Topoi

DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9259-2

Norms of Truth and Logical Revision

Giulia Terzian

Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Many take the lesson of the paradoxes to be [Language] The language of T contains the names of
that we ought to impose some form of logical revision. It is all of its expressions.
argued here that this kind of move should not be taken
[Truth] The unrestricted T-biconditionals hold in T .
lightly.
[Logic] Classical logic holds in T .
Keywords Truth  Norms  Logical revision  Paradox
When the displayed principles are formalised in the
standard way, however, they result in an inconsistent the-
ory. For a theory that meets all three constraints is one in
1 Introduction
which we can construct a liar sentence k defined to be
logically equivalent to the material biconditional
Owing to Alfred Tarski, we know that to produce a satis-
k $ :trðpkqÞ, where tr denotes the truth predicate in the
factory formal theory of truth is a project of great philo-
language of the theory.2 From k, and by familiar logical
sophical importance; owing to the logical paradoxes, we
reasoning, we can derive a contradiction internal to our
know it to be a highly challenging one. But while it is
theory: this is the liar paradox.
undeniable that the paradoxes play a role in shaping the
The liar paradox thus seems to force a difficult choice
truth-theoretic inquiry, the reasons for which we should
upon us: if we are to avoid inconsistency, one (or more) of
care about having a good theory of truth have comparably
[Language], [Truth], and [Logic] must be weakened in
little to do with the liar paradox and its kin. The latter help
some way. Virtually all extant truth theories may be
explain why the search for a satisfactory formal theory
regarded as the result of such a strategy. Some opt to
continues; but they do not explain why the project was, and
restrict [Language] by forcing type restrictions on the truth
remains, a worthwhile one.
predicate. Others, such as the Revision Theory of truth of
The two aspects of the inquiry are often conflated,
Belnap and Gupta (1993), retain [Language] and [Logic]
however: in much of the literature, attention tends to
but restrict [Truth]. Yet others choose to weaken [Logic].
gravitate around the paradoxes rather than the truth theory.
The latter will be the main focus of this paper.
But this is the result of a methodological fallacy. This
There are several examples of truth theories in which the
paper makes an effort to set the methodology straight.
principles of classical logic are not universally validated.
Suppose we lived in a state of pre-paradox innocence.
And while classical rules and principles may still hold for
Then, as Tarski first observed,1 the following would very
truth-free inferences and sentences, the fact that they no
naturally suggest themselves as basic principles for an
account T of truth:
1
See in particular Tarski (1936, 1944).
2
We will be following the mainstream literature in using p/q to
G. Terzian (&) denote (the gödel code of) the name of the formula /, where both /
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, and its name belong to the language of the theory. The rest of the
Bristol BS6 6JL, UK paper will also follow tradition insofar as use of gödel corners will for
e-mail: giulia.terzian@gmail.com the most part be omitted.

123

longer hold across the board warrants regarding these as
non-classical theories.
Suppose T 0 is such a theory; on the face of it, T 0 pre-
sents itself as a case of logical revision: for, whichever
logical principles the theory validates, they will disagree
with classical logic. The aim of this paper is to cast this
assessment into doubt, and to do so by proposing a more
fine-grained understanding of ‘logical revision’. On the
proposed conception, for a theory T 0 to qualify as a gen-
uine case of logical revision it must meet a particular
condition of naturalness (cf. Sect. 2). It will be suggested,
first, that the proposed criterion is eminently plausible; and
secondly that genuine logical revision is more elusive than
might be thought, and ultimately quite hard to come by.
2 Norms and Meta-norms
To embark on the project of constructing a theory of truth
presupposes having an answer to the following question:
(Norm) What ought a theory of truth look like?3
(Norm) invites us to give a list of desiderata, or norms, for
truth. These might be presented under formal guise, for instance
as a list of axioms; or as pre-formal demands voicing specific
pre-theoretic intuitions about the concept of truth. Either of
these would count as an informative (if partial) answer to
(Norm). For future reference let us attach the labels STORY and
FORMALISM to these two kinds of answers (respectively):
STORY Intuitions about: the expressive role of truth;
the purpose of a truth theory; the process by
which we learn the meaning of the concept
of truth; how we enlarge our current set of
truths to include new truths; and so on.
FORMALISM Choices of formal apparatus to capture
each and any of the above, including:
choice of base language; choice of logic;
logico-mathematical principles governing
the behaviour of the truth predicate; and
so on.
To give a more concrete idea of the sort of thing we
have in mind, consider the principle [Logic]. If we were to
tease apart the pre-formal and formal components, what
3
Implicit in the formulation of (Norm) is an assumption which
underwrites this entire discussion, which it is therefore worth making
explicit here. This is that, while no doubt there are mathematical
logicians uninterested in the philosophical debate about truth and
philosophers uninterested in the formal study of this concept, there are
also those whose interest and work combines both sides of the
inquiry. This paper sits—in very good company—in the latter
category. For other instances where similar remarks are voiced
explicitly, see e.g. (Halbach and Horsten forth.) and Halbach (2001).
123
G. Terzian
would appear under the two headings? Under FORMALISM,
the axioms and rules of classical logic. Under STORY, on the
other hand, we might find any one of several possible
stories about the logic of truth. Two excerpts from two such
stories are presented below by way of illustration:
It is desirable that classical logic is used [as the logic
of truth]. [...] [This] is motivated by the deflationist
conviction that truth is primarily a logico-mathe-
matical notion. Historically, classical logic has
emerged from a conscious attempt to explicate the
form of mathematical reasoning. So if truth is indeed
a logico-mathematical notion, then it ought to be
governed by classical logic.4
[...] nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be
carried on in [non-classical] logic.5
We might regard STORY and FORMALISM as stages of a
formal theory. This should not be taken to imply that STORY
and FORMALISM follow each other in strict chronological
order: to do so would be an over-simplistic and inaccurate
construal of how a formal theory comes to be. On the
contrary, the two sides of the inquiry will typically interact,
in many cases fruitfully, from the outset. This is a perva-
sive and well known phenomenon wherever formal meth-
ods are applied to philosophical questions: on the one hand
our intuitions about truth, logic and language guide and
motivate our choices of formal systems; on the other,
studying and understanding the logic-mathematical prop-
erties of these same formal systems helps sharpen and
clarify those initial intuitions.
Any (post-Tarskian) theory of truth may be seen as a
candidate answer to (Norm). But when one actually looks
at the theories on offer in the literature, it is hardly ever the
case that the pre-formal side of the account is presented
fully or explicitly. This makes it especially difficult to
adjudicate between different truth theories, and therefore
especially important for their underlying norms to be
uncovered.
2.1 Meta-norms
On the view proposed here, STORY and FORMALISM would
ideally be individually and jointly essential to the identity
of a full theory. What is meant by this is the following: that
given a suitably detailed account of both STORY and FOR-
MALISM, we would be in possession of all the relevant facts
about what truth is like (according to the view in question).
Conversely, without a suitably detailed account of STORY
4
Halbach and Horsten (2005) pp. 207–208.
5
Feferman (1984) p. 95.
Norms of Truth and Logical Revision
and FORMALISM to offer, our understanding of the view—
hence, our answer to [Norm]—will be incomplete.6
Accepting the foregoing—i.e. agreeing to the impor-
tance of both STORY and FORMALISM in a truth theory—
seems hardly problematic. It is then only reasonable to
demand that the two are related in a way that is well
motivated from a methodological perspective.
Hailing a principle of methodological soundness is
hardly going to attract controversy. But anyone working in
some area of formal philosophy will know it is easy
enough, once one’s attention is turned to the axioms that
make up a (truth) theory, to lose sight of the philosophical
story underpinning those very axioms. So the importance
of good methodology must not be underestimated.
Here is a simple thought experiment to make this even
more perspicuous. In our imaginary scenario, Lisa is an
expert logician who dabbles in philosophy on the side. One
day, Lisa decides to learn about formal theories of truth.
She sets about this task by reading up on three axiomatic
theories, T A , T B , and T C , as recommended by her friend
Tara, who is a philosopher and a truth-theorist. Lisa has no
trouble identifying the formal differences between the
theories; e.g. she is more than sufficiently competent to
derive at least basic theorems from each of the axiom lists,
she knows how to work out their respective proof-theoretic
strengths, and so on. However it is not clear to Lisa why
each list comprises precisely those axioms for truth and no
other; so she seeks Tara’s expert advice on this matter.
Now it seems clear that a satisfactory answer to Lisa’s
question must include information about the pre-theoretic
intuitions guiding the choice of axioms for each of T A , T B ,
T C . If Tara is not able to provide Lisa with such infor-
mation, this means there is nothing she can add to what
Lisa already knows about T A –T C . Yet there is plenty that
Lisa does not yet know about these theories; for instance,
she lacks sufficient information to be able to compare the
theories in a philosophically interesting and well-motivated
way. So her question—‘‘Why this axiom?’’—is a legiti-
mate one. Given Lisa already possesses the relevant tech-
nical information about the axioms of T A –T C , an
informative answer to her question should be of the form:
‘‘Because truth ought to be ... ’’
Notice that none of this hangs on the theory in question
being a theory of truth. Any formal theory, however—be it
of truth, belief, probability, and so on—ought to abide by
similar standards of good methodology. Yet theory and
practice do often drift apart. On the one hand, applying
6
As pointed out by an anonymous referee, one might be inclined to
think that FORMALISM is all and only there is to a ‘formal’ theory of
truth; and that ‘formal’ theories of truth should be distinguished from
(merely) ‘philosophical’ theories, represented instead by STORY. As
noted earlier, however, we subscribe to the view that a fully
satisfactory account of truth must encompass both these components.
formal methods in philosophy may offer novel and
invaluable insights into the subject of inquiry. On the other,
that same formal machinery may end up obscuring the line
between the philosophical and the formal sides of the
account. For this reason it becomes crucial, not only to
uphold a code of good methodological practice, but also to
make its principles explicit.
The foregoing motivates the claim labelled [Natural],
below:
[Natural] Axiom systems for truth ought to be natural
and philosophically sound.
The notion of naturalness invoked here is meant to be an
intuitive one, in the following sense. Suppose we are given
a story about truth according to some theory T (STORY T ),
and we are also given a list of axioms for truth according to
T (FORMALISM T ). The rough idea is that FORMALISM T
would qualify as a natural axiomatisation of STORY T if and
only if for any ‘‘Why this axiom?’’ question about each of
the T -axioms, each and every answer could be found
within STORY T . Another way of putting this might be to
say that given some STORY T , we should ideally be in a
position to fully recover FORMALISM T .
Like [Logic], [Natural] is a normative claim. Unlike
[Logic], [Natural] is not theory-specific in the sense that it
does not demand that a certain axiom (or axiom list) be
present or absent from one’s theory. We will refer to
[Natural] as a meta-norm in order to distinguish it from
theory-specific norms such as [Logic], [Language] etc.7
An important corollary of [Natural] is that the paradoxes
should never constitute the sole or main motivation for
including or discarding an axiom—or, more generally, a
truth-theoretic norm. One of the reasons why truth has the
status of a fundamental philosophical concept is a
descriptive one: the truth predicate is understood and
applied from very early stages of linguistic development; it
serves recognizably important expressive purposes; and it
serves them not in a subject-specific fashion but universally
and across the board. Importantly, it typically serves these
purposes without giving rise to paradox. But we should not
then magnify the role of the paradoxes beyond measure.
For liar sentences and their kin are pathological, sometimes
even contrived application instances of the concept of
truth, so it makes good methodological sense that we not
allow a concern over the paradoxes to override the original
concern for truth. The notion of ‘philosophical soundness’
is incorporated into [Natural] so as to flag this issue.
7
It is entirely conceivable that other meta-norms might emerge
beyond those countenanced in this paper; far from being cause for
concern, this would be a very welcome development, insofar as it
would at least partly validate the approach we are proposing. Thanks
to an anonymous referee for indirectly pointing this out.
123

One could also single this out as worthy of a separate
meta-norm, along the following lines:
[Independent] Truth axioms ought to be motivated
independently of the paradoxes.
[Independent] finds support in several places in the lit-
erature. The following passage from McGee (1989) is a
particularly eloquent example in this sense:
[This] consideration arises from an admonition of
Hartry Field [1972] that our methodological stan-
dards ought not to be any lower in semantics than
they are in the laboratory sciences. Now, we would
not, in general, regard it as a satisfactory defense of
an entrenched but inconsistent theory to weaken our
logic so that we hide the contradiction. [...] To
understand a concept properly, do not focus all your
attention on how the concept behaves when it is on
philosophical holiday. Look at the routine, unprob-
lematic, non-philosophical work the concept does.8
With these clarificatory remarks in place, and in the
interest of simplicity, we will henceforth restrict our
attention to [Natural], with the understanding that its nor-
mative scope encompasses that of [Independent].
As noted earlier, [Natural] is not liable to vary from one
truth theory to the next. In fact, it is of crucial importance
that it be upheld across the board. Say that [A1], [A2] and
[A3] are norms for a theory T A . Say we then fiddle with the
axioms of T A in such a way that [A3] is no longer satisfied.
What we are left with may still be a perfectly respectable
truth theory, but it is certainly no longer T A , because T A is
(possibly uniquely) determined by its underlying norms.
Call the new theory T A . It is conceivable that the tran-
sition from T A to T A is methodologically well motivated in
the following sense. Suppose that our pre-theoretic inquiry
has identified four key intuitions about the concept of truth:
[A1], [A2], [A3] and [A4]; however, the only combinations
that are jointly satisfiable are [A1] ? [A2] ? [A3] and [A1]
? [A2] ? [A4]. Suppose we then produce a ranking of our
four norms, and this ranking finds in favour of the second
list. Call this list T A ; we would then be warranted to dis-
card T A and commit to T A , since the latter has been found
to be the ‘better’ theory. Crucially, in this abstract scenario
the naturalness condition has been satisfied: indeed it is
precisely because [Natural] is satisfied that T A is guaran-
teed to be a perfectly respectable truth theory.
While the postulation of [Natural] could conceivably
spark disagreement among truth theorists, the idea itself of
appealing to meta-norms (in the sense proposed here)
should not cause much of a stir. For, it is well known,
similar strategies are applied elsewhere in philosophy: for
8 9
McGee (1989), p. 533 ff.
123
G. Terzian
instance, a sizeable chunk of the philosophy of science
literature revolves around the subject of theoretical vir-
tues—which are none other than meta-norms for scientific
theories.
Discussions about theoretical virtues in philosophy of
science are notoriously vague owing to the difficulty of
pinning down the notions of simplicity, explanatory power
etc. to a satisfactory degree of precision. Take the notion of
simplicity, for instance. There is widespread agreement
that simpler theories are to be preferred to more complex
theories that explain the same phenomena. While this
formulation of the meta-norm of simplicity appears very
intuitive, it is clearly also very vague. But any attempt to
make the meta-norm more precise typically engenders
controversy, because there is very little agreement on
exactly what the consequences of this demand ought to be.9
This vagueness does not in any way diminish the value of
this and other theoretical virtues, however: the consensus
remains that simplicity is a theoretical virtue for scientific
theories.
The situation is in many ways similar where [Natural] is
concerned. It is clear enough that [Natural] picks out a
theoretical virtue for truth theories (among others). But it is
just as clear that [Natural] does not provide anything like
(say) an identity criterion for a ‘good’ truth theory qua
theory of truth: it offers neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for determining whether or not a given axiom
system successfully captures the ‘correct’ concept of truth.
Like simplicity, [Natural] offers instead a necessary con-
dition for the ‘goodness’ of a truth theory, qua truth theory.
It also seems unlikely that any attempt to make this meta-
norm (or any others) more precise would have much suc-
cess. Just as in the case of simplicity, however, the elu-
siveness of [Natural] should not be thought to detract from
its theoretical importance.
The next two subsections each examine a case study in
which the notion of norm as well as the meta-norm [Nat-
ural] are put to work. The discussion of these case studies
will feed directly into the larger discussion about logical
revision in the face of paradox.
2.2 Naı̈ve Truth
Recall the truth theory presented in Sect. 1:
[Language] The language of T contains the names of
all of its expressions.
[Truth] The unrestricted T-biconditionals hold in T .
[Logic] Classical logic holds in T .
For an overview, see e.g. Baker (2010).
Norms of Truth and Logical Revision
Tarski was the first to investigate this theory, now
known as the naı̈ve theory of truth (henceforth NT). In
particular, Tarski proved that NT is inconsistent by show-
ing that [Language], [Truth] and [Logic] jointly license the
construction of the liar sentence, and thus of the paradox-
ical argument. Tarski’s impossibility result is one particu-
larly difficult to digest. For it rules that the most attractive
account of truth possible—the one which best captures our
fundamental intuitions about truth—is untenable. This
makes NT highly interesting from the philosophical
perspective.
Of course Tarski was not writing with an eye to
uncovering the norms underlying NT (or any other theory)
in our sense; even so, his approach was not too dissimilar to
ours. In particular it is not too difficult to spot the pre-
theoretic story behind the theory in question. The ‘naı̈ve
story’ of truth emerges most perspicuously from the fol-
lowing passages:
1. It would not be in harmony with the spirit of [natural]
language if in some other language a word occurred
which could not be translated into it [...]. If we are to
maintain this universality of everyday language in
connexion with semantical investigations, we must, to
be consistent, admit into the language, in addition to its
sentences and other expressions, also the names of
these sentences and expressions, and sentences con-
taining these names, as well as such semantic expres-
sions as ‘true sentence’ [...].10
2. We should like our definition to do justice to the
intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian
conception of truth—intuitions which find their expres-
sion in the well-known words of Aristotle’s Metaphys-
ics:
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what
is not that it is not, is true.11
3. We [assume] that the ordinary laws of logic hold. [...]
It would be superfluous to stress here the consequences
[...] of changing our logic (supposing this were
possible).12
We discuss these briefly and in turn:
1. The first desideratum is that a truth theory be semantically
closed. This is a syntactic requirement on a theory; its
counterpart is what Tarski calls ‘universality’, which is a
feature of natural language. A truth theory is semantically
closed if (and only if) its language contains the names of
10
Tarski (1936), p.164.
11
Ibid.
12
Tarski (1944), pp. 348–349.
all of its expressions.13 Thus Tarski’s first requirement
corresponds to [Language].
2. Due to this quote alone, it is not uncommon to find
Tarski described in the literature as a proponent of a
‘correspondence view’ of truth. Note however that no
textual evidence directly supports the conjecture that
Tarski shared the ontological commitments of the
orthodox correspondence view (to the extent of
postulating, for instance, the existence of a genuine
mapping between the sentences of our language and
facts, states of affairs and the like).14 What is
nevertheless uncontroversial is that this particular
requirement corresponds to [Truth].
3. The ‘‘ordinary laws of logic’’ are of course the laws of
classical logic. Tarski’s choice of words very strongly
suggests that [Logic] is held to an even higher standard
than the other requirements. Tarski’s claim in other
words is that classical logic must hold no matter what,
even—given the undefinability result—at the expense
of [Language] and [Truth].
What the above shows is that while NT fails as a truth
theory, it nevertheless sets an example of good methodol-
ogy. This same methodology will guide our analysis in the
rest of this paper.
3 Logical Revision
The discussion up to this point has served to flesh out a
framework within which to examine any truth theory
(allegedly) presenting itself as an advocate of logical
revision. The present section now puts this account to work
by examining two such theories, namely those offered by
Saul Kripke and Hartry Field respectively.
3.1 Kripke
The truth theory put forth by Kripke (1975) is often hailed
as a theory of non-classical truth; it is also one of the most
successful and attractive truth theories to date. A notable
feature of the account which makes it stand out among its
rivals is the presence of a story which accompanies and
motivates the formal theory.
The story is well known: it is an idealised reconstruction
of the process by which an otherwise competent linguistic
agent learns the meaning of the predicate ‘is true’. This
learning process begins with an empty extension of the
13
Or, in an arithmetically-coded language, the numerals of the gödel
codes of its sentences.
14
And indeed this particular controversy is ultimately immaterial to
our present concern.
123

predicate. At this stage, only sentences not containing the
truth predicate are examined, and sorted into two groups:
those corresponding to the facts, such as ‘Three plus six is
nine’; and those expressing propositions contrary to fact,
such as ‘Three plus six is eight.’ At the next level, all
sentences containing one instance of the truth predicate are
examined and sorted according to the same principle; and
so on. More and more sentences enter the extension of the
truth predicate (and that of the falsity predicate) in this
way; correspondingly, more and more sentences are
excluded from both sets.
The learning process reaches a natural fixed point along
the inductively defined sequence. This result was proved by
Kripke (1975), who also proved the existence of a fixed
point that is least in the construction. The least fixed point
set coincides with a specific subset of the expanded lan-
guage Ltr containing all (and only) the grounded sentences
of Ltr : that is, the sentences the truth value of which
depends only on non-semantic facts.
In light of the undefinability theorem, the least fixed
point model cannot satisfy the full T-biconditionals;
instead it models a weakened version of the schema such
that trð/Þ is made true in the model wherever / is made
true (and viceversa). Formally, that is, we have:
MSK  trð/Þ iff MSK  /
where MSK ¼ hN; jSK i is the model for a language
containing a type-free truth predicate (for that language),
and jSK is an inductively defined Strong Kleene ‘jump’
operator.15
The process just described is cumulative—specifically,
monotone increasing—and produces a sequence of models
of tr that is well-founded. Each of these features is captured
neatly at the formal level, and each is well motivated at the
pre-formal level.
The norms underlying Kripke’s theory are thus as
follows:
[Language] The language of T ought to contain the
names of all of its expressions.
[Type-free] The truth predicate ought to be unique
and type-free in T .
[Grounded] The grounded T-biconditionals ought to
hold in T .
The minimal fixed point described above contains all
and only the grounded sentences of the language; crucially,
15
Let ðtr þ ; tr  Þ be a partial interpretation of tr. The kripkean Strong
Kleene jump operator is defined by
jðtr þ ; tr  Þ ¼ ðjþ ðtr þ ; tr  Þ; j ðtr þ ; tr  ÞÞ,
where jþ ðtr þ ; tr  Þ ¼ f/ : ðtr þ ; tr  Þ  /g
j ðtr þ ; tr  Þ ¼ f/ : ðtr þ ; tr  Þ  :/g.
123
G. Terzian
while it contains no undesirable sentences, certain other
sentences are missing that one would expect to find in the
extension of the truth predicate. The most prominent
examples among these are certain instances of the law of
excluded middle (LEM) such as trðkÞ _ :trðkÞ. The latter
sentence is ungrounded because k is, from which it follows
that both sentences will reside permanently outside the
extension of the truth predicate. A similar fate befalls the
sentence trðsÞ _ :trðsÞ, where s is the truth-teller sentence
(defined as materially equivalent to s $ trðsÞ).
Since LEM is not universally valid in the theory, it
follows that the logic of Kripke’s theory is strictly weaker
than classical logic. Does it also follow that Kripke’s the-
ory effects a logical revision? Kripke himself clearly
thought not:
I have been amazed to hear my use of the Kleene
valuation compared occasionally to the proposals of
those who favor abandoning standard logic ‘‘for
quantum mechanics’’, or positing extra truth values
beyond truth and falsity, etc. [...] Mere conventions
for handling terms that do not designate numbers
should not be called changes in arithmetic; conven-
tions for handling sentences that do not express
propositions are not in any philosophically significant
sense ‘‘changes in logic’’.16
We seem to have every reason to take the above quote
seriously. Logical revision is emphatically not among the
motivations of Kripke’s account of truth: the failure of LEM
is not among the guiding intuitions on which the learning
story described earlier is predicated. Nor is it an essential
feature of the formal machinery chosen to capture these
guiding intuitions, namely the theory of monotone inductive
operators and ZFC set theory. On the other hand, the norm
[Grounded] does fit the bill: for, before anything else,
Kripke’s theory is a theory of grounded truth. If anything, in
fact, the choice of ZFC (in conjunction with the theory of
monotone inductive definitions) as a formal means to cap-
ture Kripke’s preferred truth-theoretic picture lends even
stronger support to this claim. For underlying ZFC itself is a
normative principle that resembles [Grounded] very clo-
sely—namely the Axiom of Foundation, which demands
that the membership relation 2 be well-founded.17 In this
case, then, ‘logical revision’—i.e. the (localised) failure of
classical logic—is a consequence of the interaction between
[Grounded] and Tarski’s undefinability result.
Equally crucially, upholding [Grounded] opens up the
possibility of ‘revising’ the logic of truth in more than one
16
Kripke (1975) pp. 64–65 fn.18.
and 17
And it hardly needs mentioning, moreover, that ZFC is itself a
thoroughly classical theory.
Norms of Truth and Logical Revision
way. This, too, is something that Kripke himself famously
remarked upon:
So far we have assumed that truth gaps are to be
handled according to the methods of Kleene. It is by
no means necessary to do so. Just about any scheme
[...] is usable, provided the basic property of the
monotonicity of / is preserved [...].18
The choice among the various available schemes
(Strong Kleene, Weak Kleene, supervaluationism, and
perhaps others) will be dictated by intuitions of a localised
sort: that is to say intuitions about the appropriate truth
value to be assigned—for instance—to the sentence
k _ :k. On the basis of preferences of this sort, someone
who is compelled by the kripkean story about truth will be
in a position of making a choice among the available
schemes; and the map of the fixed points will change
accordingly. But the theory crucially remains a theory of
grounded truth: this point really cannot be emphasised
enough. Here is Kripke once more on this:
The approach adopted here presupposes the following
version of Tarski’s ‘‘Convention T’’ [...]: If ‘k’
abbreviates a name of the sentence A, TðkÞ is to be
true, or false, respectively iff A is true, or false. This
captures the intuition that TðkÞ is to have the same
truth conditions as A itself; it follows that TðkÞ suffers
a truth-gap if A does.19
We conclude the discussion of Kripke’s theory of truth
with some brief remarks on its formal presentation. Up to
this point, talk of ‘formal theories of truth’ has been con-
flated rather loosely with talk of ‘axioms for truth’. Yet this
entire subsection has been devoted to discussing a model-
theoretic construction. What gives?
The short answer is that Kripke (1975) offers a model-
theoretic account of truth and not an axiomatic one. A
slightly longer answer acknowledges the existence of
several axiomatisations of Kripke’s theory.20 But even
though the axiomatic vs. semantic divide has sometimes
been construed as picking out, not just two different modes
of presentation of a truth theory, but more importantly two
different, even contrasting, philosophical views about truth,
the fact remains that both the kripkean models of truth and
the various axiomatisations of Kripke-style truth are above
all models of kripkean truth and axioms of kripkean truth.
Under either form, that is, these formal systems are
designed to capture the basic pre-theoretic picture under-
lying Kripke’s theory: namely, a picture of grounded truth.
18
Kripke (1975) p. 711.
19
Kripke (1975) pp. 714–715.
20
See Reinhardt (1986) and Halbach and Horsten (2006), among
others.
We might put this more succinctly by saying that the pre-
theoretic component of a truth theory can remain invariant
under different formal presentations of that theory; this
invariance is then in turn captured by the norms underlying
the theory in question.
3.2 Field
Field (2008) defends another non-classical theory of truth.
By Field’s own admission, his theory is partly of kripkean
inspiration. The two share some minimal formal ground:
both offer ‘semantic’ as opposed to axiomatic analyses of
truth, and both invalidate certain instances of LEM. But the
two theories are also sufficiently different at the pre-formal
level that the resulting constructions – and the respective
extensions of the truth predicate—are themselves different
in important respects.21
The approach here is the same as above, namely to
briefly sketch Field’s theory and list its underlying norms.
As in the case of Kripke’s theory, space constraints prevent
the analysis of Field’s account from being fully exhaustive;
this has been done to a more satisfactory extent else-
where.22 The present goal is the more modest one of
offering a plausible motivation for the choice of those
norms over other possible candidates.
We begin as usual by asking: What are the norms
guiding Field’s theory of truth?
As Field himself does not address such a question
directly, answering it requires some work. In a précis to
Field (2008) Field offers a compact summary of his theory
that is helpful for our purposes:
[Field 2008] offers a truth theory that includes all
Tarski biconditionals [...] and allows the general in-
tersubstitutivity of [trð/Þ] with [/] [...]. It does this
by restricting excluded middle, though unlike in
intuitionist logic we keep all of the deMorgan laws
together with the redundancy of double negation. We
restrict certain classical meta-rules, such as condi-
tional proof and the standard version of reductio
(though both hold given appropriate instances of
excluded middle); but classical reasoning emerges
unscathed except in contexts where ‘True’ or related
predicates have ‘‘ungrounded’’ occurrences.23
It is useful to pair this with another passage from Field
(2008) (p.232):
21
As this section is only supposed to serve as a case study, we will
not review any of the formal details of Field’s theory and assume
some familiarity with the account.
22
In Terzian (2012). A similar assessment of Field’s theory is offered
by Leitgeb (2007).
23
Field (2010) p. 416.
123
 G. Terzian

My ultimate interest is less in the semantics than in namely, the story offered by intuitionism to motivate the
the logic that the semantic validates, but the easiest rejection of LEM.25
way to find a logic that accords with the naı̈ve theory It might be immediately protested that intuitionism
of truth is to look for a semantics in which for any was not born as (nor ever developed into) a truth theory,
sentence [/], [valðtrð/ÞÞ ¼ valð/Þ] (the ‘‘Model- but as an alternative to classical mathematics. And since
Theoretic Intersubstitutivity Condition’’). our original question is about logical revision in the truth-
theoretic context, it might seem doubtful that the case of
In light of the above we suggest that the following is a
intuitionism could be genuinely instructive here.
plausible reconstruction of what truth ought to be like
But this worry should be dismissed and for much the
according to Field:
same reason which led us to dismiss Kripke’s and Field’s
[Language] The language of T contains the names of theories as candidates for logical revision. As was seen
all of its expressions. earlier, classical logic fails in Kripke’s theory because of
the prior, more fundamental requirement that truth be
[Type-free] The truth predicate ought to be unique
grounded. Intuitionists, on the other hand, make a direct
and type-free in T .
case for a revision of classical logic. The proposed revision
[Transparency] For any formula /, ‘/ is true’ and / comes with a respectable philosophical motivation, more-
ought to be intersubstitutable in any transparent over, namely a robust anti-realism about the ontology of
context of the language of T . mathematics and about the semantics of mathematical
statements. In other words, where intuitionism is concerned
It is easy to see that [Transparency]—which embodies
logical revision ticks all the right boxes: in particular, it
the ‘‘Intersubstitutivity Condition’’, above—is a very
satisfies [Natural] and therefore qualifies as a norm.
strong requirement, venturing closer than virtually any
Therefore, intuitionism is a positive example of genuine
other truth theory to satisfying the unrestricted T-scheme.
logical revision.
The trade-off, inevitably, is that full classical logic must be
given up.
At this point the question may be reasonably asked:
3.4 Logical Revision Elsewhere
Why conclude that [Transparency] is what is doing the
heavy lifting, rather than logical revision?
There are other examples of (putative) logical revision in
As with Kripke’s theory, there is a short answer to this
the truth-theoretic literature beyond those discussed in
question: because Field himself says he is not proposing to
this paper. Probably the most notable among these is the
subvert logic. Field proposes that [Transparency] is what
dialetheist theory of truth first put forward by Graham
should inform the account, and that LEM (or more gen-
Priest. To some extent, the choice not to discuss diale-
erally, classical logic) should be weakened locally, on a
theism was dictated by pragmatic constraints: the sole
case by case basis, so as to accommodate [Transparency].24
Priest (1979) would deserve more attention than this
The present analysis has found that a positive or direct
paper could afford it, let alone the many variations on
motivation for logical revision is absent from Field’s the-
the dialetheic theme which have emerged since. The
ory of truth. If this is right then here, too, logical revision is
absence of dialetheism, however, should not detract from
merely a byproduct of a more fundamental norm of truth.
what has hopefully been accomplished here, namely to
This in turn leads us to conclude that Field’s theory of truth
bring the notion of logical revision under critical
does not qualify as an example of genuine logical revision.
scrutiny.
Does any dialetheic theory of truth qualify as genuinely
3.3 Genuine Logical Revision
revisionary (in the sense proposed here)? Quite possibly:
insofar as any of the norms governing (some version of)
The discussion so far has reaped mostly negative results;
dialetheism is an independently motivated rejection of the
this subsection aims to show that instances of genuine
law of non-contradiction. Whether or not this is the case,
logical revision can be found—and without much diffi-
and whether or not dialetheism qualifies as an example of
culty. In order to substantiate this claim, we draw attention
genuine logical revision—will have to be left as open
to just one (well known) success story for logical revision:
questions, and for another paper to address.
24
We merely sketch the longer answer here, as it would take us too
far afield from the main topic. It is this: because Field is a deflationist,
and the story behind [Transparency] is the standard deflationist story
25
according to which asserting trð/Þ amounts to no more, no less, than And of related classical principles, of course, including in
asserting /. particular DNE.

123
Norms of Truth and Logical Revision
4 Conclusion
Displayed below is a one-sentence characterization of the
current situation in the truth-theoretic literature:
() At present, the fully classical truth theories are
outnumbered by those theories in which full classical
logic fails to hold.
This seems rather uncontroversial. We might rephrase
() seemingly innocently as follows:
() At present, the fully classical truth theories are
outnumbered by those theories that advocate logical
revision as a response to the paradoxes.
The first modest aim of this paper might be seen quite
simply as that of teasing () and () apart; the second, to
cast serious doubt upon (). Or rather, to at least cast such
serious doubt, and at best, to argue that () is both mis-
guided and incorrect: the fact that the laws of classical
logic fail to hold everywhere in a theory of truth does not
on its own imply that the theory in question is advocating
logical revision. For a theory may be correctly construed as
advocating logical revision only if logical revision is pre-
scribed by one of the norms underlying that theory.
In light of this proposal, two truth theories often con-
strued as examples of logical revision were found to fail the
condition outlined above. Key to this conclusion was the
observation that logical revision plays virtually no role in the
pre-theoretic stories behind these theories: instead, it was
seen that Kripke’s theory is shaped by the requirement that
truth be grounded; Field’s, by the requirement that truth be
transparent. In both cases, fulfilment of these requirements
prevents truth from commuting fully classically with the
logical connectives. But this is not tantamount to saying that
logical revision is a defining feature of either theory. Rather,
logical revision is what both Kripke’s and Field’s accounts
have to live with in order to ensure their respective truth-
theoretic desiderata can be consistently met.
The goal of this paper was to push for a better under-
standing of logical revision as a response to the paradoxes,
at least in the truth-theoretic context. Although some pro-
gress has been made, the task is some way from its com-
pletion. It is conjectured that some truth theories will be
found—or put forward—that qualify as cases of genuine
logical revision. Investigation of this conjecture will help
shape the road ahead.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to the audience at the workshop
‘‘Paradox and logical revision’’ for their many valuable questions,
criticisms, and suggestions, which helped sharpen the ideas in this
paper. I wish to thank in particular Michael Glanzberg, Hannes
Leitgeb, Graham Priest, Dave Ripley, and Tim Williamson for their
comments. I am equally grateful to the MCMP for hosting the event,
and most of all to Julien Murzi and Massimiliano Carrara for giving
me the opportunity to contribute to this special issue. Finally, I wish
to thank two anonymous referees for their comments.
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