Political Geography: Introduction

Political geography is the field of human geography that is concerned with the study of both the
spatially uneven outcomes of political processes and the ways in which political processes are
themselves affected by spatial structures. Conventionally political geography adopts a three-scale
structure for the purposes of analysis with the study of the state at the centre, above this is the
study of international relations (or geopolitics), and below it is the study of localities. The
primary concerns of the sub-discipline can be summarised as the inter-relationships between
people, state, and territory.

1. History

The origins of political geography lie in the origins of human geography itself and the early
practitioners were concerned mainly with the military and political consequences of the
relationships between physical geography, state territories, and state power. In particular there
was a close association with regional geography, with its focus on the unique characteristics of
regions, and environmental determinism with its emphasis on the influence of the physical
environment on human activities. This association found expression in the work of the German
geographer Friedrich Ratzel who, in 1897 in his book Politische Geographie, developed the
concept of Lebensraum (living space) which explicitly linked the cultural growth of a nation with
territorial expansion, and which was later used to provide academic legitimation for the
imperialist expansion of the German Third Reich in the 1930s.

The British geographer Halford Mackinder was also heavily influenced by environmental
determinism and in developing his concept of the 'geopolitical pivot of history' or heartland (first
developed in 1904) he argued that the era of sea power was coming to an end and that land based
powers were in the ascendant, and, in particular, that whoever controlled the heartland of 'Euro-
Asia' would control the world. This theory involved concepts diametrically opposed to the ideas
of Alfred Thayer Mahan about the significance of sea power in world conflict. The heartland
theory hypothesized the possibility of a huge empire being created which didn't need to use
coastal or transoceanic transport to supply its military industrial complex, and that this empire
could not be defeated by the rest of the world coalitioned against it. This perspective proved
influential throughout the period of the Cold War, underpinning military thinking about the
creation of buffer states between East and West in central Europe.

The heartland theory depicted a world divided into a Heartland (Eastern Europe/Western
Russia); World Island (Eurasia and Africa); Peripheral Islands (British Isles, Japan, Indonesia
and Australia) and New World (The Americas). Mackinder claimed that whoever controlled the
Heartland would have control of the world. He used this warning to politically influence events
such as the Treaty of Versailles, where buffer states were created between the USSR and
Germany, to prevent either of the them controlling the Heartland. At the same time, Ratzel was
creating a theory of states based around the concepts of Lebensraum and Social Darwinism. He
argued that states were analogous to 'organisms' that needed sufficient room in which to live.
Both of these writers created the idea of a political and geographical science, with an objective
view of the world. Pre-World War II political geography was concerned largely with these issues
of global power struggles and influencing state policy, and the above theories were taken on
board by German geopoliticians (see Geopolitik) such as Karl Haushofer who - perhaps
inadvertently - greatly influenced Nazi political theory. A form of politics legitimated by
'scientific' theories such as a 'neutral' requirement for state expansion was very influential at this
time.

The close association with environmental determinism and the freezing of political boundaries
during the Cold War led to a considerable decline in the importance of political geography which
was described by Brian Berry in 1968 as 'a moribund backwater'. Although in other areas of
human geography a number of new approaches were invigorating research, including
quantitative spatial science, behavioural studies, and structural Marxism, these were largely
ignored by political geographers whose main point of reference continued to be the regional
approach. As a result much political geography of this period was descriptive with little attempt
to produce generalisations from the data collected. It was not until 1976 that Richard Muir could
argue that political geography might not be a dead duck but could in fact be a phoenix.

2. Areas of Study

The Brandenburg Gate of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

From the late-1970s onwards political geography has undergone a renaissance, and could fairly
be described as one of the most dynamic of the sub-disciplines today. The revival was
underpinned by the launch of the journal Political Geography Quarterly (and its expansion to bi-
monthly production as Political Geography). In part this growth has been associated with the
adoption by political geographers of the approaches taken up earlier in other areas of human
geography, for example, Ron J. Johnston's (1979) work on electoral geography relied heavily on
the adoption of quantitative spatial science, Robert Sack's (1986) work on territoriality was based
on the behavioural approach, and Peter Taylor's (e.g. 2007) work on World Systems Theory
owes much to developments within structural Marxism. However the recent growth in the
vitality and importance of the sub-discipline is also related to changes in the world as a result of
the end of the Cold War, including the emergence of a new world order (which as yet is only
poorly defined), and the development of new research agendas, such as the more recent focus on
social movements and political struggles going beyond the study of nationalism with its explicit
territorial basis. Recently, too, there has been increasing interest in the geography of green
politics (see, for example, David Pepper's (1996) work), including the geopolitics of
environmental protest, and in the capacity of our existing state apparatus and wider political
institutions to address contemporary and future environmental problems competently.

Political geography has extended the scope of traditional political science approaches by
acknowledging that the exercise of power is not restricted to states and bureaucracies, but is part
of everyday life. This has resulted in the concerns of political geography increasingly
overlapping with those of other human geography sub-disciplines such as economic geography,
and, particularly, with those of social and cultural geography in relation to the study of the
politics of place (see, for example, the books by David Harvey (1996) and Joe Painter (1995)).
Although contemporary political geography maintains many of its traditional concerns (see
below) the multi-disciplinary expansion into related areas is part of a general process within
human geography which involves the blurring of boundaries between formerly discrete areas of
study, and through which the discipline as a whole is enriched.

In particular, then, modern political geography often considers:

 How and why states are organized into regional groupings, both formally (e.g. the
European Union) and informally (e.g. the Third World)
 The relationship between states and former colonies, and how these are propagated over
time, for example through neo-colonialism
 The relationship between a government and its people
 The relationships between states including international trades and treaties
 The functions, demarcations and policings of boundaries
 How imagined geographies have political implications
 The influence of political power on geographical space
 The study of election results (electoral geography)

2. 1. Critical Political Geography

(See also: Critical geopolitics)

Critical political geography is mainly concerned with the criticism of traditional political
geographies. As with much of the move towards 'Critical geographies', the arguments have
drawn largely from postmodern, poststructural and postcolonial theories. Examples include:

 Feminist geography, which argues for a recognition of the power relations as patriarchal
and attempts to theorise alternative conceptions of identity and identity politics.
Alongside related concerns such as Queer theory and Youth studies
 Postcolonial theories which recognise the Imperialistic, universalising nature of much
political geography, especially in Development geography
3. Notable Political Geographers

 John A. Agnew
 Simon Dalby
 Klaus Dodds
 Derek Gregory
 Richard Hartshorne
 Karl Haushofer
 Yves Lacoste
 Halford Mackinder
 Doreen Massey
 Gearóid Ó Tuathail
 Joe Painter
 Friedrich Ratzel
 Ellen Churchill Semple
 Peter J. Taylor
 Rudolf Kjellen

4. References

 Harvey D 1996 Justice, nature and the geography of difference Oxford: Blackwell ISBN
1557866805
 Johnston RJ 1979 Political, electoral and spatial systems Oxford: Clarendon Press
ISBN 0198740727
 Painter J 1995 Politics, geography and 'political geography': a critical perspective
London: Arnold ISBN 034056735X
 Pepper D 1996 Modern environmentalism London: Routledge ISBN 0415057442
 Sack RD 1986 Human territoriality: its theory and history Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press ISBN 0521266149
 Taylor PJ & Flint C 2007 Political geography: world-economy, nation-state and
locality Harlow: Pearson Education Lim. ISBN 0131960121
Friedrich Ratzel
Friedrich Ratzel (August 30, 1844, Karlsruhe, Baden - August 9, 1904, Ammerland) was a
German geographer and ethnographer, notable for first using the term Lebensraum ("living
space") in the sense that the National Socialists later would.

Friedrich Ratzel's photograph from the University of Leipzig

1. Life

Ratzel's father was the head of the household staff of the Grand Duke of Baden. He attended high
school in Karlsruhe for six years before being apprenticed at age 15 to apothecaries . In 1863, he
went to Rapperswil on the Lake of Zurich, Switzerland, where he began to study the classics.
After a further year as an apothecary at Mörs near Krefeld in the Ruhr area (1865-1866), he spent
a short time at the high school in Karlsruhe and became a student of zoology at the universities
of Heidelberg, Jena and Berlin, finishing in 1868. He studied zoology in 1869, publishing Sein
und Werden der organischen Welt on Darwin.

After the completion of his schooling, Ratzel began a period of travels that see him transform
from zoologist/biologist to geographer. He began field work in the Mediterranean, writing letters
of his experiences. These letters led to a job as a traveling reporter for the Kölnische Zeitung
("Cologne Journal"), which provided him the means for further travel. Ratzel embarked on
several expeditions, the lengthiest and most important being his 1874-1875 trip to North
America, Cuba, and Mexico. This trip was a turning point in Ratzel’s career. He studied the
influence of people of German origin in America, especially in the Midwest, as well as other
ethnic groups in North America.

He produced a written work of his account in 1876, Städte-und Kulturbilder aus Nordamerika
(Profile of Cities and Cultures in North America), which would help establish the field of
cultural geography. According to Ratzel, cities are the best place to study people because life is
"blended, compressed, and accelerated" in cities, and they bring out the "greatest, best, most
typical aspects of people". Ratzel had traveled to cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Washington, Richmond, Charleston, New Orleans, and San Francisco.

Upon his return in 1875, Ratzel became a lecturer in geography at the Technical High School in
Munich. In 1876, he was promoted to assistant professor, then rose to full professor in 1880.
While at Munich, Ratzel produced several books and established his career as an academic. In
1886, he accepted an appointment at Leipzig. His lectures were widely attended, notably by the
influential American geographer Ellen Churchill Semple.

Ratzel produced the foundations of human geography in his two-volume Anthropogeographie in

1882 and 1891. This work was misinterpreted by many of his students, creating a number of
environmental determinists. He published his work on political geography, Politische
Geographie, in 1897. It was in this work that Ratzel introduced concepts that contributed to
Lebensraum and Social Darwinism. His three volume work The History of Mankind [1] was
published in English in 1896 and contained over 1100 excellent engravings and remarkable
chromolithography.

Ratzel continued his work at Leipzig until his sudden death on August 9, 1904 in Ammerland,
Germany. Ratzel, a scholar of versatile academic interest, was a staunch German. During the
outbreak of Franco-Prussian war in 1870, he joined the Prussian army and was wounded twice
during the war.

2. Writings

Influenced by thinkers like Darwin and zoologist Ernst Heinrich Haeckel, he published several
papers. Among them is the essay Lebensraum (1901) concerning biogeography, creating a
foundation for the uniquely German variant of geopolitics: geopolitik.

Ratzel’s writings coincided with the growth of German industrialism after the Franco-Prussian
war and the subsequent search for markets that brought it into competition with England. His
writings served as welcome justification for imperial expansion. Influenced by the American
geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ratzel wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing
that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine,
unlike land power.

Ratzel’s key contribution to geopolitik was the expansion on the biological conception of
geography, without a static conception of borders. States are instead organic and growing, with
borders representing only a temporary stop in their movement. It is not the state proper that is the
organism, but the land in its spiritual bond with the people who draw sustenance from it. The
expanse of a state’s borders is a reflection of the health of the nation.

Ratzel’s idea of Raum (space) would grow out of his organic state conception. This early concept
of lebensraum was not political or economic, but spiritual and racial nationalist expansion. The
Raum-motiv is a historically driving force, pushing peoples with great Kultur to naturally
expand. Space, for Ratzel, was a vague concept, theoretically unbounded. Raum was defined by
where German peoples live, where other weaker states could serve to support German peoples
economically, and where German culture could fertilize other cultures. However, it ought to be
noted that Ratzel's concept of raum was not overtly aggressive, but theorized simply as the
natural expansion of strong states into areas controlled by weaker states.

The book for which Ratzel is acknowledged all over the world is 'Anthropogeographie'. It was
completed between 1872 to 1899. The main focus of this monumental work is on the effects of
different physical features and locations on the style and life of the people.

3. Influence

Rudolf Kjellén was Ratzel’s Swedish student who would further elaborate on organic state
theory and who coined the term “geopolitics”.

The German geostrategist General Karl Haushofer was exposed to Ratzel, who was friends with
Haushofer’s father, and would integrate Ratzel’s ideas on the division between sea and land
powers into his theories, saying that only a country with both could overcome this conflict. In his
writings, Haushofer also adopted the view that borders are largely insignificant, especially as the
nation ought to be in a frequent state of struggle with those around it. Further, Haushofer would
adopt Ratzel's conception of Raum as the central program for German geopolitik.

4. Quotations

 "A philosophy of the history of the human race, worthy of its name, must begin with the
heavens and descend to the earth, must be charged with the conviction that all existence
is one—a single conception sustained from beginning to end upon one identical law."

 "Culture grows in places that can adaquately [sic] support dense labor populations."
Sir Halford John Mackinder PC (15 February 1861 - 6 March 1947) was an English
geographer and is considered one of the founding fathers of both geopolitics and geostrategy.

In 1887, he published "On the Scope and Methods of Geography", a manifesto for the New
Geography. [2] A few months later, he was appointed as Reader in Geography at the University of
Oxford, where he introduced the teaching of the subject. As Mackinder himself put it, "a
platform has been given to a geographer." This was arguably at the time the most prestigious
academic position for a British geographer. He was allergic to peanuts.

In 1892, he was the first Principal of University Extension College, Reading, which later became
the University of Reading. [3] The following year, he was one of the founders of the Geographical
Association, which promoted (and promotes) the teaching of geography in schools. He later
became chairman of the GA from 1913 to 1946 and served as its President from 1916.

In 1895, he was one of the founders of the London School of Economics. At Oxford, Mackinder
was the driving force behind the creation of a School of Geography in 1899. [4] In the same year,
he led an expedition which was the first to climb Mount Kenya. [5]

In 1902 he published Britain and The British Seas, which included the first comprehensive
geomorphology of the British Isles and which became a classic in regional geography. [6]

He was a member of the Coefficients dining club, set up in 1902 by the Fabian campaigners
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, which brought together social reformers and advocates of national
efficiency. [7]

In 1904 Mackinder gave a paper on "The Geographical Pivot of History" at the Royal
Geographical Society, in which he formulated the Heartland Theory. [8] This is often considered
as a, if not the, founding moment of Geopolitics as a field of study, although Mackinder did not
use the term. Whilst the Heartland Theory initially received little attention outside geography,
this theory would later exerce some influence on the foreign policies of world powers. [9]

Possibly disappointed at not getting a full Chair, Mackinder left Oxford and became director of
the London School of Economics between 1903 and 1908. After 1908, he concentrated on
advocating the cause of imperial unity and lectured only part-time. [10] He was elected to
Parliament in January 1910 as Unionist Party member for the Glasgow Camlachie constituency
and was defeated in 1922. He was knighted in the 1920 New Year Honours for his services as an
MP. [11]
His next major work, Democratic ideals and reality: a study in the politics of reconstruction,
appeared in 1919. [12] It presented his theory of the Heartland and made a case for fully taking into
account geopolitical factors at the Paris Peace conference and contrasted (geographical) reality
with Woodrow Wilson's idealism. The book's most famous quote was: "Who rules East Europe
commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the
World Island commands the World." This message was composed to convince the world
statesmen at the Paris Peace conference of the crucial importance of Eastern Europe as the
strategic route to the Heartland was interpreted as requiring a strip of buffer state to separate
Germany and Russia. These were created by the peace negotiators but proved to be ineffective
bulwarks in 1939 (although this may be seen as a failure of other, later statesmen during the
interbellum). The principal concern of his work was to warn of the possibility of another major
war (a warning also given by economist John Maynard Keynes).

Mackinder was anti-Bolshevik, and as British High Commissioner in Southern Russia in late
1919 and early 1920, he stressed the need for Britain to continue her support to the White
Russian forces, which he attempted to unite. [13]

3. Significance of Mackinder

Mackinder's work paved the way for the establishment of geography as a distinct discipline in
the United Kingdom. His role in fostering the teaching of geography is probably greater than that
of any other single British geographer.

Whilst Oxford did not appoint a professor of Geography until 1934, both the University of
Liverpool and University of Wales, Aberystwyth established professorial chairs in Geography in
1917. Mackinder himself became a full professor in Geography in the University of London
(London School of Economics) in 1923.

Mackinder is often credited with introducing two new terms into the English language :
"manpower", "heartland".

3. 1. Influence on Nazi strategy

The Heartland Theory was enthusiastically taken up by the German school of Geopolitik, in
particular by its main proponent Karl Haushofer. Whilst Geopolitik was later embraced by the
German Nazi regime in the 1930s, Mackinder was always extremely critical of the German
exploitation of his ideas. The German interpretation of the Heartland Theory is referred to
explicitly (without mentioning the connection to Mackinder) in The Nazis Strike, the second of
Frank Capra's Why We Fight series of American World War II propaganda films.

3. 2. Influence on American strategy

The Heartland theory and more generally classical geopolitics and geostrategy were extremely
influential in the making of US strategic policy during the period of the Cold War. [14]

3. 3. Influence on later academics

Evidence of Mackinder’s Heartland Theory can be found in the works of geopolitician Dimitri
Kitsikis, particularly in his geopolitical model "Intermediate Region".

4. Mackinder on geography

"...the science whose main function is to trace the interaction of man in society and so much of
his environment as varies locally."

"The science of distribution. The science, that is, which traces the arrangement of things in
general on the Earth's surface."
Alfred Thayer Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan (September 27, 1840 - December 1, 1914) was a United States Navy flag
officer, geostrategist, and historian, who has been called "the most important American strategist
of the nineteenth century." [1] His concept of "sea power" was based on the idea that the most
powerful navy will control the globe; it was most famously presented in The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890). The concept had an enormous influence in shaping the
strategic thought of navies across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and
Britain. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy.

Several ships were named USS Mahan, including the lead vessel of a class of destroyers.

2. Naval War College and writings

In 1885, he was appointed lecturer in naval history and tactics at the Naval War College. Before
entering on his duties, College President Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce pointed Mahan in the
direction of writing his future studies on the influence of sea power. For his first year on the
faculty, he remained at his home in New York City researching and writing his lectures. Upon
completion of this research period, he was to succeed Luce as President of the Naval War
College from June 22, 1886 to January 12, 1889 and again from July 22, 1892 to May 10, 1893.
[6]
There, in 1887, he met and befriended Theodore Roosevelt, then a young visiting lecturer, who
would later become president of the United States.

Mahan plunged into the library and wrote lectures that drew heavily on standard classics and the
ideas of work of Henri Jomini. The lectures became his sea-power studies: The Influence of Sea
Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890); The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution
and Empire, 1793-1812 (2 vols., 1892); and Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812 (2 vols.,
1905). The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (2 vols., 1897)
supplemented the series. Mahan stresses the importance of the individual in shaping history, and
extols the traditional values of loyalty, courage, and service to the state. Mahan sought to
resurrect Horatio Nelson as a national hero in Britain and used the book as a platform for
expressing his views on naval strategy and tactics. Criticisms of the work focused on Mahan's
handling of Nelson's love affair with Lady Emma Hamilton, but it remains the standard
biography. In addition to these works, Mahan wrote more than a hundred articles on international
politics and related topics, which were closely read by policy makers.

Upon being published, Mahan struck up a friendship with pioneering British naval historian Sir
John Knox Laughton, the pair maintaining this relationship through correspondence and visits
when Mahan was in London. Mahan was later described as a 'disciple' of Laughton, although the
two men were always at pains to distinguish between each other's line of work, Laughton seeing
Mahan as a theorist while Mahan called Laughton 'the historian'. [7]
3. Strategic views

Mahan's views were shaped by the seventeenth century conflicts between Holland, England,
France and Spain, and by the nineteenth century naval wars between France and Britain, where
British naval superiority eventually defeated France, consistently preventing invasion and
blockade, (see Napoleonic war: Battle of Trafalgar and Continental System). To a modern
reader, the emphasis on controlling seaborne commerce is a commonplace, but, in the nineteenth
century, the notion was radical, especially in a nation entirely obsessed with expansion on to the
continent's western land. On the other hand, Mahan's emphasis of sea power as the crucial fact
behind Britain's ascension neglected the well-documented roles of diplomacy and armies;
Mahan's theories could not explain the success of terrestrial empires, such as Bismarckian
Germany. [8] However, as the Royal Navy's blockade of the German Empire was a critical direct
and indirect factor in the eventual German collapse, Mahan's theories were vindicated by the
First World War.

4. Sea Power

Mahan used history as a stock of lessons to be learned—or more exactly, as a pool of examples
that exemplified his theories. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated
with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. His goal was to discover
the laws of history that determined who controlled the seas. His theoretical framework came
from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals, and coaling
stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. The primary mission of a
navy was to secure the command of the sea. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea
communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary,
provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. This control of the sea could not be
achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet.
This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not overly large but
numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the
best defense is an aggressive offense [9] .

Mahan contended that with command of the sea, even if local and temporary, naval operations in
support of land forces can be of decisive importance and that naval supremacy can be exercised
by a transnational consortium acting in defense of a multinational system of free trade. His
theories—written before the submarine became a factor in warfare against shipping—delayed the
introduction of convoys as a defense against German U-Boats in World War I. By the 1930s the
U.S. Navy was building long-range submarines to raid Japanese shipping, but the Japanese, still
tied to Mahan, designed their submarines as ancillaries to the fleet and failed to attack American
supply lines in the pacific in World War II [10] .

Mahan argued that radical technological change does not eliminate uncertainty from the conduct
of war, and therefore a rigorous study of history should be the basis of naval officer education.

Sumida (2000) argues Mahan believed that good political and naval leadership was no less
important than geography when it came to the development of sea power. Second, his unit of
political analysis insofar as sea power was concerned was a transnational consortium rather than
the single nation-state. Third, his economic ideal was free trade rather than autarchy. Fourth, his
recognition of the influence of geography on strategy was tempered by a strong appreciation of
the power of contingency to affect outcomes [10] ..

Mahan prepared a secret contingency plan of 1890 in case war should break out between Britain
and the United States. Mahan concluded that the British would attempt to blockade the eastern
ports, so the American Navy should be concentrated in one of these ports, preferably New York
with its two widely separated exits, while torpedo boats should defend the other harbors. This
concentration of the U.S. fleet would force the British to tie down such a large proportion of their
navy to watch the New York exits that the other American ports would be relatively safe.
Detached American cruisers should wage "constant offensive action" against the enemy's
exposed positions, and if the British were to weaken their blockade force off New York to attack
another American port, the concentrated U.S. fleet should seize the opportunity to escort an
invasion fleet to capture the British coaling ports in Nova Scotia, thereby seriously weakening
the British ability to engage in naval operations off the American coast. This contingency plan is
a clear example of the application of Mahan's principles of naval war, with a clear reliance on
Jomini's principle of controlling strategic points. [11]

Mahan was a frequent commentator on world naval, strategic and diplomatic affairs. In the 1890s
he argues that the United States should concentrate its naval fleet and obtain Hawaii as a hedge
against Japanese eastward expansion and that the U.S. should help maintain a balance of power
in the region in order to advance the principle of the Open Door policy both commercially and
culturally. Mahan represented the U.S. at the first international conference on arms control was
initiated by Russia in 1899. Russia sought a "freeze" to keep from falling behind in Europe's
arms race. Other countries attended in order to mollify various peace groups. No significant arms
limitations agreements were reached. A proposal on neutral trade rights was debated but ruled
out of order by the Russians. The only significant result of the conference was the establishment
of an ineffective Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

5. Impact on naval thought

Timeliness contributed no small part to the widespread acceptance and resultant influence of
Mahan's views. Although his history was relatively thin (he relied on secondary sources), the
vigorous style and clear theory won widespread acceptance of navalists across the world. Sea
power supported the new colonialism which was asserting itself in Africa and Asia. Given the
very rapid technological changes underway in propulsion (from coal to oil, from boilers to
turbines), ordnance (with better fire directors, and new high explosives) and armor and
emergence of new craft such as destroyers and submarines, Mahan's emphasis on the capital ship
and the command of the sea came at an opportune moment [9] .

Mahan's name became a household word in the German navy, as Kaiser William II ordered his
officers to read Mahan, and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930) used Mahan's reputation to
finance a powerful surface fleet.

Between 1890 and 1915, Mahan and British admiral John Fisher (1841-1920) faced the problem
of how to dominate home waters and distant seas with naval forces not strong enough to do both.
Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and
minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological
change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for
protection of distant imperial interests. [12]

The French were less susceptible to Mahan's theories. French naval doctrine in 1914 was
dominated by Mahan's theory of sea power and therefore geared toward winning decisive battles
and gaining mastery of the seas. But the course of World War I changed ideas about the place of
the navy, as the refusal of the German fleet to engage in a decisive battle, the Dardanelles
expedition of 1915, the development of submarine warfare, and the organization of convoys all
showed the navy's new role in combined operations with the army. The navy's part in securing
victory was not fully understood by French public opinion in 1918, but a synthesis of old and
new ideas arose from the lessons of the war, especially by admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968),
from 1927 to 1935, who synthesized in his five-volume Théories Stratégiques the classical and
materialist schools of naval theory. He reversed Mahan's theory that command of the sea
precedes maritime communications and foresaw the enlarged roles of aircraft and submarines in
naval warfare. Castex enlarged strategic theory to include nonmilitary factors (policy, geography,
coalitions, public opinion, and constraints) and internal factors (economy of force, offense and
defense, communications, operational plans, morale, and command) to conceive a general
strategy to attain final victory. [13]

Ideologically, the United States Navy initially opposed replacing its sailing ships with steam-
powered ships after the Civil War; Mahan argued that only a fleet of armored battleships might
be decisive in a modern war. According to the decisive-battle doctrine, a fleet must not be
divided; Mahan's work encouraged technological improvement in convincing opponents that
naval knowledge and strategy remained necessary, but that domination of the seas dictated the
necessity of the speed and predictability of the steam engine.

His books were greatly acclaimed, and closely studied in Britain and Imperial Germany,
influencing the build up of their forces prior to the First World War. Mahan influenced the naval
portion of the Spanish-American War, and the battles of Tsushima, Jutland, and the Atlantic. His
work influenced the doctrines of every major navy in the interwar period.

Mahan's concept of sea power extended beyond naval superiority; that in peace time, states
should increase production and shipping capacities, acquire overseas possessions — either
colonies or privileged access to foreign markets— yet stressed that the number of coal fuel
stations and strategic bases should be few, not to drain too many resources from the mother
country. [14]

Although Mahan's influence on foreign powers has been generally recognized, only rather
recently have scholars called attention to his role as significant in the growth of American
overseas possessions, the rise of the new American navy, and the adoption of the strategic
principles upon which it operated. He died in Washington a few months after the outbreak of
World War I.
5. 1. Japan

The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783 was translated to Japanese [15] and used as a
textbook in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). This strongly affected the IJN's Pacific War
conduct, emphasising the "decisive battle" doctrine — even at the expense of protecting trade.

The IJN's pursuit of the "decisive battle" was such that it contributed to Imperial Japan's defeat in
1945, [16] [17] and so rendered obsolete the doctrine of the decisive battle between fleets, because of
the development of the submarine and the aircraft carrier. [18] However, one could argue that the
IJN did not adhere entirely to Mahan's doctrine, as they did divide their main force from time to
time, particularly the extensive division of warships in a complicated battle plan that led to the
disaster at Midway, and as such sealed their own defeat.

Later career

Between 1889 and 1892 Mahan was engaged in special service for the Bureau of Navigation, and
in 1893 he was appointed to command the powerful new protected cruiser Chicago on a visit to
Europe, where he was received and feted. He returned to lecture at the War College and then, in
1896, he retired from active service, returning briefly to duty in 1898 to consult on naval strategy
for the Spanish-American War.

Mahan continued to write voluminously and received honorary degrees from Oxford,
Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, and McGill.

In 1902 Mahan invented the term "Middle East", which he used in the article "The Persian Gulf
and International Relations", published in September in the National Review. [19]

He became Rear Admiral in 1906 by an act of Congress promoting all retired captains who had
served in the Civil War. At the outbreak of World War I, he initially engaged in the cause of
Great Britain, but an order of President Woodrow Wilson prohibited all active and retired
officers from publishing comments on the war. Mahan died of heart failure on December 1,
1914.

Karl Ernst Haushofer

Karl Ernst Haushofer (August 27, 1869 - March 10, 1946) was a German general, geographer and
geopolitician. Through his student Rudolf Hess, Haushofer's ideas may have influenced the development
of Adolf Hitler's expansionist strategies, although Haushofer denied direct influence on the Nazi regime.

1. Biography

Haushofer belonged to a family of artists and scholars. He was born in Munich, Germany, to
Max Haushofer, a professor of economics, and Frau Adele Haushofer (née Fraas). On his
graduation from the Munich Gymnasium (high school), Haushofer contemplated an academic
career. However, service with the Bavarian army proved so interesting that he stayed to work,
with great success, as an instructor in military academies and on the general staff.

In 1887, he entered the 1st Field Artillery regiment "Prinzregent Luitpold" and completed
Kriegsschule, Artillerieschule and War Academy (Kingdom of Bavaria). In 1896, he married
Martha Mayer-Doss (1877-1946) whose father was Jewish. They had two sons, Albrecht
Haushofer and Heinz Haushofer.

Haushofer continued his career as a professional soldier, serving in the army of Imperial
Germany, and rising through the Staff Corp by 1899. In 1903 he began teaching at the Bavarian
War Academy.

In November 1908 the army sent him to Tokyo to study the Japanese army and to advise it as an
artillery instructor. He travelled with his wife via India and South East Asia and arrived in
February 1909. Haushofer was received by the Japanese emperor and got to know many
important people in politics and armed forces. In autumn 1909 he travelled with his wife for a
month to Korea and Manchuria on the occasion of a railway construction. In June 1910 they
returned to Germany via Russia and arrived one month later.

Shortly afterwards he began to suffer from several severe diseases and was given a leave from
the army for three years. From 1911 - 1913 Haushofer would work on his doctorate of
philosophy from Munich University for a thesis on Japan entitled: Dai Nihon, Betrachtungen
über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft (Reflections on Greater Japan's Military
Strength, World Position, and Future). By World War I he had attained the rank of General, and
commanded a brigade on the western front. He became disillusioned after Germany's loss and
severe sanctioning, retiring with the rank of Major General in 1919. At this time, he forged a
friendship with the young Rudolf Hess who would become his scientific assistant.
General Haushofer and Rudolf Hess

Haushofer entered academia with the aim of restoring and regenerating Germany. Haushofer
believed the Germans' lack of geographical knowledge and geopolitical awareness to be a major
cause of Germany’s defeat in World War I, as Germany had found itself with a poor alignment
of allies and enemies. The fields of political and geographical science thus became his areas of
specialty. In 1919 Haushofer became Privatdozent for political geography at Munich University
and in 1933 professor.

Louis Pauwels, in his book "Monsieur Gurdjieff", describes Haushofer as a former student of
George Gurdjieff [1] ; Pauwels later recanted many things from it.[citation needed] Others, including
Pauwels, said that Haushofer created a Vril society; and that he was a secret member of the
Thule Society, [2] which is equally dubious.[citation needed]

After the establishment of the Nazi regime, Haushofer remained friendly with Rudolf Hess, who
protected Haushofer and his wife from the racial laws of the Nazis, which deemed her a "half-
Jew". During the pre-war years Haushofer was instrumental in linking Japan to the axis powers,
acting in accordance with the theories of his book "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean".

After the July 20 Plot to assassinate Hitler Haushofer's son Albrecht (1903-1945) went into
hiding but was arrested on December 7, 1944 and put into the Moabit prison in Berlin. During
the night of April 22-23, 1945 he and other selected prisoners like Klaus Bonhoeffer were
walked out of the prison by an SS-squad and shot. From September 24, 1945 on Karl Haushofer
was informally interrogated by Father Edmund A. Walsh on behalf of the Allied forces to
determine if he should stand trial at Nuremberg for war crimes. However, he was determined by
Walsh not to have committed war crimes. On the night of March 10-11, 1946 he and his wife
committed suicide in a secluded hollow on their Hartschimmelhof estate at Pähl/Ammersee.
Both drank arsenic and the wife then hanged herself while Haushofer was obviously too weak to
do so too. [3] [4]

2. Geopolitik

Main article: Geopolitik

Haushofer developed Geopolitik from widely varied sources, including the writings of Oswald
Spengler, Alexander Humboldt, Karl Ritter, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, and Halford J.
Mackinder.

Geopolitik contributed to Nazi foreign policy chiefly in the strategy and justifications for
lebensraum. The theories contributed five ideas to German foreign policy in the interwar period:

 the organic state

 lebensraum
 autarky
 pan-regions
 land power/sea power dichotomy.

Geostrategy as a political science is both descriptive and analytical like Political Geography, but
adds a normative element in its strategic prescriptions for national policy. [5] While some of
Haushofer's ideas stem from earlier American and British geostrategy, German geopolitik
adopted an essentialist outlook toward the national interest, oversimplifying issues and
representing itself as a panacea. [6] As a new and essentialist ideology, geopolitik found itself in a
position to prey upon the post-WWI insecurity of the populace. [7]

Haushofer's position in the University of Munich served as a platform for the spread of his
geopolitical ideas, magazine articles, and books. In 1922 he founded the Institute of Geopolitics
in Munich, from which he proceeded to publicize geopolitical ideas. By 1924, as the leader of
the German geopolitik school of thought, Haushofer would establish the Zeitschrift für
Geopolitik monthly devoted to geopolitik. His ideas would reach a wider audience with the
publication of Volk ohne Raum by Hans Grimm in 1926, popularizing his concept of lebensraum.
[8]
Haushofer exercised influence both through his academic teachings, urging his students to
think in terms of continents and emphasizing motion in international politics, and through his
political activities. [9] While Hitler's speeches would attract the masses, Haushofer's works served
to bring the remaining intellectuals into the fold. [10]

Geopolitik was in essence a consolidation and codification of older ideas, given a scientific
gloss:

 Lebensraum was a revised colonial imperialism;

 Autarky a new expression of tariff protectionism;
  Strategic control of key geographic territories exhibiting the same thought behind earlier
designs on the Suez and Panama canals; i.e., a view of controlling the land in the same
way as those choke points control the sea
 Pan-regions (Panideen) based upon the British Empire, and the American Monroe
Doctrine, Pan-American Union and hemispheric defense, [11] whereby the world is divided
into spheres of influence.
 Frontiers - His view of barriers between peoples not being political (i.e., borders) nor
natural placements of races or ethnicities but as being fluid and determined by the will or
needs of ethnic/racial groups.

The key reorientation in each dyad is that the focus is on land-based empire rather than naval
imperialism.

Ostensibly based upon the geopolitical theory of American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan,
and British geographer Halford J. Mackinder, German geopolitik adds older German ideas.
Enunciated most forcefully by Friedrich Ratzel and his Swedish student Rudolf Kjellén, they
include an organic or anthropomorphized conception of the state, and the need for self-
sufficiency through the top-down organization of society. [12] The root of uniquely German
geopolitik rests in the writings of Karl Ritter who first developed the organic conception of the
state that would later be elaborated upon by Ratzel and accepted by Hausfhofer. He justified
lebensraum, even at the cost of other nations' existence because conquest was a biological
necessity for a state's growth. [13]

Ratzel's writings coincided with the growth of German industrialism after the Franco-Prussian
war and the subsequent search for markets that brought it into competition with Britain. His
writings served as welcome justification for imperial expansion. [14] Influenced by Mahan, Ratzel
wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing that sea power was self-sustaining, as the
profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine, unlike land power. [15] Haushofer was
exposed to Ratzel, who was friends with Haushofer's father, a teacher of economic geography, [16]
and would integrate Ratzel's ideas on the division between sea and land powers into his theories,
saying that only a country with both could overcome this conflict. [17]

Haushofer's geopolitik expands upon that of Ratzel and Kjellén. While the latter two conceive of
geopolitik as the state as an organism in space put to the service of a leader, Haushofer's Munich
school specifically studies geography as it relates to war and designs for empire. [18] The
behavioral rules of previous geopoliticians were thus turned into dynamic normative doctrines
for action on lebensraum and world power. [19]

Haushofer defined geopolitik in 1935 as "the duty to safeguard the right to the soil, to the land in
the widest sense, not only the land within the frontiers of the Reich, but the right to the more
extensive Volk and cultural lands." [20] Culture itself was seen as the most conducive element to
dynamic special expansion. It provided a guide as to the best areas for expansion, and could
make expansion safe, whereas projected military or commercial power could not. [21] Haushofer
even held that urbanization was a symptom of a nation's decline, evidencing a decreasing soil
mastery, birthrate and effectiveness of centralized rule. [22]
To Haushofer, the existence of a state depended on living space, the pursuit of which must serve
as the basis for all policies. Germany had a high population density, whereas the old colonial
powers had a much lower density, a virtual mandate for German expansion into resource-rich
areas. [23] Space was seen as military protection against initial assaults from hostile neighbors with
long-range weaponry. A buffer zone of territories or insignificant states on one's borders would
serve to protect Germany. [24] Closely linked to this need, was Haushofer's assertion that the
existence of small states was evidence of political regression and disorder in the international
system. The small states surrounding Germany ought to be brought into the vital German order.
[25]
These states were seen as being too small to maintain practical, even if they maintained large
colonial possessions, and would be better served by protection and organization within Germany.
In Europe, he saw Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece and the
"mutilated alliance" of Austro-Hungary as supporting his assertion. [26]

Haushofer's version of autarky was based on the quasi-Malthusian idea that the earth would
become saturated with people and no longer able to provide food for all. There would essentially
be no increases in productivity. [27]

Haushofer and the Munich school of geopolitik would eventually expand their conception of
lebensraum and autarky well past the borders of 1914 and "a place in the sun" to a New
European Order, then to a New Afro-European Order, and eventually to a Eurasian Order. [28]
This concept became known as a pan-region, taken from the American Monroe Doctrine, and the
idea of national and continental self-sufficiency. [29] This was a forward-looking refashioning of
the drive for colonies, something that geopoliticians did not see as an economic necessity, but
more as a matter of prestige, and putting pressure on older colonial powers. The fundamental
motivating force would not be economic, but cultural and spiritual. [30] Haushofer was, what is
called today, a proponent of "Eurasianism", advocating a policy of German-Russian hegemony
and alliance to offset an Anglo-American power structure's potentially dominating influence in
Europe.

Beyond being an economic concept, pan-regions were a strategic concept as well. Haushofer
acknowledges the strategic concept of the Heartland put forward by the British geopolitician
Halford Mackinder. [31] If Germany could control Eastern Europe and subsequently Russian
territory, it could control a strategic area to which hostile seapower could be denied. [32] Allying
with Italy and Japan would further augment German strategic control of Eurasia, with those
states becoming the naval arms protecting Germany's insular position. [33]

3. Contacts with Nazi leadership

Evidence points to a disconnect between geopoliticians and the Nazi leadership, although their
practical tactical goals were nearly indistinguishable. [10]

Rudolf Hess, Hitler's secretary who would assist in the writing of Mein Kampf, was a close
student of Haushofer's. While Hess and Hitler were imprisoned after the Munich Putsch in 1923,
Haushofer spent six hours visiting the two, bringing along a copy of Friedrich Ratzel's Political
Geography and Clausewitz's On War. [34] After WWII, Haushofer would deny that he had taught
Hitler, and claimed that the National Socialist Party perverted Hess's study of geopolitik. He
viewed Hitler as a half-educated man who never correctly understood the principles of geopolitik
passed onto him by Hess, and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as the principal distorter
of geopolitik in Hitler's mind. [35] While Haushofer accompanied Hess on numerous propaganda
missions, and participated in consultations between Nazis and Japanese leaders, he claimed that
Hitler and the Nazis only seized upon half-developed ideas and catchwords. [36] Furthermore, the
Nazi party and government lacked any official organ that was receptive to geopolitik, leading to
selective adoption and poor interpretation of Haushofer's theories. Ultimately, Hess and
Konstantin von Neurath, Nazi Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the only officials Haushofer
would admit had a proper understanding of geopolitik. [37]

Father Edmund A. Walsh S.J., professor of geopolitics and dean at Georgetown University, who
interviewed Haushofer after the allied victory in preparation for the Nürnberg trials, disagreed
with Haushofer's assessment that geopolitik was terribly distorted by Hitler and the Nazis. [38] He
cites Hitler's speeches declaring that small states have no right to exist, and the Nazi use of
Haushofer's maps, language and arguments. Even if distorted somewhat, Fr. Walsh felt that was
enough to implicate Haushofer's geopolitik. [39]

Haushofer also denied assisting Hitler in writing Mein Kampf, saying that he only knew of it
once it was in print, and never read it. [40] Fr. Walsh found that even if Haushofer did not directly
assist Hitler, discernible new elements appeared in Mein Kampf, as compared to previous
speeches made by Hitler. Geopolitical ideas of lebensraum, space for depth of defense, appeals
for natural frontiers, balancing land and seapower, and geographic analysis of military strategy
entered Hitler's thought between his imprisonment and publishing of Mein Kampf. [41] Chapter
XIV, on German policy in Eastern Europe, in particular displays the influence of the materials
Haushofer brought Hitler and Hess while they were imprisoned. [42]

Haushofer was never a member of the Nazi Party, and did voice disagreements with the party,
leading to his brief imprisonment. Haushofer came under suspicion because of his contacts with
left wing socialist figures within the Nazi movement (led by Gregor Strasser) and his advocacy
of essentially a German-Russian alliance. This Nazi left wing had some connections to the
Communist Party of Germany and some of its leaders, especially those who were influenced by
the National Bolshevist philosophy of a German-Russian revolutionary alliance, as advocated by
Ernst Niekisch, Julius Evola, Ernst Jünger, Hielscher and other figures of the "conservative
revolution." He did profess loyalty to the Führer and make anti-Semitic remarks on occasion.
However, his emphasis was always on space over race, believing in environmental (Social
Darwinism) rather than racial determinism. [43] He refused to associate himself with anti-Semitism
as a policy, especially because his wife was half-Jewish. [44] Haushofer admits that after 1933
much of what he wrote was distorted under duress: his wife had to be protected by Hess's
influence (who managed to have her awarded 'honorary German' status); his son was implicated
in the July 20 plot to assassinate Hitler and was executed by the Gestapo; he himself was
imprisoned in Dachau concentration camp for eight months; and his son and grandson were
imprisoned for two-and-a-half months. [45]

3. 1. Conspiracy theories
The notion of a contact between Haushofer and the Nazi establishment has been stressed by
several authors. [46] [47] These authors have expanded Haushofer's contact with Hitler to a close
collaboration while Hitler was writing Mein Kampf and made him one of the 'future Chancellor's
many mentors'. Haushofer may have been a short-term student of Gurdjieff, that he had studied
Zen Buddhism, and that he had been initiated at the hands of Tibetan lamas, although these
notions are debated.

References

1. Amazon.fr: Monsieur Gurdjieff: Louis Pauwels: Livres at www.amazon.fr.

2. [Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier.The Morning of the Magicians. Avon Books,1973]
3. TIME Magazine March 25, 1946
4. Edmund A. Welsh S.J., The Mystery of Haushofer, LIFE Magazine September 16, 1946
pp. 107-120
5. Mattern, Johannesm Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire, The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore: 1942, p. 40-41.
6. Walsh, S.J., Edmund A. Total Power: A Footnote to History. Doubleday & Company,
Inc., Garden City, New York: 1949, p. 41.
7. Mattern, p. 32.
8. Dorpalen, Andreas. The World of General Haushofer. Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York:
1984, p. 16-17.
9. Walsh, p. 4-5.
10. ^ Beukema, Col. Herman. "Introduction." The World of General Haushofer. Farrar &
Rinehart, Inc., New York: 1984, p. xiii.
11. Mattern, p. 37.