Social Psychology Quarterly

2004,Vol. 67, No. 1, 103–114

Status As a Valued Resource*

BERNARDO A. HUBERMAN
Hewlett Packard Laboratories
CHRISTOPH H. LOCH
INSEAD and Hewlett Packard Laboratories
AYSE ÖNÇÜLER
INSEAD

Delivered by Ingenta to
The striving for status has long been recognized in sociology and economics. Extensive
INSEAD LIBRARY; Mrs LE CAMUS (cid 35002204)
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence propose that people view status as a sign
IP: 194.57.233.136
of competence and pursue it as a means to achieve power and resources.A small litera-
Date:from
ture, however, based on arguments 2004..08..17..05..26..
biology and evolutionary psychology, propos-
es that people pursue status as an (emotional) goal in itself, independent of competence
and expressed by culturally flexible symbols. We present results of an experiment with
human subjects from five different national cultures.We found that the subjects valued
status independently of any monetary consequence and were willing to trade off some
material gain to obtain it. Although this result was stable across the five cultures, the
intensity of the striving for status and the desirability of a public display of status varied
strongly: the intensity of the status motive corresponded to Hofstede’s power distance
index of the respective culture. Finally, the amount of status seeking observed differed
for men and for women, a preliminary but intriguing observation that deserves further
study.

Humans strive not only for access to
resources and material benefits but also for
intangibles such as status, which is character-
ized by a rank-ordered relationship among
people associated with prestige and defer-
ence behavior (e.g., Ridgeway and Walker
1995). Much of the research in sociology
views status as a means to obtain future
resources (e.g., Lin 1990, 1994); status also
leads to power (e.g., Thye 2000). This implies
that people should pursue status “rationally,”
as a symbol of ability and as a means to
obtain resources.
It has also been suggested, however, that
status may be not only a means to an end but
* Bernardo A. Huberman wants to thank INSEAD
for the kind hospitality provided during the course of
this work. We thank Denise Salin of the Swedish
School of Economics in Helsinki for help with the
experiment and for valuable suggestions. We also
thank three anonymous referees for very helpful
comments, from which we learned a great deal.
Address correspondence to Christoph H. Loch,
IN SEA D, Bouleva rd de Constance, 77 305
Fontainebleau Cedex, France; christoph.loch@
insead.edu.
103
also an end in itself, an intrinsic component of
an individual’s utility function in addition to
the pursuit of resources (e.g., Barkow 1989;
Emerson 1962; Frank 1988). In this paper, we
test experimentally whether status may rep-
resent an end in itself by showing that sub-
jects are willing to trade off an ephemeral
status symbol (which will not carry over into
their lives after the experiment, and thus will
not lead to resources) against an immediate
resource (money). Thus status itself can be a
valuable resource that generates direct utility
for individuals. Intrinsic status seeking by
individuals has important implications for
social and economic systems because it can
provide a powerful motivation to perform; it
also can lead to unproductive competitions
with no obvious social value, such as in the
overconsumption of positional goods (Frank
1985; Loch, Huberman, and Stout 2000).
After briefly reviewing previous work on
status-seeking behavior, we introduce the
experimental model and hypotheses. Next,
we discuss the results, and we conclude with
suggested topics for further research.
104 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
OVERVIEW OF RELATED WORK tions (Ball and Eckel 1996) and market inter-
changes (Ball et al. 2001), and were credited
In sociology, status structures are defined with different personality traits by their co-
as “rank-ordered relationships among actors subjects (Gerber 1996). In Ridgeway’s work
describing the interactional inequa lities on status construction theory (Ridgeway and
formed from actors’ implicit valuations of Balkwell 1997 , Ridgeway et al. 199 8;
themselves and one another according to
Ridgeway and Erikson, 2000) in encounters
some shared standard of value. Status refers
between experimental subjects with different
to one’s standing in a social hierarchy as status levels, the lower-status subjects were
determined by respect, deference and social willing to adopt beliefs that disfavored them-
influence” (Ridgeway and Walker 1995:281).
selves in relation to their higher-status coun-
Early social scientists were quite willing
Delivered by Ingenta
terparts,toand such beliefs could spr ea d
to see status as an intrinsically valued social
INSEAD through a Mrs
LIBRARY;
1
population via observation.
LE CAMUS (cid 35002204)
resource (e.g., Veblen 1899; Weber 1964).
IP: 194.57.233.136 In summary, this work is consistent with
Similarly, Emerson (1962, 1972) viewed sta-
the view of status as based on competence
Date: 2004..08..17..05..26..
tus recognition as an “ego-reward,” a highly
and serving as a means to an end such as
valued (emotional) good that could be given
power or resources (although not necessarily
by a lower-powered partner in an exchange
consciously). Some researchers, however,
to increase the higher-po wered partner’s
have called for acknowledgement of the role
“emotional investment” and make the power
of emotions in group behavior: “Sociologists
balance more equal.
have unwisely elevated the rational over the
Expectations state theory concentrates
emotional in attempting to understand and
on how regularly observed inequalities (and
explain human behavior. It’s not that human
associated expectations) govern opportuni-
beings are not rational—we are. The point is
ties, participation, evaluation, and influence
that we are not only rational. What makes us
in groups with a common goal (e.g., Bales
human is the addition of a rational mind to a
1953; Berger, Fisek, et al. 1977; Blau 1964); it
preexisting emotional base” (Massey 2002:2;
does not focus on what motivates status striv-
also see Runciman 1998 ; Tooby and
ing. Although the theory is not inconsistent
Cosmides 1990).
with the idea of status as an intrinsic emo-
In line with this argument, work in eco-
tional goal (Berger, Wagner, et al. 1985), it
nomics has formalized status as a component
has not examined how individual status striv-
of the utility function that people maximize
ing may pit group members against a com-
2 (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Coelho and
mon group goal.
McClure 1993; Congleton 1989; Kahneman
Other research has approached status
and Thaler 1991; Konrad and Lommerud
simply as a rational tool: it can provide a sig-
199 3; Robson 19 92). Kem per (1991)
nal about product quality and thus can help
observed that status assigned to experimen-
guide a consumer’s choice of product
tal subjects systematically causes positive
(Podolny 1997). At the same time, status can
emotions (if the subject is accorded status) or
be used as a means to gain valuable resources
negative emotions (if status is lost or given to
via a better hierarchical position in society
another subject). In keeping with Emerson’s
(Lin 1990, 1994). Status leads to power (by
power depend ence theory, Frank (1984)
increasing the value of a high-status individ-
showed that workers’ pay scales sometimes
ual’s goods; e.g., Lovagli a 1994; Lovagli a
are compressed because low-status workers
1997; Thye 2000). This point is consistent with
must be “paid” for giving high-status workers
studies in which people with higher status
the pleasure of prestige. Frank (1988) argued
were conceded higher benefits in negotia-
that striving for status as a valuable resource
could lead to strong motivational effects if
1 Social relationships could rest on various affectu- status depends on workers’ relative produc-
al, emotional, or traditional bases (Weber 1964:137). tivity (or performance). Loch et al. (2000)
2 In our experiment, participants pursue a status
extended Frank’s model to show that status
symbol that pits them against the group. There is no
performance toward any group goal (see next sec-
also may reduce productivity if it rests on
tion). “political” criteria.
 STATUS AS A VALUED RESOURCE 105

Some of this work draws on biology and ticipants try to win a risky all-or-none pay-
anthropology and on the fact that status off.3 In the first stage, four players in a group
behavior is a general tendency among pri- compete against one another to win the right
mates. Evolution favors efficient competition to participate in a lottery held in Stage 2 of
among group members, to be performed with the game. They do so by allocating to that
as little risk of injury as possible. goal a certain amount of their game card
Determining which of two competing indi- endowments, which are fixed and equal for
viduals would be likely to win in an all players (this is the Stage 1 “expenditure”
encounter, without actual fighting, leads to a or “investment”). From all the game cards
status hierarchy in primate groups. Human allocated by the players in one group toward
prestige has developed from the primate sta- winning the first stage, the experimenter ran-
Delivered
tus tendency but has become symbolic andby domly
Ingenta to one card; the owner of that card
pulls
flexi ble (because ancien t humans INSEAD oftenLIBRARY;
is the winner Mrs of LE CAMUS
the first stage. (cid 35002204)
IP: 194.57.233.136
migrated to different habitats). Status criteria In the status condition of the experiment
Date:exam-
are largely determined culturally—for 2004..08..17..05..26..
(but not in the no-status condition), the Stage
ple, by skills, knowledge, or the control of 1 winner receives public recognition from all
resources, or even arbitrarily (Barkow 1989). other players (announced by the facilitator at
At the same time, the primate status bias the outset) in the form of applause. Status
favoring phys ical size still exists, though (resting on prestige rather than on a formal
weakly: tall men tend to be listened to more position) is conveyed by an expression of
than short men, are granted more respect,
recognition and approval from others, such as
and, on average, enjoy better career progress
a standing ovation or applau se (Barkow
(e.g., Cialdini 1993:181– 82). Moreover, tall
1989:20 3; Frank 1995:11 3; Ridgeway and
men tend to have more reproductive success:
Walker 1995). Applause is a universally rec-
women actively select for stature in male
ognized way of expressing such approval.
partners (Pawlowski, Dunbar, and Lipowicz
In both conditions of the experiment the
2000).
winner of Stage 1 is permitted to take part in
People in all cultures crave respect and
a lottery (the second stage). In Stage 2 the
recognition (e.g., Cialdini 1993, 2001; Güth
experim enter replaces the cards that the
and Tietz 1990). This suggests that status
Stage 1 winner spent in the first round with
sometimes may be based not merely on per-
formance but on any culturally accepted sym- “loser cards,” and then draws one card from
bol, and that peo ple may pursue such a the total combined stack of game cards and
symbol not to gain resources but as an end in loser cards. If the player wins the lottery (that
itself. is, if one of his or her remaining game cards is
In summary, we find a strong theoretical drawn rather than a loser card), the player
basis as well as empirical support for the fact receives the prize for the game. Thus the
that status signals competence, provides chance of winning the prize decreases with an
access to power and resources, and therefore increase in the investment made to win the
is pursued consciously in many situations. first stage. The participants therefore are
The social sciences, however, still lack empir- forced to make a trade-off between allocat-
ical evidence for the pursuit of status as an ing more of their budget to influence the out-
(emotional) end in itself (an exception is come of Stage 1 and increasing their chances
Bakshi and Chen 1996 in the context of stock of winning in Stage 2.
market prices). Our experiment attempts to
address this situation. 3 The first stage modeled a contractor’s investment

in an effort to win a government contract; the second

A STATUS-SEEKING EXPERIMENT:
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
The experimental model consists of a
two-stage game based on Tullock’s (1980)
“rent seeking” formulation, in which the par-
stage, the execution of the contract. Competition
forces the contractors to overinvest (e.g., engage in
influencing) in the first stage in order to win the con-
tract; the overinvestment in turn, forces them to cut
corners in the second stage so as not to lose money.
Thus two-stage contracts (“rent seeking”) may cause
wasteful activity.
106 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
Our experiment shows that people are et al. 1977). This point implies that the pres-
willing to overinvest in Stage 1, thus making a ence of status does not interact with risk pref-
monetary trade-off for an arbitrary status erences over money.
symbol that carries no resource significance
for the future. As a result, the status symbol Formal Result
reduces the group’s performance by dimin-
ishing everyone’s chances of winning the pay- This game contains a unique Nash equi-
off. This behavior would be irrational unless librium that is characterized by
people cared about it intrinsically.
To model a player’s decision, suppose
xi = – Sx +
j¹i
j

that xi is player i’s Stage 1 expenditure,

Delivered Sj¹i
xj
S =
by Ingenta to x 2 w
j + i { S xj 1 + U ,
US
(2)
INSEADofLIBRARY; Mrs
is the aggregate rent-seeking expenditure j¹i LE CAMUS j¹i (cidP35002204)
IP: 194.57.233.136
the opponents in Stage 1, wi is player i’s initial for i = 1,...,n.
endowment, w i – x i is the amountDate:left2004..08..17..05..26..
for
The following argument proves the for-
Stage 2, and UP is the utility derived from the
mal result. Taking the actions xj of the other
predetermined and publicly known prize
players as given, the first derivative of player
P > 0.
i’s objective function is [(wi – xi) Sj¹i xj – xi
In the status condition of the game, win-
(xi + Sj¹i xj)] UP + (xi + Sj¹i xj) wi US. Setting
ning the first stage brings recognition and
the first derivative to zero for all players
thus confers status. If status carries value, we
yields Eq. (2). Furthermore, it is a straightfor-
would expect individuals to gain utility from
ward matter to show that the second deriva-
achieving it, in addition to the utility derived
tive is negative; thus the objective function is
from the final prize. We call this utility
strictly concave for each player. Therefore
derived from status US. This is a special case
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium that is
of the utility function used in Loch et al.
characterized by the first-order conditions
(2000): status is evaluated as per the defini-
(Harker and Pang 1990; Nash 1950). Note
tion relative to the other players; here, only
that in the no-status condition, Eq. (2)
being first (winning the stage) brings recogni-
reduces to
tion, while no other ranks bring any. As the
experimenter draws from all the game cards
allocated by the players for the first round,
xi = – Sx
j¹i
j + = Sx
j¹ i
j
2
+ wi { Sx
j¹i
j

for i = 1,...,n. This proves the formal result.

the probability that player i wins the first
If the opponents’ equilibrium expendi-
stage is xi / xi + Sx j¹i
j . tures in Stage 1 are positive, inspection of Eq.
(2) shows immediately that the equilibrium
Given that the player has succeeded in first-stage expenditures xi must increase with
reaching the second stage, the chance of win- the size of the status utility US relative to the
ning the prize is expressed by the probability monetary utility UP. The main proposition,
that one of the player’s remaining cards is that status is an end in itself, translates into
drawn, or (wi – xi) / wi. Thus each player faces the following hypothesis in terms of the
the following first-stage problem: model:
Max EUi(xi, x–i) = Hypothesis 1: Status recognition via the
xiÎ[0,wi]
applause symbol carries a positive intrinsic
value, US; thus the first-round expenditure is
xi
wi – x i significantly higher in the status condition of
UP + US . (1)
xi + Sx
j¹i
j wi
the experiment than in the nonstatus condi-
tion.

In this utility function, status and mone- We performed the experiment in five coun-
tary utility are additive, in keeping with pre- tries: the United States, Turkey, Hong Kong,
vious models (e.g., Loch et al. 2000) and with and Germany, and with Swedish-speaking
empirical results in sociology (Berger, Fisek, Finns at the Swedish School of Economics in
 STATUS AS A VALUED RESOURCE 107

Helsinki. Hypothesis 1 claims that the desire tive purchasing power or utility. Therefore we
for status and prestige is a universal human cannot compare absolute values, but only the
characteristic (e.g., Barkow 1975, 1989) ; incremental changes in the Stage 1 expendi-
therefore we expect to find significantly high- tures when a status condition is imposed. This
er expenditures in the first round in all cul- yields our second hypothesis:
tures when a status symbol is available. Hypothesis 2: The intrinsic value of status is
The relative importance of status, howev- ranked across the countries as follows: U S
er, is influenc ed by culture, particularly
(Hong Kong) > U S (Turkey) > U S (United
national culture. A proxy for the importance
States) > U S (Germany ) > U S (Sweden/
of status in national cultures that is available
for many countries is Hofstede’s power dis- Finland). Thus the incremental difference in
tance index (Hofstede 1997). 4 Delivered by Ingenta the first-round
to expenditures between the sta-
defined asLIBRARY; Mrs LE the
The power distance index isINSEAD tus condition and no-status(cid
CAMUS condition (xi
35002204)
(status)
IP: 194.57.233.136
the extent to which the less powerful mem- – x i (no status)) is ranked in the same
Date:within
bers of institutions and organizations 2004..08..17..05..26..
order.
a country expect and accept the fact that
power is distributed unequally (Hofstede DESIGN AND RESULTS
1997:28). Of course, power is not the same as
status, but Hofstede’s results showed (consis- Procedure
tent with Lovaglia 1994 and Thye 2000) that a The game was implemented as follows.
country’s power distance is correlated highly The subjects had no a priori knowledge that
with the use, expectation, and approval of sta- they were being studied to clarify the nature
tus differences (Hofstede 1997:37). Because of status. They were assigned randomly to the
this is the only measure availab le across status/no-status conditions and, within condi-
many countries, it is justifiable to use power tions, to groups of four. Each player received
distance as a proxy for the importance of sta- 30 cards, which represented the endowment
tus in a culture. Out of 53 countries, Hong to be used throughout the game.
Kong ranked sixteenth (index 68), Turkey First, each player was allowed to choose
nineteent h (66), the United States thirty- how many of the cards he or she would spend
eighth (40), Germany forty-second (35), and in Stage 1 by sending the appropriate number
Finland /Sweden 5 forty-sixth/forty-eighth of cards to the experimenter. The experi-
(index 33/31) (Hofstede 1997:26). menter then mixed together all the cards for
We were unable to control the financial each group and chose one. This step deter-
situation of the students who participated in mined the winner of the rent-seeking game in
five countries. We used US$20 as the lottery each group: cards sent to the experimenter
prize, translated at current exchange rates were the Stage 1 investment that increased
into the appropriate national currency. This the chance of reaching Stage 2.
approach, however, leaves open the possibili- In the lottery of Stage 2, the winning
ty that the amount of money as weighed player’s remaining cards were mixed with
against status was not comparable in effec- blank “loser” cards to total the origin al
endowment. If the lottery manager drew a
4 Hofstede’s influential study of managers from card belonging to this player, he or she won
more than 50 countries, conducted for the first time in $20. The game ended after this drawing; par-
1980 and repeated since, found statistical factors for ticipants were paid privately and were asked
cultural characteristics, including the power distance to leave the room.
index (PDI), individualism,the differentiation of gen-
der roles, and uncertainty avoidance. The PDI cap-
In the first condition (no status), the
tures fear of disagreement with superiors, autocratic game was conducted exactly as described
management style, and preference for autocratic style above. In the second version (status), we
by subordinates. (The measures cluster tightly.) introduced a status condition by stating at the
5 Swedish-speaking Finns, a minority of about eight

percent in Finland, regard themselves as Finnish

beginning of the game that the winner of
nationals but also have maintained a significant Stage 1 would be announced publicly, given a
amount of Swedish culture. small tag saying “Winner,” and congratulated
108 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
by all participants with applause. The second should observe a higher (to the point of ineffi-
stage of the experiment remained the same ciency) Stage 1 investment when the status
as in the no status treatment. In both treat- condition is introduced into the game. To test
ments, participants were asked in a postgame this claim we compared the Stage 1 invest-
questionnaire to explain their rationale for ments across the two conditions in each coun-
the decision. In the status condition, they also try. As see n in the table, the average
were asked what they felt when the winner investments are systematically higher in the
was announced. status condition in four countries (Hong
The experiments were conducted with Kong, Turkey, the United States, and
undergraduate students in four major univer- Germany). The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that
sities in the United States, Turkey, Hong this increase is statistically significant (p < .05)
Kong, and Germany, and at the Delivered except fortoGermany (p = .22). The lower sig-
Swedis hby Ingenta
School of Economics in Helsinki, Finland. In
INSEAD nificance in
LIBRARY; MrsGermany
LE CAMUScan be explained by the
(cid 35002204)
the first four countries, subjectsIP:
were paid a fact that the subject pool was considerably
194.57.233.136
show-up fee equivalent to $5; theDate:
Finnish stu- smaller than elsewhere, which resulted in a
2004..08..17..05..26..
dents received attendance credit in a man- higher p value. Even though the statistical sig-
agement class. In all cases, the subjects were nificance is not very strong, the difference still
paid what they earned in the experiment. The points in the right direction.6
experiment used a between-subjects design, Thus the results for the first four coun-
so that no subject participated in more than tries support our first hypothesis, while the
one type of game. The games were conducted investments for Swedish/Finnish Stage 1 stay
in a classroom in such a way that the subjects constant over the two conditions. (The differ-
could not communicate with one another. ence is slightly negative but is not statistically
different from zero, p = .81. On the basis of
The Intrinsic Value of Status Hypothesis 2, we expected the status effect to
be weakest in this treatment.)
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Stage 1 Because the only difference between the
expenditures in the two conditions (status and two experimental conditions is the presence
no-status) for all treatments. The Shapiro- or absence of a status component, our results
Wilk test statistic indicates that the distribu- show clearly that participants in the first four
tions in the German treat ments are not countries valued status independently of any
normal. To compare the distributions of Stage monetary consequence and were willing to
1 expenditures between status and no-status trade off some material gain to obtain it.
conditions, we employ a nonparametric statis- The higher spending in the first round of
tical test (Kruskal-Wallis) in the subsequent the game did not help to increase the expect-
analysis. ed payoff at the end. If participants spent too
The mean values (and standard devia-
tions) of rent-seeking expenditures in each 6 One could ask whether the variance of the status
treatment are presented in Table 1, with n condition might increase because of added considera-
denoting the number of participants. If indi- tion for participation, resulting in an increase in con-
viduals view status as a valuable resource, one fusion. This turned out not to be the case.

Table 1. Average Stage 1 Investment

Experiment U.S. Turkey Hong Kong Germany Sweden/Finland

No Status
—Average investment 16.09 16.17 14.32 10.85 14.51
——(game cards)
—Standard deviation 3.67 5.27 3.39 6.45 5.06
—n 44 36 28 20 76
Status
—Average investment 17.72 19.32 18.17 13.26 13.38
——(game cards)
—Standard deviation 3.41 5.19 4.65 5.81 3.75
—n 36 32 24 19 80
 STATUS AS A VALUED RESOURCE 109

50%
Hong Kong
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
50%
Turkey
40%
30% Delivered by Ingenta to
20% INSEAD LIBRARY; Mrs LE CAMUS (cid 35002204)
IP: 194.57.233.136
Percentage of Individuals

10%
Date: 2004..08..17..05..26..
0%
50%
United States
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
50%
Germany
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
50%
Finland
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
13-15

16-18

19-21

22-24

28-30
25-27
10-12
0-3

4-6

7-9

Stage 1 Investment Status No status

Figure 1. Distributions of Stage 1 Investments

much in the first round, they reduced the
expected final payoff by not leaving enough
cards for the lottery in the second round.
Participants in the status condition of the
gam e recognized this trade-off. In the
postgame questionnaire, several participants
explained it as follows: “On the one hand,
you want to increase the chances of winning
the money. On the other hand, you want to
get recognition from your peers since you
won’t get anything by losing in the first game.
If you pass, you get the applause and might
also get the cash.” Nor did the status-seeking
behav ior serve other purposes, such as
110 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
increasing a player’s future reputation: the duct a Chow test between the three pairs of
participants separated after the game was slopes closest together.
over, and the result did not exert any further The Chow test shows whether two mod-
influence on their lives. Most participants els differ structurally from one another or
returned the “winner” tag after the game whether they could be combined into a single
because it carried no further value for them. regression equation: in other words, whether
Therefore these results show that the partici- the regression parameters are statistically
pants valued a generally recognized status different. When Hong Kong is compared with
symbol, such as applause or being acknowl- Turkey, Turkey with the United States, and
edged. the United States with Sweden/Finland, the
respective slopes are significantly different (p
Cross-Cultural Differences in Status-Seeking < .05). This
Delivered by Ingenta to finding strongly supports our
Behavior. INSEAD LIBRARY;second hypothesis: the intrinsic
Mrs LE CAMUS valuation
(cid 35002204)of
status
IP: 194.57.233.136 (as weighed against a monetary bene-
Our second hypot hesis concerns the fit) in different countries is related to the
Date: 2004..08..17..05..26..
cross-cultural comparison of status-seeking countries’ power distance indices.
behavior. We expect to see a decrease in lev- We now discuss a possible explanation
els of status seeking from Hong Kong to for the “disappearan ce” of status in the
Turkey, the United States, Germany, and Finnish sample. This is related to the highly
Sweden/Finland. To analyze this cross-cultur- egalitarian nature of Scandinavian culture,
al effect, we conducted an ordinary least which includes a feature known as “the laws
squares regression analysis for each country, of Jante” (janteloven in Norwegian, jantelagen
where Stage 1 expenditure was the depen- in Swedish). This norm strongly encourages
dent variable (y) and the presence of status individuals to be modest, to keep a low pro-
the explanatory variable (x, where x = 0 in file, and not to act superior to others. The
the no-status condition and x = 1 in the status term was invented for a Norwegian novel
condition). 7 In the regression model for each describing a fictitious town (Sandemose
country, the parameter estimate of the slope 1933) and quickly entered the general vocab-
corresponds to an estimate for the incremen- ulary across Scandinavia because it struck an
tal increase in the Stage 1 expenditure when
a status symbol is introduced (Table 2). By
comparing the slopes of the models, we check Table 2. Stage 1 Investment as a Function of Status
for Five Countries
whether the relative effect of status symbols
is different for each of the four countries. Country Regression Output
The statistical significance of the regres- Hong Kong
sion coefficients repeats the results of the test —Regression output ŷHK = 14.32 + 3.85xHK
of Hypothesis 1. The results for Germany are —Standard error 1.12
inconclusive because of the small sample —n 52
Turkey
size; thus we do not include Germany in the —Regression output ŷTR = 16.18 + 3.14xTR
subsequent analysis. We include Sweden/ —Standard error 1.13
Finland, howeve r, where status does not —n 68
seem to increase the Stage 1 expenditures. U.S.
To test Hypothesis 2, we now compare —Regression output ŷUS = 16.09 + 1.63xUS
the slope estimates across the four remaining —Standard error .96
countries. The average expenditure increase —n 80
associated with the introduction of status is Germany
—Regression output ŷGER = 10.85 + 2.41xGER
highest in Hong Kong, followed by Turkey
—Standard error 1.97
and the United States, and lowest (about —n 39
zero) in Sweden/ Finland. To check whether Sweden/Finland
the slopes are statistically different, we con- —Regression output ŷFIN = 14.51 – 1.14xFIN
—Standard error .71
7 The comparative analysis results also hold in a —n 156
log-linear regression model, which we do not report Note: y = Stage 1 expenditure; x = 1 for status, x = 0
here. otherwise.
 STATUS AS A VALUED RESOURCE 111

important chord in Scandinavian culture. intriguing observation: males and females

Jantelagen expresses the idea that responded differently to status. Table 3 shows
Scandinavians feel very uncomfortable when the average Stage 1 investment in the no-sta-
named publicly in front of a crowd. For exam- tus condition by country, separately for men
ple, the Swedish press has ascribed to the and for women, as well as the increase in
Wallenbergs, the richest and most powerful Stage 1 expenditure in the status condition.
family in Sweden, the motto “Be but do not In the no-status treatment, the average Stage
be seen!” 8 1 expenditure is higher for males than for
The responses in the Scandinavian ques- fem ales in all countries (p < .05). (The
tionnaire support this interpretation. Twenty- Germany treatment is not included in the
five percent of the winners refused to answer analysis because of the low level of female
the question about their feelingsDelivered
when they by participation:
Ingenta to three in the no-status condition
were announced as winners (although INSEAD theyLIBRARY;
and four inMrs LE CAMUS
the status (cid 35002204)
condition).
were not shy about discussing their IP:rationale
194.57.233.136 This finding is consistent with observa-
for playing as they did). Thirty percent
Date:of2004..08..17..05..26..
the tions in anthropology and psychology (e.g.,
winners emphasized that they were lucky. Barkow 1989; Campbell 2002; Maccoby 1998;
Among all participants, not a single person Pawlowski et al. 2000; Wilson and Daly 1985)
mentioned the status symbol (the applause). that males across situations are systematical-
Rather, thirty-one percent of the participants ly more aggressive than females, and seek
commented on winners’ luck or the fairness status more intensely.
of the game. In our experiment, men reacted more
Thus Scandinavians are strongly averse strongly to a salient status symbol than did
to being acknowledged in public. Yet this women in all countries (even in the small
does not necessarily imply that their desire Ger man sample), ex cept in the
for status disappear s, but only that Swedish/Finnish sample. In the other coun-
Scandinavians prefer to satisfy it in a small tries, the comments in the postgame ques-
circle of people they know rather than in tionnaires support the statistical results. In
public. This interpretation would suggest that the United States treatment, for instance,
culture determines not only the weight of the three of the five first-round male winners
status consideration but also the acceptable commented “It’s nice to get applause”; and
status symbols. This hypothesis must be test- none made a negative comment. Of the four
ed in further research. female first-round winners, only one made a
positive comment; another stated “I was a bit
Observations on Gender Differences in embarrassed.”
Status-Seeking Behavior It remains unexplained why the women
in the Swedish/Finnish sample seemed to be
In addition to the effect of status on rent-
less averse to public acknowledgment than
seek ing activiti es and the cross-cultural
the men. On the one hand, this agrees with
implications, our results prompted another
earlier findings in gender resear ch, that
behavioral gender differences are purely sit-
8 Anecdotal conversations with American man-
uational (Deaux and Lafrance 1998). On the
agers who have moved to Sweden suggest that other hand, it may indicate interesting inter-
“employee of the month” schemes backfire there
because the employees are embarrassed to be singled actions between underlying gender differ-
out, even when the intent is positive. ences and national culture. Although we had

Table 3. Average Stage 1 Expenditures in “No Status” Condition and Average Increase in “Status” Condition

Men Women
No Status Status Increase No Status Status Increase
Hong Kong 15.78 04.16 11.70 2.16
Turkey 20.17 01.30 15.75 0.79
U.S. 16.70 03.00 15.31 –.06
Sweden/Finland 16.19 –2.82 12.33 1.05
112 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
not designed our experiment to examine gen- nificant implications for designing more effi-
der differences (sample selection bias may cient institutional arrangements. If individu-
exist because of differences in recruitment to als seek status as a value in itself, regardless
academic programs for men and for women), of subsequent payoffs, an organization can-
we believe this topic deserves further study. not be governed with material rewards and
incentive systems alone; one also must con-
CONCLUSION sider emotional rewards such as recognition.
Under which circumstances may an indi-
Does status have an intrinsic value that vidual perceive status as a means or as an
influences one’s preferences? We have shown end? One might reasonably hypothesize that
empirically that humans pursue status as an both mechanisms are at work simultaneously
end in itself across cultures: status is worth aby Ingenta
Delivered to Which one is more important at
all the time.
positive amount of material gain. Cross-cul-
INSEAD LIBRARY; any givenMrs pointLEprobably
CAMUS depends strongly
(cid 35002204)
tural differences come into playIP: in the rela- on the situation: for example, the size of the
194.57.233.136
tive importance of status,Date: predicted rationally recogniz able rewards and the
2004..08..17..05..26..
accurately by Hofstede’s cultural power dis- salience and nature of the status symbol may
tance index, and in the relative willingness to influence what is included in a decision to act.
display status publicly. Thus our study of a This topic would be highl y releva nt for
“second ary” or “higher social” emotion understanding when one can motivate peo-
(Damasio 2000) corresponds to previous ple with incentives as opposed to emotions,
cross-cultural studies of the so-called “basic but no theory currently addresses this ques-
emotions” (joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, tion; it requires further research.
guilt) that have been significantly stable
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Bernardo A. Huberman is a senior fellow at Hewlett Packard and Director of the Information
Dynamics Laboratory at Hewlett Packard Laboratories in Palo Alto, California. His research
interests include the dynamics of information flow and aggregation among social groups, priva-
cy, and large distributed informational systems.
Christoph H. Loch is a professor of technology management at INSEAD in Fontainebleau,
France. His research interests include innovation management, research and development man-
agement, and the motivation of professional personnel.
Ayse Önçüler is an assistant professor of decision sciences at INSEAD in Fontainebleau,
France. Her research interests include behavioral decision making and experimental economics.