No. 13 CIR v.

Santos, 277 SCRA 617 (1997)

COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioners,
vs
HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
Guild of Phil. Jewelers, Inc. questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. it is their contention that the present Tariff and tax
structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive
against other countries, in support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be
an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in
comparison to tax rates levied in the country.
Judge Santos of RTC Pasig, ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and
declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are
concerned.
Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no
authority to pass judgement upon the taxation policy of the Government. Petitioners also
impugn the decision asserting that there was no showing the tax laws on jewelry are
confiscatory.
Issue:
I. Whether RTC has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the government.
II. WON the state has the power to select the subjects of taxation.
Ruling:
I. The policy of the court is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary.
This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional.
But this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.
RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority does not
extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look into the
validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the provisions laid
down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence.
II. YES. The respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates on jewelry
levied by different Asian countries. This is meant to convince us that compared to other
countries; the tax rates imposed on said industry in the Philippines is oppressive and
confiscatory. This Court, however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other
countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of
taxation in our own country. It should be pointed out that in imposing the aforementioned
taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and executive branches, is exercising
its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a
singling out or one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional
limitation."
No. 14
250 SCRA 500 (wala koy makita)
No. 15 Lagmay vs. Court of Appeals
199 SCRA 501 (1991)
G.R. No. 84929. July 23, 1991
Facts: Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Julio Lagmay and 2
others. Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent letters to each of her
lessees advising them of her intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the option to
buy what they are occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not
collect the rentals from each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters
politely advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et
al did not reply not until 3 months and this time they agreed to buy the parcel of land. Tuason
however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their right over the land
they’ve been occupying for quite some time as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land
Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when
they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer. Lagmay et al appealed before the Court of
Appeals. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out that the parcel of land
in question is not declared as an “urban land” under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that
Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the same during the trial of
merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is ripe for judicial determination in this
case.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in this
case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The issue of constitutionality of a
statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The
Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination. Although the
Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue considering that
numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by
which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination.
No. 16 (wala koy makita sa internet)
No. 17 Casis vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 732
Facts:
The property in question was sold twice by Nenita Suroza, first to defendant and private
respondent herein Cielito T. Santos on June 30, 1983 and second, to plaintiff Roderick Casis on
July 19, 1983. It appears that the owner's copy of the certificate of title was handed by Nenita
Suroza to defendant Santos as early as February 10, 1983, upon payment by Santos of the
mortgage redemption amount to a certain Atty. Oscar Reyes as part of the purchase price of
the subject property. The deed of sale however in favor of Cielito Santos was executed by
Suroza only on June 23, 1983, upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. Defendant
Santos did not however register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds even if he took
possession of the subject property by his acceptance of the key to the house which he started
renovating thru the help of an architect. Meanwhile Suroza requested that she be given 45 days
to look for another place in which to reside and for time to remove her personal belongings.
Earlier on May 17, 1983, Suroza filed a petition for the reconstitution of her title to the property
on the alleged ground that her original title was lost. Having been able to obtain a reconstituted
title, Nenita Suroza again sold the same property on July 19, 1983 to plaintiff Roderick Casis
who was able to register said sale and was able to obtain a certificate of title to the land in his
name thereby cancelling the former certificate of title in the name of Nenita V. Suroza.
A complaint for Ejectment with Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Damages was
filed with the court a quo or the Metropolitan Trial Court by Roderick M. Casis against Cielito T.
Santos.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the possession of the said property in question.
Ruling:
To the mind of this Court, it is reasonable to consider defendant to have taken possession of
subject property from the time of its sale to him on June 23, 1983, and after the key was
handed over to his mother, although Mrs. Suroza might have stayed there for a little while
more for the aforecited purpose. And indicative of the fact that defendant was then already
possessor of the property in the concept of owner thereof, his mother, according to her
undisputed testimony, cause construction materials to be brought to the place for use in
renovating subject property. The fact that Mrs. Suroza stayed for a while longer on the property
or even for the whole period of 45 days as originally requested by her, for that matter did not
detract from defendant's being the true possesser of said property. Mrs. Suroza's extended stay
was by mere tolerance of defendant and not by virtue of her being the owner any longer of the
property. With the sale of the property in question in favor of the defendant, plaintiff can have
no better right of possession, and possibly ownership, for that matter over the property. It must
be stressed that as early as February 10, 1983 Nenita Suroza somehow already recognized the
right of ownership and possession of the defendant over the property in issue.
No. 18 People vs. Gutierrez
36 SCRA 172

G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970

PEOPLE vs.HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:
A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur,
and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio
Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old
woman named Vicenta Balboa.

After investigation by the authorities, information charging seventeen private respondents

herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, who allegedly burned several residential
houses.

Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and voluntarily appeared before
respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27,
28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order
No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from
and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order
No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the
Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as
implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.

On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and
48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and
calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses
seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for
reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits
.
The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and the respondent judge declined the transfer
sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to
the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious
disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that the same
should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.

At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding
with the trial of the cases until further orders.

Issue:
(1) W/N RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts authorize the Secretary of Justice to
transfer thereto specified and individual cases;

(2) W/N the SC possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another Court of First Instance within
the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand.

Held:
(1) No. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs,
trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not
directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and
immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with
the Administration's preferences.

The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of
alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition
of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the
transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.

(2) Yes. We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now
before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution
has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental
and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The
courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every
quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government".

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases
from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands While
not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to
deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the
inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their common law
heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of
justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
No. 19 Aguirre vs. Rana
403 SCRA 342, June 10, 2003
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass
oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to
the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of
legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However,
it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
No. 20 Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210, September 03, 1991
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President Corazon
Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod
allegedly lacked the necessary requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years. However,
despite Cayetano’s objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s
appointment.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC chairman by the
President is mandated by the Constitution under Article IX, Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It
provides:
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so vested subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law.
Therefore, there is no occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective power since
COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion based on the evidence presented.