UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:17-cv-252-GCM

WALTER L. HART, IV, Guardian Ad Litem

for J.G., a minor,

Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
v.

UNION COUNTY, GASTON COUNTY, With Jury Trial Demand

and WANDA SUE LARSON, in her
individual capacity and in her official
capacity,

Defendants.

NOW COMES the plaintiff—Walter L. Hart, IV, as Guardian Ad Litem for the

minor plaintiff, J.G.—and complaining of the defendants, Union County, Gaston County,

and Wanda Sue Larson says and alleges as follows:

PARTIES

1. The plaintiff, Walter L. Hart, IV (“Plaintiff Hart”), is a citizen and resident of

Mecklenburg County, North Carolina.

2. The minor plaintiff, J.G., is a citizen and resident of Mecklenburg County,

North Carolina.

3. On March 30, 2002, J.G. was born to Maria Harris (“Harris”)

4. On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff Hart qualified as, and was duly appointed

by the Clerk of Superior Court of Union County to be, the Guardian Ad Litem for J.G.,

and Plaintiff Hart is acting in his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem for the minor plaintiff,

J.G., in bringing this negligence action for personal injuries on behalf of J.G.

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 5. The defendant, Union County (“Defendant Union County”), is a county

pursuant to G.S. § 153A-10, is a body politic and corporate pursuant to G.S. § 153A-11,

and is being sued as such under both state and federal law.

6. The defendant, Gaston County (“Defendant Gaston County”), is a county

pursuant to G.S. § 153A-10, is a body politic and corporate pursuant to G.S. § 153A-11,

and is being sued as such under both state and federal law.

7. Upon information and belief, the defendant, Wanda Sue Larson

(“Defendant Larson”), is a citizen and resident of Union County, North Carolina.

8. In this civil action, Defendant Larson is being sued in both her individual

and official capacities, in that her misconduct regarding J.G. was both malicious and

corrupt.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS FOR ALL CLAIMS

9. With respect to Defendants Union County and Larson, this action is a

refiling, within one year, of a prior action, Walter L. Hart, IV, Guardian Ad Litem for J.G.,

A Minor, And Maria Harris V. Union County, And Wanda Sue Larson, W.D.N.C. File No.

3:17-cv-252, which action was dismissed without prejudice by an April 2, 2018 Order.

10. With respect to Defendants Gaston County, this action is filed within three

years of the appointment of Plaintiff Hart as Guardian Ad Litem for J.G.

11. The Court has subject matter over this litigation because it involves a

federal question.

12. At all relevant times, the minor, J.G., had the right to be free from

deprivation of liberty and injury without substantive due process and from state created

danger as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As a minor

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at all relevant times, J.G. was incapable of waiving any of his rights, including his right

to bodily integrity.

13. The Union County Human Services (“UCHS”) is a department of

Defendant Union County, and at all times relevant hereto, UCHS was a consolidated

human services agency created and existing pursuant to G.S. § 153A-77(b) and with

responsibility for government-provided, social services programs in Union County, North

Carolina.

14. The Union County Department of Social Services (“UCDSS”) is, and at all

relevant times was, one of the divisions comprising UCHS, and thus, UCDSS is and

was a division of Union County.

15. At all times relevant hereto, UCDSS administered the Foster Care and

Adoption program and the Child and Family Services program for UCHS in Union

County.

16. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Union County acted through

its managers and policy makers, including those managing UCDSS; and the acts,

edicts, and practices of these managers and policy makers represent the official policies

of Defendant Union County.

17. For the period complained of in this action, Defendant Union County has

purchased liability insurance that provides coverage for Defendants Union County and

Larson for the plaintiffs’ claims made against them in this action, which claims do not

invoke governmental immunity.

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 18. The Gaston County Department of Health and Human Services

(“GCDHHS”) is a department of Defendant Gaston County, with responsibility for

government-provided, social services programs in Gaston County, North Carolina.

19. At times relevant hereto, the Gaston County Department of Social

Services (“GCDSS”) was the department of Defendant Gaston County with

responsibility for government-provided, social services programs in Gaston County,

North Carolina, but GCDSS merged with the Gaston County Health Department,

creating GCDHHS in July 2013.

20. At all times relevant hereto, GCDSS administered the Foster Care and

Adoption program and the Child and Family Services program for Defendant Union

County.

21. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Gaston County acted

through its managers and policy makers, including those managing GCDSS; and the

acts, edicts, and practices of these managers and policy makers represent the official

policies of Defendant Gaston County.

22. For the period complained of in this action, Defendant Gaston County has

purchased liability insurance that provides coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims made

against it in this action, which claims do not invoke governmental immunity.

23. At all times relevant hereto, Wanda Sue Larson (“Larson”) was an

employee and agent of Defendant Union County.

24. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Larson was a Social Worker and

later a Social Worker Supervisor for UCDSS’s Children’s Protective Services (“CPS”),

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the division of UCDSS assigned and obliged to investigate reports of child abuse,

neglect, or improper supervision within Union County.

25. At times relevant hereto, GCDSS was responsible, among other things, for

foster home licensing in Gaston County, North Carolina.

26. At all times relevant hereto leading up to November 15, 2013, Defendant

Larson lived with a significant other, Dorian Lee Harper (“Harper”).

27. Prior to 2003, North Carolina licensed Defendant Larson and Harper as

foster parents and their Union County residence as a foster home (“the Larson-Harper

Foster Home”), and Union County supervised and oversaw the foster care licensing for

Defendant Larson and Harper.

28. At all relevant times, the Larson-Harper Foster Home was in a rural,

secluded location outside of Monroe, in Union County, North Carolina.

29. When Defendant Larson became an employee of Union County in

January 2003, the supervision and oversight of the foster care licensing for Defendant

Larson and Harper and the Larson-Harper Foster Home was transferred to Defendant

Gaston County and GCDSS, and this supervision and oversight obligation for the

Larson-Harper Foster Home remained with Defendant Gaston County and GCDSS at

all times relevant hereto.

30. In or before April 2004, UCDSS promoted Defendant Larson to be a SW

III (“Social Worker III – Investigations Assessments & Treatment”) for the CPS unit and

that was her position until December 2011, when UCDSS promoted Defendant Larson

from Social Worker III to a Social Worker Supervisor.

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 31. The factual support for the plaintiffs’ claims in part comes from the

multiple, missed opportunities that the defendants had to discover the abuse and

neglect of children in the Larson-Harper Foster Home, including J.G., when reports of

abuse or neglect were made while Defendant Gaston County was overseeing the

licensing of the Larson-Harper Foster Home and while Defendant Gaston County and

then Defendant Union County were responsible for investigating claims of abuse or

neglect of children in the Larson-Harper Foster Home, including:

a. A September 30, 2008 report of suspected abuse and improper

discipline of a child in the Larson-Harper Foster Home made by a worker at the

institute for Family Centered Services, that resulted in an investigation that did

not begin until November 18, 2008;

b. An October 2, 2008 complaint of abuse and improper discipline of

J.G. in the Larson-Harper Foster Home that was ignored, made by Harris;

c. A December 8, 2008 report of suspected abuse and improper

discipline of a child in the Larson-Harper Foster Home by the biological mother of

the child and the mother’s attorney;

d. A May 10, 2011 report of suspected abuse and neglect of a child in

the Larson-Harper Foster Home, made by a teacher at the school where the

children in the Larson-Harper Foster Home went to school; and,

e. A December 21, 2012 report of improper supervision of J.G. after

he ran away from the Larson-Harper Foster Home, made by a deputy with the

Union County Sheriff’s Department.

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 32. In addition, upon information and belief, UCDSS and GCDSS received

reports of suspected abuse or neglect involving Larson on May 8, 2006, August 21,

2006, January 22, 2007, and December 27, 2007.

33. At the beginning of February 2006, Maria Harris was working in Virginia

and her mother, Kathy Pendall, was temporarily caring for J.G.

34. Also in the home of Kathy Pendell at the beginning of February 2006 was

a daughter, Kenzata Pendell, the daughter’s husband, Geronimo Hernandez-Jijon

(“Hernandez”), and their two young children, L.H. and A.H.

35. On February 4, 2006, A.H. suffered skull fractures on each side of her

head, and A.H. was hospitalized on February 5, 2006.

36. On February 6, 2006, GCDSS began to investigate Hernandez for child

abuse of A.H. based upon the findings at the hospital. At that time in her home, Kathy

Pendell was caring for J.G., L.H., and A.H., as well as J.L. and A.L., children of Kathy

Pendell’s son, John Lynch (“Lynch”). Because Lynch was able to arrive on the scene

and to intervene, he was permitted to take custody of his children, J.L. and A.L.

Unfortunately, Harris was unable to return from Virginia as easily or as quickly to protect

J.G. from being swept up in the investigation involving A.H. and Hernandez.

37. On February 6, 2006, the remaining children in Pendell’s home—A.H.,

L.H., and J.G.—were all removed from Pendell’s home under a nonsecure custody

order, and Angela Murphy, Sharon Nash, and Debbie Hensley of GCDSS’s CPS began

an investigation for the remaining minors, A.H., L.H. and J.G.

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 38. The initial and primary focus of the CPS investigation was concern over

A.H.’s injuries and child abuse by Hernandez, and GCDSS knew by February 6, 2006

that Hernandez had confessed to striking A.H. and had been arrested.

39. Shortly after midnight on February 7, 2006 in a Walmart parking lot in

Charlotte, GCDSS delivered A.H., L.H., and J.G. to Defendant Larson.

40. A magistrate issued a nonsecure custody order.

41. On February 7, 2006, Michelle Jenkins, a social worker for GCDSS

drafted a neglect petition for JG alleging that Maria Harris had neglected her son by

failing “to provide the maternal grandparents . . . with the necessary consents to seek

medical/dental attention for the juvenile.”

42. On February 7, 2006, at the request of GCDSS, J.G. was ordered into

foster care on the grounds he was “abandoned” by his mother, and despite the pleas of

Pendell, J.G. was not permitted to return to the Pendell home where he would be

“exposed to a substantial risk” of injury because the person who caused A.H.’s injuries

had not been determined. Melanie Richards (“Richards”) was also ordered to serve as

J.G.’s Guardian Ad Litem.

43. In the meantime, Harris, alerted to the situation, hurried back from

Virginia, only to find that her son, J.G., had been taken and ordered into foster care

through the efforts of GCDSS.

44. Once the custody and control of J.G. was taken from his biological mother,

Harris, and that custody and control was legally assumed by GCDSS, Harris was never

able to achieve reunification with J.G.

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 45. So that Defendant Larson would have custody of J.G. to the exclusion of

Harris, Defendant Larson used her connections, friendships, and associations with

GCDSS employees and others to manipulate the substance and the process for legal

proceedings for the custody and control of J.G., as hereinafter described.

46. In August 2006, the primary and concurrent plan for J.G. while in

GCDSS’s custody were (1) reunification with Harris or (2) guardianship with relative.

47. As matters slowly progressed for Harris, her visitation with J.G. was

increased by the Court to allow for some unsupervised visits, the Court’s plan for J.G.

was changed to reunification with Harris by October 2006.

48. From the fall of 2006 through the beginning of 2007, Harris achieved many

but not all of the milestones required of her for reunification with J.G. Meanwhile,

Defendant Larson used her connections, friendships, and associations with GCDSS

employees and others to undermine Harris’s efforts and the evaluations of those efforts.

49. Beginning in or before 2007, Harper used physical abuse as a means of

disciplining children in the Larson-Harper Foster Home, including children Defendant

Larson and Harper had adopted, as well as L.H. and J.G., who were under their foster

care. Later, Harper began a practice of using torture to extract confessions, often false

confessions, from the children—the squeezing fingers with pliers, burning with a hot

wire, or sticking with hypodermic needles. Over the years and extending into 2013, as

Harper became more abusive, the older, adopted children learned that they could blame

incidents on J.G., whom Defendant Larson and Harper were predisposed to consider a

liar, and thus the older children could avoid punishment themselves. Harper would then

proceed to extract a false confession from J.G. through torture.

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 50. In January 2007, the GCDSS’s recommendation and the Court’s plan for

J.G. was changed to Adoption due to the length of time in foster care without sufficient

progress by Harris. GCDSS pursued this course due to the self-imposed deadlines for

moving children out of foster care, and without regard to the particular circumstances of

J.G. and his mother, Harris.

51. Harris continued to meet more milestones that had been set for the return

of her son, however, and continued to press for visitation and reunification with her son.

In October 2007, GCDSS agreed to obtain from Mecklenburg County DSS a Home

Study for Harris and her new residence in that county. Meanwhile, Defendant Larson

continued to use her connections, friendships, and associations with GCDSS to

manipulate evaluations of Harris and J.G., and through November 2007, the GCDSS

plan for J.G. continued to be Adoption, with a necessary termination of the parental

rights of Harris.

52. In December 2007, however, Mecklenburg County DSS completed the

Home Study for Harris. Without the influence and disinformation of Defendant Larson,

Mecklenburg County DSS recommended that the plan for J.G. be changed to allow

greater visitation with Harris and that a renewed effort be made toward reunification

between Harris and J.G. following continued progress by Harris.

53. Based upon the above Home Study and Harris’s progress, GCDSS

withdrew its petition for termination of parental rights in January 2008.

54. With Harris’s continued progress, the Court’s plan for J.G. was changed in

February 2008 from Adoption to Reunification with Harris, with Adoption as a concurrent

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plan. The Court also granted further visitation of J.G. with Harris, and the case was re-

calendared for review in April 2008.

55. Defendant Larson increased her efforts at disinformation and undermining

Harris, and she used her connections, friendships, and associations with GCDSS

employees and others to undermine Harris and evaluations of her. She also withheld

and manipulated J.G.’s medication so that he would act out or inappropriately, which

Defendant Larson would then attribute to Harris. In April 2008, Defendant Larson

convinced GCDSS to investigate Harris for giving J.G. medicine inappropriately.

56. In April 2008, GCDSS recommended and the Court adopted for J.G.

Reunification as the Permanent Plan, with a concurrent plan of reunification and

adoption.

57. In May 2008, Harris lost her job at Walmart, where she had worked for a

year. Harris failed to report her loss of employment to GCDSS, though Harris continued

to seek a re-hire through her old manager. She also suffered other, personal setbacks.

58. In May 2008, the GCDSS and the Court continued with a plan of eventual

reunification for J.G., with adoption as the alternative. Another review was sent for the

next month.

59. In July 2008, GAL Richards found out about Harris’s loss of employment,

and other, personal setbacks. GAL Richards, with the active assistance of Defendant

Larson, then sought to change the Court’s plan for J.G., recommending not a return to

the former plan of Adoption, but instead a brand-new plan, one of guardianship of J.G.

by Defendant Larson and Harper. Such a plan would eliminate the normal, pre- and

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post-placement reviews and protections for minors who go through the Adoption

process.

60. Upon information and belief, the new plan for Guardianship of J.G. to

Defendant Larson was against the normal policy and practice of GCDSS and Defendant

Gaston County.

61. When the matter came back before the Court for review in July 2008, the

Court calendared a Guardianship hearing for September 2008.

62. In September 2008, GCDSS not only recommended guardianship of J.G.

be given to Defendant Larson, GCDSS also recommended that there would be no need

for the normal annual reviews of the guardianship.

63. In September 2008, Harris’s parental rights were terminated by the Court,

and the Court granted guardianship of J.G. to Defendant Larson until the guardianship

is terminated by court order, emancipation, or majority. The Court also adopted

GCDSS’s recommendation to forego annual reviews of the guardianship.

64. Initially, Harris was to receive no visitation following the termination of her

parental rights, but the Court granted Harris a single monthly, supervised visitation with

her son.

65. On September 30, 2008, L.H. informed Melba Walker of the Institute for

Family Centered Services that Harper hits L.H. with a belt and has thrown him to the

ground.

66. In October 2008, Harris also complained to GCDSS that J.G. was being

whipped with a belt by Harper, and no report was made as required by GCDSS policies.

And while GCDSS discouraged Harris from doing so, Harris was informed that if she

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had a complaint about the safety of J.G. she needed to make her report to UCDSS,

where the child was now located.

67. The actions of GCDSS and Defendant Gaston County in denying J.G. the

review and protections of both foster care and adoptive placement, and instead, with

deliberate indifference to J.G. and Harris, in placing him under the guardianship—

without any annual or other review—of Defendant Larson and in the environment of the

Larson-Harper Foster Home when it was highly predictable that abuse would occur

amounted to a state created danger to J.G. in violation of his constitutional rights to

bodily integrity and freedom from restraint.

68. Because of complaining by Harris and others, GCDSS informed those in

GCDSS responsible for overseeing licensing for the Larson-Harper Foster Home of the

report, and on November 18, 2008, GCDSS finally made a report of improper discipline

and abuse to UCDSS. Such a report was routed, as with all such abuse or neglect

reports, to Defendant Larson’s CPS unit at UCDSS, and UCDSS conducted an

investigation.

69. Despite the conflict of interest, UCDSS conducted an initial investigation in

November 2009. The investigation and interviews did not take place at the Larson-

Harper Foster Home, as per the policy and practice of UCDSS. Instead, Defendant

Larson brought the children to the UCDSS offices. UCDSS did not interview the children

separately. The children were interviewed together, and Juan still reported sometimes

getting “a whooping with a hand or a belt.”

70. In December 1, 2008, UCDSS requested that Cabarrus County DSS

conduct an investigation of the reported abuse due to the conflict of interest.

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 71. In December 2008, upon information and belief, GCDSS also received in

December 2008 another report of abuse and improper discipline of L.H. while in the

Larson-Harper Foster Home made by L.H.’s biological mother and her attorney.

72. Defendant Larson attempted to interfere with the investigation conducted

by Cabarrus County DSS. Nevertheless, on December 31, 2008, Juan reports being

spanked by Harper.

73. In January 2009, another adopted child in the Larson-Harper home being

interviewed by Cabarrus County DSS admits that J.G. has been whipped with a belt by

Harper.

74. UCDSS conducted an initial investigation beginning in November 2009,

and Defendant Larson interfered with the CPS interviews of the children in the Larson-

Harper Foster Home.

75. In January 2009, Cabarrus County DSS interviews separately L.H.’s

biological mother and Harris. Both reported signs of abuse of their children.

76. Defendant Larson used her connections, friendships, and associations

within GCDSS and UCDSS to manipulate the investigation by Cabarrus County DSS,

and a decision was made by Cabarrus County DSS to close the file with the allegations

as “unsubstantiated” in February 2009.

77. In May 2011, UCDSS received another report, this time from a teacher’s

assistant at the school attended by the children living in the Larson-Harper Foster Home

who reported possible sexual abuse of A.H. In addition, the teacher’s aide reported that

A.H. had been absent 33 times and late another 47 and that A.H.’s clothes and bed

sheets (for naps) smell badly.

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 78. Once again, Defendant Larson’s CPS Unit conducted the initial

investigation of the claim, and upon information and belief, Defendant Larson again

interfered with the CPS interview process.

79. UCDSS then contacted Mecklenburg County DSS to conduct a forensic

evaluation due to the conflict of interest (rather than Cabarrus County DSS).

80. Upon information and belief, Defendant Larson used her connections,

friendships, and associations with UCDSS to manipulate the investigation by

Mecklenburg County DSS.

81. The Mecklenburg County DSS failed to interview the biological mothers of

L.H. and J.G. as part of their investigation.

82. Defendant Larson failed to cooperate with the investigation by

Mecklenburg County DSS, and only after Mecklenburg County DSS complained in July

2011 did Defendant Larson cooperate sufficiently for the forensic evaluation to be

completed.

83. In August 2011, following the report from Mecklenburg County DSS for its

investigation, UCDSS closed the case finding that the allegation of abuse or neglect

was unsubstantiated.

84. On December 21, 2012, Deputy Patricia Seacrest of the Union County

Sheriff’s Department informed UCDSS’s CPS unit that a neighbor called the Sheriff’s

Department. The neighbor reported J.G. claimed he had been living in a barn and his

parents were dead. But Deputy Seacrest recognized J.G. and returned him to the

Larson-Harper Foster Home, where Harper informed Deputy Seacrest that J.G. had run

away while Harper was napping. Deputy Seacrest also reported that the Sheriff’s

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Department had been to the Larson-Harper Foster Home previously for a 911 hang up,

and at that time the children appeared in tattered clothes and flip flops.

85. A same-day, internal decision within Defendant Larson’s CPS unit was

made not to open an investigation into Deputy Seacrest’s report.

86. On November 15, 2013, J.G. was finally rescued when another deputy for

the Union County Sheriff’s Department found J.G. handcuffed by his ankle to Defendant

Larson’s front porch, shivering from the cold and with a dead chicken tied around his

neck.

87. On November 15, 2013 and based upon probable cause from the abused

condition of J.G., by the Union County Sheriff’s Department arrested and criminally

charged Defendant Larson and Harper.

88. From multiple occurrences of child abuse by Harper, the minor plaintiff

sustained serious, permanent, and disabling emotional and physical injuries.

89. During the period from 2008 through November 15, 2013 UCDSS’s CPS

unit developed a custom, tolerance and acquiescence of depriving the constitutional

rights of children to bodily integrity, freedom from emotional and physical abuse,

freedom from undue bodily restraint, freedom to avoid potential harm, and access to

and provision of appropriate and reasonable medical care, and this custom, tolerance

and acquiescence was manifest in J.G.’s situation involving conflicts of interest

90. The Defendant Union County’s above-described custom, tolerance and

acquiescence is demonstrated, in part, by an October 2009 review by the N.C.

Department of Health and Human Services of the human services provided by

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Defendant Union County’s UCDSS, covering the previous period from October 1, 2008

to September 30, 2009 which determined, among other things:

a. The Timeliness of Initiating Investigations by Child Protective

Services (“CPS”) needed improvement;

b. CPS performance in reducing Repeat Maltreatment of children

needed improvement;

c. CPS performance in reducing Risk of Harm to children needed

improvement;

d. CPS performance in Reunification with Relatives of children in

foster care needed improvement;

e. CPS performance in Stability of Foster Care Placement needed

improvement;

f. CPS performance in Visitation with Parents and Siblings for

children in foster care needed improvement; and,

g. CPS performance in Relationship of children in foster care with

their biological parents needed improvement.

91. The Defendant Union County’s above-described custom, tolerance and

acquiescence is also demonstrated, in part, by a 2011 review by the N.C. Department of

Health and Human Services of the human services provided by Defendant Union

County’s UCDSS showed the problems and deficiencies in abuse investigations

continued for CPS.

92. Despite the above-described, demonstrable inadequacies in protecting

children and in reuniting children with their families, Defendant Union County developed

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and continued—at a time when Defendant Union County was responsible for the

custody of J.G.—a custom and policy of inadequate training and supervision to better

protect children in foster care, including J.G., from deprivations of their constitutional

rights.

93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Gaston County’s state-

created danger and as a direct and proximate result of Defendant Union County’s

custom and policy of inadequate training and supervision with respect to Children’s

Protective Services, social workers and other employees, acting within the course and

scope of their employment for either GCDSS or UCDSS, failed to discover, among other

things:

a. Harper who was physically and emotionally abusive to the children

in the Larson-Harper Foster Home, but especially J.G.;

b. Harper was subjecting J.G. to multiple occurrences of corporal

punishment, in violation of NCDHHS policies for children in foster care;

c. Harper was subjecting J.G. to multiple occurrences of physical and

emotional abuse and maltreatment, as well as unlawful restraint, as means of

behavioral modification for J.G.;

d. Harper subjecting JG to multiple occurrences of physical and

emotional torture in order to extract confessions, sometimes false confessions;

e. Multiple occurrences in which Harper maliciously and seriously

assaulted and injured J.G.;

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 f. Larson and Harper were denying J.G. appropriate and reasonably

necessary medical care and attention to the injuries he received from Harper, in

part, to keep third-parties from discovering the abuse being suffered by J.G;

g. Larson was secluding J.G. from his mother, Harris, and his siblings,

and denying J.G. visitation with them; and,

h. J.G. had been placed in a toxic, abusive, and extremely harmful,

and ultimately injurious environment through the foster care placement of J.G.

with Larson.

94. Beginning in 2007 and over time, the foster care and/or custodial

placement of J.G. with Defendant Larson became gradually increasingly more

dangerous due to the escalating, dangerous behavior, conduct and activity of the other

Harper. Beginning in 2007 and over time, Harper physically and emotionally abused

J.G., unlawfully restrained him, and kept him from appropriate medical care.

95. Harper has admitted to felonious child abuse of the minor plaintiff, and on

March 18, 2015 he pled guilty to child abuse of J.G. with intent to inflict serious bodily

injury, multiple assaults of J.G. with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and to

maiming J.G. Harper is guilty of much more physical and emotional abuse and torture

than revealed by his criminal charges and convictions.

96. Beginning in 2007 and over time, on repeated, even daily occurrences,

Defendant Larson engaged in her employment as social worker and then, through

promotion, as a CPS supervisor willfully, maliciously, and recklessly failed to report the

physical abuse, emotional abuse, unlawful restraint, and failure to provide reasonable

and adequate medical care inflicted upon the minor plaintiff by Harper.

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 97. Defendant Larson has admitted to unlawfully restraining J.G. and for

failing to report Harper’s continuing child abuse of J.G., and on March 31, 2015, she

plead guilty to willfully failing to report the child abuse of J.G., as required of her under

G.S. § 7B-301.

98. Although Defendant Larson did not herself abuse J.G. with an intent to

injure or harm him, since she had custody of J.G. during the above-described child

abuse by Harper, Defendant Larson had a legal duty to stop or interfere with this abuse,

and her failure to do was reckless and grossly negligent.

99. Defendant Larson knew or should have known that her failure to protect

J.G., and her active concealment of what was occurring with Harper, while he was in

her custody and in the legal custody of Defendant Union County, constituted violations

of J.G.’s rights to bodily integrity, freedom from emotional and physical abuse, freedom

from undue bodily restraint, freedom to avoid potential harm, and access to and

provision of appropriate and reasonable medical care.

100. Defendant Larson’s above-described conduct in failing to protect J.G.

were done not only in a manner contrary to her duties, but also done with a wicked

purpose, knowing they were prejudicial to his rights, and with a conscious, reckless and

deliberate indifference to the rights of J.G.

101. The above-described conduct of Defendant Larson was consistent with,

integral to, and proximately caused by the custom or tolerance or acquiescence of

depriving the constitutional rights of children in foster care to bodily integrity, freedom

from emotional and physical abuse, freedom from undue bodily restraint, freedom to

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avoid potential harm, and access to and provision of appropriate and reasonable

medical care.

102. The above-described conduct of Defendant Larson was consistent with,

integral to, and proximately caused by the custom and policy of inadequate training and

supervision to better protect children in foster care, including J.G., from deprivations of

their constitutional rights.

103. While the minor plaintiff was in the custody of Defendant Larson,

Defendant Larson was maliciously, reckless, and willfully failed to intercede to protect

the J.G. from a state-created danger, to wit: placement in an environment where J.G.

would be subjected to the repeated, physical, and emotional abuse by Harper.

CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS UNION AND GASTON COUNTIES

UNDER 42 USC § 1983
FOR VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCES

104. Defendant Gaston County’s above-described misuse of power under color

of law placed J.G. in a state-created dangerous environment, and this defendant’s

failure to protect the minor, J.G. from Harper, while J.G. was in this defendant’s legal

custody and control, proximately caused the multiple injuries to and damages for J.G.

105. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant Gaston County’s

breaches under color of law of the substantive due process rights of J.G., Plaintiff Hart,

in his representative capacity, is entitled to recover of this defendant, jointly and

severally, compensatory damages for J.G.’s personal injuries in an amount to be

determined by a jury, but in any event, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five

Thousand Dollars.

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 106. Defendant Union County’s above-described violations, under color of law,

of the constitutional rights of the minor plaintiff, J.G.—including but not limited to his

rights to bodily integrity, freedom from emotional and physical abuse, freedom from

undue bodily restraint, freedom to avoid potential harm, and access to and provision of

appropriate and reasonable medical care—and his resulting emotional and physical

injuries, were proximately caused by:

a. direct state-action of Defendant Union County’s public officials and

public employees, including Defendant Larson;

b. Defendant Union County’s policy, custom and usage for its Union

County’s Department of Social Services, to wit: the existence of a policy of

inadequate training or supervision and the existence of a custom or tolerance or

acquiescence of federal rights violations; and,

c. Defendant Union County’s failure, while the minor plaintiff was in its

and Defendant Larson’s custody, to protect J.G. from a state-created danger, to

wit: physical and emotional abuse committed against the minor plaintiff by

Harper.

107. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant Union County’s

breaches under color of law of the substantive due process rights of J.G., Plaintiff Hart,

in his representative capacity, is entitled to recover of this defendant, jointly and

severally, compensatory damages for J.G.’s personal injuries in an amount to be

determined by a jury, but in any event, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five

Thousand Dollars.

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 ALTERNATIVE PLEADING: CLAIM AGAINST UNION COUNTY
UNDER ART. 1, SEC. 19 OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION

108. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Courts determine that the plaintiffs

have no remedy against Defendants Union County and Gaston County under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, statute, or common law, then the plaintiffs assert claims against these

defendants for substantive violations of the Law of the Land provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 19

of the North Carolina Constitution.

109. The above-described acts and omissions of Defendants Union County and

Gaston County, acting through their employees and agents, including defendant Larson,

while the minor plaintiff, J.G., was in the care, custody and control of Defendant Union

County, constitute substantive violations of the minor plaintiff’s constitutional rights

under the Law of the Land provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 19 of the North Carolina

Constitution—including but not limited to his rights to bodily integrity, freedom from

emotional and physical abuse, freedom from undue bodily restraint, freedom to avoid

potential harm, and access to and provision of appropriate and reasonable medical

care—and these constitutional violations proximately caused the above-described,

serious, painful and permanent injuries to the minor plaintiff.

110. As a direct and proximate result of the substantive violations by

Defendants Union and Gaston Counties, made under color of law, of the minor plaintiff’s

Law of the Land rights of J.G., Plaintiff Hart, in his representative capacity, is entitled to

recover of this defendant, jointly and severally, compensatory damages for J.G.’s

personal injuries in an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any event, in an

amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars.

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 CLAIMS AGAINST WANDA SUE LARSON UNDER 42 USC § 1983
FOR VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCES

111. The above-described acts and omissions of Defendant Larson regarding

J.G., constitute substantive violations of the minor plaintiff’s constitutional rights under

the Law of the Land provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 19 of the North Carolina Constitution—

including his rights to bodily integrity, freedom from emotional and physical abuse,

freedom from undue bodily restraint, freedom to avoid potential harm, and access to

and provision of appropriate and reasonable medical care—and these constitutional

violations proximately caused the above-described, serious, painful and permanent

injuries to the minor plaintiff.

112. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant Larson’s breaches

under color of law of the substantive due process rights of J.G., Plaintiff Hart, in his

representative capacity, is entitled to recover of this defendant, jointly and severally,

compensatory damages for J.G.’s personal injuries in an amount to be determined by a

jury, but in any event, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars.

113. The above-described misconduct of Defendant Larson was malicious in

that her acts and omission were done with a conscious, deliberate indifference to the

rights and safety of J.G.

114. The above-described misconduct of Defendant Larson was corrupt in that

her acts and omission were without any legitimate purpose and were done, in part, for

the corrupt purpose of continuing to receive income as a foster parent, to continue her

employment with Defendant County, and to avoid detection of the harm to J.G.

115. Defendant Larson’s breaches under color of law of the substantive due

process rights of J.G., shocks the conscience and were done in deliberate indifference

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to those constitutional rights, and therefore, Plaintiff Hart, in his representative capacity,

is entitled to recover of this defendant punitive damages, for J.G.’s personal injuries in

an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any event, in an amount in excess of

Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars.

CLAIMS AGAINST WANDA SUE LARSON UNDER COMMON LAW

FOR GROSS NELGLIGENCE AND RECKLESS CONDUCT

116. The above-described misconduct of Defendant Larson in failing to protect

the minor plaintiff, J.G., while he was in her custody was malicious, corrupt and done in

deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of J.G., and such reckless conduct and

gross negligence was a proximate cause of the repeated and numerous occurrences of

personal injuries directly caused by the physical and emotional harm by Harper.

117. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant Larson’s reckless

conduct and gross negligence, Plaintiff Hart, in his representative capacity, is entitled to

recover of this defendant, jointly and severally, compensatory damages for J.G.’s

personal injuries in an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any event, in an

amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars

118. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant Larson’s malicious,

corrupt, and reckless conduct, Plaintiff Hart, in his representative capacity, is entitled to

recover of this defendant punitive damages pursuant to G.S. Chap. 1D and as permitted

by law.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

THE PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY

ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT SO TRIABLE.

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 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff respectfully prays to the Court as follows:

1. That the plaintiff, Walter L. Hart, IV, in his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem

for J.G., have and recover from the defendants, Union County, Gaston County, and

Wanda Sue Larson, jointly and severally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, compensatory

damages for violations under color of law of the substantive due process rights of, and

the resulting personal injuries sustained by, the minor, J.G., during the period from 2007

through November 14, 2013, in an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any event,

in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars;

2. Alternatively with respect to the defendants, Union County and Gaston

County, that the plaintiff, Walter L. Hart, IV, in his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem for

J.G., have and recover from these defendants, jointly and severally, pursuant to Art. 1,

Sec. 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, compensatory damages for violations under

color of law of the substantive Law of the Land rights of, and the personal injuries

sustained by, the minor, J.G., during the period from 2007 through November 14, 2013,

in an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any event, in an amount in excess of

Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars;

3. That the plaintiff, Walter L. Hart, IV, in his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem

for J.G., have and recover from the defendant, Wanda Sue Larson, jointly and severally,

compensatory damages for personal injuries proximately caused by her reckless

conduct and gross negligence and sustained by, the minor, J.G., during the period from

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2009 through November 14, 2013, in an amount to be determined by a jury, but in any

event, in an amount in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars;

4. For a jury trial on all issues of fact so triable;

5. That the plaintiffs have and recover from the defendants the costs of court,

including interest, to the extent permitted by law;

6. That the plaintiffs have and recover from the defendants reasonable

attorney’s fees whenever and to the extent permitted by law, including but not limited to

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

7. That the plaintiffs have such other and further relief that the Court deems

equitable, just and proper.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 2nd day of April 2019.

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

/s/ Randall J. Phillips_________

Randall Phillips
N.C. State Bar No. 36125
CHARLES G. MONNETT, III AND
ASSOCIATES
6842 Morrison Blvd., Suite 100
Charlotte, NC 28211
(704) 376-1911 Office
(704) 376-1921

Jerome P. Trehy, Jr.

N.C. State Bar No. 11124
JEROME P. TREHY, JR., P.A.
1821 Hillandale Rd, Ste 1B-180
Durham, NC 27705-2659
(844) 270-6700 Office
(919) 666-2476 Fax

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