent replied, Wala lang maam, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot.[60] Respondent claimed that
she was ashamed of what she did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty. Geptys forgiveness
and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the
CA were exhorted during office meetings never to commit such offenses. [61]
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report[62] of her conversation with their divisions chairman, Justice
Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia
on 29 September 2004.[63] She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation
and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came
not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that
it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case.
She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt.
Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus
asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.
This Court is not persuaded by respondents version. Based on the evidence on record, what
happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator practically
induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-
principal.[64]
In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because
respondent demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange
for a favorable decision of the latters pending case. Complainants narration of the incidents which led to
the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more
credible than respondents version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from
respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA. The text
messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k),
Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence[65] which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and
therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself
admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers.[66] Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant.[67] It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. [68] We have no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latters demand for
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness,
Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was
privy to the parties actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24
and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an
acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondents own
testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the
statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants cellphone and
which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed
she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. Thus, during the
17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the
following transpired:
Q: After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text messages?

(Respondent)

A: Only some of these, your honors.

Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?

A: Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your Honors.

Q: What else?

A: Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa kanya si Len David.

Q: Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309 which was around
1:09 in the afternoon and you said di me pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45
p.m. Room 107 Centennial Building.

A: Yes, your Honors.

Q: And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon you again texted Zaldy
Nuez and you said Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue.
Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama mo si Len David.

A: Opo, your Honors.

Q: How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said Di pwede kelan mo gusto fixed
price na iyon.
A: I dont remember that, your Honors.

Q: Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung
gagawa. Wala ako doon. You dont also remember this?

A: Yes, your Honors.

Q: September 27 at 1:42 p.m. Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera. You also dont remember
that?

A: Yes Your Honors.

Q: September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit
iyon. You dont remember that?

A: No, your Honors.[69]

Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime,
that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was
complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting
her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really
come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have
simply refused to answer the latters messages and calls. This she did not do. She answered those calls
and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to
complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which
respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances.[70] But this
course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this
way.[71]
While claiming that she was not interested in complainants offer of a million pesos, she met with him
not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent felt that telling
complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the same would have
been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again
on 28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding between them that the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then. Respondent even claimed that she became afraid
of complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal
drugs.[72] This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.
Anent complainants narration of respondents refusal to reduce the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting that she
actually said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have something
to talk about.[73] If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the
Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast
that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an
honest government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants believe that court
decisions may be bought and sold. Time and again this Court has declared, thus:
Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty and it behooves
everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any
misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of
justice.[74]
 Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19) of which
have been in the CA,[75] should have known very well that court employees are held to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion. As held by this
Court in a number of cases, The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility.[76] Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others,
strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary. [77]
Respondents actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July 2004 until
the entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court
employees. Respondents avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she
solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable
decision. The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondents confession immediately after the
entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in
the activity she is being accused of.
Respondents solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision violates
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M.
No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly
provide:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or
exemption for themselves or for others.

SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. (Underscoring
supplied)

It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
specifically provides:
INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court governing the
conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code.

By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent
committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the
peoples confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos,[78] complainant charged respondent, an employee of the
Records Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly deceiving him into
giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his
acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the Supreme Court. It turned out that respondents
representation was false because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court.[79]
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her
dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus:
In Mirano vs. Saavedra,[80] this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their
duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the
principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution. [81]

Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Sharia Circuit
Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,[82] this Court stated:
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the judicial office. Those
connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. Court employees in particular, must
be individuals of competence, honesty and probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . .
. . The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial dealings which
would interfere with the efficient performance of his duties.[83] The conduct required of court personnel must always
be beyond reproach.[84]

The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC
Branch 14 Cebu City[85] is also worth remembering:
Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays
for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice from the lowliest
clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the publics
faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace
but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public
official and employee.[86]

In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence,
the Committee in their Report[87] recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service
for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.[88]
Finding the Committees recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and in
accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT
PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH A.M. No. CA-05-20-P

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-
OF APPEALS, 81-CA-P)
Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PUNO,*
PANGANIBAN,**
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CIELITO M. SALUD,
CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 9, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) stands
charged with the following offenses:

1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;

2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in an official transaction,
under Section 22, paragraphs (p), (t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Civil Service Law.[1]

The Facts

Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. [2] On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the
appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.

Laguas bond was approved in a Resolution[3] dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also
directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the
Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.

Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondents unusual interest in the Lagua case. The
respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an
order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the
case were eventually found.[4] Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, [5] and to
notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. [6] At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent
then went to Atty. Madarangs office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the
said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section. [7]

On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of
release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m. [8]

In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced
herself as Laguas relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate
Laguas provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora
Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still
had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then
called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Laguas relative.

What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarangs Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:

4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I
learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig
 City, from which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated. Disguising
myself as accused-appellant Laguas relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but
Rhodora Valdez did not report for work that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester),
her officemate (who) answered my call. She added that Rhodora Valdez has been waiting for
us (Laguas relatives) to call. Her exact words were these: Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang
siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh.
Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.

5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to
inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text her process servers on the field for an update of
their deliveries, to which she answered in the affirmative. While she was in the office, she
texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his way back to Quezon City.
That was before 4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.

6. That I got Saluds mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about
the same time Ms. Secarro did. I represented myself as Arlyn, Laguas relative. Most of his
text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text message from
him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6 th Division and the
ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her
this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:

1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. Nov. 2003, 15:36:15

2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO 639204439082, 7 Nov

2003 16:14:47

3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21

4. TAWAG K S AKIN 639204439082 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47

5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO 639204439082-7

Nov 2003 19:44:52

6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman

639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05

7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit
cino. Lito 6391844701117 Nov. 2003 19:54:20

8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman 639184470111-7 Nov

2003 20:37:57

9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga 639184470111-7 Nov 2003
20:56:31

10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. 639184470111-7 Nov
2003 20:52:58

11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 7 Nov 2003
20:57:10

12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman 639184470111 7
Nov 2003 21:02:41

13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan

639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28
 14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo 639184470111, 7 Nov
2003 21:07:23

15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19

16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05

17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52

18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24

19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32

20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya.

Ok naman 639184470111 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13

21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO 639204439082 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16

22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO 639204439082 10

Nov 2003 15:12:14

23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S

IYO. 639204439082 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03

7. That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely
did not answer him. Why did he need to call me up?

8. That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was
delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release
was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7,
2003.

9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003.
Again, I introduced myself as Laguas relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how
much more we had to pay for Laguas release. She refused to entertain me because according
to her, Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito
bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud. Then, she
[hung] up.

10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to
Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the
copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel,
Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to
a certain Art, allegedly Laguas relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of
Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these
documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy
addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the
office of accused-appellants counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did
not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex C.

11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize.
But before he could even say a word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he
uttered, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.[9]
 On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the
respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted
serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. [10] Justice
Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she
would transfer the respondent to another office which has nothing to do with cases.

Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003,
containing, among others, the following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders to unauthorized persons and complete strangers who
promised to take care thereof (siya na raw ang bahala) constitutes not only neglect of duty but also
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Staying for the whole day within the vicinity
of the National Bilibid Prisons to the point of failing to fulfill his other duties for the day
constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. On the other hand,
the use of my name and that of our Division Clerk of Court to illegally solicit financial or material
benefit from parties with pending cases before this Court is illegal per se.

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an

administrative investigation and disciplinary action.[11]
Attached to the complaint were the following documents to support the charges:

ANNEX A - Record of the cases received by Salud on November 6, 2003 for delivery/service the
following day, November 7, 2003. Please note that in each of the 3 cases assigned to him, there are
several parties/counsels to be served.

ANNEX B - Certificate of Service signed by Salud, attested by the Acting Chief of the Mailing
Section and Division Clerk of Court Ma. Ramona L. Ledesma, showing that the parties/counsel in
SP-67586 were served only on November 10, 2003 (not on November 7, 2003).

ANNEX C - Certificate of Service for CR-27423, and corresponding Delivery Receipts.

C-1 - Delivery Receipts for Defense Counsel Salvador Quimpo signed by someone whose
signature was identified by Salud [as] Art a cousin of appellant Melchor Lagua.

C-2 - Delivery Receipt for the accused-appellant, received by the same Art and not served thru the
Director of Prisons.

C-3 - Delivery Receipt for the OSG, showing that it was delivered/received by the said
office on November 10, 2003, not on November 7, 2003.

C-4 - Delivery Receipt for the Director of Prisons showing receipt on November 7, 2003.

ANNEX D - Record of Resolutions in 3 other cases (SP-80241, SP-65404 and SP-77957) received
for service by Salud on November 10, 2003. The resolutions/processes in these 3 cases were
delivered/served to the parties/counsel on November 10, 2003 together with undelivered
resolutions left unserved/undelivered on November 7, 2003.

ANNEX E - Certification signed by Salud showing service to parties/counsel in SP-65404

(received by Salud on November 10, 2003) on November 10, 2003 (same date)

ANNEX F, F-1 & F-2 - Delivery Receipts for parties/counsel in SP-65404, showing
service/delivery on November 10, 2003 in contrast to his minimal delivery/services on November
7, 2003 only in Muntinlupa.

ANNEX G - Copy of the resolution dated November 6, 2003 of the 6 th Division approving the
appellants bond and directing the issuance of an order of release.
 ANNEX H - Copy of the Order of Release upon Bond, which Salud was supposed to deliver,
among others on November 7, 2003 to the defense counsel, the appellant and the OSG. [12]

In his counter-affidavit,[13] the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never demanded money from
Laguas relative; his name had been used by someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover,
the fact that he immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had no financial interest in the
transaction. His version of the events that occurred that day is as follows:

4.1 That on November 6, 2003 at around 1:38 p.m. the Acting Chief of the Mailing
Section gave me an assignment to deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus (hearing on
November 26, 2003 at RTC, Zamboanga) for CA-G.R. SP No. 80238 for delivery to NBI,
PAO, Quezon City, Muntinlupa;

4.2 That I delivered a copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to [the National] Bureau of
Investigation (NBI);

4.3 That while I was at the NBI, I received a text message from my boss, requesting me to
return to the office immediately because there is another notice of resolution coming
from Atty. Ledesma which I have to serve to Quezon City and Las Pias;

4.4 In compliance with the request, I returned to the Office and arrived at around 3:15
p.m.;

4.5 That when I received the resolution, I read the same and found out that the hearing is
still scheduled on December 10, 2003 at 10:30 a.m.;

4.6 That when I was about to leave to deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Notice of
Hearing to the PAO, Quezon City, my officemate Jun Vicencio told me to wait because
Irma, the staff of Atty. Madarang requested me to standby because I need to deliver the
Order of Release to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa;

4.7 That because of the request I waited until 4:00 p.m.;

4.8 That because its already late, I decided to go to Atty. Madarangs office to inquire
about the Order of Release which I need to deliver to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa;

4.9 That Atty. Madarang told me to wait a little while because the order is about to be
finished. So I waited.

4.10 That Atty. Madarang gave to me the Order of Release at 4:15 p.m.

4.11 That because I am aware that I may not reach [the] New Bilibid Prison on time, I told
Atty. Madarang that I can deliver it on November 7, 2003, early in the morning. She
agreed and told me THANK YOU Ikaw na ang bahala;

4.12 That I informed my boss about the Order of Release that was assigned to me and she
had it listed in our logbook. I asked my boss [Cecil Secarro] if I can deliver the Notice of
Hearing for SP 67586 and the others on Monday if I cannot finish delivering them on
November 7, 2003. She agreed but told me to be sure that the Order of Release will be
served first and the others be served not later than Monday, November 10, 2003.
Thereafter, I went home.

4.13 That on November 7, 2003, I went straight to [the] New Bilibid Prison and arrived there
before 8:00 [a.m.] Unfortunately, all the staff wearing white uniforms and the security
 guards were falling in line in front of the building of the New Bilibid Prison. So I could
not enter the administration office.

4.14 That while I was standing in front of the building where the administrative office is
located, a certain ART approached me and asked me if I am the personnel of the Court of
Appeals who will deliver the Order of Release.

4.15 That I said yes, and he told me his name and said that he is a relative of MELCHOR
LAGUA (prisoner) and is connected with the office of Atty. [Quimpo].

4.16 That at around 9:30 [a.m.] I was able to enter the administrative offices but because
there was no staff inside I went to the documentation office. The staff in the
documentation office told me to submit the Order of Release to the administrative office.
He said that they will prepare the documents of MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) but also
told me that the prisoner might be released on Monday yet because the signatories are
busy attending the ongoing 98 anniversary celebration;

4.17 That I returned to the administrative office and was able to find Mr. JUANITO
TORRES, Administrative Officer III, who received the copy for the Director but refused
to receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA. He told me to wait for his staff to receive the copy of
Mr. LAGUA;

4.18 That because the staff were not around, I went to the canteen to buy softdrinks to
quench my thirst;

4.19 That Mr. ART followed me in the canteen and told me to assist in the release of Mr.
LAGUA because there were no personnel attending to the Order of Release;

4.20 That since my boss told me to insure the release of the prisoner, I waited for my staff to
arrive who will attend to the matter;

4.21 That I delivered the copy of Mr. LAGUA to the staff. But ART told them he can
receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA because he is his relative so, the staff told me to give the
copy to ART.

4.22 That I gave the copy of the Order of Release for the accused to ART. ART also told me
that he is authorized to receive the copy for Atty. Quimpo because he is also the
representative of the law office. Hence, I also gave the copy for Atty. Quimpo to ART;

4.23 That I was able to finish my duty at the New Bilibid Prison at around 2:30 [p.m.] and I
proceeded to Purok I, 6A Bayanan, Muntinlupa to serve the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80238;

4.24 That because of [sic] the address of the addressee was incomplete, I found a hard time
locating the address of the addressee and when I found Purok I, 6A, the persons thereat
do not know JOEL DE LA PAZ. I asked for their help but nobody in the place knew
JOEL DE LA PAZ;

4.25 That I left Muntinlupa late in the afternoon and due to the lack of time I decided to
deliver the other documents on the next working day which is Monday, November 10,
2003;

4.26 That I delivered the other documents on Monday, November 10, 2003, without any
problem;
 4.27 That I was surprised when Atty. Madarang later on accused me that I used her name and
the name of Justice Magtolis to demand money from Mr. LAGUAS relative. [14]

Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia [15] referred the
matter to Atty. Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk of Court, for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The Investigation

The requisite hearings were held from December 12, 2003 to August 4, 2004.

Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit[16] dated December 8, 2003. She testified that the respondent
later came to her office along with Ms. Secarro. Amidst his cries, he pleaded, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa
aking mga anak. She replied, Wait, wala ka namang kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw ang nagpasimuno ng lahat ng ito. The
respondent repeated, Boss, patawad po alang alang sa aking mga anak, and Atty. Madarang answered, Okey lang,
pinatawad na kita. Hindi naman ako galit sa iyo.[17]

Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged
relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name Arlyn to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages
with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent
and, if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be
asked to assist them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. The respondent thereafter came to her office,
where he was asked why he was unable to serve all the other papers and documents that day.[18] He also admitted
that he served a copy of the resolution to the wrong person (Baluran). Justice Magtolis also stated that she threatened
to transfer the respondent, and that the latter vehemently objected, pleaded, and cried saying, Huwag naman pong
pa-transfer. When asked why, the respondent said that he has children in school and something like, Dyan po ako
kumikita.[19]

Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three counts of estafa who served time at the Correctional
Institute for Women in Batangas City. She testified that the respondent was introduced to her in December 1998 by
a certain Crisanta Gamil.[20] Gamil was also detained at the correctional facility; the respondent had worked on her
appeal bond papers and asked for P20,000.00 to facilitate the issuance of the appeal bond. [21] The payment was made
right in front of her, and the respondent issued a receipt. [22] The witness also testified that Gamil told her, O, at
least dyan mo ipalakad ang papel mo. Okay ′yan, sigurado.[23] The respondent visited her in May 1999, as she had
asked him to fix her appeal bond. During the visit, the respondent took the pertinent documents from her.[24] The
witness also stated that she gave the respondent a partial payment of P7,000.00[25] on May 16, 1999 and he issued a
receipt.[26] They then proceeded to the Documents Section where they secured copies of the court decision,
certificate of manifestation and her picture. She made the last payment of P13,000.00 in June 13, 1999, and also
issued a receipt. The respondent was also asking for an additional payment of P15,000.00, which she was unable to
give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee to the respondent, Dalawangbayan, whom the latter
was also able to help. She stated that according to Dalawangbayan, the respondent asked for P200,000.00. She
further testified that she knew the respondent as Joselito M. Salud, and not Cielito Salud. [27] After the incident, she
wrote a letter to Associate Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. to ask for assistance regarding her appeal bond.

Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Laguas counsel, testified that it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him as
counsel of the said accused. He stated that he gave an oral authorization to Baluran to get the CA resolutions or
orders; Baluran was the one who furnished him a copy of the resolution. [28] He called Mr. Baluran to say that an
order for Laguas release had already been issued by the appellate court. The witness stated, however, that he had
never seen the respondent before.[29]
The respondent testified that he has been a CA employee since 1991. He admitted that he knew Flores, and
met her in January 1999 when he brought Gamils order of release in the Batangas City Jail. He claimed that he was
waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who would pay for his fare home, and while waiting, he
talked to the jailguard/warden. Flores then approached him and asked him if he was from the CA. When the
respondent answered in the affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her neighbor in Bian, Laguna.

The respondent admitted that he was in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City on May
16, 1999, as he was then visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan. He also saw Flores. [30] When asked why he visited
Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores had written a letter to him (which he dubbed as maintrigang
sulat)[31] addressed Lito Salud, Mailing Section, Court of Appeals. In the said letter, Flores asked him to help
Dalawangbayan, just like he had helped Gamil. The respondent then showed the letter to then Chief of Office
Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told him, Puntahan mo yan, Lito at maintriga ′yang sulat na yan, baka tayo mapahamak
dyan.[32] Thus, he went to the Correctional Institute in Mandaluyong City to sort things out with Dalawangbayan and
Gamil. The respondent, however, stated that he could not find the letter anywhere and had already been lost. [33]

During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional facility, Flores approached him in the visiting hall, and
said suddenly, Sandali lang, Kuya, then left. He then talked to Dalawangbayan about the controversial letter,
explaining that his job in the Court of Appeals was only to remand the records and deliver the Orders for release,
just like what he did in Gamils case. [34] He again visited Dalawangbayan on June 13, 1999[35] as evidenced by the
entries in the visitors logbook. He was no longer able to speak to Flores, but made five other such visits to
Dalawangbayan in the correctional facility.

The Findings of the Investigating Officer

In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong found that the respondent was guilty as charged,
and made the following recommendation:

In view of all the foregoing, there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
the offenses charged. He is liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his
official duties and for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he admittedly
served the copies of the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case intended for detained
appellant and his counsel on Mr. Baluran whom he admitted to have met only on that day, against
the rules and normal office procedure on personal service. His long stay in the Bureau of Prisons
also caused the delay in the service of other court processes assigned to him for service on that
day. He is also liable for having financial or material interest in an official transaction considering
his undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual release of Lagua to the point of
staying almost the whole day in the Bureau of Prisons and the aborted deal as can be concluded
from the phone call of Melissa Melchor to Atty. Madarang and subsequent exchange of text
messages with Atty. Madarang disguising as Laguas relative.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Rule IV, Section 52 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, S.
1999, issued pursuant to Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the penalty for
the first offense of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for directly or indirectly having financial
and material interest in any official transaction is suspension for a period of 6 months, 1 day to 1
year. Pursuant to Section 55 of the same Memorandum Circular, if the respondent is found guilty
of 2 or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious
charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Section 54-c of the same
Memorandum Circular provides that the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present. Since in this case, the penalty is the same
for all 3 offenses, the maximum of the penalty for the first offense which is suspension for 1 year
[may be] imposed on the respondent.

2. Considering that the prescribed penalty for the offense exceeds one month
suspension, the case may now be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, pursuant to
Circular No. 30-91 of the Office of the Court Administrator. [36]
 The Ruling of the Court

On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is clearly administratively liable. After serving Laguas copy
of the resolution and order of release to the prison Director, he should have immediately returned to his station or
served the other resolutions and documents for personal service. As an officer of the court, the respondent plays an
essential part in the administration of justice. He is required to live up to the stringent standards of his office, and his
conduct must, at all times, be above reproach and suspicion. He must steer clear of any act which would tend to
undermine his integrity, or erode somehow the peoples faith and trust in the courts. [37] As the respondent himself
admitted, he stayed on until 2:30 p.m. without any valid reason, despite the fact that he knew he still had to serve
several orders and resolutions. As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties is classified as a grave offense, and is punishable by suspension for six months and
one day to one year.[38]

Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption and
bribery, relying on mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of
merit.[39] However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. [40] The findings of investigating magistrates on
the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified.[41]

To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be
considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to
prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be considered. [42] Thus, while it is true that there is no direct
evidence that the respondent received any money to facilitate the release of detained Lagua, the following
circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondents plea of innocence:

First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarangs
cellphone: bkit, C rhodora to; CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO; and SINO K KC
NAGHIWALAY N KAMI. The respondents testimony on the matter is as follows:

Q: In the hearing of December 2, 2003, in the TSN on page 32 onwards

ATTY. ROSERO:

Is that the testimony of Atty. Madarang, Justice?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Oo. I will just refer to your admission through your counsel that Cellphone No.
6392044390[8]2 is yours. You admitted that?

ATTY. ROSERO:

I think we made an admission as to that matter, Justice. Well just check the affidavit of
Atty. Madarang.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.
ATTY. ROSERO:

Yes, Justice, admitted but not the cellphone number

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Sige, ulitin natin, 6392044390[9]2.

ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

This cellphone is yours.

Q: Do you also admit that you called Atty. Madarang several times on November 7, 2003?

ATTY. ROSERO:

November 7 is a Friday. Tumawag ka daw several times kay Atty. Madarang, November
7?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Texted, Im sorry I will correct that, texted.

A: Nauna po siyang magtext sa akin, Justice, hindi po ako nagtext sa kanya. Nagtext po siya sa
akin sumagot po ako sa kanya.

Q: There was an exchange several times?

A: Nuong pong text niya sa akin hindi po several times dahil kung makita ′nyo po dyan.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Let me see the affidavit of Atty. Madarang. After this question, may I ask for a continuance?

ATTY. ROSERO:

No objection, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

All these text messages were checked by us with your counsel in the cellphone of Atty.
Madarang which were preserved until we allowed her to erase these. There are exchanges
here: 6392044390[8]2, November 7. When she texted she answered, Bkit c Rhodora 2
and then second was, Cnong kamaganak anong pangalan mo? This is addressed to you,
this is your telephone?
A: Opo.

Q: But the one who answered is Rhodora?

A: Ako po ′yun.

Q: Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say that you are Rhodora?
 A: Justice, nung ma-receive ko po ′yong text niya apat na beses ko pong na-receive ang text ni
Arlene.

INVESTIGATOR:

Who is Arlene?

A: Atty. Madarang. Arlene, sa text po niya sa akin, Sir Lito, kamaganak po ito ni Mr. Lagua.
Magkano pa po ba ang kakulangang pera para ibigay ko sa inyo. Si Rhodora ba kasama?
Hindi ko po sinagot yon. Pangalawa, ′yun din po ang message nya. Ano ito? Sa akin pong
kuan, sa pag-iisip ko lang po, bakit dahil si Mr. Art Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito? Text
pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo. Nang-iintriga na ′to. Pang-apat, intriga ′to. Text ko nga rin ′to,
lokohan lang tayo. Bkit si Rhodora ′to yun po ang sagot ko sa kanya.

Q: So at that time you already knew about Rhodora?

A: Hindi po, dun, duon po sa text niya nakalagay po dun eh, Si Rhodora kasama ba? So ikinuan ko
po na si Rhodora ′to, dun po sa text nya.

Q: Nakipaglokohan ka?
A: Sa text niya nakalagay dun na Si Rhodora ba kasama kaya po ako nakipaglokohan dun. [43]

As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondents claim of joking around (nakipaglokohan) with
an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is contrary to a normal persons reaction. This is made even
more apparent by the fact that the respondent even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked
why, gave a vague answer, and, when further questioned, even broke down in tears.[44]

The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a
violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic
communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, [45] and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. Any question as to the
admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already
admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.[46] In that case,
the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages
addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending
before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text

messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], Ephemeral electronic communications shall
be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal
knowledge thereof . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and
therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent
herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the
messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
 Second. The respondents testimony during the hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty. Longalong
is replete with inconsistencies and loopholes. He claimed that he made inquiries from other CA staff and learned that
there was indeed a deal between someone in the criminal section and a certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig. He
further claimed that the said parties wanted to get back at him for immediately serving the release order which
prevented them from demanding the balance of the deal from Laguas relative. However, this bare claim was not
corroborated by any witness. Moreover, the respondent alleged that two anonymous callers claimed to know
something about the case against him; when asked about it, he stated that he no longer exerted efforts to find out
who they were as they did not give out their names:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: On page 5 of your affidavit, you said in paragraph 8 That I made some inquiry and some
personnel of the Court of Appeals told me that there is indeed a deal between a staff in
the Criminal Section and Rhodora of RTC, Pasig. Can you tell us who is this staff?
A: Ah dito po Justice, hindi po siya nagpakilala, sa telephono po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Sino siya?

A: Hindi po siya ′yong tawag po niya sa akin sa telepono nang malaman po dito sa CA na ako ay
kinasuhan ninyo tumawag po siya sa Personnel.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Who is siya?
A: Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.

INVESTIGATOR:

Lalaki o babae?

A: Una po babae tapos ′yong pangalawa po lalaki.

INVESTIGATOR:

Sinong kinakausap?

A: Ako po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Hinahanap ka?

A: Hinahanap po nila ako.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: What did he tell you? He, lalaki, ano?

A: Sa babae muna po?

Q: Oo, babaet lalake ba?

A: Opo.
Q: Who was the first caller, the lady or the gentleman?
A: Babae po.

Q: Were you the one who answered the phone?

A: Hindi po.

INVESTIGATOR:

Hinahanap daw siya.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered the phone, what did you say?
A: Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, pupuwede mo ba akong matulungan sa paggawa ng affidavit dahil
kinasuhan nga ako ni Justice Magtolis.

Q: But you do not know who you were talking to?

A: Tinanong ko nga po kung sino siya eh tumutulong lang daw siya sa akin dahil ang naririnig
niyang tsismis din dyan eh baka po si Rhodora ang may ka-kuan sa Criminal.

Q: Saan ′yong ka-kuan?

A: Ang may kausap sa Criminal.

Q: Who said na baka si Rhodora ang may kausap sa Criminal?

A: ′Yon pong kausap ko sa kabilang linya.

Q: The name you do not know?

A: Eh tinanong ko naman po kung sino siya ayaw naman po niyang magpakilala. Matutulungan
mo ba ako, ibinaba na po ang telepono.

INVESTIGATOR:

Anonymous caller.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

You are very fond of answering calls. You dont even know the name.

Q: That anonymous caller told you that there must be some deals between Rhodora and someone
from the Criminal Section?
A: ′Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang tsismis dyan sa labas.

Q: Tsismis, that was that the caller told you?

A: Opo.

Q: And she wanted to help you?

A: Kaya po sinabi din sa akin na tsismis eh hindi pa po pwedeng

Q: What did you answer her?

INVESTIGATOR:

Anong sagot mo raw?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Anong sagot niya sa tulungan kasi nakakarinig siyang tsismis?

INVESTIGATOR:

Q Ano ang sagot mo?

A: Eh iyon nga ang gusto kong malaman, ang katotohanan. Baka naman pupuwede mo akong
matulungan. Sino ba ′to?

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Di ba she was the one who offered to help?

A: Ay ayaw daw po naman niyang masabit po ang pangalan niya.

Q: But she was the one who called you?

A: Opo.
Q: Okay. How did your talk end with this girl or lady?
A: Nung pagsalita ko nga pong baka pupuwede akong tulungan, wala na.

Q: How about the man, the gentleman or the boy who called?
A: Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Dont use kuan.

ATTY. ROSERO:

Sige, Lito, ipaliwanag mo.

A: Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na ganuon din po na narinig din po niya sa labas.

JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:

Q: Alright, you were not the one who answered the call?
A: Hindi po.

Q: Somebody called you that theres a phone call?

A: Opo.

Q: When you answered, what was your first word?

A: Hello!

Q: What was the answer at the other end of the line?

A: Hello rin po.

Q: What next?
A: Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin ganito po

Q: Who was the first one who said something other than hello?
A: Siya po ang nauna.

Q: What did she say, the exact words?

 A: Exact words, sa naalala kong sinabi niya Alam mo, Mr. Salud, Salud po ang kuan niya sa akin,
narinig ko sa labas, istoryahan dyan sa labas na baka si Rhodora ang may ka-kuan dito sa
Criminal. Ang sabi ko po sa kanya Iyan din ang itinawag sa akin kahapon. Eh dalawa na
kayo eh baka naman pupuwede nyo akong matulungan. Puede ko bang malaman ang
pangalan mo? Ganun din po, ayaw na pong magsalita ibinaba na [ang] telepono.

Q: Do you know Rhodora?

A: Hindi po.

Q: You never met her?

A: Hindi po.

Q: You never talked to her?

A: Nung pong ipinakiusap nyo sa akin sa telepono po nung tayo poy

Q: After the conversation with the lady and that gentleman who called you to offer some help and
afterwards did not help at all, what happened?
A: Wala na po.

Q: Did you not check with Rhodora, What is this they are talking about that it might be between
you and someone in the Criminal Section? You never asked her that?
A: Hindi ko na rin po

Q: You did not. But I thought you wanted help from those people who can help you?
A: Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng pangalan dahil po sabi ng unang babae ayaw nga rin
po niyang sumabit sa kaso.[47]

This respondents actuation on this matter, if at all true, is again contrary to the normal reaction of one who
has been administratively charged, and wants to clear his name of any wrongdoing.

The respondent also admitted visiting an inmate (Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional facility eight
times for no apparent reason. This admission lends some credence to the testimony of Flores, that she was the one
who introduced him to Dalawangbayan, the person he was visiting. When asked why he frequently visited, he stated
that he found her beautiful (Maganda po siya, Justice), and was on the verge of courting her (Para na nga po akong
nanliligaw). The Court believes that this allegation was concocted by the respondent as a mere afterthought, to cover
up for his misdeeds.

The Investigating Officer also found that the respondent was high-strung during his testimony, and this
finding must be accorded respect. Indeed, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it
is primarily lodged in the investigating judge. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases where preponderance of
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, respectively, are required, applies a fortioriin administrative cases
where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The investigating judge is in a better position to
pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified, and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.[48] Thus, the following findings of Atty. Longalong are well taken:
However, respondent denied receiving P20,000 from Gamil and P15,000 from Flores
and signing LM Salud on Flores notebooks (Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but admitted visiting Vilma at
the Correctional Institute for Women 8 times from May to August 1999. Respondents denial here
appears self-serving and incredible considering his admission of going to the Correctional Institute
for Women several times for no valid official reason. Moreover, although Flores is a convict
for estafa, her
testimony on the matter was more consistent and credible. Likewise, respondent admitted seeing
Flores at the Correctional Institute for Women and that Flores mailed her letter to him on May 16,
1999 which he called maintriga. He also admitted that he told Flores to seek the help of Justice
 Vasquez on her case. The foregoing, plus the fact that Flores eventually wrote Justice Vasquez,
confirms the truth of Flores testimony on the matter.

With the aforecited admissions by respondent, the substantial evidence presented by the
complainant and her witnesses with their positive and forthright testimonies deserve more
credence than respondents self-serving denial and inconsistent and vague testimony. Even the
demeanor of complainant and her witnesses give credence to their testimonies than the nervous
and [high-strung] demeanor of respondent during his testimony. Moreover, complainant and her
witnesses, including the superiors of respondent, have no reason or motive whatsoever to testify
falsely against him. Respondents defense of denial is inherently a weak defense. It is well settled
that denial, to be believed, must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability, otherwise the
denial is purely self-serving and with nil evidentiary value (People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323
SCRA 201). Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations (People
of the Philippines vs. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652).
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect, a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed with. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its
sanctity and dignity. The conduct and behavior required of every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must, at all times, be characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service. [49] Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.[50]
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money to facilitate the issuance of the
appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the surrounding circumstances, as well as the
inconsistencies in his testimony, point towards administrative culpability. The respondents actuations fall short of
the standard required of a public servant. He is guilty of gross or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior,[51] while gross, has been defined as out of all measure; beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.[52] Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave
offense. However, considering that the respondent has not been previously charged nor administratively sanctioned,
the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose of disciplining the
respondent.

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge
or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look
upon them as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.[53] Thus, any conduct
which tends to diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency
and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months, effective immediately.
He is further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his receipt of this Decision to determine when his
suspension shall have taken effect.

The Office of the Court Administrator is also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on the
possible involvement of Rhodora Valdez (Utility Worker), and other personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 163.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former
boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a
purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile
phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said
Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. 1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-
off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him,
saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan
to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but
Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text
messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture
of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The
sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan
used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio
in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he
sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand,
read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his
text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora,
and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police
officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone
and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
"Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the
face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture.
Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the
face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this
could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized
from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and
their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted
reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his
wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she
needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached
him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene
messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself
who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle
claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because
she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures
posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in
Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As
for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in
the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the
credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its Decision
dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the
picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined
in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person
against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.

xxxx

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any
form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that

alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a
"dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where
the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of
the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or
social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman
have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s
Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the
word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the
noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed,
Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter
"refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety
(away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing
basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place
does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not
reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their
three-month romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent.
But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against
women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough.
The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting
one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological
distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already
desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed
with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the
woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2
to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had
remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she
had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally,
if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several
years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the
RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for
the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can
of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to
Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade,
would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is
that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That
must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any
warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the
prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers
seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case.
Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was
used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan
with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort
and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM
cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he
himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely
forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the
unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give
credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the
things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004]

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. and
Elias Q. Tan seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated June 26, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37162 ordering the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, to pay the respondent Allied
Banking Corporation the amount of P493,566.61 plus interests and other charges. Likewise, sought to be
reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution dated August 19, 1996 denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation,
Inc., obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory
notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. The details of the promissory notes are as follows:
P/N No. Date of P/N Maturity Date Amount as of 1/23/79

BD No. 504 Nov. 7, 1977 Feb. 5, 1978 P123,377.76

BD No. 621 Nov. 28, 1977 Mar. 28, 1978 P123,411.10

BD No. 716 Dec. 12, 1977 Apr. 11, 1978 P122,322.21

BD No. 839 Jan. 5, 1978 May 5, 1978 P120,455.54[2]

As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands made
on them by the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent Bank was
constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint seeking payment by
the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation,
exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs.
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the
respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, for his
own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the respondent Bank.
The petitioner Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his capacity as
its President any promissory note and that the respondent Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were
made in petitioner Tans personal capacity and for his own use and that the petitioner Foundation never
benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. The petitioner Foundation then interposed a cross-claim
against petitioner Tan alleging that he, having exceeded his authority, should be solely liable for said
loans, and a counterclaim against the respondent Bank for damages and attorneys fees.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the respondent Bank in his
personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of
petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The
loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at
an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the
proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required him to affix two signatures on
every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their
agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to the respondent Bank, these
were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation was
included as party thereto. Further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the respondent Bank made no
demand on him.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing evidences [sic], arguments and considerations, this court hereby finds the
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff and hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. [the petitioners herein] to pay jointly and
solidarily to the plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation [the respondent herein] the amount of P493,566.61 as principal
obligation for the four promissory notes, including all other charges included in the same, with interest at 14% per
annum, computed from January 24, 1979, until the same are fully paid, plus 2% service charges and 1% monthly
penalty charges.

2. Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and solidarily, attorneys fees
in the equivalent amount of 25% of the total amount due from the defendants on the promissory notes, including all
charges;

3. Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and solidarily litigation
expenses of P1,000.00 plus costs of the suit.[3]

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by deleting the award
of attorneys fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being without basis.
The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans were his personal loans as the
promissory notes evidencing them showed upon their faces that these were obligations of the petitioner
Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan himself in his official and personal character. Applying the
parol evidence rule, the CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten
agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds of his
shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Further, the CA found that demand had been made by the respondent Bank on the petitioners prior
to the filing of the complaint a quo. It noted that the two letters of demand dated January 3, 1979 [4] and
January 30, 1979[5] asking settlement of the obligation were sent by the respondent Bank. These were
received by the petitioners as shown by the registry return cards [6] presented during trial in the court a
quo.
Finally, like the court a quo, the CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity in
holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable. The evidence showed that petitioner Tan had
represented himself as the President of the petitioner Foundation, opened savings and current accounts
in its behalf, and signed the loan documents for and in behalf of the latter. The CA, likewise, found that
the petitioner Foundation had allowed petitioner Tan to act as though he had the authority to contract the
loans in its behalf. On the other hand, petitioner Tan could not escape liability as he had used the
petitioner Foundation for his benefit.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to the Court alleging that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOANS SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE INSTANT PETITION ARE ALREADY DUE AND DEMANDABLE
DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRIOR DEMAND.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE ENTITY AS
BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON THE PART OF
PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC.[7]
The petitioners assail the appellate courts finding that the loans had become due and demandable in
view of the two demand letters sent to them by the respondent Bank. The petitioners insist that there was
no prior demand as they vigorously deny receiving those letters. According to petitioner Tan, the
signatures on the registry return cards were not his.
The petitioners denial of receipt of the demand letters was rightfully given scant consideration by the
CA as it held:
Exhibits R and S are two letters of demand, respectively dated January 3, 1979 and January 30, 1979, asking
settlement of the obligations covered by the promissory notes. The first letter was written by Ben Tio Peng Seng,
Vice-President of the bank, and addressed to Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., attention of Mr. Elias Q. Tan, President,
while the second was a final demand written by the appellees counsel, addressed to both defendants-appellants, and
giving them five (5) days from receipt within which to settle or judicial action would be instituted against them.
Both letters were duly received by the defendants, as shown by the registry return cards, marked as Exhibits R-2 and
S-1, respectively. The allegation of Tan that he does not know who signed the said registry return receipts merits
scant consideration, for there is no showing that the addresses thereon were wrong. Hence, the disputable
presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of mail (per par. V, Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) still holds.[8]

There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the petitioners insist
that the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny receipt of the respondent Banks
demand letters. When presented the registry return cards during the trial, petitioner Tan claimed that he
did not recognize the signatures thereon. The petitioners allegation and denial are self-serving. They
cannot prevail over the registry return cards which constitute documentary evidence and which enjoy the
presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, these were regularly issued by
the postal officials in the performance of their official duty and that they acted in good faith. [9] Further, as
the CA correctly opined, mails are presumed to have been properly delivered and received by the
addressee in the regular course of the mail.[10] As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses
on the registry return cards were wrong. It is the petitioners burden to overcome the presumptions by
sufficient evidence, and other than their barefaced denial, the petitioners failed to support their claim that
they did not receive the demand letters; therefore, no prior demand was made on them by the respondent
Bank.
Having established that the loans had become due and demandable, the Court shall now resolve the
issue of whether the CA correctly held the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable therefor.
 In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that these were
contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity and that it did not benefit therefrom. On the other
hand, while admitting that the loans were his personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that he had an
unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year
basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
These contentions are untenable.
The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he was made to sign blank
loan documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by the
respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court is hard pressed to believe
that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so careless as to sign blank loan
documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes [11] clearly showed upon their faces that they
are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal
capacity.[12] Moreover, the application for credit accommodation,[13] the signature cards of the two
accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation,[14] as well as New Current Account Record,[15] all
accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner
Foundation.[16] These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans
were solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim
regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of
the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.[17]
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank.
These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11,
1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit.
Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually
until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this
purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the
promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[18] While parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake.[19] No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.
Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable as it
applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity. The petitioner Foundation asserts that it has a
personality separate and distinct from that of its President, petitioner Tan, and that it cannot be held
solidarily liable for the loans of the latter.
The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners cannot hide behind the corporate veil under the
following circumstances:
The evidence shows that Tan has been representing himself as the President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. He
opened a savings account and a current account in the names of the corporation, and signed the application form as
well as the necessary specimen signature cards (Exhibits A, B and C) twice, for himself and for the foundation. He
submitted a notarized Secretarys Certificate (Exhibit G) from the corporation, attesting that he has been
authorized, inter alia, to sign for and in behalf of the Lapulapu Foundation any and all checks, drafts or other orders
with respect to the bank; to transact business with the Bank, negotiate loans, agreements, obligations, promissory
notes and other commercial documents; and to initially obtain a loan for P100,000.00 from any bank (Exhibits G-1
and G-2). Under these circumstances, the defendant corporation is liable for the transactions entered into by Tan on
its behalf.[20]

Per its Secretarys Certificate, the petitioner Foundation had given its President, petitioner Tan,
ostensible and apparent authority to inter alia deal with the respondent Bank. Accordingly, the petitioner
Foundation is estopped from questioning petitioner Tans authority to obtain the subject loans from the
respondent Bank. It is a familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any
other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing
the power to do those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt
with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agents authority. [21]
In fine, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the CAs ruling that the petitioners are jointly and
solidarily liable for the loans contracted with the respondent Bank.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated June 26, 1996
and Resolution dated August 19, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37162 are
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.