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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SERVE WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES.

Spouses Afulugencua vs, Metrobank GR No. 185145, Feb 05, 2014

Facts: Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages,
against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega
(Ortega)

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is
the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
After the filing of the parties' pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum[7] to require Metrobank's
officers to appear and testify as the petitioners' initial witnesses for the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as
those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners' 200-square meter land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan

Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6[11] of Rule 25 of the
Rules, Metrobank's officers who are considered adverse parties may not be compelled to appear
and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents
sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.

Issue: Whether or not that petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to respondent
bank's officers before they can be subpoenaed

Ruling:

No. Section 6, [1] Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served with
written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to prevent fishing
expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.


Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice,
a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party's testimony, compelling
the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own
case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the
facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse
party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling
party's being bound by the adverse party's testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling party's cause.

EVIDENCE ON MOTION

Bravo vs. Borja G.R. No. L-65228 February 18, 1985


Facts

Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog.
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest, petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two
reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand
del Rosario, one of the prosecution witnesses, of his previous statement naming petitioner as
the assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years, entitled as such to a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code which would make the murder charge
against him non-capital.

After a hearing during which the retracting witness (del Rosario) presented by petitioner made
another turn-about and declared against the latter, respondent Judge Borja denied the motion
for bail on the finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority was not
proved. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his minority had been
proved by his birth certificate which was attached to the memorandum in support of his motion
for bail, showing that he was born on February 26, 1967, that his minority had never been
challenged by the fiscal, and that the offense charged, as regards petitioner, is not capital
because even if convicted, he could not be sentenced to death because of his minority. Again,
attached to the motion for reconsideration was a duly certified copy of petitioner's birth
certificate. The Fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong, but
did not contest the minority of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the Hon. Borja commited grave abuse of discretion when he denied
taking cognizance of the unchallenged minority of the Petitioner based on his certified copy of
the birth certificate for his motion to post bail.

Ruling:

Yes. In his motion for bail, petitioner alleged that he was a minor of 16 and this averment was
never challenged by the prosecution. Subsequently, in his memorandum in support of the
motion for bail, petitioner attached a copy of his birth certificate. And finally, after respondent
Judge had denied the motion for bail, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching
thereto a certified true copy of his birth certificate. Respondents Judge however refused to take
cognizance of petitioner's unchallenged minority allegedly because the certificate of birth was
not offered in evidence. This was error because evidence of petitioner's minority was already a
part of the record of the case. It was properly filed in support of a motion. It would be a
needless formality to offer it in evidence. Respondent Judge therefore acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding it.

Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (Rules of
Court, Rule 133, Section 7.)

EXCLUSION AND SEPARATION OF WITNESSES.

Design Sources International Inc. and Kenneth Sy, Vs. Lourdes L. Eristingcol, G.R. No.
193966, February 19, 2014

Facts
Design Sources International, Inc. ("Petitioner Corporation") is a distributor of Pergo flooring.
Sometime in 1998, the Private Respondent bought the said brand of flooring of the "Cherry
Blocked" type from the Petitioner Corporation. The flooring was installed in her house.
Private Respondent discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had unsightly bulges at the
joints and seams. The Private Respondent informed the Petitioners of these defects and the
former insisted on the repair or replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter.

After several inspections of the alleged defective flooring, meetings between the parties and
exchanges of correspondence, the Petitioner Corporation was given a deadline to replace the
installed flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline, the Petitioner Corporation did not comply
with the demand of the Private Respondent. A complaint for damages was filed.
Kenneth Sy, one of the Petitioners' witnesses, testified in open court. Immediately after his
testimony, the following occurred as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic notes ("TSN"):

After the completion of the testimony of defendant's second witness in the person of Mr.
Kenneth Sy, , counsel for the defendants, moved for continuance considering that he is not
feeling well and that he needs time to secure another witness to testify on the technical aspect,
because of the objection on the part of plaintiff's counsel on his plan of presenting of Mr.
Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his failure to inform the Court and the said counsel of
the presence of the said intended witness while Mr. Kenneth Sy was testifying.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was denied on the
ground that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy from testifying when a
different witness could testify on matters similar to the intended testimony of the former. The
Order also stated that "to allow Stephen Sy from testifying would work to the disadvantage of
the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness.

Ruling: Yes. The controversy arose from the objection of respondent's counsel to the
presentation of Stephen as petitioners' witness considering that Stephen was already inside the
courtroom during the presentation of witness Kenneth Sy. Respondent failed to substantiate her
claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation
of Kenneth.

Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been examined.

Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them
from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the
truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other
words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy
of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the opposing party
or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the
testimonies of other witnesses.
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot
simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard
the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to protect the
interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed
that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's counsel
was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue
of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
209464 July 1, 2015

Facts: Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers conducted initiation rite at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna.
MARLON VILLANUEVA, a neophyte was subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was
ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.

RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners can be convicted of the offense charged beyond reasonable
doubt due to circumstantial evidence.

Ruling: Yes. In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of
proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when
direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are
usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If
direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who
commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities,
especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to
give any information regarding initiation rites. The silence is only broken after someone has
been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret
is revealed and the activities become public. Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is
only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial
evidence to prove it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.
Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. vs Wallem Phils. Shipping, Inc. G.R. No. 165647, March
26, 2009

Facts: Anhui Chemicals Import and Export Corp. loaded on board M/S Offshore Master a
shipment consisting of sodium sulphate anhydrous, complete and in good order for
transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila for consignee, covered by a clean bill of
lading.

The shipment arrived in port of manila and was discharged which caused various degrees of
spillage and losses as evidence by the turn over survey of the arrastre operator. Asia Star
Freight delivered the shipments from pier to the consignees in Quezon City, during the
unloading, it was found by the consignee that the shipment was damaged and in bad condition.
The consignee filed a claim with Wallem for the value of the damaged shipment, to no avail.
Since the shipment was insured with Phil. First Insurance against all risks in the amount of
P2,470,213.50. The consignee filed a claim against the First Insurance. First insurance after
examining the turn-over survey, the bad order certificate and other documents paid the
consignee but later on sent a demand letter to Wallem for the recovery of the amount paid to
the consignee (in exercise of its right of subrogation). Wallem did not respond to the claim.

First Insurance then instituted an action before RTC for damages against Wallem. RTC held the
shipping company and the arrastre operator solidarily liable since both are charged with the
obligation to deliver the goods in good order condition. The trial court found through the
testimony of Mr. Maximino Velasquez Talens, a cargo surveyor of Oceanica Cargo Marine
Surveyors Corporation, that the losses and damage to the cargo were caused by the
mishandling of the arrastre operator. Specifically, that the torn cargo bags resulted from the use
of steel hooks/spikes in piling the cargo bags to the pallet board and in pushing the bags by the
stevedores of the arrastre operator to the tug boats then to the ports

Issues:

Whether or not the courts below erred in giving credence to the testimony of Mr. Talens.

Ruling:

No. The general rule in assessing credibility of witnesses is well-settled The trial court's
evaluation as to the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest
respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial
judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

SPOUSES FRONDARINA VS. MALAZARTE G.R. No. 148423 December 6, 2006


Disputed lot was acquired by Flordelina Santos from Iluminado Amar., Cirila Gongora,
petitioner Esperanza Frondarina’s sister, in turn, acquired the disputed lot from On the same
date, Gongora, as Esperanza Frondarina’s predecessor-in-interest, filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application (MSA) with the Bureau of Lands.

The disputed lot was also declared in Gongora’s name for taxation purposes. She also paid the
real estate taxes due on said property. Petitioner Esperanza Frondarina, in turn, obtained the
disputed lot from her sister, Cirila Gongora, on February 19, 1985, as evidenced by the Waiver
and/or Renunciation of Rights to a Parcel of Land. Said petitioner likewise filed an MSA with
the Bureau of Lands over the disputed lot.

Petitioner also declared the disputed lot in her name in 1986 under and paid real estates taxes
on the property. She also had the lot surveyed, fenced it with four (4) strands of barbed wire,
and tended two (2) mango and one (1) coconut trees and planted different kinds of vegetables
on the lot.

Meanwhile, respondents Malazartes alleged that they bought the said lot from Romeo Valencia
(and that they resided on the lot since May 1988. On the said date, respondents immediately
started the construction of their house on the lot without a building permit—as their application
was denied due to petitioners’ complaint. They also admitted that an employee of the City
Engineer’s Office told them to stop the construction because of the complaint and absence of a
building permit.

In the meantime,, respondents threatened petitioners’ caretaker, Lorenza Andrada after they
allegedly bought the said lot. More so, according to petitioner, in her testimony, the
respondents dug holes to put up posts, riprapped the rear of the lot, and deposited hollow
blocks to construct a house, When confronted by petitioners Frondarinas the land from Mr.
Valencia, as they had bought it from him. Petitioners then reported the matter to the City
Engineer’s Office; and Mr. Malik of said office went to the said place and told the respondents
to stop the construction of the house as they had no building permit.

The respondents, however, continued the construction on the lot. Aggrieved, petitioners sent a
letter request to the authorities

The lower court found that respondents’ witness, Romeo Valencia, admitted that his possession
of the disputed lot had already been questioned—for almost three (3) years—by petitioners
before he sold it to respondents. Thus, according to the court, "it is very clear from the evidence
that petitioners did not only have prior possession of the subject lot, but it is also clear that the
possession of the land by. Therefore, the Respondents committed acts of forcible entry.
However, the appellate court reversed the ruling that petitioners Frondarina spouses failed to
prove that they were in actual and physical possession of the disputed lot. It ruled that the
Frondarina spouses’ possession was through a caretaker, Lorenza Andrada, who did not appear
as witness because of alleged threats made by respondents Malazartes and their predecessor-in-
interest, Romeo Valencia. However, the court a quo concluded that petitioner Esperanza
Frondarina’s testimony on the alleged threat to her caretaker, Andrada, constituted hearsay
evidence, as it was based on the personal knowledge of said petitioner. The appellate court also
stated that the inability of caretaker Andrada to testify prejudiced the claim of petitioners that
they committed acts of forcible entry in the subject lot.

Issue:

Whether or not the inability of caretaker Andrada to testify prejudiced the claim of petitioners
that respondents committed acts of forcible entry in the subject lot.
Ruling: No. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is defined as the existence of the principal
facts only inferred from one or more circumstances which have been established directly." It is
further explained as "an inference of a fact from other facts proved, and the fact thus inferred
and assented to by the mind is said to be presumed, that is to say, it is taken for granted until
the contrary is proved."27 In effect, the absence of Andrada’s testimony did not do any damage
to petitioners’ cause of action––as ample circumstantial evidence is extant on record sufficient to
convince the Court that respondents committed acts of forcible entry.

ADVERSE PARTY AS WITNESS

LEOPOLDO GONZALES, v. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ATTY. CECILIO I.


LIM, as WAS Assistant, ATTY. ROGELIO L. CRUZ, as Chief Claims and Investigation
section, WAS, and SY KOT, G.R. No. L-6409. February 5, 1954

Facts: the petitioner Leopoldo Gonzales filed with the Wage Administration Service a claim for
overtime pay against his employer, the respondent Sy Kot. Upon the case being submitted to
the WAS (Wage Administration Service) for investigation and arbitration, the Petitioner, to
establish his claim, had Sy Kot summoned to the witness stand and put under oath. But before
any question could be propounded to him, Sy Kot invoked his constitutional right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself, calling attention to the fact that the law on overtime
pay provides a penalty for its violation. Considering the point well taken, the investigator
ordered Sy Kot’s withdrawal from the witness stand. The ruling was, upon appeal, sustained by
the Secretary of Labor

Issue: Whether or not Sy Kot as an adverse witness can be summoned as a witness by the
Petitioner.

Ruling: Yes. However, except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from
utilizing his adversary as a witness. As a matter of fact, section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court,
expressly authorizes a party to call an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him.
This rule is, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify
against himself. But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be
invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for a
criminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there
would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not. Thus, a person who has been summoned to testify "cannot decline to
appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness" and "no claim of privilege can be made
until a question calling for a criminating answer is asked; at that time, and, generally speaking,
at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed."

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

PASTOR LOPEZ, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS R. MARTIN


G.R. No. L-31494January 23, 1978

Facts: Respondent Jesus R. Martin filed the complaint against petitioner Pastor Lopez in
seeking principally the recovery of two (2) parcels of land and the declaration of nullity of the
deed of sale allegedly executed by one Gervacio Resoso conveying to the petitioner the
said land with damages, attorneys fees and costs.

Petitioner Pastor Lopez, alleged that he is the owner of the parcels of land in question as by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale duly executed by said Gervacio Resoso over the parcel of
land and also by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by Zacarias Resoso over the
parcel of land.

During trial Pastor Lopez presented as witnesses Judge Simeon Rico, the Notary Public,
and the two alleged subscribing witnesses to the said deed, Antonio Marayag and Feliciano
Soliven, who all affirmed the genuineness of the said document. On the other hand, Jesus
R. Martin presented Antonio Rotor, an NBI examiner of documents, who testified that the
signature on the deed of sale did not appear to be the same signature of the vendor
appearing on other documents bearing his undisputed signature.

In its Decision, the lower court held and declared "false and apocryphal, null and void, the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Pastor Lopez and Gervacio Resoso. The
appellate court affirmed the Decision of the court.

Petitioner argued that public documents are presumed genuine and regular.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not applying the rule that public documents are
presumed genuine and regular and that it requires not merely preponderance of evidence
but clear, strong, and conclusive evidence to overthrow this legal presumption.

Ruling:

No. While it is true that public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the
provisions of the Rules of Court but this presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may
be overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, not conclusion evidence.

In the case at at bar, the Appellate relied not merely on the expert testimony given by Antonio
B. Rotor, the NBI handwriting expert, who examined the questioned signature appearing on the
deed of sale, then compared them with standard signatures of Gervacio Resoso and concluded
that the questioned signature was not written by the same person who made the standard
signatures.
Moreover, there is no inflexible rule under Sec. 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
gives priority to subscribing witnesses in the order and quality of evidence to prove a
handwriting. The rule referred to merely enumerates the means or methods by which the
handwriting of a person may be proved, which may either by by: 1 — any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write; 2 — or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person; 3 — by comparison made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The law makes no preference,
much less distinction among and between the different means stated above in proving the
handwriting of a person.
Under the above-cited section, Sec, 23, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court, it must be noted that
the court may also make a comparison between the questioned and standard signatures before
it, and since the Judge or the Magistrates must make use of their physical senses to conduct an
ocular inspection of the signatures where the signatures appear as they are, and not merely
described by witnesses testifying about them, the result of such inspection by the Judge or the
Magistrates becomes the ultimate judgment of the Court. Plainly, the signatures speak for
themselves.

CREDIBLE WITNESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.. ARSENIO DE JESUS (Acquitted) and RUBEN
AGO LUMIBAO, Accused, RUBEN AGO LUMIBAO. G.R. Nos. 144080-81. January 26, 2004
Facts:

Appellant Ruben Ago Lumibao is the paternal uncle of the alleged victim, Agnes Lumibao.

At the time of the alleged offenses, which occurred sometime between September 1996 and
March 1997, Agnes Lumibao was 27 years old, but with a mental age of 3 years and 3 months
and an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 29. Her mother, Nenita Lumibao, left Agnes in the care of
her grandparents from the time she was 7 years old. When Nenitas husband died, she left
Agnes with her sister-in-law, Evelyn Lumibao Tagaro, while Nenita worked in Manila.

Appellants house as well as that of Agnes was located in the same compound owned by
appellants parents. The accused Arsenio de Jesus was their neighbor.

Melba Lumibao Vicente, a paternal aunt of Agnes, observed that Agnes was pregnant. Melba
informed Evelyn about her observation. They asked Agnes who was the author of her
pregnancy by enumerating the names of the men they knew, including Ago, the nickname of
appellant Ruben Lumibao. Agnes only smiled in response to all the names given to her.

When Nenita was notified of her daughters pregnancy, she directed her son to bring Agnes
to Manila where she was examined by a doctor. Agnes pregnancy was confirmed. Subsequently
her mother filed her complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against herein
appellant. In the line-up conducted by the NBI, Agnes pointed to him when asked who raped
her from among a line-up of seven (7) men, six (6) of whom she had never seen before.

The trial court rendered a decision, convicting ruben lumibao of rape and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua, while acquitting arsenio de jesus. Appellant now questions said
conviction and anchors his appeal on the ground that the trial court erred in giving full faith
and credence to the testimony of agnes lumibao despite its material inconsistencies and
contradictions.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General stresses that though mentally retarded,
Agnes could perceive things and convey her perceptions, using limited verbal communication
and sign language.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the victim can be given credence.

Ruling: No. Appellant Lumibao is acquitted. In reviewing rape cases, this Court observes the
following guiding principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult
to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. These guidelines understandably assume that the victim of the
rape is herself the complaining witness and that she could testify intelligently such that her
testimony could normally be understood by the trial court.

The guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is convicted, there
should be moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of
those who are to act upon it. Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element
essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the offender. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is meant to be that, all things given, the mind of the judge can rest at ease
concerning its verdict. Again, these basic postulates assume, that the court and others at the trial
are able to comprehend the testimony of witnesses, particularly of the victim herself if she is
presented and testified under oath.

In this case, the records show that when Agnes was asked by her paternal aunts Melba and
Evelyn (with whom she then was living) on the matter of who the father of her child was, she
could not give any answer and merely smiled by way of response to all the names given to her,
including that of appellant. This confrontation happened just after the aunts first noticed that
Agnes was pregnant and before she was sent to her mother in Manila.

It was only after she met her mother in Manila that the author of her pregnancy became
identified. When the NBI psychologist asked her who caused her to be pregnant, she answered
Papa with the assistance of her mother. When asked the same question by the NBI psychiatrist
who enumerated random names of men, Agnes nodded upon the mention of the names
Arsenio and Ruben because these were the only names she knew from those given to her. When
asked by the NBI special investigator the identity of her rapist, she answered Papa Onald, again
with the assistance of her mother.

It appears clear that Agnes could hardly communicate without her mother assisting her and
interpreting what she said. However, the trial court had to order her mother to step out of the
courtroom because she kept coaching her on what to say during the direct examination.

Given the circumstances of Agnes testimony in court, in the light of the entire evidence on
record, the identity of the author of Agnes pregnancy does not appear to us clearly established.
Note that the alleged offenses took place over an extended period of time and long before the
actual investigation conducted by the NBI. During the investigation, the active influence played
by her mother during the interviews conducted by the NBI psychologist, psychiatrist, and
special investigator is undenied. The trial judge observed her mother’s constant presence and
assistance given to Agnes during her direct examination in court. All these leave us
unconvinced that Agnes testimony on this point could be relied upon to pin down who was her
ravisher and the purported father of her child, with moral certainty.

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE v. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO GR No. L-28699, Apr 29, 1975


Facts:

Accused Francisco Lim, now private respondent, indicted for violation of the Retail Trade Law
as well as of the Alien Registration Act of 1950, the crucial issue posed was his citizenship. His
being an alien is mainly predicated on the allegation that his election of Philippine citizenship
was made over and beyond the period provided for by law. In the course of such joint trial, so it
is alleged, respondent Francisco Lim, through his counsel, with the prosecution objecting,
presented testimonial and documentary evidence referring to matters pertaining to certain
persons, namely, Fernando Nuevo and Porfirio Doctor, who are not parties to the cases.

The Respondent judge admitted the said evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented can be admitted?

Ruling: Yes. Respondent Judge certainly has not been shown to be remiss in the fulfillment of
his judicial duties. On the contrary, the petition would impute not only abuse of discretion, but
grave abuse thereof, when precisely he was manifesting fealty to the well-settled doctrine that a
trial judge should display receptivity to offers of evidence as well as to searching questions with
the end in view of having the truth come out.
IDENTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS

PEOPLE v. SUSANA NAPAT-A Y MACABIO GR No. 84951, Nov 14, 1989

Facts:

The Narcotics Regional Unit in Baguio City received information that a certain Susana Napat-a
was looking for a buyer of marijuana leaves. Acting on this report, police conducted a buy-bust
operation.

The contents of the brown carton box were referred to a forensic chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory for examination. In his Chemistry Report Lt. Figueroa affirmed that a qualitative
examination of the specimens taken from the brown carton box showed them to be marijuana.

In her defense, the appellant claimed that she was a vegetable vendor in the market; that on the
date of buy bust opeartion at about 10:30 A.M. she went home to Brookside to cook food for her
children. On her way back to the city market, she met Naty Doguiwen, who was also a
vegetable vendor. Naty Doguiwen was holding a small box. While they were waiting
for a ride, a man approached Naty. The two talked (which appellant could not hear),
then Naty handed to the man the box she was holding. Suddenly two men
approached Naty who speedily ran away. The two men gave chase but were unable to catch
her. To Susana's surprise, the two men came back and arrested her. She was brought to
headquarters where she was investigated. She submitted her counter-affidavit to the City Fiscal

On cross-examination,. She was informed of her right to remain silent and to have counsel.
During the investigation, she signed a receipt for the property that was seized from her and
marked as Exhibit "J".

She admitted that the brown carton box containing four bundles of dried marijuana leaves
weighing about three (3) kilos, were seized from her. Appellant questions the non-presentation
of the poseur-buyer who died before the trial, and the informer, as witnesses at the
trial. Appellant also contention that the trial court erred in convicting her in view of the
prosecution's failure to present to the Court the brown carton box and its contents (dried
marijuana leaves

Issue:

Whether the non presentation of poseur buyer and failure to present the object evidence are
sufficient to acquit the accused?

Ruling:

No. The death of Poseur Buyer did not destroy the case of the prosecution, for the sale and
actual delivery of the marijuana by appellant to the former were witnessed by others, who
testified at the trial.

Moreover, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the box and its contents
were presented, identified and marked as exhibits in court. The subsequent loss of these
exhibits did not affect the case for the trial court had described the evidence in the records.
Thus, even without the exhibits which have been incorporated into the records of the case, the
prosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses properly identified those exhibits
and their testimonies are recorded." Furthermore, in this case, appellant's counsel had cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on those exhibits.

ADMISSION

US vs. Pedro Tolosa G.R. No. L-2650 February 16, 1906

Facts: Defendant was sentenced for the crime of homicide to fourteen years eight months and
one day of imprisonment ( reclusion temporal), to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of 1,000 pesos, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Solicitor-General now asks the court to acquit the defendant on the ground that, in his opinion,
the latter acted in self-defense when he inflicted the wounds which caused the death of the
deceased.

The defendant, testified that the deceased was killed due to unprovoked attack and striking him
with his fist and kicking him until he, the defendant, fell to the ground, and continuing the
aggression with a heavy piece of bamboo with which he struck him several blows, as a result of
which he, the defendant, again fell to the ground. The defendant, seeking to save himself from a
further attack with the piece of bamboo, drew a pocketknife from his pocket and attacked the
deceased, inflicting upon him the wounds which resulted in his death a few hours later.

The trial considered as evidence of the guilt of the defendant the fact that he pleaded guilty at
the preliminary investigation.

Issue: whether or not there was an admission.

Ruling. No the plea made by the defendant at the preliminary investigation was not intended as
a confession of his guilt in the legal sense of the word, but was merely an admission that he was
the person who had inflicted upon the deceased the wounds in question based on self defense.

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