REFERENCE COPY

FOR LIBRARY USE ONLY

Federal

/ Construction
BUILDING RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD

Council

Technical Report No. 69

Stationary Diesel Engines

For Use with Generators

To Supply Electric Power

 BUILDING RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD
THE BUILDING RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD is the principal unit of the National Research Council Commission on
Sociotechnical Systems concerned with the built environment. Its primary objective is 10 promote the orderly growth and develop
ment of science and technology to meet societal needs for housing, building, and related community and environmental design
and development. In fulfilling this objective the Board works toward: improving the availability and utilization of the human and
natural resources needed to create, operate, maintain, and renew the built environment; identifying the individual, societal, and
physical environmental objectives to be sought in the built environment; increasing the effectiveness of the building process func
tions of planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance, repair and alteration, rehabilitation and disposal, and recycling
of useful materials and products; and extending the base of knowledge concerning the art, science, and technology of building and
stimulating the transference of this knowledge into application.
The 36-member Board, together with a number of individuals from federal agencies who serve in a liaison capacity, constitutes a
body of recognized authorities in building-interested segments of industry, government, the design professions, and academic and
research institutions; each member serves as an individual and never as a representative of any other organization or interest group.
The Board's strength rests in the expertise and dedication of this multidisciplinary membership and that of the hundreds of indi
viduals from both the public and private sectors who respond to its requests that they serve voluntarily on its various working
groups. Composed of these knowledgeable individuals, the Board's Councils, committees, panels, and task groups address and often
recommend solutions to important problems and issues that affect the future of the built environment.
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS
1976-77
OFFICERS
Charles E. Schaffner, Chairman
Bernard H. Breymann, Vice Chairman Dan E. Morgenroth, Vice Chairman J. Neils Thompson. Vice Chairman
Robert M. Dillon, Executive Director
MEMBERS
'Bernard H. Breymann, President, Eco-Terra Corp., Chicago, Kenneth J. Kerin, Director, Economics and Research, Na
Illinois tional Association of Realtors, Washington, D.C.
Richard B. DeMars, President, Geupel DeMars, Inc., India Marjorie M. Lawson, Attorney, Lawson and Lawson, Wash
napolis, Indiana ington, D.C.
G. Day Ding, Head, Department of Achitecture, College of Otis M. Mader, Vice President-Consumer Group-Allied Prod
Fine and
•JWalter Appied Arts,
S. Douglas, University
Chairman of theofBoard,
Illinois.Parsons.
Urbana Brinck- ucts, Aluminum Company of America, Pittsburgh, Penn
sylvania
erhoff. Quade & Douglas, Inc., New York, New York Garth L. Mangum, McGraw Professor of Economics and
William D. Drake, Professor of Urban and Regional Plan Director, Human Resources Institute, University of Utah,
ning and Professor of Natural Resources, University of Salt Lake City
Michigan, Ann Arbor
•Robert Martin Engelbrecht, AIA, Robert Martin Engelbrecht Frank J. Matzke, Executive Director, State of Illinois Capi
tal Development Board. Springfield
and Associates, Architects, Planners, Researchers, Prince D. Quinn Mills, Professor of Business Administration and
ton, New Jersey Labor Relations, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massa
(Joseph T. English, M.D., Director, Department of Psychia chusetts
try, St. Vincent's Hospital and Medical Center of New •Dan E. Morgenroth, PE, Manager, Market Development,
York, New York
•Robert A. Georgine, President, Building and Construction Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Toledo. Ohio
Louis W. Riggs, President and Director, Tudor Engineering
Trades Department. AFL-CIO, Washington. D.C. Company, San Francisco, California
Charles P. Graves, Professor, College of Architecture, Uni •Harold D. Sarshik, Vice President. 20th Century Construc
versity of Kentucky, Lexington tion Company, Inc.. Cherry Hill. New Jersey
Paul C. Grciner, Vice President, Energy Conservation and •Charles E. Schaffner, Senior Vice President, Syska & Hen-
Management, Edison Electric Institute, New York, New nessy. Inc., New York, New York
York Gutman, Professor, School of Architecture, Princeton
•Robert •J. Neils Thompson, Director, Balcones Research Center. The
University, Princeton, New Jersey University of Texas, Austin
Charles M. Haar. Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Law Warren H. Turner, Engineering Director, Equipment and
School of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
•Calvin S. Hamilton, Director of Planning, City of Los Ange Building, American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
les, Los Angeles, California Basking Ridge, New Jersey
Lawrence E. Hinkle, M.D., Professor of Medicine and Di William G. Vasvary, Executive Director, Southern Building
rector, Division of Human Ecology, Medical College, Cor Code Congress, Birmingham, Alabama
nell University, New York, New York Arthur M. Weimer, Special Assistant to the President, Grad
Morton Hoppenfeld, AIA, A1P, Dean, School of Architec uate School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington
ture and Planning, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque John H. Wiggins, President, J. H. Wiggins Company, Re-
John C. Horning, Manager, Engineering, Real Estate and dondo Beach. California
Construction Operation, General Electric Company, Sche •Beverly A. Willis, AIA, President, Willis and Associates,
nectady, New York Inc., Architects, Environmental Planners, and Consultants,
Oliver H. Jones, Executive Vice President, Mortgage Bank San Francisco. California
ers Association
•Rudard A. Jones,ofAIA,
America, Washington,
Director D C. Professor of
and Research •Joseph H. Zettel, Vice President, Director of Research and
Architecture, Small Homes Council-Building Research Development, Industrial and Building Products, Johns-
Council, University of Illinois, Urbana Manville Products Corporation, Denver, Colorado
LIAISON
Gerrit D. Fremouw, PE, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Charles J. Orlebeke, Assistant Secretary for Policy Develop
Facilities Engineering and Property Management, Depart ment and Research, Department of Housing and Urban
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington. D.C. Development, Washington, D.C.
Henry H. Marvin, Director, Division of Solar Energy, Energy Nicholas A. Panuzio, Commissioner, Public Buildings Serv
Research and Development Administration, Washington. ice, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C.
D.C. William B. Taylor, Chief, Research and Development Office,
Viggo P. Miller, Assistant Administrator for Construction, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army,
Office of Construction, Veterans Administration, Washing Washington, D.C.
ton, D.C. James R. Wright, Deputy Director, Institute for Applied
Michael H. Moskow, Undersecretary, Department of Labor. Technology, National Bureau of Standards, Department
Washington, D.C. of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
EX-OFF1CIO MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Past Chairmen )
John P. Gnaedinger. President, Soil Testing Services, Inc., tWalter R. Hibbard. Jr., University Professor of Engineering,
Northbrook, Illinois Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacks-
burg, Virginia
Herbert H. Swinburne, FAIA, Architect, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
EX-OFFICIO
tPhilip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences
tCourtland D. Perkins, President, National Academy of Engi- ttHarvey Brooks, Chairman, Commission on Sociotechnical
Systems, National Research Council
•Member, BRAB Executive Committee tMember, NAS JMember, NAE {Member, IOM
 STATIONARY DIESEL ENGINES FOR USE

WITH GENERATORS TO SUPPLY ELECTRIC POWER

Technical Report No . 69

Prepared by
the Task Group T-59
of the
Federal Construction Council
Building Research Advisory Board
Commission on Sociotechnical Systems
National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Washington, D.C.
1977 NAS-NAE

FEB 15 1978

LIBRARY
NOTICE: The project that is the suhject of this report was approved by
the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are
drawn from the Councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the
Committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special compe
tences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according
to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members
of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering,
and the Institute of Medicine.

This report was prepared under the following contracts between the National
Academy of Sciences and the supporting federal agencies: Department of the
Army, N00014-76-A-0013 ; Department of Commerce, 700476; Energy Research and
Development Administration, EA-77-C-01-2641 ; General Services Administration,
GS-00-B-871; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, HEW-100-76-00051 ;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASW-2988; Department of the
Navy, N00025-77-C-0001; Veterans Administration, V101 (031C) P-322.

By supporting contract agreement, federal agencies wishing copies of this

report are entitled to such copies on request to the Building Research
Advisory Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 20418.

Inquiries concerning this publication should be addressed to: The Executive

Director, Building Research Advisory Board, National Research Council, 2101
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C 20418.
 FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION COUNCIL
of the
BUILDING RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD

The Federal Construction Council serves as a planning, coordinating, and operating body to encourage
continuing cooperation among federal agencies in advancing the science and technology of building as
related to federal construction activities.
In this pursuit, its specific objectives include: Assembly and correlation of available knowledge
and experience from each of the agencies; elimination of undesirable duplication in investigative
effort on common problems; free discussion among scientific and technical personnel, both within
and outside the government, on selected building problems; objective resolution of technical prob
lems of particular concern to the federal construction agencies; and appropriate distribution of
resulting information.
The Council as such comprises ten members appointed by the BRAB Chairman from among BRAB membership,
plus one member from the senior professional staff of each of the supporting federal agencies (cur
rently nine), also appointed by the BRAB Chairman on nomination from the Individual agencies; all
appointments are subject to approval by the President of the National Academy of Sciences.
The Council directs the conduct of technical investigations and surveys of practice, holds symposia/
workshops, arranges for interchanges of information and for monitoring of research and technical
projects.

FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION COUNCIL— 1976-1977

Chairman
Beverly A. Willis, AIA, President
Willis and Associates, Incorporated
San Francisco, California

James M. Bayne, Director, Resources Management Division, Office of Facilities, National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D. C.
Robert W. Blake, Director, Office of Planning and Development, Facilities Engineering and
Property Management, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D. C.
Gregory J. Cavanagh, Assistant Director for Plant Operations, Division of Planning and
Support, Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D. C.
James C. Day, Jr., Director, Engineering Operations Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, Department of the Navy, Alexandria, Virginia
Richard B. DeMars, President, Geupel DeMars, Incorporated, Indianapolis, Indiana
G. Day Ding, Professor and Head, Department of Architecture, University of Illinois,
Urbana, Illinois
Lee S. Garrett, Chief, Engineering Division, Military Construction Directorate, Office
of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
Charles P. Graves, Professor, College of Architecture, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
Kentucky
Paul C. Greiner, Vice President, Conservation and Energy Management, Edison Electric,
Institute, Washington, D. C.
John C. Horning, Manager—Engineering, Real Estate and Construction Operation, General
Electric Company, Schenectady, New York
Kenneth J. Kerin, Director, Economics and Research, National Association of Realtors,
Washington, D. C.
Frank J. Matzke, FAIA, Consultant, Springfield, Illinois
Edwin B. Mixon, Chief, Structures Branch, Directorate of Engineering and Construction
Division, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D. C.
Tom Lewis Peyton, Jr., Deputy Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services
Administration, Washington, D. C.
Blake J. Rati iff, Director, Research Staff, Office of Construction, Veterans Administration,
Washington, D. C.
Louis W. Riggs, President and Director, Tudor Engineering Company, San Francisco,
California
Harry E. Thompson, Acting Chief, Office of Housing and Building Technology, Center for
Building Technology, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D. C.
John Henry Wiggins, Jr., J. H. Wiggins, Company, Redondo Beach, California
 FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION COUNCIL

TASK GROUP T-59, DIESEL ENGINE CRITERIA*

Robert Binns. Jr., Department of the Air Force

John F. Bruton, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of
the Army
Kenneth Credle, Division of Building Technology and Safety,
Department of Housing and Urban Dcvelopivnt
Henry Gramlich, Naval Facilities Erginecring Command, Department
of the Navy
Ernest G. Huber, Formerly with the Department of the Air Force
B. J. Jankowski, Rural Electrification Administration, Department
of Agriculture
John A. Klisch, Formerly with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Paul F . Neal , Department of the Air Force
Arthur M. Pahno, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department
of the Army
Anthony J. Seal one, Office of Construction, Veterans Administration
Edward T. Zulkofske, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department
of the Army

BRAB Supporting Staff

Henry A. Borger, Executive Secretary, Federal Construction Council

Claret M. Heider, Editorial Consultant

*Brian Jessop, Rural Electrification Administration, Department

of Agriculture also assisted in the preparation of the report.
 FOREWORD

Federal Construction Council Technical Reports 42, Continuously-Operated

Diesel Engines for Electrical Power Generation, and 46, Diesel Engines for
Use with Generators to Supply Emergency and Short-Term Electric Power, pub
lished by the National Academy of Sciences in 1961 and 1963, respectively,
recommended criteria for judging the acceptability of diesel engines for
use in federal installations. Both reports have been disseminated widely
and used extensively by federal agencies and others in preparing diesel -
engine specifications. During the past few years, however, industry has
voiced the concern that certain criteria have become out of date.

In response to this concern and in view of advances in diesel technology,

the Federal Construction Council (FCC) of the Building Research Advisory
Board decided that the guidelines presented in Technical Reports 42 and 46
should be reassessed. This report, prepared by FCC Task Group T-59, reflects
this reassessment and is intended to supersede Technical Reports 42 and 46.

The Building Research Advisory Board gratefully acknowledges the work of

Task Group T-59 and wishes to thank the diesel -engine manufacturers who
provided the Task Group with information and data.

Charles E. Schaffner, Chairman

Building Research Advisory Board
_
 CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. Purpose of this Report 1

B. Scope 1
C. Conduct of the Study 1
D. Organization of the Report 1

II. RECOMMENDATIONS 3

A. General 3
B. Technical Requirements 3
C. Cost Factors 7
D. Experience Requirements 8

III. DISCUSSION 9

A. General 9
B. Technical Requirements 11
C. Cost Evaluation 18
D. Experience Requirements 20

APPENDIXES

A. Questionnaire Sent to Diesel Engine Manufacturers . . 23

B. Recommended Experience Clauses 27

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Recommended Rotational Speed Limits 4

Table 2. Recommended Brake Mean Effective Pressure Limits ... 6
Figure 1. Typical graph of vibratory stress vs. speed for a
4-stroke-cycle diesel engine 17
 I
INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide federal construction agencies with

guidance concerning the procurement of stationary diesel engines for on-site
generation of electric power. The recommendations presented in this report
are intended to supersede those presented in FCC Technical Reports 42, Con
tinuously Operated Diesel Engines for Electrical Power Generation (1961),
and 46, Diesel Engines for Use with Generators to Supply Emergency and Short-
Term Electric Power (1963) .

B. SCOPE

The report deals with technical criteria and policy relating to federal
agency procurement of stationary diesel engines for electric -power genera
tion. The report does not include criteria for the generator and related
electrical components of diesel -generator sets or for the design of electric-
power generating plants or their air-pollution or noise control equipment.*

C. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

The study on which this report is based was conducted by Federal Construction
Council Task Group T-59, composed of engineers from several federal construc
tion agencies concerned with the procurement of stationary diesel engines
used for electric-power generation. During its study the Task Group sent a
questionnaire (see Appendix A) to major manufacturers of diesel engines
requesting technical information on diesel engines and comments on the cri
teria previously published by the Federal Construction Council. After analyz
ing the responses to this questionnaire, the Task Group arranged to meet with
all manufacturers indicating a desire to do so, and during these conferences,
the Task Group members discussed possible criteria with manufacturers. The
information and views thus acquired and the collective technical experience
of the Task Group members are the basis for the recommendations made in this
report .

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The Task Group's recommendations concerning the procurement of stationary

diesel engines are presented without elaboration in section II of this report.
The rationale for these recommendations is presented in section III. Recom
mended experience clauses for diesel engines are presented in Appendix B.

♦Requirements for air-pollution and noise control equipment needed to meet

federal, state, or local regulations are considered to be overriding.

1
 II
RECOMMENDATIONS

A. GENERAL

To obtain stationary power plant diesel engines that offer adequate output,
low life-cycle cost, and high reliability, federal agencies should employ
procurement documents that include both technical and experience requirements
and provide for consideration of operating costs in the award of contracts.

In developing such documents in accordance with the specific recommendations

presented below, federal agencies should recognize three classes of engine:

1. Class A, for use with diesel-electric generator sets expected to provide

power on a continuous basis (i.e., in excess of 4,000 hours annually or
in excess of 40,000 hours during the initial 10 years of operation) or
to serve as the sole or primary source of power.

2. Class B, for use with diesel-electric generator sets expected to provide

power on a standby basis for a significant number of hours each year (i.e.,
between 1,000 and 4,000 hours annually or between 10,000 and 40,000 hours
during the initial 10 years of operation) .

3. Class C, for use with diesel-electric generator sets expected to provide

power on an emergency basis for short periods of time (i.e., less than
1,000 hours annually or less than 10,000 hours during the initial 10
years of operation) .

B. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

1. Specified Output

Federal agencies should require engine suppliers to certify that, under

the specified fuel and ambient conditions,* the net capacity of the engine
to be supplied (i.e., the capacity after allowance is made for parasitic
loads) equals or exceeds the specified output and that the engine will
deliver the specified output continuously and have the capability to provide
at least 10 percent additional output for up to 2 hours in any 24 hours.

2. Rotational Speed Limitation

Federal agencies should not accept diesel engines that have rotational
speeds which exceed the values presented in Table 1 for the appropriate
class of engine and specified output.

*Agencies should stipulate in procurement documents the ambient atmospheric

conditions under which the specified output is to be achieved as well as
the type of fuel to be used and the pressure drops to be encountered in
associated intake air and exhaust systems.

3
 Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum

000 00 90 75 aFor
0-Hz
ispeed
the
limits
be
should
reduced
nthe
dto
power
niecatredst

EClass
Cngine
00
5
less
(kW)
Output
Specified
>00
00
to
000
>00
to
powera)
RSpeed
0
TABLE
Limits
5-Hz
(for
eoctoamtienodeadl >00

Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum

000 00 90 75 00

EClass
Bngine
00
less
§
(kW)
Output
Specified sspeed
for
frequency.
that
ynchronous
>00
00
to
>00
00
to >00
00
to
>00

Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum
500
000 00 90 75
EClass
Angine
§
00
less
(kW)
Output
Specified
>00
00
to >00
70
to >70
000
to
>00
3. Brake Mean Effective Pressure Limitation

Federal agencies should not accept diesel engines that have a brake mean
effective pressure (bmep) at the specified output which exceeds the
values presented in Table 2 for the appropriate engine class and rota
tional speed. Agencies also should not accept an engine if its bmep at
the specified output exceeds the manufacturer's published bmep for the
engine with the same output in a similar application.

4. Torsional Stress

Federal agencies should require diesel engine suppliers to provide

certification of compliance with the torsional stress limitations con
tained in Military Standard (MIL-STD) 167B.

5. Engine Auxiliaries

Federal agencies should require diesel engine suppliers to provide the

full complement of auxiliary engine equipment needed for the proper
functioning of the unit including: exhaust muffler, intake air filter,
starting equipment, lubricating-oil pump, lubricating-oil strainer and
filter, lubricating-oil cooler, fuel-oil pump, fuel-oil strainer and
filter, engine jacket coolant pump, radiator and radiator fan, engine
governor, and instrumentation. When deemed necessary and specified by
the plant designer, the engine supplier also should be required to pro
vide such optional accessories as intake air muffler or silencer, fuel-
oil heater, and waste-heat recovery equipment. Unless the plant designer
determines that special auxiliary engine equipment is needed, agencies
should require that all such equipment be of the type and capacity spe
cified by the engine manufacturer for use with the class of engine being
provided except that :

a. All lubrication-oil filters should be of the full-flow type.

b. All fuel-oil filters for Class A and Class B engines should be of

the duplex type (i.e., having two parallel filter elements, either
of which can be changed without shuting down the engine) .

c. Disposable air and oil filter elements should meet Military or Federal
Specifications if obtaining other types would present a supply problem.

d. Mechanical governors should not be used on engines with a capacity

greater than 30 kilowatts (kW) .

e. Instrumentation for engines should include:

(1) Outlet -water temperature gauge,

(2) Lubricating-oil pressure gauge,

(3) Running time indicator,

(4) Fuel -oil pressure gauge,

5
 Supercharged
w/co ling"
aThe
ifor
speeds
0-Hz
00-Hz
the
should
be
ndare
power;
ipower,
cated

070 000 00 070 20 200 00 000 20 200 00

00 00 20 20 22 00 00 00 00 20

Supercharged coolingG
w/o

4Cycle
2-Stroke

00 00 00 00 00 00 020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 040 140 040 040 040

02

NatAsp6
85 90 95 90 95 95 95
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBrake
Maximum
PMean
fresctuirve
reduced
sthe
frequency.
that
for
speed
ynto
ecahreosntous
Supercharged
Limits
RMean
EBrake
P2
eTABLE
frcoemscetunidrved
cooling"
w/

00 00 020 020 020 020 020 00 00 00 00 00 020 00 00 00 00 00

02 00 02

Supercharged
cooling0
w/o

00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0 00 00 00 00 00 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cTwithout
uinrtbeorcohlaerg.ed
"^Tuwith
irntbeorcohalerg.ed
NatAsp*
85 85 85 85 85 85 90 90
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 0

(rpm)a
Speed 400
less
S 400
less
& less
&
400
Rotational ^Naturally
aspirated.

004
000 020 90 72 90 004 004
000 00 90 72 90 000 020 90 72 90

Engine
Class

A B C
 (5) Automatic alarm and shutdown for overspeed, low lubricating-oil
pressure, and high cooling-water temperature.

In addition all turbocharged engines should have a charging pressure

gauge, and all engines with a capacity of 300 kW and greater should have
the following instruments:

(1) Inlet -water temperature gauge,

(2) Lubricating-oil temperature gauge,

(3) Differential oil pressure gauge on filters,

(4) Master pyrometer (multipoint, with individual cylinder thermocouples).

6. Fuel Consumption Testing

Federal agencies should require that all class A and class B diesel engines
and all class C engines for which fuel guarantees are required be tested
for fuel consumption at full load, three-quarter load, and one-half load
(or such other loads as may be appropriate) in accordance with Power Test
Code No. 17 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Wherever
possible all fuel consumption tests should be performed in the field and
witnessed and certified by a representative of the contracting officer.
Where several identical units are being installed, a test of one engine
may be considered applicable to all.

C. COST FACTORS

In procuring Class A and Class B engines and, whenever practicable, Class C

engines, federal agencies should provide for fuel cost as well as first cost
to be taken into account in the award of contracts. Specifically:

1. When a project involves only the installation of diesel generating

equipment (as would be the case, for example, when units in an existing
plant are being replaced) or when such equipment is being purchased
separately by an agency for installation in connection with a larger
project, agencies should:

a. Require that bids include a maximum fuel consumption guarantee for

the engine generator set (in terms of Btu of fuel used per net kWhr
generated; i.e., gross power generated less power consumed by inde
pendently driven auxiliary equipment) for full load, three-quarter
load, and one-half load operation.

b. Calculate the cost of the fuel expected to be used over the antici
pated useful life of each engine on the basis of the bidder's guar
anteed maximum fuel consumption rate for full load, three-quarter

7
 load, and one-half load operation; the number of hours the unit is
expected to operate annually at the various loads; and the projected
cost of fuel over the anticipated useful life of the unit.*

c. Add the cost of the fuel expected to be consumed by each engine to

the first cost of the unit and its auxiliary equipment and award
the contract to the bidder whose unit is the lowest in total cost.

2. When the installation of diesel generating equipment is part of a larger

project and it is impractical for the responsible agency to purchase the
equipment separately, agencies should provide for equalization of the
bids of the various prospective suppliers by specifying stringent fuel
consumption rates for full load, three-quarter load, and one-half load
operation that, can be met only by the most efficient engines. In addi
tion, the contract documents should indicate that if the unit supplied
by the successful bidder fails to meet the specified fuel consumption
rates, the contractor will be required to return to the government a
sum of money that is equal to the cost of the fuel used in excess of the
amount that would have been consumed at the specified consumption rate
over the anticipated useful life of the unit.** The contract should be
awarded to the bidder with the lowest bid for the overall project; the
amount of the financial adjustment to be made if necessary should be
determined on the basis of fuel consumption tests and should be deducted
from the final payment to the contractor.

D. EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS

Federal agencies should include in contract documents a clause requiring

suppliers to demonstrate that the type of engine they propose to provide has
given satisfactory service over a period of time in other plants (see the
Appendix for a sample experience clause) .

*The basis on which the calculating will be made should be indicated in

contract documents .

**The procurement documents should specify the basis on which any financial
adjustment will be calculated (i.e., the assumed number of operating hours
per year at the various loads, the assumed anticipated useful life of the
unit, the assumed cost of fuel, and the assumed discount rate if used).

8
 Ill
DISCUSSION

A. GENERAL

Most federal agencies purchase electric power from public utilities whenever
possible, and they appear to be quite satisfied with this approach. However,
for a number of reasons (e.g., to obtain the extra precise electric power
required by some computers and highly sophisticated military and scientific
equipment, to generate electricity at remote facilities not served by electric
utilities, or to provide an emergency power source for critical installations),
agencies have had to build hundreds of electric-power generating plants of
their own during the past 30 years.

Although such federally owned plants generate only a small fraction of the
total power used by the federal government, the annual investment in such
plants runs into many millions of dollars. In addition, this investment
probably will increase significantly in the future since the recent increases
in power and fuel costs have made it economically advantageous for agencies
to build and operate generating plants in some situations (e.g., when the
waste heat from such plants can be used effectively) even when power from a
public utility is available.

Given the high initial investment involved and the fact that, once built, a
plant usually will be operated for many years at considerable expense, federal
agencies try to ensure that their plants are outfitted with the proper equip
ment. Among the many pieces of equipment installed in a generating plant,
none is more important than the prime mover. It, more than any other item,
affects the reliability of the plant and its maintenance and operating costs.

Although many different prime movers can be used for electric -power generation
(including gas and steam turbines) , diesel engines have been used most often
in the past and most likely will continue to be for plants of the size required
by federal agencies. Diesel engines are selected for use in such plants pri
marily because: (1) they are efficient and reliable, (2) their first cost is
relatively low, (3) they are manufactured in a very wide range of sizes, (4)
spare parts usually are readily available, and (5) trained operators and
mechanics are in good supply.

Because diesel engines are used so frequently and are such key items in
generating plants, federal agencies try to obtain units that offer high
reliability, adequate output, and low life-cycle cost (i.e., total owning
and operating cost, which is the sum of the first cost of the unit and its
auxiliary equipment and the cost of operating, maintaining, and repairing
the unit over its economic life) . Since these objectives are basically the
same for all types of mechanical equipment it might appear that developing
satisfactory diesel engine procurement documents would not be particularly
difficult, but federal agencies have found that this is not the case.

9
A major source of difficulty is that a very wide variety of diesel engines
are available from different manufacturers and, in some cases, from the same
manufacturer. To further complicate the situation, a manufacturer frequently
will offer the same basic engine, with possibly a different output rating
and/or a different model number, for various applications, and while virtually
all currently available engines will give satisfactory service in the applica
tion for which they are particularly suited, many will give less than satis
factory service in some other application.

Thus, the problem for the agencies is to ensure that the engine procured is a
good one (and hopefully the best one) for the job. This is not an easy task
for any purchaser, but it is particularly difficult for federal agencies
because they are required by federal procurement regulations to purchase most
items on the basis of competitive bids. For this reason federal agencies
must take special care in the preparation of their diesel engine procurement
documents and, in fact, they have done so over the years.

The procurement documents currently used by most federal agencies include

technical requirements (both prescriptive and performance) and experience
requirements (i.e., clauses requiring prospective engine suppliers to show
evidence that the engine to be provided has operated satisfactorily in the past) .
Such documents generally have been effective in that most of the engines
obtained by the agencies have produced the amount of power required and have
operated reliably without requiring undue maintenance. The only fundamental
shortcoming of these documents is that they do not permit the matter of life-
cycle cost to be addressed directly. Instead, they control life-cycle cost
indirectly through various technical requirements aimed at minimizing repair
costs and limiting fuel consumption and through use of competitive bidding
to minimize first cost. This shortcoming probably was not of great signifi
cance when fuel costs were low; however, since the recent dramatic increases
in fuel costs, failure to consider fuel cost directly in awarding some con
tracts probably has resulted in considerable extra expense to the government.
The Task Group therefore has concluded that agencies should provide for an
evaluation of fuel costs in their procurement documents (see section C below) .
In addition, while the Task Group considers the basic concept of using tech
nical requirements and experience requirements in procurement to be sound,
it believes that some updating of such requirements is needed (see sections
B and D below) .

As indicated above, one of the keys to ensuring satisfactory service from

diesel engines is the proper matching of the engine to the application. In
this regard it is not sufficient merely to establish that the application is
electric -power generation. How many hours the engine will operate also should
be established since this is an important factor in determining the technical
and experience requirements for the engine and in calculating fuel costs.

Most engine manufacturers indirectly recognize the importance of operating

hours in that they usually offer a given engine with different ratings for
different classes of duty. Manufacturers have not, however, defined the duty
classes; instead, they tend to use such general terms as "continuous duty"
and "emergency duty," leaving it to the purchaser to decide which class of

10
engine he needs for his application. Moreover, most manufacturers identify
only two classes, which the Task Group believes is too few for the many dif
ferent operating conditions that federal agencies (and probably other owners
as well) must consider.

In order to clarify the situation and to provide a more precise basis for
establishing and applying its specific recommendations, the Task Group has
defined three classes of engine, basically in terms of the number of hours
the engine is expected to operate per year or to average annually over a
10-year period (see page 2) . While the Task Group realizes that in some
cases an agency will find it difficult to predict the number of hours an
engine will operate, it believes that it is better to base decisions on con
sidered, although possibly imperfect, estimates than to rely on vague terms
subject to different interpretations.

B. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

In the course of its study the Task Group wrote to all known U.S. diesel
engine manufacturers requesting suggestions for updating and improving the
criteria currently used by federal agencies in the procurement of diesel
engines. In their responses, many manufacturers indicated that technical
requirements relating to the design of engines should not be included in
agency procurement documents because such requirements restrict the manu
facturers' design freedom, something they maintained is necessary: (1) because
engines are complex machines that cannot be designed on the basis of rules of
thumb, and (2) to permit them to continue to improve the state of the art.

In subsequent meetings with manufacturers, the Task Group explained that most
technical requirements were included in agency procurement documents primarily
to ensure that the engines purchased by the agencies would operate reliably
and would not require excessive maintenance and repair. The Task Group also
indicated, however, that it recognized the desirability of not restricting the
manufacturers' design freedom, and it invited discussion of alternative means
for achieving the purpose for which the technical requirements have been used.
A number of possibilities were considered including: (1) having manufacturers
provide long-term warranties for their products relative to reliability and
repair, and (2) having manufacturers provide verifiable equipment -reliability
and -repair cost data that agencies could use in awarding contracts. After
considerable discussion with the various manufacturers, the Task Group rejected
these and other alternatives because almost all of the concepts proposed
required that the manufacturers have good data on the operating histories of
their engines and most manufacturers indicated either that they did not have
such data and could not afford to collect them or that they would hesitate to
draw conclusions about the probable repair and maintenance costs of a particu
lar prospective owner on the basis of the experience of a group of previous
owners .

Some manufacturers suggested that neither technical requirements nor other

mechanisms are needed to ensure that the engines purchased by agencies will
operate satisfactorily because all engine manufacturers are reputable companies

11
anxious to maintain the good will of their customers. Without disputing that
diesel engine manufacturers are highly reputable firms, the Task Group con
cluded that it had to reject this suggestion for several reasons:

1. In many cases agencies do not purchase engines directly from manufacturers,

and it is the experience of the Task Group members that a manufacturer
feels less responsible for his product if it has been obtained through a
construction contractor or an assembler, particularly if the manufacturer
believes his product has been misapplied.

2. Because of the nature of competitive bidding, manufacturers sometimes

have to cut prices almost to cost in order to obtain a contract; when
this occurs, manufacturers are understandably anxious to hold post-
installation cost to a minimum.

3. Manufacturers take understandable pride in their engines and in the

engineering that went into them. However, such pride sometimes causes
a manufacturer to be less than completely objective about the capabili
ties of his unit compared to other types of engine, and it leads him to
believe that his unit should be accepted for a particular project even
though it is clearly not as well suited for the application as other
units. Without objective criteria regarding engine capabilities, such
attitudes could result in bidding competition between unequal engines,
which would be unfair to both agencies and the manufacturers of the more
costly engines.

On the basis of its analysis of the situation, the Task Group concluded that
agency procurement documents must include technical requirements to ensure
that the engines purchased by the agencies give reliable service without
requiring undue maintenance and produce the amount of power required. The
Task Group therefore has recommended that the technical requirements discussed
below be included in agency procurement documents. However, in the interest
of minimizing restrictions on the design freedom of the manufacturers, the
number of technical requirements recommended has been held to a minimum.

1. Specified Output

In their technical literature, all diesel engine manufacturers include

tables indicating the output ratings of their various units. Such ratings
are developed by the various manufacturers themselves and are intended
to indicate to prospective purchasers the maximum amount of power that
each engine can be expected to deliver. While the Task Group believes
that ratings give a reliable indication of the relative power output
capacity of the engines of a particular manufacturer, it does not believe
ratings provide a fair basis for comparing the relative output capacity
of engines of different manufacturers for the following reasons:

a. A rating is a reflection of the design philosophy of the manufacturer.

In designing an engine the manufacturer must strike a balance between
output, efficiency, engine life, and first cost. The process of

12
 striking this balance is a somewhat subjective one, and various
manufacturers view the matter differently; some, for example, strive
for high output and low first cost, while others emphasize high reli
ability and long life.* Obviously, if only output ratings were com
pared, manufacturers in the latter category would be at a disadvantage.

b. All manufacturers do not agree on what a rating means. To some it is

the power that an engine can produce continuously while still being
capable of providing up to 10 percent additional power for short periods
(e.g., 2 hours per day); to others it is the maximum amount of power
that an engine can produce for short periods .

c. All manufacturers do not agree on the condition to be assumed in

establishing ratings. Some manufacturers follow the standards of the
American Society of Automotive Engineers while others follow the stan
dards of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association.

Thus, the Task Group believes that manufacturer-assigned ratings should

not be mentioned in contract documents or accepted as evidence that a par
ticular engine will meet the needs of an agency. Instead, the Task Group
believes agencies should merely specify the minimum output needed and the
ambient conditions under which that amount of power must be supplied and
require engine manufacturers to certify that the engine to be provided will
produce that output continuously and have the capability to provide at
least 10 percent additional output for up to 2 hours in any 24 hours.**
By taking this approach, the Task Group believes agencies will minimize
disputes, which have been common in the past, over ratings, and will help
to ensure fair competition among manufacturers .

2. Rotational Speed Limitations

The extent to which rotational speed--i.e., the number of revolutions per

minute (rpm) of the crankshaft --affects the reliability, frequency of
repair, and life expectancy of a diesel engine has been the subject of
heated discussion for many years. Manufacturers of high-speed engines
usually assert that rotational speed has little or no effect if the engine
is properly designed while manufacturers of low-speed engines usually main
tain that, all things being equal, the faster an engine runs, the faster it
will wear out. On the other hand, some engine specialists contend that
piston speed (i.e., the linear distance traveled per minute by a piston
moving up and down within its cylinder) , not rotational speed, is the
important factor.

The earlier FCC task groups studying diesel engines tended to accept the
argument that engine reliability and longevity decrease as rotational speed
increases, and they recommended limitations on rotational speed depending
on the capacity and application class of the engine. However, these task
groups also recommended further investigation of the matter.

*For obvious reasons, few if any manufacturers will admit to having sacrificed
anything in the design of their engines.

**Before accepting such certification, however, an agency should satisfy itself

that the proposed engine will perform as required by checking the published
literature .

13
 Prior to initiating the study on which this report is based, Task Group
T-59 made an extensive survey of federal facilities in an effort to deter
mine the facts of the matter. Unfortunately, all the Task Group could
learn was that the data available from federal facilities are insufficient
to permit any conclusions to be drawn, one way or another. A review of
data available from other sources also failed to provide a definitive
answer. Therefore, in addressing the matter in this study, the Task Group
had to rely primarily on the experience and engineering judgment of its
members and the views of the various manufacturers with whom it met.

On the basis of its investigation the Task Group reached essentially the
same conclusion that other FCC task groups had reached; namely, that there
is a relationship between wear and rotational speed. Accordingly, the
Task Group developed Table 1 (page 3) which presents its recommended limi
tations on rotational speed. The limitations are similar to those recom
mended by earlier FCC groups in that less stringent limitations are recom
mended both for engines in lighter duty applications and for smaller
engines. The Task Group believes that higher speed engines should be
permitted for lighter duty applications because, by definition, such
engines are expected to operate fewer hours per year and, hence, can be
expected to experience less wear than an engine operating almost continu
ously. The Task Group has recommended that higher speeds be permitted in
the smaller capacity ranges because it believes that stress and wear rates
decrease as the mass of the moving elements of the engine decreases. (The
fact that no small low-speed engines currently are manufactured in the
United States was, of course, also a factor in the Task Group's decision.)

In making its recommendation, the Task Group was aware that, in terms of
initial cost, a high-speed engine is less expensive than a low-speed
engine of the same capacity. The Task Group nevertheless opted in favor
of lower speeds in the belief that the higher first cost of a low-speed
engine would be offset by savings in maintenance and repair costs and by
the somewhat intangible benefits of higher reliability.

3. Brake Mean Effective Pressure Limitation

Brake mean effective pressure (bmep) is a derived value indicating the

average pressure in a cylinder during the power stroke needed to produce
a given engine torque.* Although it cannot be measured directly, bmep is
a valuable engine parameter because it provides an indication of the amount
of power being produced per cubic inch of displacement.

*The formula for bmep is:

. bhp • 33,000
bm6P = L • A • N »

where bhp = brake horsepower per cylinder, L = stroke of piston in feet,

A = net piston area in square inches, and N = number of power strokes per
cylinder per minute.

14
In a physical sense, bmep is increased by increasing the charge of fuel
and air supplied to the engine cylinders. The most direct way of accom
plishing this is through supercharging (i.e., using a compressor or a
blower to compress the combustion air being supplied to the cylinders) .
In most modem engines, superchargers are powered by turbines driven by
engine exhaust gases, in which case the process is known as turbocharging.

As bmep increases, thermal and mechanical stresses in the engine increase.

A large portion of the additional thermal stress can be eliminated through
use of more effective engine cooling systems and by cooling the compressed
combustion air before it enters the engine; however, additional mechanical
stress is an inherent byproduct of the effort to increase the output
capacity of the engine and cannot be mitigated. Recognizing this fact,
earlier FCC task groups recommended that agencies place limits on bmep in
order to preclude the purchase of engines that would have unacceptably
high failure rates. These groups also recommended, however, that the upper
limits on bmep be increased as engine manufacturers develop better materials
and methods of coping with the higher stresses associated with higher bmep
levels .

Some manufacturers have objected to any limits being placed on bmep. They
have contended that, in the interest of economy, bmep should be as high as
the engine can comfortably withstand and that this value is a function of
the design of the engine, which of course is the province of the engine
manufacturers .

Task Group T-59 recognizes the economic advantages of higher bmep values
(i.e., higher output without a corresponding increase in engine size);
however, for the reasons mentioned in the first section of this discussion
the Task Group does not believe it would be practical or desirable for
federal agencies to eliminate bmep restrictions. The Task Group there
fore has recommended bmep limits for various classes, rotational speeds,
and types of engine (see Table 2, page 5). In most cases, these limits
are significantly higher than those recommended in earlier FCC reports,
reflecting advances in engine technology over the intervening years. The
limits are not, however, as high as the bmep values currently used by
some manufacturers. If the recommended limits are adopted by government
agencies, manufacturers of such engines in some cases would be forced to
supply a larger engine than they ordinarily would supply to meet the mini
mum output specified. This situation will result because bmep is directly
related to engine output, and by adopting bmep limits, agencies would be
placing an upper limit on the maximum output of an engine of a particular
size and type. This, in effect, would force a manufacturer who has assigned
his engine an output rating higher than that permitted by the applicable
bmep limit to derate his engine. Although forcing a manufacturer to
derate his engine might seem unfair, blanket acceptance of manufacturer-
assigned ratings could be even more unfair as discussed previously. On
the other hand, the Task Group does not believe that a manufacturer should
be permitted to supply a federal agency with an engine having a bmep
at the specified output that exceeds the maximum bmep that the manufac
turer would permit at the same output. In other words, when dealing

15
 with agencies, a manufacturer whose engines are conservatively designed
with lower bmep levels than those indicated in Table 2 should not be
permitted to raise their bmep levels up to those in the table thereby
permitting them to provide an agency a smaller engine than they would
any other purchaser.

4. Torsional Stress

All crankshafts have a degree of torsional elasticity. With the con

centrated mass of pistons, connecting rods, flywheel, and generator
attached to a diesel engine crankshaft and distributed over its length,
the crankshaft has several natural modes of vibration. When the fre
quency of the power-stroke impulses coincides with a natural frequency
of the entire crankshaft system, a maximum torsional vibration is pro
duced and the crankshaft is said to be rotating at a critical speed.
Critical speeds depend upon the number of power impulses per revolu
tion and the natural frequencies of the mass elastic system of the unit.

Not all critical speeds are of equal importance and, in fact, the majority
are of no importance at all. In general, the most significant speeds are
those whose torque components act cumulatively to twist the crankshaft,
in its normal mode of vibration, to a degree causing excessive torsional
stresses. Torsional vibrations usually do not shake the framing of the
engine and may not be noticeable to the operator (i.e., crankshafts have
broken without warning when the mass elastic system has not been safely
designed to limit fatigue stresses) ; therefore, it is important that the
degree and nature of existing stresses in an engine crankshaft be deter
mined by torsional analysis.

Torsional stresses can be predetermined and controlled in design when

precise information concerning the driven equipment is made available and
considered. First the manufacturer makes a mathematical analysis of the
mass elastic system resulting in a graph (stress spectrum) that shows the
torsional stresses as they occur in the crankshaft at certain speeds known
as major and minor resonance points (order harmonics) . Figure 1 is an
example of such a graph, on which can be noted the peaks of torsional
stresses arising when the engine is operated at certain speeds other than
its normal operating speed. Graphs similar to this are available from
diesel -engine manufacturers and enable the prospective user of diesel gen
erators to see at a glance the magnitude of torsional stresses that will
occur in the crankshaft at the normal operating speed. If the graph is
extended to cover the entire speed range of the engine (from zero to oper
ating speed and beyond) , the operator can be made aware of those speeds at
which the engine should not be operated for any prolonged time. Short of
crankshaft breakage, excessive torsional stresses may result in torsional
deflection of the crankshaft, which can lead to damage of the camshaft-
drive gear train or the drive gears of the auxiliary pump and the gover
nor. Experience shows that torsional deflection of the crankshaft can be
calculated accurately within 10 percent.

16
 SPEED (rpm)

FIGURE 1 Typical graph of vibratory stress vs. speed for a 4 -stroke- cycle
diesel engine.

17
 With materials currently available and current technology, there is a low
incidence of failures of the type just described. However, because of
the potential seriousness of this type of failure and the cumulative
effect of torsional stresses on the acceleration of metal fatigue, the
Task Group believes that conservative limits should be observed. In the
opinion of the Task Group, the torsional stress limitations established
in MIL-STD 167B will provide engines of satisfactory reliability.

5. Auxiliary Engine Equipment

The term "auxiliary engine equipment" encompasses a wide variety of

components that are attached or related to an engine and that are essen
tial to its proper functioning. These include exhaust mufflers, intake
air filters, starting equipment, lubricating-oil pumps, lumbricating-oil
strainers and filters, lubricating-oil coolers, fuel-oil pumps, fuel-oil
strainers and filters, engine jacket water pumps, radiators, engine gover
nors, and instrumentation. The term also refers to such optional acces
sories as intake air mufflers or silencers, fuel -oil heaters, and waste-
heat recovery equipment.

Previously published FCC reports on diesel engines included many recom

mendations and considerable information on auxiliary engine equipment
because at that time agencies were experiencing various problems related
to failure or inadequate performance of auxiliary equipment that presum
ably resulted because some manufacturers and professional engineers had
not given these important items the attention they deserved. Since that
time, however, manufacturers have devoted considerable effort to refining
the auxiliary equipment for their engines, and significant improvements
have been made (notably with regard to oil and air filters) . In view of
these improvements, the Task Group believes that for most applications
agencies can accept auxiliary equipment of the type and capacity ordi
narily supplied by a manufacturer with his engine. This approach, the
Task Group believes, will involve little risk on the part of agencies
and will save money for the agencies since a manufacturer's costs are
increased significantly whenever nonstandard components must be provided.

The Task Group nevertheless has recommended several overriding requirements

regarding auxiliary equipment that it considers to be particularly impor
tant (see Recommendations section). For the most part, however, these
requirements are in agreement with the current practices of most manufac
turers or can be accommodated by most manufacturers with little difficulty.

C. COST EVALUATION

As indicated above, a fundamental shortcoming of the diesel -engine procure

ment documents currently used by most federal agencies is that they do not
permit anticipated engine operating costs to be considered in awarding con
tracts. Instead, most agencies award contracts to the lowest bidder whose
engine satisfies the specification, an approach that is uncomplicated to
administer and minimizes first costs. This approach, however, encourages

18
Suppliers to subordinate all design considerations and performance goals to
first cost (within the limits permitted by the specification) and can result
in engine operating costs that are unnecessarily high.

It should be emphasized that manufacturers seldom, if ever, design a diesel

engine with low-bid federal procurement in mind. On the contrary, engines
are almost always designed to be competitive in the broad private industrial
market where first cost is seldom the only consideration, and because it
would be impractical to do otherwise, a manufacturer usually offers one of his
standard models when bidding on a federal contract. The federal government,
therefore runs little risk of receiving an engine whose design has been pur
posely cheapened in order to reduce the first cost of the unit. Nevertheless,
the low -bid approach virtually forces a manufacturer with various model lines
to offer the cheapest standard model that meets the specification and elimi
nates from consideration a manufacturer who builds only high-quality engines.

Recognizing the realities of the situation and the fact that low first cost
can seldom be achieved without sacrificing either fuel economy or engine life
or both, most agencies have tried to develop diesel -engine specifications that
serve to establish a minimum level of quality, and such specifications generally
have served their purpose. There is, however, one serious drawback to speci
fying minimum quality levels in a competitive bidding situation, and that is
that the minimums tend to become the maximums since there is no incentive for
a supplier to offer a unit that exceeds the minimums.

In the case of minimum values relating to fuel economy this shortcoming can
be very expensive for the owner since the cost of the fuel consumed by a class
A engine in just two years can more than exceed the first cost of the unit.
Given rising fuel prices, the economic penalty for having an inefficient
engine grow larger yearly.*

To overcome this problem the Task Group has proposed that federal agencies
either:

(1) purchase engines (or engine-generator sets) directly from manufacturers

and award contracts on the basis of economic analyses that consider both
the first cost of the units and the cost of the fuel expected to be
consumed by the units, or

(2) specify very stringent fuel consumption rates and impose a financial
penalty equal to the estimated extra cost of fuel consumed over the
projected life of the unit on any successful bidder whose engine cannot
meet the specified consumption rate.**

*A similar problem exists with regard to the maintenance and repair costs,
but the amount of money involved is much less than in the case of fuel con
sumption and the solution is much more complex. For these reasons the Task
Group concluded that the problem did not lend itself to the types of solution
proposed for fuel costs.

**The penalty can be imposed either by requiring the contractor to refund money
to the government or by withholding money from his final payment.

19
The first alternative is considered the more straightforward of the two since
it would not involve payment of a penalty by the supplier (except in those
rare cases when a supplier could not meet the fuel consumption rate he has
guaranteed) and is generally in accord with common commercial practice. How
ever, agencies would have to contract separately for engine-generator sets
and for any other work associated with the project, and federal contracting
officers prefer to have just one contract for a particular project. The
second alternative is intended to be used only when it is impractical to pur
chase engine-generator sets directly from a manufacturer or supplier (e.g.
when the sets are part of a much larger project and the contracting officer
refuses to permit multiple contracts for the project) and is considered less
desirable than the first because it assumes that successful bidders fre
quently will be required to refund money to the government, a situation that
could lead to disputes between the contracting agency and the contractor
whenever the contractor does not fully understand the rationale behind the
requirement. The Task Group believes, however, that this approach can be
used successfully (i.e., can be used without generating disputes) if agencies
clearly indicate to prospective bidders that the specified fuel rate is not
necessarily expected to be met but rather that it should be considered as a
reference point which will be used to determine the amount of any financial
penalty to be imposed, thereby to equalize the bids of various suppliers on
the basis of fuel consumption. Thus, bidders should include in their bids
money to cover any penalty that they will have to pay.

No matter which of the alternatives is used, it is essential that project

specifications indicate the basis on which anticipated fuel costs will be
calculated so that potential suppliers can make the calculations for them
selves before bidding. Specifically, the specification should indicate the
Btu value of the fuel to be used; the assumed unit price of the fuel (and
any price escalation factor to be used); the assumed useful life of the unit,
the estimated number of hours each unit will operate each year at full load,
three-quarter load, and one-half load; and the discount rate, if any, to be
used.

D. EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS

To ensure that any engines procured by the government have an established

record of satisfactory performance, earlier FCC task groups recommended that
agency contract documents require diesel -engine suppliers to provide evidence
that the engines they propose to supply have operated satisfactorily in the
past, and Task Group T-59 concurs in this recommendation.

Given the complexity of diesel engines, Task Group T-59 also believes as did
the earlier groups, that the soundness of a particular design can be proven
only through operation of the engine under field conditions over a period of
time. Several federal agencies have included experience clauses in their
contract documents for a number of years, and it appears that such clauses
have been useful .

20
Most engine manufacturers recognize the desirability of experience requirements
and have voiced few objections to the use of experience clauses. A few, how
ever, have recommended that they not be used because they sometimes prevent
manufacturers from supplying agencies with their most modern designs. This,
the Task Group believes, is a small price to pay for the peace of mind that
comes from knowing that an engine of proven reliability is being purchased.
Moreover, the Task Group believes it is not a common problem since manufacturers
develop a totally new engine design very infrequently.

Several manufacturers, however, offered two specific criticisms of some experi

ence clauses. The first was that some clauses treat every change in engine
design as though it were a complete redesign of the unit, thus precluding the
acceptance of experience gained on a particular unit as evidence of the suita
bility of a modified version of the same unit and requiring the manufacturer
to gain full experience with the modified version before it can be considered
acceptable. The manufacturers pointed out that they regularly make minor design
changes in their units and that requiring them to obtain new experience after
each such change makes it almost impossible for them to obtain approval on a
production model. The Task Group recognizes that this problem can be a serious
one, and it believes that agencies should not consider any changes that are
truly minor in nature as complete redesigns requiring new experience data. On
the other hand, manufacturers sometimes tend to view relatively major changes
as minor refinements, and agencies should not necessarily accept without ques
tion a manufacturer's assertion that a change is insignificant. What is needed
is a balanced approach such as the one taken in the sample experience clauses
presented in the Appendix.

The second criticism voiced by manufacturers was that some experience clauses
have precluded use of satisfactory experience gained in one application (e.g.,
in a locomotive) as evidence that the engine will perform satisfactorily in
another application (e.g., for electric -power generation). The manufacturers
maintained that such experience data should be accepted if the application on
which it is based is more demanding than the anticipated application, but the
Task Group is not persuaded by these arguments. It believes that each appli
cation, in its own way, is usually as demanding as another application; electric-
power generation, for example, is frequently more demanding than almost any other
application in terms of the number of hours the engine must operate continuously
and efficiently. The Task Group therefore believes that agencies should require
that experience data for diesels to be used for electric -power generation be on
diesels used for the same purpose.

21
 APPENDIX A

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26
 APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDED EXPERIENCE CLAUSES

 RECOMMENDED EXPERIENCE CLAUSES

EXPERIENCE REQUIRED FOR CLASS A AND CLASS B DIESEL ENGINES

a. Engines : Each of two diesel engines of the same model, speed, bore,
stroke , number of cylinders and cylinder configuration as the equipment
proposed hereunder and operating at the same or higher brake mean effec
tive pressure (bmep) , and rating than the equipment proposed hereunder
shall have performed satisfactorily in a stationary electric -power plant,
independent of the contractor's facilities, for a minimum of 8,000 hours
of actual operation. For at least 400 of these 8,000 hours, the load
carried shall be equal to or in excess of the full load rating required
under this invitation and it shall have produced not less than 5,000 kilo
watt hours (kWh) of electricity for each kW of generator nameplate capa
bility. This operating experience (8,000 hours total, 5,000 kWh per kW
of nameplate capability, 400 hours full load) shall have been accumulated
within a consecutive calendar period of 2 years. Except for auxiliaries
and attachments on the engine, the two engines cited for experience shall
be essentially identical with each other and with the engine being pro
posed hereunder. Where individual components in the engine being pro
posed are not identical to the similar components in the engine cited for
experience, the component being proposed must have at least 4,000 hours
of experience with the particular model of engine being offered. Opera
tion during the 2-year period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if:

(1) The availability of the engine together with its auxiliaries was
less than 95 percent. Availability as used herein is defined as
the operating time divided by the operating time plus downtime due
to repair and maintenance time. In making this calculation, all of
the operating times (irrespective of load), repair times, and main
tenance times within the 2-year period will be included. Administra
tive downtimes will be excluded from both the numerator and denominator.

(2) Any failure of engine or engine auxiliaries resulted in a downtime

for repairs in excess of 72 hours.

b. Engine Auxiliaries: Auxiliaries and attachments on the engines proposed

hereunder, such as governors, superchargers, pumps, filters, etc. may be
different from the same items on the engine cited for experience, provided
such devices meet the detailed requirements of these specifications. In
addition, each such device shall have had a minimum of 2,000 hours of

29
 satisfactory operating experience associated with diesel -electric
generating service (within a consecutive calendar period of 2 years) .
Operation during the 2-year period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if:

(1) The availability of the engine auxiliary was less than 95 percent.

(2) Any failure of the engine auxiliary resulted in a downtime for

repairs in excess of 72 hours.

c. Fuel System: Engines cited for experience shall have accumulated all of
the required operating time using the particular type or types (and grades
as applicable) of fuel specified herein. Where the specified fuel system
requires the engine to be started on one type or grade of fuel and then
run on another type or grade of fuel, the cited engines shall have accumu
lated all of the required operating time in this manner. In addition,
where the specified fuel system requires dual fuel operation, minimum
operation on each fuel shall be 400 hours on at least one of the engines
cited for experience. The automatic fuel transfer function for the cited
dual -fuel engines shall have occurred a minimum of 10 times during the
required operating time without any significant deviation in the quality
of the power produced.

EXPERIENCE REQUIRED FOR CLASS C UIESEL ENGINES

A diesel engine of the same model, speed, bore, stroke, number of cylinders,
and cylinder configuration as the equipment proposed hereunder and operating
at the same or higher brake mean effective pressure (bmep) , and rating than
the equipment proposed hereunder shall have performed satisfactorily in
electric-generator service, in the manufacturer's plant or independent of
the contractor's facilities, for a minimum of 2,000 hours of actual operation.
For at least 100 of these 2,000 hours, the load carried shall be equal to or
in excess of the full load rating required under this invitation. Except for
auxiliaries and attachments on the engine, the engine cited for experience
shall be essentially identical with the engine being proposed hereunder. Where
individual components in the engine being proposed are not identical to the
similar components in the engine cited for experience, the component being
proposed must have at least 1,000 hours of experience with the particular model
of engine being offered. Auxiliaries and attachments on the engine proposed
hereunder, such as governors, superchargers, pumps, filters, etc. may be dif
ferent from the same item on the engine cited for experience, provided such
devices meet the detailed requirements of these specifications. In addition,
each such device shall have had a minimum of 1,000 hours of satisfactory
operating experience associated with diesel -electric generating service. Oper
ation during the operating period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if any failure of the engine or an engine auxiliary resulted in
a downtime for repairs in excess of 72 hours.

30