CASES IN LEGAL WRITING 1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427,
429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839,
878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-
510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574,
593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right
to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
1
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to
be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government
to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute
this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering
that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered
his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to
time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
2
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by
this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance On the
other hand, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good,
may be achieved.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private respondent Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax
returns. The corollary issue is whether or not the appeal of the private respondent from the decision of the
Collector of Internal Revenue was made on time and in accordance with law.
We deal first with the procedural question.
The record shows that on January 14, 1965, the private respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in
engineering, construction and other allied activities, received a letter from the petitioner assessing it in the
total amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes for the years 1958 and 1959. 1 On January 18, 1965,
Algue flied a letter of protest or request for reconsideration, which letter was stamp received on the same day
in the office of the petitioner. 2 On March 12, 1965, a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to the private
respondent, through its counsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara, Jr., who refused to receive it on the ground of the
pending protest. 3 A search of the protest in the dockets of the case proved fruitless. Atty. Guevara produced his
file copy and gave a photostat to BIR agent Ramon Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant. 4 On April 7,
1965, Atty. Guevara was finally informed that the BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it was only
then that he accepted the warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be served. 5 Sixteen days later, on April
23, 1965, Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the
Court of Tax Appeals.6
3
The above chronology shows that the petition was filed seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appeal
may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged. 7 It is true that as a rule the
warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the assessment" 8 and renders hopeless a request for
reconsideration," 9 being "tantamount to an outright denial thereof and makes the said request deemed
rejected." 10 But there is a special circumstance in the case at bar that prevents application of this accepted
doctrine.
The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent received the petitioner's notice of assessment, it
filed its letter of protest. This was apparently not taken into account before the warrant of distraint and levy
was issued; indeed, such protest could not be located in the office of the petitioner. It was only after Atty.
Guevara gave the BIR a copy of the protest that it was, if at all, considered by the tax authorities. During the
intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be served.
As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted," 11 the protest filed by private respondent was not pro forma and
was based on strong legal considerations. It thus had the effect of suspending on January 18, 1965, when it was
filed, the reglementary period which started on the date the assessment was received, viz., January 14, 1965.
The period started running again only on April 7, 1965, when the private respondent was definitely informed
of the implied rejection of the said protest and the warrant was finally served on it. Hence, when the appeal
was filed on April 23, 1965, only 20 days of the reglementary period had been consumed.
Now for the substantive question.
The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not
an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense. The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it differently.
Agreeing with Algue, it held that the said amount had been legitimately paid by the private respondent for
actual services rendered. The payment was in the form of promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees
for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the Philippines and its subsequent
purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the petitioner had Originally claimed these promotional fees to be
personal holding company income 12 but later conformed to the decision of the respondent court rejecting this
assertion.13 In fact, as the said court found, the amount was earned through the joint efforts of the persons
among whom it was distributed It has been established that the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company had earlier appointed Algue as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil manufacturing
process. Pursuant to such authority, Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith, O'Farell, and
Pablo Sanchez, worked for the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation, inducing other persons
to invest in it.14 Ultimately, after its incorporation largely through the promotion of the said persons, this new
corporation purchased the PSEDC properties. 15 For this sale, Algue received as agent a commission of
P126,000.00, and it was from this commission that the P75,000.00 promotional fees were paid to the
aforenamed individuals.16
There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in their income tax returns
and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.17 The Court of Tax Appeals also found, after examining the evidence,
that no distribution of dividends was involved. 18
The petitioner claims that these payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the same
family in control of Algue. It is argued that no indication was made as to how such payments were made,
whether by check or in cash, and there is not enough substantiation of such payments. In short, the petitioner
suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary deduction.
We find that these suspicions were adequately met by the private respondent when its President, Alberto
Guevara, and the accountant, Cecilia V. de Jesus, testified that the payments were not made in one lump sum
but periodically and in different amounts as each payee's need arose. 19 It should be remembered that this was
a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of receipts
was not required. Even so, at the end of the year, when the books were to be closed, each payee made an
accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. 20 Admittedly,
everything seemed to be informal. This arrangement was understandable, however, in view of the close
relationship among the persons in the family corporation.
We agree with the respondent court that the amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The total
commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to the private respondent was
P125,000.00. 21After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the
transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable proportion,
considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties. This finding of the
respondent court is in accord with the following provision of the Tax Code:
SEC. 30. Deductions from gross income.--In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions —
(a) Expenses:
(1) In general.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or
other compensation for personal services actually rendered; ... 22
and Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 70 (1), reading as follows:
SEC. 70. Compensation for personal services.--Among the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business may be included a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. The
test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable
and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test and deductibility in the case of
compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely
for service. This test and its practical application may be further stated and illustrated as
follows:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of
services, is not deductible. (a) An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a
distribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having
few stockholders, Practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in
4
 excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services, and the excessive payment correspond
or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers of employees, it would seem
likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but the excessive payments
are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. . . . (Promulgated Feb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18,
325.)
It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not in the regular employ of Algue nor were they
its controlling stockholders. 23
The Solicitor General is correct when he says that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the
claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find that the onus has been discharged satisfactorily. The
private respondent has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the
efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental
enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and
should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed.
It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed
for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part
of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in
the running of the government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values.
This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is an
arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.
But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all democratic
regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then the
taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome power of the
tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law
has not been observed.
We hold that the appeal of the private respondent from the decision of the petitioner was filed on time with the
respondent court in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed deduction by the
private respondent was permitted under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not have been
disallowed by the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit,
"to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548
was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment
greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of
liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
5
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief
of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinñ as Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of
the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable.
As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held
by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate
officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such
rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly
authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit,
"to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make
the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
6
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmenñ a, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this
Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen
should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in
People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power
of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the
part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state,
have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion
of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.
Avancenñ a, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832],
6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to
the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the
present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The
legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the
political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the
facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the
"non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
7
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these
people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a
permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is
a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio
of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the
Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759
of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by
said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which
read as follows:
8
 SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said
governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of
this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically
relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its
proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with
reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the
attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation
on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo,
on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November
10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in
order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry
out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various
times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to
serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in
communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and
mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot
profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which
men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings,
our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones;
and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing
inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment
and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves,
and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the
above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same
be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat
compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters.
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they
shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We
hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the
lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And,
9
 because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby
order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen,
also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors
and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more
than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the
priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid,
on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards
who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of
living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them,
the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and
also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to
reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of
grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in
the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the
law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly
honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children
of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be
affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the
Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is
the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which
enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under
the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow
any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the
seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of
the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races
might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments
imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this
serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as
well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner
and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
10
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of
its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules.
These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the
towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment
of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the
opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so
that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the
remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not
be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in
case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place
most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases,
an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in
a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands
and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition
against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction
with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and
assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity
among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law;
freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and
give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials
under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall,
in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not
have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a
place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding
the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of
next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the
this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the
Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of
such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be
repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and
everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the
attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied
to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application
of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and
priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining
about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within
11
 their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp.
128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines
was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and
ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions
have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest
should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this
end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over
the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part
of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the
Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain
Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time
of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district
(sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have
general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act
NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of
Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the
Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the
Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549,
550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos
Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan),
Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act
No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the
provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three
hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments
in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision
and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual
freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
12
 sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a
township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be
found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No.
253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the
Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127,
128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature.
These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705,
2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine
Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No.
2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a
religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-
Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there
could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zunñ iga,
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr.
N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898,
vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of
many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in
the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law
confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now
represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making
certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian
tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this
article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized
provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and
Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of
local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not
granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians
and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative
Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a
particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or
lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term.
"The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had
these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the
"backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the
Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act
to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine
Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
13
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-
Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special
view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and
material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection
with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In
discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called
non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused
is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the
legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former
Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of
provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by
the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It
was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief
as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the
doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be
the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to
say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe
the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of
June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as
against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement,
agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of
Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11,
1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations
with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including
Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or
towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's
form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it
is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain
tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether
a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila
claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian.
This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs,
Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are
paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in
most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts
of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
14
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes
due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of
settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby
published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they
do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development.
All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided
into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs
the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the
community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he
comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to
persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration
of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him
without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man
is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack
of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as
those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the
opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the
Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a
Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person
selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General
Avancenñ a, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in
question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person
selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least,
I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian
tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond
the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos
which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the
religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and
non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present
Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now
being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of
the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the
title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
15
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de
Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be
that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows
that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending
still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by
the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond
the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number
approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings
with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by
the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After
quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations
as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them
from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118
U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress
"power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more
extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since
the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a
complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians
who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since,
have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the
Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of
this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or
the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could
be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to
define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations,
and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States,
and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely
due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . .
The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether
the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court
16
looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that
these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation
Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of
the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the
Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United
States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to
overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in
nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197
U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S.,
218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S.,
286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass
such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in
their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing
Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that
the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal
relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst
they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were
arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return
to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians;
that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory
— had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of
the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return
the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the
relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the
Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its
dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of
the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon
certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations
without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the
commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore,
the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases
where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as
the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race,
and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the
laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that
Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the
meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In
re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that
Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation
as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
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The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to
provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority
and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his
instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio
S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of
the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the
approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of
the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States
Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all
Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a
good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the
nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions
naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is
needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States
Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients,
says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and
unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The
inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between
individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by
the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as
hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression,
especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid,
the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as
much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of
like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses
on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the
offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty
exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the
more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
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 Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one
ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted
with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority
of any human government — especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution
— to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect
of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator,
subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of
the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and
the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by
free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet.,
627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg
[1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The
right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good.
Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other
citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S.,
539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course
of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in
forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a
hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of
the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.)
Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power,
in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be
held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means
simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike
to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the
subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not
exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any
place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the
Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the
United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude,
together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It
has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
19
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next
must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its
purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order
of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is
wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right
of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake
View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary
rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not
go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is
limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915],
31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether
any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should
endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such
legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it
will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for
the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam;
(5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site
selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction
of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school
the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which
are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and
habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than
one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to
the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a
nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to
organize them into political communities and to educate their children with the object of
making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will
ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people,
has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions
inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
20
 To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that
they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic
habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They
are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically
into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to
aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children,
and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they
are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to
economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of
the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of
non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following
unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means
and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating
the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and
arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and
apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we
have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the
Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather
together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin
the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the
same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not
precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting
the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops
and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such
crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense
and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro,
and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes)
are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
cainñ gins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State
and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal cainñ gins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
21
 xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point
to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already
been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we
give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the
Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure,
and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now
willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in
a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They
are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established
for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization
and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody
but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to
another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the
property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to
another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them
live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be
not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The
early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not
possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding
Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without
question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined
as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed
Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the
law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that
they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-
treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and
the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally
challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the
individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical
subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In
resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a
power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted
to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering
with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to
determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the
other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
22
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that
comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior
case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a
thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions
must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been
in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from
early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest
conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If
the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be
developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a
time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on
the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the
aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to
take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions
which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a
view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty
in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and
effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of
the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on
different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives
from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
23
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby
the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not
the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs.
United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,
are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that
this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
24
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was
in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because
the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such
as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction
of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of
words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the
time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers
the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions.
Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally
necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission
of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the
same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of
a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
25
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House
No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects
under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment
of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered
and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration,
and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner,
vs.
CAPT. JUAN DE LEON (P.N.), respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this special civil action of quo warranto, petitioner Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao asserts that he is the lawful holder of
the position of Chief of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center — Aquaculture Department, and
seeks to prevent Juan de Leon, a retired navy captain, from usurping and taking over or occupying the said
office and from exercising the functions and responsibilities of such office.
The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) was established by an Agreement that was
signed in Bangkok on 28 December 1967 by the Governments of the following countries: Burma, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 1 The general purpose of
the SEAFDEC is "to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia," 2 which
purpose is to be realized by carrying out the following functions:
(i) to train fisheries technicians of the Southeast Asian countries;
(ii) to study such fisheries techniques as are suited to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;
(iii) to develop fishing grounds and to conduct investigation of fisheries resources and
research in fisheries oceanography in Southeast Asia;
(iv) to collect and analyze information related to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;
(v) to provide the Members with the results of studies and researches by the Center and
other information; and
(vi) to handle other matters related to the functions referred to in (i) to (v) of this Article. 3
The SEAFDEC has the following principal organs: the Council, where each member government is represented
by one Director and an Alternate Director; the Secretariat, which consists of a Secretary-General a Deputy
Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff; and such Departments as may be created by the Council. 4 Each
Department consists of a Department-Chief, a Deputy Department-Chief and Department staff. In July 3-7,
1973, the SEAFDEC Council at its sixth meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, approved the establishment of an
Aquaculture Department in the province of Iloilo, Philippines. The Government of the Philippines has granted
certain tax exemption privileges to the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC as well as to foreign (non
Philippine) citizens serving on the technical and scientific staff of the Aquaculture Department. 5
Under Article 6 (2) (vi) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, the power to appoint Department-Chiefs
rests in the Council of the SEAFDEC. Article 10 of the Agreement further provides:
xxx xxx xxx
26
 2. The Department-Chief shall be appointed by the Council upon the recommendation of the
government of the member country in whose territory the Department is located and the
Deputy Department-Chief shall be appointed by the Council upon the recommendation of
the government of Japan.
3. The term of office of the Department-Chief and the Deputy Department-Chief shall be two
years and they may be re-appointed.
4. The Department staff shall be appointed by the Department-Chief.
... (Emphasis supplied)
Just before and immediately after the February 1986 revolution in the country, the position of Department-
Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, was held by Dr. Alfredo C. Santiago, Jr. Dr. Santiago was
prevailed upon to withdraw as Chief of the Aquaculture Department and to surrender his office to the
petitioner. By a letter dated 8 April 1986, the Minister of Agriculture and Food, acting "by authority of the
President," nominated the petitioner as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC. 6 This
recommendation was immediately transmitted to the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC, who holds office in
Bangkok, Thailand.
By an urgent telex dated 8 April 1986 addressed to the petitioner, the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC
acknowledged receipt of the petitioner's "nomination by the President of the Philippines as new Chief for the
SEAFDEC AQD." 7 The Secretary General advised the petitioner, in the same telex that pending Council approval
of his nomination, the petitioner was requested "to serve as [Officer-in-charge] for AQD effective today" and
was authorized "to take necessary actions to ensure orderly transfer of power in both administration and
finance."
By another telex dated 11 April 1986, the Secretary General advised the petitioner that the Secretariat had
received the favorable vote of a majority of the members of the Council, and that, consequently, under Article 7
(2) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, "the appointment of Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as AQD Chief [had
been] approved by SEAFDEC Council." 8 It appears that the Council was not then in session and we assume that
the members were canvassed by telephone, telex or other comparable means and their votes obtained or
transmitted by the same means. 9
By a letter dated 13 June 1986, the Secretary General formally advised the SEAFDEC Council Director for Japan
(and presumably the Council Directors for the other member countries) that "the Secretariat has received a
unanimous vote for the appointment of Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as Chief of the SEAFDEC Aquaculture Department
effective 8 April 1986, for a period of two years, as recommended by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines. 10
Accordingly, the petitioner entered upon the discharge of the functions and duties of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC and continued to do so from early April 1986. until about 21 November 1986.
On or about 21 November 1986, while Dr. Lacanilao was in Tokyo, Japan attending the annual SEAFDEC
Council meeting, the respondent, attended by groups of retainers and assistants, entered and took physical
possession of the different offices of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, i.e., its Manila Liaison Office, its
Research Stations in Binangonan, Naujan Tigbauan and Leganes, as well as its Iloilo Liaison Office. Having
physically. occupied the office of the Aquaculture Department, the respondent instantly undertook to exercise
the functions of the Department-Chief, and in the process took immediate control of all purchases and
payments, stopped the issuance of checks, recalled all motor vehicles assigned to various officers and agencies
of the Department, immediately terminated the services of all consultants of the Department and put his own
followers in charge of the various sections and agencies of the Department.
The petitioners and other previously appointed or designated Aquaculture Department Officers and employees
protested and have opposed and resisted the respondent's assertion of power and physical occupation of the
Aquaculture Department by the respondent and his followers who have refused to vacate the offices and
stations they have physically occupied.
On 25 November 1986, immediately upon his return from Tokyo, Dr. Lacanilao filed in this Court a sworn
Petition for Quo Warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction dated 24 November 1986. In the afternoon of
26 November 1986, the petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining order, stating
that morning, he had been served with summons issued by Judge Eutropio Migrinio of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 151, in Civil Case No. 54091 entitled "Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center —
Aquaculture Department, et al. vs. Flor J. Lacanilao," together with are strainin order issued by the same judge
purporting to restrain the petitioner from discharging the functions and exercising the privileges pertaining to
the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, disbursing funds of the Aquaculture
Department, using any of its facilities and vehicles and otherwise acting in his capacity of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department.
On 27 November 1986, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Migrinio from proceeding
with Civil Case No. 54091 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, and from implementing and
enforcing his restraining order issued in the said civil case, and further restraining the respondent Capt. Juan
de Leon from assuming and/or continuing to exercise the functions of the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, from intimidating the officers and personnel of the SEAFDEC, in particular the use of
armed men in such intimidation, and from occupying and otherwise intervening in the functions and activities
of the Aquaculture Department.
In his Comment filed on 18 December 1986 on the Petition for Quo Warranto in accordance with the resolution
of this Court, the respondent claims that he is entitled to the office of Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, by reason of a recommendation in his favor embodied in a letter dated 12 November 1986 signed by
the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and addressed to the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC. This
letter reads as follows:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is pleased to submit the nomination of
Juan A. de Leon as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC for a two-year term
vice Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao. This nomination is being submitted for consideration in the annual
meeting of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors scheduled in Tokyo next week in accordance
with Article 10 of the SEAFDEC Agreement.
The term of Mr. de Leon shall take effect on November 21, 1986. ...
27
Copies of this letter were apparently sent to the SEAFDEC Council Directors for Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand.
In another letter also dated 12 November 1986, addressed to the respondent, the Vice President and Minister
for Foreign Affairs advised him that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
has approved your nomination as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of the Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) for a term of two years starting November
21, 1986.
In accordance with established procedure of the SEAFDEC nomination, this Ministry has
advised the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC regarding your nomination.
You are, therefore, directed to assume the foregoing position effective November 21, 1986,
and to request, for this purpose, the assistance of government offices and agencies
concerned.
It was under cover of this letter that the respondent, about nine days later, launched his physical occupation of
the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, with all the planning and dispatch of a military
campaign.
The receipt of the 12 November 1986 nomination of the respondent as Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, caused consternation in the SEAFDEC Council meeting in Tokyo, where Dr. lacanilao was present.
Objections were raised and the Courcil refrained from acting on the respondent's nomination The formal
response of the SEAFDEC Council is embodied in a letter dated 21 November 1986 addressed by Mr. K. Kimura,
Chairman of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors, to Mr. Juanito B. Malig, Council Director for the Philippines:
I have the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's letter of 18 November 1986 informing
the Council Directors that the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Government of the Philippines has officially submitted, by his letter of 12 November 1986,
the nomination of Mr. Juan A. De Leon as Chief of the 9 Aquaculture Department, effective 21
November 1986.
In this connection, you have mentioned to the Council Members that neither the President
of the Philippines nor the Minister of Agriculture and Food have withdrawn support for Dr.
F.J. Lacanilao, appointed by the Council for a two-year term effective 8 April 1986, as Chief of
AQD.
I therefore would like to convey to you the unanimous agreement of the Council Members
asking you to seek further clarification on this matter and inform SEAFDEC Council
accordingly. 11
We note from this letter that the SEAFDEC Council of Directors has not approved the nomination of respondent
as chief of the Aquaculture Department. So far as the records of this case in this Court show, the SEAFDEC
Council has not taken any further action on such nomination.
The recommendation in favor of the respondent must be regarded as legally ineffective for the fundamental
reason that there existed no vacancy to which the respondent could be nominated by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to which the respondent could be appointed by the SEAFDEC Council.
Notwithstanding the insinuations of the respondent, we have no doubt that Dr. Lacanilao was lawfully entitled
to hold the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, as of 21 November 1986 when the
respondent and his assistants and retainers introjected themselves in the offices of the Aquaculture
Department. Until the tenure of the petitioner is lawfully terminated in accordance with the laws and
regulations governing such tenure, no nomination for the same position can be approved and given effect It is
clear that the nomination of the respondent for a position then lawfully filled in accordance with the provisions
of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, did not have the effect of removing or otherwise terminating the
two-year term of the petitioner. The power to appoint having been vested by Article 6 of the SEAFDEC
Agreement in the Council, the, power to remove must likewise be deemed lodged in the Council, and not in the
nominating member-government. It is worth noting that under Article 6 (2) of the Agreement, the power to
appoint the Department-Chiefs and the Deputy Department-Chiefs cannot be delegated by the Council to the
Secretary-General. It follows, under the present terms of the SEAFDEC Agreement, that the power to
remove cannot similarly be delegated to the Secretary-General.
It has been suggested by the respondent that a nomination by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department should be regarded as equivalent to an
appointment to such position, upon the ground that "by established diplomatic procedure (sic), the
appointment to be made by the SFAFDEC Council based on such nomination or recommendation would be
merely ministerial as the Council, again by force of international procedure (sic) could not override or reject such
nomination." 12 This suggestion of the respondent is bereft of any basis in the Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC and indeed flies in the face of Article 10 (2) of that Agreement. Under Article 10 (2) of the
Agreement, two distinct acts are essential for a Department-Chief to be lawfully entitled to his position as such:
the recommendation of the government of the member country in whose territory the department is located;
and the appointment to such position be the SEAFDEC Council. The recommendation by the government of the
member country must be accepted by the Council; a Department-Chief must be acceptable to both the host
government and the Council of the SEAFDEC. If it be assumed that the SEAFDEC Council has in the past
uniformly accepted the recommendations of the government of the host member country, that circumstance
assuredly does not mean that the SEAFDEC Council cannot, under its constitutional document, reject such a
recommendation. Neither can it be supposed that the recommendation by the government of the host member
country, by itself and without more, would be sufficient to vest lawful title to the office concerned. It follows
that the recommendation dated 12 November 1986 in favor of the respondent cannot, in and of itself, be
regarded as lawfully authorizing him to assume the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, and to exclude the petitioner from that same office.
We hold, accordingly, that the petitioner is entitled to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, for the duration of his term or until that term is otherwise ended conformably with applicable law,
including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.
The respondent also argues that the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a "public
office" and therefore not a proper subject of inquiry in a quo warranto proceeding. The respondent further
asserts that the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a corporation and that the office of the Chief of the
Aquaculture Department is not therefore a corporate position. These arguments need not detain us for long. It
is not necessary for us here to determine the precise nature of the position of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. The SEAFDEC exhibits some of the features of an intergovernmental organization,
28
albeit of a fairly rudimentary type. Thus, the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department may be
assimilated to a position within an intergovernmental organization. There appears nothing to prevent the
petitioner, as the lawful holder of an office within an international organization having offices within the
territory of the Philippines, from seeking the assistance of the courts of the Philippines in protecting his right
to such office against the pretensions of the respondent. The respondent himself sought the assistance of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 151, by filing a complaint for injunction and damages, in attempting to
prevent the petitioner from continuing to exercise the rights and responsibilities attaching to the position of
Chief of the Aquaculture Department. In his complaint for injunction, the respondent made allegations entirely
analogous to those made in petitioner's Quo Warranto petition: his own right to the office, and the defendant's
(petitioner herein) lack of right to the same office.
We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to the same
position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee, or a
person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no
question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such immunity whether
by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC.
The present controversy has created considerable confusion and anxiety among the officers and employees of
the Aquaculture Department and threatens the paralization of the important activities, and dissipation of funds
and assets, of that Department. This controversy should be resolved forthwith. In the exercise of the broad
jurisdiction of this Court and in the interest of prompt and substantial justice, we treat the petition in this case
as a petition for injunction, the respondent's comment as his answer thereto and dispose of the case
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby enjoined from assuming the position and from discharging, or
continuing to discharge, directly or indirectly, the powers and functions of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. All acts, contracts and directives done or issued by the respondent, or by persons
appointed or designated by him, are invalid and ineffective unless adopted or ratified by the petitioner or other
competent authority of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC. The Temporary Restraining Order we issued
on 27 November 1986 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went
to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT
scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of
court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-
cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid
and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right
to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That
the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
29
 school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case
is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is
sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things,
of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given
the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking
into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we
are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason
was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-
flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test
and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the
bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a
lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to
be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who
has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however
appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even
those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all
the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not
have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students
who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very
lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The
accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who
have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among
equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love.
30
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not
qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that
he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even
be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of
his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and
engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing
the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise,
we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in
intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba"
and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.
Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.
Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The
others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and
neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact
even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out by
what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor,
went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle
rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood
without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter
looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head,
before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he
bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent
farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial
were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Munñ oz, who
did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the
appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a
reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Munñ oz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other
seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All
four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was
then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by
Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as
he fell. At that precise time, Munñ oz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed
support. None of them made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked
him down. Munñ oz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in
silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third
target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They
found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Munñ oz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and
then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora,
Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana
watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the
accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on Aquilino,
whom Munñ oz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Munñ oz
ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Munñ oz and Minora then picked
up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two
grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose
Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their
31
son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three
victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the
mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court especially noted
the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the
participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Munñ oz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to
Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and named
Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate
Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the
money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused
to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how
Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Munñ oz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her
testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was
"talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these
witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly
pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that
they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not
allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher
authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed
out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their
accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the
medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1
cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in
diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the
brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone around
1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm.
in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around 1- 1/2
inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and
unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy
group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani
said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano
Munñ oz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire
after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los
Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the
former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did
not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the
alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family
to condole with them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets
when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Munñ oz
was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to
show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were
discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed
battleground but under his house, as testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in the
evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after drinking
beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following
morning or June 30, 1972. 27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own
children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the
face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses
who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have
been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group
that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Munñ oz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of
cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29,
1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them
breakfast. 30Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers
32
from Balite Sur. 31Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated
them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao
was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that
morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag,
who also testified for the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with
Munñ oz and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial
and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The written record
will not show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant
pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the
truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could be considered by the trial
judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before him, and we do not find that he has
erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Munñ oz and their seven other companions, participated in the
killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the
herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more
convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the
appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty
as principal and Munñ oz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos.
0177 and 0178, Munñ oz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In
support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of
the accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to look for
the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the
Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to
look for them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's
house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot
Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him.
Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Munñ oz kicked him in the head
while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to
her husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Munñ oz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to
stop him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common
design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in
equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime
of murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims.
It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery because
every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused
with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro
was lying down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and
shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as
follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for
under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision.
The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as
before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i.
e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original
penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of
the constitutional prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death
penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original
maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the
modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras
in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the
doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section
19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the
opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court,
however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of
the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby
limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should
now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature.
Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These
should be maintained intact.
33
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention,
for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar.
Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still not
convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the
two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the
provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking
but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those
statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes,
especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code,
do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it has a range
of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what
would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion
temporal to death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He
will have difficulty in computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that
the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a
range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM, July 18,
1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the
penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum period
of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum period for
the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it
is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until
such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that
Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the
intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original
penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task,"
especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges
cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were not saying
more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the
death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l)
of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so
easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One
searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal
observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another-or
strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous
thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the Court today.
If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of
a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting
on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are
not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital,
growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not
prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing
inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby
reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the
Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not
change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium
and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty
34
and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be
both punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter.
True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not
construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the
stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid
the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied:
"Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?'
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute
and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not
encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and
announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of
the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the
heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with
the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained unpunished
were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting officer,
who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still
the most potent weapons against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and
frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as
principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00
for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the
petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the
ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether
prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene
and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was
filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December
1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great
departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the
1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In
cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos
stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to
be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive
or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
35
 The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups
of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time
to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed
by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By
following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need
not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as
to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the
intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by
the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in
Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to
which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from
the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all
other officers of The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang
Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint
inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded
and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with
hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is
not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
"middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other
officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower
rank.
36
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section
16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as
follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the
frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was
manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments
more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I
would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be
limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of
bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and
approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the
requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments
made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The records of the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7,
Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and on
line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to
MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-
authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word
ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first
proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would
be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion
also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff
directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of
powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only
stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the
staff bureau directors.
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The
Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on
Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the
President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of
Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
37
 MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the
Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter
should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first
vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that
appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and
bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on
page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29,
delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed
amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned
therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words: AND
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS
CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter
of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is
not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I
proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those
officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the
Ombudsman.
38
 MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification
made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence)
The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be
made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned
in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the
conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well;
besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary,
stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence,
can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of
said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of
nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of
different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed
and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers
whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may
be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the
Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in
rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate
judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987
Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is
clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of
the Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone,
this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it
follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely
declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in
the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No
reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word
"President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in
draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of
par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
39
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes practically
all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from
the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception
to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers
(equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there
was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in
providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of
various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the
1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position
of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one
assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the
'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief
and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known
as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner
and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in
harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and
power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting
his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without
costs.
SO ORDERED.
40