G.R. No.
145022 September 23, 2005 offending news reports were printed and first published, the
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Doctrine: Jurisdiction vs Venue; Venue can be waived in civil
cases
FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand
Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary
damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that
the venue was improperly laid, among many others. It appeared
that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and
admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the
amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This
caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set
aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or
deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been
cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial
amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which
would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and
the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by
the petitioners. Petitioners argue that since the original complaint
only contained the office address of respondent and not the
latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly
original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations,
failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based
on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations
thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from
libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is the RTC that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon.
Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as
follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine
a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or
tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue,
of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation
between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot
be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties.
Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint
that the article and the caricature were printed and first published
in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and
not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer
jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include
the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these
allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a
party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code as referring to the place where actions for libel shall
be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely to establish the
proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue
has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions.
Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was
proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed
to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may
still be amended. In so doing, the court acted properly and without
any grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL
ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a
procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of
trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the
place where the libelous articles were printed and first published
would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case.
The failure of the original complaint to contain such information
would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which
goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be
because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not
jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
RULE 4 – VENUE
G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE
CITY, respondent.
NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of
Parañaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz
Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a
consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the
amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties
owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this
purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles
with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended,
all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the
petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject
titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque
City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry
of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located
in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the
petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it
appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.
Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the
petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared
from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City;
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it
had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the
motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that it may
not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by
respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain
error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as
fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties,
and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure
of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event,
the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may
be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the
place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the
venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision
to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial
court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without
first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take
its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of
cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.
The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment
proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the
actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without
regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in
this case where the amendment to the complaint was made
before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
PACIFIC BANKING CORP vs CA
FACTS: [Consolidated Case]
CASE#1 (union)(5th division)
1. Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines and,
was placed under liquidation.
a. A Liquidator was appointed.
2. RTC: the Central Bank filed a petition entitled "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation."
a. The petition was approved, after which creditors
filed their claims with the court.
3. Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization
(Union), herein petitioner, filed a complaint-in-
intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month
pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas
bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its
members as employees of PaBC.
a. RTC ordered payment of the principal claims of the
Union.
4. The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification of the order.
a. DENIED!
5. The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for
Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal.
a. The respondent judge disallowed Liquidator's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late.
(Filed more than 15 days after receipt of the
decision)
6. *CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus
a. CA held in the case of the Union that the
proceeding before the RTC was a special
proceeding and, therefore, the period for
appealing from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 30 days.
b. Since the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day
of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's
claims, the appeal was brought on time.
c. RTC should give due course to the appeal.
7. *SC: The Union filed a petition
a. The union contends that the case is a special
proceeding and that the appeal was filed out of
time.
CASE #2 (stockholders/investors)(14th divison)
1. *RTC: Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private
respondent, filed claims for the payment of investment in
the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks
amounting to US$2,531,632.18.
a. Respondent judge directed the Liquidator to pay
private respondents as preferred creditors.
2. The Liquidator moved for reconsideration
a. DENIED!
3. The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders.
a. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record
on the ground that it had been filed without authority
of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days.
b. The judge directed the execution of his order
granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
4. *CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus
a. CA held that a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action.
b. Therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered is 15 days
c. Since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on
the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion
for reconsideration was pending, the notice of
appeal was filed late.
5. *SC: The Liquidator filed a petition
a. Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance
in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation
s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which
allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of
appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of
the order/judgment appealed from.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding
or an ordinary civil action
HELD: SPECIAL PROCEEDING
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of
justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy,
including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
( I made a table para masmadali maintindihan haha – joel )
ACTION (CIVIL ACTION) SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
The act by which one sues The act by which one seeks to
another in a court of justice establish the status or right of a
for the enforcement or party, or a particular fact.
protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a
wrong.
 A formal demand of a right by A petition for a declaration of a
one against another. status, right or fact.
Proper remedy of a party Proper remedy of a party
litigant that seeks to recover whose purpose is to seek the
property from another. appointment of a guardian for
an insane.
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such
petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor
the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not
pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful
act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced
against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file
their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of
creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Since a petition for liquidation is in the nature of a special
proceeding, the period of appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the
trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal.
In CASE#2 (Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of
appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of
receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a
record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his
appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under
the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for
cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is
that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision
or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed.
Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial
court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.
In CASE#1 (union), CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the
Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to
file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days
of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without
waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on
December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on
appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on
appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a
record on appeal.
CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition and its decision
should be affirmed.
Note:
Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims
on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the
Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of
its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus -The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent)
charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate
only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by on the grounds that :
law.

(1) the requisite docket fee had not been paid;

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the
(2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of
shopping; and
the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The claim was not filed and served personally.
Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged
with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances,
the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The
court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights - RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the
and the determination of their order of payment. money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent.
Allan Sheker filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are denied . Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O.
SHEKER -Allan Sheker maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to
a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists
Facts: that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules
in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
-The holographic will of Alice O. Sheker was admitted for probate
a suppletory manner
in the RTC of Iligan City. Thereafter, the RTC issued an order for
all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.
- In compliance, petitioner, Allan Sheker filed a contingent claim Issue :
for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately
P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate of Alice Sheker, and the amount of
P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to Whether or not Allan Sheker’s contention that rules in ordinary
be incurred by Allan Sheker in the course of negotiating the sale actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
of said realties. entirely correct.

Held: No.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing
ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings,
as far as practicable.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or
perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.1[4]
This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much
as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules
in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to
special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment
of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any
way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to
special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.
Notes:
Certification of non forum shopping:
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is
an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or
of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more
akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken
into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for
the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not
require a certification against non-forum shopping.
Docket fees:
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's
fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the
administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees
shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment
of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court
had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of
the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a
money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for
dismissing a money claim against the estate.
Written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally:
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or
filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then
be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village,
Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which
rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance
between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable
to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following
Medina v. Court of Appeals,2[12] the failure of petitioner to submit
a written explanation why service has not been done personally,
may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have
exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss
the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-ChingFacts:
1.Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband
(petitioner) and two minor children.2.Emilio filed a verified
petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.3.Miguelita’s
mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters
of administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of
paraphernal properties. She wishedto be appointed. She also
said that she has direct and material interest in the estate
becauseshe gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased
on conditio ntaht they wouldundertake a business endeavor as
partners.4.The mother asked that one Emmanuel be
appointed.5.Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-
administrator.6.No claims were filed. Thereafter,
Emilio filed an inventory.Emmanuel failed to file
one.7.Court declared Emilio and his children as the
only compulsoryheirs of the deceased.8.Emilio then petitioned
the court for the payment of estate tax andthe partition and
distribution of the estate.9.RTC denied the petition as
to the partition and distribution. CA affirmed.
Issue:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of
the decedent’s estate?
Held:
1. General Rule:a.jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only tomatters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of
deceasedpersons but
does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership thatarise during the proceedings
.i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.b.A well-recognized deviation to
the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probatecourt may
hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is
todetermine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventoryi.Pastor v. CA1.As a rule, the question of ownership is
an extrataneous matter which theprobate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included inthe inventory
of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
titlethereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subjectto the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA
a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in
sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a
hearing on respondent’s claim.
Such relianceis misplaced
.b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the
purpose of theintestate or probate court in hearing and passing
upon questions of ownership
is merely todetermine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory
. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the
intestate court.i.
First
, the inventory was not disputed.1. Respondent could have
opposed petitioner’s inventory and
sought the exclusion of thespecific properties which she
believed or considered to be hers
. But instead of doing so,she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on thereal estate
properties.ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondent’s son) did not file
an inventory1.
He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom
those propertieswhich respondent considered to be hers.
The fact that he did not endeavor tosubmit one shows that
he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
2.Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped
its jurisdiction. Itsproper course should have been to maintain a
hands-off stance on the matter. It iswell- settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions,that when a
question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part
of theestate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other
person to be his property,not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to thatof the deceased and
his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to
thecourt in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.
a.
Jurisprudence states that:
i. probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estateand which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regardssaid properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventoryor list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well andgood, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
toresort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title becausethe probate court
cannot do so.3. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a
separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverseclaim of ownership over
properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife
who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was
appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose
became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife
Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise
agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the
compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was
made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as
full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco
and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of
Francisco de Borja among the heirsthereto before the probate of
his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as
to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or
his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of
Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking
Corporation , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON
ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J
ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
NOTES: The principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal
is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to
perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the
decision or final order appealed from.
FACTS:
The cases are consolidated.
Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to
Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it
was placed under liquidation and a Liquidator was appointed.
The Central Bank filed with the RTC of Manila a petition entitled
"Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation." The petition was approved, after which creditors
filed their claims with the court.
Nañagas, a new Liquidator, was appointed by the Central Bank.
In G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union):
Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for
short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-
intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay
differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and
cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as
employees of PaBC.
RTC:
 September 13, 1991-the trial court ordered payment of the
principal claims of the Union
 September 16, 1991-Liquidator received a copy of the
order
 October 16, 1991-he filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and Clarification of the order
 December 6, 1991-the judge modified his September 13,
1991 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for
reconsideration
 December 9, 1991-the order was received by the
Liquidator
 December 10, 1991-he filed a Notice of Appeal and a
Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal
 December 23, 1991-another Notice of Appeal was filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas
 February 10, 1992- in his order, respondent judge
disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground
that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the
decision and he ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off
the record on the ground that it had been filed without
authority of the Central Bank and again, beyond 15 days.
The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and
subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied
reconsideration.
 March 27, 1992-the judge granted the Union's Motion for
issuance of a writ of Execution
CA: The Liquidator filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders
of the trial court denying his appeal. In its decision of November
17, 1992, the Fifth Division held in the case of the Union that the
proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and,
therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the
Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision
granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The
Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court
and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the
Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
SC: The Union contends that the Court of Appeals erred seriously
in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed
on time.
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors):
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents filed
claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the
form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The
shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares,
constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC.
They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital
investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign
Investments Law.
RTC:

September 11, 1992-respondent judge of the RTC
directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total
amount of their claim as preferred creditors
 September 16, 1992-the Liquidator received the order
 September 30, 1992-he moved for reconsideration
 October 2, 1992- his motion was denied
 October 5, 1992- He received the order denying his Motion
for Reconsideration
 October 14, 1992-he filed a Notice of Appeal from the
orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992
 October 28, 1992- the judge directed the execution of his
September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/
Investors' claim
CA: The Liquidator filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of
the trial court denying his appeal. On December 16, 1993, the
Fourteenth Division ruled in the case of the
Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since
the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his
receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during
which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of
appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division
dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
SC: The Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation is a Special
Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in
which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
ISSUES:
Main Issue:
1. Whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No.
265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding or an ordinary civil action.
Sub-issues:
2. Whether or not In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the
Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was
filed on time.
3. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union),
the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
4. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor Union),
the Liquidator can question the order of the court or appeal from
it, in which the liquation plan was already approved by the
Monetary Board.
5. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor Union),
the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was filed by
the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank.
HELD:
1. The petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265,
otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpuscases the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu
thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of
the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129
provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases
referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109
of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required.
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of
justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy,
including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
Distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding
by Chief Justice Moran states:
ACTION (CIVIL ACTION) SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
The act by which one sues The act by which one seeks to
another in a court of justice establish the status or right of a
for the enforcement or party, or a particular fact.
protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a
wrong.
A formal demand of a right A petition for a declaration of a
by one against another. status, right or fact.
Proper remedy of a party Proper remedy of a party
litigant that seeks to whose purpose is to seek the
 recover property from appointment of a guardian for
another. an insane.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an
insolvent corporation should be classified a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not
seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention
or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or
omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against
any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file
their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. The
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of
insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of
payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's
assets.
Also, contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation
proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. Rather, a
liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the
settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of
the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts
and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The
Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged
with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances,
the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The
court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights
and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are
allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation.
As stated:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists
of a number of cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically
a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the
approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the
petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the
liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are
required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end
with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not
proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with
the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the
claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred, and
thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing
or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be
appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the
distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The
distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for
distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The
Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is
available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in
accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved
distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance
or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized.
It is the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a
"case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The issuance
of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims
involved, and which may assume finality if no appeal is made
therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple appeals
are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single
petition by the Solicitor General with a court of competent
jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the
insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the
treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the
Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is
considered separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in
the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing a
particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the
others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the
original records of the proceeding are not elevated to the
appellate court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of
the original record, a record of appeal is instead required to be
prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation
proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary
in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal
therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal
being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
2. Yes, In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the
Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was
filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the
order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors.
However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with
the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated
a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple
appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims
are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with
respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original
record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims
may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.
Consequently, the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.
3. Yes, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), the court
find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. As already
noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e.,
within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's
claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for
extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension
sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in
disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's
motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
4. Yes, the Liquidator can question the order of the court or
appeal from it
In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not
limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked
by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of
the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action
is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." As this Court held
in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
There is no question that the action of the monetary Board in this
regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held
that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall
be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never
been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith
(Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central
Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act
No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through
counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against
the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be
necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power
to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he
believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
5. Yes, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was
filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the
Central Bank. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor
General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27,
1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to
prepare and sign pleadings in the case. Conformably thereto the
Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit
Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo
I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an
ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-
1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice
produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial
personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate
for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except
for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of
an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes
vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to
include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice
or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such
legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution
of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished
by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any,
and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death
like his pending application at the commission.
SULPICIA VENTURA,petitioner, vs.HON. FRANCIS J.
MILITANTE, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court,7th Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and
JOHN UY,respondent.
G.R. No. 63145 October 5, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and
Damages againstpetitioner. However, petitioner moved to
dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground
that “the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality,” the same
being “neither a natural no r legal person in contemption of law.”
The petitioner then filed an opposition to privaterespondent’s
Motion to Dismiss. The public respondent then gave private
respondent 15 days to make the amendment of the complaint.
Petitioner filed a MR of the order of publicrespondent.
First, she argued that the action instituted by the private
respondent to recoverP48, 889.70, representing the unpaid price
of the automotive spare parts purchased by herdeceased
husband during his lifetime, is a money claim which, under
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not
survive, the same having been filed after Carlos Ngohad already
died.
Second, she claimed that the public respondent never acquired
jurisdictionover the subject matter of the case which, being an
action to recover a sum of money froma deceased person, may
only be heard by a probate court. Private respondent opposed
theforegoing motion. Public respondent then issued an Order
giving private respondent 24hours to file his amended complaint.
Private respondent then filed his amended complaint.
Petitioner then filed a Comment to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Private respondent then filed A Rejoinder to Defendant’s
Comment. Public respondent then issued the hereinassailed
order. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari assailing the said
Order.
ISSUE: WON A DEAD PERSON OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE
A PARTY PLAINTIFF IN A COURTACTION.HELD:
No.Firstly, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party
plaintiff in a courtaction. A deceased person does not have such
legal entity as is necessary to bring action somuch so that a
motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court.
Anaction begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have
been begun by a legal person,since an estate is not a legal entity;
such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend theparty plaintiff
will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court toamend.
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the
capacity to sue, to thesame extent, a decedent does not have the
capacity to be sued and may not be named aparty defendant in
a court action. .
Secondly, It is clear that the original complaint of private
respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against
Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at the time of thefiling
of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent
admitted, no specialproceeding to settle his estate had been filed
in court. As such, the trial court did notacquire jurisdiction over
either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. It is true
thatamendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice, in order that everycase may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trialof
causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. But amendmentscannot be allowed so as to confer
jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place.
When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the
person and the subjectmatter and that the pleading is so fatally
defective as not to be susceptible of amendment,or that to permit
such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature
of theaction, then the court should refuse the amendment of
the defective pleading and order thedismissal of the case.
Philippine Savings Bank vs Lantin
Duplex-apartment house on a lot in Sampaloc, Manila owned by
Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan duplex built by Candido
Ramos, a duly licensed architect and a building contractor for 32,
927 spouses paid 7,139 only- hence the architect used his
own money to finish the construction of the duplex-apartment -
25,788.50. in dec 1966 and feb 1967 spouses Tabligan
obtained from Philippine Savings bank 3 loans in the total
amountof 35,000 to complete the construction of the duplex
apartment. To secure the payment of the loans, the spouses
executed 3 PNs and 3 Deeds of REM over the property subject.
all REM were registered with ROD Manila, TCTs were free from
all liens and encumbrances at that time. spouses later failed to
pay their monthly amortizations so BANK FORECLOSED ON
THE MORTGAGED AND WASTHE HIGHEST BIDDER AT THE
PUBLIC AUCTION. Lantin also filed an action against
spouses to collect on unpaid cost of the construction and
later succeeded inOBTAINING A WRIT OF PREL
ATTACHMENT over the property- later adverse claim annotated
at the back of the TCT.
Trial court ruling: in favor of Architect but writ of exec
unsatisfied. Architect wrote letter to PSB FOR THE
DELIVERY TO HIM OF HIS PRO-RATA SHARE OVER THE
PROPERTY. PSB REFUSED TO PAY
ISSUE: WON ARCHITECT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM A PRO-
RATA SHARE IN THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION?
Bank: De Barretto vs Villanueva- not the proceedings
contemplated- there must be an insolvency proceeding
orother liquidation proceeding; architect's lien did not acquire
the character of a statutory lien equal to PSB'sregistered
mortgage.
Ramos:proceedings in trial court can qualify as a general
liquidation of the estate of the spouses Tabliganbecause the
only existing property of spouses is the duplex apt
Held: the proceedings in the court below do not partake of
the nature of the insolvency proceedings or settlement of a
decedent's estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to
COLLECT THE UNPAID COST of the construction of the
duplex apt. insolvency proceedings and settlement of a
decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are
bindingagainst the whole world regardless of WON persons
having interest were notified or not- they are equally bound.
although lower court found that there were no known creditors
other than the plaintiff and defendant herein. it will not bar other
creditors in the event they show up and present their claims
against PSB claimingthat they also have preferred liens against
the property involved. TCT issued in favor of bank is supposed to
be indefeasible. it wouldnt hurt if annotated. as far as bank knew,
it financed the entire construction "equivalent general liquidation"-
purchaser in good faith and for value takes the registered land
free from liensand encumbrances other thant the statutory liens
and those recorded in the TCT.
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA.
CRISANTO DE BORJA, administrator-appellant, vs. JUAN
DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. [J. Felix, 1957]
Doctrine: An administrator may be held accountable for any loss
or damage that the estate under his administration may incur by
reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration
(i.e. mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with
his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the
Intestate in his capacity as administrator). He may be made to
reimburse the Intestate for amounts that were not properly
accounted for. Expenses which are reasonable and necessary for
the care and preservation of the Intestate are allowable charges
to the estate.
Facts:
- Qunitin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, are legitimate children
of Marcelo de Borja. Marcelo died intestate and Quintin de Borja
became the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja. Quintin died testate and Crisanto de Borja, son of
Francisco de Borja, was appointed as administrator of the Estate
of Marcelo. Francisco, on the other hand, became the executor
of the will of Quintin.
- Francisco was later required by the Court to resign as such
executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of
Quintin de Borja; while the Intestate remained under the
administration of Crisanto de Borja until the then outbreak of the
war.
- After the war or in 1945, the court ordered the the reconstitution
of the records of this case, requiring the administrator to submit
his report and a copy of the project of partition.
- The heirs of Quintin de Borja opposed to the approval of the
statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja on the ground that it was not
detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the
same; that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer
any loss considering that during the administration of the same
by Quintin de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains of more than
P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash
balance; that they desired to examine the accounts of Dr.
Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and therefore prayed that the
administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all
books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to the
Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
- On July 6, 1950, herein oppositors-appellees, filed a motion for
the delivery to them of their inheritance in the estate, pursuant to
the provisions of the project of Partition, and expressing their
willingness to put up a bond if required to do so by the Court.
Motion was granted and affirmed by the SC.
- On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties
adjudicated to Juliana de Borja in the project of Partition were
finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond
for P20,000. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja
and Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties
allegedly belonging to the Intestate, said petition should properly
be considered together with the final accounts of the
administrator.
- On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended
statement of accounts covering the period from March 1, 1945,
to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An
additional statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the
period of from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a
cash balance of P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount
of P6,165.03.
- The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the
statements of accounts on the ground that certain fruits which
should have been accrued to the estate were unaccounted for.
But as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts
presented by said administrator and as their group was only one
of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the
administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4
of the amount alleged to have been omitted.
- On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said
opposition containing a counterclaim for moral damages against
all the heirs of Quintin de Borja which was admitted by the court.
The administrator later on filed an amended counterclaim
impleading the counsel for the oppositors as defendant, which
was denied by the lower court.
Issues:
What may be considered as acts of maladministration and
whether an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be
held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his
administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or
acts of maladministration [Yes, administrator may be held
accountable]
Ratio:
SC: After a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the
Court, finding the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, guilty of
certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the payment
to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the
unreported income which the estate should have received.
Hence, he is liable for: (a) P7,084.27;
(b)12,175.00; (c) 16,113.95; and (d) 3,352.75.
The SC relied on the evidence presented by the oppositors (i.e.
testimony of Lauro Aguila, testimony of Narciso Punzal who was
instructed by appellant to testify in court that he was the overseer
of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944,
delivering the yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to
Rogelio Limaco, and testimony of Basilio Javier who worked as a
tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land
belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only
by a river. He knew the tenants and the yields.)
TOPIC: COMPENSATION
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and
collected from the estate the sum of P13,294 as his fees from
1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no controversy
as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the
order or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there
any doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by
Crisanto de Borja is far from satisfactory. Yet it is a fact that
Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and
is entitled also to a certain amount as compensation for the work
and services he has rendered as such. Now, considering the
extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature
of the properties under administration, the amount collected by
the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not
unreasonable and should therefore be allowed.
MANOTOK REALTY v. CA, GR No. L-45038, 1987-04-30
Facts:
Felipe
Madlangawa... claims that he has been occupying a parcel of
land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision... since
1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores...
with the understanding that the... respondent would eventually
buy the lot.
the lot,... the owner of t
Clara Tambunting... died and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the
private respondent were placed under custodia legis.
the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum
of P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband
of the late owner... private respondent did not pay or was unable
to pay this balance because after the death of the testatrix, Clara
Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could not settle their...
differences.
Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of
the estate
Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the
lot in question.
the petitioner became the successful bidder and vendee of the
Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision
In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters
and occupants, the petitioner caused the publication of several
notices... private respondent was one of the many occupants who
refused to vacate the lots they were occupying... he petitioner
filed the action below to recover the said lot
Issues:
In this petition, the petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don
Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid,
binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.
petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property
in question was the paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting,...
no authority whatsoe
Vicente Legarda had no a... o the private... ever to sell the said
property to the private respondent... on May 12, 1950 since... the
former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara
Tambunting only on August 28, 1950
Ruling:
There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente
Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of
Dona Clara Tambuting during the lifetime of the latter
Thus, it cannot be said that the sale with was entered into by the
private respondent and
Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona
Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on
behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death.
n Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of
the lot in... dispute as a continuing administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of
the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied
before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property
in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved
the request,... then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able
to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the
administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure
nor on that of the respondent to protect his... interests or to pay
the balance of the installments to the court appointed
administrator.
Principles:
sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is
void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator
of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be
the... subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company
or the probate court.
Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449 , No. L-22761 May 31, 1969
Facts: the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were
the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct
line of the deceased John T. Bush. They prayed that They prayed
that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be
ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the
properties left by the deceased and another project of partition
adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said
estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all
or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market
value thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to pay for the
value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of
action, res judicata and statute of limitations.
After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on
the date thereof the hearing was postponed upon the defendant's
manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The
motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating
that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly
approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could
take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the
Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied
upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed.
The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence,
this appeal.
Issue: The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the
lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the
motion to dismiss?
Held: No. The Court should not dismiss a case based on a
ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss because it is
tantamount to depriving the opposing party of their right to
respond or argue the case.
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and
after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of
since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and
friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that
husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20
years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to
have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability
under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of
presumptive death before she can remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration
of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails
during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes
of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
GUE vs REPUBLICNo. L-14058 March 24, 1960
Petitioner and appellant: Angelina L. GueOppositor and appellee:
Republic of the PhilippinesNature of the case: Appeal from the
order of the CFI of ManilaPOnente: Montemayor,
J.Issue:Facts:1)Appeal from an order of the
CFI Manila dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue
2)
Oct 11, 1944: married to William Gue and had a child Anthony
Gue; another child Eulogio
3)
on January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to Shanghai
China but since then had not been heardof, neither had he written
to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to
locate himdespite of her efforts and diligence4)they had not
acquired any property during the marriage5)she asked the court
for a declaration of the presumption of death of William gue (Art
390 of the CC)CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order
of dismissal-no right had been established by the petitioner upon
which a judicial decree may be predicated and thisaction is not
for settlement of the estate of the absentee as it is clear he did
not leave any
-
* A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be
a prima facie presumption only and it stilldisputable—it is for this
reason that it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration—proof of actual death would still have to be
determined6)Appealed- invoked the provisions of Art 390 of the
New Civil Code—absence of 7 years—for successionshall not be
presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years7)According to
appellant with promulgation of the NCC in 1950, the courts are
now authorized to declarepersons presumptively
deadSOLICITOR GENERAL:opposed to the petition; same
reason as above (*)SC: the appeal order dismissing the petition
is AFFIRMED.
Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-60101, August 31,
1983 (124 SCRA 425)
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances
attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon
and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to
lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the
persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule
on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code
must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court
said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls."
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for
conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of
presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed
established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a
finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override,
or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which
logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died
shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on
February 16, 1980.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF
APPEALS,et.al.
458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION
Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional
Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The petition was
thereafter granted by the trial court. The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial
court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the
present case is a special proceeding which requires that a record
of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed
a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. The CA
affirmed the trial court‘s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death
of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding.
HELD: with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed
a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains Article 238
which provides that unless modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in the said Title shall apply in all cases provided ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid
for in the Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
HELD:
The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is therefore, a
summary proceeding under the Family Code as her purpose was
to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not a special proceeding
under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s
filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence
from the trial court‘s order sufficed. is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio
and their marriage is legal and valid.
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
Montaner vs. Shariah District Court

FACTS:
Facts: Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in
Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She
three children.
gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims,
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and
filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the
her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her
Shari’a District Court. They claim to be the first family of
parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio
Alejandro.
until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to
separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
becasue Discangcopan failed to pay the correct amount of docket
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married
fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopan’s petition which contains
Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the
naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage
conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient.
Issue: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for
“Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties.
Held: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present
the clerk of court’s assessment.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making
a deficiencyassessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such
a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose
jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s
insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law
with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in
accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized
with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment. However, the
party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.
In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of
court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do
not include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the
clerk of court’s assessment.
URIARTE V. CFI
Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed
petition for settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte
y Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as
special administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by
nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while he was in Spain, the
deceased made a will AND that petitioner had doubtful interest
(proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not yet done).
Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate of the
will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed,
contending that Negros courts already had exclusive jurisdiction
of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special proceeding,
and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will. Petitioner
contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a non-
resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues
for the proceedings. But since probate proceedings enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even
if the venue was improper, petitioner considered to have waived
the defect by laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized
as the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in
the probate proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.
Facts:
-Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in
Manila and Negros
-The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed
petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan
before the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time,
the proceedings for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural
son of Don Juan was still pending
-PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate,
but PNB failed to qualify
-OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of
Don Juan):
Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated -
submitted before Negros court
ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable
-JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related)
commenced SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON
JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts
Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before
Negros Courts
Vicente had no legal personality to sue
>>>OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took
cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same
NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it
-VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to
intervene + dismissal of petition for probate + annulment of
proceedings - DENIED
-Manila court admitted to probate the last will
WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO.
Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the
time of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left
property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate
-here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros
Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to
give way to Manila court
special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate
of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on
intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate
of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if
at that stage an administrator had already been appointed,
the latter being required to render final account and turn over
the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed.
If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as
intestacy
VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE
IMPROPERLY LAID
-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros
court, so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court earlier:
Manila court already
*appointed an administrator
*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier
-court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction
As to interest of Vicente in the case
-two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his
status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.
ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS
Short summary: Intestate proceedings already commenced and
was about to be closed (there already been a project of partition)
when testate proceedings initiated. The decedent left 2 wills
which the petitioners for the intestate proceedings knew. Court
held that probate proceedings are proper and intestate
proceedings should be consolidated with the testate -Administrators submitted an inventory
proceedings.
-Palawan Pearl Project (business owned by deceased) sold to
Makiling Management Co (owned by Ethel and husband and
lawyer), acquiesced by Linda (daughter in 2nd marriage) and
Facts: Juanita (other daughter in 1st marriage)
-Edward Grimm died in Makati Med -PROJECT PARTITION APPROVED BY INTESTATE COURT
-Heirs -Ethel filed MOTION for accounting so that Estate properties can
be partitioned among heirs and intestate estate be closed.
1st marriage (ended in divorce) children:
TESTATE COURT: filed 2 years after intestate proceedings
Juanita Grimm Morris
-sought to set aside the 1979 partition approved by intestate court
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden)
-Ethel filed MTD - denied for lack of merit
2nd marriage
2nd wife MAXINE
WON THE TESTATE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
Son Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete)
THE PETITION FOR PROBATE? NO
Daughter Linda Grimm
-A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
-he left 2 wills: 1 for his properties in RP (conjugal property w/ 2nd with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal
wife), the other for his estate outside RP wherein the daughters property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code;
in the 1st marriage were intentionally not given anything sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

-43 days after decedent's death, ETHEL filed Intestate
proceedings, was named special administrator
>>>Maxine (2nd wife/stepmom) filed OPPOSITION + MTD:
there's Utah proceedings for the probate of will
Prayed that she be appointed special administratrix
>>>w/drawn by Maxine
INTESTATE COURT: since the parties wanted it, Maxine, Pete
and Ethel were all appointed as joint administrators (Intestate
court already knew there was a will but did not do anything about
it)
-The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned
to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
-so dismissed Ethel's petition for certiorari
Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., 100 Phil. 593 , No. L-8409
December 28, 1956
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition
for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father,
Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings
(Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that
they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and
alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.
They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that
venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his
siblings’ objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and
had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only
bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City
because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at
No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able
to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and
was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that
“domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely
for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge that one
will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the
presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not
manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did
not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to
testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his
house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children
remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at
889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as
his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he
was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days
prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place
chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although
Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change
of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the
authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on
the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants
specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose
only of assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had
no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate
of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile
is gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for one’s own
health.
Figuracion v. Vda. De Figuracion
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed a deed of
quitclaim over his
real properties in favor of his six children. When he died in 1958,
he left behind two
parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his
deceased parents.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a
dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half
of Lot.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any
debt and she
and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she Petitioner Ma. Socorro Avellino, the compulsory heir of the late
does not dispute the Antonio Avelino Sr. Petitioner filed before the RTC for a petition
finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Avelino
to her father’s final Sr.
illness and burial have not been properly settled.
The respondent Sharon Avelino the second wife of the children
ISSUE: Is an action for partition appropriate in this case? and Angelina Avelino filed a motion to convert the said judicial
proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly
No. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the opposed.
expenses chargeable
to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out
that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro ISSUE: WON converting petitioner‘s petition for issuance of
Figuracion’s only legal letters of administration to an action for judicial partition is valid.
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain
expenses” including those
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been HELD: Petition is denied.
properly settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s SC ruled that if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
estate to settlement legatee are all of age, section 1 rule 74 of the rules of court should
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in apply.
an action for partition.
Extra judicial settlement by agreement between heirs if the
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or
the accounting of all the minors represented by their judicial or legal representative
expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing
consolation at all to petitioner, letters of administration divide the estate among themselves as
the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession they see fit by means of public instrument filed in the office of the
thereof even before the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
settlement of accounts, as long as they ordinary action of partition.
first file a bond conditioned on the payment of
the estate’s obligations. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the
partition of the estate and no extra judicial action for partition is
Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 369 , G.R. No. possible, the ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as
115181 March 31, 2000 in this case.

FACTS: Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676)

Facts
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal
property of spouses Gregorio Yapand Rosario Diez. In 1946,
Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario,
andchildren, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr.,
and private respondent Caridad Yap ashis heirs. Thereafter,
Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a
mortgage on thedisputed land, which was annotated on its OCT.
When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering theland as
security, the bank’s lawyer, Atty. Serna, suggested that she
submit an extrajudicial settlementcovering the disputed land as a
means of facilitating the approval of her application. The
suggestionwas accepted. The extrajudicial settlement,
which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was signed by theheirs, with
the exception of Gregorio, Jr., then only a minor. After the
document was notarized, theOCT was cancelled and a TCT was
issued. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on theland,
the loan was approved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of
ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit against
Jovita’s husband and son to evict them from the ground floor
of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly
thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario hadoffered the land
for sale. She informed her younger brother, Gregorio, Jr. and
they filed an actionfor partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join
in the action for partition against their mother, shewas impleaded
as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial
instrument was simulatedand therefore void. They claimed that in
signing the instrument, they did not really intend to conveytheir
interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to
obtain the loan on thesecurity of the land to cover expenses for
Caridad’s school fees and for household repairs.
Issue: 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and
can be enforced against petitioners?2.) Whether or not Gregorio,
Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the property?
Held
1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully
effective. The record reveals thatthere was an intention on the
part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their interest in the land to
their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially
motivated by a desire to acquire a loan.Under Art. 1082, CC,
every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs isdeemed to be partition even though it should purport to be
a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.2.)No. As he did
not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At
thetime the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a
minor. As such, he was not included or even informed of the
partition. Instead, the registration of the land in his mother’s name
created animplied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC,
which provides that “when land passes bysuccession to any
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust isestablished by implication of law for the benefit
of the true owner. As a general rule, a resultingtrust arises where
such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the
parties, as determinedfrom the facts and circumstances existing
at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to
beestablished. For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the
trust must be repudiated byunequivocal acts made known to the
cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence.A
cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within
10 years from the time when thetrust is repudiated. The rule that
the prescriptive period must be counted from the date of
issuanceof the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the
remedy of reconveyance under the PropertyRegistration Decree.
Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought
shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their mother’s effort to
sell the property, his claim cannot beconsidered barred either by
prescription or by laches.
Sebial v. Sebial Digest
G.R. No. L-23419
Facts of the Case:
 Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife
Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6 other children with his 2nd wife
Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, BEjamina filed for the Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes
settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as who co-owned the subject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu,
administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by Roberta on the with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand respondents, claim to
ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and daughter of
she should be the one appointed as administrator and not Anacleto's daughter.
Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that
alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of
administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez,
don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to
was denied. For the possibility of an amicale settlement, the court Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez),
ordered both sides to give a complete list of the porperties of te also their co-respondents in this case. When Spouses
decedent with segregation for each marriage. Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they
discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so:
On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's
(1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating
inventory (second one) or six months from the appointment.
that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is
Roberta them moved for the motion reocnsideration alleging as
approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated
ground that the court has no jusridiction to approve the inventory
July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851,
as it was files beyiind the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals
while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the
certified the case to the Supreme Court.
property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes,
Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.
inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment?
Ruling. NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court,
Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
the prescribed three-month period is not mandatory. Once a
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the
petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with
aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise
the proper court and the publication of the notice of hearing is
prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject
complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and
property.
retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even
if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this
delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to
approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed,
Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an hence the petition.
administrator's removal.
Reyes vs Enriquez
Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008 proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits
of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.
Ruling: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance
of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance. The respondents have yet to substantiate their
claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus,
entitled to the subject property.
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is
allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party
in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such
interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is
present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.
Case # 13
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN,
MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ,
ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE,
TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME
DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO,
PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE
CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and
TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner (Maria Elena R. Pedrosa-the adpted child) and
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's
estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the
estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents
(Rodriguezes) filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner
before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein
respondent Rosalina as defendants.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and
upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private
respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of
the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered
14 parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters.
These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes,
Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein by virtue of Deed
of Sale.
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought
to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to
Dismiss. CA dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the
adoption of petitioner.
 Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, to claim their
share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused
saying that Maria Elena and her daughter were not heirs since
they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said
complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the
allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of
petitioner had already prescribed
The RTC dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to
the CA. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the TC.
Petitioner filed a MR, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already
prescribed;
2. WON said deed is valid; and
3. WON the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had
already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
HELD:
1. NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive
period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part
or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive
period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as
provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which
held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery
of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when
said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on
January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, the court holds that her action against the respondents
on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
2. The Deed of extra Judicial settlemet of estate and partition
is Invalid.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule
on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all
persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement
cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a
notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication
was done in the instant case. since Maria Elena did not
participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on
her.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the
same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel
together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of
Miguel from participating in his estate. The decree of adoption
was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that
private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith
with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares
in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in
the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was
no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.
Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent
Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only
Pilar's estate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is
declared invalid
3. Given the circumstances in this case, it is constrained to
hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.
The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are
now all registered under the name of third parties. Well
settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by
private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid
Utulo v. Pasion Vda De GarciaFacts:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and in the proceedings
instituted in the CFI Tarlac for theadministration of his property,
Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia (surviving spouse) wasappointed
judicial administratrix. Sanchez left legitimate children, named
Juan, Patrocinioand Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia married Pablo Utulo
and during the pendency of theadministration proceedings of her
father, she died. Her only forced heirs were her motherand
husband. Pablo filed a petition, which stated the following:1.
That
Luz’ only heirs were
himself and his mother-in-law2.
That the only property left by Luz consisted in the share due her
from the intestateof her father, Juan Sanchez3.
That he should be named administrator of the necessary so that he may have legalcapacity to appear in the
intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he
Luz’ wouldappear in the said intestate by the right of
representation, it would suffice for him toallege in proof of
propertyLeona objected to the petition and alleged that inasmuch
his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his
as the said deceased left noindebtedness, there was no occasion
deceased wifewho, in turn, would be a forced heir and an
for the said judicial administration. However statedthat should the
interested and necessary party if she wereliving. In order to
court grant administration of the property, she should be
intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution
appointed theadministratrix as she had a better right than Pablo.
of theproperty it is not necessary that the administration of
Issue: the property of his deceasedwife be instituted an
administration, which will take up time and
1. Whether judicial administration of the property left by Luz occasioninconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
Garcia lies with theconsequent appointment of an administrator2.
2. Thus, there is no need to determine which of the parties has
preferential right to theoffice of administrator.
Whether Leona has a better right to the said office than Pablo
Held: G.R. No. L-26306 Necessity of Probate April 27, 1988
1. No. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving Page 1 of 2
property in the PhilippineIslands, his property should be judicially
administered and the competent court shouldappoint a qualified 101st Case
administrator, in the order established by law, in case the
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA
deceasedleft no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to
MARIA VENTURA, executrixappellant,
name an executor therein. Thisrule, however, is subject to the
exceptions. First, when all the heirs are of lawful ageand MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition theproperty without instituting the judicial v.
administration or applying for the appointmentof an administrator.
According to the second, if the property left does not exceed GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL
sixthousand pesos , the heirs may apply to the competent court, VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA
after the requiredpublications, to proceed with the summary
and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-
partition and, after paying all he knownobligations, to partition all
appellees.
the property constituting the inheritance among
themselvespursuant to law, without instituting the judicial PARAS, J.:
administration and the appointment ofan administrator.
FACTS:
There is no weight in the argument adduced by Pablo to the
effectthat his appointment as judicial administrator is
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the executrix and administrator Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1)
deceased Gregorio that she is grossly
Ventura. appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely
deceased's legitimate concealed certain properties of
children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate
daughter who can have
On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the
probate of his no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix
has neglected to
will which did not include the appellees. In the said will, the
appellant Maria Ventura, render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the
Court.
although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the
testator to be the The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has
squandered the
executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. Said will
was admitted to funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to
comply with the
probate on January 14,195. Gregorio Ventura died on September
26, 1955. On October orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date
statements of accounts and
10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered the
questioned decision.
and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour. On
October 17, 1955, Maria ISSUE:
Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the removal of
testamentary was Maria Ventura
issued in her favour. On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix.
submitted an inventory
RULING:
of the estate of Gregorio Ventura. On June 17, 1960, she filed her
accounts of REVERSED.

administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.
Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura to remove as
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura and Maria and
Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property.
G.R. No. L-26306 Necessity of Probate April 27, 1988
Page 2 of 2
101st Case
It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the
estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.” Among
members of a class
the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the
late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of
Gregorio Ventura they are
entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, namely: Maria
and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the
surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest
of kin, or Juana Cardona
and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the
Court, in order to represent
both interests.
[G.R. No. 120575. December 16, 1998.]
DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special
administratrix of the estate of the late DON ANDRES
PASCUAL and as executrix of the testate estate of the late
DOÑA ADELA S. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 162; DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS G.
MAOG; and ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents.
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J:
Facts:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate and survived by his
widow, children of his full blood brother, children of his half blood
brother, intestate estate of his full blood brother, and
acknowledged natural children of his full blood (herein
petitioners). Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) was appointed
administratrix. To assist her with said proceedings, Doña Adela
hired Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her
counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross
estate of the decedent.
While the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died,
leaving a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal
heir. Six years after Doña Adela's death Judge Padolina rendered
a Decision, which had become final and executory. Private
respondent then filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution insofar as the payment of his attorney's fees was
concerned. Despite opposition from the petitioner, the motion
was granted and the court directed "the issuance of a writ of
execution in the partial amount of P2,000,000.00 in favor Atty.
Jose I. Santos to be implemented against the 3/4 share of Doña
Adela S. Pascual, upon payment by the movant of the prescribed
docket fees for the said partial amount." Having exhausted all
remedies, petitioner filed this present petition for review on
certiorari challenging the Decision of the CA denying the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment. They claim among others that,
without any hearing or notice to them, the judge approved and
awarded the attorney's fees of private respondent, who was
purportedly his classmate and compadre. Furthermore, they
allege that, in the settlement of Doña Adela's estate, private
respondent filed a similar collection case before the RTC of
Malabon, which was, however, dismissed for violating the rules
against forum shopping. Private respondent allegedly filed
another collection case before the RTC of Makati wherein
petitioner, in her Answer, alleged that she had paid him
approximately P8 million from the time his services were
engaged, aside from some unreported "commissions" from
tenants, squatters and other businesses included in the Pascual
estate.
Issue:
Whteher or not he portion of the decision dated January
19, 1994 awarding attorney's fees is void from the beginning
because it was made after trial court had lost its jurisdiction over
the attorney's client by reason of her [client's] death.
Ruling:
NO. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish
the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile
his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her estate. Had
he filed the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule would
have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don
Andres. Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the
applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which
requires the appointment of a new administrator, viz.: "Sec. 2.
Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal.
—. . . When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer
the trust alone, unless the court grants letter to someone to act
with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person."
The rule does not have the effect of divesting the intestate
court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper
party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct
and separate from that of Doña Adela who merely served as the
former's administratrix. Doña Adela was merely a representative
party, and the claim was an item of the administrative expense of
Don Andres estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against
the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts
of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is
pending. Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed
administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court to determine
whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as
administrative expense — if it was obtained in reference to the
management of the estate; the performance of legal services
which the administratrix herself could not perform; the
prosecution or defense of actions or suits on behalf of or against
the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of
properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court has a
mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a "necessary
expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate."
For the same reason, the fact that the private respondent's lien
was recorded four months after the administratrix had died is of
no moment.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Omnibus Motion are
hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
Case Digest:Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in
the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note
in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of
Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and
Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence,
executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of
them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the
latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed
a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his return
to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the
loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and
her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under
the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the
unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence,
and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union
Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the
probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of
the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still
have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE:
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibañez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund
and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was
void considering that it had not been approved by the probate
court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before
the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
o (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing
all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped
his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties
he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.
The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez,
should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose
of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his
son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-
maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and
continuing guaranty.
MANINANG vs. CA
June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all
her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose
family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30
years. The will also provided that she does not consider
Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution
is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the
determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo
has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the
face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition
is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to
the lower court.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA
449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Difference between Preterition and
Disinheritance)
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and
Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole,
universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to
her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground
that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in
consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the
conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased
as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate
or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
– her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case
is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance,
in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole,
universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it
contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession
ensues.
Acain v. IAC
(1987)
Facts:
On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain)
filed on the RTC of Cebu City, apetition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain ofletters
testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain
and his siblings wereinstituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner
withoutobjection raised by private respondents.Segundo, the
brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case
Segundo pre-deceas
es Nemesio, Segundo’s children
would then
succeed. After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents
(Virginia Fernandez, legally adopteddaughter of Nemesio, and
the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on
thefollowing grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; he ismerely a universal heir and the
Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was
denied. After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the
privaterespondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will ofNemesio.His MR having been
denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of
IAC’s
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited.
No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.
2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate
proceedings.
No.
**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority.
No.
Ratio/Held:
1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of themeither because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
institutedas heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, there is nopreterition, for she is not in the
direct line
. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. Itcannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator. Neithercan it be denied that she was not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case ofpreterition of the
Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to
the entireinheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating
the will.2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have aninterest in the estate, or in
the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor
or asa claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who
would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to
have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy
havingresulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the
universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effectnot an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the
will left bythe deceased and must then be dismissed.**3. The
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to
the extrinsic validity ofthe will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance withthe
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comesonly after the Court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, isnot
inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerlessto do what the situation constrains
it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
Wherecircumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon evenbefore the extrinsic
validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue.The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly
availed of by private respondents.The petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was
survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and
Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and
Ethel) which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on
January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by
Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice
of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978.
The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on
April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise
agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was
instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of
pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the
court a copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the
motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the
record.The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two
wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters
of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding
was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to
the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by
Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to
dismiss.
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s
motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code;
sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned
to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.