CASES Canons 6 9

A.C. No.
3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its
subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the
registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in
favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.
Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket
from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G
or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter
would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up
with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the
deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a
reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000
same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under
Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the
questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case
No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative
disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be
heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in
connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron
waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge
of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the
documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming
of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions
before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on
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Page 1 of 72
documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the
respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding representations by
the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the
Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to
him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier
sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to
clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should have
motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of
his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the
respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a
disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his
malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man
for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an
"officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the
quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously
(Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt
motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125
SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA
269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the
high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He
should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
DECISION

Page 2 of 72
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of
trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the
May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while
[1]
Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now a senator, was
also a candidate for the Senate in that election.
[2]
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as
shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates
Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes
which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts,
Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in
18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries therein were false,
the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees
which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering
the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to
[3]
20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11,
1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of
R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of
[4]
evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant, this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for
[5]
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c) and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did
not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to
indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained
whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has
[6]
been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is
prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party.Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is
made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any
[7]
error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the
records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to
the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his
present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to
show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999,i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was
[8]
received by the Office of the Bar Confidant,the delay would only be two days. The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this
case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to
be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
[9] [10] [11] [12]
For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or prescription or with procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial
[13]
questions have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is
[14] [15] [16]
clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed six, four, and three days late. In this case, the petition is
clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the
tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and
only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the
media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No.
[17]
6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents.
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
[18] [19]
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing
[20]
and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The
only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of
the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

Page 3 of 72
[21]
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections. In rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted
for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official
duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC
and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate
Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of
[22]
honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns
[23]
and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates
at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner
reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the
said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of
votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.
[24]
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of
votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of
votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied
by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these
presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for
which respondents are liable.The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect
the discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties
[25]
as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or
is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a
[26]
member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers
in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v.
[27]
Tandayag in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is
important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a
[28]
common reality. . . .
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the
profession because a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in
particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed
through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the
[29]
case of Salayon, after a long public service. Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents
should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them
a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013

ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
1
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E.
Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers)
are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was
issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a
notice to lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order
2
No. 09.
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title
3
on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).

Page 4 of 72
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion from the CARP’s coverage in the
4
Order dated February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said
5
area sought to be excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock.
6
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of DAR.
7
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional
8
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed
9
the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession.
10
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process as they were not furnished
11
with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order dated March 22,
1999.
12
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the
13 14
Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The Berenguers opposed the motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their pending
15
appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.
16
In his Order dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’ appeal.
17
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution, which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance
of the writ of possession prayed for.
18
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside the Resolution dated April 8, 1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired
jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal.
19 20
In an Order dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied
outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person
certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners signed the
certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-
21
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders
dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of
22
appeal.
23
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’
24
protestations.
25
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
26
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant
Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the
following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND
RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE
WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE
HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO
CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER
APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER;
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT
HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT
OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE
27
PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.
28
Florin filed her Comment stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and
not on a final and executory decision that would require a certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De
Jesus), as Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time when it was requested; (3)
there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement;
(4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and desist
order and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both
dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants
her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
29
In a separate Comment, Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of possession is not illegal in the absence of a court
order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3)
the Legal Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to
30
ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by the person/s executing the writ.
31
Jornales’ Comment, for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no
supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales
admitted, however, that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his

Page 5 of 72
capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him
32
is not only malicious for lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP.
33
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
34
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended that Florin be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to
35
substantiate the charges against them.
36
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings of the CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-
37
G.R. SP No. 53174, which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a petition for review and the court found the
following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture and livestock and already classified as
residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and
issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the
DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’ Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022,
8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus – "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural,
we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of
the CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no
end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’ application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug.
Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional
Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the
38
assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside."
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions,
adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
The charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
39
against Respondents.
40
In her opposition, Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order
dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the
Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of their landholding nor
did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
41
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr., the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally
42
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The
grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge
43
of their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
44
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-
constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
45
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
46
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial

Page 6 of 72
adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
47
government.
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to
those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made
subject of an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary
directs execution pending appeal, as he may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987],
Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director
Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records
reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the
Berenguers’ appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has
48 49
become final and executory; (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing; and (3) execution of
50
several, separate or partial judgments.
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or
proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or
representative on record and to the party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution
ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall
deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement
agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board
which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages
which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement shall
not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP
is yet to become final and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show
whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause
51
an injustice, the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement
Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued
52
only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory. As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered
53
the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB. Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of
suspension.
As to the penalty –
54
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. In
this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice
or bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an
injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment
but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3)
55 56
months without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr., three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after
finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was
adduced to substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against
Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,

Page 7 of 72
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last
named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential
house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a
transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia
Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty.
Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of
sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle
their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with
damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report,
p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a
notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay
the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed
purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower
court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of
execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of
execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty.
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that
said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the
purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391)
against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his
client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491
of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975,
Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed
and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had
died already about eight years before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as
Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said
deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to
annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her
parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the
donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered
to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name
of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for
falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court
against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts
and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975
and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.1âwphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was
appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding
Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of complainant Constancia L.

Page 8 of 72
Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting;
dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos;
however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the
"Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon
his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice
(In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513;
Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a
pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates,
in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art.
1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty.
Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the
Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document
"Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence
that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which
at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves
credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the
he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court
prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry
Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs.
Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at
liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the
court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member
of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather
intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the
high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for
cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The
case must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty.
Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of
an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso factoresult in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of
an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to
substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not
based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its

Page 9 of 72
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand."
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant
failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa
Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their
houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house
with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held
in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer
is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They
may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken
off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.
Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan
convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867 of said Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are
all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the
Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the
municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took
part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction
materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is
the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount of
P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation
and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved.
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July, 1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864,
in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are
said to be the following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00
Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30
Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00
Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00
Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
T o t a l - - - - P7,730.50
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal

Page 10 of 72
cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual disqualification from
the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40, Decision; Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition, herein petitioner
presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from
Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the
suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985,
petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of
petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the
Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against
herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in
this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). The submission
made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx xxx xxx
The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.
The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:
a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo, pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is said
to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity
before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner
should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should
have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The consolidated comment also
played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as
the President-Manager of the said corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution
of January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs.
Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986, raised the following legal questions.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of
materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered
by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal
Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity
within the context of the above-mentioned law?
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the Government or the
Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by
the transacting corporation?
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long
before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page 15)
It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense, and more
particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or
transactions.
Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General, after
seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu
of the People's Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office
moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen
Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had already sold his shares with
Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which

Page 11 of 72
was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation.
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the
prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President.
The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not
updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales
report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.
Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC
In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141,
Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official
capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged.
(Rollo, pp. 299-300).
In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record
the following observations:
Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award
The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the
transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen.
Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding?
A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.
Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen?
A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)
In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions
were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of
construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and
even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award, which of course is a false
assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:
. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his liability may also come in when he
took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that the
transactions were regular and proper. (Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial,
page 7).
No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment
Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after
payment.
Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of
construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12)
-municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not
presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed as a
matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)
xxx xxx xxx
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment
Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following
uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:
Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as you said, and then presented to
Mayor Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question already paid?
A. They had already been paid for, sir.
Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?
A. Yes, sir.
A.J. ESCAREAL:
Q. Under what authority were they paid?
A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.
Q. Who authorized the payment?
A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the
time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials had already been delivered and paid
by the municipality to Trigen?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir
Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste?
A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long

Page 12 of 72
before the municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case
in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality?
ESCAREAL:
Payment made by Trigen?
ATTY. CONSULTA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G,
H, I were prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by
the municipal treasurer.
Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal
treasurer?
A. Already paid.
Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts?
A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.
Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the
fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen?
A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5,
1984, pp. 19-49).
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on the
vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
xxx xxx xxx
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or
pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the
Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in
its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation on
Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the
transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the
construction materials from Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even
before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the
lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).
It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that
Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot
be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its
consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free
just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the
decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled
to a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein
petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and
reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged against him with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a
decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the
ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing
government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the
Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955
the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes,
bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal
districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating
"that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act
No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the
Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle
and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the

Page 13 of 72
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May
1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the
municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality
of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to
take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services
of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the
municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829
approving Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting
his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the
complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500
upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall
have become final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that
the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court
and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents
(Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542,
Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of
28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter
to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as
initial attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim
letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the
petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who
held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal
council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of
P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and
on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex
N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question
relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit
the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the
provincial government and its officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and
municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to
him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be
employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province
and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the
municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the
municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party
1
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; and when in the case involving the municipality, he, or
2
his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the
opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality
with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and
animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a
3 4
legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot
refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that
5
he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. . . ." Instead of
engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial
fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against
it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an
awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46
Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and
supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished
supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt
the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in
disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Page 14 of 72
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be
charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with
coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's
Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant.
That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the
Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice.
Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with
hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding
before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from
such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the
grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the
complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his
1
separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila."
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the
Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the
investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel
did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again
called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his
lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the
absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he
brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint
2
with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person."
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as
"this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an
attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may
3
appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this
ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the charges
that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal
protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re
4
Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
5
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has
6
been subsequently adhered to.
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of
respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it
would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge
he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that
labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass
unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as
to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of
this resolution be spread on his record.
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, A.C. No. 7430

Complainants,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:

Page 15 of 72
February 15, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
[1]
Before us is a verified complaint filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor
Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
[2]
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment to the complaint.
[3]
In a Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
[4]
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din,
Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of
the InternationalSchool, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the
respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in
the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for
additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain
the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his
former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an
early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007
requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze
claim of moral and exemplary damages.
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the]
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was
filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter
filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on
account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for
a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006
that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal
dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant
case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the
complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[5]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of
the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining
order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against the
September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo anteuntil the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment
contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a
[6]
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.

Page 16 of 72
[7]
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously
recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled Mary Ann T.
Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr..
[8]
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or
[9]
good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
[10]
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar. However,
the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the
discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is
well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good
[11]
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor
arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
[12]
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.
[13]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money
as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to
affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal
for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners
alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
[14]
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (emphasis
supplied and citations omitted)
[15]
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial
adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering
that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.

Page 17 of 72
[16]
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for
acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges.
Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering
the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent
[17]
to cause an injustice.
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that
when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a
judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to
[18]
be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross
[19]
ignorance of the law.
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the
September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed,
however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in
effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when
it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor
dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any
party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the
party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes
involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its
Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by
the Commission through its Divisionspursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or
arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is
limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides
that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction
may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may
determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he
has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly
ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, should have been
familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first,
states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states

Page 18 of 72
[that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated
[20]
capacity.
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14,
2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent
deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and
August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of International School of Manila
until the resolution of the formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is about to expire or end on August
2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the
resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International School
Manila.
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4) months
left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006
that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes
Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and
academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be
countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before
him for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents disregard to settled rules and
jurisprudence. Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is
akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine
[21]
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x.
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the
clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being
inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
[22]
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge,
[23]
punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
[24]
than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended
[25]
from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel cases, a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty
of suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for
three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.. This case, however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is

Page 19 of 72
more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under
norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public;
[26]
their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.
[27]
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa, thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to
observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge
of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
[28]
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with
a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former
Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid
bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M
and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor
of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this
transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the
employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate
Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil
Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan
account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued
between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution
pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the
case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did
not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to
designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one
of them handles their own cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report
and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in
connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as
counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the
case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro
Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did
not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record
that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.

Page 20 of 72
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of
complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to
seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to
earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in
this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP
Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former
Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on
acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent did not use against his
client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land
that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks inHilado vs.
David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional
capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the
forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public
policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing.
Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of
complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse
influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

February 19, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
[1]
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His
[2] [3]
mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units
in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong

Page 21 of 72
th [4]
Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 District of Manila where the parties reside.
[5]
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
[6]
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his
task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute
and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled
her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual
issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating
[7]
the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the
complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case
filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-
trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.
[8]
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning
[9]
that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only
to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v.
[11]
Sandiganbayan, we ruled that Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that
provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE

OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.
This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
[12]
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 governs:

Page 22 of 72
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite
scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
[13]
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor
and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and
the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.
[14]
Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
[15]
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to
[16]
serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW

MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the
[17]
private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the
end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to
obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect
for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply
with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Page 23 of 72
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
[18]
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every
[19]
lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[20]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of
six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The
Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN,
CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN,
TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP.,
VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of
lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
[1]
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3
[2]
million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans
[3]
to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March
25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
[4]
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
[5]
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the
then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to
establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan,
Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto
B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to
herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
[6]
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of
[7]
sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to theSandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with
[8] [9]
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then
[10]
Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by

Page 24 of 72
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK
which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza
[11]
in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function
as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
[12]
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to
be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
[13]
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG
[14]
did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.
[15]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division. In its
resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.
[16]
It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the
motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
[17]
December 5, 2001.
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
[18]
the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The PCGG alleged that
the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending
that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with
any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to
respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does
[19]
not apply.
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early
statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the
central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most
of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the
litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England. The
colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England
was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was
far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting
some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties
can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness,
[20]
competency and reasonable fees.
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were
filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform
standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the
broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding
to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulationse.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of
client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
[21]
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code
of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of
duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the
statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to
the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the

Page 25 of 72
colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up
where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the
[22]
American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the
[23]
model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which
the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
[24]
Professional Ethics.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving
door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
[25]
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. These concerns were classified
as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the
[26]
government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are
[27]
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update
the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen
[28]
new canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-
[29]
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts. The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government
lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to
[30]
the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
[31]
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.
[32]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the
ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the
inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters
during their employment with the government.
[33]
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The basic
ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
[34] [35]
which the lawyer must adhere. In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
[36]
the Model Code.
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each
rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black
letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments
after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive
[37]
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless
[38]
dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in
1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to
[39]
conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest
problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter
as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an
act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor

Page 26 of 72
General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:
[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11,
2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then
Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson,
then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department
of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor
General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum
states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that
it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation
and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished
copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation.
The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977,
containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of
Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central
Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept
of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to
do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited
to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The
Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken
and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to
adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors
and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that

Page 27 of 72
the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or
judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be
in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned
that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of
Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not
include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be
vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended
by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter
per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject
matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096.
Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocksowned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are
ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3:
to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay
[41]
on both sides of an intervening river . . .)
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
[42]
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a
[43]
proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an
[44]
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the
word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do
not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed uponwhile in such office or
employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer,
while in the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a)
provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For
one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actualparticipation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the
case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the
Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to
assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not
that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics
of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without
difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy
considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values

Page 28 of 72
of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it
is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income
[45]
in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that
the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.
[46] [47]
Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his
client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the
opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases
[48]
in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court
[49]
of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza
is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and
only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case
at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were
[50]
subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. At the very least, the circumstances under which
the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
[51]
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work
[52]
done by the latter. The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers
in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
[53]
demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom. He adds: Any system that
[54]
affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence. The case
at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate
the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession.
[55]
Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. Former
government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible
appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
[56] [57]
highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions
as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys
[58]
which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
[59]
Professional Conduct and some courts have abandoned per sedisqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest
[60]
exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed
that switching sides carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But
this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the
shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the
validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is
for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents
Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might
[61]
be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
[62]
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. In the
cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
[63]
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies. Prof. Morgan, however,
[64]
considers this concern as probably excessive. He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who
had just been disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government
[65]
lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates. But again, this particular concern is a non
factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an
eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents
Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.
[66]
Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an
employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government
[67]
x x x. More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-
worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that
[68]
the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.

Page 29 of 72
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet
adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 2505. February 21, 1992.]
EVANGELINE LEDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; GROSS MISREPRESENTATION AS A
GROUND. — Respondent’s declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code
of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him
outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; REQUISITES AND CONDITIONS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN MET. —
Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.
3. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADOPTING CONFLICTING POSITIONS IN PLEADINGS, DUPLICITOUS
AND DEPLORABLE. — Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the
case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable. Respondent has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a
lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."cralaw
virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; COURTS ENTITLED TO EXPECT COMPLETE CANDOR AND HONESTY FROM LAWYERS APPEARING AND PLEADING BEFORE
THEM. — Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola,
Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only
as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
5. ID.; ID.; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER, ESSENTIAL FOR ADMISSION TO AND FOR REMAINING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — It cannot be
overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692).
6. ID.; ID.; COURTS RETAIN THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE AN ATTORNEY. — As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
[1933]).
7. ID.; ID.; INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IMPOSED WHERE LAWYER IS FOUND EVIDENTLY LACKING IN GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. —
Wherefore, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed
against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition
for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge
Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A," Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977), and had taken the

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Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then
passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted
fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
alleged that after Respondent’s law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent’s Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant’s conformity
(Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made
and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our
future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to
declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and
Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar
Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against
Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution
dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent’s disbarment based on the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a
mockery of our marriage institution.
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.
"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and
later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and
introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the
Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Attached to Complainant’s Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by
Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant’s help, he "could not force
myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with
the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they
were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for
him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to
any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent’s initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and
fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he
wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites
of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of
the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he
honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the
Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant
failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the
various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General’s Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an
undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent’s lack of good moral character sufficiently
established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a
material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from
taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent’s protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to
keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely
wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of

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a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith
has been regularly performed.cralawnad
Secondly, Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is
duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been
"legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such
pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant’s own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative
Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality
of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take
the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the
reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76
of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put
a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer’s Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had
done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent’s lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has
also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a
lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm.
Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
December 3, 1948
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.
Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of
the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded
by the headline in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar,
Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we
quote the news item in full:
Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to
the Star Reporter this morning.
These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the
Philippine Normal School.
Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those
they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city.
The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the
matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests
before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine

Page 32 of 72
Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had
come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been
designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner
with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of
showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has
been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar
Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the
practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions
directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in
good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication
but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their
identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and
cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit
and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to
start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible
for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was
designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of
Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a
report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged
leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and
Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to
conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of
said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo,
and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes
for the consideration of this Court.
From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the
identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated
appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged
bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of
the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him
that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice
Montemayor will advise the Court of the result.
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and
it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information
and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar
examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar
examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions
and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the
bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of
the examination questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of
the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the
investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that
under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to
do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at
his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M.
Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and
Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make
the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the
consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano
extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest
of the state.
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as
questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53
means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court
compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the
record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record
that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was
absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however,
under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an
amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest,"
claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the

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elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc.,
many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending
the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in
which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one
example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity
accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto
amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at
the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase
public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally
approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public
safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of
the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate
that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill,
as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the
Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the
Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the
phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or
interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of
the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to
"interest of the state."
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco
was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not
propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be
confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public
safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in
Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or whenpublic safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same
Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when
thepublic safety requires it.
The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes against National
Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in
section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court,
promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the
exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could easily and
readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been
familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the
phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal
the sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not
as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for
instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate"
even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations,
not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the
principal functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research,
practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of
the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations.
Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained to passing
grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the
Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a
number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the
licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and
knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of
public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed
lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar,
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that
the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the
legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in
the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the
examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are
later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would
have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The
public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or
to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations
because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting
hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty.
Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are
admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of
the public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the

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hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected,
even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not
difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic
spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or
two or more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not
themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the
Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And,
lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the
suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think
and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause
the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of
students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation
of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or
departments of the Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in
general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their
integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error,
abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350;
21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and
necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were
denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due
investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right
place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come
forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing
themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained
and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and
answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said
examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical;
no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions,
although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not
disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each
candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight
bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred
candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known
until the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged
anomaly had actually been committed, — evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely
released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does
not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books
with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding
or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions,
especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis,
data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of
his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further
examine and probe into the charges contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated
by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations
clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing
with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and
correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge
of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing
responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a
result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of
his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's
endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to
punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties
who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a
private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of
many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he
gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute
an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in
his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of
questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that
many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by
being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly
passed the examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources
of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning
of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent
repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words,

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he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of
Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case
like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty,
as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases
of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have
decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of
that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly
denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action."
The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the
lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the
Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for
ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and
maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28
June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio
Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been
careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not
issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant
Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed
to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle
him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his
Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in
this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible
of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later
foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

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The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to
by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of
Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E.
Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the
above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our
Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the
Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this
Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the
outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609,
vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and
surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with
Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her
case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere
repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the
letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a
time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the question whether personal
forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and
finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutions which
are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in
the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties,
devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who
apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17
December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal
et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial
Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage
thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation;
reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising
acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the
loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution,
complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del
Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This
was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August
1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them
to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination
of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and
that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and passed
the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the
several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from
complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was
brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use
as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any
defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise
with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection
to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may
amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's
petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for
reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's
fitness to become a member of the Bar.

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It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free
patent title over property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his
moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed
by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the
Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known
of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the
foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against
him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of
the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal
his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal
case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government
against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his
motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has
withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another
subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are
vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v.
Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification
for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is
RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
[ Adm. Case No. 2104, August 24, 1989 ]
NARCISO MELENDREZ AND ERLINDA DALMAN, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
[1]
In a sworn complaint dated 25 September 1979, the spouses ErlindaDalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of
the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud
and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of
their only residential lot in Pagadian City: that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had
compromised that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation,
with instructions to submit thereafter his report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case
until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte'srequest and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal
of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court, on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for
indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to
the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty
(30) days from notice.
[2]
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation dated 21 June 1988. In his Report, after setting out the facts
and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following
"FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records). In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that
the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document was
a mere formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted
from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously
paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial
reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage
(Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the
sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a
special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event

Page 38 of 72
complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants,
respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the
motive of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public
for notarization. After the document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from
respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976,
applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act
No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him,
and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant NarcisoMelendres,
p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had
executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the
same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979
to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper),
which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own
handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by
complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7, 1976, is allegedly the truth, and
claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent
claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva,
which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent
denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to
secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the time
complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original loan of
P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property
in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that
out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but
only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants
paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December
31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at
P500.00 equals P3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection)
totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount
appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage.
Section 7. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
'SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. -- When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing
all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term "agreement" includes wills.'
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated
P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to
writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must
be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the factsobtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the
Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a mere
formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal
implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the
event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired
practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he
would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully well that
complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from
the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the
IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not
enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of
P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to
mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any
encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only
P4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of P10,000.00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he
could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand
pesos. Respondent's denial is specious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30, 1979, three (3)
years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With this lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the
accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in his own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C,
Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:
'In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the

Page 39 of 72
version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully
examined and considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that
respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the
complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar,complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite
of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially
and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were onlycompelled to file the above-entitled complaint against the respondent
because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is
inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see
to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the
records of this case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a
month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question.'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734,
for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00
as advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the said amount nor informing them of said
settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant
wife Erlinda DalmanMelendre(z).
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of
P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the
complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to
accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only
amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However,
respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of
P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the above-mentioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of
respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in
respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the P10,000.00 offered by complainants to
redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to
respondent. Accused then showed complainantMelendres the receipt (Annex M, id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and
relieved respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
'With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants
and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were
the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal
issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an
amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the
knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants
as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the
complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants know that the said amount was given to the
respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on
him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of
their private prosecutor, yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private
prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for
which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or
non-professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves,
regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral
turpitude. (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska [C.C.C. Neb] 19F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they
executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained
by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent
the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss
of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation." (Underscoring supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years."
[3]
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the investigation of the present
[4]
administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings while
[5]
only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings, were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants
presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for
respondent: complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the
investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation,
Fiscal Jameroproposed a change of procedure, from trial-type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position
papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that
of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also
filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof. In the hearing of 28 October 1987, which had
been set for the cross-examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to
cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination
as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not
having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination

Page 40 of 72
constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated. Respondent in fact cross-
examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants
(those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for
numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a
total of twenty three (23)resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under
Fiscal Jamero. There were alsoinstances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of
his choice on which neither he nor his counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his
(respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of
17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their
witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that
they were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property;
and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had
a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of
respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral
turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals". The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied
by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one
penal statute - the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the
complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that
respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval
of the complainants: the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement." he failed to inform
complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"
the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable
"settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And
respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without
[6]
special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash." Respondent's
failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty
and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where,
however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal
[7]
profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Roll of Attorneys. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross
misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral
[8]
character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them, and
the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney,
compel this Court to the Conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313

Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M.
RONGCAL,
September 7, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Page 41 of 72
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these
claims is called for.Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
[1]
convincing and satisfactory proof.
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter
presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing
Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary
[2]
referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked
for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would
need for her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist
in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started
courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet
inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to
marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
[3]
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer (Affidavit) categorically stating that
[4]
even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read
the contents of the Affidavit, she claims.Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way
that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted
[5]
him at this point, she signed the document without even taking a glance at it.
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2)
postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal
[6]
check in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May
2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for
nd
the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2 District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her
daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against
[7]
Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. It was only
when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the
same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance
that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust
and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able
to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation
of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and
[8] [9]
Canon 7. Hence, she filed the instant complaint dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned
action for support.Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to
[10]
him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child. Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated
through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the
spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her
daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with
a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an
out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00.When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered
to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino
then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted
to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for
and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a
college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she
allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why,
he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet

Page 42 of 72
[11]
words and empty promises.According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults, complainant then being in her
thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to
demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at
his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to
his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from
1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it
was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his
house and even actively helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house
in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that
she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester
respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also
[12]
advised her to look for the right man and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in
filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance
of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In
2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would have
arrived.Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had
stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for
a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a
prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he
was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
[13]
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. After
the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
[14]
Recommendation dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character, putting in
doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law
confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been
compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness
(sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while
waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of
[l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the
[15]
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
[16]
Recommendation in a Resolution dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem
[17]
of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern
warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
[18]
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with
the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant.Altogether, he portrays
complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she
wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence,
he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
[19]
In a Resolution dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter
had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
[20]
which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a
continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
[21]
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and

Page 43 of 72
[22]
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
[23]
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
[24]
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral
[25]
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
[26] [27]
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
[28]
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged
deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP
concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his promises of financial security and because of
her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual
relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be
easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from
[29]
any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. Respondents numerous visits and regular calls
to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man,
precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted.Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief
that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in respondents
assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend
and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number
and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in
2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his
residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering
that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual
relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to
[30]
change [her] life for the better, as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by
[31]
clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into
an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly
disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that
he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was
suffering from a heart ailment.We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and
thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file.The
Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing
it. She alleged that respondent even urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandras medical and educational
[32]
support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer. If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going
negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she
was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she
signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a
violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to
her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
[33]
Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change
of heart.Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we
[34]
only have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of
[35]
contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over
the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation
of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to
complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties
are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as
there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the
amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorneys
fees.

Page 44 of 72
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the
amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an
agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by
respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel
all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot
and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the
veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the
substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that he
misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against
[36]
a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain
in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its
officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
[37] [38]
confidence. As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
[39]
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of
[40]
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage, abandoned his family to cohabit with his
[41] [42] [43] [44]
paramour, cohabited with a married woman, lured an innocent woman into marriage, or was found to be a womanizer. The instant case
can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the
[45] [46]
end desired. In Zaguirre v. Castillo, respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein
sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and
[47]
desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte, where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was
fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended
the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as
[48]
mitigating circumstances in his favor. Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of
course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our
attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the
Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation"

Page 45 of 72
(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of
the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of
the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can
be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is
thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme
Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and
allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The
motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of
the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son
of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be
the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous
cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was
and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay
respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided
that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any
or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed
out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments
legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney
could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion,
which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God
in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could
be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of
Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in
judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated
that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor.
He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted
from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that
Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the
dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case
as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "

Page 46 of 72
[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of
context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context
would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original
jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of
First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or
witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27,
1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his
associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads
inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and
referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their
previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in
connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our
November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys
for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even
while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a
special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous
grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member
who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee
and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds
of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually,
until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt
of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized
when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said
request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the
allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good
faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument
allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton
Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and
Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the
contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago)
convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of
a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied
Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never
even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth
motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in
the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if
he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time
handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He
signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago
to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes
and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete
quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring
the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the
second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of

Page 47 of 72
an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by
innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner.
He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of
an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would
seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court
should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to
engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not
only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be
allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has
been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only
because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with
derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that
no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party
or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial
favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial
ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or
principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that
sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of
this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this.
But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called
upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the
Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon,
as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
1
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the
2
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of
3
the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
4
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice;
5
to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." As rightly
observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is
6
the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr.
Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the
court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It
may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the
part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
7
justice."
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct
8
tending to degrade the administration of justice — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted.
Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur."
He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant;
it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a]

Page 48 of 72
9
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is
10
charged."
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the
following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never
owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple
job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion!
This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a
plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court
may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the
circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
11
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto."
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in
the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade
the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty.
Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that
he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-
counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy
was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the
provision in its entire thought should be read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the
court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk
at the date of
12
submission.
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS"
which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor
and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a
lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted
and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered
that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements
were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off
of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even
been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he
is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only
at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge
against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not
even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was
Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling
says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to
read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads
himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not
read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has
control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things
which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors.
If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment.
The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a
lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.

Page 49 of 72
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case
against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the
invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly,
13
the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a
bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same
have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the
sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court;
and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the
premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the
disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what
he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by
this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published
statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why
he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis
commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of
the constitutional bases for impeachment."
1
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel
for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did
not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment.

Page 50 of 72
For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card.
This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the
record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June
24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the
reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of
time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading
entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-
appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to
those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in
the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is
no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time.
Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered
expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already
adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his
certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he
had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the
negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since
this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats
his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from
thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye,
and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of
what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification,
into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members

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have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you
remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that
justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties.
But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have
not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared
by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the
French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only
two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer
was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain
of his grievances.
2
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms expressed against this Court's practice of
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however,
3
most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the
burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has
defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to
the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the
same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do
its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice
Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section
12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

Page 52 of 72
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are
not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained
in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should
be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review.
Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has
decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals
had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away
from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There
was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least
three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and
place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused
the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness,
he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate,
he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to
differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
4 5
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
6 7
concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. "Our decisions and all our official actions," said
8
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the
9
administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. This danger lurks
especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
10
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. For courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
11
right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges.
12 13
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors
of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under

Page 53 of 72
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it
his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our
judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who
might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
14
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and
15
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts
of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open
court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their
judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of
their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into
a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples
of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
16 17
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political, campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court
of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which
do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which
accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being
subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge
Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer,
had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute
with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular
assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the
capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart.
116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in
our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the
public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

Page 54 of 72
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the
judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit
against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in
dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the
right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the
law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly
an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together
with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of
the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the
administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of
that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have
reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends
the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the
judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an
impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial
officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will
be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the Public
generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when
such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney
making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative
and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their
favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted
attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of
improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the
court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of
government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health
of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the
protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members
of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the
several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the
name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

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10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of
cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had
been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a
widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated
intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its
rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite
of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard
to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury.
"The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication."
18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was
wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold,
from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no
right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official
acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like
cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City
Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under
the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says
the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with
unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while
not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one
of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of
its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he
accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes
"moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was
dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language.
The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with
the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His

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disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the
morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-
cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one
Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice
of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would
have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation
of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize
or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of
Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of
this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is
to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not
on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts;
he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with
having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to
hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."

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18
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed
pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous
19
remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only
after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in
20
this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
21
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the
view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has
been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending,
as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made
only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is
here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is
altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
22
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for
admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has
23
the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice.
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much
so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of
the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
24
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion.
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an
25
express mandate by the Rules of Court.
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and
actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no
statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of
the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually
makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the
same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the
Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the
scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify
the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of
gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

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We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is
not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
26
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy.
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the
members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not
a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
27
officers. Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
28
therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
29
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate
and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
30
not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
31
jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of
the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out
32
by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. The discretion to assess under the circumstances
the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to
hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and
that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way
of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
33
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is
best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any
time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until
further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of
complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to
interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a
fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned

Page 59 of 72
to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of
judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter
looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with
his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo",
referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of
making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of
this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l
would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled
for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited
lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm
of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent
has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-
7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative
remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since
January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record"
for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and
eight months after the decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume
this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare
behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had
agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the
other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled
"Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the
precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present
case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano
allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this
Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the
two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was

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on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render
his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice, an
area of only about 19 hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated
absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes.
It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as
well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case.
He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already
litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And
2
if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Atty. Soriano's entry of
appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio
Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with
Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make
mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now
pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the
present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano
accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the
3
befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of
the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his
actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty.
Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that
circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty. Soriano cannot
lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the
hearing of this incident, categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted
of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly accessible by car
or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time
to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This
inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of
this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby
severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands,
upon the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for admission to
the bar ( In reBosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular
signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque
would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney & Bosque. Juan
G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español - C.W. Ney, abogado americano."chanrobles virtual law library
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance,
papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney &
Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."chanrobles virtual law library
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of
the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take
appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by
implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing the name of
one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the
individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person
residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly
rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than those
specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency.
( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have
been duly admitted to practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The

Page 61 of 72
defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-General
instituted this form of proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?chanrobles virtual law library
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.,
505.)chanrobles virtual law library
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only
order that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was directly binding
upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation.
Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made
on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had
his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the establishment of an
office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by
the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person
might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his
professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law.
One of the most eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. ( In
re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in
a proceeding to which he was a party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the
other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the
opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the
pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless
the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended
him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily
conforming to the customary standard of members of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within
ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
1
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint dated 31
August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his
supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison.
Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s
signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification
2 3
of Public Document and Dishonesty be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public
document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed
against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-
C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a

Page 62 of 72
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
4
SO ORDERED.
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.
5
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder,
Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not
6
the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that
the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary
Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft
all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications
be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against
them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to
attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear
despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further,
both parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18
October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her
Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure
to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo
E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in
the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation
under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not
just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain
responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x
x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds
himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the
law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T.
7
Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it
8
is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to
hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Page 63 of 72
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of
his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.
9
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
10
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there
11
is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case
against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the
verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and
Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful
practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty.
Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the
case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They
were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya
by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and
your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City,
on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales
agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I
hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually

Page 64 of 72
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it,
and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa &
Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a
month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between
me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself
is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty,
and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for
the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
a
thereof. He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief,
Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner
b
by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective
c
May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD
[1]
26." In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate
from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant
[2]
Division Clerk of Court.
[3]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this
power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District
Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms.
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
[4]
Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."
[5]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, Alauya requested the former to give
[6]
him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within
the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
[7]
deducted from his salary. He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in
defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the
[8]
comment as Annex J); and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those
[9]
letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which
Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
[10]
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." He claims he was
[11]
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still
[12]
does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He
also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the
[13]
down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity

Page 65 of 72
in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and
his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996,
he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
[14]
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
[15]
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting
[16]
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees
** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
[17]
public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
[18]
of the public for the judiciary."
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
[19]
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation,
or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
[20]
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are
[21]
not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to
the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language,
i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11754

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
1
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin
G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil
Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or
Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and

Page 66 of 72
2
Associates Law Office through Atty. Era.
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay
Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to
3
pay a partially computed amount of ₱674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay. Bonifacio and
the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against
4
them.
5
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment dated February 6,
6 7 8
2006 was likewise issued. Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 and April 16, 2013 were later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of
₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty.
9
Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664. In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a
warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its guidance.
10
SO ORDERED.
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business establishment was
conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public auction and tendered a bid for his clients who
were declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and
employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped
to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned
Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment
11
award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with
their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented
12
by Bonifacio in the instant administrative complaint.
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay
13
City. In its Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave
14
coercion.
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in February and April, 2014 with
15
regard to the subject labor case.
16
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.
17
In their Answer, Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on November 28, 2013 and
18
December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time. Hence, his allegations of force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of
19
the judgment is without basis. In his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of
20
law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory
that with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he
never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates
Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they
made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own computations,
21
which they could respectively accept or otherwise.
22
In his Report and Recommendation dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal of
the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a pleading considering that the same
was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment
against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a
pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging
in the practice of law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an
auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using force, threat, and intimidation, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close
23
and Terminate Case dated December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and
24
Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation dated March 12, 2014, wherein
complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion
25
to Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO Bond dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for
26 27
Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated December 10, 2013 on the
criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated
that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and
Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment, complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of
28
the judgment was improperly and unlawfully implemented.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency
29
of evidence.

Page 67 of 72
30
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-270 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating
Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering Atty. Era's continuedengagement in the practice of law
during the period of his suspension by admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest
he acted as his clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly
summoned the complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
31
In its Extended Resolution dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he merely acted pursuant to an
SP A given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era the authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group
only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf
of his clients, the SP A specifically stated that said payments should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era
had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's
machines as payment of the judgment award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the
32 33
judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of law. The
Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member
34
of the bar in good standing.
35
Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the
practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty.
Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its
disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
36
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. is on point. Thus, We quote herein
the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a
kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
37
23) (Emphasis supplied)
38
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client,

Page 68 of 72
39
or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the
condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the
corporation's officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject
properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in
40
his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the
Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by
41
a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Precisely, this is
why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor
42
case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their
claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the
43
latter being their lawyer. It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are
one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law in
performing the acts above-cited as such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot
countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated July 16, 2013. He
performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an
unauthorized law practice.
44
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his
insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else,
45
are called upon to obey court orders and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
46
courts and to show respect to their processes.
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite being suspended by the Court.
47
In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat, this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice of law for practicing his profession despite this
Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language
48
of this Court's suspension order.
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful order of this
Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty.
Era, i.e., three years suspension from the practice of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate
in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public
49
interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a
member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows
that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely
assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of
violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective
immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a
commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977

JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying
his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private
respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First

Page 69 of 72
Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of
1
the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates.
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default
and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private
respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado,
another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law; and
2
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo
V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court,
3
presided by respondent Judge for execution.
4
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge.
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida
Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately
5
protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law.
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said
Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". .
6
. could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... "
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three
7
motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for
lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the
8
pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the
subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the
Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In
other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted
by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's
failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this
petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado &
Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why
Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
1
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated
deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment,
and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of
this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we
have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of
national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
2
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days
weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi,
they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for
every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons.
Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on
September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.

Page 70 of 72
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed,
but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to
report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without
fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that
he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that
not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving.
This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted
on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private
respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be
unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that
Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on
September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of
the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
3
substantial evidence. Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and
4
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general
prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor
has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded
therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be
made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the
employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is
necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the
employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized
deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such
that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the
same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he
5
had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits.
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute
that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same
clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents
herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find
6
nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." (Words in
parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was
nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General
correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the
law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his
7
services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such

Page 71 of 72
8
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for
reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by
petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution
up to the date of actual payment thereof.

Page 72 of 72

CASES Canons 6 9

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A.C. No.

3056 August 16, 1991

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[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]

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A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013

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A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991

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G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

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G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960

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MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, A.C. No. 7430

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Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

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On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:

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A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

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WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

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xxx xxx xxx

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RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE

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A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW

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I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

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I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

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The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

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Balancing Policy Considerations

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The question of fairness

[A.C. No. 2505. February 21, 1992.]

EVANGELINE LEDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Respondent.

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B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

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