TATEL VS.
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207
SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a
warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of
Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance
caused by the operation of the abaca bailing
machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A
committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its
investigation on the matter that an accidental
fire within the warehouse of the petitioner
created a danger to the lives and properties of
the people in the neighborhood. Resolution
No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal
council declaring said warehouse as a public
nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the
New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13,
series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in
the poblacion or barrios without maintaining
the necessary distance of 200 meters from
said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and
properties by accidental fire. On the other
hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No.
13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a
nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the
Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of
1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in
petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the
provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed
by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. It is valid because
it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade, 5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and 6) must not
be unreasonable. The purpose of the said
ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and
life in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of government. The lower court did
not err in its decision.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No.
111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the
same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino
during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the
project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit
and canceling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino,
and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty
for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the
ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power
authority to prohibit the operation of casino for
the general welfare.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local
political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as
the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to
the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or
any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with
public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein
and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30,
1988
Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed
by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan
on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to
½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12
years old. There was a fine from 200-600
pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A
TRO was then issued to prevent the law from
being enforced. The respondent court entered
its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the
grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power. Petitioners contend
that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power
of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided
for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523
where it states that the Muncipal board can
only fix license fees for theaters and not
admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the
enactment of the ordinance by invoking the
general welfare clause embodied in Section 15
(nn) of the cited law.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the
authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of
admission to these places of exhibition and
amusement whether under its general grant of
power or under the general welfare clause as
invoked by the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus
unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word
"regulate" was interpreted to include the power
to control, to govern and to restrain, it would
seem that under its power to regulate places of
exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal
Board of the City of Butuan could make proper
police regulations as to the mode in which the
business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the
operation of theaters, cinematographs and
other places of public exhibition are subject to
regulation by the municipal council in the
exercise of delegated police power by the local
government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of
Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs
from selling tickets beyond their seating
capacity was upheld as constitutional for being
a valid exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it
has no authority to enact the ordinance in
question under its power to regulate embodied
in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power
as delegated to it under the general welfare
clause to justify the enactment of said
ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that the interest of the
public generally requires an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations. In other words, the
determination as to what is a proper exercise
of its police power is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640
violates the due process clause of the
Constitution for being oppressive, unfair,
unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of
trade, and violative of the right of persons to
enter into contracts, considering that the
theater owners are bound under a contract
with the film owners for just admission prices
for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of
police power is necessarily subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded
by the regard, the respect and the obedience
due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the
ordinance is not justified by any necessity for
the public interest. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to
help ease the burden of cost on the part of
parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their
children, as they would for themselves. A
reduction in the price of admission would
mean corresponding savings for the parents;
however, the petitioners are the ones made to
bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance
does not only make the petitioners suffer the
loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them
for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as
petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in
its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity
of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age
tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in
order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard
against this undesirable practice and as such,
the respondent City of Butuan now suggests
that birth certificates be exhibited by movie
house patrons to prove the age of children.
This is, however, not at all practicable. We can
see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable
if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible
relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and
the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging
the full price, the children are being exploited
by movie house operators. We fail to see how
the children are exploited if they pay the full
price of admission. They are treated with the
same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the
ordinance, movie house and theater operators
will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome
movies for general patronage, much less
children's pictures if only to avoid compliance
with the ordinance and still earn profits for
themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be
either a mere license, revocable at the will of
the proprietor of the theater or it may be
evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable
consideration, the purchaser has acquired the
right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves
properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a
right, Positive or conditional, as the case may
be, according to the terms of the original
contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of
property. The ticket which represents that right
is also, necessarily, a species of property. As
such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by
which he obtained it, has the clear right to
dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and
at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered
public utilities. The State has not found it
appropriate as a national policy to interfere
with the admission prices to these
performances. This does not mean however,
that theaters and exhibitions are not affected
with public interest even to a certain degree.
Motion pictures have been considered
important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and expression of the
artistic impulse. Their effects on the
perceptions by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation
must be within the bounds of reason, that is,
the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered
with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the
conduct, control and operation of a business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and
lawful exercise by the citizens of their property
rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price
at which his property shall be sold or used is
an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due
process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of
the validity or reasonableness of the
ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity
or unreasonableness appears on the face of
the ordinance itself or is established by proper
evidence.
Dela Cruz vs Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 – 123 SCRA 569 –
Political Law – Subject Shall Be Expressed in
the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret
operators. They assail the constitutionality of
Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition
and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan.
De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful
business for the said ordinance would close
out their business. That the hospitality girls
they employed are healthy and are not allowed
to go out with customers. Judge Paras
however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring
that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant
to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras
ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la
Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal
corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of
night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant
to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night
clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance
would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the
Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only
regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
Padilla vs. COMELEC
Governor (P) vs. COMELEC (D)
Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created
municipality was conducted and the voters
rejected its creation. The governor questioned
the result and challenged the inclusion of the
voters of the mother municipality in the
plebiscite.
Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected—Section 10, Article X, 1987
Constitution.
Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new
municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province
of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law,
the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for
its approval. In its resolution for the conduct of
the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all
the voters of the Municipality of Labo—the
parent unit of the new municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the
majority rejected the creation of the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor,
Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court
to set aside the result arguing that the phrase
"political units directly affected" in Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not
include the parent political unit—the
Municipality of Labo.
Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?
Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the
plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents
of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation
thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
What is contemplated by the phrase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the
plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in
such political areas are the inhabitants of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in
relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government
Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz
and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay,
Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and
Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the
new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law,
the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a
case for Prohibition and contending that the
B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government
Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros
Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than
the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied
with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No
province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected” must first be obtained. The creation
of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that
two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628)
should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting
view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to
wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or
units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided
such as in the case at bar or of the people of
two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is
as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the
points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal
effect for being a patent nullity.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and
CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for the charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino
Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge,
Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the
respondent’s property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that
the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers.
They further argued that the Quezon City
Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, ” to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall
deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because
the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a
valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid
exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is
the provision which states that ‘no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other
hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with
the property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are
said to exist independently of the Constitution
as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City
(Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. The power
to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the
power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property’. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use
but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters
which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power,
may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety,
health, morals and the best and highest
interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his
use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to
the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the rights of the community. A property in the
state is held subject to its general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are
subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient. The state,
under the police power, is possessed with
plenary power to deal with all matters relating
to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any
positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in
such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a
portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of population of the city and
to provide for their burial in a proper place
subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177
(q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
“provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by
law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city
to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance
is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of
public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are
sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
Power of eminent domain in general
Definition and nature of eminent domain of
LGUs
BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R.
No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) FIRST DIVISION
While the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local government units
(LGUs), other public entities and public
utilities, the exercise of such power by the
delegated entities is not absolute. The scope
of such delegated power is narrower than that
of the delegating authority and may be
exercised only when authorized by Congress,
subject to its control and the restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power
or in other legislations. Thus, strictly
speaking, the power of eminent domain
delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but "inferior.” The national legislature is still
the principal of the LGUs, and the latter cannot
go against the principal's will or modify the
same.
MASIKIP VS. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No.
136349 (January 23, 2006) SECOND
DIVISION; LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No.
155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC Local
government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain. Local governments can
exercise such power only when expressly
authorized by the Legislature. By virtue of the
Local Government Code of 1991, Congress
conferred upon local government units the
power to expropriate. Further, the exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. The exercise thereof is
subject to the statutory requirements.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
FOUNDATION V. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No.
152230 (August 9, 2005) SECOND DIVISION
When the sovereign delegates the power to a
political unit or agency, a strict construction will
be given against the agency asserting the
power. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and
against the condemnor. When the power is
granted, the extent to which it may be
exercised is limited to the express terms or
clear implication of the statute in which the
grant is contained. Corollarily, the condemnor
has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation.
It has the burden of proof to establish that it
has complied with all the requirements
provided by law for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
HEIRS OF SAGUITAN VS. CITY OF
MANDALUYONG, G.R. No. 135087 (March 14
2000) THIRD DIVISION Eminent domain is the
right or power of the sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses
to
promote public welfare. Although it is
legislative in nature, it may be validly
delegated to local government units, other
public entities and public utilities, subject to
terms stated in the delegating law.
LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746
(October 13, 2004) EN BANC Local
government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain. Local governments can
exercise such power only when expressly
authorized by the Legislature. By virtue of the
Local Government Code of 1991, Congress
conferred upon local government units the
power to expropriate. However, the exercise
by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not absolute. The exercise
thereof is subject to the statutory
requirements.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, G.R. No.
118127 (April 12, 2005) EN BANC Ordering a
particular type of business to wind up, transfer,
relocate or convert to an allowable type of
business in effect permanently restricts the
use of property and thus goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of the property without just compensation. It is
intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
Police power distinguished from eminent
domain
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA,
G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST
DIVISION In the exercise of police power,
there is a limitation on or restriction of property
interests to promote public welfare which
involves no compensable taking.
Compensation is necessary only when the
state's power of eminent domain is exercised.
In eminent domain, property is appropriated
and applied to some public purpose. Property
condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or
intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose
and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public
health and safety from danger is not a taking.
It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a
noxious use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. In the regulation of the use
of the property, nobody else acquires the use
thereof or interest therein, hence there is no
compensable taking.
Devolution - As used in this Code, the term
"devolution" refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and
authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
(f) The national government or the next higher
level of local government unit may provide or
augment the basic services and facilities
assigned to a lower level of local government
unit when such services or facilities are not
made available or, if made available, are
inadequate to meet the requirements of its
inhabitants.
(g) The basic services and facilities
hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from
the share of local government units in the
proceeds of national taxes and other local
revenues and funding support from the (b) It is also the policy of the State to
national government, its instrumentalities and ensure the accountability of local
government-owned or controlled corporations government units through the
which are tasked by law to establish and institution of effective mechanisms of
maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or recall, initiative and referendum.
resource available for the use of local
government units shall be first allocated for the (c) It is likewise the policy of the State
provision of basic services or facilities to require all national agencies and
enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before offices to conduct periodic
applying the same for other purposes, unless consultations with appropriate local
otherwise provided in this Code. government units, nongovernmental
and people's organizations, and other
(h) Regional offices of national agencies or concerned sectors of the community
offices whose functions are devolved to local before any project or program is
government units as provided herein shall be implemented in their respective
phased out within one (1) year from the jurisdictions.1awphil.net
approval of this Code. Said national agencies
and offices may establish such field units as
may be necessary for monitoring purposes
and providing technical assistance to local
government units. The properties, equipment,
and other assets of these regional offices shall
be distributed to the local government units in
the region in accordance with the rules and
regulations issued by the oversight committee
created under this Code.

(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code

shall include the transfer to local government
units of the records, equipment, and other
assets and personnel of national agencies and
offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions, and responsibilities.

Effective Principles

RA 7160 Local Government Code Section 2.

Declaration of Policy. -

(a) It is hereby declared the policy of

the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall
be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government
to the local government units.