Iraq: "Mission Accomplished" Mark II?

By Anthony H. Cordesman
August 20th, 2010

Well, he did not wear a flight suit, stand on a carrier deck, or have a "Mission Accomplished"
banner behind him. The fact remains, however, that President Obama did issued a second "mission
accomplished" statement on Iraq on August 18th, and one just as wrong and irresponsible as the one
given by President Bush:

Today, I'm pleased to report that -- thanks to the extraordinary service of our troops and civilians in Iraq -- our
combat mission will end this month, and we will complete a substantial drawdown of our troops...By the end
of this month, 50,000 troops will be serving in Iraq. As Iraqi Security Forces take responsibility for securing
their country, our troops will move to an advise-and-assist role. And, consistent with our agreement with the
Iraqi government, all of our troops will be out of Iraq by the end of next year. Meanwhile, we will continue to
build a strong partnership with the Iraqi people with an increased civilian commitment and diplomatic effort.

Political posturing is the norm in Washington, and claiming victory and an end to a war is far more
popular than bearing the burden of leadership and dealing with reality. The Iraq War is not over and
it is not "won." In fact, it is at as critical a stage as at any time since 2003. Regardless of the reasons
for going to war, everything now depends on a successful transition to an effective and unified Iraqi
government, and Iraqi security forces that can bring both security and stability to the average Iraqi.
The creation of such an "end state" will take a minimum of another five years, and probably ten.

Iraq still faces a serious insurgency, and deep ethnic and sectarian tensions. In spite of its potential
oil wealth, its economy is one of the poorest in the world in terms of real per capita income, and it is
the second year of a budget crisis that has force it to devote most state funds to paying salaries and
maintaining employment at the cost of both development and creating effective security forces.

In spite of some grossly exaggerated projections of how quickly Iraq can expand its oil exports, it
will be years before Iraq can overcome the impact of over 30 years of war and crisis. Moreover, the
bulk of a massive international aid effort has either been wasted or consumed in dealing with the
insurgency, and aid is phasing down to critically low levels at time when Iraq lack both the funds
and capability to replace aid or even take transfer of many aid projects.

Why the US Must Seek to Forge a Lasting Strategic Partnership with Iraq

There are many in America, including members of Congress, who would like to forget these
strategic realities, and reduce or eliminate every aspect of the US role in Iraq as soon as possible.
This already has already raised questions as to whether the US mission in Iraq, and State
Department and Defense Department will get the support they need to create a real strategic
partnership with Iraq.

It is true that the US cannot impose such a partnership on Iraq, and much depends on the formation
of a new Iraqi government that wants such a partnership, serves the needs of all Iraqis, and shows it
can govern effectively. The fact remains, however, that Iraq is a truly vital national security interest
of the United States, and of all its friends and allies:

• Iraq can play a critical role in limiting Iranian influence, and Iran's ability to threaten and intimidate
its Gulf neighbors. A stable, friendly Iraq can help separate Iran and Syria, provide turkey with a key
alternative to economic involvement with Iran, show the Southern Gulf states that Iran cannot dominate the
Northern Gulf or expand to the south, and help secure friendly states like Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.

• A stable and secure Iraq will show that Sunni and Shi'ite can cooperate and defuse the threat of Sunni
Islamic extremists and terrorists, as well as the kind of Shi'ite extremism supported by Iran. It can play a
critical role in giving the Kurds the future they deserve and integrating the Kurds into the region. If it receives
continuing support from the US and the West, this will show that we are fighting extremism, not Arabs or
Islam. It will play this role in a region of a far greater strategic interest to the US than Central and South Asia.

• While the US Department of Energy is far more realistic about the rate at which Iraq can expand its
oil production than Iraq's Oil Ministry and various oil companies, it still projects Iraq will expand its oil
production from 2.4 million barrels per day in 2008 to 2.6 in 2015, 3.1 in 2020, 3.9 in 2025, 5.1 in 2030, and
6.1 in 2035. This expansion is critical in offsetting declines in the production of other major exporting states,
and could be substantially quicker in a more stable Iraq - reaching 6.3 MMBD in 2030 and 7.6 MMBD in
2035.

• Iraq can play a key role in securing the entire Gulf, in cooperation with US forces and the forces of
the Southern Gulf states. It plays a role in ensuring the stable flow of oil and gas exports throughout the region.
Even using highly favorable projections of alternative fuels and liquids, the Department of Energy estimates
that the Gulf will continue to increase its share of total world conventional and unconventional liquids
production from 28% of all world production in 2008 to 31% in 2035. The Department estimates that this total
could be as high as 35% by 2035.

Like all of his predecessors since the Ford Administration, President Obama has so far been more
willing to deal with security issues than energy and global economics. It is all very well to talk
about energy independence -- US politicians, academics, media, and think tanks have now been
doing so for nearly four decades. The fact remains, however, that the latest Annual Energy Outlook
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/)and International Energy Outlook
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/)issued by the Department of Energy project that the US will not
make any significant reduction in its strategic dependence on oil imports through 2035.

Moreover, these projections make no effort to measure the level of indirect imports that the US
makes through its imports of manufactured goods from Europe and Asia - manufacturers in
countries like China and Japan which are far more dependent on oil and gas imports from the Gulf
and other exporting nations than the US.

The energy aspects of the US need for a strategic partnership with Iraq, and strong overall posture
in the Gulf, is driven by two other factors:

• First, it does not matter where the US get its oil from on any given day. The US competes in a world
market driven by total world supply and pays world prices. If a crisis occurs in the Gulf, the US will compete
at the same increase in prices as every other importing nation, if world price rise on a longer-term basis, the US
will pay for the same increase, and if supplies are cut by a major conflict, the US must share the oil left for
import with other OECD states.

• Second, the US is steadily more dependent on the overall health of the global economy and the global
economy is steadily more dependent on the stable flow of oil and gas exports. Oil prices are not simply a
matter of increases in gasoline or home heating costs. They affect every job in America.
If one combines these strategic priorities with the need to deter and defend against Iran's overall
threat in the region, and aid all of our other allies to build their security in the face of the threat from
terrorism and extremism, it is clear that we are several decades away from any ability to ignore Iraq
or the needs of other friendly states.

Building A Lasting Strategic Partnership is the Only Way to Claim Any Kind of Success or
"Victory" in this War

It is true that as much depends on next and future Iraqi governments as on the action of the US. US
now can only influence Iraq, not control it. Iraq is a fully sovereign state, its forces took effective
control over virtually all security efforts in June, and the Iraqi people have deep reservations about
the justification for US intervention in Iraq and over the way US aid and military operations have
been handled since 2003. That said, there are many Iraqi officials and officers who have seen the
US work with Iraq to end the insurgency, have seen the US rebuild Iraqi forces, and have seen
successful aid programs. There are many Iraqi leaders and senior officers who realize that Iraq
needs the US at least as much as the US needs Iraq. It is not popular for them to say so, but we
already have a strategic partnership agreement and we are quietly working with a wide range of
Iraqi leaders to make that agreement work if anything approaching a national and pragmatic Iraqi
government comes to office.

President Obama should have concentrated on these realities. He should have made it clear that Iraq
is still at least seven to ten years away from anything that can be called a stable "end state," and
decades away from full development.

He should have prepared Americans for the commitment they still need to make if Iraq is to
succeed, and warned them that US forces are withdrawing from a country with a massive budget
crisis, grossly inadequate quality of governance and rule of law, an economy crippled by 30 years of
crisis and mismanagement, and with security force that are still some years away from the
counterinsurgency capabilities they need and as much as decade away from building up all of the
military forces they need to defend against a threat like Iran. He should have been honest about
Iraq's near political paralysis, ongoing violence, and need for help in dealing with potentially
explosive differences between Sunni and Shi'ite and Arab and Kurd.

The President should also have made it clear that announcing a formal end to an active combat role
by US forces does not mean that the US will not act to provide military help if Iraq's government
makes such a request. US combat forces will not leave Iraq before the end of 2011, and then only if
the situation does not deteriorate to the point where the Iraqi government asks for help. The core of
the 50,000 troops that remain in Iraq consists of six Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) that have
major combat capabilities, and are not merely training forces.. They are brigade combat teams that
have been augmented with 50 additional officers and the units have received additional preparation
to be trainers. They will be able to shift to combat operations immediately if the Iraqi government
should request this and the US President approves.

Yes, much depends on what Iraqis want and their view of such a partnership, but President Obama
should have begun to prepare them and the American people and the Congress for the fact that the
US can only succeed if is willing to make a lasting commitment to making a strategic partnership
work. This requires a strong US presence in the Gulf after the US withdraws its combat forces from
Iraq, and a US commitment to providing an advisory mission and FMS sales and aid until Iraq's oil
revenues are large enough for it to fund every aspect of its armed forces. It also requires hard
decisions about funding a police training and advisory mission, and far more effective management
of the State Department role in such an effort that has take place in any country to date.
Moreover, it will be at least half a decade before Iraq's forces can defend the country from outside
threats. US arms transfers and aid, and US security guarantees, can offer Iraq security during that
period. US air and naval power can operate from other areas in the Gulf to conduct devastating
attacks on any major force that tries to cross the Iraqi border. US training teams can continue to
help Iraq build up all the elements of its security forces after US withdrawal in 2012. US FMS
programs offer Iraq a way of obtaining full support for military modernization without corruption
and with the required levels of support and sustainability.

Comparatively limited amounts of US economic aid can help speed economic development and
improve the capacity and quality of Iraqi government. A strong State Department aid team can help
Iraq shift away from a State-driven economy to a more mixed and open economy, and play a key
role in showing Iraqis that there are strong economic reasons to avoid sectarian and ethnic tensions.
A strong country team that mixes a major Embassy effort, active consulates in Basra and Arbil and
smaller posts in Mosul and Kirkuk can provide the broad level of aid and support that will be
critical long after a new Iraqi government is chosen, and probably for at least a half a decade after
2011.

Iraq still needs help and aid in every aspect of development, a continuing diplomatic and civil effort
to help Iraqis overcome their sectarian and ethnic tensions. Defining exactly what level of US
support is needed, and Iraq will accept, must wait on the creation of a new Iraqi government and
giving that new government the time it needs to make such decisions. It is already clear, however,
that Iraq needs immediate aid in developing its capability for governance, and economy.

Why the US Must Maintain a Major Military presence in the Gulf: Facing the Broader
Challenge

More broadly, the US cannot afford to leave the Gulf. It must be ready to make future military
interventions and fight new conflicts to secure the region indefinitely into the future. The President
has not announced his future plans for USCENTCOM, but these are as critical to our national
security as a strategic partnership with Iraq. Leaving Iraq does not mean we are "going home."

The US now has two major bases in Kuwait, a 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, a massive air base
in Qatar, and contingency facilities in Oman, the UAE, and Diego Garcia. It maintains a major
military advisory mission in Saudi Arabia, and has close military ties to Turkey. It prepositioned
brigade sets in Kuwait and Qatar before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and has deployed an average
of more than one carrier battle group and more than a combat wing of US fighters in the region
since the mid-1980s. It can rapidly deploy additional ground forces, air and missile capabilities,
naval forces, and missile defenses

Maintaining a major combat capability in the Gulf is as vital now as at any time in the last half
century, and the US must maintain forces that can deter or defeat any conventional outside attack on
Iraq if the US and Iraq are truly committed to a strategic partnership. If Iraq is to be stable, secure,
and any kind of partner, the US must be able to provide airpower, intelligence, and emergency
resupply to Iraqi forces for the counterinsurgency mission and to rapidly deploy Special Forces to
directly aid Iraqi troops. It must provide as large or small a group of US military advisors as Iraq
wants, and help Iraq acquire the major combat systems it will need over the next half decade to
deter and defeat foreign threats on its own. This not only will directly aid Iraq, but help make Iraqi
forces interoperable with key elements of US, Saudi, UAE, Kuwaiti, and other Southern Gulf
forces.

We Need Leadership, Not Hollow Posturing

We did not need a second, vacuous "mission accomplished" speech. We do need the kind of firm
and continuing Presidential leadership that makes it clear that precipitous US withdrawal, or
Congressional cutbacks in State Department and Department of Defense aid and advisory plans will
end any chance of an effective strategic partnership and lose the war by default. It will empower
Iran, extremism, and terrorists throughout the region, and threaten all of our friends and allies.

In contrast, providing continuing civil and military support to Iraq during the critical transition
period between 2010 and 2015 will provide the US side of the effort necessary to build a lasting
strategic partnership; help Iraq through a potential crisis in its budget, economy, and the
development of the security forces it needs; and give the blood and dollars of the last seven years
some kind of strategic value and meaning.