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Parts of a Pleading Manner of Making a Effect of Failure to Plead

1. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan
193 SCRA 282
2. Cortez v. CA 83 SCRA 31
3. Jureidini v. CA 83 SCRA 90
4. Sto Tomas v. Surla 294
SCRA 382
5. Kavinta v. Castillo, Jr. 249
SCRA 604
6. International Container
Terminal v. CA 249 SCRA 389
7. Ortiz v. CA 299 SCRA
Pleading
1. Ferrer v. Ericta 84 SCRA 705
1. Toribio v. Bidin 134 SCRA 2. Garcia v. Mathis 100 SCRA
162 251
2. Bough v. Cantiveros 40 Phil 3. Gabuya v. Layug 250 SCRA
209 218
3. Hibberd v. Rohde 32 Phil 476 4. Cavili v. Florendo 154 SCRA
4. Central Surety v. CN Hodges 610
38 SCRA 159 5. Pacete v. Carriaga 231 SCRA
5. Capitol Motors v. Yabut 32 321
SCRA 1 6. Ramnani v. CA 221 SCRA

RULE 7
1 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FILING OF ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST A
LAWYER, PROPER FOR ALLEGED HARASSMENT FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL
CODE; IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. — The charges pressed by
respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a
compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action
for damages against the Solicitor General. To allow a
counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court
and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences. A lawyer owes his client
entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293
[1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312
[1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969;
People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer
cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in
controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly
use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look
at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from
above may compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same
cases they are prosecuting. As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from
damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case
he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should
be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.

DECISION
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GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan
issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the
defendants in the civil case, to implead the
petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his motion to
dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. The
Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by
respondent Enrile. On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:
"The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is deferred until
after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable. On the matter of the additional parties
(Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG
Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading
them either under Sec. 14, Rule 60 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to
determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at
this time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be
considered." (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition) Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the
Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged
"harassment suit" against him. LLpr

The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:

"In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying for
leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation
and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce
Enrile's answer with counterclaim. This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put
forth individually or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise." (Rollo, p. 27)

In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June
8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
"WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG officials Ramon
Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but,
considering these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution of these
motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits." (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as
provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court
assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The lone
issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the
counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033. It may be noted that the private respondent did
not limit himself to general averments of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then
PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false,
the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
xxx xxx xxx
"Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who CD Technologies Asia, Inc. ©
2016 cdasiaonline.com
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assisted the PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent
Solicitor General, he continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.

"He is sued in his personal and official capacities. "On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the
then Chairman, now
Senate President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that 'not one of the documents left by then
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US
State Department implicates Enrile.' Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused
to yield to the 'pressure' exerted on him to prosecute Defendant. LibLex
xxx xxx xxx
"Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the
illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of
Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary
Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.
Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo,
Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint
against Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this
harassment suit against Defendant. In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the
action against Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave
abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated,
impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . .," (Rollo, pp. 260-262) On the other
hand, the petitioner submits that no counterclaim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General
since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957]
wherein we ruled:
". . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not
make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf
will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other
than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in
representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed.
Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel
whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant,
however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel
for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
does not make the former a party to the action,
even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at." (at pp. 924-925)

Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to
assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14,
he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case. Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed
that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office. The general rule is that public
officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official
duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
"A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of,
or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this
instance. In Salcedo v.
Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries
of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor
refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate. Cdpr
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In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]),the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a
police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable
cause and without any administrative investigation. "In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-
44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were
ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees
of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations." (Laganapan
v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also
extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
charges being automatically dropped.

In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a)
of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
"With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to
point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the
Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity from
suit thus: 'No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member
thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.' No absolute
immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved.
It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable
magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity
from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in
the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . ."
(at pp. 581-582)

Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:

"It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended
merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof may
not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of official duty, provided that such member had acted
in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that the Sandiganbayan would
have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in
damages to a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose
that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that
such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court." (at pp. 586-587) Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic. (id., at page 586) Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts
in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners
in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be
filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another.

The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken
against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action
for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory
counterclaim in the case filed against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges
pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an
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alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the
Solicitor General. In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to
have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the
petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not
against the party plaintiff itself.

To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their
representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences. A
lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier
v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312
[1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969;
People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973] A lawyer
cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.
LexLib

The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor
General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the
Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The
Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and
obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too
personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves
against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting. As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a
lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should
not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim
for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET
ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

2 CONCHITA CORTEZ, ELENA CORTEZ, ROSENDO CORTEZ, JUDINA CORTEZ and

FERNANDO CORTEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE FELIX R.
DOMINGO of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Manila, THE SHERIFF, City of Manila, SPECIAL
SHERIFF REYNALDO JAVIER, KUY GUAM KAY. LTD. and MACARIO SUPAN Y MERCADO,
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision against private respondents. When a copy of the decision was served
on private respondents' counsel of record, the latter returned the same, informing the court that he had ceased to
be the lawyer for private respondents. After making the observation that counsel had not filed any formal
motion for withdrawal of his appearance in the case, the Court of Appeals sent copies of the decision to private
respondents themselves by registered mail but the copies were not delivered because they were unclaimed. The
decision then became final and executory and the record was remanded to the lower court after an entry of
judgment. Notices to that effect were sent to private respondents' counsel of record and a writ of execution was
issued by the lower court. Subsequently, acting upon a motion for reconsideration and suspension of execution
filed by private respondent firm, through a new lawyer, on the ground that there was no valid service of the
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decision upon it and that the decision is contrary to the ruling in Corpus vs. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31,
1969, the Court of Appeals set aside the entry of judgment and ordered the lower court to
elevate the record of the case. Thereafter, it issued a resolution setting aside its decision and dismissing the
complaint on the basis of the ruling in Corpus vs. Paje, (supra). The Supreme Court ruled that since counsel had
not retired from the case with his client's consent or with the court's authorization, service upon him was valid,
and that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to set aside its decision which had become final and executory
and was in the process of being executed.

Resolution reversed and set aside.

SYLLABUS
1.COURT OF APPEALS; JURISDICTION; ABSENCE THEREOF. — The Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to set aside its decision which had become final and executory (a copy thereof having been/duly
served upon the counsel of record) and which was in the process of being executed in the lower court to which
the record was remanded after an entry of judgment had been made in the Court of Appeals.

2.WRITS AND PROCESSES; SERVICE MUST BE MADE UPON LAWYER OF RECORD. — When a party
is represented by an attorney, service of ordering and notices must be made upon the latter, and notice to the
client and not to his lawyer of record is not a notice in law.

3.ATTORNEYS; SUBSTITUTION; PROCEDURE. — In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a

given case, there must be (1) written application for substitution; (2) a written consent of the client, and (3) a
written consent of the attorney to be substituted. And in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot
be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the
motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT WHERE NO FORMAL SUBSTITUTION EFFECTED. — Where the procedure for
substitution of attorney is not followed, the attorney who appears to be on record before the filing of the
application for substitution should be regarded as the attorney entitled to be served with all notices and
pleadings and the client is answerable for the shortcomings of this counsel of record. Thus, the return to the
court of a copy of a decision by counsel of record with a note that he was no longer counsel of one of the parties
does not nullify the effectiveness of the service upon him where his withdrawal from the case was without his
client's consent or the court's authorization.

5.ID.; DUTIES. — The counsel of record is obligated to protect his client's interest until he is released from his
professional relationship with his client. For its part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf
of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.

DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the propriety of the service of a decision of the Court of Appeals upon appellants' lawyer,
who claimed that he had ceased to be their counsel but who was not authorized to withdraw from the case. The
question is whether, after the record had been remanded to the trial court and after a writ of execution had been
issued, the Court of Appeals could still set aside that decision on the theory that it did not become final because
it had not been properly served upon the appellants. LibLex

1.On August 12, 1960, Judge E. Soriano of the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision ordering
defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Macario Supan to pay solidarily the sum of four thousand pesos as
damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of Severino Cortez (Civil Case No. 34092). The court found that, due to the
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driver's negligence, a truck owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and driven by Macario Supan on August 20, 1957,
hit and killed Severino Cortez in Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

2.Defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28400-R).
During the pendency of that appeal, Judge Luis B. Reyes of the Court of First Instance of Manila in his decision
dated June 12, 1961 in Criminal Case No. 41549 acquitted Supan of homicide through reckless imprudence.

3.Because of that acquittal, Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan filed petition in the Court of Appeals dated July 14,
1961 and March 26, 1966 to re open Civil Case No. 34092 so that the judgment of acquittal could be presented
in evidence. The latter petition was denied on June 15, 1966.

4.On November 17, 1969 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 34092 with the modification that the amount of damages was increased to P12,000. A copy of
that decision was served on November 21, 1969 on Atty. Joaquin C. Yuseco, the defendantsappellants' counsel
of record. However, Atty. Yuseco returned that copy and
informed the Court by letter that he had ceased to be the lawyer for defendantsappellants Supan and Kuy Guam
Kay, Ltd. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1970 noted Yuseco's letter and made the
observation that Yuseco had "not filed any formal motion for the withdrawal of his appearance" in that case.
The Court Appeals then sent copies of the decision to the defendants
appellants themselves by registered mail but the copies were not delivered because they were unclaimed.

5.Thereafter, there was an entry of judgment indicating that the decision of the Court of Appeals became final
and executory on December 8, 1969. The record was remanded and was received in the lower court on March
25, 1970. Notices to that effect were sent to Attys. Pacifico Garcia and Yuseco, the parties' counsels of record.

6.On May 30, 1970 a writ of execution was issued by the lower court. The Sheriff levied upon five freight
trucks and an adding machine owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. He scheduled the auction sale on June 26, 1970.
Instead of guarding the trucks and adding machine, the sheriff allowed the manager of the firm to have custody
thereof so that they could be used in the firm's business. On June 26, two trucks and the adding machine were
turned over to the plaintiffs. The other three trucks were sequestered away by the manager of defendant firm.

7.On June 23, 1970 defendant firm, through a new lawyer, filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration and suspension of execution. It alleged that there was no valid service of the decision upon it;
that the decision is contrary to the ruling in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062 (that the
acquittal of the accused of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence is a bar to the civil liability), and
that the increase of the damages from P4,000 to P12,000 was unwarranted since the plaintiffs did not appeal.

8.The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 1, 1970 set aside the entry of judgment, ordered the lower court
to elevate the record of the case and required plaintiffs Cortez to comment on the motion for reconsideration.
The plaintiffs opposed the motion. The record was re elevated to the Court of Appeals.

9.On August 18, 1970 the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its decision of November 17, 1969
and dismissing the complaint on the basis of the said ruling in Corpus vs. Paje, supra. Plaintiffs' motion for the
reconsideration of that decision was denied.

10.On September 21, 1970, the plaintiffs filed the instant petition for certiorari against the Court of Appeals,
Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. (which had been succeeded by Seven-O-Seven Trucking Co., Inc.) and Macario Supan
(who allegedly died in 1962, pp. 150 and 164 of Rollo). The petition is really an appeal from the resolution of
August 18, 1970. After the petitioners had posted a bond in the sum
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of P500, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated September 30, 1970 to restrain the enforcement
of that resolution. Because of that injunction, the petitioners retained the possession of the adding machine and
the two trucks (p. 203, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. We hold that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to set aside on August 18,
1970 its decision of November 17, 1969 which had become final and was in the process of being executed in
the lower court towhich the record was remanded after entry of judgment had been made in the Court of
Appeals. The 1969 decision became final and executory as to defendant-appellant Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. because
its lawyer of record, Atty. Yuseco, was duly served with a copy of that decision. It is true that Atty. Yuseco
returned that copy to the Court with the note that he was no longer appellants' counsel but that return did not
nullify the effectiveness of the service upon him since he did not retire from the case with his client's consent or
with the Court's authorization (Sec. 2, Rule 13 and Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court; Don Lino Gutierrez &
Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Alvendia, L-39124, November 15, 1974, 61 SCRA 87, 91; Magpayo vs.
Court of Appeals and People, L-35966, November 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 115; Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 112
Phil. 764; Guanzon vs. Aragon, 107 Phil. 316, 320). LLpr

When a party is represented by an attorney, service of ordering and notices must be made upon the latter, and
notice to the client and not to his lawyer of record is not a notice in law (Chainani vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862).
Thus, it was held that, unless the procedure prescribed in section 26 of Rule 138 is complied with the attorney
of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings
and who should be held responsible for the conduct of the case (Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32
SCRA 476, 485).

"In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1) written application for
substitution; (2) a written consent of the client, and (3) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted. And
in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice
of the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the
manner prescribed by our rules." Where the procedure for substitution of attorney is not followed, the attorney
who appears to be on record before the filing of the application for substitution should be regarded as the
attorney entitled to be served with all notices and pleadings and the client is answerable for the shortcomings of
this counsel of record. (Ramos vs. Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435).
The counsel of record is obligated to protect his client's interest until he is released from his professional
relationship with his client. For its part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client
except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. (Wack Wack Golf and Country
Club, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501, 504).
It is noteworthy that in the instant case even after Atty. Yuseco had returned to the Court the copy of the
decision served upon him, the Appellate Court and the lower court continued to serve copies of orders and
resolutions upon him as defendants' counsel of record without any objection on his part. He was responsible for
the conduct of the case since he had not been properly relieved as counsel of record of the appellants (See U. S.
vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189; Olivares and Colegio de San Jose vs. Leola, 97 Phil. 253, 257).

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 1970 is reversed and set aside with
costs against respondent firm. Llcd SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur.

3 JESUS D. JUREIDINI, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO CLARENCE
JUREIDINI, represented by his mother LUZ RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
[Type text]

Pending submission of petitioner's brief, private respondent, thru his counsel, Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva,
simultaneously filed with the Supreme Court an amicable compromise agreement and an appearance. Attorneys
Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and
Ortile and Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, counsel of record for private respondent, manifested that the
appearance of the new counsel is without their knowledge and consent and that they have no knowledge of the
intervention in the amicable settlement executed by and between the petitioner and private respondent. They
then filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the compromise agreement with a prayer that a
commissioner be appointed to receive evidence for attorney's fees and to approve the same as charging lien.
Meanwhile, one Manuel T. Cortez filed a petition for intervention praying, among others, that he be allowed to
intervene and file his claim against private respondent for all his financial aid extended to the latter during the
pendency and prosecution of the case and that the approval of the compromise agreement be held in abeyance
until he shall have been duly heard. The Supreme Court, in approving the compromise agreement, ruled that the
lawyers' rights to fees from their client may not be invoked to prevent the approval of a compromise agreement
which is not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy since the lawyers concerned can enforce their
rights to the fees due them in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding. The Court likewise denied the
petition for intervention not only because the intervenor's claim can be properly ventilated before the court in a
separate proceeding but also because it will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties litigants in the case at bar.

SYLLABUS
1. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT; AGREEMENT; COURT APPROVAL. — A compromise agreement
will be approved by the court where it is not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, and provides
for the full satisfaction of a party's claim
against the other.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES; CLAIM THEREFOR CANNOT PREVENT APPROVAL OF
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; REMEDY OF LAWYER. — Lawyers' rights to fees from their clients cannot
have a standing higher than the rights of the clients or parties themselves and may not be invoked by the
lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or otherwise holding in abeyance the approval of the
compromise agreement, which is not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy since said rights can
be enforced in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR INTERVENTION; EFFECT AND DENIAL THEREOF. — A petition for
intervention cannot prevent the approval of a compromise agreement entered into by and between the parties
litigants and the same will be denied where the claim of the intervenor can be properly ventiliated before the
proper court in a separate proceeding and where it will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties litigants.

DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
Within the extended period for petitioner to file his brief in the above-entitled case, private respondent, thru his
counsel, Atty. Luisito Villanueva, simultaneously filed before this Court, on August 5, 1976, an amicable
compromise agreement and an appearance, both dated August 2, 1976, furnishing a copy thereof to each of the
counsel of record of petitioner, and to Attys. Estanislao A. Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile and
Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, Suit 804 JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, counsel for private
respondent (pp. 381, 383-385, rec.). The amicable compromise agreement which was signed by Nazario
Clarence Jureidini, private respondent, assisted by his counsel, Luisito S. Villanueva, and by Jesus D. Jureidini,
petitioner, assisted by his counsel, Conrado V. Sanchez and Felipe G. Tac-an, and verified under oath before
Hon. Melecio A. Genato, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental at Oroquieta
City, runs as follows:
[Type text]

"AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

"COME NOW the parties, assisted by their respective counsels, and to this Honorable Court, respectfully
submit this AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT to be made as basis for the Decision in the above
entitled case, to wit:

"1. That private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini is now of legal age and is not suffering from any
incapacity to enter into a contract, and that he has entered into this agreement in his own personal capacity;

"2. That the parties have agreed to settle and terminate this case No. G.R. No. L-39958 before this Honorable
Court, including the case under CA-G.R. No. 40441- R, Court of Appeals, and Civil Case No. OZ (118), Court
of First Instance, Branch II, Misamis Occidental;

"3. That for and in consideration of this amicable compromise agreement, the parties have agreed that petitioner
Jesus D. Jureidini shall pay, as in fact he has already paid, to private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) Philippine Currency;

"4. That private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini does hereby acknowledge receipt, to his entire
satisfaction, of the aforesaid sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from petitioner;

"5. That by virtue of this agreement, private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini does hereby renounce,
repudiate, waive and quitclaim, now and forever, in favor of petitioner Jesus D. Jureidini, whatever rights,
interests, claims, title, and participations he has in the estate, real, personal and/or whatever nature, left by the
deceased Nazario S. Jureidini;

"6. The parties do hereby agree to waive, relinquish and abandon whatever claims and counterclaims they have
against each other in the aforesaid cases.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with this Amicable
Compromise Agreement, without costs. "At Oroquieta City (for Manila), August 2, 1976.
"(SGD) NAZARIO CLARENCE JUREIDINI
Acting on the aforequoted compromise agreement, Attys. Estanislao A. Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and
Ortile and Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, filed with this Court on August 19, 1916, a manifestation and motion
stating, among other things: (a) that the appearance of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva as counsel for respondent
Nazario Clarence Jureidini is without their knowledge and consent; and (b) that they have no knowledge,
intervention or inkling of the amicable settlement executed by and between the petitioner and aforesaid
respondent, with prayer that they be given thirty (30) days from August 19, 1976 within which to file the
necessary comment, pleading or motion with respect to said amicable settlement, and pending the filing of such
comment, any action on the agreement be held in abeyance.

The Court, per Its resolution of September 1, 1976 required:

(1) the movants to furnish Atty. Villanueva with a copy of said manifestation and motion and to submit to this
Court proof of such service, both within five (5) days from notice thereof; and (2) Atty. Villanueva to comment
thereon within ten (10) days from receipt of said copy. On October 5, 1976, Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva filed his
comment to manifestation and motion, stating among other things — "

2. That the private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini sometime on August 2, 1976, engaged the legal
services of the undersigned for the purpose of drafting, preparing and participating in the execution of the
amicable settlement which said private respondent and the petitioner had already arrived at and concluded, as a
[Type text]

matter of fact, the monetary consideration mentioned in the Amicable Compromise Agreement had already
been paid prior to August 2, 1976, par. 3, of the Amicable Compromise Agreement;

"3. That the undersigned had inquired from the private respondent as to whether his previous counsel or
counsels has knowledge of the said settlement, and the latter informed the former that he has not engaged and
contracted the services of any counsel at any time, however, he declared that his mother did, but their legal
services were already fully compensated, and that he further declared that he wants and desires to engage a
counsel of his own choice;

"4. That having known the private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to be of legal age and that he was not
suffering from any incapacity to enter into a contract, and further knowing that the contract he will enter into is
not contrary to law, morals or public policy, the undersigned accepted the request of private respondent to be his
counsel in the execution of the said Amicable Compromise Agreement and its consequent approval by this
Honorable Court;

"5. That consequently, on the same date of August 2, 1976, when the Amicable Compromise Agreement was
entered into by the parties in the City of Oroquieta, the undersigned formally filed his appearance with this
Honorable Court, with the consent and authority of the private respondent as may be shown therein. . . ."

In reply to the foregoing comment of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva, Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay,
Barin and Ortile 􀀹led on November 4, 1976 a motion to hold in abeyance approval of the compromise
agreement, stating among other things, that the
compromise agreement "is not only immoral and entered (into) in bad faith by petitioner and private respondent
but also patently unconscionable, inequitous and an unjust action to the prejudice of all the lawyers who had
rendered legal services since 26 March 1976", and that "even assuming Nazario Clarence Jureidini did not enter
into any contract with the attorneys of record, he cannot disregard the legal services rendered in his behalf and
for which he has wholly bene􀀹ted," and praying further that a commissioner be appointed to receive the
evidence for attorney's fees and to approve the same as charging lien on the Testate Estate of Nazario Jureidini.

Considering the reply of Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile to the comment of Atty.
Luisito S. Villanueva to the former's manifestation and motion dated August 19, 1976, this Court in its
Resolution dated November 10, 1976, required private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to 􀀹le his
rejoinder to said reply within ten (10) days from notice thereof. A copy of this resolution of November 10,
1976, addressed to private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini at Plaridel, Misamis Occidental was returned
to this Court with the information that addressee is no longer residing at Plaridel, Misamis Occidental.
Accordingly this Court, in a resolution dated January 26, 1977, resolved;: (a) to advise Atty. Estanislao
Fernandez, et al. that the aforesaid respondent is no longer residing at his last known address; and (b) to require
aforesaid counsel to inform this Court within 􀀹ve (5 ) days from notice, of the present address of aforesaid
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini. Complying with the immediately preceding resolution, Atty. Estanislao
Fernandez, et al. informed this Court that the present address of private respondent
Nazario Clarence Jureidini is as follows: LLjur
Nazario Clarence Jureidini
c/o Luz Rodriguez
No. 339 Younger Street
Balut, Tondo, Manila.
Acting on the compliance by counsel for respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini aforesaid, this Court resolved
on February as, 1977, to send to respondent at the above given address, the resolution of this Court dated
November 10, 1976 requiring him to file rejoinder to the reply of Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. For failure
of private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to file a rejoinder to the reply of Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et
al. to the comment of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva to the former's manifestation and motion dated August 19,
[Type text]

1976, within the period which expired on March 19, 1976, the Court resolved on May 10, 1977 to require
aforesaid respondent;
(a) to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for such failure; and (b) to comply with the resolution
of November 10, 1976 requiring said rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice thereof. For willful
disregard of the resolution of this Court of May 20, 1977 which required private respondent Nazario Clarence
Jureidini to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for having failed to file a rejoinder to
the reply dated November 3, 1976 of Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile and to
comply with the resolution of November 10, 1976 requiring said rejoinder both within the period which expired
on June 9, 1977, the Court adjudged said respondent Jureidini guilty of contempt of court and ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his imprisonment at the detention cell of the National Bureau of Investigation until he
shall have complied with this Court's
resolutions. Forthwith, this Court issued on the same day an "Order of Arrest and Commitment", commanding
the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue Manila, "to arrest Nazario Clarence Jureidini who
is said to be found at No. 339 Younger
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila (c/o Luz Rodriguez) . . . and to commit him to the detention cell of the NBI where
he shall be detained and safely kept until he has fully complied with the resolutions of this Court . . . ."

On January 12, 1978, Sr. NBI Agent Jesus S. Caragan of the National Bureau of Investigation returned to this
Court the order of arrest and commitment, UNSERVED, with the information that subject cannot be located at
the aforementioned address and his
present whereabouts are not known. While this Court, in the meantime, was awaiting compliance by private
respondent Nazario
Clarence Jureidini of the resolution of November 10, 1976, one Manuel T. Cortez of Ozamis City filed before
this Court a petition for intervention praying, inter-alia, that he be allowed to intervene and file his claim against
the private respondent for all his financial aid
extended to him during the pendency and prosecution of his claim in the trial court and in CD Technologies
Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com the Court of Appeals against the Testate Estate of Nazario Jureidini; and
that the approval of petitioner's compromise agreement entered into with private respondent Nazario Clarence
Jureidini be held in abeyance until he shall have been duly heard, attaching thereto a copy of a memorandum of
agreement, which was executed between him and Luz Rodriguez, for herself and as guardian ad litem of private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini, on March 7, 1974. Among other things, said memorandum of agreement
provides that to reimburse Cortez for the expenses incurred to prosecute and defend the case including the
professional fee of her lawyer together with the interest charged thereon, the parties (petitioner and Luz
Rodriguez) agreed that in the event this case is finally terminated and won, Luz Rodriguez would pay Cortez:

"ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE TOTAL SHARE OF THE FIRST PARTY OF THE MONIES,
PROPERTIES AND ALL OTHER KINDS OR NATURE WHATSOEVER ADJUDICATED TO THE FIRST
PARTY, including damages awarded and interests due thereon as based and computed in the final promulgation
of the decision in said Civil Case mentioned herein."
The questions that now arise are:
1. May the rights of lawyers to the fees due them for services rendered their client be invoked as a ground for
holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement entered into by the client and his adversary?

2. May a petition for intervention filed by an alleged financier of one of the parties litigants in a case be
entertained by this Court at this stage of the proceedings, and if so, may the pendency thereof be invoked as a
ground for holding in abeyance a compromise
agreement entered into by and between the parties litigants?

WE answer these questions in the negative.

[Type text]

1. The matter of attorney's fees, if any, due Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile from
private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini cannot have a standing higher than the rights of the clients or the
parties themselves. Hence, lawyers' rights to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers
themselves as a ground for disapproving or otherwise holding in abeyance the approval of the compromise
agreement, which is otherwise not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy. The lawyers concerned
can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court,
but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement (Jesalva, et al. vs. Hon.
Bautista and Premier Productions. Inc., 105 Phil. 348, 352).

2. With respect to the petition for intervention, WE deny the same, not only because the claim of the intervenor
can be properly ventilated before the proper court in a separate proceeding, but also because it will unduly delay
and prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties litigants in the case at bar. The compromise agreement hereinabove reproduced is not
contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, and provides for the full satisfaction of respondent's claim
against the petitioner. LibLex
WHEREFORE. THE AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 12, 1976 IS HEREBY
APPROVED, AND THE PARTIES ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO ABIDE BY AND COMPLY WITH THE
TERMS THEREOF.

4 SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and EVANGELINE
SURLA, respondents.
Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping? This question is the core issue presented for resolution
in the instant petition.
First, a factual background.
On 26 December 1995, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas
University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City predicated on an allegation by the spouses
that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had
accidentally fallen from his incubator on 16 April 1995 possibly causing serious harm on the child. The case
was raffled and assigned to Branch 226 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by the Hon.
Leah S. Domingo-Regala, and there docketed Civil Case No. Q-95-25977.
On 28 February 1996, petitioner hospital filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that
respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for Emmanuels confinement at
the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees, by reason of the
supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it.
On 21 March 1996, petitioner received a copy of respondents Reply to Counterclaim, dated 12 March 1996,
that sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for its non-compliance with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourt, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum
shopping.
In its Rejoinder to respondents Reply to Counterclaim, petitioner contended that the subject circular should
be held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily
connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the
filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for
[Type text]

independent adjudication. Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was compulsory in nature, the
subject circular did not perforce apply to it.[1]
In its Order of 22 March 1996, the trial court dismissed petitioners counterclaim,it held:

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provides; among others:

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition
or application wherein a party asserts his claim on (sic) relief.

It will be noted that the counterclaim does not distinguish whether the same should be permissive or
compulsory, hence this Court finds that the counterclaim referred to in said Circular covers both kinds.

WHEREFORE, the counterclaim of defendant is hereby DISMISSED. Let the pre-trial of this case be set on
May 14, 1996 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon xxx[2]

On 16 April 1996, petitioner filed before the same court an Omnibus Motion seeking a clarification of the
courts Order of 14 March 1996 denying respondents Reply to Counterclaim and reconsideration of the
22nd March 1996 Order dismissing the compulsory counterclaim.[3] On 22 April 1996, petitioner received a
copy of the courts Order, dated 16 April 1996, which pertinently read:

WHEREFORE, the Order dated March 14, 1996 is hereby clarified as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

The Reply to counterclaim filed by counsel for plaintiffs is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

"The Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts Order dated March 22, 1996 is hereby DENIED. The pre-trial
conference set on May 14, 1996 will go on as scheduled.[4]

Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, asseverating grave abuse of discretion by public
respondent in dismissing the compulsory counterclaim and in espousing the view that Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 should apply even to compulsory counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision promulgated on 12 March 1997, dismissed the petition for certiorari;
it opined:

x x x the Supreme Court circular aforequoted requires without equivocation that to the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,etc.) party complainant, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief to be filed in all courts and agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals must be annexed and simultaneously filed therewith the required
certification under oath to avoid forum shopping or multiple filing of petitions and complaints. Non-compliance
therewith is a cause for the dismissal of the complainant, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading. Included in such initiatory pleading is the defendants counterclaim, permissive or compulsory.
[Type text]

A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case x x
x, only this time it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is
tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.[5]

In its present recourse, petitioner contends that

The Court of Appeals (has) committed serious, evident and palpable error in ruling that:

5.1 THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT IS UNAVAILING. THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM BEING A
FINAL ORDER, THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE TAKEN AN APPEAL THEREFROM; AND

5.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT LIKEWISE

APPLIES TO BOTH KINDS OF COUNTERCLAIMS, PERMISSIVE AND COMPULSORY.[6]

The petition is partly meritorious.

The appellate court ruled that the dismissal of the counterclaim, being a final order, petitioners remedy was
to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then available, the special civil action for certiorari had been
improperly filed.
The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished form an interlocutory issuance, is that the former
decisively puts to a close, or disposes of a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing else to be done by the court
in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended
on the particular matter involved.[7] An order is interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be
provisional in character and would still leave substantial proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in
order to put the controversy to rest.[8]
The order of the trial court dismissing petitioners counterclaim was a final order since the dismissal,
although based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the court with respect to the specific
subject except only to await the possible filing during the reglementary period of a motion for reconsideration
or the taking of an appeal therefrom.
As a rule, errors of judgment, as well as of procedure, neither relating to the jurisdiction of the court nor
involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.[9] As long as
a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed
error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and
not assailable by a special civil action for certiorari.[10] This rule however, is not a rigid and inflexible
technicality.This Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the
proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations could warrant such a
recourse.[11] Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and
injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where an
ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment
complained of.[12]
In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not totally unavailable, could
have well been ineffective, if not futile, as far as petitioner is concerned since no single piece of evidence has
yet been presented by it, the opportunity having been foreclosed by the trial court, on the dismissed
counterclaim which could form part of the records to be reviewed by the appellate court. The object of
procedural law is not to cause an undue protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of
conflicting claims and to serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice.[13]
[Type text]

The opinion of this Court on the next issue persuades it to accept, tested by the foregoing disquisition, the
instant petition for its consideration.
The pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:

1 The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding
is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and
(d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification
contemplated here have been filed.

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth, etc.) party complaint or complaint-in-intervention,
petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on
01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition tha tone or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.[14] The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to
cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.[15]
It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that the
circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as
being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support
therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent
resolution except by the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the provisio in the
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-
forum shopping rule shall not be curable by mere amendment x x x but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification against forum
shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up.
Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so called counterclaim of petitioner really
consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total
amount of P82,632.10; and (2) for damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorneys fees by reason of the alleged
malicious and unfounded suit filed against it.[16] It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court here refers to
as not being initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-
94.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for moral, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees in Civil Case No. Q-95-25977 of petitioner is ordered reinstated. The temporary restraining
order priorly issued by this Court is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[Type text]

5 LAZARO V. KAVINTA , petitioner, v s . HON. PRUDENCIO ALTRE CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge,
Branch 220, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, and ANTONIO C. FRANCO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94; COMPLIANCE THEREWITH,
MANDATORY; WHEN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE ALLOWED; CASE AT BAR. — I n Loyola vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117186, 29 June 1995 this Court categorically ruled that Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 of this Court issued by the Chief Justice on 8 February 1994 and which took effect on 1
April 1994 is mandatory as indicated by the clear language of its paragraph 2. Nevertheless, substantial
compliance thereof is suf􀁃cient. Thus: Substantial compliance with the Circular is suf􀁃cient. This Circular
expanded or broadened the applicability of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. In Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals,
[G.R. No. 112547, Resolution of 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192] this Court held that substantial compliance
therewith is suf􀁃cient for: It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and
applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular
No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate an orderly administration of justice
and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure —which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible. . . . The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not
thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justi􀁃able circumstances. The proximity then
of the 􀁃ling of the complaint to the date of the effectivity of the Circular may be pleaded as a justi􀁃able
circumstance, and the belated 􀁃ling of the certi􀁃cation required thereunder may be deemed a substantial
compliance therewith. We thus rule pro hac vice, but not without a whit of reluctance, that this special
circumstance in this case could sustain the action of the respondent Judge. This should not be taken, however,
as a precedent. Elsewise stated, the mere submission of a certi􀁃cation under Administrative Circular No. 04-94
after the 􀁃ling of a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-compliance thereof does not ipso facto operate as a
substantial
compliance; otherwise the Circular would lose its value or efficacy. Cdasia

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:

The issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether public respondent Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo,
Jr., has committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20532 on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping required under Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 1was, nevertheless, subsequently submitted after the filing of the motion to dismiss.

The antecedent disclosed by the parties in their pleadings are uncomplicated.

On 11 May 1994, private respondent represented by his attorney-in-fact, Angeles F. Arroyo, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner Lazaro V. Kavinta and others 2 a complaint
for Recovery of Possession and Issuance of Writ of Demolition. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20532 and was raffled to Branch 220 of said court, which is presided over by public respondent Judge Castillo.
[Type text]

On 20 June 1994, the petitioner and his codefendants moved to dismiss the complaint 3 on the ground that "it
does not comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court which took effect on April 1,
1994."

On 4 July 1994 private respondent filed, through counsel, an opposition to the motion to dismiss, 4 to which he
attached as Annex "A" thereof the certification required in Administrative Circular No. 04-94. 5

On 20 July 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 6 denying the motion to dismiss in view of the submission of
the aforesaid certification, and directing the defendants to file their answer or responsive pleading "within the
remaining reglementary period in accordance with the Rules of Court."

On 3 August 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 7 declaring petitioner's Reply to the opposition to the motion
to dismiss moot and academic in view of the order of 20 July 1994.

On 24 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider his Reply as a motion for the reconsideration of the
order of 20 July 1994. 8

On 2 September 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order 9 denying the Reply, which was treated as a motion for
reconsideration, and clarifying that

The language of the July 20, 1994 order is very clear and unambiguous. The fifteen (15) days
reglementary period to plead is reckoned from the date defendants, through counsel, received the
notice denying their motion to dismiss.

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of this Court issued by the Chief Justice on 8 February 1994 and which took
effect on 1 April 1994 pertinently provides:

Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of
petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of
forum shopping.

Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in addition to
those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly
complied with in the filing of complaints petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in
all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and shall be
subject to the sanctions provided hereunder:

1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the
following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency
wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.
[Type text]

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the
original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) — party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.

2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly
wilful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple
complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1
hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings
against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party.

In Loyola vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 10 we categorically ruled that the Circular is mandatory as indicated by the
clear language of its paragraph 2. Nevertheless, substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Thus:

Substantial compliance with the Circular is sufficient. This Circular expanded or broadened the
applicability of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. In Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
112547, Resolution of 18 July 1994. 234 SCRA 192] this Court held that substantial compliance
therewith is sufficient for:

It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and
applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it
promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate an orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure —
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded,
but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, private respondent neither offered any explanation why he failed to
comply with the Circular nor invoked any justifiable circumstance which would relieve him of the adverse
effect of non-compliance. If this Court is to be unbending in its demand for at least a substantial compliance of
the said Circular, the challenged order must have to be set aside. However, in his motion to dismiss the instant
petition, 11private respondent pointed out that the filing of the required certification was done with dispatch by
his counsel upon "realization of the existence of said circular." He thereby admits his unawareness or ignorance
of the Circular at the time he filed his complaint. We are not unmindful of the fact that Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 took effect only on 1 April 1994 and the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-94-20532 was filed on 11
May 1994. The proximity then of the filing of the complaint to the date of the effectivity of the Circular may be
pleaded as a justifiable circumstance, and the belated filing of the certification required thereunder may be
deemed a substantial compliance therewith. We thus rule pro hac vice, but not without a whit of reluctance, that
this special circumstance in this case could sustain the action of the respondent Judge. This should not be taken,
however, as a precedent. Elsewise stated, the mere submission of a certification under Administrative Circular
[Type text]

No. 04-94 after the filing of a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-compliance thereof does not ipso
facto operate as a substantial compliance; otherwise the Circular would lose its value or efficacy.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to file his responsive pleading in
Civil Case No. Q-94-20532 within a period of ten (10) days from notice of this resolution.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

6 INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL., petitioners, v s . COURT

OF APPEALS, HON. ANGEL V. COLET, MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., respondents.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; FORUM-SHOPPING; WHEN PRESENT. — For forum shopping to exist, both actions
must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances. Furthermore, the actions must also
raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Moreover, "[t]here is forum-shopping whenever, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another." Therefore, a party to a case resorts to forum-shopping because "[b]y filing another petition
involving the same essential facts and circumstances, . . . , respondents approached two different fora in order to
increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action."

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J p:

Material hereto are the antecedents mostly taken from the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP 33177, (International Container Terminal Services, Inc., et. al. v. Hon. Angel V. Colet, et.
al.), 1 subject of the present petition for review, viz:

On February 3, 1988, the Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-88 (A.O. No. 02-88)
entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service". A.O. No. 02-88 opened pilotage services in the
Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots regardless of their non-membership in existing harbor
pilots association. 2

The United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "United Harbor" for
brevity) and private respondent Manila Pilots Association (hereinafter referred to as "Manila Pilots") 3 made
representations with then Acting Secretary of Transportation and Communications, Hon. Rainerio O. Reyes and
the Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority to set aside the implementation of A.O. No. 02-88 claiming that
it violated their exclusive right to provide pilotage services in the Philippines.

Failing in their efforts to obtain a reconsideration of the said administrative order, "United Harbor" and private
respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to invalidate A.O. No. 02-88 by filing with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order against Secretary
Reyes, the Philippine Ports Authority, its General Manager, Maximo S. Dumlao, Jr. and certain "John Does"
(Civil Case No. 88-44726).

On October 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726 in favor of
"United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots", the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted:

[Type text]

1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving Resolution No. 869 and in enacting
Administrative Order No. 02-88, the subject of which is "Implementing Guidelines or (sic) Open
Pilotage Service;

2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void;

3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent; and

4. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

The above decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it raised a purely legal question. 5 The dismissal was appealed to this court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari which was denied with finality on June 8, 1992. 6 Notwithstanding
the finality of the decision recognizing the exclusive right to pilotage of "United Harbor" and private respondent
"Manila Pilots", petitioner "International Container" took over the pilotage services at the Manila International
Port area 7 on October 28, 1992 by virtue of a contract it entered into with the Philippine Ports Authority.

As a consequence, "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed a series of petitions in Civil
Case No. 88-44726 to hold then Philippine Ports Authority General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan and
"International Container" officials and other persons in contempt of court. The contempt petitions, however,
have not been resolved because the Office of the Solicitor General elevated to the Supreme Court (docketed as
G.R. 107720) the question of whether or not the lower court still had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petitions for contempt in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726.

Pending resolution of the contempt petitions, private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed another case against
petitioner "International Container" before Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-66024 for damages suffered by private respondent "Manila Pilots" between April 19, 1993 and
April 29, 1993 as a result of petitioner's usurpation of its sole and exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the
South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan, except the Manila International Port area. 8

Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of petitioner "International Container", and its continuing refusal
to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila International Port area, private respondent "Manila Pilots"
instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against
petitioner "International Container" before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil
Case No. 66143.

In an Order dated January 20, 1994, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 93-66143 issued the writ prayed
for, thereby "restoring and reinstating private respondent "Manila Pilots" to the exclusive exercise of harbor
pilotage in the Manila International Port (MIP) area and commanding petitioner "International Container" to
cease and desist from usurping or exercising the right to compulsory pilotage in the said Manila International
Port (MIP) area." 9Petitioner "International Container" assailed this order of the lower court by filing a petition
for certiorari with respondent court contending, among others, that the filing of Civil Case No. 93-66143,
pending:

1.) Contempt petitions incidents of Civil Case No.

88-44726 — The contempt petitions filed by "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila
[Type text]

Pilots" against petitioner "International Container" and Philippine Ports Authority for defying the
final judgment in Civil Case No. 88-44726;

2.) G.R. No. 107720 — The case filed by the Office of the Solicitor General with the Supreme
Court raising the question of jurisdiction of the lower court to take cognizance of the contempt
petitions in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726; and

3.) Civil Case No. 93-66024 — The action for damages filed by private respondent "Manila
Pilots" against "International Container" to recover unearned income from the exercise of harbor
pilotage in ports other than the Manila International Port (MIP) area from April 19, 1993 to April
29, 1993 was violative of the prohibition against forum shopping. 10 Respondent court found no
merit in this contention, and affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Hence, the main inquiry posed before us: On the basis of the foregoing, is there forum shopping?

Petitioner "International Container" contends that there is forum shopping because "[t]he issue on (sic) the
contempt petition before Judge Flojo 11 and before this Court and (sic) in G.R. No. 107720 is the very same
issue involved in the case for mandamus and prohibition (Civil Case No. 93-66143)". 12 It further contends that
private respondent "Manila Pilots" is guilty of forum shopping because "[a]t the time the contempt petitions
were pending . . . and while these petitions were being challenged . . . (G.R. No. 107720), another case . . . was
pending before RTC Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
93-66024 . . ." 13

We are not persuaded.

The assailed decision is in accordance with the established rule that for forum shopping to exist, both actions
must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances. 14 Furthermore, the actions must
also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 15 We find no such similarity in the actions
involved. Thus, as correctly observed by the respondent court:

The facts which gave rise to the contempt petition is directed against what was perceived to be
violative of the permanent injunction issued by Judge Flojo not to implement the open pilotage
policy as provided for under PPA Administrative Order No. 02-88, . . . .

Upon the other hand the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-68143 (sic) is anchored on the alleged
usurpation of the right of respondents on (sic) the sole and exclusive exercise of Harbor
Pilotage only in the MIP area, from October 29, 1992 up to the present and the corresponding
claim for damages. 16(Emphasis provided)

Furthermore, G.R. No. 107720 was filed with the Supreme Court solely to question the jurisdiction of the lower
court to take cognizance of the contempt petitions filed in Civil Case No. 88-44726, and the issue raised therein
has no bearing on that raised in Civil Case No. 93-66143.

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 93-66024 sought the recovery of damages in the form of unearned income as
a result of petitioner's usurpation of the right to pilotage of private respondent "Manila Pilots" in the South and
North Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan except Manila International Port area from April 19, 1993 to April
29, 1993while Civil Case No. 93-66143 was brought to enjoin petitioner from further usurping the same right of
private respondent "Manila Pilots" in the Manila International Port area only from October 28, 1992 up to the
present. Clearly, these two cases do not have the same facts nor do they raise identical causes of action.
[Type text]

Moreover, "[t]here is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another". 17 Therefore, a party to a case resorts to forum
shopping because "[b]y filing another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances, . . .,
respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action". 18 It cannot be said that private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to increase its chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, inasmuch as no unfavorable decision
had ever been rendered against private respondent "Manila Pilots" in any of the cases brought before the courts
below. On the contrary, private respondent "Manila Pilots" was one of the prevailing parties in Civil Case No.
88-44726 which established with finality its exclusive right together with "United Harbor" to provide pilotage
services in the Philippines even prior to the institution of the other actions (G.R.107720, Civil Case No. 93-
66024 and Civil Case No. 93-66143.)

ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible errors, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this
petition is DENIED.

7. SPOUSES VALENTINO ORTIZ AND CAMILLA MILAN ORTIZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND BERNARDINA RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioners seeks a review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV 42238 dated October
18, 1996, and its resolution[2] dated December 03, 1996, on the motion for reconsideration, dismissing the case
for failure of the petitioners to comply strictly with the Rules of Court. The appellate court decreed, thus:

WHEREFORE, for not being sufficient in form and substance, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED due course and accordingly DISMISSED outright.[3]

The factual background of this petition is as follows:

The spouses Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, herein private respondents (hereafter the Rodriguezes),
filed an action for ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque, Branch 77, against Valentin
and Camilla Ortiz, herein petitioners (hereafter the Ortizes), who are lessees of Cristopher and Angelica
Barramedas, on the ground that they are the real owners of the house and lot or the subject property. MeTC,
Branch 77, awarded the possession of the property in favor of the Rodriguezes.
The Ortizes appealed the Paraaque MeTC decision to the RTC of Paraaque, Branch 257. On August 30,
1996, the latter court found no reversible error in the assailed judgment, and thus affirmed it in toto. On
September 27, 1996, the Rodriguezes filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of judgment, which
was opposed by the herein petitioners on October 24, 1996.
Upon the Paraaque RTCs denial of the Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the
petitioner Ortizes appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was dismissed on the following grounds:
(1) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the counsel and not by the petitioners themselves, and
(2) the copy of the RTC decision is not duly certified as a true copy as required by Sec. 3 (b), Rule 6 of the
Revised Internal Rules of CA. Further, the supposed duplicate original copy of said decision does not bear the
dry seal of the trial court, but merely stamped Original Signed, which appears above the name of the judge.
Hence, the petitioners now come before us, and raise the following grounds in support of the petition:
[Type text]

I The Court of Appeals is clear contravention of the rules of Court, and the ruling in Gabionza v. Court of
Appeals, 234 SCRA 192, Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 477 and Kavinta v. Castillo, 249 SCRA 604
gravely erred in dismissing the Ortizes' petition review, and/or in failing to reconsider such dismissal.

II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to rule on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC which
had decided the issue of ownership.

III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ignoring the issue of forum shopping raised against the Rodriguezes,
and thus sanctioned a violation of Circular Nos. 28-91 and 04-94.[4]

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the main issue for our resolution is:

DID THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
UNDER RULE 41 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED, FOR FAILURE OF
PETITIONERS TO FAITHFULLY COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH
IN SC CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND SC ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULARS NO. 3-96?

To resolve the issue, it should be recalled that Revised Circular No. 28-91[5] provides that the
party must certify under oath that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different Division thereof, or any other tribunal or agency[6] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners admit that their lawyer, Atty. Ma. Filomena Singh-Paulite, signed the Certification on Non-
Forum Shopping. Allegedly, Atty. Paulite has personal knowledge that the Ortizes had not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same parties and causes of action. Petitioners now assert that their
lawyers signature must be accepted as substantial compliance with the requirements of the Circular.
Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance as
provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners
here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince
the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. However, the
petitioners did not give any explanation to warrant their exemption from the strict application of rule. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Concerning the second ground for the appellate courts dismissal of the petition, it is required that:

2 The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialled by the authorities or the corresponding officers
or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other official indication
of the authenticity and completeness of such copy.[7] (Emphasis ours.)

Petitioners contend that they attached the very same duplicate original copy of the decision which they
revised from the RTC. Said duplicate original copy of the decision, having come from the trial court itself.,
petitioners believed in good faith that, by attaching it to the petition, they would be considered to have
substantially complied with the filing requirements under the law. However, strict compliance with procedural
requirements in taking an appeal cannot be substituted by good faith compliance. To rule otherwise would
defeat the very purpose of the rules of procedure, i. e., to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[8]
Although the petitioners subsequently submitted to the CA the corrected annexes of the Petition for review,
the respondent court ruled that it did not stop the questioned decision from becoming final and executory.
[Type text]

The petitioners failed to fully satisfy the CA or this Court that (1) the non-compliance with the
requirements was not in any way attributable to them; (2) they exerted due diligence; (3) there are highly
justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make a disposition in the interest of justice.[9]
The Petition for review filed by the Ortizes with the CA was an appeal from the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Ortizes should bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a natural
right to a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.[10] The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules, Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[11] Rules of Procedure are required to be
followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons, they must be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[12]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent,
the Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRM the decision in CA-G.R. CV
42238. COST against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.