Global Insecurity

Anthony Burke • Rita Parker

Editors

Global Insecurity
Futures of Global Chaos and Governance
Editors
Anthony Burke Rita Parker
UNSW UNSW
Canberra, Australia Canberra, Australia

ISBN 978-1-349-95144-4 ISBN 978-1-349-95145-1 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017930676

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Stocktrek Images, Inc./Alamy Stock Photo, ProSymbols/Noun Project

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW,
United Kingdom
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book began its life in a two-day international workshop held in

Canberra in mid-2013 on the theme of the ‘Globalisation of Insecurity:
Challenges for Global Governance’. It gathered many of the contributors
in this book, Canberra-based diplomats, and Australian government offi-
cials for discussions about the developing landscape of global security and
our efforts to move beyond the national level. The workshop was finan-
cially and logistically supported by the School of Humanities and Social
Sciences at the University of New South Wales at Canberra, and we wish
to thank its Head, Professor David Lovell, School Manager Margaret
McGee, Shirley Ramsey, and Christopher Brown for their support and
work on the event.

v
 CONTENTS

1 Introduction 1
Anthony Burke

Part I Conceptualising Global Insecurity

2 Insecurity and Governance in an Age of Transition 23

Joseph Camilleri

3 Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective 43

Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag

4 Post-human Security 65
Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden

5 Security Cosmopolitanism and Global Governance 83

Anthony Burke

Part II Global Agendas

6 Global Ecology, Social Nature, and Governance 103

Simon Dalby

vii
viii CONTENTS

7 Framing Global Climate Security 119

Mary E. Pettenger

8 The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda at the United

Nations 139
Laura J. Shepherd

9 Children, Conflict, and Global Governance 159

Katrina Lee-Koo

10 Global Weapons Proliferation, Disarmament,

and Arms Control 175
Marianne Hanson

11 Challenges Facing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 195

Tanya Ogilvie-White

12 Restraint and Governance in Cyberspace 215

Greg Austin

13 Pandemics and Dual-Use Research 235

Rita Parker

14 Advocating Global Health Security 253

Sara E. Davies

15 The International Governance of Forced Migration 273

Savitri Taylor

16 Three Generations of International Human Rights

Governance 293
Morten B. Pedersen

17 The UN Security Council and the Problem of Mass

Atrocities 311
Alex J. Bellamy
 CONTENTS ix

Part III Reforming Global Institutions

18 The Future of National Security and the Role of States 327

Allan Behm

19 The United Nations and Global Security 347

Rita Parker and Anthony Burke

Index 369
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 10.1 Summary of adherents to the landmines and cluster

munitions conventions and the Arms Trade Treaty 180
Table 11.1 Summary of NPT Review Conference Outcomes,
1975–2015 199
Table 11.2 States with Demonstrated Enrichment and/or
Reprocessing Capability 203
Table 11.3 Nuclear status of countries where AP is not in force 204
Table 12.1 Significant milestones driving cyber norm development
2007–2014 218
Table 14.1 Word tree results from ‘Security’ and ‘Other Normative’
word searches in GAVI and TFI founding documents 264

xi
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction
From Collective to Global Security

Anthony Burke

This is a book about the nature of global insecurity today and our collec-
tive international efforts to address it through what can be called ‘global
security governance’. Reflecting a broadening of the security agenda in
both International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009), and in
major institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the US
Department of Defense, its chapters analyse contemporary patterns,
sources, and symptoms of security – from climate change to gender,
geopolitics, and genocide – and critically assess the institutional and policy
responses of states and other key actors at multiple levels, from national
capitals to global institutions. An important concern of the book is to
highlight how important forms of insecurity and threat now have wide-
spread range and sources beyond particular states and regions: to, in many
cases, the global and planetary levels. They also have a temporal scale that
is not often appreciated, having roots in past processes and effects that will
extend for hundreds and thousands of years, shaping the lives of many
future generations. The insecurities represented by phenomena such as

A. Burke (*)
International and Political Studies, University of New South Wales, New South
Wales, Australia
e-mail: a.burke@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 1

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_1
2 A. BURKE

transnational terrorism, gender violence, climate change and ecological

degradation, pollution, economic crisis, nuclear weapons, and transna-
tional crime have complex and systemic sources across large swathes of
time and space and can be reasonably understood as global forms of
insecurity. These often interpenetrating processes are what Joseph
Camilleri in this book calls ‘the globalisation of insecurity’. Furthermore,
it is important to understand ecological degradation, climate change, and
the potential global cooling (or ‘nuclear winter’) that would ensue from
nuclear war as threats to the very survival of the living complexity of planet
earth, and thus as planetary forms of insecurity.
We have assembled a group of leading scholars in global governance and
security studies, known for the innovation and excellence of their thinking, to
analyse how the global governance of security works in a range of major
global problems and processes: mass atrocities and the use of force; the global
climate and ecology; the world economy and the role of states; conflict,
gender, and peace-building; forced migration and asylum seekers; children
and health; weapons of mass destruction; cybersecurity; and human rights.
We asked them to explain how those issues are evolving in ways which
challenge existing structures and norms, to consider potential futures that
those structures and frameworks will need to address and to make recom-
mendations for reform, change and further evolution. And even as all of the
contributors are generally supportive of a broadening of the security agenda,
some ask hard questions about the impact of securitising particular issues
(such as health, climate, and refugees) because they are concerned that the
kinds of policy that results undermines human dignity, ecological protection
and social justice – that, in short, it creates more rather than less insecurity.
Hence the book’s subtitle concerned with futures and chaos. Even as
we can point to many positive global trends, what kind of futures should
we be concerned by? The fate of the planetary ecology is obviously the
most alarming. Climate and earth system scientists are making disturbing
predictions of dangerous climate change, the collapse of marine food
chains and fisheries and global collapse in biodiversity that will have
grave consequences both for human and ecological security in this century
(Steffen et al. 2015; Burke et al. 2016). The atmosphere has the highest
concentrations of carbon dioxide in 1 million years; the earth is already
experiencing its hottest average temperatures since records began; and
extreme weather and drought has killed and displaced large numbers of
people and been implicated in new conflicts such as the war in Darfur
(Mazo 2010; Christoff and Eckersley 2013).
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Women remain vulnerable to conflict-related and sexual violence; to

deaths from childbirth and sexually transmitted disease; and dispropor-
tionally bear the costs of structural poverty, conflict, and forced migration.
While there are positive trends in women’s health and participation in
education, improvement in workforce participation and equality remains
stagnant (Department of Social and Economic Affairs 2015). Progress on
these issues is slow and fitful, despite a range of energetic global efforts,
and women confront growing sexism from conservative and fundamen-
talist political and religious movements in numerous countries. In turn,
the human rights and security of women are strongly dependent on how
we manage the global economy and address conflict in the coming dec-
ades. If inequality and violence is not reduced, the security of women will
not improve (True 2012).
Renewed talk of a return to geopolitics, with deepening strategic
hostility and distrust between the major powers, raises fears of a new
Cold War (Mead 2014). This threatens to undermine important norma-
tive progress on human rights, arms control, and crimes against humanity,
and is exacerbated by existing structures of global security governance
especially by the rules and composition of the Security Council and the
UN Charter. Such a development would also undermine the ability of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime both to address current challenges and to
evolve to deal with future ones. The NPT (Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) regime could muddle along in its
damaged and fractured state; it could break down entirely and open up
an alarming scenario of increased proliferation and potential nuclear use;
or it could face a different kind of challenge, in which momentum on
cooperative disarmament increases, raising the need to create new struc-
tures of regulation and control to secure a world of very few or zero
nuclear weapons. The development of drones, artificial intelligence,
cyber weapons, and space-based global strike capabilities raise further
possibilities for future insecurity.
An important feature of this book is the willingness of its authors to
look at global governance problems through new lenses. This willingness
is visible in all the chapters, and while it reflects the broadening and
deepening of the security agenda, there is also visible in this book a
willingness to rethink the very foundations and architecture of interna-
tional security. This is why the book begins with a section on conceptua-
lising global insecurity, with four framing theoretical contributions that
draw on important past and recent work: the globalisation of insecurity
4 A. BURKE

(Camilleri and Falk 2009), feminist political economy of violence (True

2012), post-human security (Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Mitchell
2014; Dalby 2014), and security cosmopolitanism (Burke et al. 2014;
Burke 2013, 2015, 2016). These are diverse theoretical contributions, but
they converge on some core understandings: the systemic and processual
nature of global insecurity; the need to address complex insecurities
through profound structural and normative change; and the need for
new kinds of analysis, ethics, and governance to address our common
global challenges.
In particular, two major conceptual and structural shifts that will shape
global governance – for good or ill – are highlighted in this book. First, in
the chapters by Camilleri, Dalby, Burke, and Cudworth and Hobden, the
‘Anthropocene’ is a powerful presence: a new geologic and industrial
epoch in which the collective activity of humanity has so dramatically
transformed the earth that society and nature are no longer distinct. As a
result, global governance can no longer retain its state- and anthropo-
centric focus and if it persists in doing so, the planet will pay a heavy price
in cascading forms of insecurity over coming decades and centuries.
Secondly, in many other chapters, including that on the role of the state
by Behm, the sustainability of an exclusively ‘Westphalian’ (state-centric)
international order is raised as a question. The globalisation of insecurity
puts the doctrine of national sovereignty into question in multiple and
complex ways, some of which we have probably not yet seen. One is
already obvious: the numbers of forced migrants in the world (nearly 60
million) are the highest ever; if poverty, climate change, and conflict are
not adequately addressed, hundreds of millions are likely to be on the
move.

THE GLOBALISATION OF INSECURITY

Understanding insecurity at the global and planetary scales can be double-
edged. On the one hand, it can focus the minds of analysts and policy-
makers on the global scale of cooperation and response – and, in the case
of the global ecology, on the need to broaden our range of global actors
and institutional participants to include the biosphere, ecosystems, and
nonhuman forms of life. In that latter vision, termed ‘Planet Politics’, the
UN Charter may need to be revised so that major ecosystems or species
groups could have representation in international organisations in the way
that states currently do (Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Mitchell 2014;
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

Burke et al. 2016). While this would no doubt be a complex and radical
reform, the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recognises the indivisible and
globally interconnected nature of development, security, human rights,
and ecological protection. When it was adopted in September 2015 the
General Assembly declared that ‘we are resolved to free the human
race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure
our planet . . . to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path’
(UN A/RES/70/1). However, the governments of the world propose
to pursue this ‘supremely ambitious and transformational vision’ within
the current architecture of the UN and the international society of states
(United Nations 2015: 3, 28–35). Whether they can realise such a vision
within the current structure and dynamics of international order is a
matter of some doubt that demands significant, and critical, debate.
Hence, on the other hand, such a focus on the global and planetary
scale of insecurity raises profound questions of global will, capacity, nor-
mative and political conflict, and structural and institutional design. As we
write, in mid-2016, the United Nations Security Council was utterly
paralysed over a brutal and inhuman civil war in Syria that had taken
over 200,000 lives and created 10 million displaced persons. It was just
one of many long-running conflicts that international society was strug-
gling to resolve and ameliorate, while the militaries and intelligence agen-
cies of multiple states fanned the flames. Europe and the Middle East were
facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War, and largely
failing to deal with asylum seekers in ways that respected their human
rights or the deep insecurities that drove them to flee. Despite (or possibly
also in part because of) the prosecution of the global war on terror since
2001, casualties from terrorist attacks had seen a ninefold increase to a
high of over 32,000 deaths in 2014 (Global Terrorism Index 2015: 2).
Less than a decade after the Wall Street crash caused tens of trillions of
dollars in wealth to disappear, global economic recovery remained weak,
and poverty and economic inequality was increasing, creating a profound
barrier to economic and social recovery (Obstfeld 2016; Dabla-Norris
et al. 2015). At the same time, serious questions were being raised about
the viability and sustainability of a global growth model driven by con-
sumerism and financialisation using the energy provided by the burning of
fossil fuels, raw materials provided by environmentally and socially destruc-
tive mining activities, and food produced in ways that stress ecosystems
and enslave and immiserate animals (Klein 2015; Hamilton 2010).
6 A. BURKE

Global economic governance remains controlled and dominated by the

Bretton Woods institutions and by neoliberal ideologies of small govern-
ment, austerity, and free trade without reference to their devastating
social, ecological, and economic impact – even if a grand decline in the
credibility of neoliberalism is increasingly visible (Chakrabortty 2016).
In similar ways, global environmental governance is kept separate from
economic and security governance, and itself is fractured between multiple
treaties and institutions, so that, for example, climate change and biodi-
versity are not being addressed together. Despite the hope provided by the
Paris Agreement on climate change, global climate governance has pre-
sided over a leap in global greenhouse emissions that, if left unchecked,
will take us towards the nightmare of a ‘four degree world’ this century
(Biermann 2014; Stevenson 2012; Burke et al. 2016; Hamilton 2010;
Christoff 2013).
The grand bargain at the heart of the nuclear non-proliferation regime –
which exchanges disarmament for non-proliferation – is broken, evidenced
by the failure of the 9th Review Conference on the NPT in 2015, the push
by many states for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, and the refusal of
countries from the South to cooperate with strengthening controls on
nuclear proliferation. It is failing to address current trends of nuclear mod-
ernisation and hostility, let alone evolve to grapple with future change.
Recent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Palestine have seen terrible
war crimes committed by states and non-state belligerents, with impunity.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been attacked for only indicting
Africans and leaving great power human rights abusers untouched, and
numerous countries have thumbed their noses at its indictment of the
Sudanese president (Thakur 2015). To be sure, the picture is an ambiguous
one: serious failures coexist with remarkable successes, which would include
the strengthening norm of the Responsibility to Protect, the adoption of the
ICC Statute, the downward trend in the number of (and mortality from)
armed conflicts, the non-use of nuclear weapons in war since 1945, the Paris
Agreement on climate change, and normative progress in thinking about
international security.

GLOBAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

In the light of the current crisis and stalemate, and our concern about
disastrous possible futures, a focus on the functioning and improvement of
global security governance is of crucial importance. Global governance
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

refers not just to ‘how states have established norms, laws, and institutions
to help them engage in collective action and create order’ but also to how
‘other actors, including [international organisations], transnational cor-
porations, non-governmental organisations, and new kinds of networks’
combine with states to create complex (and sometimes competing) sys-
tems of interaction and governance of particular international and global
problems (Barnett and Sikkink 2008: 63–64).
Three key issues arise in the global governance of security. The first
is about architecture and levels of governance. How integrated are
these levels and architectures, and if they lack integration, why? The
second is about normative pluralism in global governance: the question
of what global security governance is for. Can the world manage and
cope with deep normative conflict about what the fundamental ends
and purposes of global governance are – especially when they fracture
organisations that need to be organised around a common goals, such
as the UN? Or must they be harmonised if global security is to be
genuinely advanced? The third relates not only to these questions of
norms, but also to very real questions of whether we are missing and
failing to address serious and actual forms of insecurity, such as gender-
related insecurity, ecological degradation and climate change, the rights
and agency of children, refugees and asylum seekers, and the interests
of smaller and less powerful states. How do the key actors in global
security governance understand security? Do they see security as being
about coercion and power, as something that cannot be shared with
others but must be achieved against them, or do they see it in shared
and cooperative ways? What kinds of problems, threats, and challenges – and
to whom and what – are subsumed under those practical understandings
of security? All of these questions combine in the actual practice of global
security governance.
The global governance of security takes three major architectural forms:
firstly, bilateral or multilateral strategic alliances, which are usually focused
on military and intelligence cooperation and common defence; secondly,
regional security organisations and treaties that are being seen as increas-
ingly important and as conduits for normative pressures on their member
states (Aris and Wenger 2014); and, thirdly, the UN system, which
combines international law, numerous treaties, and cooperative enforce-
ment and management arrangements, and its key bodies such as the
General Assembly and the Security Council (Thakur 2006; Price and
Zacher 2004). These levels interact and coalesce with a range of less
8 A. BURKE

formal arrangements and institutions to produce, in aggregate, systems of

global security governance.
Whether and how these structures contribute to global security, and
normatively and operationally integrate, is a contested question. For
example, Cold War strategic alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw
Pact may have not only provided their members with some reassurance,
but also exposed them to great collective risks and fuelled nuclear prolif-
eration, creating ‘security dilemmas’ on a grand scale. There is real con-
cern that contemporary versions of such alliances – an expanded NATO
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are going to act in
ways that contribute to a new Cold War (Booth and Wheeler 2008;
Bleiker 2005). Recognising this, one regional organisation, Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was formed around the principle of
precluding great power conflict and competition in Southeast Asia,
embedded norms for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and created a
nuclear weapons free zone. It was a prototype for what scholars later began
to call the ‘security community’ (Acharya 2001; Bellamy 2004). Yet it also
aggressively defended the principle of non-interference in internal affairs
which provided cover for member states to violently prosecute internal
conflicts and abuse human rights (Burke and McDonald 2007). Similarly,
its ability to prevent interstate conflict and strategic competition never
quite matched its declared norms, as exemplified by strategic tensions
between Singapore and Malaysia and ASEAN’s internal division over
Cambodia, a conflict that was ultimately resolved with the ideational and
diplomatic intervention of outsiders.
Over the last decade ASEAN has adopted a series of ambitious and
normatively progressive common objectives (an ASEAN ‘political-secur-
ity’, ‘economic’, and ‘social-cultural’ community), but commentators
remark that the ASEAN Regional Forum ‘has not tackled the most
important security issues in the region’ especially those in Northeast
Asia, and ‘climate change has not been adequately securitised . . . to make
it a substantiated area of regional cooperation’ despite the fact that the
region’s populations are distinctly vulnerable to climate change impacts
and already suffer the adverse health effects of transboundary pollution
(Burke 2010; Jetschke 2014: 94; Dent 2014: 113). In a similar way, the
African Union has transitioned from values of ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-
indifference’, while its practices have remained somewhat contradictory,
exhibiting tensions between ‘a conservative and deferential approach to
the continent’s incumbent regimes’ and the organisation’s declared liberal
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

objectives (Williams 2014: 38). An organisation such as the 115-member

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) does not have a formal security mandate,
but was formed to create a community of states who wished to stand aside
from superpower conflict, and it plays a major role as a lobby in the nuclear
non-proliferation regime (Mukhatzhanova and Potter 2012).
One cannot underestimate the weight of strategic alliances and regional
security organisations in shaping the effective realities and landscape of
international security. However, the UN forms the final and most norma-
tively, legally and organisationally crucial layer. The UN Charter is over-
whelmingly concerned with peace and security, and acts like a global
constitution, establishing the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice and setting out rules for the pacific settlement of disputes
and the resort to force in international relations. Here its role is funda-
mentally ambiguous: it prohibits military aggression between sovereign
states and licenses the resort to force in self-defence, but creates few
constraints – certainly not legal ones – to the resort to force by a state
within its own borders (Burke et al. 2014: 84–90). This sets up compli-
cated challenges in relation to efforts to prevent and end civil wars, prevent
crimes against humanity, or prevent and prosecute war crimes, as the
chapters by Alex Bellamy and Anthony Burke and Rita Parker explain.
The UN also plays a significant role in the negotiation and adoption of key
international security treaties (such as the NPT, the chemical and biolo-
gical weapons conventions, the landmines convention, and more), hosts
major meetings of states and plays key roles in the evolution of those
treaties into cooperative security regimes. In this book, critical scrutiny of
the UN’s role in the promotion of the ‘women, peace, and security’
agenda and the governance of nuclear weapons and small arms are, respec-
tively, carried out by Laura Shepherd, Tanya Ogilvie White, and Marianne
Hanson.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN’s role and responses have ranged
from being highly valuable to highly damaging. It was sidelined prior to the
Iraq invasion of 2003, then invited to mediate between ethnic groups only
to have its Baghdad headquarters bombed; it was rendered impotent in East
Timor in 1999 and in Bosnia-Herzogovina in 1997, stood scandalously by
while the Rwanda genocide took place in 1994, and imposed a near-total
trade embargo of Iraq during the 1990s which is alleged to have caused
the deaths of 100,000–500,000 people and provoked considerable soul-
searching about the value and impact of international sanctions (Cortwright
et al. 2007; Burke 2007: 208). More recently, it has been a well-meaning
10 A. BURKE

bystander to terrible conflicts in Sri Lanka, Syria, Libya, and Yemen,

reduced to providing humanitarian aid and refugee housing, and spon-
soring glacially slow processes of diplomatic mediation (Kampmark
2016; Perera 2015; Thasan 2016).
It is beyond the scope of a single chapter or book to convey the
complexity of the UN’s role and machinery in global security – which
includes roles in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the limitation of
small arms; peacekeeping and peace-enforcement; international criminal
law; refugee protection; and normative innovations around the
Responsibility to Protect, human security, and gender – but there have
been a number of important studies (Price and Zacher 2004; Thakur
2006; Weiss and Daws 2008; Zifcak 2009; Newman 2007). This com-
plexity is exacerbated by internal division within the UN, both between
groups of member states and between major bodies such as the General
Assembly and the Security Council, and by serious problems of account-
ability and efficiency within the UN organisation itself, which are mani-
festing mostly visibly in ongoing problems around sexual abuses by
peacekeepers (Whalan 2016; Simm 2013; Duncanson 2009). A broader
source of division is evident in the deliberate lack of integration between
the global governance regimes relating to security, economics, develop-
ment, health, and the environment, which reflects both power politics and
profound normative disagreement between major actors in global security
(Biermann 2014). The UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change (United Nations 2004) may have argued that poverty, infec-
tious disease, and environmental degradation are threats to international
security as much as armed conflict, and as the 2005 World Summit (2005:
para 9) declared that ‘development, peace and security and human rights
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’, but key global governance
frameworks and institutions dealing with the environment, the world
economy, human rights, and security are deliberately kept fragmented
and separate.

FROM COLLECTIVE TO GLOBAL SECURITY, AND BEYOND

Earlier we asked what global security governance is for. The UN began as a
system to create and assure ‘collective security’, which Barry Buzan has
defined as ‘a system for maintaining world peace and security by the
concerted action and agreement of all nations. The central idea of collec-
tive security is to institutionalize a permanent arrangement of the balance
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

of power in which the entire international community agrees to oppose

military aggression by any member’ (Buzan 2009). International lawyer
Alexander Orakhelashvili argues that ‘no collective security is feasible
unless it draws on fundamental security needs of states’ and – drawing
on the charters of the Organisation of American States, European Union,
and African union – that ‘protecting basic rights and interests of states is at
the heart of every viable collective security arrangement’. It is thus a
fundamentally state-centric and inter-national concept, which has flowed
into how the UN Charter was framed and the international security order
constructed (see also Weiss and Gordenker 1993). While international law
strongly prohibits military aggression by one state against another, Article
2(7) of the UN Charter states that ‘nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ – a principle that
protected human rights abusers during the Cold War and has been pried
open only with great difficulty and complexity.
Hence, collective security as a concept and institutional framework has
been framed around the interests of states and the need to suppress
interstate military conflict. This emphasis, however, is slowly transforming
and is an important background to this book. On the one hand, the
national and collective security agenda has been slowly broadening beyond
military conflict; on the other hand, global security governance is placing
normative, moral, and legal pressure on the permissible ways that states
can define their own security. This can be seen in the growing acceptance
of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect and its underlying principle of
‘sovereignty as responsibility’; debates over the last decade about the value
of human security over national security as a concept and set of practices;
and the growth of the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda. Orakhelashvili
(2011: 6) comments that ‘collective security thus understood imposes
universal concepts on national policies; it is, then, about an international
compromise on permissible limits to how states perceive security, and
means by which they can maximize their security’. He was drawing on
Nincic’s argument that ‘notion of security cannot, therefore, be left to the
individual and necessarily subjective appreciation of each individual
State . . . but should be objectively defined by the norms of the interna-
tional legal order. Security should, moreover, be equal for all’
(Orakhelashvili 2011: 5).
After the end of the Cold War, and especially since the attacks of 9/11
and the 2003 crisis around the invasion of Iraq, international efforts to
12 A. BURKE

rethink collective security have gathered pace. In 2003 the UN Secretary-

General commissioned an eminent ‘high level panel’ to develop ‘a new
security consensus’ around three basic pillars: ‘today’s threats recognise no
national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global
and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful,
can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And
it cannot be assumed that every state will always be able or willing to meet
its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neigh-
bours.’ It argued that ‘poverty, infectious disease, environmental degrada-
tion are more feed one another in a deadly cycle’, and argued that the new
collective security agenda should be based around six clusters of threats
(economic and social threats, including environmental degradation, inter-
state conflict, internal conflict, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,
and transnational organised crime) (United Nations 2004: 9, 23).
The report was not without flaws (Fishel 2013), but it was working
intuitively with an underlying human security concept and attempting to
harmonise collective and national security in a new way. The 2005 United
Nations World Summit broadly adopted this new way of thinking, stating
that ‘we believe that today, more than ever before, we live in a global and
interdependent world [and] that collective security depends on effective
cooperation, in accordance with international law, against transnational
threats’. The Summit also resolved to ‘address the root causes of those
threats and challenges with resolve and determination’ (United Nations
2005: 2). The expansion and deepening of the security agenda has been
less obvious and more fitful in the national security approaches of member
states. However, the challenges of climate change receive prominent
mention in the United States’ 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review and its
2015 national security strategy, and the United Kingdom’s 2008 National
Security Strategy focuses around ‘a diverse but interconnected set of
threats and risks’ that are ‘driven by a diverse and interconnected set of
factors including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and
poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation’ (Department
of Defence 2010; White House 2015; United Kingdom 2008).
The 2005 World Summit was the most important gathering of UN
member states since 1945; even more important was the General
Assembly session in 2015 that adopted the Sustainable Development
Goals. That meeting acknowledged the urgency of the global economic
and climate crisis; the integrated nature of the earth system and human
impacts upon it; the systemic need to integrate social and gender justice,
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

ecological protection, human rights, and social inclusivity; and it set a goal
for the elimination of poverty and achievement of genuinely environmen-
tally sustainable economic growth. It recognised that ‘the survival of many
societies, and the biological support systems of the planet, is at risk’ and that
these are issues central to global security: ‘sustainable development cannot
be realised without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk
without sustainable development’. Importantly, the General Assembly
affirmed, against the widespread warehousing and coercive exclusion of
refugees, that ‘we will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and
regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane
treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of
displaced persons’ (United Nations 2015: paras. 9, 13, 14, 35, 29).
The normative goals and analytical framework of the 2030 Agenda
reflect, at least in part, many of the most innovative and progressive
theories of security: Mary Kaldor’s ideal of global security based on
‘global social justice’ and the ‘international rule of law . . . based on
cosmopolitan principles’; Ken Booth’s vision of ‘global governance
becom[ing] a community of emancipatory communities . . . above and
below the state’; Jacqui True’s call for the structural transformation of
political economies to underpin the security of women and sustain non-
violent societies; Audra Mitchell’s call to secure the ‘worlds’ that
‘humans co-constitute with diverse nonhuman beings’; and Anthony
Burke’s call for ‘all actors and institutions’ to ‘advance the global
security of humanity and ecosystems without bias or discrimination’
and thus sustain ‘the entire mesh of planetary existence and life’
(Kaldor 2007: 98; Booth 2007: 141–142; True 2012: 184; Mitchell
2014: 5; Burke 2013: 24, 2016: 148–152).
Similarly innovative, future-directed, and progressive thinking to
address the weaknesses of global security governance is visible throughout
this book. Joseph Camilleri argues for new integrated modes of policy that
combine ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of society’ approaches that are
far more democratic, responsive, and accountable. Jacqui True and Maria
Tanyag highlight the need to ‘challenge and overhaul underlying struc-
tures of political, social and economic inequality’. Simon Dalby asserts that
we must collectively ‘build a solar powered civilisation quickly so as to
secure the future relative stability of the biosphere’, which ‘may require
more drastic social changes than either traditional political or new govern-
ance agendas usually contemplate’. Taking a slightly different tack, Mary
Pettenger, Erica Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, and Sara Davies,
14 A. BURKE

respectively, question whether the ‘securitisation’ of climate change, the

global ecology, or global health will effectively advance efforts to promote
beneficial change.
Other contributors make concrete suggestions for improved regime
performance and institutional reform. Laura Shepherd insists that we
should go beyond a focus on conflict-related sexual violence to consider
how women are ‘agents of change in conflict and post-conflict situations’
and to ‘ensure women’s meaningful participation [at all levels] in peace
and security governance’ using a ‘whole of UN action’ approach. Katrina
Lee-Koo urges that existing programmes which take children’s ‘positive
agency’ in peace-building seriously need to be ‘aligned with existing
global architecture on children and armed conflict’. In regard to the
arms trade and weapons of mass destruction, Marianne Hanson argues
that the Arms Trade Treaty should be strengthened and that governments
should ‘legislate for greater civilian inclusion in defence policy-making and
for greater oversight of government arms acquisitions and transfers’;
Tanya Ogilvie-White advocates a range of measures to strengthen the
NPT regime, especially changes by the nuclear states in weapons posturing
and strategy, and a more sincere effort to progress disarmament in a
transparent way; and Rita Parker stresses the need for a comprehensive
and precautionary policy framework to govern dual-use biological
research. In his survey of global cybersecurity, Greg Austin concludes
that ‘the security interests of many actors are better served by understand-
ing how the technologies can be regulated and restrained through mutual
compromise’.
In the area of human rights, Savitri Taylor urges us to acknowledge that
the international refugee regime is broken. The way to overcome the
negative impacts of the coercive securitisation of forced migration, she
argues, is to think holistically and ‘advocate for the better implementation
of the existing human rights regime . . . as a regime that trumps all others’.
Morten Pedersen argues for traditional approaches to the enforcement of
international human rights, such as sanctions, to be supplemented by
practices of ‘principled engagement’ rather than the isolation of offending
regimes. Finally, when considering the role of major global security insti-
tutions, Allan Behm urges states to move beyond the failed nostrums of
neoliberal economics, and to develop ‘agility and adroitness’ and ‘prag-
matic interdependency’ based on the ‘fundamental recognition that every
human being enjoys the same basic rights by virtue of their very human-
ity’. Concerned to enhance the ability of the UN Security Council to fulfil
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

its role in promoting international peace and security, Alex Bellamy, Rita
Parker, and Anthony Burke, respectively, argue for voluntary restraint on
the use of the great power veto, the adoption of robust and transparent
accountability measures, reform of its membership that avoids entrenching
more destructive power politics, and a broadening of its understanding of
international peace and security to take in the holistic understanding of
global vulnerability that has been so prominent in General Assembly
meetings over the last decade.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development stands as the acme of
global institutional thinking about the complex integration of economic,
ecological, justice, and security systems, and it could well be one of the
most important documents that the international society of states has ever
produced. Yet there is also a vast gulf between aspiration and action. A
reading of the chapters in this book will demonstrate how far the world is
from being organised, normatively or institutionally, to achieve the goals
that the Agenda sets out as the conditions for our common survival.
However, this book provides timely analysis and creative thinking that
deserves to be part of the conversation about how, collectively, we can find
our way there.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acharya, A. (2001). Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN
and the problem of regional order. London: Routledge.
Aris, S., & Wenger, A. (Eds.) (2014). Regional organisations and security:
Conceptions and practices. London/New York: Routledge.
Barnett, M., & Sikkink, K. (2008). ‘From international relations to global society.
In Christian Reus Smit and Duncan Snidal (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
international relations (pp. 62–83). London/New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bellamy, A. (2004). Security communities and their neighbours. Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Biermann, F. (2014). Earth system governance: World politics in the anthropocene.
Cambridge/London: The MIT Press.
Bleiker, R. (2005). Divided Korea: Toward a culture of reconciliation.
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
Booth, K. (2007). Theory of world security. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Booth, K., & Wheeler, N. (2008). The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation and
trust in world politics. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
16 A. BURKE

Burke, A. (2007). Beyond security, ethics and violence: War against the other.
London and New York: Routledge.
Burke, A. (2010). Questions of community: Australian identity and Asian change.
Australian Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 75–94.
Burke, A. (2013). Security cosmopolitanism. Critical Studies on Security, 1(1),
13–28.
Burke, A. (2015). Security cosmopolitanism: The next phase. Critical Studies on
Security, 3(2), 190–212.
Burke, A. (2016). The ethical sources of security cosmopolitanism. In S. Nyman &
A. Burke (Eds.), Ethical security studies: A new research Agenda (pp. 145–159).
London/New York: Routledge.
Burke, A., Lee-Koo, K., & McDonald, M. (2014). Ethics and global security:
A cosmopolitan approach. London/New York: Routledge.
Burke, A., Fishel, S., Mitchell, A., Dalby, S., & Levine, D. (2016). Planet politics:
A Manifesto from the end of IR. Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
44(3), 499–523. doi: 10.1177/0305829816636674.
Burke, A., & McDonald, M. (2007). Introduction. Critical security in the Asia-
Pacific. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Buzan, B. (2009). Collective security. In I. McLean & A. McMillan (Eds.),
The concise Oxford dictionary of politics. Oxford/New York: Oxford University
Press.
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). The evolution of international security studies.
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Camilleri, J. A., & Falk, J. (2009). Worlds in transition: Evolving governance across
a stressed planet. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Chakrabortty, A. (2016). ‘You’re witnessing the death of neoliberalism – From
within’. The Guardian, 31 May 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/com
mentisfree/2016/may/31/witnessing-death-neoliberalism-imf-economists.
Christoff, P. (Ed.) (2013). Four degrees of global warming: Australia in a hot
world. London/New York: Routledge.
Christoff, P., & Eckersley, R. (2013). No Island is an island: Security in a four
degree world. In P. Christoff (Ed.), Four degrees of global warming: Australia
in a hot world, 2014 (pp. 190–204). London/New York: Routledge.
Cortright, D., Lopez, G., & Gerber-Stellingwerf, L. (2007). Sanctions. In T. H.
Weiss & S. Daws (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on the United Nations. Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2011). Posthuman international relations:
Complexity, ecologism and global politics. London: Zed Books. Save document.
Dabla-Norris, E., Kochhar, K., Ricka, F., Suphaphiphat, N., & Tsounta, E. (2015).
Causes and consequences of income inequality: A global perspective, SDN/15/13.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/exter
nal/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2016.
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

Dalby, S. (2014). Environmental geopolitics in the twenty first century.

Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 39(1), 3–16.
Dent, C. M. (2014). The evolving new security Agenda in East Asia’s regional
affairs. In S. Aris & A. Wenger (Eds.), Regional organisations and security:
Conceptions and practices. London/New York: Routledge.
Department of Defense (2010). The quadrennial defence review 2010
(Washington, DC).
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). The world’s women 2015:
Trends and statistics (New York: United Nations).
Duncanson, C. (2009). Forces for good? Narratives of military masculinity in peace-
keeping operations. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(1), 63–80.
Fishel, S. (2013). Theorising violence in the responsibility to protect. Critical
Studies on Security, 1(2), 204–218.
Global Terrorism Index (2015). Measuring and understanding the impact of
terrorism. Maryland: Institute for Economics and Peace.
Hamilton, C. (2010). Requiem for a species. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Jetschke, A. (2014). ASEAN as a regional organisation: Security conceptions and
practices. In S. Aris & A. Wenger (Eds.), Regional organisations and security:
Conceptions and practices (pp. 81–98). London/New York: Routledge.
Kaldor, M. (2007). Human security: Reflections on globalisation and intervention.
Cambridge: Polity.
Kampmark, B. (2016), ‘Fake US-Russia ‘peace diplomacy’. The Syrian conflict
deepens’, Global Research, 15 February. http://www.globalresearch.ca/fake-
us-russia-peace-diplomacy-the-syrian-conflict-deepens-war-between-false-
friends-and-misaligned-enemies/5507880.
Klein, N. (2015). This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate. London/
New York: Penguin.
Mazo, J. (2010), Climate conflict: How global warming threatens security and what
to do about it, Adelphi Paper No. 409 (London: IISS and Routledge).
Mead, W. R. (2014, May/June). The return of geopolitics: The revenge of the
revisionist powers. Foreign Affairs, 93(3), 69–79.
Mitchell, A. (2014). Only human? A worldly approach to security. Security
Dialogue, 45(1), 5–21.
Mukhatzhanova, G., & Potter, W. (2012), Nuclear politics and the Non-Aligned
Movement, Adelphi Paper 427 (London: IISS and Routledge).
Newman, E. (2007). A crisis of global institutions? Multilateralism and interna-
tional security. London/New York: Routledge.
Obstfeld, M. (2016). ‘Global growth: Too slow for too long’, IMFDirect:
The International Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Forum, 12 April.
https://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2016/04/12/global-growth-too-slow-for-
too-long/. Accessed 1 June 2016.
Orakhelashvili, A. (2011). Collective security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18 A. BURKE

Perera, S. (2015), ‘Visibility, suffering, and the subject of postcolonial justice.

Borderlands, 14(1). http://borderlands.net.au/vol14no1_2015/perera_visibi
lity.pdf.
Price, R., & Zacher, M. (Eds.). (2004). The United Nations and global security.
New York/Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Simm, G. (2013). Sex in peace operations. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Steffen, W. et al. (2015). Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a
changing planet. Science, 347(6223). doi: 10.1126/science.1259855.
Stevenson, H. (2012). Institutionalizing unsustainability: The paradox of global
climate governance. Berkeley/London: University of California Press.
Thakur, R. (2006). The United Nations, peace and security. Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thakur, R. (2015). Belling the International Criminal Court. Australian Outlook,
5 November.
Thasan, S. K. (2016), Time for action on Sri Lanka war crimes. The Diplomat,
15 January. http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/time-for-action-on-sri-lanka-
war-crimes/.
The White House (2015). National security strategy of the United States.
Washington, DC.
True, J. (2012). The political economy of violence against women. Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press.
United Kingdom. (2008). The national security strategy of the United Kingdom:
Security in an interdependent world. London: Cabinet Office.
United Nations (2004). ‘A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of
the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change, General Assembly A/59/
565. New York: United Nations.
United Nations (2005). World summit outcome. General Assembly. 15 September.
A/60/L.1
United Nations (2010). 2010 Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, NPT/
CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)*. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I).
United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015. New York: General Assembly.
Weiss, T. G. (2009). What’s wrong with the United Nations and how to fix it.
Cambridge and New York: Polity.
Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (2008). The Oxford handbook on the United Nations.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weiss, T. G., & Gordenker, L. (1993). The collective security idea and changing
world politics. In T. G. Weiss & L. Gordenker (Eds.), Collective security in a
changing world. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner.
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

Whalan, J. (2016), ‘Here’s how to end UN peacekeeping’s history of sexual

violence’, The Lowy Interpreter, 29 April.
Williams, P. D. (2014). The Security Culture of the African Union. In S. Aris &
A. Wenger (Eds.), Regional organisations and security: Conceptions and practices,
(2014) (pp. 21–38). London and New York: Routledge.
Zacher, M. (2004). The conundrums of international power-sharing: The politics
of Security Council reform. In R. Price & M. Zacher (Eds.), The United
Nations and Global Security. New York and Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zifcak, S. (2009). United Nations reform: Heading North or South?. New York and
London: Routledge.

Anthony Burke is Professor of International and Political Studies, University of

New South Wales, Australia. He is coauthor (with Katrina Lee-Koo and Matt
McDonald) of Ethics and Global Security: A Cosmopolitan Approach (2014,
Routledge), and author of Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War
Against the Other (Routledge, 2007), and Uranium (Polity Press, 2017). He is
also co-editor (with Jonna Nyman) of Ethical Security Studies (2016, Routledge)
and (with Matt McDonald) Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific (2007, Manchester
University Press).
 PART I

Conceptualising Global Insecurity

 CHAPTER 2

Insecurity and Governance in an Age

of Transition

Joseph Camilleri

The twentieth century ushered in a period of profound cultural,

economic and political change (Spengler 1926–1928; Ortega Y Gasset
1932; Habsburg 1958; Geiss 1983; Wallerstein 1984; Braudel 1993) but
whose far-reaching impact is only now beginning to emerge. The two
world wars, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, the Holocaust, the
advent of nuclear weapons, the ensuing Cold War, and the dissolution of
European empires are part of a complex and still unfolding historical
dynamic.

THE GLOBALISATION OF INSECURITY

As I have argued elsewhere (Camilleri and Falk 2009, 446–457), the
‘globalisation of insecurity’ is one of the defining characteristics of our
age. But what exactly does this mean? How has the phenomenon come
about, and how does it manifest itself? Attending to these questions is
a necessary first step if we are to make sense of the challenges posed by
the globalisation of insecurity, the adequacy of the responses to date, and
the normative and institutional remedies that may be available to us.

J. Camilleri (*)
La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: J.Camilleri@latrobe.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 23

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_2
24 J. CAMILLERI

It is fair to say that Westphalian notions of security have normally empha-

sised physical security understood as the organisational and technological
capacity of a given state to protect its territorial integrity against the
physical threats posed by other states. The normative justification for this
conception of security rests on the conflation of the interests of state and
nation (Reis 2004). A hostile armed force is said to threaten not just the
integrity of the state but the well-being of its people, the nation’s values
and institutions, indeed its sense of identity. Not unlike its forerunners, the
Modern sovereign state has relied on the use and threat of force to protect
its strategic interests, but with the important difference that it has consis-
tently presented itself as the exclusive protector of the nation’s interests
and as exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
It is precisely around these two interrelated claims that the Modern
state has fashioned the discourse of ‘national security’ and shaped the
policies and institutional infrastructure that give content and meaning to
that discourse (Paul and Risman 2004). The military or material dimen-
sions of security have become paramount. Yet the function of military
force remains ambiguous. In waging and preparing for war, the state may
well be endangering not just the security of other states but the security
of its own citizens. Engaging in – or preparing for – war may involve
economic pain, social disruption, psychological trauma, and even injury
and death for many citizens. The use of force against the state’s internal
enemies carries the same contradictory implications. Simply put, the state’s
security policies may well be both cause and effect of a generalised sense of
insecurity (Hoppe 2003). There is, then, much to be said for conceptua-
lising security primarily as a state of mind rather than a physical condition.
Ultimately, all steps taken to preserve the security of states and peoples,
even when they involve the actual or threatened use of force, are legitimised
by reference to any number of perceived threats, be they real or imaginary.
The subjective experience of insecurity, whether on the part of rulers or
ruled, lies at the core of the security problématique.
In what sense, then, may we speak of the globalisation of insecurity?
Here we have in mind the ways in which the sources, actual experience
and consequences of insecurity have assumed global dimensions. Many of
the threats to security are physically global in that they have global reach,
whether by virtue of the destructiveness of weapon systems (e.g. nuclear
arsenals), the ubiquity of the threat (e.g. climate change), or the speed with
which the threat is propagated (e.g. the AIDS pandemic). But the sense of
insecurity is globalised psychologically as well as physically (Moghaddam
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 25

2010; Mittelman 2010), in part by virtue of the near instantaneous speed

with which information and images are transmitted across borders. The
shrinking of time and space makes possible a near universal consciousness of
the scale and interconnectedness of the multiple threats to security (Camilleri
and Falk 1992, 221–225). Objective and subjective conditions thus combine
to produce new threats to security, of which unregulated cross-border popu-
lation movements are perhaps the single most dramatic example.
A range of mechanisms facilitate a web of geographical, functional,
and institutional interconnections, the most obvious of which is the inter-
nationalisation of conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). Wartime
alliances and imperial connections played a key role in extending the two
world wars beyond the locus of their initial European protagonists. In the
post-1945 period, ideological and strategic bipolarity – that is, the forma-
tion of highly integrated peacetime alliances by the United States and
the Soviet Union, initially in Europe and subsequently in the Middle
East and the Asia-Pacific region – ensured the global reach of the Cold
War. The strategy of extended nuclear deterrence, whereby each super-
power deployed nuclear weapons outside its borders and threatened a
nuclear response should its allies come under attack by the opposing
superpower, had the same effect. Paradoxically, the demise of the Cold
War appears to have strengthened and even accelerated the transnationa-
lisation of perceived threats. Ideology may be a less prominent factor in
the internationalisation of conflict, but is far from absent. In what some
assumed to be a unipolar moment, the United States sought with varying
degrees of assertiveness to advance its interests and justify its policies under
the banner of spreading democracy and free markets, objectives which are
not devoid of ideological content. At the same time, religion and culture
have generally become highly visible signposts of emerging geopolitical
fault lines, as evidenced by the Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’
paradigm and the heightened tensions ‘between Islam and the West’.
A second trend, less institutionalised but still gathering momentum, has
been the emergence of armed non-state entities, including ethnic militias,
paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religiously inspired organisations, private
military contractors, criminal syndicates, and terrorist groups (Davis 2009;
Schneckener 2007). Two aspects of this trend are worth noting: the ability
of these entities to operate across state boundaries, and the speed with
which they can move and adapt to different terrains and jurisdictions. Over
time, this trend threatens to delegitimise the state’s purported monopoly
on the use of violence.
26 J. CAMILLERI

The third mechanism pointing to the decline of state-centric percep-

tions of insecurity is the continual reconfiguration of political space. The
system of sovereign states was meant to usher in a period of relatively
stable boundaries within which each state could exercise its authority,
confident in the knowledge that its sovereignty would be respected by
other sovereign states. This has not been the case. The conclusion of the
First World War paved the way for the comprehensive redrawing of the
political map of Europe. So did the conclusion of the Second World War
and the end of the Cold War (Anderson and Bort 1998). The dissolution
of the European empires had the same effect outside Europe. A large
number of new, supposedly independent states were created, many of
which have been vulnerable to powerful fissiparous tendencies – hence,
the long list of collapsed, failed, or failing states (e.g. Sudan, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Congo, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria).
Put simply, these distinct but mutually reinforcing mechanisms have
meant not just declining national control over physical space, but increas-
ing interpenetration of the national and international domains (Albert and
Brock 1996). Agency has come to be exercised by old entities (states)
within shifting boundaries and in new ways (e.g. cyber warfare) as well as
by new entities (subnational and transnational) in ways both old and new.
The ambiguous and often contradictory conceptions of physical and social
space vying for legitimacy and efficacy have become integral to the globa-
lisation of insecurity.

INADEQUACY OF GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

A globalised dynamic now feeds and amplifies a deep sense of generalised
insecurity that far exceeds the problem solving capabilities of existing
institutions. The single most important actor with responsibilities in the
field of security remains the sovereign national state. However, as we have
seen, its sovereignty has been steadily eroding, in practice if not in name,
as its borders have become increasingly porous. The critical factor here has
been the heightened scale, speed, and intensity of cross border flows –
flows of goods and services, technology, money, arms, pathogens, green-
house gases, people, images, and information (Camilleri and Falk 2009).
The state-centric security paradigm, with its emphasis on the paramount
authority of the state to provide protection against threats and the role of
national security forces to counter such threats, is proving ill-equipped to
address the insecurities associated with these flows.
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 27

Simply put, if what is to be protected is first and foremost the state,

and the state is to exercise sole responsibility for the protection of its
interests, then it is difficult to see how the system of states can address
the globalisation of insecurity. Most governments, it is true, have come to
accept the proposition that national security policies must somehow accom-
modate notions of regional and global security (Axworthy 2001). Some
governments even concede that a globalising world has acquired character-
istics which do not sit comfortably with the assumptions and prescriptions
of the ‘national security’ paradigm. They acknowledge that contemporary
vulnerabilities, often transnational in origin and reach, do not necessarily
involve physical violence, and even where, as in the case of terrorism, force is
used or threatened, a military response may well prove counterproductive.
The limitations of state-centric approaches to security have led states
to entertain a wide range of multilateral arrangements, of which the
UN system remains by far the most important. Since the adoption of the
UN Charter in 1945 states have given birth to a plethora of treaties, con-
ventions and institutions that now form an integral part of the international
security landscape. Yet this modified response to the security dilemma,
though it represents a significant advance, has not yielded the anticipated
results (Newman 2007). The discursive and institutional innovations of
the last several decades have yet to produce a consensual and coherent
inter-governmental assessment of the challenges posed by the globalisation
of insecurity, much less adoption of an integrated policy framework.
The ensuing international security system is therefore the casualty of a
serious governance deficit. A brief look at some of the more troubling
threats to security should give us a clearer sense of the scale, structure, and
implications of this deficit. With this in mind I propose to consider three
security threats pertaining to military power: the use or threatened use of
nuclear weapons, terrorism, and great power military intervention; and
two non-traditional threats: climate change and population displacement.
Each phenomenon offers a unique window on the dynamics of insecurity.
Taken together they make possible a more systematic understanding of the
governance deficit, and of the avenues that may lead to a better integrated
and more effective response.
Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapon states
have made little progress towards nuclear disarmament. The world’s com-
bined stockpile presently consists of 15,700 nuclear warheads, of which
4,100 are thought to be operational, while some 1,800 US and Russian
warheads are on high alert. More importantly, nuclear weapon states
28 J. CAMILLERI

continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals and appear disinclined to

engage in meaningful negotiations. The UN Security Council, notwith-
standing the well intentioned declarations of the 2009 summit-level
meeting chaired by the United States, has remained inactive on the
issue. The UN General Assembly First Committee has been largely stale-
mated, while the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs has
been entirely peripheral. For its part, the 65-nation Conference on
Disarmament (CD) has not negotiated a single disarmament agreement
since the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in
1996, and has not even managed to agree on the adoption of a programme
of work. An informal working group has been no more successful in finding
a consensus on any of the CD’s four core issues: nuclear disarmament, a
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), the prevention of an arms race in outer
space, and negative security assurances. The five-yearly NPT Review
Conferences have fared little better (Johnson 2010). After prolonged and
at times acrimonious consultations, the 2015 Conference could not resolve
differences over the pace and modalities of nuclear disarmament or on the
process for convening a conference to establish a zone free of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East (Meier 2015). Clearly, there is
no dearth of multilateral avenues through which disarmament negotiations
can be pursued. What is lacking is the capacity of key players (states) to make
effective use of the existing multilateral framework. Yet, multilateralism
does sometimes work. A promising recent initiative has been the ‘humani-
tarian pledge’ which emerged at the December 2014 Conference held in
Vienna following two previous conferences held in Norway (2013) and
Mexico (2014). In October 2016, the First committee of the UN General
Assembly adopted a landmark resolution to negotiate a “legally binding
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimina-
tion”. The resolution was supported by 123 states with 38 states against
(including all five major nuclear-weapon states and Israel) and 16 abstaining.
The initiative is indicative of the potential of multistakeholder approaches
but also of the bottlenecks which often mar multilateral initiatives.
Though international terrorism found its most dramatic expression in
the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, the phe-
nomenon is neither new nor limited to Islamist violence directed against
Western targets (Camilleri 2008). Similarly, the international response has
been in the making for some considerable time. Between 1963 and 2000
twelve international legal instruments to prevent terrorist acts were devel-
oped under the auspices of the United Nations, its specialised agencies and
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 29

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 9/11 terrorist

attacks followed by the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 impelled
the UN system to further action. In September 2006, the UN General
Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy in line with the five basic pillars identified by the UN Secretary-
General’s report: dissuading groups from resorting to terrorism; denying
terrorists the means to carry out an attack; deterring states from support-
ing terrorist groups; developing state capacity to prevent terrorism; and
defending human rights in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism.
The strategy has since been the subject of General Assembly biennial
reviews. For its part, the Security Council has passed numerous resolutions
and set up a number of committees and working groups, while the
Secretary-General established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation
Task Force in July 2005, and has since issued a number of progress reports.
UN activism has nonetheless failed to produce the intended results.
Since September 2001 terrorist activity has drastically, with the number of
deaths from terrorism rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). Two factors largely account
for this disappointing outcome. The first is the failure of the UN system to
conduct a probing inquiry into the nature of transnational terrorism and
the psychological, social, political, and economic conditions which pro-
vide it with the necessary fertile ground. In the absence of anything
approaching thorough diagnosis efficacious remedies have been few and
far between. The second and closely related factor is that multilateral
approaches have been effectively sidelined by the unilateralist actions of
states intent on using force to destroy the human and material infrastruc-
ture of terrorist organisations, notably those of Islamic provenance, and
inflicting exemplary punishment on those who harbour, finance, or, in any
way, support them. The ensuing ‘war on terror’, whether waged singly or
in hastily improvised coalitions, on home soil or in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Middle East, and other parts of Africa and Asia, has proven costly and
largely self-defeating. States that privilege the use of force and coercive
strategies – even against their own citizens – cannot easily prevail over
opponents that are transnational in structure and modus operandi, and feed
on the psychological, cultural, and religious discontents of modernity, its
dominant Western ethos and institutions.
Great power military intervention, pursued in response to civil conflicts
and humanitarian crises of varying scope and severity, has demonstrated
the diminishing utility of military force. Quite apart from the prolonged
30 J. CAMILLERI

and overwhelmingly counterproductive military expeditions the United

States has conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq (Isakhan 2015), military
operations conducted by the United States or its allies in Libya, Syria,
Chad, and Yemen, or by Russia in the Ukraine and Syria, have been
conducted at great human and financial cost and more often than not
have had a number of highly damaging blowback effects for the interven-
ing power (Kinzer 2012; Zenko 2014). In none of these cases can it
be said that the intervention helped pave the way for the resolution of
domestic or regional conflicts or for political stability and legitimate
governance. The UN’s adoption of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)
principle can be rightly regarded as a significant advance in the inter-
national community’s response to mass atrocity crimes. However, this
principle should not be confused with the unilateralist tendencies that
have characterised most great power interventions, including Libya. In
this case the United States, Britain, and France initially enjoyed the seem-
ing approval of the UN Security Council (Resolution 1973), which
authorised the international community to establish a no-fly zone and to
use all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians. It
soon emerged, however, that the introduction of ground forces had as one
of its key objectives regime change rather than the establishment of a
ceasefire as originally intended by the resolution (Kuperman 2013). In
this as in most other instances, the net effect of intervention has been to
heighten regional tensions and fuel great power rivalries, thereby fracturing
the consensus on which international action aimed at the social, political, or
economic reconstruction of crisis-torn societies ultimately depends.
Though the handling of transnational threats to security has developed
somewhat different modalities, a similar dynamic has been in evidence.
The international response to climate change – and the various phases or
thresholds it has traversed – is a case in point (Camilleri 2011). The first
threshold came with the 1988 Toronto Conference at which industrialised
countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent
by 2005. A decision was also taken to establish the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The second threshold came at the
1992 UN conference on Environment and Development with the signing
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change which came into
effect in March 1994. The third threshold followed in December 1997 with
the signing of the Kyoto Protocol which provided for an overall reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries over 2008–2012 by an
average of 5.2 per cent from 1990 levels. In less than ten years the
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 31

international community appeared to be making substantial headway, and

then the going got tough. It took another seven years for the Kyoto
Protocol to come into effect, and even then the United States, the world’s
then largest greenhouse gas emitter, refused to participate. Nearly five years
later the much anticipated Copenhagen Conference in December 2009
produced few tangible results. The only substantive outcome was an
unspecified commitment to limit the rise in global temperatures to 2°C
and a collective pledge by developed countries to provide developing
countries with additional funds ‘rising to $100 billion a year by 2020’.
Ironically, while international negotiations were seemingly paralysed
after the third threshold was reached in 1997, the scientific consensus on
climate change gathered pace. From 1988 the IPCC, acting as the world’s
pre-eminent voice on climate science, was able to present an increasingly
confident assessment of the extent and probability of climate change,
including estimates of the consequent surface warming and sea level rise,
which it attributed with increasing confidence to human activity. Whereas
its first assessment report in 1990 described the attribution of climate
change to human intervention as ‘likely’, the fourth report (2007)
described it as ‘very likely’, and the fifth report (2014) as ‘extremely likely’.
To explain the widening gap between science and politics, some commen-
tators pointed to the inadequacies of international diplomacy (Victor
2011), while others drew attention to the contradictory interests of devel-
oped and developing countries (Gogus 2014). Each interpretation had an
element of truth to it, but neither offered an adequate explanation of the
governance deficit. The inability of governments to develop a well regu-
lated international climate change regime had much to do with the
structure of their economies and of the world economy with which they
were closely integrated. Many transnational enterprises and national
economies had come to depend on highly energy intensive modes of
production and consumption. Corporations operating in strategic sectors
of the economy had massively invested in fossil fuel exploration and
exploitation, to which should be added not only refining and distribution
operations but also the practices of electricity utilities and manufacturing
industries closely tied to global electrification and to the transportation,
petrochemical and metal smelting industries. If account is also taken of the
financial and other professional networks as well as trade unions that had
come to depend on the carbon intensive sector, it is not hard to under-
stand why governments should have been reluctant to embark on a low
carbon course that risked the ire of these powerful interest groups, massive
32 J. CAMILLERI

job losses, large expenditures on new energy technologies and strategies,

electoral backlash, and in extremis political instability.
Eventually the inexorable impact of accumulating scientific evidence,
the increasingly loud voices of civil society – not least that of Pope Francis
in his highly influential encyclical Laudato Si’ – and the growing realisa-
tion of key industrial sectors that long-term profitability did not reside in
the carbon economy created the conditions for more fruitful international
negotiations. The COP21 Conference held in Paris in December 2015
was widely interpreted as producing the first meaningful agreement since
the signing of the Kyoto protocol. The Paris Agreement established the
general obligation for all parties to undertake ‘ambitious efforts’ to realise
the objective of holding temperature ‘well below’ 2°C, while also pursuing
efforts to stay below 1.5°C. It also established an obligation to make
‘financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas
emissions and climate resilient development’ (European Commission
2016). But considerable ambiguity remained as to how the mitigation
objective would be achieved in practice. The Agreement relied largely on
‘nationally determined contributions (NDCs)’ which were not legally
binding and whose content and the timeline for implementation were
not specified (Bodle et al. 2016; Averchenkova and Bassi 2016). It was
left to an interim negotiating group, the Ad-hoc Working Group on the
Paris Agreement, to provide further guidance on NDCs and to future
COP meetings to assess progress made and deal with other outstanding
issues. Simply put, the agreement had accepted the urgency of the pro-
blem and the need for ambitious responses on the part of states, but the
difficult questions of detailed quantification, transparency, and account-
ability were left unresolved. Paris had created new and much needed
momentum, but it remained to be seen whether the governance arrange-
ments set in train would prove equal to the task.
The governance deficit was not peculiar to climate change. It was
starkly articulated in the joint statement issued by UN Secretary General,
Ban Ki-moon and ICRC President Peter Maurer on 31 October 2015:

Every day, civilians – ordinary women, men and children – are being
deliberately or recklessly injured and killed, tortured and abducted. Every
hour, people in dire circumstances are being denied the medical care, food,
water and shelter they need to survive . . . International humanitarian law is
being flouted on a global scale. The international community is failing to
hold perpetrators to account.
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 33

The two organisations went on to stress that the failings of international

humanitarian law were themselves a symptom of a deeper ailment, the
failure to address the root causes of war and negotiate sustainable peace.
In much the same way, a closely related security challenge, displacement of
large populations, was both symptom and cause of a glaring governance
deficit (Betts 2013). Political turbulence in many regions of the world
associated with violent conflict, persecution, economic dislocation and
environmental breakdown – all manifestations of a failure of governance –
had vastly increased the number of people fleeing their homes. In 2013 the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported
that global forced displacement had exceeded 50 million for the first time
since the Second World War. Such large displacements which show no sign
of abating, have in turn brought destination countries under immense
pressure, as they struggle to welcome, assist, and process those seeking
asylum and to provide language training; employment;and access to educa-
tion, health, and other social services to those who have been granted
refugee status. The governance deficit is structural and multifaceted. It is
structural in the sense that both national and international institutions are
poorly equipped to tackle the symptoms, let alone the causes, of a complex
emergency for which their policies, not least military policies, may
be largely responsible. It is multifaceted in the sense that international
institutions (e.g. UNHCR) are lacking organisational and financial
resources, while national institutions – and in the case of Europe regional
institutions – are themselves struggling with a legitimacy deficit which
significantly curtails their ability to address the crisis. Poor lines of commu-
nication and coordination between different tiers of governance further
limit institutional capacity and make for a degraded system of burden-
sharing between countries.

NAVIGATING THE TURBULENT SEAS OF TRANSITION

What the preceding analysis makes clear is that the experience of risk and
uncertainty is now at the core of insecurity. In this new psychological
climate, military capability seems a less appropriate instrument for dealing
with any number of security threats. More generally, state-centric
approaches, even to physical security, are fast losing the relevance or
credibility they once enjoyed. Simply put, a rapidly changing security
landscape points to new ways of conceptualising both policy-making and
governance arrangements
34 J. CAMILLERI

At one end of the spectrum are the threats posed by climate change and
nuclear weapons, which are widely understood to carry planetary implica-
tions. These and related developments have prompted many in the scien-
tifically engaged community to posit the advent of the ‘Anthropocene’, a
term used to denote the present period in which many geologically
significant conditions and processes are said to be profoundly altered
by human activities (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Even if we managed
to avoid a major nuclear exchange or to limit the average global surface
temperature increase to 2°C – and there can be no certainty that we will
succeed in either endeavour – humans have as of now directly affected
some 83 per cent of the planet’s viable land surface. They have impacted
everything: from the makeup of ecosystems to the geochemistry of the
earth, from the atmosphere to the oceans.
At the other end of the spectrum are the many local but highly
destructive conflicts which have become a defining feature of the post-
Cold War landscape. These are conflicts which defy the traditional
characterisation of inter-state conflicts, that is to say, conflicts waged
between the armed forces of two or more sovereign authorities.
Invariably they are fought within supposedly sovereign jurisdictions, in
which the security apparatus of a given state is pitted against an assort-
ment of subnational and transnational organisations and networks, of
which ethnonationalist movements and terrorist groups are perhaps the
most striking instances.
Between these two ends of the spectrum is a multitude of other security
challenges spanning diverse spatial and social terrains, actors, and mod-
alities, all of which in different ways and to different degrees interact and
amplify the globalisation of insecurity. It follows that the response, to be at
all effective, must encompass diverse stakeholders and perspectives and so
pave the way for a whole-of-society and whole-of-governance approach.
To this end, the international community, acting primarily through the
agency of states, has built over time an elaborate multilateral legal and
institutional framework designed to provide opportunities for the plurality
of views and interests, at least as articulated by states, to be considered, and
for a degree of policy coherence to emerge. Underpinning this framework
has been a body of normative precepts which have gained wide acceptance,
including the commitment to peace as a primary norm of international
law and such notions as peacekeeping and peace-building, universal
human rights, international citizenship, sustainable development, and
most recently the ‘responsibility to protect’. Though impressive,
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 35

normative and institutional innovation has nevertheless suffered from a

number of conceptual and operational shortcomings (Alvarez 2000).
A recurring difficulty has been the failure to internalise and operatio-
nalise the understanding that old and new security threats are closely
interrelated, and that this interrelationship increasingly assumes a transna-
tional character. Crucial here is the relationship between physical violence
and social violence as reflected in any number of cultural, social, economic,
or environmental disorders. Armed hostilities can accentuate or even
provoke such disorders but more often than not they are the symptom
rather than the cause. A well-integrated security policy framework must
therefore address underlying socio-economic and environmental ailments.
It must combine peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking and
post-conflict reconstruction measures with conflict prevention and conflict
transformation strategies.
Nowhere is the imperative for a holistic approach to security govern-
ance more compelling than in those states that have been variously
described as ‘crisis’, ‘fragile’, or ‘failed’ states (Brooks 2005), categories
that apply to many states in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and parts of
Latin America, but also describe a surprisingly large number of European
states. Indeed, it can be said that fragility and crisis are to varying degrees
characteristic of all states, including well established polities and developed
economies. France at the height of the Algerian War in the 1950s and
more recently in the wake of several terrorist attacks, the United States
during the Vietnam War and again in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,
and Greece during the debt crisis beginning in 2010 are striking instances
of the phenomenon.
A second difficulty has been the tendency of international intervention
to deal with crisis or fragility by privileging Western concepts of govern-
ance which accord priority to building the legal and security infrastructure
of the state and the introduction of neoliberal market principles. This has
usually meant inadequate attention to tribal, ethnic, and religious identi-
ties and loyalties or to social and economic disparities. As a consequence,
attempts to build or rebuild a state’s security apparatus or financial archi-
tecture have often proven a double-edged sword, accentuating existing
divisions and generating new ones.
For international intervention in crisis situations to be at all effective
and for the system of governance not to collapse under the weight
of ill-conceived or unattainable objectives, interventionist strategies
should be pursued sparingly, and only with explicit UN authorisation
36 J. CAMILLERI

(Mertus 1999). When they are pursued, the institutional infrastructure

should be programmed to generate detailed knowledge of and engage
with civil society. The aim should be to reconcile communities with
divergent histories, interests, and grievances, and to integrate different
policy domains. The normative, legal, and institutional architecture
should, wherever possible, give expression to culturally grounded concepts
of conflict resolution and peace-building (Scholte 2011). Humanitarian
assistance and post-conflict reconstruction efforts should as far as possible
dovetail with local needs and aspirations rather than donor-based notions
of conditionality. Institutional mechanisms should be periodically reviewed
to monitor their alignment with these requirements.
The kind of integrated policy response proposed here by definition
requires a whole-of-governance and a whole-of-society framework within
which the national state retains a central role, but one that rests on notions
of inclusion rather than exclusion (Wood and Shearing 2013). Instead of
arrogating to itself exclusive authority over all functions pertaining to
security, the state sees itself as a catalyst for collective action engaging all
tiers of governance and the wider community.
A whole-of-governance approach begins with the state putting its own
house in order. This means sustaining a political environment conducive
to collaborative interaction between the executive, legislative, and judicial
arms of national government. Within the executive it calls for civilian rule
and effective coordination between ministries, departments, and other
public bodies entrusted with security related responsibilities – not just
those covering foreign affairs, defence, and homeland security, but also
justice, health, environment, and immigration to name a few. Secondly, a
whole-of-governance response to insecurity is premised on the idea that
the national, provincial, and municipal tiers of government have devel-
oped appropriate mechanisms for collaboration in both policy formulation
and policy implementation. The two lower tiers of government have much
to contribute given that they often have primary carriage of functions that
bear directly upon security, including health, education, environment and
public safety. Thirdly, national governments must be conceptually and
operationally attuned to the exigencies of regional and global multilater-
alism. Quite apart from devoting more organisational and financial
resources to multilateral initiatives and more diligently complying with
their obligations under international treaties, conventions, and covenants,
national governments can greatly facilitate the input of provincial and local
governments into regional and global policy-making. Local and provincial
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 37

government representatives can take part in international negotiations as

members of or advisers to national negotiating teams. Alternatively they
can convene their own international forums in tandem with formal
multilateral conferences, as in the case of the climate change summits
of recent years.
When it comes to promoting a whole-of-society approach to security,
the role of the state is no less important. The key here is to encourage and
assist the widest possible cross-section of society to engage in public
advocacy and public debate on a range of security-related questions. The
function of national government is to provide the resources, develop the
competencies, and create the forums that make for informed and coherent
engagement. Research centres, institutes and think tanks and the many
non-governmental organisations working around issues of development,
human rights, disarmament and environment have no doubt much
to contribute. But so do other constituencies, in particular the legal,
health, information and communications sectors as well as the ethnic
and religious communities whose interests and insights bear directly on
foreign and security policy. In societies with rising levels of ethnic,
religious, and cultural diversity, migrant communities have first-hand
experience and knowledge of the security landscape in some of the most
troubled regions of the world. It is also the case that most advanced
societies and a good many developing societies are producing large and
growing numbers of graduates who have completed programs in interna-
tional relations, international law, security, development, health, human
rights, and related fields of study. Many of these are pursuing professional
careers in non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations and
have as a result acquired considerable expertise and contacts in a wide
range of security related fields.
A whole-of-society response to contemporary insecurities offers two
distinct benefits. First, it enables a great many constituencies to give
expression to their experience of insecurity. In other words, it provides a
safety-valve mechanism which allows groups and individuals to ‘let off
steam’ as it were, and so can be said to perform a latent tension-reducing
function. Secondly, and more importantly, it expands the pool of knowl-
edge and insights that decision-makers can call upon when addressing the
contemporary security agenda, whether in relation to energy security and
climate change, ‘border protection’ and the treatment of refugees and
asylum seekers, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights abuses,
or inter-ethnic tensions. Simply put, a whole-of-society approach can
38 J. CAMILLERI

help create a political environment conducive to a more reflective and

sustainable security dialogue.
The kind of public engagement envisaged here, it must be said, will not
easily come to pass. A number of vested interests can be expected to
oppose such a development. The security establishment in most countries
is likely to view such engagement with disfavour either because it is
thought to lack the necessary knowledge or expertise, or because it
fears that its priorities and preferred methods of work will be subjected
to greater outside scrutiny. For such an approach to have any chance of
success it will need to be nurtured by a far more affirmative and inter-
nationalist approach to citizenship education than has hitherto been the
case in most societies. The complex set of problems encapsulated by the
globalisation of insecurity is for the most part poorly developed or alto-
gether absent from primary and secondary school curricula, and receives at
best token treatment in higher education institutions. Insofar as security
issues are broached at all, it is more often than not from the counter-
productive perspectives of ethnocentrism, glib patriotism, or unthinking
acceptance of conventional wisdom. If the promise of a new pedagogy is
to be realised then a concerted collaborative effort will be needed on the
part of civil servants, legislators, educators, and their professional associa-
tions, school boards and university managers. The process itself would be
indicative of a whole-of-society contribution to a new security discourse
and architecture.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert, M., & Brock, L. (1996). Debordering the world of states: New spaces in
international relations. New Political Science, 18(1), 69–106.
Alvarez, J. E. (2000). Multilateralism and its discontents. European Journal of
International Law, 11(2), 393–411.
Anderson, M., & Bort, E. (Eds). (1998). The frontiers of Europe. London: Pinter.
Averchenkova, A., & Bassi, S. (2016), ‘Beyond the targets: Assessing the political
credibility of pledges for the Paris’, Policy Brief, The Centre for Climate
Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment, February 2016.
Axworthy, L. (2001). Human security and global governance: Putting people first.
Global Governance, 7, 19–23.
Betts, A. (2013). Survival migration: Failed governance and the crisis of displace-
ment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 39

Bodle, R., Donat, L., & Duwe, M. (2016), ‘ The Paris Agreement: Analysis,
assessment and outlook’, Background paper for the workshop ‘Beyond
COP21: what does Paris mean for future climate policy?’, Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conserva-tion, Building and Nuclear Safety
(BMUB), Berlin, 28 January 2016.
Braudel, F. (1993). A history of civilizations. Trans: Richard Mayne. New York:
Penguin Books.
Brooks, R. E. (2005). Failed states, or the state as failure? The University of Chicago
Law Review, 72(4), 1159–1196.
Camilleri, J. (2008). The “war on terror”: Reassessing rationale and efficacy. In
Hans Köchler (Ed.), The ‘global war on terror’ and the question of world order,
Studies in International Relations XXX (pp. 58–84). Vienna: International
Progress Organisation.
Camilleri, J. (2011). Energy governance in the era of climate change. In L. Anceschi
& J. Symons (Eds.), Energy security in the era of climate change – The Asia-pacific
experience (pp. 255–274). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Camilleri, J., & Falk, J. (1992). The end of sovereignty? The politics of a shrinking
and fragmenting world. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Camilleri, J., & Falk, J. (2009). Worlds in transition: Evolving governance across a
stressed planet. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Crutzen, P. J., & Stoermer, E. F. (2000), The anthopocene, IGBP Newsletter
41:17–18.
Davis, D. E. (2009). “Non-state armed actors, new imagined communities, and
shifting patterns of sovereignty and insecurity in the modern.
World.”Contemporary Security Policy, 30(2), 221–245.
European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: The road from Paris: Assessing the
implications of the Paris Agreement, Brussels, 2 March 2016.
Geiss, I. (1983). War and empire in the twentieth century. Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press.
Gogus, S. S. (2014), Understanding Impasse in Climate Change Negotiations:
The North-South Conflict and Beyond. [Available at: http://climate-
exchange.org/2014/02/06/understanding-impasse-in-climate-change-nego
tiations-the-north-south-conflict-and-beyond. Accessed 3 December 2015.
Greenpeace International (2011), Who’s holding us back – How carbon-intensive
industry is preventing effective climate change legislation. Accessed at http://
www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/Whos-holding-
us-back/, 24 November 2013.
Habsburg, O. (1958). The social order of tomorrow: State and society in the atomic
age. Trans: Ivo Jarosy. London: Wolff.
Harbom, L., & Wallensteen, P. (2005). Armed conflict and its international
dimensions, 1946–2004. Journal of Peace Research, 42(5), 623–635.
40 J. CAMILLERI

Hoppe, H. (2003). Introduction. In H.-H. Hoppe (ed.), The myth of national

defense: Essays on the theory and history of security production. Auburn: Ludwig
von Mises Institute.
Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), Global Terrorism Index 2015,
Isakhan, B. (Ed.) (2015). The legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 war to the ‘Islamic
State’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, R. (2010). Rethinking the NPT’s role in security: 2010 and beyond.
International Affairs, 86(2), 429–445.
Kinzer, S. (2012). Libya and the limits of intervention. Current History, 111(748),
305–309.
Kuperman, A. (2013). A model humanitarian intervention? Reassessing NATO’s
Libya campaign. International Security, 38(1), 105–136.
Meier, O. (2015), “The 2015 NPT Review Conference Failure Implications for
the Nuclear Order”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Working Paper FG03-WP No 04, Berlin.
Mertus, J. (1999). Reconsidering the legality of humanitarian intervention:
Lessons from Kosovo. William & Mary Law. Review, 41(5), 1743–1787.
Mittelman, J. (2010). Hyperconflict: Globalization and insecurity. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2010). The new global insecurity: How terrorism, environ-
mental collapse, economic inequalities, and resource shortages are changing our
world. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
Newman, E. (2007). A crisis of global institutions? Multilateralism and interna-
tional security (pp. 10–29). London: Routledge.
Ortega Y Gasset, J. (1932). The revolt of the masses. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Paul, T. V., & Risman, N. M. (2004). Under pressure? Globalisation and the
national security state. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 33(2),
355–380.
Reis, E. P. (2004). The lasting marriage between nation and state despite globa-
lization. International Political Science Review, 25(3), 251–257.
Robinson, W. I. (1996). Globalization, the world system, and ‘democracy promo-
tion’ in US Foreign policy. Theory and Society, 25(5), 615–665.
Schneckener, U. (2007), “Armed non-state actors and the monopoly of force”, in
Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force, Policy Paper
24: 10–19.
Scholte, J. A. (2011). Towards greater legitimacy in global governance. Review of
International Political Economy, 18(1), 110–120.
Spengler, O. (1926–1928). The Decline of the West, authorised translation with
notes by Charles Francis Atkinson. London: G. Allen & Unwin.
 2 INSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 41

Union of Concerned Scientists. (2012). A climate of corporate control – How

corporations have influenced the U.S. dialogue on climate science and policy.
Accessed at http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/a-
climate-of-corporate-control.html, 12 December 2013.
Victor, D. G. (2011). Global warming gridlock: Creating more effective strategies
for protecting the planet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Von Hlatky, S., & Wenger, A. (Eds). (2015). The future of extended deterrence:
The United States, NATO, and beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University press.
Wallerstein, I. (1984). The politics of the world economy: The states, the movements
and the civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gusterson, H., & Duvall, R. (Eds.) (1999). Cultures
of insecurity: States, communities and the production of danger. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Wood, J., & Shearing, C. (2013). Imagining security. London: Routledge.
Zenko, M. (2014), “The slippery slope of US intervention”, Foreign Policy, 11

Joseph Camilleri is Emeritus Professor at La Trobe University, Melbourne,

Australia; a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences; and founding
Director of the Centre for Dialogue at La Trobe University. Recent works include
coeditor Culture, Religion and Conflict in Muslim Southeast Asia (Routledge,
2013) and Religion and Ethics in a Globalizing World (Palgrave MacMillan,
2011). He coauthored Worlds in Transition: Evolving Governance Across a Stressed
Planet (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), and is the author of Regionalism in the
New Asia Pacific Order (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003), and States, Markets and
Civil Society in Asia Pacific (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000).
 CHAPTER 3

Global Violence and Security

from a Gendered Perspective

Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag

More than 15 years since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution

1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), considerable
challenges and gaps remain in implementing the resolution’s core pillars on
prevention, protection, participation, and peace-building and recovery (UN
Women 2015). The UN-commissioned global review of UNSCR 1325
underscores the staggering exclusion of women from peace processes in the
face of statistical data suggesting that their presence as witnesses, signatories,
mediators, and/or negotiators makes it 20 per cent more likely that a peace
agreement will last at least two years and 35 per cent more likely it will last
15 years (UN Women 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). However, between
1990 and 2011 across 31 peace processes that the UN was involved in, and
women represented just 2 per cent of chief mediators, 4 per cent of witnesses
and signatories, and 9 per cent of negotiators (UN Women 2015, p. 45; see
also Davies and True 2015a, b). That the WPS agenda remains to be fully
realised points to the systemic challenges it raises for how we understand

J. True (*)
School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: jacqui.true@monash.edu
M. Tanyag
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: maria.tanyag@monash.edu

© The Author(s) 2017 43

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_3
44 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

global violence and insecurity. It is a major paradox that as gender has

become more de rigeur in international peace and security policy-making
it is been less able to challenge unequal political and economic power
structures such as men’s dominance of peace negotiations and pervasive
militarisation leading to militarised responses to conflict and insecurity.
Applying a feminist political economy framework to the WPS agenda
brings back the fundamental focus on social and economic justice, dis-
armament and comprehensive security that catalysed the transnational
movement that pushed for UNSCR 1325 two decades ago.
Studies have shown that women’s inclusion in peace and transition
processes also translates to more responsive conflict prevention (see
Paffenholz et al. 2016; O’Reilly et al. 2015; Arnado 2012; Pruitt 2013).
Increasing platforms for women in all stages matters ‘because they repre-
sent at least half of the population, and their participation and progress is
essential to achieve peace and security from the community to the inter-
national level’ (Davies and True 2015a). However, rather than mere
inclusion in decision-making, substantive peace and security especially
for women and girls is contingent on restructuring gendered inequalities
that go beyond crisis situations such as armed conflicts and environmental
disasters but are also rooted in everyday political economy. Indeed, echo-
ing recommendations for advancing the WPS agenda more productively,
this requires concerted efforts that cut across different dimensions to peace
and security such as by strengthening the integrated implementation of
WPS alongside the sustainable development goals and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) (Shepherd 2014; UN Women 2015). Finally, it poses us to
rethink what global violence and security mean and their implications for
how we view governance challenges in the twenty-first century.
In this chapter, we reconceptualise global violence and insecurity
through a feminist political economy framework. First, we begin by pro-
viding an overview of the key implications of feminist international rela-
tions scholarship for rethinking global violence, peace, and security by
drawing attention to the continuum of violence. Feminist theorising
challenges mainstream approaches to security and violence, which artifi-
cially severs the connections between public and private spheres, produc-
tive and reproductive activities, and war with peace. Second, we then
outline the components of feminist political economy analysis which we
argue provides the analytical tools for understanding the underlying
unequal political and economic power relations within processes of
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 45

globalisation that disproportionately undermine the security and freedom

of women and girls as well as individuals and communities more generally.
Third, to illustrate this framework we identify issues of global gendered
violence and insecurities in the context of the deepening ‘siloed’ treatment
between the political-military and the socio-economic pillars in interna-
tional security agendas. We thus, critique current modes of gender main-
streaming for substantively achieving women’s rights to protection and
participation. We conclude by emphasising fundamental change in global
security governance that involves transforming the underlying structures
of political, social, and economic inequality rather than prescribing more
‘good governance’, and ‘gender mainstreaming’ grafted onto security and
humanitarian interventions.

‘VIOLENCE AS ACONTINUUM’: FEMINIST THEORISING

ON GENDER, PEACE, AND SECURITY
Feminist political economy analysis of global violence and insecurity builds
on feminist contributions to international relations (IR) and international
political economy (IPE). Feminist theorising in these disciplines inform a
rethinking of global violence as occurring in a continuum. Using the
concept of violence as a continuum enables us to render visible first, the
connections between physical insecurity and structural and symbolic forms
of violence (Galtung 1969). Structural violence was theorised by the peace
researcher, Johan Galtung as built into the social structure, emerging as
unequal power and unequal life chances: ‘Structural violence is silent, it
does not show – it is essentially static, it is tranquil waters’ (p. 173).
Second, violence in its many forms can manifest as perpetrated upon an
individual body, in the home, against minority communities and by states.
Third and crucially, violence as a continuum underscores that violence in
war and conflict contexts is structurally connected to violence, discrimina-
tion, and marginalisation in apparently peaceful contexts (True 2012).
IR feminists have shown that traditionally predominant understandings
of war, peace and security have been exclusively drawn from a male
perspective and as such reward masculine traits and activities. Moreover,
this male and masculine bias serves the interests of men more than women.
By ignoring gender, mainstream IR obscures particular sets of hierarchical
relationships that underpin and are reproduced by global policy-making.
The corresponding definitions of peace and security are thus inadequate in
46 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

encompassing women’s experiences of violence. By contrast, feminist

theorising and empirical research emphasise that women’s lives offer
unique standpoints for understanding war and militarism as well as peace
and security (Cockburn 2004, 2010; Tickner 1992; Enloe 1989).
Women’s standpoints or ‘situated knowledges’ inform us that concepts
such as violence, peace, and security are multidimensional (Haraway 1988;
Cockburn 2010). This is clearly seen, for example, in the targeting of
gender and ethnic minorities for sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV) in conflict. Citing the case of conflict-related SGBV against
Colombian women, especially Afro-Colombian and indigenous women
and girls, Sara Davies and Jacqui True (2015b) demonstrate the com-
pounded violence these women experience as minority women margin-
alised from state structures of protection prior to and after armed conflicts.
At the same time, their experience points to the symbolic violence of the
Columbian state against them as they embody minority ethnic group
identity.
The privileging of masculinist norms foster a gendered division of
public/private spheres, of production/reproduction activities, and of
war/peace. Feminist scholars argue that women’s experiences of insecurity
do not end with the absence of war, but continues on even after conflicts
have ceased as they disproportionately deal with the indirect consequences
of war such as poverty and violence in their households (Tickner 1992;
True 2012). Hence, these boundaries are in fact permeable and interre-
lated. For example, studies have shown that internally displaced and
refugee women and girls residing in camps experience heightened vulner-
ability to SGBV in the performance of their caregiving and familial obliga-
tions (The Brookings-LSE Project 2014; True 2012). Women and girls,
whether by risking themselves to sexual violence in order to collect water
or engaging in sex work in exchange for relief goods and protection,
commit self-sacrifice which is justified by culturally informed set of gen-
dered expectations. This theme of female altruism, however, is increasingly
defining women’s and girls’ lives even outside of armed conflicts as a result
of neoliberal economic policies that heavily rely on women’s social repro-
ductive labour while keeping this labour economically devalued by the
state (see Molyneux 2007; Chant 2010; Rai et al. 2014).
Similarly, the intensification of transnational movements of migrant
women to take up employment as domestic workers – a process driven
in many contexts by structural violence in home countries – exposes
women to other forms of SGBV in the hands of employers and states in
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 47

receiving countries (Elias 2013; Elias and Rai 2015). But as many studies
document, the decision to seek employment overseas is strongly influ-
enced by gendered expectations that these women need to fulfil so as to
ensure that their families survive economically (see, for example, Parreñas
2003; Yeates 2009). And yet, hegemonic norms on masculinities particu-
larly ideals of men as protectors and breadwinners underpin men’s and
boy’s experiences of violence and insecurity too. For instance, the male
breadwinner stereotype is rendered fragile through neoliberal restructuring
processes, and in crisis contexts in many states. Economic changes may
mean that ‘men may be unable to find alternative employment to provide
incomes that fulfill their visions of themselves as breadwinners. They may
react violently against women and children in the home and in public
spaces, compensating for the loss of economic control’ (True 2012, p. 41).
Finally, feminist reconceptualisation of the continuum of violence from
the standpoint of women reveals the workings of patriarchal structures
that engender insecurities from the household to international politics
(Enloe 1989, 2000; True 2012). Cynthia Cockburn (2010, p. 140)
argues that

[P]atriarchal gender relations predispose our societies to war. They are a

driving force perpetuating war. They are among the causes of war. This is
not, of course, to say that gender is the only dimension of power implicated
in war. It is not to diminish the commonly understood importance of
economic factors (particularly an ever-expansive capitalism) and antagon-
isms between ethnic communities, states and blocs (particularly the institu-
tion of the nation-state) as causes of war.

Interrogating patriarchy involves rendering visible ‘how and why mascu-

linity is privileged – and how much of that privileging depends on con-
trolling women or drawing them into complicity’ (Enloe 2004, p. 7).
However, the global attention to sexual violence through the WPS
agenda, as an example, tends to isolate sexual violence within conflict
and crisis settings and therefore fail to grasp security as a multidimensional
concept that encompasses various threats to human life (True 2016).
Furthermore, this disproportionate focus on securitised settings directs
attention away from the broader political economy context where struc-
tural gendered inequalities between men and women are reinforced (True
2013a, 2015a). Neglecting women’s contributions in the informal econ-
omy prior to and after conflict, or issues of economic exploitation created
48 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

by international peace operations represents a major setback for establish-

ing long-term recovery and sustainable peace.

FEMINIST POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL

GENDERED VIOLENCE AND INSECURITIES
In this section we outline the components to a feminist political economy
framework that can be employed to understand the underlying unequal
political and economic power relations that both generate and exacerbate
global gendered violence and insecurities. Feminist political economy
specifically reconceptualises violence as a form of power that has ‘a material
basis, often founded on material relations of inequality within and across
societies and cultures’ and thus not just its consequence (True 2012,
p. 30). That is, ‘power operates not only through direct coercion but
also through the structured relations of production and reproduction that
govern the distribution of resources, benefits, privileges and authority’
(True 2012). Unequal structures and processes of political economy are
increasingly globalised and encompassing all aspects of everyday life from
health and well-being to political and economic decision-making.
Consequently, gendered inequalities between men and women must be
part of the same global frameworks for bringing about lasting peace and
security.
The first component in the analysis begins with the gendered division of
labour within the family and household economy. Across various historical
and geographical contexts, women through culture and biology are
expected to be primary caregivers. Feminist political economy framework
draws the connections between violence and insecurity, and women’s
social reproductive labour or the range of unpaid domestic and affective
labour at the household. This is done ‘by showing how macro level non-
recognition of socially reproductive work is intimately connected to every-
day depletion of individuals, households, and communities’ (Elias and Rai
2015, p. 427). According to Catherine Hoskyns and Shirin Rai (2007),
‘the fact that unpaid service work in the home is seen to be outside the
production boundary is particularly important, since this renders it invi-
sible and severs the link between domestic labour and other economic
processes’ (301). And yet, the continued exclusion of social reproduction
and unpaid domestic work in particular has been due to the structural
constraints in economic institutions as well as economics as a discipline
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 49

which allow labour to be only valued in certain respects and not others
(Hoskyns and Rai 2007, p. 315).
The devaluing of social reproduction also casts women as not consti-
tuting ‘real’ workers which places them in precarious employment as
‘cheap labour’ in the global economy. Women especially factory and
domestic workers have been among the most vulnerable to violence and
exploitation (Elias 2013; Parreñas 2003; Yeates 2009). Similarly, occupa-
tions associated with social reproduction are either not considered ‘work’
or looked down upon because it is represented as not requiring skills or
‘technical’ knowledge (Safri and Graham 2010; Barber 2011; Chin 1998).
Such devalued conditions, which feminist political economy analysis
reveals, gradually harm the health and well-being of women including
the households and communities which depend on their labour. The
human costs are exacerbated under situations of crisis but are nevertheless
engendered in everyday life (Elias and Rai 2015).
The second component relates to unpacking the causal role of the
contemporary global political economy – particularly neoliberal political
economic state transformations – in engendering violence. This involves
critically examining the contextual ways by which neoliberal globalisation is
(re)structuring the household, and how the household is co-constructing
the global economic order (Waylen 2006; Bedford and Rai 2010; Peterson
2003). For instance, gender is increasingly a focal point for global govern-
ance given how gender balance serves as an indicator of economic competi-
tiveness, and state modernisation (Prügl and True 2014; Towns 2010).
This is evident in the recognition of women as key economic actors by the
World Bank and multinational corporations such as Nike (see Calkin 2016).
And yet, the co-optation of women is juxtaposed against their continued
exclusion from key economic decision-making bodies such as in corporate
boardrooms, national economic bodies on macro-economic policy, foreign
investment, trade, and taxation (Prügl and True 2014). Their absence in
these key areas consequently underpins the lack of economic contributions
to support social reproduction, which is the basis for sustaining women’s
health and well-being at the household and community levels. The relation-
ship between the state and economy as a site for oppression and insecurity is
relevant for reconceptualising global violence because ‘gendered economic
structures determine the limits and the possibilities of politics, including
security politics, whereas politics is the principal means through which
markets are established and transformed’ (True 2015a, p. 423). The state
and global economy, thus, reinforce one another in the production of
50 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

gendered relations of power even as restructuring processes have shifted

power away from state actors towards non-state actors such as corporations
and public–private partnerships (True 2013b).
Feminist political economy analysis interrogates the contradictory
impacts global economic restructuring has for different groups of women
particularly the paradoxical trend of bringing certain groups of women in
while keeping others out. Taking account of the gendered division of labour
at the household uncovers the social structure of gender. However, in
linking the household with the global economy, such an approach effec-
tively draws under scrutiny how gender intersects with other relationships of
power based on class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Indeed, in the
Global South, women particularly through motherhood are fashioned as
key to a country’s development success (Roy 2010; Molyneux 2007).
Ananya Roy observes that in the Millennium Development Agenda, the
‘Third World Woman’ was no longer represented as a victim; rather she was
presented as a heroic entrepreneur and selfless altruist (2010, p. 548). The
strategic shift in discourse from victimhood to empowerment – without of
course significant structural changes in the economic status of women in
both developed and developing countries in terms of access to economic
and political decision-making – serves to obscure the material inequalities
that continue to define women’s insecurities in everyday life. Thus, women
continue being primary caregivers in households and communities, and on
whose backs economies are violently built upon (Sassen 2000). Indeed,
following Nancy Fraser’s critique, recognition without redistribution and
representation fails to address the full range of gender injustices in a globa-
lising world (2005, p. 306).
The third component consists of gendered dichotomies between mascu-
line protector and feminine protected as well as other gendered identities.
Gendered symbols and narratives inform crisis interventions by states and
the international community, whether in armed conflicts or natural disas-
ters. They also serve to normalise and/or reinforce gendered expectations in
the aftermath of crisis. A feminist political economy critique uncovers the
material basis to cultural discourses and how they are employed to legitimise
the exclusion and subordination of women in international politics. In so
doing, we also sharpen the focus on how gender is interconnected with
ethnic, religious and/or national identities. Throughout history, women’s
bodies have served as markers of difference, which makes them sites of
political contestations belying the assumption of separate public and private
spheres. As feminist scholars point out, the control of women’s bodies has
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 51

been at the heart of authoritative struggles over claims on how society and
the roles and relationships within it ought to be (Yuval-Davis and Anthias
1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). As Nira Yuval-Davis argues, ‘gender relations are
at the heart of cultural constructions of social identities and collectivities as
well as in most cultural conflicts and contestations’ (1997, p. 39).
Drawing once again the connections across different levels of analysis,
feminist political economy reveals how individuals, states and other collec-
tivities are gendered. As Cynthia Enloe puts it, ‘to operate in the interna-
tional arena, governments depend on ideas of masculinised dignity and
feminised sacrifice to sustain their sovereignty’ (1989, p. 197). Processes of
war and militarism constantly rely on and mobilise gendered discourses to
ensure the complicity of men and women. Furthermore, the state especially
in situations of crisis is constructed as and legitimated through its projected
image of masculine roles such as the patriarchal provider of the family and
protector writ large to citizens especially women and children within and
outside of its borders (True 2015a, p. 420). Masculinities and femininities
are also deeply implicated in SGBV as these discourses serve to enforce
relations of domination and subordination. Sexual violence has been stra-
tegically used to subjugate enemies as a way of rendering them symbolically
‘feminine’, weak or inferior (Enloe 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997). Indeed, the
significant under-reporting of rape and sexual violence for men and boys
indicates how effectively traumatising and degrading such acts especially in
violating their masculine agency and political identity (Davies and True
2015b, p. 8; Cockburn 2010). Lastly, in the context of humanitarian crises,
these discourses taint relief efforts in terms of gendered assumptions per-
taining to the ‘head of household’ or ‘ideal aid recipients’. Privileging male
members of the family unquestioningly assume that they are innate pro-
tectors of the family. Still, in some cases when female members are con-
sidered primary recipients but without taking into account how this
treatment alienates and threatens the masculinity of male members,
women’s vulnerability to violence may be further exacerbated (True 2012).

GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND INSECURITIES: THE UN WOMEN,

PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA
Feminist political economy analysis reveals how gender identities and
inequalities structure institutions from the household to the global econ-
omy creating violent reactions and heightening vulnerabilities to violence.
Here we illustrate the analytical contribution of this framework in the
52 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

context of the division of political-military and the socio-economic pillars

in international peace and security agendas. The lack of integration of
political-military security from socio-economic security, especially after
conflict, has particularly detrimental consequences for women’s rights to
protection from violence and to participation in peace-building. We begin
by examining how gender has been mainstreamed in international peace
and security policy-making foregrounding the failure to prevent SGBV in
crisis contexts and to address gender inequalities during humanitarian
responses.
Gender mainstreaming in policy began with the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, which demanded the integration of
a gender perspective into all programs and policies (see True 2003; Krook
and True 2012). In the last two decades, gender mainstreaming has been
adopted in a variety of forms including in the area of security policies
within the UN system. The WPS agenda is a prominent example. It took
shape as a result of the global recognition of the disproportionate con-
sequences of wars and conflicts on women, and consequently, the vital
importance they play for achieving sustainable peace and security (UN
Women 2013). Through the foundational UNSCR 1325 and seven sub-
sequent UNSC resolutions, the WPS agenda identifies three priority
issues: the representation of women at all levels of peace and security
governance; the meaningful participation of women in peace and security
governance; and the protection of women’s rights and bodies in conflict
and post-conflict situations (Shepherd 2014). The WPS agenda, as a
defining international normative framework, establishes the obligations
of states and international actors for women’s protection against SGBV,
the promotion of their participation in peace and security processes, as well
as broadening the provided support for women’s roles in peace-building
and conflict prevention (True 2013a). Gender mainstreaming, however,
creates both opportunities and risks for advancing women’s rights and
gender equality (True 2016). In practice, gender mainstreaming in secur-
ity and peace frameworks such as the WPS has often either detracted
from, or served to depoliticise, comprehensive gender equality goals and
outcomes.
First, gender mainstreaming in national and international peace and
security processes is often translated in practice in the form of a checklist to
satisfy external actors rather than to substantively achieve gender equality
goals. Without a comprehensive understanding of how gender operates
to exclude and subjugate, policies in effect contribute and create SGBV.
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 53

We see this in many liberal democratic states where as part of gender-

mainstreaming policy, women are integrated into armed forces without
necessarily reforming the masculinist norms in military training and socia-
lisation that continue to ignore and thus legitimise the rampant discrimi-
nation, and SGBV within defence institutions (see Kronsell 2012; True
2015b). For example, while Australia’s first Women, Peace and Security
National Action Plan (2012–2018) formally encompasses mainstreaming
gender equality objectives into many domestic and international peace and
security actions and commitments but implementation has largely focused
on increasing the number of women in security sector institutions, espe-
cially the Australian Defence Force (Australian Council for International
Development 2014).
Second, gender-mainstreaming practices often neglect or underesti-
mate the complexity of gender relations in different contexts. Gender
relations are mutable, but at the same time historically contingent and
intersecting within a given society’s class, race/ethnicity, religious hierar-
chies (see McCall 2005; Weldon 2006). In peace and security operations,
gender is commonly used a synonym for women, and women’s experi-
ences are primarily viewed through feminised narratives of victimhood and
protection. This leads not only to homogenising women as a group but
also to obscuring the diversity of gender and sexual identities in need of
protection in crisis situations. It also means that the range of structural and
institutional, rather than just individual or attitudinal, factors that con-
tribute to gender inequalities are ignored. And yet, studies show that
experiences of conflict-related SGBV are strongly mediated by the ethnic,
religious, minority status of women and girls (Davies and True 2015a, b;
Baaz and Stern 2009). Moreover, gender mainstreaming in practice main-
tains women in a subordinated position when the goal of gender equality
is sacrificed for other institutional ends.
Women, for instance, are included at the peace table not because they
have an equal democratic right to be there (Dahl 1998), but because they
are expected to contribute ‘uniquely’ feminine qualities such as nurturing,
empathy, cooperation, non-violence with a focus on community well-
being rather individual interests. However, gendered expectations such
that ‘women devote a greater proportion of their income than men do to
expenditures that benefit families – their own children and members of
extended kinship networks’ when instituted within global agendas serve to
globally reinforce or ‘normalise’ the already problematic norms around
altruism and sacrifice which underpin many women’s experiences of
54 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

insecurities in conflict and post-conflict situations (see UNGA 2010, p. 3).

The effectiveness of gender mainstreaming in undoing gender stereotypes
is thus limited.
Here we can see the failure of gender mainstreaming in international
peace and security policy-making to address underlying, unequal political
and economic relations that are root causes of conflict and insecurity (True
2016). The shortcomings associated with gender mainstreaming are
rooted in the ‘siloed’ treatment of the political-military and the socio-
economic dimensions of security in international agendas and operations
on the ground. Within peace and security policies, gender is not and
should not be reduced to a single-issue focus either on protection from
sexual violence in conflict or on the women’s economic empowerment
during the peace-building phase. Rather, gender must be constituted
within an overall approach to practicing foreign and national policies
that addresses gender justice and equality outcomes (True 2015b).
The severing of political-military and socio-economic concerns is detri-
mental to women and girls in post-conflict situations. The study by
political scientists Quan Li and Ming Wen (2005) suggests that over
time, women’s mortality in war is as high as men’s largely due to the
long-term socio-economic effects of war. The case of international peace-
keeping missions demonstrates this problem particularly as they indirectly
create both economic opportunities and exploitation (True 2014;
Jennings 2014; Enloe 2000). UN peace operations typically prioritise
military security and reinstating political order without due regard and
planning in terms of the socio-economic dimensions of security. That is,
restoring men and women’s livelihoods, which are crucial for household
and societal security, takes a back seat to re-establishing law and order.
Even worse, the UN has been under fire for its own misconduct concern-
ing an investigation into sexual crimes by peacekeepers against civilians
(Davies and True 2015a).
Given women and girls’ disproportionate vulnerability to the long-term
effects of conflict, they are at the losing end when interventions fail to
seriously deliberate the long-term, socio-economic conditions to sustain
peace. Both pillars are interdependent for survivors of SGBV in particular.
For these women the capacity to access justice and physical security is
dependent on their access to economic resources during and after conflict.
As a direct result of conflict however, they may have lost their partners,
become simultaneously breadwinners and carers for dependent children
and elder family members, and/or have been shunned by their family or
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 55

community as survivors of SGBV (True 2014). For instance, women’s

ability to protect themselves and their families from future violence is
affected by their material situation; whether they have a choice over their
residence, their mobility or means of travel, their workplace, their time to
collectively organise and influence community leaders and services, and
whether they can cover costs including the opportunity costs (of their time
away from income earning or caring) of seeking legal justice. Therefore,
addressing pre-existing gendered inequalities must form part of the mandate
of UN peace operations. Interventions must equally secure peace through
cessation of conflict-related violence as well as do more to create sustainable
livelihoods and economic opportunities to address structural forms of vio-
lence as an ‘avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs’ (Galtung
1990, p. 291) that are themselves precursors to gender-based violence (True
2012) and also future civil conflict (see Cederman et al. 2013).
Such an integrated approach is imperative for the prevention of SGBV
against women and girls in conflict and disasters. Using existing indicators
of gender discrimination and the UN Secretary-General annual reports
(2012–2015) on situations of concern for sexual violence, Davies and
True (2015b) reveal the strong empirical relationship between normalised
and systemic gender discrimination. For instance, in the protection of
physical integrity, access to economic resources, to public space and
mobility and other civil and political liberties in a society and the occur-
rence of mass SGBV (Davies and True 2015b). Gendered inequalities
characterise relationships between and within groups. And though they
exist in all countries, gender inequalities vary significantly across them and
are particularly heightened in high-risk situations. Contextualised analysis
of which groups are most marginalised and subject to institutional and
structural discrimination socially, politically, and economically can isolate
who are the most vulnerable to being targeted for SGBV and bolster their
self-protection capacities. Such feminist political economy informed ana-
lysis can also highlight the political, social, and cultural barriers to report-
ing for SGBV crimes. Taken together, this knowledge of structural
gendered inequalities affecting vulnerability to and reporting of violence
can significantly improve local and international conflict prevention and
human protection strategies (Davies and True 2015b, p. 3).
As well as during conflict, we see the impact of the separation of
political-military and socio-economic pillars of security in the context of
humanitarian ‘rapid responses’ to crises with gender-specific consequences
(see Higelin and Yermo 2015). The reality of women giving birth amidst
56 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

war-torn or disaster contexts without assistance, often used to highlight

the need for humanitarian protection by international organisations, is
illustrative here of the collision of a conflict situation with pervasive
gender-based structural violence (lack of reproductive health care services
and access) that results in preventable physical insecurity and violence
(maternal mortality). UNFPA (2015) in its 2015 State of the World
Population report noted that 25 per cent of the more than 100 million
displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance are women and girls
aged 15 to 49 whose sexual and reproductive rights are threatened. They
face heightened risks of SGBV including sexually transmitted infections
and HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality, and forced or unwanted pregnancies.
The report further noted that although there has been remarkable pro-
gress in targeting humanitarian services to women and girls over the past
decade, large gaps remain in transformative actions beyond the crisis or
emergency phase to address gender inequalities, as well as in the gender-
equitable distribution of resources during crises.
The problem lies in the prioritisation of restoring political order in the
aftermath of the disaster particularly through military presence, at the cost
of neglecting the gendered socio-economic inequalities that define women
and girls immediate and long-term vulnerability to violence. For example,
sexual and reproductive health needs of women and girls in times of crisis
continue to be undermined by inadequate supplies. But barriers to accessing
sexual and reproductive health services and supplies especially on the basis of
resource scarcity exist before, during, and after crises. Indeed, as Rosalind
Petchesky (2005, p. 303) points out, ‘in the reality of a world governed by
neo-liberal capitalist regimes, sexual and reproductive health and rights and
the right to the highest attainable standard of health care are entirely subject
to resource availability and held hostage to inequitable patterns of resource
distribution that belie the myths of scarcity’. Moreover, the promotion of
sexual and reproductive health remains greatly impeded by institutional
barriers within a society particularly the influence of conservative religious
elites in national policy-making and deeply entrenched traditional beliefs on
sex and reproduction (see Tanyag 2015). Indeed, General Comment no. 22
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2016)
emphasises that

States must recognize and take measures to rectify entrenched social norms
and power structures that impair the equal exercise of their right, such as the
impact that gender roles have on the social determinants of health. Such
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 57

measures must address and eliminate discriminatory stereotypes, assump-

tions and norms concerning sexuality and reproduction, which underlie
restrictive laws and undermine the realization of sexual and reproductive
health. (E/C.12/GC/22)

The status of sexual and reproductive health in crisis situations is also a

strong indictment of women’s exclusion from participating in decision-
making concerning climate change and post-disaster reconstruction
(UNFPA 2015; Ivanova 2015; Lee-Koo 2012; True 2012). In the Asia
Pacific, a region highly vulnerable to climate change risks, three countries
– Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines – are leading climate change
policy reform through the adoption of national adaptation plans of action.
And yet, gender equality interventions proposed in these plans do not
adequately address issues of sexual and reproductive health in and after
environmental disasters (ARROW 2014).
Integrating both political-military and the socio-economic pillars works
towards long-term prevention and sustainable peace. Existing challenges
are evident in peacekeeping and post-disaster reconstruction. Both must
seriously address pre-existing gender inequalities and incorporate contin-
gencies for how the presence of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers
co-constitutes gender relations in the long run. The interdependent and
indivisible steps to achieving security and peace, which is the aspiration of
human rights, are not only rendered visible through feminist political
economy analysis, they are able to be practically implemented.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have reconceptualised global security by emphasising
the gendered structural inequalities underlying vulnerabilities to violence
and conflict, often referred to as ‘the continuum of violence’ across peace
and war or conflict. Drawing upon the critical work by feminist scholars
and activists, the chapter offers an alternative framework for how we might
view and assess the gendered insecurities affecting women and girls but
also men and boys, though not addressed fully here. Our discussion
emphasises a transformative agenda, which illuminates upon the connec-
tions between women’s health and well-being in the household, their
ability to fully participate in political and economic decision-making out-
side the household and the achievement of sustainable peace and security
at community, national, and global levels. Crucially, feminist political
58 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

economy analysis of global violence and insecurity points to the imperative

to challenge and overhaul underlying structures of political, social, and
economic inequalities. We argue that to be effective, global policy agendas
such as the WPS agenda must join up the political-military and socio-
economic dimensions of peace and security starting at the point of peace
operations and humanitarian interventions. Efforts at mainstreaming gender
must be guided by critical reflections around the kind of gendered assump-
tions and expectations that inform policies and their implementation.
Taking gender seriously within peace and security frameworks must involve
at a minimum examining the intersection of relationships of power based
among others on gender, class, race/ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. The
central goal of this examination and reconceptualisation of security must be
the long-term prevention of conflict and violence through investment in
people-centred socio-economic development and justice enabled (and
resourced) by a shift to demilitarisation and disarmament.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnado, M. (2012), Women’s involvement in conflict early warning systems: Moving
from rhetoric to reality in Mindanao. (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue).
http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/77Womensinvolvement
inconflictearlywarningsystemsFINAL_2.pdf.
Asian-Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW). (2014).
Identifying opportunities for action on climate change and sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Kuala
Lumpur: ARROW. www.arrow.org.my.
Australian Council for International Development (2014) The second annual civil
society report card on Australia’s national action plan on women, peace and
security. Canberra:Australian Council for International Development.
Baaz, M., & Stern, M. (2009). Why do soldiers rape? Masculinities, violence and
sexuality in the armed forces of the Congo. International Studies Quarterly,
53(2), 495–518.
Barber, P. (2011). Women’s work unbound: Philippine development and
global restructuring. In M. Marchand & A. Runyan (Eds.), Gender and
global restructuring: Sightings, sites and resistances (2nd ed., pp. 143–162).
London; New York: Routledge.
Bedford, K., & Rai, S. (2010). Feminists theorize international political economy.
Signs, 36(1), 1–18.
Calkin, S. (2016). Globalizing ‘girl power’: Corporate social responsibility and trans-
national business initiatives for gender equal. Globalizations, 13(2), 158–172.
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 59

Cederman, L. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). Inequality, grievances

and civil war. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chant, S. (2010). Towards a (re)conceptualisation of the ‘feminisation of pov-
erty’: Reflections on gender-differentiated poverty from The Gambia,
Philippines and Costa Rica. In S. Chant (Eds.), The International Handbook
of Gender and Poverty: Concepts, Research, Policy (pp. 111–116). Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Chin, C. (1998). In service and servitude: Foreign female domestic worker and the
Malaysian ‘Modernity’ project. New York: Columbia University Press.
Cockburn, C. (2004). The continuum of violence: A gender perspective on war
and peace. In W. Giles (Ed.), Sites of violence: Gender and conflict zones.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cockburn, C. (2010). Gender relations as causal in militarization and war.
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12(2), 139–157.
Dahl, R. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.
Davies, S., & True, J. (2015a), ‘The UN, women, peace and security: 15 years on,
women’s participation in peace and security is more urgent than ever,’
Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 16. http://www.inter
nationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/the-un-women-peace-and-security-
15-years-on-womens-participation-in-peace-and-security-is-more-urgent-
than-ever/.
Davies, S., & True, J. (2015b). Reframing conflict-related sexual and gender-
based violence: Bringing gender analysis back in. Security Dialogue, 46(6),
495–512.
Elias, J. (2013). Foreign policy and the domestic worker: The Malaysia-Indonesia
domestic worker dispute. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 15(3),
391–410.
Elias, J., & Rai, S. (2015). The everyday gendered political economy of violence.
Politics & Gender, 11(2), 424–429.
Enloe, C. (1989). Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of interna-
tional politics. Berkeley/London: University of California Press.
Enloe, C. (2000). Maneuvers: The international politics of militarizing women’s
lives. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Enloe, C. (2004). The curious feminist: Searching for women in a new age of
empire. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research,
6(3), 167–191.
Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27(3), 291–305.
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledge: The science question in feminism and
the privilege of partial perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599.
Higelin, M., & Yermo, F. (2015) ‘Transforming disaster into opportunity:
Shifting the power’. World Humanitarian Summit 2016 Paper. Action Aid.
60 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

Hoskyns, C. & Rai, S. (2007). Recasting the global political economy: Counting
women’s unpaid work. New Political Economy, 12(3), 297–317.
Ivanova, M. (2015), ‘Paris climate summit: Why more women need seats at the
table,’ The Conversation, November 20. https://theconversation.com/paris-
climate-summit-why-more-women-need-seats-at-the-table-50116.
Jennings, K. M. (2014). Service, sex, and security: Gendered peacekeeping econo-
mies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Security Dialogue,
45(4), 313–330.
Kronsell, A. (2012). Gender, sex and postnational defense: Militarism and peace-
keeping. New York: Oxford University Press.
Krook, M. L., & True, J. (2012). Rethinking the life cycles of international norms:
The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality. European
Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 103–127.
Lee-Koo, K. (2012). Gender at the crossroad of conflict: Tsunami and peace in
post-2005 Aceh. Feminist Review, 101, 59–77.
Li, Q., & Wen, M. (2005). The immediate and lingering effects of armed conflict
on adult mortality: A time-series cross-national analysis. Journal of Peace
Research, 42(4), 471–492.
McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. Signs: Journal of Women,
Culture and Society, 30(3), 1771–1800.
Molyneux, M. (2007). Change and Continuity in Social Protection in Latin
America: Mothers at the Service of the State. Gender and Development Paper
1. Geneva: UNRISD.
O’Reilly, M., Suilleabhain, A., & Paffenholz, T. (2015), Reimagining peacemak-
ing: Women’s roles in peace processes. International Peace Institute. http://
www.ipinst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-
Peacemaking-rev.pdf.
Paffenholz, T., Ross, N., Dixon, S., Schluchter, A.-L., & True, J. (2016). Making
Women Count – Not just counting women: Assessing women’s inclusion and
influence on peace negotiations. Geneva/New York: Inclusive Peace and
Transition Initiative and UN Women.
Parreñas, R. (2003). At the cost of women. Interventions: International Journal of
Postcolonial Studies, 5(1), 29–44.
Petchesky, R. (2005). Rights of the body and perversions of war: Sexual rights and
wrongs ten years past Beijing. International Social Science Journal, 57(184),
301–318.
Peterson, V. S. (2003). A critical rewriting of global political economy: Integrating
reproductive, productive and virtual economies. London: Routledge.
Prügl, E., & True, J. (2014). Equality means business? Governing gender through
transnational public-private partnerships. Review of International Political
Economy, 21(6), 1137–1169.
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 61

Pruitt, L. (2013). All female police contingents: Feminism and the discourse of
armed protection. International Peacekeeping, 20(1), 67–79.
Rai, S., Hoskyns, C., & Thomas, D. (2014). Depletion: The social cost of
reproduction. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 16(1), 86–105.
Roy, A. (2010). Millennial woman: The gender order of development. In S. Chant
(Eds.), The international handbook of gender and poverty: Concepts, research,
policy (pp. 548–553). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Safri, M., & Graham, J. (2010). The global household: Toward a feminist post-
capitalist international political economy. Signs, 36(1), 99–125.
Sassen, S. (2000). Women’s burden: Counter-geographies of globalization and
the feminization of survival. Journal of International Affairs, 53(2), 503–524.
Shepherd, L. (2014), ‘Advancing the women, peace and security agenda: 2015
and beyond,’ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Expert Analysis,
August 28. http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Inclusivity-and-gender/
Publications/Advancing-the-Women-Peace-and-Security-agenda-2015-and-
beyond.
SRVAW. (2011), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its
Causes and Consequences, A/HRC/17/26.
Tanyag, M. (2015), ‘Unravelling the intersections of power: The case of sexual
and reproductive freedom in the Philippines,’ Women’s Studies International
Forum 53: 63–72.
The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement (The Brookings-LSE
Project). 2014. Improving the Protection of Internally Displaced Women:
Assessment of Progress and Challenges. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2014/10/un-idps-women/improving-the-protection-of-internally-displace
ment-women-october-10-2014.pdf.
Tickner, J. (1992). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on
achieving global security. New York: Columbia University Press.
Towns, A. (2010). Women and states: norms and hierarchies in international
society. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
True, J. (2003). Mainstreaming gender in global public policy. International
Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(3), 368–396.
True, J. (2012). The political economy of violence against women. New York:
Oxford University Press.
True, J. (2013a), ‘Women, peace, and security in post-conflict and peacebuilding
contexts,’ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Expert Analysis, March 14.
http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Inclusivity-and-gender/Publications/
Women-peace-and-security-in-post-conflict-and-peacebuilding-contexts.
True, J. (2013b). Counting women and balancing gender: Increasing women’s
participation in governance. Politics & Gender, 9(3), 351–359.
62 J. TRUE AND M. TANYAG

True, J. (2014). The Political economy of gender in UN peacekeeping. In

G. Heathcote & D. Otto (Eds.), Rethinking peacekeeping, gender equality
and collective security. London: Palgrave.
True, J. (2015a). A tale of two feminisms in international relations? Feminist
political economy and the women, peace and security Agenda. Politics &
Gender, 11(2), 419–424.
True, J. (2015b), ‘Why we need a feminist foreign policy to stop war,’ Open
Democracy, April 20. https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/jacqui-true/
why-we-need-feminist-foreign-policy-to-stop-war.
True, J. (2016). Is Gender mainstreaming in peace and security effective? In
J. Steans & D. Tepe-Belfrage (eds.), Handbook on gender and world politics.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (2016). General
Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to sexual and reproductive health
(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights). 4 March. E/C.12/GC/22.
UN General Assembly (UNGA). (2010), Women’s participation in peacebuilding:
Report of the Secretary-General. Sixty-fifth session, 7 September. A/65/354–
S/2010/466.
UN Women. (2013), Peace and security: In brief. New York. http://www.
unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security. Accessed 18 February,
2016.
UN Women. (2015), Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace:
A global study on the implementation of United Nations security council resolu-
tion 1325. New York. http://wps.unwomen.org/en. Accessed 12 February,
2016.
UNFPA. (2015), The State of the World Population 2015. ‘Shelter from the
Storm: A transformative agenda for women and girls in a crisis prone world,’
(New York: UNFPA). http://www.unfpa.org/swop, Accessed 12 February,
2016.
Waylen, G. (2006). You still don’t understand: Why troubled engagements con-
tinue between feminists and (critical) IPE. Review of International Studies,
32(1), 145–164.
Weldon, L. (2006). The structure of intersectionality: A comparative politics of
gender. Politics & Gender, 2(2), 235–248.
Yeates, N. (2009). Globalizing care economies and migrant workers: Explorations in
global care chains. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,1999.
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Gender and nation. London: Sage.
Yuval-Davis, N., & Anthias, F., (Eds). (1989). Woman, nation, state. Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
 3 GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND SECURITY FROM A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE 63

Jacqui True is a professor of Politics and International Relations in the School of

Social Sciences, Monash University, Australia. She is a specialist in gender and
international relations, women, peace and security with a focus on the political
economy dimensions of peace-building and the long-term prevention of violence.
She is also specialist in feminist research methodologies. Recent publications
include The Political Economy of Violence Against Women (2012, Oxford
University Press), Doing Feminist Research in the Political and Social Sciences
(co-authored, 2010, Palgrave), and ‘Increasing Women’s Participation in
Governance’ in Politics & Gender (2012). Professor True is also a member of
the editorial board of Palgrave Macmillan Politics & Gender Series.

Maria Tanyag is a doctoral candidate in Politics and International Relations at

Monash University, Australia. Her research interests are in the global politics of
sexual and reproductive rights, political economy of sexual and gender-based
violence in crisis situations, and transnational religious fundamentalisms. She has
published in Women’s Studies International Forum and the International Feminist
Journal of Politics.
 CHAPTER 4

Post-human Security

Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden

Since the early 1990s, the non-human has emerged as a significant ele-
ment in discussions of ‘global’ security with respect to the development of
the notion of ‘environmental security’ (Dalby 2002, 95). This has been a
significant departure from traditional security studies wherein the referent
of security is the nation state. Yet those who have engaged with the
concept of environmental security have seen it as problematic. Daniel
Deudney, for example, has argued that the use of the term ‘security’
links the environment too closely to questions of national survival
(Deudney 1990, 465–469). The broadening of the security agenda has
raised questions about what is being secured, and by and/or for whom,
and from what? Expanded notions of what constitutes security have also
led to the development of analyses which focus either on sub-state groups
such as communities or the individual (as in the concept of ‘human
security’); supra-state formations such as international organisations; or
the biosphere.
Our failure, at a civilisational, societal, and disciplinary level, some
suggest, is leading us towards some form of apocalyptic future, and

E. Cudworth (*)
S. Hobden

School of Social Sciences, University of East London, London, UK
e-mail: E.Calvo@uel.ac.uk; s.c.hobden@uel.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2017 65

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_4
66 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

there is a considerable literature depicting the environmental crisis in

dramatic terms (see, for example, Hamilton 2015). Virtual scientific con-
sensus on climate change and the evidence of a sixth great extinction
indicate that far-reaching changes are occurring at a global level (Kolbert
2014). When a scientist as respected as James Hansen (Hansen et al.,
2016) warns of civilisational collapse then it could be time to start pushing
the issue up the list of global crises.
The last 20 years or more have seen a burgeoning of intellectual work
and an increase in political activism which has contested the exclusively
human focus of political theory and political practice and asserted that the
world is more-than-human. This has been a key element of environmental
politics and the development of critical theoretical perspectives – political
ecologisms. There has also been intervention from the field of science and
technology studies, animal studies, and cultural studies which insists on
the inclusion of the more-than-human world in our analyses. Collectively,
these ideas can be described as ‘posthumanist’, with a common thread
which attempts to analytically decentre the human. This chapter focuses
on the questions such thinking raises for issues of security. We will begin
by outlining different approaches to security, consider a variety of post-
humanist perspectives and draw these together by considering the ways in
which various post-humanist ideas problematise both traditional and cri-
tical approaches to the study of security. The conclusion of the chapter will
argue that, rather than a focus on ‘security’, we should be more concerned
about ‘insecurity’ both of the human and of the other forms of life with
which we share the planet.

THE NON-HUMAN IN TRADITIONAL AND CRITICAL

APPROACHES TO SECURITY
Security Studies, in its many forms has been, as with much of the social
sciences, deeply anthropocentric. While issues beyond the human have
become increasingly part of the security agenda, these have either primar-
ily focused on the human or see the non-human as a cause of conflict or
as a threat to the human. Traditional approaches to security closely corre-
spond to realist thinking in International Relations. In common with
realist thinking generally, the state is the focus of security efforts, and
threats to that security are principally of a military character and from
other states. The state has been seen as the only legitimate user of force,
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 67

and the organisation to which individual citizens owe a responsibility. In

turn, the state has a responsibility to protect the citizen.
Within this realist framework there has been little concern with issues
beyond military threats to the state. While, traditionally, the environment
has not been seen as a threat to the state in the realist perspective, some
realist writers have been increasingly concerned about resource issues as
a possible trigger for conflict. In a series of articles and books, Michael
Klare (2001, 2008, 2012) has raised concerned about the possibility
of ‘resource’ wars between states over a dwindling supply of natural
resources. Oil has been seen a resource over which states might be pre-
pared to fight, with the second gulf war of 2003 being cited as an example
of ‘petroimperialism’ (Jhaveri 2004). These concerns with regard to oil
were exacerbated by arguments over so-called ‘peak oil’, although these
concerns have now subsided to an extent as there appears to be more fossil
fuel remaining than can be burnt without catastrophic disruption to the
climate (Berners-Lee and Clark 2013). Water shortages have also been
suggested as a possible cause of conflict, described as ‘water wars’, with the
term entering into popular usage. A further version of this perspective is
the increasingly frequently made claim that climate change is a cause of
conflict, with the fighting in Darfur and the conflict in Syria linked to
changes in the climate.
In trying to assess the links between the climate and conflict Thomas
Homer-Dixon, in a wide-ranging assessment, came to the conclusion that
while environmental issues can be linked to a number of conflicts, it is
mostly one factor amongst many rather than a specific cause (Homer-
Dixon 1999). Furthermore, as David Katz (2011) argues, however,
there is little evidence to support the idea that water wars have occurred
or are likely to occur.
Realist-influenced understandings have continued to influence security
concerns. However, for a variety of reasons, the notion that the state
provides a guarantee of safety for the citizen has come under substantial
challenge during the latter part of the twentieth century. The increase in
civilian casualties, particularly during the Second World War, indicated
that states were less able to fulfil their responsibilities than at first thought.
Indeed, not only might the state be unable to prevent civilian casualties it
might also be the major threat to a proportion of its citizens as indicated
by the holocaust. The inability of the state to provide security for its
citizens has also been challenged by the advent of nuclear weapons
(Herz 1959). Likewise, weak states, or ‘quasi states’ (Jackson 1993)
68 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

have not had sufficient capabilities to sustain sovereignty, let alone provide
security for their citizens.
That the state has not been able to secure its borders has also been
illustrated in the latter part of the twentieth century by the rise of concern
over environmental issues. Environmental issues are not constrained by
state borders. The existence of many Pacific Island states is, for example,
under threat due to rising sea levels. This is occurring despite the very
limited emissions of greenhouse gases in these states. At the same time, the
specific states under threat are not able to provide protection from events
that are occurring elsewhere.
Alongside the growing realisation that the state is not able to provide
security for its citizens has come a broadening of the security agenda. This
broadening has occurred in terms of referent object and in terms of issue.
Such a more expansive notion of security is closely associated with
the notion of Critical Security Studies (Krause and Williams 1997; Wyn
Jones 1999; Booth 2007) and the linked idea of human security. These
approaches have broadened the concept of security away from the state
level, so that the focus of security moves to the community or individual,
and have broadened the threats to security away from the purely military
to a range of issues such as food security or economic security. Alongside
these potential threats a move towards a less state focused approach
security has also allowed for a consideration of the environment as a
security issue. Yet the focus of such analyses is on the impacts that
environmental issues have on human existence. For example, the impacts
of drought on communities, or the disruption caused as communities are
uprooted, by, for example, soil erosion. The focus of expanded ideas
about security then remains on the human and, as with traditional
security thinking, depicts the human as in some ways separate from the
rest of nature.

THE DISPARATE APPROACHES TO POST-HUMANISM

The term ‘posthumanism’ has been understood in a variety of different
ways (Wolfe 2010, xi). However, a clear common theme in post-humanist
scholarship would be to say that it represents a reaction against the view of
human exceptionalism (or anthropocentrism). Anthropocentrism under-
stands humanity to be marked off from the huge diversity of non-human
animal life due to ‘exceptional characteristics’, such as the possession of
syntactical language or of ‘free will’.
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 69

One strand of new post-humanism might be referred to as ‘new vital-

ism’. The latter has been particularly associated with the influence of Gilles
Deleuze, who did not consider himself a materialist but rather was con-
cerned that his work be understood as vitalist (Coole and Frost 2010, 9).
In political work, this position is best illustrated by the ‘enchanted’ or
‘vital’ materialism of Jane Bennett (2010) who argues that inorganic
matter such as kerbside litter (trash) or an electricity grid, all exhibit
force and vitality rendering them active, productive, and self-creating.
Bennett argues for a vital materialism in order to recognise the role of
apparently inanimate matter affecting and configuring situations and
events. In vital materialism, there is a tendency to minimise the differences
between subjects and objects with this notion of a vitality which runs
through both human and non-human matter. The end in view is the
development of a more environmentally aware and cautious politics, but
the elevation of the ‘shared materiality of all things’ does seem to be a
rather blunt instrument in securing this end. Bennett’s notion of ‘thing
power’ understands agentic capacity as distributed, apparently equally,
‘across a range of ontological types’. (2004, 347–372). For Bennett,
non-human assemblages can act. However, what she actually seems to
mean is that assemblages can have an impact or effect on humans and non-
humans. Here, Bennett is conflating the idea of the properties and powers
of beings and things, and the notion of action and the idea of agency, and
there are serious questions to be raised about her assumption that a
distributed concept of agency will be effective in unsettling human-centric
politics (Bennett 2010, 13).
A second approach, which we would call hybridisation, is best illu-
strated by the contributions of Bruno Latour, for whom the social world
is an assembly of material entities and processes which is constituted
through the interactions of all kinds of matter (human and non-human)
in the form of networks. Latour (1993) describes the emergence of
apparently modern Western societies through the interaction of two pro-
cesses – purification and hybridisation. The processes of purification
involve the separation of the human world from the world of things and
the construction of the world of nature and its scientific study, separate
from the study of the social world with its selves, cultures, and politics.
Yet, Latour argues, the human social world has never been pure, despite all
the attempts to extricate it from the world of nature. However ‘modern’
we think we are, our world is one of relative degrees of hybridisation as we
are caught in networks of interactions and relations between what Latour
70 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

would understand as more or less natural and more or less social phenom-
ena. Within these networks, non-human matter can be understood as
‘actant’. This is both a counter to human-centric prejudice, and reflects
our reality as one of the multitude of species situated in a range of
‘attachments’ on planet earth (Latour 2009, 72–84).
Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT) holds that agency may be
attributed to any object or ‘actant’, temporarily constituted by the emer-
gent web of ‘materially heterogeneous relations’ (Law 2009, 71). Here, as
with the vital materialist position, agency is inflated conceptually (so that it
becomes simply a capacity for action) and extensively (so that anything
that has an effect on something else is seen as an actant, from fishermen to
scallops). However, the difficulty with Latour is that in his broad sweep all
agency is understood as of the same quality. Both Latour and Bennett can
be seen as subscribing to a position of agential realism. Here, the agency of
matter, distributed across the world of ‘being’ makes up the beings, things
and relations of which our world is composed. In both hybridity and
vitalism, there is a tendency to horizontalism – relations are not understood
to exist in a context of hierarchies of power. The flat, non-hierarchical
networks for ANT cannot deal with power because it cannot make distinc-
tions between nature and society, or between humans, other animals,
plants and objects. In contrast we consider that, when theorising power,
we need such distinction between different kinds of being and objects in
the world; this enables us to recognise, for example, that distinctions such
as those between humans and all other ‘animals’ are forged through, and
continue to carry, relations of inequality and domination (see Cudworth
and Hobden 2015a).
More politically radical approaches are related to critical theory
(broadly defined) and associated with the various schools of political
ecologism which have problematised human-centred understandings of
the world. Within these there are a range of biophysical, philosophical and
political post-humanisms that centre on the relationships between human
beings, other species and the whole other worlds of ‘nature’, but are less
interested in our relations with ‘things’ than the work of ANT scholarship
or those identifying with new vitalism.
Some forms of ecologism and earth systems science have been read
as suggesting an anti-humanist form of post-humanism. An example here
would be the apocalyptic writing of earth systems scientist James Lovelock
(2009) about the irreversible harm we humans have now effected on our
planet and the extensive and (certainly for humans and other mammals)
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 71

catastrophic changes which are currently emerging. Lovelock (2014) most

recently suggests that the ‘earth’ cannot be ‘saved’ by human intervention,
but that those places which can must adopt a policy of ‘sustainable retreat’
in order that some humans and other organic species survive the coming
transformation of the earth. Malthusian statements on overpopulation
and management strategies in the face of climate change have peppered
Lovelocks earlier work and in his latest offering, the prioritisation of
securing only a tiny human elite group has met strong criticism.
Others, however, have linked earth systems science to left, green,
and anti-colonialist political projects. Fritjopf Capra (1996, 2002), for
example, has linked deep ecologism to ideas emerging from complexity
approaches in the sciences. In this analysis, we become part of a multitude
of various levels of natural and social systems, in which we humans exploit
non-human natures as resources. Simon Dalby argues that human-
induced changes mean that ‘the environment’ is increasingly artificial –
we have remade the environmental context of our own existence (Dalby
2009, 11–12). Dalby’s account is influenced by certain kinds of political
ecologism, and he considers our current predicament to be constituted
through collective human activity that has been structured by carbonifer-
ous consumer capitalism, as well as relations between rich and poor
regions and peoples. It is from this position that Dalby has made a
sustained and important intervention in the literature on ‘environmental
security’, suggesting that our increasingly perilous situation demands a
rethinking – an ‘ecological security’.
Work in the areas of de-development and eco-feminism provide a
starting point for our own post-humanist perspective, and these positions,
informed by feminist and alter-colonialist critiques of forms of social
and political domination have much to say of the relationships between
differentiated human populations, and the non-human lifeworld. From
a de-development perspective, such as advocated by Wolfgang Sachs
(2008a, 2008b), there is a need to completely re-think forms of social
organisation. For Sachs (1992) the notion of development ‘stands like a
ruin in the intellectual landscape’. In its place there is a need for a radically
different path, particularly in the wealthier parts of the world. This way of
life requires a prioritisation of the carrying capacity of the planet, and the
envisioning of lifestyles within that capacity. Val Plumwood shares Sachs’
concerns with the impacts of development on the planet and its capacity to
support life. In terms of our relationship with the rest of nature her view is
that notions of human domination over nature ‘must end either with the
72 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

death of the other on whom he relies, and therefore with his own death,
or with the abandonment of mastery, his failure and transformation’
(Plumwood 1993, 196). While Sachs advocates a de-development agenda,
Plumwood argues for a reconsideration of our place within the rest of
nature. Drawing on the political frameworks of indigenous Australian
and North American cultures, she argues for a non-colonial post-human
politics which develops a culture of belonging and community (as opposed
to a prioritisation of conquest and private property), and on flourishing
(to replace a Western obsession with wealth) (Plumwood 2002; see also
Salleh 1997).
An alternative perspective is one that we call ‘complex ecologism’
(Cudworth and Hobden 2011). It is committed to many of the insights
of political ecologism in trying to understand the current social forma-
tions of what, after Haraway (2003), we would call ‘naturecultures’. We
have used complexity theory with its notions of co-existing, interrelated,
multi-levelled systems to capture the ontological depth of relational
systems of social domination (of colonialism, capitalism, patriarchy,
and so on) and their intersections. Complex ecologism assumes the co-
constitution and co-evolution of social and natural systems in dynamic
configurations (Cudworth and Hobden 2011, 110–139). While we have
acknowledged that human communities of all kinds live in relations of
dependency and reciprocity within complex natural/social systems with
non-human beings, things, and processes, we have stressed the domina-
tion of non-human nature under certain kinds of relations and the ways
in which certain groups of relatively privileged humans are able to assert
domination over certain other kinds of human, animal, and other life
forms. In our own work, we have emphasised the importance of social
intersectionality as an analytic frame. Our use of post-humanism is to
indicate the understanding of ‘humanity’ as embedded in networks of
relations of dependency with the non-human lifeworld, to emphasise
the fragility of embodied life. In addition, we want to emphasise the
importance of a post-humanist lens in examining phenomena which, in
international politics, are often seen as exclusively human such as the
practice of war, the delivery of welfare and security, the distribution of
resources, and so on. In addition, given the combination of a notion
of both dependency, reciprocity, and co-constitution of the human
and non-human lifeworld, and an analysis of human domination of
the non-human that is relational and intersectional (shaped by systemic
relations of domination constituted by capitalism, colonialism, patriarch,
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 73

and so on), we consider our kind of post-humanism to be a ‘critical

posthumanism’.
This understanding of ‘humanity’ as a fundamentally socially and cul-
turally constituted category, and of humans as existent in webs of relations
with other species, has also raised key questions for the meaning of ‘the
human’. For Cary Wolfe (2010, 1), we need to develop modes of social
and cultural inquiry that reject the classic humanist divisions of self and
other, mind and body, society and nature, human and animal, organic and
technological. What Wolfe and others emphasise is that it is not so much
‘the human’ that is a difficulty, but the human-centric understanding of
the human as the unique individual striving in the world, and not embo-
died and embedded in complex biotic lifeworlds. As Wolfe (2008) sug-
gests, post-human work undertakes two related tasks. First, it challenges
the ontological and ethical divide between humans and non-humans that
has been the philosophical linchpin of modernity. Second, it engages with
the challenge of sharing this planet we inhabit with ‘non-human subjects’,
and of the co-constituted conditions of multiple species and biosphere.
The varied contributions of new vitalism, hybrid approaches such as ANT,
different varieties of political ecologism and animal studies and the insights
of transdisciplinary complexity theory illuminate the folly of explanations
of the world embedded in humanocentric assumptions. How, then, have
these new ways of understanding the world problematised the traditional
conceptions of security with which this chapter began?

POSTHUMAN SECURITY
As we’ve seen, the term ‘posthumanism’ is open to a variety of approaches
and interpretations. Hence in this section we are not going to outline a
definitive account of what comprises a post-human approach to security. It
is not simply the case that there would be a multiplicity of post-humanist
approaches to security, but more fundamentally, post-humanisms would
question the notion of whether ideas about ‘security’ are even useful.
What we will do here is to outline some questions that thinking from a
post-human perspective would raise with regard to issues of security.
Traditional approaches to security are inherently anthropocentric, and
this has blinded these approaches to the more than human character of
existence, that is, highlighted post-human thinking. For example, recent
work on the more-than-human nature of warfare has argued that exclu-
sively human warfare would look very different but for the conscripting of
74 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

an enormous variety of non-human creatures (from bacteria to elephants

to orcas) into the practices of warfare means that the constitution of war
is qualitatively altered (Cudworth and Hobden 2015b). In addition, a
variety of technology has always been deployed in warfare in ways that it
is more than simply a tool used by a human combatant, but is constitutive
of the cyborg figure of the soldier. The more than human character
of conflict is almost exclusively ignored within Security Studies. Post-
humanism urges us to attend to the realities of our situation in a world
where we are all made up of multiple species and things. In order to
capture more accurately the subject matter of security, such as systems of
war, there is a need to appreciate the ways in which our world is teeming
with multiple human and non-human lives, relations, and formations
of being.
The anthropocentrism of security also leads to an exclusive focus on
human agency. The concept of agency has almost always been understood
as applying to beings with wills, desires, and intentions. It has been seen as
a capacity for action which (usually) is a product of social relations, a
relationally generated capacity. This capacity is what makes us human.
Agency is concerned with the ways in which our world is reproduced
and recast. While non-human beings and things evolve, we humans, we
political animals go about planning and changing our world. By contrast,
post-human approaches have pointed to agency beyond the human,
whether it is an inherent character of matter (Bennett), contained within
assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari), or as actants (Latour). Post-humanist
thinking seeks to assess the ways that all kinds of creatures, beings,
and things bound up in relations of complex systems and are able to, in
the words of Antony Giddens (1984), ‘make a difference in the world’. In
this sense, agency, or here, ‘affective agency’ can be used to discuss the
significant effects of natural systems and the beings and things caught up
in them (Cudworth and Hobden 2013). This is not simply the causal
powers of a being, thing or set of relations but a systemic impact that is
collective and significant. Significant here means that it ‘makes a difference
in the world’, that is, it alters the systemic conditions, the agential land-
scape, for other beings and things. The impact of global warming, or the
effects of a viral pandemic would be examples here.
As we saw in the first section, thinking about security has frequently
revolved around the question of the referent – who is being secured. Over
the latter half of the twentieth century the referent of security for some
thinkers migrated from the state level, to the community and on to the
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 75

notion of human security. Such a move was not without critics, and the
term ‘human security’ for some (Buzan 2004) was seen a particularly
worthless. There were even contributions that thought about environ-
mental security, or even ecological security. As we noted before, all these
approaches to security were anthropocentric, in that the human, or human
agglomerations, were seen as the referent. Ecological security was an
exception to this, but ecological security was still anthropocentric in that
it sees the human as the threat to the rest of nature.
Post-humanism rejects a dualism between the human and the rest of
nature, and hence not only disputes a human comprised referent for
security but also divides between the human and the rest of nature (see
Mitchell 2014). Humans are ‘of’ nature rather than ‘in’ nature. In this
view there is nothing that is outside of nature. Therefore, the perspectives
that would see the human as a threatened by nature, or as of a threat to
nature, simply make no sense. How this is perceived varies by perspective.
So for example the ‘vital materialism’ advocated by Jane Bennett (2010)
raises the question of how our conceptions of the world change when we
consider matter itself, of which all things are constituted, to be ‘vibrant’.
Likewise, the complexity focused post-humanism of Cudworth and
Hobden identifies a range of interacting and co-constituting systems, or,
following Gunderson and Holling (2002), a panarchy in which human
systems interrelate with both animate and inanimate systems.
Post-humanism therefore differs from conventional environmental
security by considering the biosphere itself as a system co-constitutive
with other human and non-human systems. Envisioning human systems
embedded within a wider range of systems overcomes the duality inherent
in the majority of approaches to understanding environmental issues
within international relations. The environment is not ‘out there’, but
instead constitutive of, and reactive to, human systems. Human systems
are embedded within a number of non-human systems, with the conse-
quence that developments in one system may have implications elsewhere
in the panarchy. Thus, as a simple example, increased carbon dioxide levels
as a result of increased industrialisation can be linked to species migration
in local ecological systems. Likewise, global temperature rises can increase
energy use, for example, to run cooling systems, impacting across
economic (oil prices), political (inter-state relations), and ethnic systems
(relations with the Middle East).
The interlinking of complex systems also allows the analysis to shift
from a focus on security to one of insecurity. Post-humanism understands
76 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

interactions and changes in complex systems as resulting in multiple risks,

hazards, and uncertainties, which international politics must navigate.
A significant feature of current global environmental issues is that many
of those most in a situation of risk are not the authors of the causes of that
risk. For non-human species this is particularly the case. Environmental
risk situations faced by individuals, communities, societies, and between
species are frequently the consequences of complex power inter-relation-
ships. By focusing on the intersection of power relations operating in
and between different systems, and the creation of risk that is associated
with relations between systems, the possibilities for a mitigation of risk
throughout the panarchy become the key issue. The move from ‘security’
to ‘risk alleviation’ implies that the focus of attention is on the re-structur-
ing of risk-creating activities, rather than attempts to secure protection for
specific groups. From such a viewpoint, the possibility of this ultimately
being perceived as a situation requiring a military solution becomes less
viable. By breaking the link between this as a state-focused issue, and
instead a concentration on an analysis focused on intersecting systems,
removes the focus on particular groups, and re-orientates the analysis
towards both a concern for the wider biosphere and social justice.

CONCLUSION
Social sciences has recently seen something of a ‘turn’ towards the study of
violence. This was a pre-occupation of some of the key figures drawn upon
by many disciplines, such as Marx and Weber, but has been eclipsed by
other concerns (Walby 2013). Yet the study of international politics and
relations has long been focused on issues of intra- and inter-state violence
at various scales. This focus on multi-scalar violence is surely a strength of
the traditional approaches to security with which the discussion in this
chapter began. In addition, we have seen a widening of scope and concern,
with the development of the concept and study of human security, in
particular around issues of impoverishment and hunger. With the devel-
opment of critical security studies, there has been a move away from a
preoccupation with states and inter-state relations and this is very much to
be welcomed, allowing as it does, a consideration of the environment as a
security issue. Yet the focus of such analyses is on the impacts that
environmental issues have on human existence, such as the impact of
desertification or soil fertility and their consequences such as migration
across national borders or within states. For all the benefits of an extended
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 77

scope, the focus then of expanded ideas about security remains on the
human, and similarly to traditional security approaches ‘the human’ is
understood to be separate from the rest of nature in significant ways.
The wide and expanding range of approaches which can loosely
be called ‘posthumanist’ collectively assert that to hold such a position is
ontologically wrong. We inhabit a shared world, and a security frame
which does not reflect this overlooks the interlinked character of being.
Some post-humanist approaches may be more open to the development of
post-human security studies than others, particularly those such as ANT
which focus on the networks between various actants (both human and
non-human). More critical approaches which emphasise the embodied
vulnerability of creatures and other organic life may well be more resistant
to the attempt to ‘posthumanise’ the concept of security. The precarious
situation in which much organic life finds itself in the Anthropocene
means that analysis might better shift to a focus on insecurity rather than
security (Cudworth and Hobden 2009). In addition, the shifting of the
referent of security from the state to populations of beings and things, and
even to the biosphere implies a reinventing of the term ‘security’ itself as in
some post-humanist positions, the urgent need is to intervene (or leave
well alone) in order to ‘secure’ other creatures and things from rapacious
human behaviour. This re-orientation also implies undermining key socio-
political and economic systems of institutional and relational power, such as
those of industrial capitalism.
A further perspective, such as Lovelock’s (2014) recent intervention,
suggests a process of securitisation by effectively abandoning the idea of
earth as we have known it in order to preserve a limited quantity and range
of organic life against the ‘revenge of Gaia’. Such promethean faith in the
ability of (some few) humans to survive through the creative harnessing
of technology is chilling. This is certainly a form of securitisation but
we would see this as about human transcendence, a trans- rather than a
post-human security and one which is highly human-centric.
In reducing the risks to animals such as ourselves, who are very vulner-
able in the context of global environmental change, post-human political
perspectives might also be seen to be human-centred, or perhaps centred
on the survival of creatures and organic life forms on which we depend.
The very situation in which we find ourselves, however, suggests that
‘ends’ are uncertain. Lovelock’s call to effectively ‘abandon ship’ in
order to secure the human in a post-apocalyptic world is elitist and
exclusive. It perhaps demonstrates the difficulties in engaging with
78 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

securitisation as a discourse. Those who have held on to critical ideas, such

as the rapaciousness of colonial capitalism in the work of Simon Dalby, for
example, stretch notions of security to their limit. While fundamentally
reworking ideas such as Dalby’s ecological security is laudable we are
not quite convinced. In our view, a post-humanist lens means that we
see our situation as ever insecure. The key argument of this chapter has
been that post-humanism raises many questions for ‘security’, and as such,
‘posthumanist insecurity’ may well have been a more accurate title!

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bennett, J. (2004). The force of things. Political Theory, 32(3), 347–372.
Bennett, J. (2010). Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Berners-Lee, M., & Clark, D. (2013). The burning question: We can’t burn half the
world’s oil, coal and gas. So how do we quit? London: Profile Books.
Booth, K. (2007). Theory of world security. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Buzan, B. (2004). A reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value.
Security Dialogue, 35(3), 369–370.
Capra, F. (1996). The web of life: A new synthesis of mind and matter. New York:
Harper Collins.
Capra, F. (2002). The hidden connections: A science for sustainable living. London:
Harper Collins.
Coole, D., & Frost, S. (2010). New materialisms: Ontology, agency, and politics.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2009). Environmental insecurity. In H. Fagan &
R. Munck (Eds.), The encyclopedia of globalization and security: Volume one-
economic and political aspects (pp. 79–100). London: Praeger.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2011). Posthuman international relations:
Complexity, ecologism and global politics. London: Zed Books.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2013). Of parts and wholes: International relations
beyond the human. Millennium, 42(3), 430–450.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2015a). Liberation for straw dogs? Old materialism,
new materialism and the challenge of an emancipatory posthumanism.
Globalizations, Special Issue ‘Occupying Subjectivity: Being and Becoming
Radical in the Twenty-First Century’ 12(1), 134–148.
Cudworth, E., & Hobden, S. (2015b). The posthuman way of war. Security
Dialogue, 46(6), 513–529.
Dalby, S. (2002). Security and ecology in the age of globalization. Environmental
Change and Security Report, 8, 95–108.
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 79

Dalby, S. (2009). Security and environmental change. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Deudney, D. (1990). The case against linking environmental degradation and
national security. Millennium, 19(3), 461–476.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Gunderson, L. H., & Holling, C. S. (Eds.) (2002). Panarchy: Understanding
transformations in human and natural systems. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Hamilton, C. (2015). Requiem for a species: Why we resist the truth about climate
change. London: Routledge.
Hansen, J. et al. (2016). Ice melt, sea level rise and superstorms: Evidence From
paleoclimate data, climate modeling, and modern observations that 2 °C global
warming is highly dangerous. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 16(6),
3761–3812.
Haraway, D. J. (1985). Manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology, and socialist
feminism in the 1980s. Socialist Review, 80, 65–108.
Haraway, D. J. (2003). The companion species manifesto: Dogs, people and signifi-
cant otherness. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press.
Herz, J. (1959). International politics in the atomic age. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, scarcity and violence. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Jackson, R. (1993). Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations and the Third
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jhaveri, N. J. (2004). Petroimperialism: US oil interests and the Iraq War.
Antipode, 36(1), 2–11.
Jones, R. W. (1999). Security, strategy, and critical theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner.
Katz, D. (2011). Hydro-political hyperbole: Examining incentives for over-
emphasizing the risks of water wars. Global Environmental Politics, 11(1),
12–35.
Klare, M. (2001). Resource wars: The new landscape of global conflict. New York:
Metropolitan Books.
Klare, M. (2008). Rising powers, shrinking planet: How scarce energy is creating a
new world order. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Klare, M. (2012). The race for what’s left: The global scramble for the world’s last
resources. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Kolbert, E. (2014). The sixth extinction: An unnatural history. London:
Bloomsbury.
Krause, K., & Williams, M. C. Eds. (1997). Critical security studies: Concepts and
cases. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
80 E. CUDWORTH AND S. HOBDEN

Latour, B. (2009). A plea for earthly sciences. In J. Burnett, S. Jeffers, &

G. Thomas (Eds.), New social connections: Sociology’s subjects and objects
(pp. 72–84). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Law, J. (2009). Practising nature and culture: An essay for Ted Benton. In
S. Moog & R. Stones (Eds.), Nature, social relations and human needs: Essays
in honour of Ted Benton (pp. 65–79). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lovelock, J. (2009). The vanishing face of Gaia: A final warning. London:
Allen Lane.
Lovelock, J. (2014). A rough ride to the future. London: Allen Lane.
Mitchell, A. (2014). Only human? A worldly approach to security. Security Dialogue,
45(1), 5–21.
Plumwood, V. (1993). Feminism and the mastery of nature. Routledge: London.
Plumwood, V. (2002). Environmental culture: The ecological crisis of reason.
London: Routledge.
Sachs, W. (1992). Development: A guide to the ruins. New Internationalist, 232.
Retrieved from http://newint.org.
Sachs, W. (2008a). Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland in einer globalisierten welt
(Sustainable Germany in a globalized world) (Frankfurt: Brot für die Welt,
eed and BUND – Fischer.)
Sachs, W. (2008b). Climate change and human rights. Development, 51(3), 332–337.
Salleh, A. (1997). Ecofeminism as politics: Nature, Marx and the postmodern.
London: Zed.
Walby, S. (2013). Violence and society: An introduction to an emerging field of
sociology. Current Sociology, 61(2), 95–111.
Wolfe, C. (2008). Flesh and finitude: Thinking animals in (post) humanist philo-
sophy. SubStance, 37(3), 8–36.
Wolfe, C. (2010). What is posthumanism? Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press.

Erika Cudworth is Professor of Feminist Animal Studies in the School of

Social Sciences at University of East London, UK. Areas of expertise include
environment–society relations, human–animal relations, and gender, where she is
particularly interested in questions of intersectionality and the persistence of com-
plex inequalities. She is the author of Social Lives with Other Animals: Tales of Sex,
Death and Love (2011, Palgrave), Developing Ecofeminist Theory: The Complexity
of Difference (2005, Palgrave), Environment and Society (Routledge 2003)
and co-author of Animalizing Sociology: Posthumanist Readings of Classical
Social Theory (2015, Ashgate), Posthuman International Relations: Complexity,
Ecologism and Global Politics (2011, Zed Books), and The Modern State: Theories
and Ideologies (2007, Edinburgh University Press). She is also reviews editor of the
journal Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses.
 4 POST-HUMAN SECURITY 81

Stephen Hobden is Reader in International Relations Theory in the School of

Social Sciences, University of East London, UK. He has expertise in complexity
theory and international relations. His publications include ‘Nature as an Actor in
International Politics’, in Encounters with World Politics (2015, Routledge),
‘Posthumanism’ in Critical Environmental Politics (2013, Routledge), co-author
of Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism And Global Politics
(2011, Zed) and ‘Of Parts and Wholes: International Relations Beyond the
Human’ in Millennium (2013), and ‘Complexity, Ecologism, and Posthuman
Politics’ in Review of International Studies (2013).
 CHAPTER 5

Security Cosmopolitanism
and Global Governance

Anthony Burke

It can be compellingly argued that the most serious insecurities that

the world faces in the twenty-first century have globalised (and even
planetary) sources, manifestations, scope, and scale. Human-induced
climate change – which is on track in this century to cause the melting
of northern permafrost and polar ice caps, collapse marine food chains,
flood coastal cities, and destroy the rainforests of the Amazon – has
numerous global sources and will manifest on a planetary scale that
takes in the atmosphere and the biosphere itself (Burke et al. 2016).
These processes threaten insecurity to human communities around the
globe; less appreciated is the systemic vulnerability and insecurity of
ecosystems, and non-human animal and plant communities, that is
represented by unprecedented rates of habitat and biodiversity loss.
Sunni Islamist terrorism has spread from its sources in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Pakistan to take tens of thousands of lives on every continent
and seen a proliferation of brutal armed groups fuelling conflict and
violence in south and central Asia, the Middle East, North and Central
Africa, and Southeast Asia (Global Terrorism Index 2015). In turn, such

A. Burke (*)
International and Political Studies, University of New South Wales
Canberra, Australia
e-mail: a.burke@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 83

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_5
84 A. BURKE

terrorism has inspired a global counterterrorist response with disturbing

new developments such as a return to the routine use of torture and
extrajudicial killings using advanced technology such as drones, GPS,
computing, and satellite systems (Burke et al. 2014: 119).
Twice in the last two decades corruption and contradiction in bank-
ing systems in the United States and Southeast Asia, and chaotic global
share market responses, have plunged vast areas of the world into severe
economic recession and destroyed trillions of dollars of global wealth
and capital. Such events have caused severe poverty, suffering, and
human insecurity and in some places fuelled violent conflict and social
upheaval. They must also be seen against a background of ongoing
fragility and instability in global financial markets and terrible social
inequalities both within and between states, in a world economy domi-
nated by neoliberal ideology and rigged for the interests of the already
fabulously wealthy (Stiglitz and Kaldor 2013; Crouch 2011; Glezos
2012; Piketty 2014). Gender-related violence and insecurity is experi-
enced by millions of women, children and men every day, in homes,
institutions, and conflict zones. It has complex structural and ideational
causes, and manifests in ways that erase barriers between inside and
outside, domestic and international (True 2012). Racist and xenophobic
attitudes and policy remain widespread globally – corrupting policing
practices, education and social programs, and policy responses to asylum
seekers and refugees, who are now fleeing their homelands in numbers
unprecedented since the Second World War. These are just two exam-
ples, among many others, where the observance of universal human
rights is being systemically undermined.
Nuclear war – which has long been known to precipitate a ‘nuclear
winter’ that would devastate global food production and plunge parts
of the earth into a new ice age – remains a possibility. Similarly,
conventional armed conflict – whether between or within states –
has killed hundreds of millions and caused profound social, economic
and geostrategic transformations across regional and global scales.
And the world remains apprehensive about a range of other threats,
from chemical weapons use by states or terrorists, genocide and crimes
against humanity, virulent viruses that can leap across the barrier
between animal and human and quickly cross borders, to cybercrime
and attacks on vulnerable systems that the world increasingly depends
upon to manage the rhythms of social and industrial life (Austin
et al. 2015).
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 85

THE GLOBALISATION OF INSECURITY: MORAL

AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

These examples of the transnationalisation, globalisation, and even

‘planetisation’ of insecurity raise a number of profound intellectual, ethi-
cal, and policy concerns. Firstly, there is a problem of the relative concern
and attention paid to particular forms of insecurity by political elites
(complacency about gender violence and nuclear war, on the one hand,
and hyper-vigilance in relation to Daesh, refugees or Ebola, on the other).
Without denying that these examples are significant challenges, this poli-
ticisation of particular kinds of insecurity based on political ideology
and global privilege misrecognises the relative threat and severity of
various structures and systems of insecurity. It also contributes to bad
policy responses and ineffective systems of global governance. Secondly,
there is a problem of how adequately scholars and policymakers under-
stand the complex roots and sources of such forms of insecurity. Too
often, insecurities are seen as discrete events and symptoms, and policy is
targeted at their most visible and immediate manifestations. We seem less
able (or more to the point, less willing) to identify and analyse the under-
lying systems of which such insecurities are the product, and less able and
willing again to address and transform those systems in the interests of
global security. Thirdly, is a problem that is the major focus of this book:
how to effectively, justly, and fairly respond to systemic, globalised forms
of insecurity with improved approaches to national policy and regional and
global governance. Given several deeply worrying trends in global security –
a deterioration in the strategic relationships and trust between major
powers; the persistence of conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen,
Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia with its disproportionate impact on
civilians; unprecedented numbers of forced migrants and refugees; annual
terrorism casualties reaching the tens of thousands; and the dire predictions
of climate and earth system scientists – it is right to express concern that our
national and global approaches to global insecurity are in grave crisis.
It is no longer acceptable to either view the current situation as some-
how routine, or see it through the lens of a selective and self-interested
alarmism. It makes no sense to privilege the security of our own state, our
allies, or states themselves, when so many other communities and forms of
life are also suffering grave insecurity. Given the distributed and systemic
and interrelated nature of contemporary insecurities, it makes no sense
to privilege any one ‘referent’ of security; rather, reflecting the enmeshed
86 A. BURKE

coexistence of states, human communities, and ecologies in ways that

extend to the entire biosphere, we have to find ways to collectively and
cooperatively secure the entire mesh of planetary existence and life (Burke
2016: 148). At the same time, it is also important to distinguish between
the global as a question of scale and the global as a question of scope (or
reach). As Jon Western explains, insecurities that are global in scale (such
as climate change, nuclear war, economic crisis, and gender and racial
inequality) ‘affect a larger set of actors . . . with effects that are more widely
dispersed and challenging’. They also ‘tend to be more connected in
diverse and convoluted ways with an array of emergent properties that
make them more difficult to diagnose and to develop governance struc-
tures to control or mitigate’. Alternatively, he suggests, ‘issues that are
global in reach may also have high degrees of complexity, but they tend
to have more localised causes and effects and require a different set of
governance structures to address them’ (Western 2016: 100).
The globalisation of insecurity is not just a transformation of scale and
scope. The twentieth century saw the creation of integrated and chaotic
global processes that have transformed nature itself and made the world
confront the enormity of humankind’s strange new powers. Imperialism
and settler colonialism brought about the destruction of indigenous
societies on five continents and the global slave trade. In the Holocaust
and other genocides, we have witnessed the attempt to exterminate entire
races, cultures, and political communities. The nuclear age and the global
ecological crisis have together ushered in what earth system scientists and
social theorists have called the ‘Anthropocene’: a new geologic epoch in
which humans – through processes of imperialism, warfare, and industria-
lised capitalism – have become a geophysical force that is reshaping the
planet and erasing the boundaries between humanity and nature (Burke
et al. 2016; Harrington 2016; Youatt 2014; Dalby 2015). In short, the
problem is not merely one of scale and management – although that is
certainly challenging enough – but also one of moral enormity and ethical
response.
An awareness of moral enormity implies an awareness of the enormous
impact on earth and each other that our forms of collective political and
industrial power have had and will continue to have; it demands the
development of ethical and political principles that can honour our sys-
temic enmeshment with and impact on the planet, and that can appreciate
our historical and cultural differences along with our common humanity
and dependence on the earth. And, given the tremendous future duration
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 87

of the changes to the biosphere that nuclear isotopes and climate change
are creating (from hundreds to millions of years), this ethical awareness
must honour our obligation to future generations of human beings,
plants, and animals. Such a situation requires an ethics that can grapple
with the dilemma that the philosopher Hannah Arendt identified: ‘[E]very
act that is once made its appearance stays with mankind as a potentiality
long after its actuality has become a thing of the past . . . the unprece-
dented, once it has appeared, may become a precedent for the future’
(Arendt 2005: 98–99). The challenge this poses to our current concepts
and architecture of collective security and global governance cannot be
underestimated.

REDEFINING GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH COSMOPOLITANISM

In political theory and philosophy, cosmopolitanism means more than just
cities or worlds of harmoniously mixed races and cultures, or sophisticated
and travelled citizens. It is a particular understanding of the globe as a
moral unity shared by humans with myriad differences but a common fate.
It foregrounds the dignity and rights of the individual, the obligations that
we owe to others beyond our shores, and is committed to an enduring
peace and sometimes the elimination of war entirely. It posits that all
humans are fundamentally equal and that situations of hierarchy, author-
itarianism, and social inequality are morally and politically unacceptable.
And, it suggests that forms of political community and institutionalisation
should exceed and govern the state by restricting their sovereign freedoms
with universal values and law and by binding them into systems of coop-
eration and governance to solve global and planetary problems. While it is
a predominantly humanistic and anthropocentric theory, it often extends
moral community and obligations to the non-human, animals, ecosystems,
and the earth as a biospheric whole (Held 2010: 14–16).
The theory of security cosmopolitanism, which I first published in 2013
and has been developed and debated in a range of different fora, reflects
many of these tenets. It was specifically developed to analyse and suggest
better responses to the systemic and globalised nature of insecurity today
(Burke 2013, 2015; Burke et al. 2014; Nyman and Burke 2016; Critical
Studies On Security 2013, 2015). Analytically, it develops a broader
and more intuitive definition of security and insecurity that can take in
complex globalised processes, and expands beyond the nation-state to
humanity, ecosystems, and non-human animals. This definition focuses
88 A. BURKE

specifically on shared vulnerability and harm. It defines insecurity as ‘pro-

cesses that threaten or cause serious harm to human beings, communities,
and ecosystems; harm to their structures of living, dignity, and survival’. In
turn, it defines security ‘as coordinated and multilayered efforts to elim-
inate serious and avoidable harms and protect humanity and the biosphere
from them; as efforts to create legal and structural frameworks that work
to build security and ward off disastrous outcomes in a systemic fashion’.
This reflects both the strategic and industrial enmeshment of human
communities and ecologies, often very destructively, and a moral perspec-
tive that insists both that all humans have an equal right to security and
that ecosystems have a prior right to security from destructive and exploi-
tative human activities (Burke 2015: 191). Security cosmopolitanism also
argues that while insecurities may manifest around particular events and
actors, they are the result of complex systemic processes with roots long in
the past and effects that will extend well into the future:

When states draw on the same water sources, experience a common climate,
depend on global prices and currency values, transmit conflict and weapons
beyond their borders, and threaten and affect the lives of others far away,
enclosed or circular models of moral community – however generous – fail
to reflect an urgent reality. It is no longer a matter of deciding whether
national interests and global goods must clash, but of honouring the com-
mon space of life and death that we have created (Burke 2013: 17–19).

The policy implications of this perspective are profound. Even as we

recognise that many states face significant security dilemmas and fears,
states have a responsibility to cooperate internationally in the global and
planetary interest and to harmonise their security interests with those
of humanity and the planet. This no doubt sounds idealistic, but it is
a strategic necessity. There is also a necessity to improve the quality,
accountability, ethics, and effectiveness of global governance regimes
around complex interlocking structures of insecurity. This problem is
discussed below. Furthermore, there is a need both to expand the mem-
bership and accountability of global institutions to communities and
ecosystems (whether this be by directly expanding their membership, or
opening their forums to the views of NGOs and affected communities),
and to recognise and encourage grassroots community action and political
participation that can shape national, regional and global governance and
directly contribute to creating local systems of security.
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 89

Distributed and multi-layered systems of insecurity require distributed

and multi-layered systems of response and amelioration: this is a vision of
global security governance that works at multiple levels, and is focused on
creating enduring structures of security for communities and ecosystems.
My approach is somewhat of a departure from the traditionally anthropo-
centric focus of cosmopolitan ethics, and has been described by one author
(Mitchell 2016) as a ‘cosmopolitics’; however, it hardly makes sense for
cosmopolitanism to ignore humanity’s enmeshment with the biosphere or
deny non-humans practical or moral agency. There is a widespread and
commonsense ethical regard amongst human communities for non-
human animals, forests and oceans – for their living vitality, beauty,
and intrinsic moral worth – and these are a worthwhile counterpoint to
instrumental approaches that see animals and environments merely as
commodities and resources. This is why, in this age, a strategic and
ethical perspective converges.

SECURITY INEQUALITY, GOVERNANCE, AND ETHICS

In 2003 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a
report from a group of eminent persons to assess the new landscape of
international insecurity and recommend reforms to our collective security
system – that is, to global security governance. The report by the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, made a valuable contribution by broadening
the international security agenda beyond interstate conflict and weapons
of mass destruction to take in grave human rights abuses and war crimes,
development, terrorism, and transnational crime, and what they called
‘economic and social threats – poverty, infectious disease, and environmen-
tal degradation’. The report was also criticised in the General Assembly and
by scholars for various shortcomings, such as failing to identify the structural
drivers of conflict and crimes against humanity, or by treating development
too narrowly as a security concern to the northern West (Fishel 2013;
Duffield 2007).
One striking admission in the report acknowledged the considerable
inequality in global security governance:

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive

as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus
lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their
90 A. BURKE

survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people

believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for
protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental
challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without
mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help
will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual
gain will elude us (High Level Panel 2004: 2).

Inequalities are visible at many levels in global security governance. One is

the makeup and voting system of the United Nations Security Council:
five states who were allied victors in the Second World War are permanent
members (the ‘P5’) and possess a veto on a majority vote by the Council.
The other ten members must compete for rotating seats that last 2 years
only, and require an increasingly expensive campaigning process. In effect
this has meant that the Security Council can decide what the international
security agenda is – what collective security is – and both promote and
retard normative and ethical innovation in global governance. Hence it
has broken normative ground by creating international criminal tribunals
and voting for humanitarian interventions, but been almost silent on the
question of Palestine, climate change, the world economy, and global
ecological crisis – despite the fact that these are amongst the most dramatic
and portentous issues of our age. Another inequality is between the
coercive and agenda-setting power of the Council vis-à-vis the much
weaker influence of the General Assembly, despite its universal member-
ship. Inequality is also reproduced by the way that major powers dominate
global economic governance, and exclude most of the world’s nations and
peoples from their deliberations, at the same time as economic governance
is institutionally and politically divorced from questions of security and
ecological sustainability.
Security cosmopolitanism sees this inequality as both a strategic and
ethical problem. To the extent that it prevents an understanding of the
integrated nature of many threats and their systemic roots – and thus
prevents coordinated and effective action – the selective and fractured
nature of global security governance is a global strategic weakness. This
weakness is, in significant part, created by a normative weakness at the
heart of the global security regime: most major global insecurity institu-
tions – whether we consider UN bodies, the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, or international criminal justice – are structured in a state-centric
way. They privilege the interests of states, ensure that they are the
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91

dominant (if often the only) actors, and rely on bargaining and lowest
common denominator objectives and results. They thus reflect a global
power structure that is biased towards the interests of large-scale capitalism
(especially agribusiness, fossil fuels, banking, and information), and major
state powers (and their allies) who have the preponderant share of military
capacity and GDP. This kind of institutional and normative architecture
also fails to grapple with the damage that states do to the security of people
and ecosystems by virtue of the sovereign freedoms and jurisdiction that
they enjoy: they can abuse human rights, plunder fisheries, damage eco-
systems, and even pollute entire regions with relative impunity. Even
developments that have seemed normatively progressive, such as the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the doctrine
of the Responsibility to Protect, have plausibly been accused of being
distorted by the interests of major powers and thus failing their underlying
ethical vision (Thakur 2015; Fishel 2013; Bellamy 2011).
Security cosmopolitanism seeks to counter these failings with some key
ethical principles. Firstly, it insists that ‘the responsibility of all states and
security actors is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings
in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political
activity with the integrity of global ecosystems’. Secondly, it insists that
‘all states and security actors have fundamental responsibilities to future
generations and the long-term survival of global ecosystems: to consider
the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time’.
Thirdly, it instructs security actors to ‘act as if both the principles and
consequences of the action will become global, across space and through
time, and act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human
beings closer’ (Burke 2013: 21–23).
Actors here are defined somewhat broadly: as all state or non-state
agents whose ‘actions will affect the security of others, especially if they
will affect the security of many others’. Thus security actors can be states
and their security agencies (military, intelligence, diplomatic etc.), inter-
national organisations, NGOs, churches and faith groups, political orga-
nisations, corporations, and even local communities. The three principles
aim to serve ‘the overarching ethical end of security: to secure all human
beings and the ecosystems that they affect and depend upon for survival’,
because ‘without serious efforts to secure all, none can ever be secure’
(Burke et al. 2014: 15–16).
This ethics is thus concerned both to reduce the inequality in the global
security order – inequalities between states, between states and communities,
92 A. BURKE

and between human beings and ecosystems – and to insist that security
actors understand and cooperatively work on the systemic underpinnings of
major threats and forms of insecurity.1 This work means looking far into the
future and taking on ethical obligations for future generations and future
ecological transformations, whose degraded conditions of life are being laid
down now. Cosmopolitan ethics has traditionally expanded ethical concern
spatially, to larger and larger structures of human community; security
cosmopolitanism, importantly, extends ethical concern through time.

COSMOPOLITAN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE REFORM

On one level, it seems extraordinary that global security governance works
at all. States all too often approach international organisations and coop-
eration from a strictly national point of view. There can be no agreement
about what global security is because every state interprets things in terms
of its own national security, and these interpretations change over time
and with the domestic political winds. Effective global cooperation falters
or is stymied entirely because states interpret globalised problems through
the lens of their own national interest or indeed the sectoral interest of
powerful actors, such as corporations, who have captured or subverted the
state. Normative and institutional reform occurs at a snail’s pace, or does
not occur at all, even as new problems emerge that outpace the ability
of our institutions to cope with them. This is one important facet of
an unfortunate reality. Against this pessimism, it can be recognised that
global institutionalisation and the creation of new international law –
which recently saw the adoption of the Rome Statute on the ICC (includ-
ing a crime of aggression), a landmines convention, and the declaration on
the rights of indigenous peoples – occurs because enough states, often
under pressure from their publics and groups of global citizens, recognise
that threats to life, rights, and security have emerged that cannot be
handled by states or alliances alone. It is possible to argue that the over-
whelming trend in international law, global governance, and regional
governance is cosmopolitan in nature; however, power politics and
inequality still exist and still have the power to sabotage and weaken new
institutions and law. However, it must also be said that if we understand
globalised insecurities as systemic and linked in nature – as processes with
multiple and often anonymous roots and actors – global institutionalisa-
tion, cooperation, and action must be one important part of responding
adequately to the myriad crises that we face.
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 93

Security cosmopolitanism suggests that the design and functioning of

international institutions must reflect a better ethics, be more democratic
and accountable, and be better organised so as to deal with these systemic
roots of global insecurity. Across so many issue areas – from gender, to
terrorism, nuclear threats, environmental crisis and biosecurity – this book
demonstrates that effective systemic responses are lacking. This occurs for
multiple reasons: power politics, poor institutional design, and inadequate
analytical and ethical paradigms in policy-making and global governance.
Comprehensively analysing this situation requires many more words than
are available here. However, we can identify some key problems and areas
needing urgent reform.

Common Global Ends

We should not devalue contestation and debate about collective security
priorities and efforts. This contributes to improved accountability.
However, value pluralism, when taken to extremes, is extremely dama-
ging to global security: it weakens human rights, conflict prevention, and
environmental protection in systems of global governance. According to
principle three of this cosmopolitan security ethics, there are common
values and commitments that underpin a functioning and responsive
global security system which can provide security universally to commu-
nities, states, and ecosystems. These values and commitments make it
possible for humanity to flourish and coexist. They are the essential
substrate of our common and enmeshed global life. In particular, they
are our only hope in collectively grappling with the terrible ecological
catastrophe that looms this century. In these key areas – human rights,
ecological protection, social justice, and the prevention of violence –
we need to harmonise norms and ends, even as we debate how best to
realise them.

Deepen Accountability, Membership, and Responsiveness

Security cosmopolitanism challenges us to ask: who and what is global
security governance for? It challenges us to look at what global governance
does and does not do, and to look at what states have specifically conspired
to prevent it from doing. Is it structured around the interests of the most
powerful organisations and states, or is it receptive to the needs of com-
munities and ecosystems, to the powerless and invisible? The state-centric
94 A. BURKE

membership of the United Nations and key regional security organisations

narrows representation to a tiny elite, and their structures and voting
procedures seem perpetually to hamper effective and just responses to
the most pressing global problems. Exhibit A would be the stranglehold
the major powers hold on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, delaying
disarmament, and denying consideration of the many humanitarian con-
sequences of nuclear weapons and the broader nuclear weapons and
energy complexes. Exhibit B would be the terrible weakness and lateness
of global efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an effort to prevent dan-
gerous climate change and disastrous ocean acidification. The Paris climate
agreement of 2015 opened up a potential alternative path, but the world is
still careering towards a four-degree world. This list could continue
through the entire alphabet and around again, and touch on the terrible
treatment of refugees around the world, the impunity afforded war crim-
inals and structural flaws in International Humanitarian Law (Burke 2014;
International Crisis Group 2010; Mason 2012), the dysfunctional weak-
ness of global economic governance, and more.
We must make global security governance more open and accountable
in two ways. Firstly, it must be opened to forms of insecurity and injustice
that widely exist but so far not been admitted as priorities and concerns. It
must be willing to challenge the powerful in doing so. It has slowly and
grudgingly admitted concerns about the security of women and children;
it has very poorly acknowledged the insecurity of people subject to inter-
nal, intrastate conflicts, only when they cross the most terrible of thresh-
olds; and it is utterly silent on global ecological degradation. Can it shed
its anthropocentric and state-centric bias, to knowledge that ecosystems
have a fundamental right to security from destructive human activities?
Doing so is the first step toward securing the complex mesh of global
cultural and ecological coexistence and entanglement (Barad 2007;
Morton 2010; Mitchell 2014). Secondly, it can open its structures and
membership beyond states. There are arguments to be made that major
ecosystems – such as the Arctic and Antarctic, the Amazon, and the Pacific
Ocean – should have seats in the General Assembly. With others, I have
recommended the consideration of an ‘Earth System Council’, much like
the Security Council but with weaker coercive powers, which would have
the representation of major ecosystems and earth system scientists as well
as states. The deliberative complexity of how representatives for such
regions would be elected and to whom they would be accountable must
be acknowledged, but such ideas should be explored further. More
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 95

generally, global security governance bodies must make their processes

completely transparent and more responsive to NGOs and regional and
local communities.

Integrate Governance Regimes

Global governance regimes cluster around distinct issue areas – the world
economy, security, human rights, development, and the environment –
without developing strong functional and normative inter-linkages. Yet
when we recognise that global life is organised by interpenetrating and
complex social-natural systems, these issues continually interconnect.
In the same way that major powers and corporate interests have colluded
to make individual regime structures weaker, they have colluded to keep
them disconnected. Such disconnection is compounded by the internal
complexity of many global governance regimes.
Global governance of the world economy is extraordinarily weak – it
does little or nothing to restrain financial markets, corruption, tax evasion,
and environmentally damaging corporate practices – and is kept away from
the UN system under the control of a small number of states. It exacer-
bates inequality, and has not encouraged the pricing of carbon emissions
or other environmental externalities. Hence corporations have been able
to frack, burn coal, and engage in extraordinarily damaging environmental
practices in the face of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The contrast between the
Paris Agreement on climate change and the secretive negotiations between
the United States and the European Union of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership or TTIP – which includes ‘Investor-State Dispute
Settlements’ provisions that would allow corporations to sue governments
over environmental and other regulations that damage their profits – is
striking (Williams 2015). Likewise, development remains disconnected
from economic and environmental governance, although the adoption
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 indicates some
progress in integrating them – at least normatively and aspirationally.
However, cosmopolitans would be critical of how conservatively some of
the goals, especially the poverty and climate change goals, are framed
(United Nations 2015). The implementation section of the SDG docu-
ment sets out no plan or even aspiration to clear the global governance
roadblocks to achieving true sustainability. Rather it throws the responsi-
bility onto national governments even as it recognises the elephant in the
96 A. BURKE

room: ‘national development efforts need to be supported by an enabling

international economic environment, including coherent and mutually
supporting world trade, monetary and financial systems, and strengthened
and enhanced global economic governance’ (United Nations 2015:
para 63). It will be an enormously challenging and conflictual process
to reorganise global economic governance so as to integrate it with
the objectives of social justice, equality and earth system repair that the
document sets out.
Global security governance is similarly kept restricted to the narrow
‘hard’ security issues of military conflict and proliferation, or the slightly
broader ‘peace and security’ agenda that has evolved to take in genocide
prevention, conflict impacts on women and children, and peace-building.
Even on this narrow agenda, criticisms of the United Nations Security
Council and other major treaty bodies – such as the NPT – are frequent, as
many of the contributions to this book show. The Security Council has
struggled to manage intrastate conflicts and prevent war crimes, and
International Law does not require states to report decisions to use force
within their borders to the Council. Nor has it ever assumed any mandate
to grapple with questions of strategic stability, conventional arms acquisi-
tion, and spiralling security dilemmas; all of which are a significant drain
on national treasuries and important precursors to major interstate armed
conflict (Burke et al. 2014: 85). It has also consistently refused to connect
its work and structures to the crisis in the global ecology. There was in
2007, under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom, a non-binding
debate in the Council about the security implications of climate change;
however China, speaking for the developing world, opposed its inclusion
on the agenda. It is notable that no resolution of the Council has ever
dealt with an environmental issue (Security Council Press Release 2007;
Scott 2015).

CONCLUSION
At the core of the best global governance innovations has been a combi-
nation of normative innovation, institution-building, openness to new
agendas and wrongs, responsiveness to communities, and robust account-
ability. The evolution of the international human rights regime – from the
conceptualisation of the crime of genocide by Raphael Lemkin in the
1930s, through the adoption of the universal declaration and the four
protocols to the Geneva Conventions, to the creation of the ICC – is an
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 97

example. Yet the many flaws in the promotion and enforcement of inter-
national human rights law show how far short international society still
falls in actually implementing cosmopolitan goals. In the twenty-first
century, the terrible scale and scope of the looming global ecological crisis
means that we no longer have the luxury of waiting many decades for such
a stuttering process to play itself out. By then the oceans will be dead, our
cities will be flooded, and our governance and food systems under terrible
stress. Security cosmopolitanism was formulated with this crisis in mind.
The Sustainable Development Goals are a fascinating and welcome devel-
opment because they implicitly recognise the complex, systemic, and
integrated structure of our common life on this earth, and the threats
that emerge to it from unsustainable, inequitable, and violent systems and
institutions. The document has a distinctively cosmopolitan and post-
human cast to it. The real test is to move beyond such grand declarations:
to see if we can collectively change our governments, corporations, and
global governance systems so that they genuinely support the twin goals of
human dignity and ecological protection that are essential for the future of
life on this planet. Practical reform of this scale, against so many powerful
countervailing forces, will be complex and difficult and will not happen
without conflict.

NOTE
1. Critics have raised questions about the sweeping ambition and obligation of
these ethical principles and wondered if differential real-world state capa-
cities and clashes of interests would not make them difficult to implement.
A detailed response to these criticisms can be read in my contribution to the
book Ethical Security Studies (Burke 2016: 152–157).

REFERENCES
Arendt, H. (2005). Eichmann and the holocaust. London: Penguin.
Austin, G., McConnell, B., & Neutze, J. (2015). Promoting international cyber
norms: A new advocacy forum (New York: East West Institute).
Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway. Durham and London: Duke
University Press.
Bellamy, A. (2011). Global politics and the responsibility to protect: From words to
deeds. London and New York: Routledge.
Burke, A. (2013). Security cosmopolitanism. Critical Studies on Security, 1(1),
13–28.
98 A. BURKE

Burke, A., Sjoberg, L., Cooper, N., Turner, M., & Kaldor, M. (2013). Forum:
Security cosmopolitanism. Critical Studies on Security, 1(1), 13–45.
Burke, A. (2014, 6 August). The law that is no law: War crimes in Gaza. Global
Theory [Blog]. https://worldthoughtworldpolitics.wordpress.com/2014/08/
06/the-law-that-is-no-law-warcrimes-in-gaza/, Last Accessed 23 April 2016.
Burke, A. (2015). Security cosmopolitanism: The next phase. Critical Studies on
Security, 3(2), 190–212.
Burke, A. (2016). The ethical sources of security cosmopolitanism. In S. Nyman &
A. Burke (Eds.), Ethical security studies: A new research agenda (pp. 145–159).
London and New York: Routledge.
Burke, A., Lee-Koo, K., & McDonald, M. (2014). Ethics and global security: A
cosmopolitan approach. London and New York: Routledge.
Burke, A., Fishel, S., Mitchell, A., Dalby, S., & Levine, D. (2016). Planet politics:
A manifesto from the end of IR. Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
44(3), 478–498. doi:10.1177/0305829816636674.
Crouch, T. (2011). The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Cambridge and New
York: Polity Press.
Dalby, S. (2015). Framing the anthropocene: The good, the bad and the ugly. The
Anthropocene Review, 1–19. doi:10.1177/2053019615618681.
Duffield, M. (2007). Development, security and unending war: Governing the
world of peoples. Cambridge: Polity.
Fishel, S. (2013). Theorising violence in the responsibility to protect. Critical
Studies on Security, 1(2), 204–221.
Floyd, R., Dalby, S., Robinson, F., Bilgin, P., Richmond, O., & Burke, A.
(2015). Forum: Security cosmopolitanism. Critical Studies on Security, 3(2),
162–212.
Glezos, S. (2012). The politics of speed: Capitalism, the state and war in an
accelerating world. London and New York: Routledge Interventions.
Global Terrorism Index. (2015). Measuring and understanding the impact of
terrorism. Maryland: Institute for Economics and Peace.
Harrington, C. (2016). The ends of the world: International relations and the
anthropocene. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 44(3), 478–498.
Held, D. (2010). Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and realities. Cambridge and New York:
Polity Press.
High Level Panel. (2004). A more secure world: Our shared responsibility: Report of
the High-level panel on threats, challenges and change, general assembly A/59/
565. New York: United Nations.
International Crisis Group (2010, May). War crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report
191, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/
191-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka.aspx, last accessed 23 April 2016.
 5 SECURITY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99

Mason, V. (2012). No permission to shoot in Gaza is necessary’: Israeli state terror

against Palestinians in Gaza during operation cast lead. In S. Poynting &
D. Whyte (Eds.), Counterterrorism and state political violence: The ‘war on
terror’ as terror (pp. 116–138). London and New York: Routledge.
Mitchell, A. (2014). Only human? A worldly approach to security. Security
Dialogue, 45(1), 5–21.
Mitchell, A. (2016). Is IR going extinct? The European Journal of International
Relations. Online first. doi:10.1177/1354066116632853.
Morton, T. (2010). The ecological thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Nyman, S., & Burke, A. (eds). (2016). Ethical security studies: A new research
agenda. London and New York: Routledge.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press.
Scott, S. V. (2015). Implications of climate change for the UN Security Council:
Mapping the range of potential policy responses. International Affairs, 91(5),
1317–1333.
Security Council Press Release. (2007). Security council holds first-ever debate on
impact of climate change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers. S/C 9000.
5663rd Meeting. http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm.
Stiglitz, J., & Kaldor, M. (2013). Quest for security: Protection without protection-
ism and the challenge of global governance. New York and Chichester: Columbia
University Press.
Thakur, T. (2015, 5 November). Belling the International Criminal Court.
Australian Outlook. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_out
look/belling-the-international-criminal-court/.
True, J. (2012). The political economy of violence against women. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press.
United Nations. (2004). A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. New York: United
Nations.
United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2013 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. Resolution A/RES/70/1 of the General Assembly
adopted on 25 September 2015.
Western, J. (2016). What is global in Global Security Studies? Journal of Global
Security Studies, 1(1), 99–101. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv012.
Williams, L. (2015, 6 October). What is TTIP? And six reasons why the answer
should scare you. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/
comment/what-is-ttip-and-six-reasons-why-the-answer-should-scare-you-
9779688.html, accessed 17 May 2016.
Youatt, R. (2014). Interspecies relations, international relations: rethinking anthro-
pocentric politics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 43(1), 207–223.
100 A. BURKE

Anthony Burke is Professor of International and Political Studies, University of

New South Wales, Australia. He is coauthor (with Katrina Lee-Koo and Matt
McDonald) of Ethics and Global Security: A Cosmopolitan Approach (2014,
Routledge), author of Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (2008,
Cambridge University Press), Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against
The Other (2007, Routledge), and Uranium (2017, Polity Press). He is also
co-editor (with Jonna Nyman) of Ethical Security Studies (2016, Routledge) and
(with Matt McDonald) Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific (2007, Manchester
University Press).
 PART II

Global Agendas
 CHAPTER 6

Global Ecology, Social Nature,

and Governance

Simon Dalby

The Anthropocene is different. It is one of those moments when a scientific

realization, like Copernicus grasping that the earth goes round the sun, could
fundamentally change people’s view of things far beyond science. It means more
than rewriting some textbooks. It means thinking afresh about the relationship
between people and their world and acting accordingly.

(The Economist, May 28th, 2011, p. 80)

The first two terms in the title of this chapter are not especially noteworthy to
readers in the second decade of the third millennium, but they are relatively
new in the human experience. Ecology is about the relationships of living
things to their surrounding context, the food, energy, water, and predatory
hazards that threaten any living thing. It is only in the last half-century that it
has become clear just how interconnected that environment is, and how long-
distance connections have important if not immediately obvious consequences
for ecosystems. In modern societies nature has usually been contrasted to
society or understood as the context and backdrop to human activity rather
than being conjoined with it. That assumption of separation too is no longer
tenable in contemporary thinking.

S. Dalby (*)
Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, Canada
e-mail: sdalby@gmail.com

© The Author(s) 2017 103

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_6
104 S. DALBY

This is the case because the sheer scale of human activity is now drama-
tically shaping what until recently was understood to be the natural world.
Nature is being reconfigured; species moved about all over the planet;
ecosystems demolished and replaced by fields, roads, and towns. Taken
together these dramatic changes have convinced many earth system scien-
tists that we are now living in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene,
or the human age (Steffen et al. 2011). Nature is increasingly social in the
crucial sense that it’s being remade by human activities, and numerous
matters beyond the especially high-profile question of climate change are
part of the process. Given how artificial human arrangements now are,
security too has become increasingly enmeshed with the globalisation
processes that are dramatically changing global ecology (Stiglitz and
Kaldor 2013).
Governance, the third term in the chapter title, might appear to be even
more unremarkable. But some reflection on what it now means in light of
global ecology and the increasingly social forms of nature that matter to
humanity is also in order. ‘The term governance refers to efforts to assert
authority, but it also connotes the quest for legitimacy in that process, and
it should not be confused with the simple administration of government’
(Stoett 2012, p. 20). It is not just politics, the fraught and contested
arguments about how human communities ought to rule themselves, or
be ruled, matters of coercion and consent, force, fraud, legitimate author-
ity, states, municipalities, and treaty arrangements. It is in part about these
things, but more than that it is now also about expert procedures, institu-
tions, technical practices, industrial standards, trade rules and, crucially,
numerous management metrics, and complex financial calculations. Many
of these technical procedures and calculations escape the contentious
debates of formal politics, but they shape the practicalities of contempor-
ary human life profoundly even if we rarely notice such pervasive things as
the corporate management certifications of the International Organization
for Standardization.
Matters of climate change in particular are now discussed in terms of
such things as emissions, carbon credits, ecological services, clean devel-
opment mechanisms, green funds, and common but differentiated respon-
sibilities. The huge annual conferences of the parties (COPs) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are fre-
quently tied up in interminable discussions of procedural matters and
semantic arguments about particular terms. All this is apparently govern-
ance, but after 20 years of discussions since the UNFCCC was adopted in
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 105

1994, annual emissions of greenhouse gases were close to 60 per cent

higher than they were when this process got underway. Clearly the danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, that the UNFCCC
was established to ward off, is upon us, and as a governance mechanism
this arrangement has so far clearly failed.
Questions concerning how climate change will play out in the next few
decades are now about how humanity reshapes landscapes to simulta-
neously reduce greenhouse gas emissions while making agriculture, cities,
and infrastructure less vulnerable to the extreme weather events that are
becoming more frequent. Ecology has gone global and social activities
are reshaping nature (Whitehead 2014).
Understanding human actions in this framework, viewing ourselves as
shaping the future in the new circumstances we have albeit most inadver-
tently created, the age of the Anthropocene, requires both a shift in how
we visualise the world and, once that is accomplished, hard thinking about
how to bridge what Victor Galaz (2014) calls ‘the Anthropocene gap’
between existing technology and political arrangements on the one hand
and on the other, the rapidly changing social nature in which we now
make our lives. The future will be all about change, and governance is
increasingly a matter of how this will be shaped, and by whom towards
what kind of future global social nature. Welcome to the Anthropocene!

COLD WAR, GLOBAL CLIMATE

While global ecology might be taken for granted now, it is worth empha-
sising that the emergence of the conceptualisation of the ‘global’ in terms
that might be related to threats and risks that might somehow be amen-
able to management, or to practices of security, has a history that relates to
the rapid changes in politics and technology through the twentieth cen-
tury (Dalby 2013a). Nuclear weapons, long-range bombers and then
missiles suggested new vulnerabilities beyond the aerial destruction in
the 1940s. Then the dangers of nuclear radiation carried around the
world from bomb tests, suggested increasingly shared vulnerabilities.
United Nations institutions on health and agriculture, and food shortages
in India in particular in the 1960s generated concerns for food supplies
at the global scale. World War II generated a rapid expansion of industrial
capabilities and concerns about resource supplies for these industries,
a matter that took on global perspectives as the cold war progressed
and the United States in particular looked worldwide for minerals and
106 S. DALBY

subsequently fuel supplies for its war machine in particular and its econ-
omy more generally (Robertson 2012). Fears of shortages of materials,
population growth and the ability of the world to feed rapidly growing
numbers were keys to the emergence of a perspective on economic and
technological problems understood as global.
This sense of the global, long before the term ‘globalisation’ became
common parlance, also relates to the growth of sciences, especially geo-
physics, and the emergence of rocketry, satellites and the ability to observe
the planet from earth orbit and further afield, technical practices that were
key to geopolitics in the cold war and subsequently to matters of global
ecology and climate change. Fears of nuclear radiation were compounded
by concerns about ozone depletion as a result of weapon detonations in
the atmosphere, well before the problems with chlorofluorocarbon caused
depletion came to the fore in the 1970s. Perhaps most important in the
emergence of a sense of the global, because of its practical use in everyday
life, was the emergence of meteorology as a science that first had to link up
vast amounts of data collected around the world and then find ways to
integrate this immediately to make short-term forecasts (Edwards 2010).
This science subsequently complimented climate science as it too increas-
ingly used models to try to understand the dynamics of what emerged as a
globally integrated system. While satellite images are now routine in daily
weather forecasts such things are impossible without reliable rockets to
loft the appropriate cameras, other sensors and data transmission systems
into orbit that span the globe too.
In the late 1960s the NASA Apollo program sent spacecraft to the
moon and allowed photographs of the planet to be broadcast globally on
the then nascent global television networks to an environmental move-
ment anxious to curtail pollution as well as population growth. The iconic
image of the blue marble earth suspended against a black background
emphasised the theme of the Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos (1972)
unofficial report to the Stockholm UN conference on the human
environment, ‘Only One Earth’. Subsequent concerns about ozone
depletion, and then the possibilities of a nuclear winter phenomenon
in the early 1980s should the superpowers unleash their arsenals in a
major war, emphasised the interconnected vulnerabilities of humanity.
The fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and concerns about
burning rainforests linked to worries about climate change in the
1980s in a discourse of the global atmosphere. The conference on
the ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 107

June 1988 in Toronto sketched out many of the themes that now
shape the current international discussion, well before globalisation
was used as a term to summarise the increasingly interconnected nature
of the global economy in the 1990s.
All these themes came together in the Earth Summit held in Rio de
Janeiro in June of 1992, a combination of formal inter-governmental
meetings as what was effectively a world fair for environmental move-
ments. This huge conference produced a number of agreements, including
the UNFCCC that was ratified by most states in the following two years,
and an ambitious plan, Agenda 21, for reworking global governance in
terms of sustainable development (Grubb 1993). This plan suggested that
widespread local government and numerous civil society organisations
should be involved in working to shape development to be ecologically
sensitive to local conditions. The summit also promoted an elegant
summary of environmental goals for the planet in the ‘Earth Charter’
(see http://earthcharter.org/discover/the-earth-charter/), a document
that is now largely but not completely forgotten.
Critics of the jamboree in Rio were quick to argue that for all the green
language and aspirational statements to global cooperation the practical-
ities of agreements were actually rather limited and what was agreed to was
in fact congruent with the political agendas of the major states and
the growing power of corporations shaping both climate and forestry
agreements (Sachs 1993). Global ecology was, so it seemed at the time
to its critics, a project that facilitated the extension of arrangements to use
market mechanisms and corporate definitions of sustainability rather than
to involve local communities, indigenous peoples or economically mar-
ginal populations in determining their future. The editors of the Ecologist
Magazine (1993) bluntly asked ‘Whose Common Future?’ suggesting
that the Brundtland Commission’s formulation of sustainable develop-
ment in terms of ‘Our Common Future’ five years prior to Rio (World
Commission on Environment and Development 1987), was nowhere
close to globally inclusive.
Much of the political impetus towards implementing the measures
discussed in Rio was lost over the following few years, not least by the
rapid expansion of the global economy, and in particular the growing
corporate interconnections and financialisation of a world increasingly
dominated by doctrines of neoliberalism and its supposedly market prin-
ciples of governance. The critics of the Rio process turned out to be mostly
right about its agenda. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the rapid
108 S. DALBY

growth of Chinese manufacturing marked both the deindustrialisation of

parts of North America and Europe and the expansion of global trade. In
part too globalisation has been about so called free trade agreements that
constrain government actions by facilitating corporate legal actions against
states that legislate environmental and labour matters, or attempt local
economic development policies that can be claimed to be discriminatory in
trade terms.
Protests about the increasingly unaccountable decisions made by
international organisations, the World Trade Organization in parti-
cular, and the rising power of global corporations relative to national
governments coalesced into a movement against globalisation in the
1990s, one that lead to widespread protests and increasingly mili-
tarised policing. Environmentalists were a key part of this being
especially concerned about the decreasing capabilities, and crucially
the willingness, of governments to enforce environmental regulations in
the face of corporate power, and the apparent ability of businesses to
move to other jurisdictions should regulations not be written to their
liking.

GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL NATURE

A major difficulty with such formulations of globalisation was that it
frequently conflated numerous cross border phenomena with practices
that are perhaps more usefully labelled neoliberalism. The monetisation
of many things, reduction of state capacities, privatisation, the use of
market mechanisms as modes of governance, and the expansion of
numerous complicated financial instruments to handle indebtedness are
related to growing inequalities and frequently the reduction of the ability
of state rulers to control economic or social policies within their suppo-
sedly autonomous territories (Harvey 2005). This shifting geography is
part of the concern with globalisation, as are the consequences of de-
industrialisation and the suppression of wage rates in North America in
particular as a consequence of the outsourcing. All of which is directly
related to the environmental disruptions caused by the ever-larger
extractions of resources from rural environments, both in the form of
mines and wells and the transformation of relatively ‘natural’ ecosystems
into farms and plantations. Humans are now the largest geomorphological
forces on earth.
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 109

While European modernisation had set many of these processes in

motion globalisation has accelerated them while distancing consumption
from the consequences of the extractions needed to supply it.

The global spread of capitalist markets, aided by new communication

and transportation technologies, has radically accentuated the compres-
sion of space and time that is the hallmark of the modernization process.
Local place and time are increasingly overlaid with abstract space and
time, producing more abstract social relations along with a biophysical
world that is increasingly exploited, disassembled, transported, reas-
sembled, and consumed in different parts of the planet. (Christoff and
Eckersley 2013: 162)

These abstract social relations, and such things as the computations that
equate carbon emissions from different circumstances into one metric,
obscure local conditions and frequently accelerate the dispossession and
transformation of peoples and places.
In Saskia Sassen’s (2014) recent evocative formulation, the com-
plexities of financial and political processes frequently have brutal
results for people suffering ‘expulsion’ from the global financial system
and its economic processes. She highlights two processes that over the
last three decades have marked what is frequently called globalisation.
First is the rise of what she calls extreme zones, where key economic
activities are concentrated, such as outsourced manufacturing zones or
plantation agriculture production or large mining enterprises that are
networked through the rise of global cities that transcend the old
geographies of North and South, East and West. Second is the rise
of financial mechanisms that securitise numerous things in complicated
instruments such as derivatives with all sorts of effects, frequently far
from those intended. The global flows of notional wealth in the
electronic trading systems of the present accentuate the mobility of
capital.
These two processes, the frequently brutal transformation of particular
places by the complicated logics of financial instruments that are directed
from afar in the global city network, and the expansion of advanced
industrial and financial mechanisms at the expense of traditional capitalist
arrangements, have destroyed many national industrial production
arrangements. They have moved the economies of many places towards
service sector employment and away from consumer-based growth.
110 S. DALBY

The resultant export of jobs is also a problem laid at the feet of globalisa-
tion. The extraction of resources in many places is now more important
than traditional manufacturing, a process especially marked in the
Australian and Canadian economies. All of which also makes political
protests by the dispossessed, those who have been expelled, in Sassen’s
terms, more difficult given the absence of an obvious geographical focal
point at which to express grievances. Local protests about parks, preserva-
tion, and pollution continue in many places, but connecting these actions
together into effective global governance and social change remains very
difficult.
As the rapid melting of polar ice caps and permafrost illustrate,
material transformations are afoot, the causes of which are frequently
distant from the consequences. While this is clearly a matter of glo-
balisation in the sense of the global carboniferous economy causing
change, how sustainability is to be geographically designated in these
circumstances isn’t so easy. Traditional notions of parks and preserved
areas understood human presence as the problem to be avoided,
pristine conditions required the absence of at least some forms of
human activity. But now in the face of climate change in particular
and numerous other boundary crossing pollutants and disruptions,
stable geographical enclosed areas are obviously not a very useful
template for governance for many things considered environmental
(Dalby 2014). They are not a very useful template for considering
security in its various forms either; thinking in terms of global ecology
points directly to the transboundary sources of climate change as well
as the importance of specific extractive activities in particular places to
supply global markets.
These processes all involve the wholesale transformation of places
and landscapes. The scale of industrial production and the resource
extractions that fuel and supply the global economy is now clearly
changing how the earth system functions (Whitehead 2014).
Concerns about climate change, rising carbon dioxide levels, disap-
pearing ice caps and glaciers as well as vegetation changes, rivers
being dammed and whole new assemblages of species indicate very
clearly that we live in increasingly artificial circumstances in the
appropriately named Anthropocene (Steffen et al. 2011). Which raises
the very difficult questions of what needs to be done to shape the
future of the planetary system to make a sustainable earth for future
generations of humanity.
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 111

VISUALISING GEOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY

The discussion of earth system analyses has made very clear that we can no
longer make assumptions about an environment separate from human
activity; the rapidly rising presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
is simple empirical evidence of this. Nature and society, long separated in
modern thinking can no longer be treated in this way if ecological science
is to be taken seriously as a mode of thinking and the basis for serious
policy advocacy and political action. As had become clear by the end of the
twentieth century, we live in a hybrid world of social nature (Castree and
Braun 2001), one that is an integrated system of which human action is a
rapidly expanding component:

Crucial to the emergence of this perspective has been the dawning awareness
of two fundamental aspects of the nature of the planet. The first is that the
Earth itself is a single system, within which the biosphere is an active
essential component. In terms of a sporting analogy, life is a player, not a
spectator. Second, human activities are now so pervasive and profound in
their consequences that they affect the Earth at a global scale in complex,
interactive and accelerating ways; humans now have the capacity to alter the
Earth System in ways that threaten the very processes and components, both
biotic and abiotic, upon which humans depend. (IGBP 2001: 4)

Getting climate change in particular into appropriate focus relates to the

larger shifting visualisations of the world currently underway. Globalisation
is in part a matter of an emerging sense of a globe as an interconnected
planetary system. Science, from the early tentative efforts to construct a
global network of meteorological stations, through to ever more complex
satellite observations systems and computer models of climate and weather
systems has been part of the cultural shift to a greater sense of globality.
Global data, and the efforts to make data global in Edwards’ (2010)
phrasing, are part of the increasing sense of a single planetary system. All
this is now powerfully reinforced by both the discussions of climate systems
and the ability to visualise the planet in novel ways, beyond the static image
of the blue marble suspended against a background of black emptiness
(Cosgrove 2001).
This assumption that politics is played out in a single planetary system
in which dominance is endlessly sought by actors with some sort of
geographical ‘home base’, is as Agnew (2003) has long emphasised, a
key part of the logic that informs geopolitics. But the point that the earth
112 S. DALBY

system perspective demands be taken seriously is that this notion of

geopolitics, of a flat earth with competing territorial entities vying for
supremacy, is now seriously outdated (Dalby 2014). It is so both because
of the compelling necessity to deal with dramatic ecological change and
because that ecological change is itself changing the terms of geopolitical
rivalry (Hommel and Murphy 2013). We are in circumstances that might
better be thought of as a matter of geopolitical ecology where humanity is
remaking the context for politics rather than reacting to an already given
context that shapes political possibilities (Brauch et al. 2011).
This requires looking much more carefully at how the global economy
is producing commodities and exploiting numerous specific environ-
ments in search of both supplies and commodities and also using parti-
cular places to dispose of the garbage and pollutants that result. How
trade agreements specify the terms of production, and how patents are
honoured or not, shape what gets produced, how, and where. The
assumption running through all this neoliberal thinking is still that a
rapidly expanding economy is essential to dealing with poverty and that
development following the North American automobile and urbanisa-
tion trajectory is the appropriate mode of economy for humanity. The
lifestyles that go with this may be subject to some limits, mostly to be
accomplished by increased efficiency in the use of energy and resources,
but modern consumers are the political telos for all societies. Where
consumption generates carbon emissions that may be a problem, so the
logic goes, the solution is not to cut consumption but to offset the
emissions by purchasing ecological services in the global South, funded
by clean development mechanisms and carbon markets (Newell and
Paterson 2010).
The complicated computations of both climate modelling, and of the
financial instruments that calibrate carbon allowances, offsets, sinks, and so
on are not so easy to subject to visual surveillance. The similarities between
the two are instructive; mathematical physicists operate in the financial
control rooms of large investment houses, overseeing ever more compli-
cated algorithms, while climate modellers run ever larger datasets through
computer simulations of future planetary configurations. Out of these
computations come financial and climate calculations and the two are
increasingly interconnected. As Bill McKibben ruefully notes in his high
profile 2012 Rolling Stone magazine article on climate change, the fuel
reserves that count as assets in the balance sheers of petroleum producers
are precisely what will ‘crater the planet’!
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 113

With the vast increase in computational power and the ability to make,
transmit and manipulate images new possibilities of imagining the bio-
sphere have also opened up. The possibility of visualising things differently
and thinking about the artificial constructions of the Anthropocene – of
artificial landscapes and video cartographies – also present possibilities
of different scopic regimes that show the interconnected physical realities
of globalisation, and the practicalities of life in the Anthropocene. We have
moved well beyond the symbolism of the blue marble photograph into
more complicated visualisations, as the images on the globaia.org website
repeatedly show, but whether these dynamic images of transformation can
actually be mobilised to effect dramatic political change more effectively
than the static image of the NASA ‘whole earth’ remains to be seen.
Nonetheless such representations are already part of the discussion about
what to do about problems of global ecology and they do clearly facilitate
imagining interconnections. Above all such visualisations suggest very
clearly the importance of understanding our current context as one of
an increasingly social nature. At the same time, they do not necessarily
suggest an effective political strategy for reining in the worst excesses of
neoliberalism, or for developing sustainable modes of living within the
parameters of the earth system boundaries that are suggested by the
Anthropocene idea.

GRASSROOTS ECOPOLITICS
The novel perspectives of geopolitical ecology also suggest that ‘global
governance’ in terms of international treaties and institutions may not be
the most useful venues for political action, nor the necessary ‘answer’ to
‘problems’ of globalisation. Viewed from communities struggling to pre-
vent clear-cut logging, stop mining companies polluting rivers, or most
recently resisting attempts by petroleum corporations to use hydraulic
fracturing as a method to release hydrocarbons from shale rock, such
global views may seem hopelessly removed from practical everyday issues
of a healthy environment and sustainable food and water supplies (Nixon
2011). Protest movements about the further encroachment of industrial
modes of extraction into rural environments have emerged in recent years,
creating new political coalitions between ranchers, environmentalists and
indigenous peoples in numerous places. Many of these take the form of
blockades of roads and access to farms and forests. The term ‘blockadia’
has emerged to encompass these forms of very local resistance to the
114 S. DALBY

depredations of mining corporations, forestry plantations and numerous

pipelines that run through both farmland and indigenous territories.
Naomi Klein’s (2014) analysis of climate change, This Changes Everything,
suggests that these emergent political coalitions may be one key to the
politics of the future and be a key part of climate governance.
While there have been many previous attempts to see environmental
movements in alliance with indigenous peoples, a matter of grassroots
post-modernism in Esteva and Prakesh’s (1998) terms in the aftermath of
the Rio conference, now these movements are also linking up with such
campaigns as the divestment movement targeting fossil fuel companies,
and such new initiatives as designs for ecologically sensible urban devel-
opments in the transition town movement. Thinking about how to build
energy efficient cities and not rely on huge automobile fleets, and power-
ing things with renewable energy sources, while growing food supplies
close to these cities suggests a new localism that should use much less
energy than twentieth century modes of consumption. Linking these
initiatives, from the grass roots up, is a very different politics, one that
starts with communities and localities, not with a vision of a globe in
need of management either by some central administration or the market
mechanisms of global neoliberalism.
There are very considerable ironies in all this. Indigenous peoples
usually have cosmologies that understand the interconnectedness of nat-
ural and social phenomena, and the necessity of acting with respect to
other living things. These are understood in local terms usually, while the
global ecology perspective of big science, climate models and economic
metrics frequently disaggregates things precisely while trying to deal with
ecological transformations. Many of the worst depredations of the extrac-
tive industries that supply minerals, food and fuel to the global economy
happen on indigenous lands, those areas marginalised by previous episodes
of global expansion in the history of European colonisation. In the dis-
courses of climate security these are precisely the territories that are
rendered as potentially unstable and hence the source of security threats,
a misreading of the nature of climate security that badly mixes up causes
and effects (Dalby 2013b). That the poorest and most marginal popula-
tions should be at the centre of efforts to constrain the excesses of global
consumption is but more evidence of the inequities in the current global
polity, matters that are going to have to be addressed in the near future if
a planet in approximately the state that humanity has so far known it is to
be handed on to future generations.
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 115

Attempts to govern the Anthropocene now stretch the gamut of state

and non-state actors, including carbon markets and numerous efforts to
promote less destructive energy systems, reduce consumption and ‘green’
production systems. Naomi Klein’s (2014) This Changes Everything chal-
lenges many of the conventional assumptions about climate but crucially
focuses on aboriginal peoples, divestment strategies designed to directly
challenge the fossil fuel industry and attempts by municipalities to wrest
control of their energy systems from corporate interests. But this is not the
whole story. Governance of climate related matters in particular isn’t
happening in one identifiable centre, nor under any particular interna-
tional agreement; it is a complicated patchwork of initiatives (Bulkeley
et al. 2014). There is no clear indication either that the efforts to mitigate
and adapt to climate may not be counterproductive if they fail to com-
prehend the specific social nature contexts within which policy now has to
be made (Dabelko et al. 2013). While there is no good reason to expect
imminent climate wars, the potential for major disruptions of human
societies is growing as greenhouse gases accumulate and natural systems
are driven into unfamiliar arrangements by the combination of direct
human disruptions in terms of ecosystem disruption, pollution, resource
extraction, and the construction of increasingly artificial environments.

FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS
The sheer scale of human changes to the global biosphere now requires
that discussions of governance move beyond traditional notions of envir-
onmental protection, parks, pollution, and population. Globalisation isn’t
just a matter of economic, political, and cultural boundary crossings, but
now has to be understood as a matter of material transformation. The
environment is no longer ‘out there’ as the given context for humanity;
globalisation has changed that both conceptually and in terms of how
governance now needs to operate to shape the future conditions for human
life in an interconnected and rapidly changing biosphere. Globalisation
has, among other things substantially rearranged the species mix in most of
the fertile parts of the terrestrial biosphere, dramatically changed ocean
ecosystems through industrial scale fishing and is now setting in motion
disruptive climate changes too.
While sustainability and resilience have become the new terms for
conceptualising environmental governance, the debates surrounding
them have, as yet, not really begun to grapple with the big questions of
116 S. DALBY

who should decide what the immensely productive industrial systems

of the global economy should actually produce, and how ecosystems are
to be reconstructed to provide a more stable backdrop for the new forms
of urban human life that globalisation is constructing. Juxtaposing social
nature and governance requires us to begin thinking through how to
construct institutions to answer such immediate questions and in the
process begin to close ‘the Anthropocene gap’ (Galaz 2014), between
governance institutions and the ecological tasks that need attention.
The longer-term question is quite simply a matter of how best to build
a solar powered civilisation quickly so as to secure the future relative
stability of the biosphere, the necessary prerequisite for any form of
political economy short of a reversion to barbarism. How to limit the
scope of future climate change is the political question of our times.
Innovation and state transformation are immediately necessary. What is
not clear is how best to facilitate this in the widely varying circumstances
across the globe. This may require more drastic social changes than either
traditional political or new governance agendas usually contemplate, but
the future is upon us, and it will play out in changing circumstances that
carbon fuelled capitalism has already set in motion. Governance now is
about shaping those new circumstances, and in so far as slowing green-
house gas emissions, reducing pollutants, limiting the extirpation of
species, and facilitating migration of those that survive is accomplished,
the difficulties of adapting in rapidly changing circumstances are made
easier. Failure to slow the processes of natural transformation requires ever
larger efforts to reinvent social arrangements and their natural supports, in
turn making humane governance ever more difficult.

REFERENCES
Agnew, J. (2003). Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics. London: Routledge.
Brauch, H. G., Dalby, S., & Oswald Spring, U. (2011). Political geoecology for the
anthropocene. In H. G. Brauch, U. Oswald Spring, P. Kameri-Mbote,
C. Mesjasz, J. Grin, B. Chourou, P. Dunay, & J. Birkmann (Eds.), Coping with
global environmental change, disasters and security threats, challenges, vulnerabil-
ities and risks (pp. 1453–1485). Berlin-Heidelberg/New York: Springer-Verlag.
Bulkeley, H., Andonova, L. B., Betsill, M. M., Compagnon, D., Hale, T.,
Hoffmann, M. J., Newell, P., Paterson, M., Roger, C., & Vandeveer, S. D.
(2014). Transnational climate change governance. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY, SOCIAL NATURE, AND GOVERNANCE 117

Castree, N., & Braun, B. (Eds.) (2001). Social Nature: Theory, practice and
politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Christoff, P., & Eckersley, R. (2013). Globalization and the environment. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Cosgrove, D. (2001). Apollo’s eye: A cartographic genealogy of the earth in the
Western imagination. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dabelko, G., Herzer, L., Null, S., Parker, M., & Sticklor, R. (Eds.) (2013).
Backdraft: The conflict potential of climate change adaptation and mitigation
Woodrow Wilson Center Environmental Change and Security Program Report
14(2), 1–60.
Dalby, S. (2013a). The geopolitics of climate change. Political Geography, 37, 38–47.
Dalby, S. (2013b). Climate change: New dimensions of environmental security.
RUSI Journal, 158(3), 34–43.
Dalby, S. (2014). Environmental geopolitics in the twenty first century.
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 39(1), 1–14.
Edwards, P. N. (2010). A vast machine: Computer models, climate data, and the
politics of global warming. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Esteva, G., & Prakash, M. S. (1998). Grassroots post-modernism: Remaking the soil
of cultures. London: Zed.
Galaz, V. (2014). Global environmental governance, technology and politics:
The Anthropocene gap. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Grubb, M. (1993). Earth summit agreements: A guide and assessment. London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hommel, D., & Murphy, A. B. (2013). Rethinking geopolitics in an era of climate
change. GeoJournal, 78, 507–524.
International Geosphere Biosphere Program. (2001). “Global change and the
earth system: A planet under pressure.” IGBP Science No. 4.
Klein, N. (2014). This Changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate. New York:
Knopf.
McKibben, B. (2012). Global warming’s terrible new math rolling stone 19 July
(http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-
new-math-20120719).
Newell, P., & Paterson, M. (2010). Climate capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nixon, R. (2011). Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Robertson, T. (2012). Total war and the total environment: Fairfield Osborn,
William Vogt and the birth of global ecology. Environmental History, 17(2),
336–364.
Sachs, W. (Ed.) (1993). Global ecology: A new arena of political conflict.
London: Zed.
118 S. DALBY

Sassen, S. (2014). Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy.

Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Steffen, W., Grinevald, J., Crutzen, P., & McNeill, J. (2011). The Anthropocene:
Conceptual and historical perspectives. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society A, 369, 842–867.
Stiglitz, J. E., & Kaldor, M. (Eds.) (2013). The Quest for security: Protection
without protectionism and the challenge of global governance. Edited by New
York: Columbia University Press.
Stoett, P. J. (2012). Global ecopolitics: Crisis, goverance, and justice. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
The Ecologist Ed. (1993). Whose common future? Reclaiming the commons.
London: Earthscan.
Ward, B., & Dubos, R. (1972). Only one earth: The care and maintenance of a
small Planet. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Whitehead, M. (2014). Environmental transformations: A geography of the anthro-
pocene. London: Routledge.
World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our common
future. London: Oxford University Press.

Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the
Balsillie School of International Affairs and Professor of Geography and
Environmental Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario. He is
the author of Creating the Second Cold War (Pinter 1990), Environmental Security
(2002, University of Minnesota Press), and Security and Environmental Change
(2009, Polity).
 CHAPTER 7

Framing Global Climate Security

Mary E. Pettenger

I’m here to appeal for the survival of my country.

Tony DeBrum (former) Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands1

Climate change is one of the most contested, ubiquitous and amorphous

phenomena confronting humanity today. The physical reality of climate
change is tangible and empirically documented, yet the complexity of the
issue has generated impassioned debates about its causes, consequences,
and the actions required to combat the phenomenon. Policymakers may
long for an issue such as the role of chlorofluorocarbons and the destruc-
tion of the ozone hole, with a clear cause and clear policies to identify and
implement. However, climate change requires scientific understanding of
extremely complex interactions of the earth’s climate system including
inter alia the atmosphere, typology of the earth’s geologic features, and
living organisms. The list of scientific ‘unknowns’ generates frustration,
and openings for criticism of the science and the immediacy of the issue.
However, recent actions such as the Paris Agreement adopted at the 21st
Conference of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework

M.E. Pettenger (*)

Department of Political Science, Western Oregon University, Portland, USA
e-mail: pettengm@wou.edu

© The Author(s) 2017 119

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_7
120 M.E. PETTENGER

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) demonstrate that an over-

whelming number of states agree that climate change is real and of
significant concern for all. While the Agreement sets out the parameters
for policies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change, the issue remains a
‘super wicked problem’ (Lazarus 2009).
Further understanding of climate change and generation of effective
policies are essential to halt climate change. One approach offers potential,
framing climate change as a security threat. Climate change is an existen-
tial threat. If the worst-case scenarios are actualised, our species and many
others face extinction. Some states face disaster sooner than others; in
addition, states have different capacities to respond to the threat, e.g., risk
factors, vulnerability, and level of economic development. For example,
the small island states have led the effort to serve as our ‘canary in the coal
mine’:

We cannot be expected to sign off on a small island death warrant here in

Paris. . . . Anything over 2 degrees is a death warrant for us. It means the sea
level will rise above . . . our level of the islands. It means the islands go under
(Tony DeBrum, statement during the Paris Agreement Negotiations.
(Shapiro 2015)

On face value, it seems logical that framing climate change as a security

threat would produce an immediate and effective response. Security
threats by their very nature necessitate a substantial response to reduce
or eliminate harm. In addition, expanding the frame to the ‘globalisation
of climate insecurity’ may be a means of generating global-level responses
to a global problem as all humans come to recognise the common threat.
Yet, even with these dire statements and unequivocal proof of the negative
effects of climate change, this frame remains blurred. The ability of citizens
on the local level, and leaders at the national and international level to
bring positive change is not impossible, but highly problematic.
Alternative frames such as economic prosperity may even supersede or in
fact dilute the threat of climate change. For example, President Obama has
repeatedly framed climate as a threat to future generations, and an oppor-
tunity for economic development:

We’ve seen the longest streak of private sector job creation in our his-
tory. . . . This agreement will mean less of the carbon pollution that threatens
our planet and more of the jobs and economic growth driven by low carbon
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 121

investment. . . . This agreement represents the best chance we’ve had to save
the one planet that we’ve got. . . . I imagine taking my grand kids . . . to the
park someday . . . all the while knowing that our work today prevented an
alternative future that could have been grim [italics added for emphasis].
(President Obama of the United States, statement on the Paris Agreement,
12 December 2015)

Conceptualising climate change as a security issue poses several opportu-

nities and challenges to creating an effective global strategy. Additionally,
‘When one reviews years of writing, scholarly work, and government
policy on climate change and national security, it is striking how well
trod the ground is’ (Campbell 2008, p. 20). Nevertheless, the securitisa-
tion of climate change has significant implications. While the chapter’s
main focus is on the frame of climate security, readers should bear in mind
the following question: What do we gain by framing climate change as a
security threat?
This chapter adopts a ‘frame analysis’ approach with the intent of
illuminating the positions of power in the framing of climate change, to
identify who is framing, and what is being framed. Frame analysis provides
a tool to identify what is allowed to exist within the frame and what is
purposively externalised.2 One visual representation that may assist the
reader in understanding this process is Johannes Vermeer’s The Art of
Painting in which he painted the scene of a painter painting a young
woman. This dual frame invites the viewer to see the symbolic representa-
tion of his art, casting painters as artists rather than merely craftsman. The
woman being painted is Clio, the muse of the history, and the scene
includes a tapestry, chandelier and the painter (presumably) Vermeer
dressed in fine clothing (Vergara 2003). He is creating more than a
functional tool that can be purchased for some task, but rather a symbol
of what it means to be a creator (in today’s terms, a maker). While it may
be a stretch to view the framers of climate change security as artists,
understanding that the painting has symbolic meaning and a dual frame
exists is essential. On one hand, climate change security is more than a
functional outcome; the frame enables the viewer to see climate change
from the eye of the maker as well as to connect individually with the
painting. On the other, the painter themself can be identified. The why
and how of the frame is made visible.
This chapter focuses on intersecting frames of climate change as a
security issue and is the beginning of a process. First, it briefly outlines
122 M.E. PETTENGER

how climate security is framed (who does it threaten, how and why,
defining risks, etc.). Second, it examines the framing process itself, i.e.,
why it is being framed as a security issue (versus other issues), who is doing
the framing (the framers such as scientists, environmental activities, aca-
demics, and policymakers, and the level of response (individuals, cities,
regions, states and the global community). Third, it critiques the prospect
of lasting and effective change emerging from framing climate change as a
security issue, including identifying potential promises and obstacles. The
essential or underlying question is how to bring positive change to human
actions, the core of much of the social sciences. The securitisation of
climate change is an empirical, as well as normative and theoretical process
of conceptualising the what, how and why. As this book sets out, the field
of national security has expanded to include non-traditional threats as well
as to encompass human security. Climate change is both a threat to human
existence, and significantly diminishes human security. Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that the purpose of this chapter is not to define climate change
as a security threat, nor to propose a new approach to the topic, but rather
to ask the question, is it appropriate and effective to define climate change
as a global security threat requiring a global approach?

THE FRAME AND THE FRAMERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE SECURITY

Security is a human construct. To be safe from harm requires a social
definition of who is threatened, by what and how, and importantly, what
actions are necessary to insure security. For example, Dalby (2013a) in his
discussion of climate security states, ‘security is a contested political term
that can be invoked in response to a crisis, or as a matter of heightening the
importance of a particular policy issue in public discussion’ (Dalby 2013a,
pp. 25–26). Climate change is an empirical fact; however, human under-
standing and response to climate change is socially constructed (Pettenger
2007). Scientists have been warning about the potential for climate change
and its negative impacts since John Tyndall’s examination of the interaction
of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere and solar radiation in
the 1850s. The most recent report from the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) found ‘2015 the hottest year on record’ with a five
year warming trend of successively hotter years since 2011 (WMO 2016).
Nevertheless, climate deniers challenge the existence of anthropogenic
climate change and flood the narrative of climate change with ideological
and counter-scientific claims (see Hoffman 2011; Dunlap 2013; for analysis
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 123

of the language and strength of the denier perspective). For some, the 2015
UNFCCC – Paris Agreement (United Nations 2015) symbolises a signifi-
cant global step toward real change. The world community has finally
created an international treaty that aspires to eliminate the potential threat
of the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere rising above 1.5° Celsius, as
well as the requirement to simultaneously address mitigation and adapta-
tion. However, the voluntary approach of Nationally Determined
Contributions to reduce emissions may lead to increased contestation
over acceptable and sufficient actions (rather than a common approach).
Additionally, the Paris Agreement is non-binding and depends on states’
will to comply, and as such may fail to prevent climate change.
Climate change has been framed in several issue areas, e.g., security,
economic, moral, and scientific. Due to the nature of climate change as a
contested and ambiguous phenomenon, how it is presented, debated and
understood by policymakers and the general public has implications for
policy outcomes. ‘Framing a policy problem or issue endows certain
dimensions of the complex issue with greater apparent relevance than
they would have under an alternative frame.’ Of significance, ‘a specific
frame only is effective if it is relevant–or applicable–to the audience’s
preexisting interpretations’ (Nisbet 2009, pp. 15–16). As such when
analysing the applicability of a climate security frame to bring lasting
change, one must recognise that the audience exposed to the frame may
outright reject the frame due to prior perceptions and worldview. For
example, Nisbet (2009) describes how Al Gore’s Inconvenient Truth
movie with its ‘alarmist’ portrayal of climate change as ‘an environmental
Frankenstein monster’ generated greater partisan divides, and ‘a sense of
fatalism’ that any action was too late (Nisbet 2009, p. 18). Likewise,
framing climate change as a national security threat ‘may generate an
angry backlash, especially among the climate change deniers who are
already “Doubtful or Dismissive” of climate change’ (Myers et al. 2012,
p. 1110). In short, identifying what is privileged by certain images or
stories in the frame over others, what is included and excluded, and by
whom, serves as a heuristic and practical tool.
Those who discuss climate change as a security issue can be categorised
as painting two dominant frames of climate security: pragmatic and apoc-
alyptical. The pragmatic frame is exemplified as a straightforward process
of identifying and examining the threats, vulnerabilities and risks posed by
climate change, and postulating actions and assigning tasks to confront
these concerns. Those who articulate this frame are often research
124 M.E. PETTENGER

institutes, think tanks, government agencies, international organisations,

and policymakers who are producing studies, workshops, and reports, as
well as an overabundance of public statements. The apocalyptical frame
includes dramatic language and clarion calls for immediate response. The
apocalyptical framers overlap at times with those from the pragmatic
frame. Importantly these framers also include environmentalist activists,
typified in the United States as those who could be classified as the
‘Alarmed are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming.
They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and
urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives
and support an aggressive national response’ (Maibach et al. 2010, p. 3).

THE PRAGMATIC FRAME: THINK TANKS, THE UNITED NATIONS,

THE MILITARY

The pragmatic frame encompasses recognising the reality of climate

change, predicting its impacts and divining the appropriate level and
means of response. Language of risk assessment and vulnerabilities, of
capacity building and lists of threats including inter alia conflict, drought,
violent storms, sea level rise, humanitarian assistance and environmental
refugees dominate the frame.

Think Tanks
The following synopsis of reports by two think tanks illustrates the
language and foci of the pragmatic frame in the US context. The
Council on Foreign Relations published a report in 2007 on climate
change and national security, with the prescient sub-title: An Agenda
for Action (Busby 2007). The report, as do most within this frame,
emphasises that ‘Climate change could, through extreme weather
events, have a more direct impact on national security by severely
damaging critical military bases, thereby diverting or severely under-
mining significant national defense resources’ (Busby 2007, p. 6), lead
to instability around the world ‘leaving “ungoverned spaces” where
terrorist can organize’ (Busby 2007, p. 9) and should be avoided as it
could prove to be a ‘wedge issue in the U.S.-China relationship’
(Busby 2007, p. 18). One conclusion of significance to this chapter
is the emphasis on crossing issue areas ‘The strongest policies will
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 125

simultaneously address problems in multiple domains. Policies should

address climate security challenges but could also help reduce green-
house gas emissions, shore up energy security, or provide economic
benefits’ (Busby 2007, p. 12).
Similarly, the Brookings Institute released a report with the dramatic
title of ‘Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security
Implications of Climate Change’. The report, based on meetings of scien-
tists and national security strategists, outlines three scenarios ranging from
expected change to catastrophic change, ‘This project on climate change
and national security fundamental changed the perspective of its
participants. . . . The result was a sobering, sometimes even harrowing,
set of assessments of what the world can expect if a carbon-based busi-
ness-as-usual approach to civilization continues and expands in the years
ahead’ (Campbell 2008, p. vii). It also offers insight into the process of
framing the issue:

Remarkably, the debate as to whether or not it is appropriate to define

climate change in particular and the environment in general as national
security still continues today. A primary source of disagreement between the
camps as to whether national security implies military, rather than political,
solutions. . . . But while academics, analysts, and the media could argue over
definition until the end of time, it is still up to elected national leaders to
enact serious change. The only way to viably do so is to settle the definitional
issue once and for all, by convincing the American people that climate
change is perhaps the top national security problem we face [italics added
for emphasis]. (Campbell 2008, pp. 11–12)

Additionally, it adds to the list of possible outcomes of climate change ‘these

developments could contribute to state failure, interstate conflicts, or other
security problems in many geographic regions that could require a response
by an already overburdened U.S. military’ (Campbell 2008, p. 16).
Furthermore, review of the extensive literature portrays the interaction
of climate change with other security domains including arctic security,
human security, energy security, food security, resource security, regional
security (and in particular SE Asia, Europe), security in particular states,
migration and refugees from environmental insecurity. Climate security is
also analysed for the particular threats or hazards it poses such as sea level
rise, water security, ocean acidification, species extinction and threats to
biodiversity. Moreover, this literature often frames climate change as a
126 M.E. PETTENGER

‘threat multiplier, . . . there is little evidence that environmental change or

climate change impacts translate directly into armed conflict. Under cer-
tain circumstances, however, when drastic environmental shocks lead to
wealth deprivation and in countries with additional stress factors, such as
poverty and inequality, environmental change can trigger violent out-
comes’ (Webersik 2010, p. 15). For example, the civil war in Syria has
been partially blamed on climate change and the drought of 2008–2011.
Robert Glasser, head of the U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
noted:

The distinction between complex emergencies, such as the conflict in Syria,

and natural disasters ‘is blurring increasingly,’ . . . In Syria, a prolonged
drought was blamed for pushing people into cities, inflaming
tensions, . . . ‘I would expect with climate change that distinction is going
to blur further, and we’re going to see more incidents–whether it’s . . . food
insecurity riots that create instability, or refugees in Europe’. (Rowling
2016)

However, others dispute the connection between climate change and

conflict (Selby 2014). This debate illustrates the complexity of fram-
ing climate change as a security threat. If climate change is merely a
‘threat multiplier’ is an immediate response necessary? Should the
response be one of the military or the political establishment or the
insurance industry? Again, how the threat of climate change is framed
will privilege particular actors and responses while negating others.

The United Nations

The United Nation’s efforts to generate a collective response to climate
change have been erratic. One body that has focused significantly on
climate change threat is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change created in 1988, and in particular Working Group Two that
focuses on ‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, clearly the terrain
of a security-based approach. However, success of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the subsequent Kyoto
Protocol have been extremely limited with minimal reductions in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and many false starts (Copenhagen
Accord) and empty promises (few states achieved the 6% reduction in
GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2012). The 2015 Paris
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 127

Agreement symbolises hope to those who perceive climate change as a

threat to human existence. As noted above the Agreement offers the
potential for real change. Significantly, most international level
responses have been grounded in a ‘nation-state’ solution, including
how each state defines and addresses responsibility, risk, vulnerability
and strategy individually. The Paris Agreement may symbolise a new
globalised era when the most vulnerable and the responsibility to future
generations are recognised. With its focus on the 1.5° Celsius trigger
point, and mutually privileging mitigation and adaptation, it may pro-
vide the entrance to making ourselves secure, by asserting our global
responsibility to others across time and space, and privileging not just
the most powerful but the security of the most vulnerable and least
powerful.

The Military
Within the large body of literature that illustrates the pragmatic frame,
the oft-studied US Department of Defense (DoD) (Dalby 2016; Szasz
2016; Von Lucke et al. 2014) reviews, reports and briefings on climate
change are the quintessential examples of this frame. Two positions are
significant. First, there is an emphasis on adapting to the negative con-
sequences of climate change rather than mitigation, responding to rather
than preventing climate change, e.g., the purpose of DoD Directive
4715.21 is to ‘provide the DoD with the resources necessary to assess
and manage risk associated with the impacts of climate change’ (DoD
2016). Second, there is a focus on a US-centric rather than global
response with the steps necessary for the US military to continue to
keep Americans and its allies safe. One saving grace is that the reports
confirm the existence of the phenomenon and recognition of its poten-
tial threats, ‘Climate change will affect the DoD’s ability to defend the
nation and poses immediate risks to U.S. national security’ (US
Department of Defense FY2014 Climate Change Adaptation
Roadmap). Not to be left out, groups outside the United States are
active in identifying, categorising, and urging responses to climate inse-
curity such as organisations generating climate change threat indicators
include the Briefing Paper ‘Global Climate Risk Index 2015’ by German
Watch that includes country specific threats (Kreft et al. 2014).
Consequently, framing climate change as a security threat may privilege
128 M.E. PETTENGER

a military response in contrast to an economic, social, or moral one, and

may focus the policy response on the level of the state rather than globally.
Additionally, the militarisation of climate change responses that ensues
from framing climate change as a security threat has been heavily criticised.
Dalby (2009) argues that the military is not designed to address environ-
ment problems ‘They are designed, equipped, and trained to break things
and kill people, not nurture trees, breed fish, clean river beds, or install
solar panels’ (Dalby 2009, p. 4). He urges ‘Clarity and careful analysis are
needed here too to make sense of what it is that is endangered, and how
such threats are invoked in the very political language of security’ (Dalby
2009, p. 9). Von Lucke et al. (2014) elucidate the implications of the
‘militarisation’ of climate change as a discursive battle between ‘securitisa-
tion’ and ‘riskification’. ‘Securitisation’ can lead to ‘politicisation in setting
agendas and moving an issue forward in the policy-making process’.
Framing climate change as a security issue in the policy-making process
may lead to political contests of priority, security versus other issues such
as economic development or terrorism. ‘Riskification’ may lead to a siloing
response to reduce risk, i.e., the military response presented above that
assigns the task for risk reduction to one government entity. Either out-
come could led to ineffective policy by addressing ‘indirect effects’ rather
than ‘underlying causes’ of climate change (Von Lucke et al. 2014,
p. 876).

Intersecting Frames
If predictions of the impacts of climate change prove true and we reach the
crisis stage, the climate security frame will subsume all other frames,
unfortunately the triumph of this frame may be too late. Nevertheless,
this perspective offers a glimpse into the framers’ perspectives. For some,
climate security should be a viable frame but has yet to dominate the
narrative. For others, caution should be employed with whom or what is
assigned to keep us safe. However, the climate security frame must also
contend with counter or intersecting frames. These frames may dilute the
focus on climate change, or may serve as a multiplier policymakers can
emphasise to gain support for other issues that in turn limit climate
change.
Several studies illustrate these intersecting frames, and the obstacles and
opportunities they provide. Szasz (2016) juxtaposes framing of climate
security in the United States in three areas: military, insurance and
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 129

religious, and assesses the impact on significant action. He concludes that

the ‘convergent framings are necessary but not yet sufficient’ (Szasz 2016,
p. 161) either focusing on adaptation rather than mitigation (military and
insurance), or are ‘uneven and apparently not very successful’ (religious)
(Szasz 2016, p. 164). He ends with a positive note though that bears
attention:

As conditions worsen – and, unfortunately, they are likely to worsen – a

‘meta-frame’ might well emerge: climate change as an existential threat to
global human society. Such a framing has the potential to subsume and
synthesize all other framings: security, economic, ethical, and theological
imperatives. It might even prove sufficiently powerful to overcome the
denialist frame that currently paralyses climate politics in the United
States. (Szasz 2016, p. 166)

Similarly, Hoffman (2011) compares two framings of climate change,

deniers and the ‘convinced’, and finds that framing climate as a secur-
ity issue is rarely done by ‘convinced authors’. These framers would
seem to be most interested in advancing an effective response but their
audience may be different, as he concludes ‘One possible explanation is
that the national security frame is invoked more often by climate
believer social movement actors writing white papers for think tanks
and policy institutes that do not reach lay citizens easily’ (Hoffman
2011, p. 18).
Social scientists also have begun to focus more directly on governance
on the global level that brings together networks and processes that reach
beyond the traditional nation-state in order to examine the climate change
security frame. Dalby (2013a) includes discussions of the ‘international
norms of the responsibility to protect, which obligates states to protect
their populations’ (Dalby 2013a, p. 30), and could also be expanded to
include populations in other states. Chaturvedi and Doyle make a negative
association by framing of climate change security as a tool of ‘a neo-liberal,
post-political globalised world marked by profound asymmetries in terms
of economic growth and development’ (Chaturvedi and Doyle, p. xii).
Additionally, to enunciate the statement by President Obama above, we
can spend our way to climate security, ‘Given the neoliberal times in which
we live, where markets are the preferred modes of governance, citizenship
is frequently reduced to consumption, and success is assessed in short-term
financial measures’ (O’Lear and Dalby 2016, p. 3).
130 M.E. PETTENGER

On a more positive note, Rothe (2016) presents a very informative

description of an emerging ‘resilience approach to climate security’ that
‘opposes the alarmist tone informing climate security discourse’ (Rothe
2016, p. 3). In line with the views of this author, Rothe describes the
evolution of a ‘climate security discourse coalition’ that includes inter alia
academics, national leaders, and non-government actors. He notes, of
significance to this chapter and the book:

Storylines that paint climate change as an enemy of humanity, as well as

related security concepts such as collective security, reinforce a global fram-
ing of climate change. On the other hand, a security take on climate change
stresses the importance of assessing, monitoring and predicting possible
climate risks. (Rothe 2016, p. 137)

By refocusing global, national and local efforts on increasing resilience, he

posits that a multitude of international and national approaches have been
generated, and real change can occur. Allowing other issues (or intersect-
ing frames) into the discourse, can empower the vulnerable to adapt to
climate threats, ‘Resilience thinking . . . embraces complexity as a govern-
mental paradigm. It promotes local ownership, self-reflexivity, and stake-
holder-participation to overcome both market – as well as governance –
failures’ (Rothe 2016, p. 139).
In summary, the pragmatic frame language of climate security is one of
vulnerability, threat, and risk with climate security responses framed as risk
and disaster reductions. While some of the literature provides a global
perspective, most are tailored to the security of particular states rather than
the human species. The question becomes, what is necessary and is it
possible to frame climate change as a global threat requiring a truly global
response?

THE APOCALYPTICAL FRAME

The apocalyptical frame also includes a large body of literature. The
language used by these framers is significant, such as the quotes in the
beginning by Minister DeBrum, and are important for an analysis of
the potential effect of using framing climate as a security threat. The intent
of most writers in this frame is to induce a crisis of security, and galvanise
immediate and substantial mitigation of climate change. For the sake of
space, the titles of books in this frame serve well to illustrate the
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 131

apocalyptical orientation and the subsequent call to action: Climate Terror

(Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015), Climate Cataclysm (Campbell 2008),
Climate Wars: Why People Will Be Killed in the 21st Century (Welzer
2012) and Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats
(Dyer 2011), as well as an injection of normative framing of the conse-
quences for future generations Climate Change: What It Means for Us,
Our Children, and Our Grandchildren (DiMento and Doughman 2014).
The threat of climate change is framed as one of impending disaster and a
narrative of fear.
Further emblematic of this frame are discussions of a new geologic
epoch, the ‘Anthropocene’ (Crutzen and Steffen 2003; Malm and
Hornborg 2014; Dalby 2013b, 2009). This constructed term is meant
to capture the significant negative impacts of humans (rather than ‘natural
process’) on the earth’s land, water and atmosphere leading to a new
geological epoch. Framing anthropogenic climate change as geologic
change is itself contested, nevertheless, the association of human actions
with irreversible, and by assumption negative, change is clearly within the
apocalyptical frame.
This frame, similarly to the pragmatic frame, has its limitations and
critiques. Barkdull and Harris (2014) provide an important analysis of the
apocalyptical framing process. The siren call of this frame emerges in their
final paragraph,

Perhaps more importantly, in the process of trying to transform global

society in order to limit future climate change and to cope with it, the global
community would be creating a world that has fewer of the problems faced
today–human suffering due to pollution, widespread poverty and recurring
war–and a wider distribution of things society should aspire to: environ-
mental sustainability, fair development, and peace. (Barkdull and Harris
2014, p. 128)

However, they provide insight into obstacles in employing this frame.

First, they outline the outcomes of the ‘end is near’ approach that may
lead to inaction due to ‘apathy and despair’ (Barkdull and Harris 2014,
p. 124). Second, and more importantly, they question whether the
timeline for the ‘end is near’ may problematise the climate security
emphasis. Scientific consensus on the timeline for dramatic change
(within this century, permanent change, etc.) and the magnitude of
change (human extinction or disproportionate impact on humans across
132 M.E. PETTENGER

the globe) is in flux. If the ‘crisis is imminent’ and the threat of extinc-
tion are real, framing climate change as a security threat will prove
effective. As they note, ‘Unfortunately, science provides no clear-cut
answers on whether catastrophe looms or how much time remains to
avoid a crisis so great that it threatens human survival’ (Barkdull and
Harris 2014, p. 127).
Likewise Oels (2014), and in contrast to Rothe (2016), offers caution
in using this approach ‘The configuration of power termed “climate
apocalypse” tends to naturalize climate change as an unfortunate but
unavoidable problem and focuses attention on preparedness for the
impacts of climate change’ (Oels 2014, p. 211). In addition she takes
the case of migration and climate refugees to examine how ‘three dis-
courses on climate refugees or climate change-induced migration contri-
bute to legitimizing the displacement of millions of people. By presenting
dangerous levels of climate change as inevitable and by making resilience
the new leitmotif of climate policy, the third and most recent discourse
depoliticizes the issue of climate change in a radical way’ (Oels 2016,
p. 189). In sum, the three discourses leave climate refugees as a group to
‘fear’ (Oels 2016, p. 192), as ‘helpless victims in need of Northern
assistance’, or ‘depoliticizes the issue of climate change, making it seem
as if nothing can be done about it, as if it is merely a “fact of life” ’ (Oels
2016, p. 199). While Oels uses the language of discourse theory, it fits
readily to frame analysis. Each of these discourses illustrate how viewing
the tangible threat of climate change’s impacts on climate refugees can be
framed as strongly negative and in fact, calling for no action to be taken.
Furthermore, Matthew (2014) examines why the UNFCCC process
is not working even with the narrative increasingly shifting to one of ‘an
existential threat to humankind’ (Matthew 2014, p. 261). He laments
‘The gap between the terrible vision of a climate-changed world and
the anemic outputs of two decades of climate-change negotiations is
wide and growing’ (Matthew 2014, p. 262). In addition, he calls atten-
tion to another important necessary shift that relates to the theme of
this book,

Human security shifts our focus from the level of humankind and the state,
where much of the climate-change negotiation takes place, to the level of
the individual and community, where much of the impact of climate change
is being experienced . . . (Matthew 2014, p. 262). It is perhaps important for
the integrity of the UNFCCC process to foster a sense of shared vulnerability,
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 133

and hence of shared fate, through the idea that climate change is a global
challenge with the potential to negatively affect virtually everyone on the planet
[italics added for emphasis]. (Matthew 2014, p. 265)

Clearly, generating a crisis-based frame may induce change, or it may

create more of the same, contestation and ambiguity, and states focusing
on their own national security rather than a global approach.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: CAUTION AHEAD

The chapter returns to its original questions: is framing climate change
as a security threat appropriate and productive, and what value is
added in calling for a global response to this problem? This chapter
echoes Oels (2014) of the need to focus on the ‘analytical framework
of security that is sensitive to the shifting modes of power enabled in
its name. . . . security is best studied as a configuration of different
technologies of power and their characteristic techniques. It is the
correlation of these various technologies that must be studied – a
correlation that varies across time and place’ (Oels 2014, p. 212).
The dual frame of climate security and climate security framers illus-
trates that framing climate change as a security issue poses several
challenges or even roadblocks to creating an effective and lasting
response to the climate threat.
First, if climate change is perceived as a national security threat, then
the security apparatus of states may be tasked with responding. This poses
the possibility of a militarised response. Relegating climate change to the
military may lead to ineffective if not regressive responses. For example,
the US Department of Defense response has been to identify the threats
that climate change poses to their facilities, access to the resources needed
to run the military (oil), and the ability to move US troops around the
world. In addition, there is some focus on identify upcoming conflicts or
the impact of natural disasters that might require the US military to
respond. What this frame leaves out though, are a response to mitigate
climate change and a global level approach. Rather than prevention, it
privileges adaptation and a purely a state-based response from the largest
military in the world. A ‘global’ response of coordinating either mitigation
or adaptation is lost.
Second, opportunities may emerge if climate change is perceived as a
security threat, as it may prompt the attention of policymakers as security
134 M.E. PETTENGER

threats tend to do. However, some caution that this may also lead to
apathy and the de-framing of climate change. Apocalyptic warnings that
are decades away can induce people to turn off the perceived noise, or to
believe nothing can be done (the end is near), or to push the topic to later
on the agenda as the threat is not as imminent as immediate threats such as
terrorism.
Third, if climate change is perceived as security threat, the appropriate
level of response may become even more unreachable. Climate change
is caused by local activities, the processes by which people’s daily lives
produce greenhouse gases (transportation, energy, fuel for heating,
agriculture, etc.). Multiply each person’s activities to the level of a
region, state, and then globally, the problem seems overwhelming and
insurmountable. Recent framings of climate change as part of the
Anthropocene reflect this perspective. Human activity is changing the
earth such that we are entering a new geologic era. Rather than a ‘natural’
process leading to dramatic geological changes, it is anthropogenic. An
individual’s ability to alter this enormous process is easily perceived as
miniscule. Rarely do traditional security studies focus on a person’s day-
to-day life, but rather on protection of a state or a people. While there can
be an effort to ‘globalise’ climate change, will this in turn take the issue
farther from the local level and thus farther from any individual believing
that their actions, either for or against climate change, will have an impact?
Perhaps changing the mindset of an individual to frame themself as a ‘global
citizen’ may motivate the needed action. But it seems unrealistic that the
process of creating such a mindset would be accomplished easily or at all. In
addition, the leaders of states must be convinced that climate security is real
and action is imperative. As witnessed by the influence of national leaders in
the United States, Canada, and Australia, elections can bring leaders who
believe in climate change and create positive legislation to reduce green-
house gas emissions, or leaders who believe and practice the opposite.
Citizens who adopt a ‘global’ view of shared threat may be able to influence
their governments, but again, this requires an enormous amount of political
will to challenge and overcome the dominate power structures.
Finally, it is unclear if the ‘globalisation of insecurity’ in relation to
climate change may be a means to advance positive global responses to
mitigate and adapt to climate change. Globalising the issue may increase
awareness of each individual’s impact on humankind and the earth.
However, this process could also trend toward conflict between those
facing the insecurity. The powerful states may adopt a bunker mentality of
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 135

protecting themselves and letting the vulnerable fall to the side, or sink
into apathy in that the problem becomes so insurmountable that action is
inconceivable.

NOTES
1. Press release after his presentation to the United Nations Security Council,
February 2013 (deBrun 2013).
2. For an introduction to frame analysis, see Entman (1993) for a discussion of
framing as ‘a process of selecting some aspects of a perceived reality in order
to make them more salient for audience members’ (Entman 1993, p. 5),
Goffman’s (1974) introduction of frame analysis as a tool to examine sym-
bolic communication, and Hoffman’s (2011) and Nisbet’s (2009) applica-
tion of frame analysis to climate change.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barkdull, J., & Harris, P. G. (2014). Climate Catastrophe and Transformationalism.
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 16, 119–130.
Busby, J. W. (2007). Climate change and national security: An agenda for action.
CSR No. 32, November. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Campbell, K. M. ed. (2008). Climatic cataclysm: The Foreign policy and national
security implications of climate change. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press.
Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2015). Climate terror: A critical geopolitics of climate
change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015.
Crutzen, P. J., & Steffen, W. (2003). How long have we been in in the
Anthropocene era? Climatic Change, 61(3), 251–257.
Dalby, S. (2009). Security and environmental change. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Dalby, S. (2013a). Climate change as an issue of human security. In M. R. Redclift &
M. Grasso (eds.), Handbook on climate change and human security (pp. 21–40).
Cheltenham, UK, Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Dalby, S. (2013b). Climate change. The RUSI Journal, 158(3), 34–43.
Dalby, S. (2016). Climate change and the insecurity frame. In S. O’Lear &
S. Dalby (Eds.), Reframing Climate Change: Constructing Ecological
Geopolitics. London, UK: Routledge.
deBrun, T. (2013) “Climate change and security” http://webtv.un.org/watch/
climate-change-and-security-tony-debrum-marshall-islands-press-conference/
2167969694001.
DiMento, J. F. C., & Doughman, P. eds. (2014). Climate change: What it means for us,
our children, and our grandchildren. Cambridge, MA/ London: The MIT Press.
136 M.E. PETTENGER

Dunlap, R. E. (2013). Climate change skepticism and denial: An introduction.

American Behavioral Scientist, 57, 691–698.
Dyer, G. (2011). Climate wars: The fight for survival as the world overheats.
London, UK: One World Publications.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward a clarification of a fractured paradigm.
Journal of Communication, 43, 51–58.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hoffman, A. (2011). Talking past each other? Cultural framing of skeptical and
convinced logics in the climate change debate. Organization & Environment,
24(1), 3–33.
Kreft, S. et al. (2014). Global climate risk index 2015: Who suffers most from
extreme weather events? Weather-related loss events from 2013 and 1994 to
2013. Bonn, Germany: Germanwatch e.V. (www.germanwatch.org).
Lacy, M. J. (2005). Security and climate change: International relation and the
limits of realism. London: Routledge.
Lazarus, R. (2009). Super wicked problems and climate change: Restraining the
present to liberate the future. Cornell Law Review, 94((5 July)), 1153–1234.
Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., & Leiserowitz, A., (2010) “Global Warming’s Six
Americas 2009: An Audience Segmentation Analysis” (Yale University and
George Mason University: Yale Project on Climate Change Communication).
Malm, A., & Hornborg, A. (2014). The geology of mankind? A critique of the
anthropocene narrative. The Anthropocene Review, 1(1), 62–69.
Matthew, R. A. (2014). Climate change and human security. In J. F. C. DiMento &
P. Doughman (eds.), Climate change: What it means for us, our children, and our
grandchildren (pp. 257–294). Cambridge MA/London: The MIT Press.
Myers, T., Nisbet, M., Maibach, E., & Leiserowitz, A. (2012). A public health
frame arouses hopeful emotions about climate change. Climate Change,
113(3), 1105–1112.
Nisbet, M. (2009). Communicating climate change: Why frames matter for
public engagement. Environement: Science and Policy for Sustainable
Development, 51(2), 12–23.
Obama, B. (2015) “Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change.
Oels, A. (2014). Climate security as governmentality: From precaution to pre-
paredness. In J. Stripple & H. Bulkeley (eds.), Governing the climate: New
approaches to rationality, power and politics (pp. 197–218). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Oels, A. (2016). Resisting the climate security discourse: Restoring ‘the political’
in climate change politics. In S. O’Lear & S. Dalby (eds.), Reframing climate
change (pp. 188–202). London/New York: Routledge.
 7 FRAMING GLOBAL CLIMATE SECURITY 137

O’Lear, S., & Dalby, S. (Eds.). (2016). Reframing Climate Change: Constructing
Ecological Geopolitics. London, UK: Routledge.
Pettenger, M. (2007). The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power,
knowledge, norms, discourses. London, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Rothe, D. (2016). Securitizing global warming: A climate of complexity. London,
UK: Routledge.
Rowling, M. (2016) “Interview: Stop ignoring cost of smaller disasters - UN risk
chief” in Thomson Reuters Foundation, 21 January, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-climatechange-disaster-risks-idUSKCN0UZ12U.
Selby, J. (2014). Positivist climate conflict research: A critique. Geopolitics,
19(4), 829–856.
Shapiro, A. (2015), “For the Marshall Islands, the Climate Goal is ‘1.5 to Stay
Alive’ “ http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/12/09/459053208/
for-the-marshall-islands-the-climate-goal-is-1-5-to-stay-alive.
Szasz, A. (2016). Novel framings create new, unexpected allies for climate activism.
In S. O’Lear & S. Dalby (eds.), Reframing climate change (pp. 150–170).
London/New York: Routledge.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Paris Agreement
(2015), FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, Paris, 11 December 2015, Available from
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/02/20160215%2006-03%
20PM/Ch_XXVII-7-d.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense [DoD]. (2016). DoD directive 4715.21 climate
change adaptation and resilience. January 14. http://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/471521p.pdf.
Vergara, A. 2003 “Vermeer and the Dutch Interior” http://essentialvermeer.com.
Von Lucke, F., Wellmann, Z., & Diez, T. (2014). What’s at stake in securitising
climate change? Towards a differentiated approach. Geopolitics, 19(4), 857–884.
Webersik, C. (2010). Climate change and security: A gathering storm of global
challenges. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Welzer, H. (2012). Climate wars: Why people will be killed in the 21st century.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
World Meteorological Organization, 26 January 2016, “2015 the hottest year on
record” https://www.wmo.int/media/content/2015-hottest-year-record.

Mary E. Pettenger is Professor of Political Science at Western Oregon University,

USA. Her research interests include social constructivism, role theory, and small
states. She is currently researching active learning techniques in climate change
negotiation role-playing simulations. She is editor of The Social Construction of
Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses (2007, Ashgate).
 CHAPTER 8

The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

at the United Nations

Laura J. Shepherd

Under the provisions of the United Nations (UN) Charter, the UN

Security Council is charged with the maintenance of international peace
and security. The Council has taken steps towards accounting for the ways
in which gender matters in and to peace and security governance, through
the adoption of eight inter-related resolutions on Women, Peace,
and Security, which together form the Women, Peace and Security
(WPS) agenda. The agenda is conventionally described as being comprised
of four ‘pillars’: prevention (of violence); participation (in peace and
security governance); protection (of rights and bodies); and relief and
recovery (such that women and girls are able to benefit from and engage
in a meaningful way in post-conflict reconstruction). The pillars them-
selves are derived from the foundational resolution, UNSCR 1325
(2000), and are addressed in more or less detail in the seven subsequent
resolutions that together form the policy architecture of the agenda; the
relevant resolutions are UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009),
UNSCR 1889 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013),
UNSCR 2122 (2013), and UNSCR 2242 (2015). Like all Security
Council (SC) resolutions, these are binding on UN member states.

L.J. Shepherd (*)

School of Social Sciences, UNSW Australia, Sydney, Australia
e-mail: l.j.shepherd@unsw.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 139

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_8
140 L.J. SHEPHERD

There has been a notable increase in political momentum around the

WPS agenda recently, with the launch of the outcome report of the
independent global study on implementation in 2015, the 15th anniver-
sary of the passage of the first resolution, and the adoption of three WPS
resolutions in a three year period (UNSCR 2103 and UNSCR 2122 in
2013 and UNSCR 2242 in 2015). The 2015 report notes a number of
areas in which progress has been made over the previous decade and a half.
A number of factors are cited as evidence of this progress, including an
increase in the number of women in relevant leadership roles in the UN
system, an increase in the references to women and WPS principles in
peace agreements, and increased monitoring and investigation of sexual
violence crimes in conflict situations with the introduction of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002 and the creation of
the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual
Violence in Conflict (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015: 13–14). The report also
states, however, that progress on the WPS agenda has been profoundly
inconsistent, and that there are significant challenges hindering the full
implementation of the WPS agenda (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015: 14).
The human consequences of success or failure of the WPS agenda are
significant. In peace-building, for example, women’s participation and
leadership remains severely constrained: women comprise less than 10%
of peace negotiators and less than 4% of signatories to peace agreements
(on the broad issues of gender, peace-building and the WPS agenda, see
also Anderlini 2007; Charlesworth 2008; Haynes et al. 2012; Porter
2007; Hamilton and Shepherd 2015). The questions of how to ensure
full and meaningful participation of women in peace-building and post-
conflict reconstruction, and how to protect women’s rights in this context,
remain unanswered. Further, the prevention of sexualised and gender-
based violence (SGBV) and sexualised exploitation and abuse (SEA)
remains a core policy problem (on the prevention of SGBV and SEA
using WPS architecture, see Chun and Skjelsbæk 2010; Cook 2009;
Nduka-Agwu 2009; Simić 2010).
In this chapter, I examine three dimensions of the WPS agenda at
the UN. First, I provide an overview of the development of the WPS agenda
and explore the extent to which the eight WPS resolutions are integrated
into the business of the Security Council, investigating how and in what ways
the WPS resolutions and WPS concerns are referenced in other resolutions.
Second, I comment briefly on the development of National Action Plans
(NAPs) and Regional Action Plans (RAPs) for the implementation of
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 141

UNSCR 1325, and the institutional support – or lack thereof – that exists for
these at the UN level. Finally, I outline what I consider to be some core
obstacles that continue to inhibit the progression of the WPS agenda at
the UN and how these obstacles might be overcome.

GENDERING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: ‘WHAT WOULD

IT MEAN, TO SPEAK AS A WOMAN AND BE HEARD?’1
Given that the UN’s WPS agenda is founded on a resolution passed by the
Security Council in 2000, some decade and a half ago, it is perhaps some-
thing of a stretch to classify it as a ‘new global agenda’, per the title of this
section of the book. It is certainly the case, however, that the WPS agenda
has gained significant global political traction in recent years, and so perhaps
it is more accurate to speak of new momentum and commitment to this
agenda, an agenda that transnational women’s peace activist movements
have been advocating for since the turn of the twentieth century. In this
section, I outline the background of the WPS agenda, and comment on the
extent to which WPS principles have been integrated into the core business
of the UN Security Council. This is a measure not only of the ability of the
Council deliver on the commitments that it has made, but also a symbol of
the Council’s recognition that WPS principles have relevance beyond the
thematic resolutions that comprise the agenda itself.
The significance of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR
1325) cannot be overstated. This is not to say that the resolution itself is
wholly unproblematic, as I and others have argued elsewhere (Cohn et al.
2004; Shepherd 2008a, 2011; Otto 2010), but to recognise the achieve-
ment of the various women’s civil society organisations that were able to
gain the attention of the UN Security Council: to speak as women, and be
heard. The UN Security Council, prior to the passage of UNSCR 1325,
was broadly considered the preserve of masculinised power and militarised
visions of security (Cohn 2008). Although in the mid-1990s it appeared
that security discourse was shifting, from a state-centric conceptualisation
in which the state was the referent object of security policies and practice
to a broader conceptualisation in which multiple referent objects could
exist (including the individual human subject), the Council remained
highly conservative in its engagement with ‘non-traditional’ security
issues, including the protection of civilians and the management of post-
conflict situations. The ability of women’s civil society organisations to
co-ordinate their efforts, and to successfully advocate for the inclusion of
142 L.J. SHEPHERD

issues pertaining to women’s rights and the prevention of sexualised

violence in and after conflict at the Council is thus noteworthy.
It is important to remember, however, that UNSCR 1325 and the WPS
agenda more broadly did not emerge fully formed in late 1999, when
civil organisations began to mobilise seriously to inform debate at the
Council in 2000. There are a number of other significant policy moments
prior to the formation of the WPS agenda that deserve recognition,
in particular the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (DEVAW), ratified in 1993, and the Beijing Platform for Action
(BPfA), from the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in
1995. The campaigns by women’s organisations that supported the pro-
duction of these two documents ‘successfully politicised the private pain
suffered by women and indicated that it is a matter of public concern’
(Youngs 2003: 1210). DEVAW preceded the appointment of the first UN
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, which occurred in 1994,
and was instrumental in extending the discussion of security at the UN to
include threats and perpetration of gendered and sexualised violence (for
further discussion of the Declaration, see Shepherd 2006). The BPfA
built on this platform the recognition that armed conflict affects women
and men differently, and that the management of armed conflict and
post-conflict reconstruction needs to take into account the protection of
women’s rights and bodies, the prevention of gendered and sexualised
violence, and the participation of women in peace-building. As Sanam
Anderlini and Judy El-Bushra (2004: 13) note, ‘[a]t Beijing, the impact of
armed conflict on women was noted as a specific emerging issue requiring
attention. Its inclusion in the Platform for Action spurred the growth of a
global women’s peace movement’.
Various civil society organisations came together to form the NGO
Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in New York in early 2000
to ensure that these principles were discussed at the UN Security Council.
The NGO Working Group pursued ‘two recommendations – to encou-
rage women’s participation in peace agreements and to push for the
convening of a special session of the Security Council’, which happened
in October 2000 and led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Hill et al.
2003: 1256). UNSCR 1325 was the first admission by the UN Security
Council since its formation that gender matters in and to the conduct,
management, and prevention of armed conflict. The principles discussed
above – prevention (of violence); participation (in peace and security
governance); protection (of rights and bodies); and relief and recovery
(such that women and girls are able to benefit from and engage in a
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 143

meaningful way in post-conflict reconstruction) – are enshrined in UNSCR

1325; these are the principles that form the foundations of the WPS agenda.

EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE WOMEN, PEACE

AND SECURITY AGENDA
As mentioned above, since the passage of UNSCR 1325 there have been
seven further WPS resolutions, the most recent of these being UNSCR
2422, which was adopted in October 2015. The seven subsequent resolu-
tions form a coherent and robust policy architecture, focussing on different
elements of the WPS agenda (an issue to which I return in the final section
below). The NGO Working Group continues its advocacy in New York,
working with the Council to ensure that each element of Council business is
informed by WPS principles, drawing on each of the WPS resolutions where
necessary and advocating for the inclusion of WPS language in each Council
resolution. There have been some notable successes: UNSCR 2117 on Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), for example, contains strong WPS
language relating the unchecked flow of SALW to the increased prevalence
of sexualised and gender-based violence and implicating SALW in the per-
petration of such violence (United Nations Security Council 2013a:
Preamble, OP12). The NGO Working Group, in alliance with a number
of member states, had significant influence in the wording of these passages,
and the inclusion of such strong WPS language in not only the Preamble but
also in Operative Paragraphs of the resolution (which are binding on all UN
member states) was hailed as a small victory for women’s peace activists.
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom run a project
in parallel to the work undertaken by the NGO Working Group that
monitors references to the eight WPS resolutions in all Council output.2
From analysing the data that they have gathered, it is clear that WPS
principles have not been consistently integrated by the Council across the
countries on its agenda. There have been 38 UN Security Council resolu-
tions pertaining to the situation in Iraq since 2000, for example, and only
seven of these, or 18 per cent, contain language related to the WPS agenda.
Most significantly, of these seven resolutions, not a single one contains WPS
language in the operative paragraphs (OPs), which are the elements of the
resolution with ‘teeth’ – those that require operationalisation by states. (The
Preamble to each SC resolution is often much less contested by UN member
states precisely because the text does not need to be operationalised, mean-
ing that the inclusion of WPS language in the Preamble of a resolution is far
less significant than its inclusion in the operative paragraphs.) By contrast,
144 L.J. SHEPHERD

the 26 resolutions concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of

Congo all contain WPS language, with 92% of them demanding action
related to the WPS agenda in the operative paragraphs (WPS language was
confined to the Preamble in only two of the resolutions).
The lack of consistency documented by the PeaceWomen’s ‘Resolution
Watch’ project is the result of a number of factors. The member state
penholder, who takes the lead on drafting each resolution, is very influen-
tial: the United Kingdom, which has recently emerged as something of a
champion of some aspects of the WPS agenda, is the penholder on
resolutions pertaining to Darfur, 94% of which contain useful WPS lan-
guage. Resolutions about the situation in Georgia, by contrast, are drafted
by a loose configuration of interested parties known as a ‘Group of
Friends’; as many of these ‘Friends’ may not be Council members, concern
for the systematic inclusion of WPS principles may not be entrenched
in the conduct of business. This may account for the small percentage
of resolutions about Georgia that contain WPS language (less than one-
third). Political will is another key factor. Where states are willing to
expend political capital to get WPS language into country-specific or
thematic resolutions, this can have significant effects. Where there is no
state champion or group of allied states, and/or access for the NGO
Working Group is curtailed for political reasons, it is much less likely
that there will be effective WPS provisions in the final resolution.
Finally, even where there is political will, and willingness on behalf of the
penholder to incorporate meaningful language related to the WPS agenda,
there is no guarantee that all elements of the agenda will be well repre-
sented. Eighty three per cent of the country-specific resolutions related to
Cyprus, for example, reference WPS language, but of these, 65% comment
solely on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peace-
keeping personnel. This is an important issue, of course, but it is only a small
component of the much larger WPS agenda, of which many more elements
are relevant to the ongoing situation in Cyprus (including, for example,
the participation of women in post-conflict peace-building and peace and
security governance, and the prevention of violence more broadly). Another
example of such selective inclusion is the recent focus on conflict-related
sexualised violence. Concerted advocacy by key state champions, civil
society organisations, and the office of the Special Representative of the
Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC), has resulted
in the incorporation of language concerning conflict-related sexualised
violence featuring in a number of thematic and country-specific resolutions
while language pertaining to women’s participation in peace and security
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 145

governance is not included. UNSCR 2127, which formed the mandate

for the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African
Republic (MISCA), is a key example of this: while the resolution has strong
Preambular material on the WPS agenda broadly conceived, its inclusion in
the operative paragraphs relates only to conflict-related sexual violence
(United Nations Security Council 2013b: OP 23). This is despite the
resolution containing several paragraphs on disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and the rule of law,
where women’s leadership in these spaces could have been highlighted.

IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL,

AND LOCAL LEVELS
As noted above, UN Security Council resolutions are binding on UN
member states. UNSCR 1325 outlines a number of responsibilities on
member states under the WPS framework (United Nations Security
Council 2000), including, inter alia:
• The need ‘to ensure increased representation of women at all deci-
sion-making levels in national, regional and international institutions
and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of
conflict’ (OP 1);
• The need ‘to support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous
processes for conflict resolution, and . . . involve women in all of the
implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements’ (OP 8);
• The need to provide training for military and civilian peace and
security personnel deployed through the UN and to increase ‘finan-
cial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training
efforts’ (OP 6, 7); and
• The need to protect women and girls from sexualised and gender-
based violence and end impunity for the perpetration of such violence
(OP 10, 11).

In 2002, the UN Security Council encouraged member states to pursue full

implementation of UNSCR 1325 by developing ‘clear strategies and action
plans with goals and timetables’ (United Nations Security Council 2002). A
Security Council Presidential Statement in 2004 formalised the expectation
that member states would meet their responsibilities under the WPS agenda at
the national level through the development of National Actions Plans (United
Nations Security Council 2004) (Box 8.1 source: Shepherd 2014a).
 146

Box 8.1: Changing mechanisms of implementation review (2000–2010)

2004 2005 2007 2009 2010

S/PRST/2004/40 S/2005/636 S/2007/567 S/RES/1889 S/2010/173

L.J. SHEPHERD

Requests System-Wide First SysAP (2007–2009) Second SysAP Calls for Reported on 4 of 5
Action Plan (SysAP) on organised around 12 areas: (2008–2009). indicators to track thematic areas identified in
the full implementation of A. Conflict prevention and early Consolidates implementation SysAP (2008–2009).
UNSCR 1325 warning; 12 areas for of UNSCR 1325 ‘Normative’ dimension
B. Peacemaking and peace- action into 5 deemed to ‘cut across’ the
building; thematic areas: remaining four thematic
C. Peacekeeping operations; 1. Prevention; areas.
D. Humanitarian response; 2. Participation; Develops 26 indicators to
E. Post-conflict reconstruction 3. Protection; track implementation,
and rehabilitation; 4. Relief and categorised using the four
F. Disarmament, demobilisation, recovery; thematic areas.
and reintegration; 5. Normative. Each indicator is clearly
G. Preventing and responding to linked to a goal.
gender-based violence in 20/26 indicators are
armed conflict; primary responsibility of
H. Preventing and responding to various UN entities.
sexual exploitation and abuse 6/26 indicators are
by UN staff, related personnel primary responsibility of
and UN partners; Member States.
I. Gender balance;
J. Coordination and partnership;
K. Monitoring and reporting;
L. Financial resources.
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 147

Functioning as an alternative to a ‘mainstreaming’ approach, which

would see WPS principles cross-cutting each area of government rather
than housed within a particular policy framework, National Action Plans
are a key way for state governments to articulate their policy priorities in
relation to the WPS agenda, and to indicate how these priorities translate to
strategies for implementation The first NAP was developed by Denmark in
2005, with momentum building through to a peak in 2010–2011, which
saw the launch of 20 separate NAPs in a two-year period, three of which
were second iterations. This period coincided with the celebration of
UNSCR 1325’s ten-year anniversary; the increased attention paid to the
WPS agenda at the ten-year anniversary probably accounts for the spike in
NAP development at that time. There was another small spike in 2014,
which can probably be accounted for by the increased global attention to
WPS created by the global study referenced above.
At the time of writing, 61 states have developed National Action Plans,
with several more currently in progress. Ten states are already in the
second iteration of their NAP, following implementation, evaluation and
review, and a further four states in a third iteration already. There are,
however, important differences between NAPs, and different models of
development and implementation that seem to have an impact on the
efficacy of the NAP to deliver on WPS objectives. One critical factor seems
to be the location of the NAP in the machinery of government. One study,
published in 2010 and obviously limited to the NAPs that existed at the
time, suggests that minority world3 NAPs tend to be located in
Departments or Ministries associated with foreign affairs, while majority
world NAPs tend to be driven by Ministries responsible for gender equal-
ity. The positioning of the NAP within government will determine its
focus (domestic or foreign-policy focused) and its level of influence
(national women’s machineries are typically lacking the resources and
political status in many conflict-affected countries to strongly attract gen-
uine political interest and funding) (Swaine 2009: 417).
The findings of this study have certainly partially been upheld as more
NAPs have been developed: minority world NAPs tend to be ‘outward
facing’, concerned with training personnel deployed to international poli-
tical, peace, and security missions and ensuring that branches of the
military have sufficient representation of women. This orientation is pro-
duced by and productive of the assumption among ‘Western states’ that
‘1325 applies in “other” geographical locations (Swaine 2009: 426) and is
thus not applicable to ongoing, unresolved, conflicts in settler colonial
148 L.J. SHEPHERD

societies such as Canada, the United States, and Australia. Further, mana-
ging the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through ‘outward facing’
NAPs perpetuates the idea that ‘other’ women – ‘Third World’ women –
need protecting from the violence and discrimination perpetrated by
‘other’ men, thus diminishing the agency of all majority world women
and positioning minority world men as non-violent and inclusive.
There are other issues related to the production and implementation of
National Action Plans that are worthy of note. The most comprehensive
study to date was undertaken by Barbara Miller et al. (2014); these research-
ers analysed the forty NAPs that were available at the time of sampling and
subjected the Plans to a content analysis using fourteen different criteria. Key
findings from this study include the fact that only about one-third of NAPs
contain specific information about timelines for implementation, with the
Rwandan NAP being the most specific (Miller et al. 2014: 30). Roles and
responsibilities in each National Action Plan are mostly well specified, but
financial allocation is vague at best: ‘only two NAPs identify concrete sources
of funding’ (Miller et al. 2014: 30). One very interesting finding, given the
genealogy of the National Action Plans that can be traced back to women’s
peace activism, is that there is a strong correlation between the involvement
of women’s civil society organisation in the drafting and development of the
NAPs and the specificity of the NAP across all elements (Miller et al. 2014:
38). Specificity is important because, as with any policy document, if the
NAP is to be implemented effective, responsible agencies both need to know
that they are responsible (specificity of responsible agency) and what it is that
they are supposed to be responsible for (specificity of target/objective).
In addition to National Action Plans, various Regional Actions Plans
(RAPs) have been developed. In her background study for the 2013
Global Technical Review Meeting on ‘Building Accountability for
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and
Security’, Natalie Hudson notes that, as many conflicts do not respect
national territorial boundaries, there is a clear rationale for regional colla-
boration on implementing the WPS agenda (Hudson 2013: 11). There
are currently seven RAPs in effect,4 and they face many of the same
challenges associated with National Action Plans: a lack of political will
to deliver on specific objectives; in some cases a lack of clearly specified
objectives; and a lack of dedicated funding to support WPS initiatives
(Hudson 2013: 5). RAPs also have the additional complexity afforded
by the fact that they are by definition multi-vocal agreements, with multi-
ple stakeholders in both design and implementation, each with often
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 149

competing priorities. This occurs at the national level where co-ordination

is required across different government departments, but the problem is
writ large at the regional level and can cause progress to stall at key
decision-making moments. Sara Davies, Kimberly Nackers, and Sarah
Teitt, for example, provide a fascinating analysis of the engagement of
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the WPS
agenda that is illustrative of this phenomenon (as well as documenting
other factors inhibiting progress on the WPS agenda in the region, see
Davies et al. 2014). One interesting finding from research into RAPs is
that their design and implementation seems to offer opportunities for
women’s leadership in peace and security governance, which is a key
principle of UNSCR 1325. The 2013 UN Secretary-General’s report on
WPS (United Nations Security Council 2013c: Para 28, also cited in
Hudson 2013: 12) commended regional organisations involved in conflict
prevention, as 24% of leadership positions in these organisations were held
by women. At the headquarters level this percentage rises to 37%. The
2014 report notes an upward trend on this indicator, with the percentage
of women in leadership positions in regional organisations rising to 32%
from 24% (United Nations Security Council 2014: Para 30).
Beyond NAPs and RAPs, however, there is another important imple-
mentation mechanism that deserves some discussion: the Global Network
of Women Peacebuilders’ (GNWP) Localization Program (Hudson 2013:
15–6). This initiative was cited in the 2012 UN Secretary-General’s report
as a positive way to ensure that WPS principles are translated to the subna-
tional level. Since 2012, the GNWP has formalised their initiative, which
began in Burundi and is now operational in Colombia, Nepal, the
Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (see Global Network of Women
Peacebuilders 2013). The Localization Program decentralises the imple-
mentation of the WPS agenda, working with subnational organisations such
as local authorities and traditional leaders to ensure that WPS-related activ-
ities are ‘owned and carried out at the local level’ (Global Network of
Women Peacebuilders 2013: 5). The Localization Program has two com-
ponent parts: Localization workshops, where key local actors learn about
UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, and discuss WPS principles in relation
to local laws, policies and practices; and the development of Localization
Guidelines, which follows after a ‘Training the Trainers’ workshop to ensure
sustainability of the Localization Program (Global Network of Women
Peacebuilders 2013: 6–8). Although the Localization Programs experience
challenges related to rapid turnover of local officials, and the same issues
150 L.J. SHEPHERD

related to political will that affect National and Regional Action Plans,
the local ownership of the Guidelines enhances their efficacy as a WPS
implementation tool. The findings from the reviews of the Localization
Programs in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and
Uganda suggest that this is a meaningful and effective strategy for
increasing awareness and support of, and adherence to, WPS principles
at the local level.

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK:

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
There are a number of reasons to be optimistic about the future of the
WPS agenda as a new global agenda. The period 2013–2015 has seen a
significant uptick in visibility of, and stakeholder support for, key elements
of the WPS agenda. The ‘Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative’, spear-
headed by the United Kingdom, is a good example of the ways in which
aspects of the WPS agenda have received coverage not only in national and
international policy spheres but in mainstream media: the Western
Anglophone world, at least, has learned much about the impact of con-
flict-related sexualised violence from leveraging Angelina Jolie’s celebrity
status. This was particularly evident in 2014 when the United Kingdom
hosted the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, the out-
come of which was a Statement of Action signed by delegates at the
Summit including the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura.
Although it has no legal status, the Statement of Action is at least a
normative commitment by the signatories to work towards the elimination
of the perpetration of, and impunity for, such violence.
That said, activists and academics alike have expressed concern about the
narrowing of the WPS agenda that the PSVI initiative represents. The
prevention of conflict-related sexual violence is one element of the WPS
agenda, and yet so much political capital has been expended on this aspect
that there is little space for discussion of recognising women as agents of
change in conflict and post-conflict situations, or of how to ensure
women’s meaningful participation in peace and security governance. This
tension is in part due to the institutional structure of the WPS architecture.
Box 8.2 shows the key priorities of each of the WPS resolutions (Box 8.2
source: Kirby and Shepherd 2016).
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 151

Box 8.2 is ‘Key provisions of the WPS resolutions 2000–2015

(Source: Kirby and Shepherd 2016)’.

Resolution (Year) Key issues and core provisions

UNSCR 1325 (2000) Representation and participation of women in peace and

security governance; protection of women’s rights and
bodies in conflict and post-conflict situations.
UNSCR 1820 (2008) Protection of women from sexualised violence in
conflict; zero tolerance of sexualised abuse and
exploitation perpetrated by UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations personnel.
UNSCR 1888 (2009) Creation of office of Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(CRSV); creation of UN Action as an umbrella
organisation addressing issues related to CRSV;
identification of ‘team of experts’; appointment of
Women’s Protection Advisors (WPAs) to field missions.
UNSCR 1889 (2009) Need to increase participation of women in peace and
security governance at all levels; creation of global
indicators to map implementation of UNSCR 1325.
UNSCR 1960 (2010) Development of CSRV monitoring, analysis and
reporting arrangements; integration of WPAs to field
missions alongside Gender Advisors.
UNSCR 2106 (2013) Challenging impunity and lack of accountability for CRSV.
UNSCR 2122 (2013) Identifies UN women as key UN entity providing
information and advice on participation of women in
peace and security governance; whole-of-UN
accountability; civil society inclusion; 2015 high-level
review of implementation of UNSCR 1325.
UNSCR 2242 (2015) Integrates WPS all UNSC country situations; establishes
Informal Experts Group on WPS; adds WPS
considerations to sanctions committee deliberations;
links WPS to countering terrorism and violent
extremism (CT/CVE).

The two resolutions that followed UNSCR 1325 focussed on conflict-

related sexualised violence (UNSCR 1820 and USCR 1888), as did
UNSCR 1960 and UNSCR 2106. Thus, there is an institutional division
in the resolutions, such that certain resolutions focus on sexual violence
152 L.J. SHEPHERD

and others (UNSCR 1889 and UNSCR 2122) focus on participation.

This is in part due to the fact that key member states of the UN (the
United Kingdom and the United States specifically) have started to cham-
pion the prevention of CRSV. The United States is the pen-holder on
these resolutions in the Security Council, which adds political weight to
their ideological support. But, as mentioned above, it is also in part a result
of the fact that there is still resistance to women’s political empowerment
among member states at the UN SC. It is one thing to recognise, even to
challenge, the culture of impunity that surrounds CRSV and the damage
that this does not only to the life experiences of survivors, but also to
the possibility of sustainable post-conflict reconstruction. It is another
thing entirely to acknowledge that women should be included in deci-
sion-making at all levels of peace and security governance, as this might
require some uncomfortable reflections on the domestic political arrange-
ments of UN member states. In the Americas in 2014, women occupied
25.7% of seats in both Upper and Lower Houses combined; this figure is
approximately the same for Europe (OSCE member states including
Nordic countries, which skews the averages upwards slightly) at 24.9%.5
It is important to note, however, that the most recent WPS resolutions,
UNSCR 2122 and UNSCR 2242, break the mould somewhat. Elsewhere,
I have described the first of these resolutions as ‘radically different’
(Shepherd 2014b: 2, emphasis in original):
There is a call for whole-of-UN action, including enhanced expectations
of the UNSC itself, and a demand for more – and more meaningful – civil
society participation, both at UN Headquarters in New York and in in-
country field missions. Finally, the resolution stresses the need for the
High-Level Review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 due in 2015.
These provisions set UNSCR 2122 apart from all other WPS reso-
lutions. (It is notable as well that this is the first resolution since
UNSCR 1325 that had really significant civil society input into the
language and principles.) At the heart of UNSCR 2122 is the recogni-
tion that the Security Council, and the whole of the UN system, needs
to fundamentally change how it conducts its business in the realm of
WPS. There are some truly innovative provisions in the operative
paragraphs of UNSCR 2122, including the recognition that ‘without
a significant implementation shift, women and women’s perspectives
will continue to be underrepresented in conflict prevention, resolution,
protection and peace-building for the foreseeable future’ (United
Nations Security Council 2013d: OP 15; see Box 8.3).
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 153

Box 8.3: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2122 (2013)

‘ . . . without a significant implementation shift, women and women’s
perspectives will continue to be underrepresented in conflict preven-
tion, resolution, protection and peacebuilding for the foreseeable
future’
S/RES/2122, OP 15

This is a restatement of the principles enshrined in UNSCR 1325, but it

articulates them in such a powerful and meaningful way that activists,
advocates and academics alike celebrated the passage of this resolution as
representing the dawn of a new era of WPS governance. UNSCR 2242
continues to emphasise the need for ‘joined up thinking’ about WPS across
the UN system (United Nations Security Council 2015: OP 4, 7) and in
particular at the Council, with the creation of an Informal Experts Group on
WPS to inform Council business and the creation of more opportunities for
civil society engagement in both country-specific considerations and the-
matic areas (United Nations Security Council 2015: OP 5a, 5c).
There are unresolved tensions, of course: how to balance the various
pillars of the WPS agenda, as discussed above; how to ensure that men and
boys can access the protection provisions of the agenda without diverting
resources away from women and girls; how to create representations of
women in conflict that depict all of the many roles that they play – from
agent of change to perpetrator of violence – without undermining the
utility of the political message; and how to maintain political momentum
beyond the High Level Review in 2015. Reflecting on the current state of
the agenda, though, engenders cautious optimism: we can glimpse the
possibility that all actors, from the local leaders of women’s civil society
organisations to the UN Secretary-General, might make meaningful
changes to the lives of women and girls everywhere through the principles
that comprise the WPS agenda.

NOTES
1. This subtitle is a question posed by the medieval French poet Christine de
Pisan, quoted in an essay by Kimberly Hutchings (2010).
2. The PeaceWomen program was founded by the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom in 2000 to work specifically on UNSCR
154 L.J. SHEPHERD

1325 advocacy and later across the Women, Peace and Security agenda more
broadly. PeaceWomen run ‘Resolution Watch’, as part of their ‘Security
Council Monitor’ project. The data in this chapter is drawn from the
PeaceWomen website (http://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/
resolution-watch) and is correct at the time of writing (3 December 2015).
3. Distinctions such as ‘developed’ versus ‘developing’, ‘minority’ versus ‘major-
ity’ world, or ‘North’ versus ‘South’ are all problematic, and obscure more
differences than they are able to identify similarities. I choose to use ‘minority’
versus ‘majority’ world as it captures the fact that most of the world’s popula-
tion lives in the territories of Asia, Africa and Latin America, whereas a
minority live in the areas of the world that would be typically identified as
‘wealthy’ or ‘economically developed’ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
United States, Japan, and Europe). ‘Minority’ versus ‘majority’ also avoids
deploying an external standard of ‘development’ as an identity category.
4. Regional Action Plans have been developed by the following entities:
African Union (2009); European Union (2008); International Conference
of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (2004); North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation/ Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (NATO/EAPC)
(2007); Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
(2004); Pacific Region (2012); South African Development Community
(SADC) (2009). These RAPs are not all titled ‘Regional Action Plans’ per se,
but all reference UNSCR 1325 and seek to implement the core provisions of
this resolution (the Plans themselves are available on the PeaceWomen
website at http://www.peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-raps).
5. This data is drawn from the Women in National Parliaments project from
the Inter-Parliamentary Union and is available online at http://www.ipu.
org/wmn-e/world.htm.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderlini, S. (2007). Women building peace: What they do, why it matters. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner.
Anderlini, S., & El-Bushra, J. (2004). The conceptual framework: Security, peace,
accountability and rights. In International Alert and Women Waging Peace
(Eds.), Inclusive security, sustainable peace: A toolkit for advocacy and action
(pp. 5–14). https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/05/101864251-Toolkit-for-Advocacy-and-Action.pdf. Accessed 22
November 2016.
Charlesworth, H. (2008). Are women peaceful? Reflections on the role of women
in peacebuilding. Feminist Legal Review, 16, 347–361.
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 155

Chun, S., & Skjelsbæk, I. (2010) ‘Sexual violence in armed conflict’, PRIO Policy
Brief. Available at: https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7338.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
Cohn, C. (2008). Mainstreaming gender in UN Security Policy: A path to political
transformation? In S. M. Rai & G. Waylen (Eds.), Global governance: Feminist
perspectives (pp. 185–206). Basingstoke and New York, NY: Macmillan Palgrave.
Cohn, C., Kinsella, H., & Gibbings, S. (2004). ‘Women, peace and security:
Resolution 1325’. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 6(1), 130–140.
Cook, S. (2009). Security Council Resolution 1820: On Militarism, flashlights,
raincoats and rooms without doors—A political perspective on where it
came from and what it adds. Emory International Law Review, 23((n.i.)):
125–139.
Coomaraswamy, R. et al. (2015). Preventing conflict, transforming justice, security
the peace: A global study on the implementation of United Nations Security
Council resolution 1325. New York: UN Women. Available at http://www.
unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-
study-1325-2015.pdf. Accessed 3 December 2015.
Davies, S. E., Nackers, K., & Teitt, S. (2014). Women, peace and security as
an ASEAN priority. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(3),
333–355.
Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (2013). ‘Implementing Locally,
Inspiring Globally: Localizing UNSCR 1325 in Colombia, Nepal, the
Philippines, Sierra Leone and Uganda’. Available at http://www.gnwp.org/
resource/implementing-locally-inspiring-globally-localizing-unscr-1325-
colombia-nepal-philippines. Accessed 3 December 2015.
Hamilton, C., & Shepherd, L. J. (2015). The construction of gender-sensitive
peacebuilding in Australia: ?Advance Australia Fair? Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 69(4), 373–393.
Haynes, D. F., Cahn, N., & Ní Aoláin, F. (2012). Women in the post-conflict
process: Reviewing the impact of recent UN actions in achieving gender
centrality. Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 11(7), 189–217.
Hill, F., Aboitiz, M., & Poehlman-Doumbouya, S. (2003). ‘Nongovernmental
Organizations’ Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council
Resolution 1325’. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(4),
1255–1269.
Hudson, N. F. (2009). Gender, human security and the United Nations. London
and New York: Routledge.
Hudson, N. F. (2013) ‘National and Regional Implementation of Security
Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security: Background Paper for
Global Review Meeting’. Available at http://peacewomen.org/node/91320.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
156 L.J. SHEPHERD

Hutchings, K. (2010). Knowing Thyself: Hegel, Feminism, and an Ethics of

Heteronomy. In K. Hutchings & T. Pulkkinen (Eds.), Hegel’s philosophy
and feminist thought: Beyond antigone (pp. 87–108). Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kirby, P., & Shepherd, L. J. (2016) Re-introducing women, peace and security,
International Affairs. (in press at the time of writing, publication due 8 March
2016).
Miller, B., Pournik, M., & Swaine, A. (2014) ‘Women in peace and security
through United Nations Security resolution 1325: Literature review, content
analysis of national action plans, and implementation’, Global Gender Program
Working Paper. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ggi/research/publica
tions.cfm. Accessed 3 December 2015.
Nduka-Agwu, A. (2009). “Doing gender’ After the war: Dealing with gender
mainstreaming and sexual exploitation and abuse in UN Peace Support
Operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone’. Civil Wars, 11(2), 179–199.
Olonisakin, F., Barnes, K., & Ikpe, E. (2010). Women, peace and security: trans-
lating policy into practice. London/New York: Routledge.
Otto, D. (2010). Power and danger: Feminist engagement with international law
through the UN Security Council. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 132, 97–121.
Porter, E. (2007). Peacebuilding: Women in international perspective. London:
Routledge.
Shepherd, L. J. (2006). Loud voices behind the wall: Gender violence and the
violent reproduction of the international. Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, 34(2), 377–401.
Shepherd, L. J. (2008a). Power and authority in the production of United nations
security council resolution 1325. International Studies Quarterly, 52(2),
383–404.
Shepherd, L. J. (2008b). Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice.
London: Zed.
Shepherd, L. J. (2011). Sex, security and superhero(in)es: From 1325 to 1820 and
beyond. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 14(3), 504–521.
Shepherd, L. J. (2014a) ‘Advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda: 2015
and beyond’, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Policy Brief. Available
at http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Inclusivity-and-gender/
Publications/Advancing-the-Women-Peace-and-Security-agenda-2015-and-
beyond. Accessed 3 December 2015.
Shepherd, L. J. (2014b). On the road to “Recovery”? A multidisciplinary feminist
approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In D. Otto & G. Heathcote
(Eds.), Peacekeeping, gender equality and collective security. Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan.
 8 THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA AT THE UNITED NATIONS 157

Simić, O. (2010). Does the presence of women really matter? Towards combating
male sexual violence in peacekeeping operations. International Peacekeeping,
17(2), 188–199.
Swaine, A. (2009). Assessing the potential of national action plans to advance
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Yearbook
of International Humanitarian Law, 12, 403–433.
United Nations Security Council (2000) ‘Resolution 1325ʹ, S/RES/1325.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2000.shtml.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2002) ‘Statement by the President of the
Security Council’, S/PRST/2002/32. Available at http://www.un.org/en/
sc/documents/statements/2002.shtml. Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2004) ‘Statement by the President of the
Security Council’, S/PRST/2004/40. Available at http://www.un.org/en/
sc/documents/statements/2004.shtml. Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2012) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
Women, Peace and Security’, S/2012/7323. Available at http://www.un.
org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2012.shtml. Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2013a) ‘Resolution 2117ʹ, S/RES/2117.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2013.shtml.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2013b) ‘Resolution 2127ʹ, S/RES/2127.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2013.shtml.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2013c) ‘Report of the Secretary-General
on Women, Peace and Security’, S/2013/525. Available at http://www.
un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2013.shtml. Accessed 3 December
2015.
United Nations Security Council (2013d) ‘Resolution 2122ʹ, S/RES/2122.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2013.shtml.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2014) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
Women, Peace and Security’, S/2014/693. Available at http://www.un.
org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2014.shtml. Accessed 3 December 2015.
United Nations Security Council (2015) ‘Resolution 2242ʹ. S/RES/2242.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml.
Accessed 3 December 2015.
Youngs, G. (2003). Private Pain /Public Peace: Women’s Rights as Human Rights
and Amnesty International’s Report on Violence Against Women. Signs: Journal
of Women in Culture and Society, 28(4), 1209–1229.
158 L.J. SHEPHERD

Laura Shepherd is Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of

Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia. She has expertise in
gender politics, international relations, and peace and security; empirical interests
include peace and security governance, and the politics and practices of the United
Nations. She is the author of Gender, Violence and Popular Culture: Telling Stories
(Routledge, 2013) and Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice (2008,
Zed Books) and co-editor, Gender, Agency and Political Violence (2012, Palgrave)
and editor, Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and
Methods (2013, Routledge).
 CHAPTER 9

Children, Conflict, and Global Governance

Katrina Lee-Koo

In February 2015 the media reported a case of three British schoolgirls, aged
fifteen and sixteen, who successfully travelled from London into Syria, via
Turkey, to join ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). Soon after their
arrival, two of the girls were married to ISIS fighters, and another had report-
edly joined all-female brigades in Syria. The girls, described as ‘gifted students
at the Bethnal Green Academy in east London’ (Dodd and Khomami 2015)
were radicalised online, and deceived their families in order to carry out their
journey. This is not an isolated case. Over a 12-month period during 2013 and
2014, 423 British children were referred to the national Channel Project as
being ‘at risk’ of radicalisation (Whitehead 2015). In recent years, there have
been several reports of children from Western countries becoming radicalised
as part of globalised terrorist movements. At the extreme end of the spectrum,
this radicalisation manifests in children travelling overseas to participate in
armed struggles, engage in planned and actual violence in their home and
other countries, and seek to disseminate their views and influence others.
In each case, these children undoubtedly imagined themselves as playing a
role in a global political struggle.
At the other end of this spectrum, in 2014 the 17-year-old Pakistani
schoolgirl Malala Yousefzai won the Nobel Peace Prize. Known

K. Lee-Koo (*)
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: katrina.leekoo@monash.edu

© The Author(s) 2017 159

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_9
160 K. LEE-KOO

worldwide for her activism for children’s rights to education, Malala

already had extensive experience as a children’s rights and peace activist.
She and many of her classmates in the Swat Valley had defied a Taliban
edict banning girls from school, and she documented these activities on
her blog:

I had a terrible dream yesterday with military helicopters and the Taleban.
I have had such dreams since the launch of the military operation in Swat.
My mother made me breakfast and I went off to school. I was afraid going to
school because the Taleban had issued an edict banning all girls from
attending school. (BBC News 2009)

During the conflict that engulfed her homeland, Malala had witnessed
widespread public violence and was herself the victim of numerous threats
of violence. This reinforced her already well-established and vocal commit-
ment to pursue a peaceful future for her community. She wrote in her blog:
‘They cannot stop me . . . I will get my education’ and ‘I would like to be a
politician. Our country is full of crisis . . . I would like to . . . serve the nation.’
Malala’s comments, and the activities of those and her classmates demon-
strate a strong understanding of the politics surrounding them. The decision
to attend school was made amid recognition of the violence and potential
repercussions. There is also a strong sense that these girls were aware of the
political statement they were making in response to the Taliban’s operations
in their homeland in addition to a personal desire to attend school.
Children’s engagement with conflict and political violence is not new.
From Australian boys who deceived recruiters to participate in the First
World War to Palestinian children resisting occupation, children have
always been active in conflict. Children are volunteer soldiers, active
combatants, spies, resistors, witnesses, conciliators, and peace-builders.
In some cases, children engage with the conflict that surrounds them:
one that that they were born into or grow up in. For instance, generations
of Afghan children have grown up amidst violence at the hands of local
or foreign militarism (see, for example, Lee-Koo 2013). In other cases
children are using processes of globalisation to participate transglobally,
interactively and clandestinely, relying upon the internet to access non-
mainstream information about conflicts, interacting with others via social
media, and independently travelling to participate in conflict.
Yet international relations – a discipline whose core business is to
address questions of conflict and peace – rarely considers the role of
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 161

children in armed conflict and political violence. This oversight extends to

a theoretical concern regarding children’s identities, capacities, and rela-
tionships within and to peace and conflict, as well as to an empirical
exploration of children’s experiences and actions. It is an extraordinary
oversight given the colossal number of children impacted by conflict: an
estimated one billion children currently live in zones affected by armed
conflict (Worldvision 2015). Moreover, children often constitute a sig-
nificant portion of the population of societies transitioning out of conflict.
World Bank (2015) data suggests, for instance, that there are 42 countries
that have experienced conflict in the past 20 years where 40% of the
population remains under the age of 14. Yet, the bulk of the research on
these issues emerges from disciplines such as education, sociology, child-
hood studies, and psychology. International relations is notably missing
from this list, and along with it is the absence of a thorough and detailed
global political account of the breadth of children’s engagement with
armed conflict and political violence. Importantly, this means that there
is no explicitly political account that can influence and shape the global
governance architecture on children’s engagement with conflict.
This chapter seeks to address this issue. In light of the cases raised
above, the goal of this chapter is to identify the opportunities that exist
to develop the United Nations’ global governance architecture on chil-
dren’s engagement with armed conflict to better reflect the lived realities
of children. It does this with the further goal of seeking to incorporate
children’s positive engagements with peace and conflict transition (such as
that of Malala noted above), while at the same time continuing to protect
children from conflict’s violence. It does so first by exploring the UN’s
governance architecture surrounding children’s engagement with armed
conflict. Second, it seeks to offer a political account of children’s agency.
In doing so, it seeks to identify children’s positive and negative agency
and link it to peace and conflict outcomes. In this sense, this chapter
acknowledges children’s capacity to make a political contribution to the
development of their societies, be that towards peace or conflict. Finally,
this chapter asks what is necessary to realign these two issues – the UN
global architecture with children’s agency – as a means of pursuing
children’s security.
This chapter argues that children should be invested as agents in their
own security. It provides accounts which highlight that some children
have a demonstrated capacity to contribute actively – even if in small part –
to the security and stability of their communities. Furthermore, it is
162 K. LEE-KOO

argued that the UN should develop a governance architecture that sup-

ports this for two reasons: first, it will greatly contribute to children’s own
security; secondly, it has the instrumentalist impact of building resilient
communities whose youngest members possess the skills, knowledge, and
commitment to transfer positive social values to the next generation.

THE UN’S GOVERNANCE APPROACH

The UN has been deeply invested in the issue of children’s involvement in
armed conflict and political violence. Moreover, since the publication of
the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF’s) Machel Report into the
Impact of Armed Conflict on children in 1996, it has established significant
global architecture around the protection of children who experience
armed conflict. The UN’s approach has been two-pronged: first, and
primarily, its goal is to ensure the protection of children in conflict
zones. Second, it has engaged in strong advocacy and action designed to
avert the recruitment of children into armed forces. This work is under-
taken by several UN agencies. UNICEF, founded in 1946, continues to
work directly with children affected by war, including with child soldiers,
across a range of its priority areas. Currently, these priority areas are
development, education, health, social inclusion, and gender equality.
However, the bulk of dedicated advocacy and policy development for
children affected by armed conflict within the UN now sits with the UN
Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict, appointed in 1997, and her office. The office was created out of
the recommendations of Machel’s 1996 Report. The role of the Special
Representative ‘is to strengthen the protection of children affected by
armed conflict, raise awareness, promote the collection of information
about the plight of children affected by war and foster international
cooperation to improve their protection’. The Office reports to the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council and provides advocacy
to the Security Council and individual states. To direct this role, the Office
has outlined a policy agenda targeting ‘six grave violations’ against chil-
dren in conflict: the recruitment of children, the killing and maiming of
children, sexual violence against children, attacks on schools and hospitals,
abduction of children, and denial of humanitarian access.
Moreover, the Security Council has extended its traditional interpreta-
tion of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security to include consideration of this issue. Since 1999, it has
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 163

adopted six thematic resolutions regarding the impact of armed conflict on

children: UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1261 (1999),
1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005),
1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), and 2143 (2014). These
resolutions constitute a significant element of the global architecture on
the issue. They are directed at a range of overlapping goals. These include
preventing recruitment of children into armed groups, protecting children
from all forms of violence during conflict, particularly those which speak
directly to the ‘six grave violations’ mentioned above, designing action
plans for implementation of these goals, and establishing monitoring and
evaluation frameworks. Significantly, UNSCR 1379 introduced a ‘naming
and shaming’ list that requested the Secretary-General to prepare a list of
those parties that engage in child soldiering. This is in addition to the
country-specific conflict transformation resolutions that advocate for
children’s protection within a particular conflict context.
The UN’s children and armed conflict governance architecture is also
supported by the 2002 Optional Protocol on the Convention of the
Rights of the Child. This protocol specifically seeks to protect children
from recruitment and use in hostilities, the first of the six grave viola-
tions. Its most substantial provisions include raising the minimum age of
child soldiers who take direct part in hostilities from ages 15 to 18, and
sets an age limit of 18 for compulsory recruitment by states. While the
Optional Protocol remains active, it has been sidelined by many NGOs,
states and UN agencies in preference of the UNICEF-sponsored ‘Cape
Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of
Children into the Armed Forces’ in 1997, then later the ‘Paris Principles’
in 2007. These principles establish a much stronger protection element
for child soldiers, a more inclusive definition of child soldiers (in parti-
cular their reference to non-combatant children), and include a stronger
gender focus. Collectively, these documents support a number of UN-
based campaigns around this issue. For instance, the UN’s 2010–12
‘Zero under 18’ campaign generated 21 new ratifications of the
Optional Protocol, while the 2014 ‘Children not Soldiers’ project
(with UNICEF) similarly seeks to lobby conflict parties to end child
recruitment.
The remaining five grave violations against children in conflict deal with
horrendous violence committed against children. These issues are abhor-
rent, are universally evident across conflict zones, and are clear in their
violation of international law and norms. Collectively, these six grave
164 K. LEE-KOO

violations set a clear research agenda and policy priority area for the UN
and its partner organisations. The Office of the Special Representative
supports the collection of data on these violations and they can be found
in UN reports (for example, the United Nations Assistant Mission to
Afghanistan includes disaggregated data on the impact of conflict on
children in its biannual ‘Protection of Civilians’ Report while also support-
ing several dedicated UN reports on the topic) and in NGO reporting
(see, for example, the Global Reports produced by Child Soldiers
International, for example, 2012).
However, it is important to acknowledge that embedded in the pre-
sentation, focus and activism around each of these six grave violations is a
set of preconceived ontological assumptions regarding children and their
relationship to conflict. The primary assumption here is that children are
solely victims of conflict who lack any political agency whatsoever. Even in
circumstances where children are actively engaging in political violence (as
is the case with child soldiers who take direct part in hostilities), children
are seen as passive actors in the sense that they have been radicalised,
forcibly recruited, or brainwashed. There is no capacity to consider the
extent to which children – particularly teenagers and older children – may
have been capable of independent considerations and decision-making
regarding their participation in conflict. The consequence of this assump-
tion is that children are generally not held responsible for their actions in
conflict. This point is most relevant to those children who engage in
violence; the global normative position (which is consistent with global
liberal values) is that children should not be held accountable for war
crimes on the understanding that they were conducted under some form
of duress. However, the ontological claim that underpins this normative
position effects a universalism that seems to operate across all aspects of
children’s experiences in conflict. In short, because there is a general
acceptance within global governance practices that children should not
be held accountable for crimes, the agency of children to act in conflict has
been muted.
This assumption of children’s passivity in the face of conflict enables a
global architecture whose consistent theme is children’s protection. In fact,
the entire focus of the Office of the Special Representative is on the protec-
tion of children in armed conflict. This is an appropriate agenda. As noted,
the documented cases of deliberate and accidental violence against children
in armed conflict constitute grotesque reading (see UNICEF 2009; Lee-
Koo 2014; Huynh, Lee-Koo and D’Costa 2015: 18–31). Children do not
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 165

start wars, are never the primary protagonists, and are uniquely vulner-
able to its impact. Moreover, the protection of children has a strong
moral and legal claim within global governance. As such, regardless of
whether they are civilians or combatants, children’s protection should be
a priority for international actors seeking to regulate and bring about an
end to armed conflict. However, this is an incomplete reading of chil-
dren’s experiences with armed conflict. While in no way underestimating
the extent to which children are victims of conflict, and the severe
limitation placed upon their capacities to shape their surroundings vis-
à-vis adults, it is important to highlight that there are nonetheless sig-
nificant problems with this framework.
The first problem is that it is inconsistent with children’s rights as
guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC; 1989), which has near-universal adoption. Based on age,
maturity, and evolving capacities, children possess the right to express their
views freely, to assemble peacefully, and to be heard in any ‘administrative
proceeding affecting the child’. In essence, the UNCRC recognises chil-
dren’s capacities to act politically, and their right to do so. Crucially, Article
12 states that a child’s views should be ‘given due weight in accordance with
the age and maturity’ of the child in all matters affecting them. While the
UNCRC remains paternalistic in nature, ‘emphasising children’s welfare
over their autonomy’ (Huynh, Lee-Koo and D’Costa 2015: 42), it none-
theless creates space for children to develop as political actors. This idea that
children are evolving political actors is missing from the current global
architecture on children’s engagement with conflict.
Second, this protectionist framework fails to acknowledge children’s
demonstrated capacity for positive and independent agency – an aspect
that will be discussed further in the section below. At this point, how-
ever, it is important to note that an unwavering focus upon the worst
forms of violence against children will nearly always reinforce a narra-
tive of victimhood. This research agenda excludes the experiences of
children who have engaged with or experienced conflict in other ways.
It also fails to explore the complex set of experiences that children
might have as victims of conflict. In this sense, children may simulta-
neously, or at different points in their lives be both victims and agents.
Thus, this protectionist ontology does not prompt questions such as:
‘how do children resist violence?’; ‘how do children mitigate conflict’s
impact?’; and ‘how do children adapt to cultures of violence or build
resilience in the face of ongoing violence?’ The failure to ask these
166 K. LEE-KOO

questions overlooks opportunities to explore what might be – albeit

limited – expressions of positive agency.
These two issues highlight a third problem: the further and supporting
ontological assumption that children are irrelevant to the study and prac-
tice of global politics because they live apolitical lives. The fact that the
children’s protection agenda is prompted by an assumption of universal
victimhood, which in turn is a produced through a perception that chil-
dren lack political agency, perpetuates the struggle for their visibility in
political concerns. Consequently, children are rarely seen or heard in the
study of international relations as a discipline. They have no legitimate
status as political beings and are conceptualised as private-sphere entities
who lack the authority to make valid and enduring contributions to
political life. In this sense, children are often seen as human ‘becomings’
rather than human beings (Uprichard 2008). This is emphasised in the
political reality that most children are not given political responsibilities:
children do not vote, cannot be conscripted to fight in state-based mili-
taries, are not expected to pay taxes, or otherwise engage in activities often
associated with the social contract. Instead, children are the passive reci-
pients of social goods: education, healthcare, and state oversight of their
protection. In this sense, they are both apolitical and pre-political.
While this is a uniquely liberal conceptualisation of children, it does
serve to reinforce the dominant protection framework. Moreover, within
overlapping frameworks of human rights and international law is the
consistent claim that children should be protected from armed conflict
because they are children and, usually, civilians. However, its broader effect
is that it operates as a universalist claim: children should be protected from
all politics. This exclusion is not isolated to protection from conflict’s
violence, but rather is extended to all forms of conflict’s politics.
However, as noted below, even as an idealised claim, it is inconsistent
with the lived realities of children in contemporary conflict. Given these
realities, there is little utility in hiding behind a normative framework that
insists children are apolitical beings.
The final problem with the protection framework is instrumentalist.
Children who demonstrate negative political agency – such as active
engagement in armed conflict – can indeed be a potential threat to
themselves and broader society, while children who demonstrate positive
political agency – such as building social cohesion – can become useful
‘agents of change’ (Schwartz 2010). In the first instance, the so-called
‘youth bulge’ thesis identifies children and young people as potential
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 167

spoilers of peace. Recognising a conflict-driven demographic shift in

which young people become a dominant ‘bulge’ in the population of
post-conflict states, this thesis suggest that the presence of a large group
of conflict-affected, unemployed, under-educated and politically disen-
franchised people is a threat to peace. Moreover, read through a gendered
lens, this thesis argues that young men in particular are likely to recom-
mence violence. For example, journalist and political commentator Robert
Kaplan (1994) wrote in the aftermath of his travel to several post-Cold
War West African states: ‘I saw . . . young men everywhere – hordes of
them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a
fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting.’ This thesis has been
perpetuated elsewhere (see Huntington 1996), generating a discourse of
fear and distrust of young men in post-conflict zones (see Lee-Koo 2011).
However, there are significant problems with this thesis (see Urdal 2004),
not least of all is the unevidenced determinism that links young men (often
from the Global South) with violence (Urdal 2004: 16). Nonetheless,
this demographic presents an opportunity for the global community to
engage positively with them as partners for inclusive and enduring peace.
To some extent, this opportunity has been recently recognised by the
UN Security Council with the adoption of UNSCR 2250 in December
2015 on ‘Youth, Peace and Security’. In response to the radicalisation of
young people around the world, UNSCR 2250 acknowledges the positive
role that young people as a distinct demographic can play in both conflict
prevention and peace-building. Therefore, UNSCR 2250 recognises the
need to engage young people as part of the broader process of combatting
terrorism and violent extremism. Indeed, part of the UN’s strategy to
prevent violent extremism involves integrating youth participation, leader-
ship, and empowerment into its activities. On this point, the resolution
notes ‘the important role [that] youth can play further as positive role
models in preventing and countering violent extremism’.
This resolution is a significant shift in the UN’s thinking about the
capacity of young people to demonstrate positive agency. However, the
UN Security Council defines youth as between the ages of 18 and 29. This
identifies youth as a sub-category of adulthood that subsequently excludes
children who are defined by the UNCRC as ‘every human being below the
age of eighteen years’. Consequently, UNSCR 2250 excludes children.
This is a political act. The dividing lines that separate ‘child’ from ‘youth’
and indeed ‘adult’ are ultimately based upon social (and legal) construc-
tions of childhood. The markers that delineate children from adults are
168 K. LEE-KOO

not fixed, nor are they universal. Instead, they are culturally contingent,
drawn from a range of social, legal and religious practices in different
political spaces. Moreover, they are often challenged and adapted. This
is particularly the case in efforts to distinguish between children and youth.
The idea of a youth, or young person, is contested across the world, with
the age bracket ranging from 10 to 40. For instance, the UN Population
Fund defines ‘young people’ as people between 10 and 24 years of age,
and ‘youth’ as those between 15 and 24, while the 2006 African Youth
Charter considers youth to be between 15 and 35. Spark notes that in
Pacific societies, women up to the age of 40 might be considered youth
depending upon their marital status and maternity (Spark 2014).

CHILDREN AND POLITICAL AGENCY

This chapter now considers how to conceptualise, identify, and document
cases of children’s positive agency in conflict zones. Agency is understood
to be an evolving process by which the capacity for individuals to negoti-
ate, shape, and re-shape political structures and contexts develops over a
period of time. In this sense, agency is not necessarily a grand or sudden
gesture, but rather can be a series of minute actions that somehow enables
the agent some control over their experiences, opportunities or relation-
ships (see Kabeer 2010; Madhok and Rai 2012). Moreover, agency is
understood as something that can be equally located in the ‘everyday’.
Borrowing from the work of De Certeau (1988, 12–14) this requires
accepting that ‘everyday life’ is a political space. Consequently, the every-
day activities of ‘ordinary’ people can be the site of political action. De
Certeau argues that these daily activities can constitute a reorganisation of
social power, a willing attempt at resistance, and an intentional form of
political communication. Richmond (2009, 331) further argues that in
conflict zones everyday activities require people to ‘negotiate around
violence, structural and overt, [and] around material issues’. In this
sense, everyday actions can be examples of political agency. Agency is
therefore present in actions by children to negotiate, mitigate, resist,
alleviate, contribute to, or be resilient in experiences of conflict. Thus,
children (as a discreet group) can be conscious political agents in their
everyday lives.
What is lacking from the research generated from the current govern-
ance approaches to this issue (outlined in the previous section) are the
cases in which there is a positive social dividend from children’s agency. In
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 169

its focus upon protecting children from conflict and recruitment, the
current agenda does not ask: ‘How do children contribute to peace?’
However, using the framework of ‘everyday agency’, it becomes evident
that children are routinely active peace-builders in their communities. The
United Nations (2015) defines peace-building as involving ‘a range of
measure targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and
to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development’. Moreover,
the concept of inclusive peace-building, which the UN Secretary-General
recognised as ‘critical in preventing relapse into violent conflict and pro-
ducing more resilient States and societies’ (United Nations 2012) suggests
the participation of all sectors of society. In this model, any individual or
collective act by conflict-affected children that is directed towards
strengthening communities, building resilience, and resisting violence
can reasonably be considered a contribution towards peace. However,
for children’s peace-building capacities to be understood and even
developed as part of inclusive peace processes, it is necessary first to
understanding children’s agency.
Recent cases of the radicalisation of children in political violence provide
a timely reminder of two a priori claims central to this concern. First, some
children who voluntarily engage with conflict – regardless of whether they
are combatants or peace-builders – demonstrate political awareness of
conflict. This manifests in an understanding of a conflict’s protagonists,
geography, timeline, alleged causes, and goals. Australian teenager Jake
Biladi, for instance, made several written statements demonstrating an
understanding of the politics of the conflict in the Middle East (see ABC
News 2015). This is not uncommon in children who make choices to
become politically active. Research demonstrates that Vietnamese children
who resisted US forces during the Second Indochina War (Huynh et al.
2015) and French children who resisted the Nazis during the Second World
War (Brocklehurst 2006) could demonstrate intelligible knowledge of the
political issues dominating the surrounding violence. Reminiscent of the
courage and forthrightness of Malala Yousafzai, Anne Frank wrote in her
diary during the Second World War: ‘Although I am only fourteen, I know
quite well what I want, I know who is right and who is wrong. I have my
opinions, my own ideas and principles. . . . I feel quite independent of any-
one’ (Frank 1993, 191). This does not dismiss claims that children have been
subject to indoctrination or that they are uniquely vulnerable to political
influence. Children by definition have less life experience, education, and
170 K. LEE-KOO

capacity for personal self-determination than adults. Moreover, they are

generally reliant upon adults for their understanding of the world.
However, regardless of this conditioning, the net effect has been that some
children demonstrate the capacities to engage with the politics of conflict.
Second, this political awareness can influence the everyday activities of
children, regardless of how banal and apolitical it may seem. Whether it is a
simple determination to attend school, resist radicalisation or recruitment,
hope for a better future, develop social bonds across political divides,
protest, speak out, or lead on issues of peace or human rights, conflict is
replete with everyday examples of children’s positive political agency hav-
ing tangible impacts upon peace-building efforts. Importantly, this has
been acknowledged by civil society. At the grassroots level, NGOs, some-
times in collaboration with states, have been working with children to
develop and shape their social engagement in positive ways. For instance,
Defence of Children International administers leadership workshops for
children and youth affected by conflict, and Worldvision has run ‘children’s
clubs’ in a number of conflict zones to provide spaces where children can
talk openly about their ambitions for conflict transformation (Worldvision
2012). In 2011 the Nepalese Ministry of Education declared all schools
and school buses to be zones of peace as part of a child-driven ‘children as
zones of peace’ campaign (see Feinstein et al. 2010, 56), and in East Timor
in 2006 actor Jackie Chan engaged thousands of young men and women in
martial arts training to redirect the youth gang violence towards a philo-
sophy of peace (see Oviedo 2008). These programmes are often presented
as being community-minded, education-based, and child welfare pro-
grammes. Crucially, they seek to invest children in the future of their
communities rather than disenfranchise them. Yet they are typically dis-
connected from processes of peace-building, and are dismissed as irrelevant
to the prospect of stable political local and global governance. This is
despite the fact that these programmes often provide the skills, opportu-
nities, and groundwork for children to become peace-builders, thus laying
the foundations for sustainable peace. Whether it be skills in leadership and
community, opportunities for a voice and collaboration with others, or the
creation of networks and relationships that children can continue to use,
these programmes often do take children’s positive agency seriously and
seek to develop it in an optimistic and politically aware manner.
These programmes need to be aligned with the existing global archi-
tecture on children and armed conflict. The goal of this should not be to
wilfully force children into becoming political actors or agents. Similarly,
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 171

this project should not even directly advocate that children should be
agents for peace-building. It is simply to acknowledge that in some
cases, they already are. Moreover, as the focus on contemporary peace-
building is moving towards inclusivity and sustainability, children – as
stakeholders in peace – should be visible. Thus, aligning the UN’s global
governance architecture with the lived realities of children in conflict
requires the acceptance of two basic claims: the international community
has a responsibility to protect those children who experience, and are
vulnerable to, all forms of violence within conflict zones; the international
community should acknowledge and support those children who have a
capacity and propensity towards peace-building. The latter should be done
through the systematic gathering of data on children’s everyday activities;
analysis of that data directed towards understanding the relationship
between those activities and sustainable peace; development of a frame-
work that might support such engagements by children (through the
Office for the Special Representative, for example); and appropriate fund-
ing, implementation and monitoring of these activities.
Such realignment challenges our conceptualisation of childhood. Again,
this is not to suggest that children should be considered political actors, or
should have political responsibilities. Rather, this realignment accepts that
political agency is not something that is switched on at the age of 18; rather
it develops over time, with the support of communities. Moreover, this
realignment accepts that politics, like peace, is not only found in traditional
sites of public power such as the Security Council, but also found in the
everyday and in the private spheres of those experiencing conflict.

CONCLUSION
Children face horrific and unique forms of insecurity in armed conflict.
While this impact is well documented and challenged by those actors and
architectures charged with global peace and security, the capacity for
children to build their own secure spaces is not well-documented. This
needs to change. As scholars and practitioners begin to identify the often
small, everyday actions that some children undertake to renegotiate their
vulnerability or maximise their opportunities in conflict, it becomes clear
that children can be a strong, peace-building constituency. This has both
ethical and instrumental implications. In the first instance, it provides
global actors with an opportunity to respect children’s rights and support
their ongoing development as political actors. Second, a stronger
172 K. LEE-KOO

commitment to identify and support children’s peace-building capacities

will begin to build important relationships between future leaders and the
international community. Furthermore, it will invest children – as custo-
dians of peace – in the future of their own community. These are the
foundations of a sustainable peace.

REFERENCES
ABC News (2015). ‘Jake Bilardi: What we know about Melbourne teenager linked
to Islamic State suicide bombing’. ABC News Online. 13 March. Accessed from
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-13/jake-bilardi-what-we-know-aus
tralian-teenager-islamic-state/6314260.
Brocklehurst, H. (2006). Who’s afraid of children? Children, conflict and interna-
tional relations. Hampshire: Ashgate.
Child Soldiers International (2012) Louder than Words: Information of the invol-
vement on children in armed conflict: http://www.child-soldiers.org/publica
tions_archive.php.
De Certeau, M. (1988). The practice of everyday life. Berkeley: California
University Press.
Dodd, V., & Khomami, N. (2015) ‘Two Bethnal Green schoolgirls ‘now married to
ISIS men’ in Syria. The Guardian. 4 July. https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/jul/04/two-bethnal-green-schoolgirls-now-married-isis-men-syria.
Feinstein, C., Giertsen, A., & O’Kane, C. (2010). Children’s participation
in armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. In B. Percy-Smith &
N. Thomas A handbook of children and young people’s participation: Perspectives
from theory and practice (pp. 53–62). Abingdon: Routledge.
Frank, A. (1993). Anne Frank: the diary of a young girl (first published 1947).
Ealing: Bantam.
Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world
order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Huynh, K., D’Costa, B., & Lee-Koo, K. (2015). Children and global conflict.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kabeer, N. 2010. “Voice, agency and the sounds of silence: A comment on Jane
L. Parpart’s Paper.” Gendered Perspectives on International Development (July).
Kaplan, R. D. ‘The coming anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly, 1 February 1994. http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/
304670/.
Lee-Koo, K. (2011). Horror and hope: (re)presenting militarised children in
global North-South relations. Third World Quarterly, 32(4), 725–742.
 9 CHILDREN, CONFLICT, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 173

Lee-Koo, K. (2013). Not suitable for children: The politicisation of conflict-

affected children in post-2001 Afghanistan. Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 67(4), 475–490.
Lee-Koo, K. (2014). Gender and Globalisation. In M. Steger, P. Battersby &
J. Siracusa (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Globalization, Volume 1.
London: Sage.
Madhok, S., & Rai, S. M. (2012). Agency, injury, and transgressive politics in
neoliberal times. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 37(3),
645–669.
Oviedo, S. (2008). ‘Jackie Chan takes on Timor’s karate kids’, Asia Times. 18
September.
Richmond, O. (2009). Becoming liberal, unbecoming liberalism: Liberal–local
hybridity via the everyday as a response to the paradoxes of liberal peacebuild-
ing. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3(3), 324–344.
Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and post-conflict reconstruction: Agents of change.
Washington, DC: USIP Press.
Spark, C. 2014. ‘Developing young women’s collective action in Vanuatu’, SSGM
In Brief, Australian National University 2014/28.
UNICEF. (2009). Machel study 10-year strategic review: Children and conflict in a
changing world. New York: UNICEF.
United Nations (2012). ‘Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict: Report of the
Secretary-General’ A/67/499, 8 October.
United Nations (2015). ‘What is peacebuilding?’ Available at: http://www.unpbf.
org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/.
Uprichard, E. (2008). ‘Children as being and becomings: Children, childhood and
temporality. Children and Society, 20(4), 303–313.
Urdal, H., ‘The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic
armed conflict, 1950–2000’ Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction, The World Bank, Paper No. 14, July 2004. http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/28/
000012009_20040728162225/Rendered/PDF/29740.pdf.
Whitehead, T. (2015). Children at risk of radicalisation to double. The Telegraph,
27 July, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-theuk/
11765877/Children-at-risk-of-radicalisation-to-double.html#top.
World Bank (2015) ‘Population, ages 0-14’. Available from http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2014
+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc.
Worldvision. (2012).Children and peacebuilding: Experiences and perspectives.
London: World Vision.
Worldvision (2015) ‘Child Soldiers’. Available from http://www.worldvision.
org/about-us/media-center/child-soldiers.
174 K. LEE-KOO

Yousafzai, M. (2009) ‘”Saturday 03 January: I am afraid” – Diary of a Pakistani

girl’, BBC News 19 January 2009. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/7834402.stm.

Katrina Lee-Koo is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Monash

University, Australia. She has expertise in human security in conflict and post-
conflict zones and conceptualising identity in security studies. She is the co-author
of Children and Global Conflict (2015, Cambridge University Press) and Ethics
and Global Security: A Cosmopolitan Approach (2014, Routledge), and author of
‘Gender and Women’s Work in Asia and the Pacific’ in The Globalization of World
Politics: Case Studies from Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Pacific (2014,
Oxford University Press), ‘Translating UNSCR 1325 into Practice: Lessons
Learned and Obstacles Ahead’ in Responsibility to Protect and Women, Peace and
Security: Aligning the Protection Agendas (2013, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). She
is Associate Editor of International Feminist Journal of Politics.
 CHAPTER 10

Global Weapons Proliferation,

Disarmament, and Arms Control

Marianne Hanson

The proliferation of weapons – both conventional and unconventional – has

resulted in globalised risks and dangers which threaten civilians and comba-
tants alike, and is a reflection of global political structures and the distribution
of power among states. When assessing the attempts that have been made to
control weapons, and when thinking about the efficacy of these attempts and
how they might evolve in years to come, it seems that we are currently poised
precariously between two possible outcomes: the first is a future of effective
governance, where weapons that are deemed inhumane will be effectively
prohibited and destroyed, where the thriving arms trade and especially the
rampant proliferation of small arms and light weapons will be reined in by
appropriate controls, and where the extraordinarily high levels of military
spending will be curbed by more rational approaches to achieving national
security; the second is a future of continued proliferation, evasion of global
responsibilities, ever-higher military budgets, the killing of hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians each year, and the likelihood that devastating weapons of mass
destruction will one day be used, with catastrophic global consequences.
It is not at all clear which direction we are headed towards; on the one
hand, there have been some laudable achievements in arms control and

M. Hanson (*)
University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
e-mail: m.hanson@uq.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 175

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_10
176 M. HANSON

disarmament recently which suggest a safer global future, but on the other
hand, there is significant risk that norms and processes which have pains-
takingly been put into place over the decades will be disregarded and that
agreements will unravel as states and arms industries seek selfish gains over
any collective good.
This chapter begins by providing an overview of recent developments
in weapons control. It outlines the successes that have been made in this
field since the Cold War ended, but also notes some of the setbacks and
controversies which continue to cause concern. This section is followed by
an analysis of what I believe to be four fundamental problems, or practices,
that have plagued in the past – and are likely to plague in the future – the
prospects for controlling weapons. Finally, the chapter will advocate for a
range of actions to be taken at the normative, policy, and institutional
levels if we wish to avert a world of greater insecurity.

WEAPONS CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT

AND CURRENT PRACTICES

The period since 1945 has seen important advances made in the area of
controlling the spread of weapons, and in the past two decades, especially,
there has been a strengthened push to address the proliferation of various
weapons. Accompanying this has been the gradual development of a
perception that some weapons are simply too inhumane ever to be used,
that they violate the fundamentals tenets of international humanitarian
law, and that no civilised state should tolerate their possession or use. The
result of this development is that there is now established in world politics
a strong sense that it is not only processes of arms control which are
important, focusing as they do on limiting the spread of weapons, but
also that processes of disarmament – the actual prohibition and destruc-
tion of specific weapons – are valuable in order to ensure that the most
egregious weapons are never used.
Attempts to control weapons during the Cold War were characterised
by the following factors: there was an almost exclusive focus on nuclear
arms; these processes were conducted mainly by the two superpowers; and
they were very much state-driven initiatives, motivated by considerations
of realpolitik. A few agreements were multilaterally negotiated during the
Cold War: these were the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
which sought to halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five states
which already possessed them (United States, Soviet Union, Britain,
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 177

France, and China, also known as the P5), and which also stipulated that
these same states must at some point eliminate their nuclear weapons;
the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972; and the 1986 Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty. For the most part, however, weapons control was
not something that afforded small- or medium-sized states any real pro-
spect of sustained involvement or impact. The United States and the
Soviet Union determined what could be addressed or achieved. Nor was
there any real possibility that non-state actors – civil society, or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) – could play a part in initiating and
directing what were seen as the exclusive prerogatives of states, namely
their security policies and the role of weapons in these policies.

Recent Successes
This situation has changed significantly since the Cold War ended. The
focus has shifted to address conventional weapons (even as concern with
nuclear weapons continues); a greater range of states has been involved
in driving arms control and disarmament processes (sometimes even at
the displeasure of the great powers); and we see a strong civil society
presence which has propelled a number of important agreements forward.
These are the Landmines Convention of 1997, the Cluster Munitions
Convention of 2008, (both of which, importantly, incorporate the provi-
sion of assistance to victims) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2013.
What is striking about each of these achievements is that it was a combina-
tion of civil society actors working in tandem with particular (middle-sized)
states (Canada in the case of landmines, Norway in the case of cluster
munitions, and various states in the case of the ATT) that created these
treaties, and that they have been achieved in large part without the support
of the great powers. Gone too is the exclusive prism of realpolitik; national
security concerns have certainly not vanished, but the weapons control
processes that we see today are motivated as much by humanitarian con-
cerns as they are by anything else. All these agreements have explicitly
focused attention on the inhumane nature of certain weapons, and
have helped to resurrect the importance of international humanitarian law
(formerly known as the Laws of War) as a decisive factor in delegitimising
certain weapons.1
All of these have been very important developments. Whereas for
decades attention was paid mainly to restricting weapons of mass
destruction – that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – these
178 M. HANSON

new methods of diplomacy and wider range of state and NGO actors has
focused attention on weapons which are commonly used, which have long
been considered ‘conventional’ and part of the sovereign state’s ‘right’ to
armaments necessary for self-defence, and which have thus been largely
immune to questioning or criticism.2 Although the UN has convened,
since 1991, a Register of Conventional Arms, state reporting is done on a
voluntary basis; moreover, the Register cannot itself put pressure on states
to alter their arms trading practices. The result is that ‘business as usual’
has prevailed.
The case of the Arms Trade Treaty – addressing what Kofi Annan
(2006) called ‘the real weapons of mass destruction’ – is thus particularly
notable, because it represents a direct challenge to sovereign states
previously used to manufacturing and supplying weapons – in this case
conventional weapons and especially small arms and light weapons
(SALW) – to other states with relatively little oversight, restraint or
accountability. The ATT does not focus on inhumane weapons per se;
indeed, it is not an arms control or disarmament treaty, but an attempt
to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons. It starts from
the fact that between 300,000 and 500,000 people, most of them civi-
lians, are killed every year by SALW which have in the past been traded,
legally and illegally, with almost no global restraints, and which have
fuelled deadly violence in conflict-prone areas (Amnesty International
2015; Shah 2006). As such, the ATT seeks to prevent the irresponsible
or illegal transfers of weapons, where it is deemed that these might be used
in serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law,
especially in acts of genocide or crimes against humanity, in gender-based
violence, or in organised crime, and where their presence could adversely
affect regional security or hinder economic development. SALW are
the weapons that are most used globally and which result in the highest
number of deaths, yet until recently were not subject to the raft of
restrictions or banning that we have seen applied to weapons of mass
destruction. They have been circulated widely and freely, and it is esti-
mated that there are now around 875 million SALW in existence and use.
The ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014; importantly, five of
the top ten arms exporters have signed the treaty (United Kingdom,
Germany, Spain, France, and Italy); additionally, the United States and
Israel have signed, but not yet ratified, the treaty. States signatory to the
ATT must report annually on their arms transfers; they will meet to show
progress, assess each other’s actions, and be able to hold other states to
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 179

account. Critics have argued that the ATT does not go far enough, and
that it contains too many loopholes, but in a world where there was little
to prevent a state selling whatever it wanted, to whoever it wanted, this
treaty is a good beginning.3
We have also seen numerous states and NGOs becoming involved in
driving forwards the NPT – primarily to pressure the nuclear weapon
states to fulfil their end of the NPT’s ‘bargain’ by eliminating their nuclear
weapons. (This remains one of the most contentious issues in current
weapons control efforts, and is discussed in greater detail in Tanya
Ogilvie-White’s chapter.) There have been some important nuclear/
WMD-related achievements in recent years: these include the 2010 New
START Treaty between the United States and Russia which will limit the
number of deployed strategic warheads each can hold, the deal reached
with Iran by the United States, Russia, and EU states to restrict Iran’s
nuclear programme, and the destruction of Syrian-held chemical weapons
following the use of these against civilians in 2013.4 While these might be
seen as only isolated achievements, they are important components in
global efforts to restrict and eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

Recent Controversies
Against the generally positive achievements noted above, one must point
to a number of areas where success has been elusive and/or where state
behaviour has continued to hamper global efforts to control weapons.
Although landmine use has decreased sharply with the intensification of
the norm against their use,5 the deployment of cluster munitions con-
tinues and various states affirm their right to these weapons,6 even though
they – like landmines – remain inactive in the ground for long periods and
maim or kill civilians long after a war has ceased. Compliance with the
ATT is also under question, where, recently, Britain has been criticised for
not adhering to the provisions it accepted (Stavrianarkis and Cooper
2016) (Table 10.1).
Of some concern also is the development of new weapons which are
not explicitly subject to any formal treaties. The use of drones (Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles or UAVS) in warfare has increased sharply in recent
years. These are aircraft either controlled by ‘pilots’ from the ground or
increasingly, autonomously with a programmed mission. There are two
categories of drones: those used for reconnaissance and surveillance, and
those armed with weapons (missiles or bombs) designed to kill. Their use
180 M. HANSON

Table 10.1 Summary of adherents to the landmines and cluster munitions

conventions and the Arms Trade Treaty
Entered into force Signatories and/or Non-
states parties signatories

Convention on the 1 March 1999 162 35 (including

Prohibition of the China, Russia,
Use, Stockpiling, and United
Production and States)
Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction
(Landmines Treaty)
Convention on Cluster 1 August 2010 118 79 (including
Munitions (Cluster Israel, China,
Munitions Treaty) Russia, and
United States)
Arms Trade Treaty 24 December 2014 132 (including some 65 (including
of the world’s biggest China, Russia)
arms exporters: France,
Germany, Italy, Spain,
United Kingdom,
United States

for reconnaissance and surveillance is generally accepted, and even the UN

has recently recommended a greater use of such drones in peacekeeping
operations (Charbonneau 2015). But their use in killing has been much
more controversial. They have come into prominent use since the United
States’ ‘War on Terror’, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and
more recently in Yemen and Somalia. Unlike aircraft which are piloted,
drones can stay airborne for prolonged periods of time; they are cheaper
to build and run than other kinds of aircraft and because they are flown
remotely, there is no danger to any flight crew.
But their pilotless nature has raised concerns: critics argue that where
drones are used to kill, the fact that an operator is based thousands of miles
away can depersonalise the use of force, and ‘sanitise’ the business of
killing. In other words, while the use of drones is not necessarily illegal,
it carries the risk of an operator, distanced from the war zone, becoming
removed from any elements of humanity and constraint. There are also
concerns that the use of drones violates international humanitarian law,
given the large percentage of civilians who have been killed mistakenly,
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 181

especially by US drone warfare. Indeed it is this issue which has prompted

moves to develop a code of conduct regarding the use of drones in warfare
(International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC 2013). Their accuracy
rate is said to be as low as 2% (Global Drones Watch 2014; Ackerman 2014),
although others believe that their success is greater than this (Byman 2013).
Nevertheless, even one of their staunchest defenders concedes that ‘drones
kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger for-
eign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that
irresponsible governments will abuse’ (Byman 2013). As Christof Heyns,
the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary execu-
tions, has noted, it is imperative that human rights and fundamental free-
doms are protected, even while seeking to counter-terrorism (Heyns 2013).
But it is not at all evident that the United States and other users of drones
as weapons intend to cease this kind of warfare.
What is even more troubling than the use of drones as weapons – where
there is a human operator – is the rise of what are called Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’. These are
fully autonomous weapons able to select and engage targets – without
any human intervention. This issue is being addressed by the UN within
the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, with
the third multilateral ‘meeting of experts’ held in April 2016. But it is
uncertain whether effective, legally binding restrictions can be put in place.
Rudimentary LAWS have already been developed (to varying degrees) by
the United States, China, Israel, South Korea, Russia, and the United
Kingdom. As with drones, this issue has been publicised widely by
NGOs, especially the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which is calling
for a pre-emptive ban, as are many states. As Human Rights Watch notes,

[F]ully autonomous weapons could be operational in 20 to 30 years . . . these

weapons would be incapable of meeting international humanitarian law
standards, including the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military
necessity. The weapons would not be constrained by the capacity for com-
passion, which can provide a key check on the killing of civilians. Fully
autonomous weapons also raise serious questions of accountability because
it is unclear who should be held responsible for any unlawful actions they
commit. (Human Rights Watch n.d.)

It is the lack of meaningful human control which is the main concern, but
the UN has so far been unable to put together a legally binding instrument
182 M. HANSON

which would ban the development and use of killer robots. This is pri-
marily because of opposition from the United States and the United
Kingdom which want any treaty to focus on future technology only,
leaving existing technological developments free from restraints (Grant
2015).
Nuclear weapons also continue to raise grave concerns, especially as
we have not been able to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or a
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, that proliferation risks remain high, and
that there are still over 15,000 nuclear weapons in existence (see Tanya
Ogilvie-White’s chapter). At a very visible level, the defiance of North
Korea as it continues to test nuclear weapons – the only state in the world
to do so this century – is a grim and unwelcome reminder of this issue, and
the world has rightly condemned these continued violations of the norm
against nuclear testing. But the problem is much bigger than this. The
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty came to represent something of a global
‘compact’ between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, wherein
the latter would refrain from developing nuclear weapons, in exchange for
the nuclear weapon states’ promise to disarm (and to assist non-nuclear
states with the peaceful use of nuclear energy). But this compact has been
called into question several times and discussions came to an acrimonious
head in 2015, when most states seemed finally to give up on the idea that
the NPT could force the nuclear weapon states to disarm. This has led a
majority of states to seek alternative mechanisms and venues for pursuing
nuclear disarmament, notably through a process called the ‘Humanitarian
Initiative’, an agreement now signed by 127 states, which calls ultimately
for a nuclear weapons ban treaty. Such a treaty would be aspirational,
but would nevertheless have a potentially transformative nature (Acheson
et al. 2014).
From the assessments above, it can be seen that while there have been
some positive achievements in weapons control over the past few years,
these processes nevertheless remain only partially fulfilled, and in some
cases, are at risk of being wound back considerably. Moreover, global
institutions regulating weapons control and disarmament have become
moribund and even dysfunctional; the UN’s Conference on Disarmament
is the prime example here, but the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons and the Register of Conventional Arms are also only sporadically
upheld. Even those instruments which seemed to promise significant
change, like the NPT, have become tarnished by the failure of key states
to abide by their obligations to that treaty. The result is that the world
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 183

continues to be at risk from the proliferation and use of weapons, and that
none of the agreements reached will necessarily provide security and save
us from disaster.

CRITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING WEAPONS CONTROL

This chapter opened with the observation that we seem to be poised
between embarking either on a future of effective governance regarding
weapons control or on a future of continued proliferation, with its atten-
dant risks. The following section of this chapter outlines some of the key
factors, or practices, which have enabled the huge growth in weapons and
military capabilities that we see today, and argues that the way in which
these factors are addressed in coming years will determine which of these
futures we are likely to face. Each of these factors is complex and signifi-
cant in itself and warrants a much closer examination than is possible here,
but they are noted here as useful markers for what will be necessary if we
are to manage weapons control effectively in the future.

The Economics of Armaments and the Sovereignty of States

The first and rather obvious point to note is that weapons manufacturing
and trading are big business, resulting in a (conventional weapons) arms
industry of US$70–100 billion dollars per year (Amnesty International
2015; SIPRI 2014).7 While it is difficult to calculate with precision a
definitive figure for the value of international conventional arms transfers,
respected sources indicate that these figures are, if anything, conservative
estimates, based on national reporting data (Amnesty International 2015;
SIPRI 2014). The top ten conventional arms supplier states remain the
United States, Russia, China, Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Italy,
Ukraine, and Israel (Amnesty International 2015), but it is developing
countries which are predominantly the recipients of conventional arms
transfers, raising questions about the ethics of an arms industry which
flourishes and enables fortunes to be made by some, amidst ongoing
violent conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment in recipient states.
A closely related issue is that of state sovereignty, whereby individual
countries are at liberty, essentially, to acquire whatever levels of (conven-
tional) armaments they wish, or to export arms, as part of their sovereign
rights. The right to self-defence, enshrined since 1945 in Article 51 of the
UN Charter, presupposes a capacity to wage military conflict, although
184 M. HANSON

how states have interpreted this need for a military capacity has varied
greatly, with some states spending enormous sums on their armed forces,
and others, relatively little.8 The tradition of states manufacturing and/or
acquiring armaments, for defence if nothing else, is a powerful norm
which has informed state practice for centuries, and it will be difficult to
challenge this. It has come to be qualified somewhat with the recent ATT,
but the powerful combination of capitalist forces and largely untram-
melled sovereign state rights has been the major enabler of the build-up
of arms we see at the global, regional and national levels. It will be
extraordinarily difficult to question these long-standing practices and to
re-set issues like state sovereignty within a more restricted or even non-
military ethos. The formulation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ that
we have seen applied to human rights, and the state’s ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ its citizens are encouraging developments, and to some extent at
least, the ATT will be able to make states accountable for the armaments
they buy and sell, including those which are bought and sold legally, but
which end up in the ‘wrong hands’, and traded illegally.

The ‘Militarization of Society’

In 1961, when looking at the main purposes of arms control, the notable
strategist and academic Hedley Bull pointed to the following: arms control
would promote international security by making war, and especially
nuclear war, less likely; it would reduce the economic costs of developing
and maintaining expensive weapons systems; and it was necessary because
preparing for and threatening war was often, as he said, morally wrong
(Bull 1961: 4).
But Bull also pointed to a fourth reason: arms control was important
to avoid what he termed ‘the militarization of society’ (Bull 1961: 4).
Although he did not elaborate greatly on this point, it was a prescient one.
Militarization is one of the key factors which helps to explain the level of
armaments and growth in weaponry we have seen over recent decades.
Militarization is not, of course, something that has affected all societies
uniformly; in some cases, this has grown gradually while in others specific
events have propelled a rise in military action and armaments’ acquisition.
Either way, it appears that over time, many governments have increased
their levels of military spending and have acquired ever more sophisticated
and expensive weaponry, regardless of whether these actually provide
effective and lasting security. In 2014, world military spending was
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 185

US$1.8 trillion (SIPRI 2015); this figure remains reasonably constant

each year. By contrast, funding made available for meeting development
goals or UN peacekeeping operations is a tiny fraction of this amount.
One of the anticipations at the end of the Cold War was that a ‘peace
dividend’ might be realised, as confrontation between the two super-
powers was no longer the determining element in global politics. Hopes
for a more peaceful world, a more effective United Nations, adherence
to international law, and lessened military budgets soon faded however,
especially as the United States’ ‘War on Terror’ took hold. The costly wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq pushed up US defence spending considerably, and
reflected a belief among the United States – and the leaders of those states
which joined it – that military action was the only useful way to respond to
terrorism. At the same time that the United States was spending more on
these wars, it was becoming clear that such wars were simply not winnable
by the use of force, and indeed that they have sparked wider regional
conflagrations that show little signs of abating. Most conflicts today are
enormously complex and require not force but protracted negotiations
and careful consideration of a myriad of factors on the ground. The
United States’ use of drones to target suspected terrorists is illustrative:
not only is the accuracy rate low, but the resentment among civilians and
governments in the states targeted is likely to fuel more anti-Americanism
and is hardly worth the alleged benefits of such operations.
Thus, and paradoxically, at the same time that many states are spending
vast amounts of money on modernised armaments, it has become evident
that the use of military force is no longer necessarily able to achieve the
political goals that its protagonists desire. The military preponderance of the
United States in Vietnam and its sophisticated weaponry in Afghanistan and
Iraq have not been able to bring about the outcomes that Washington
desires, while the limits of military force were evident to the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Nevertheless, an abiding faith in high levels of
armaments continues, at the same time that it is clear that this huge level of
spending has not brought greater security, either to the United States in its
specific wars, or globally, where insurgency and terrorism against the West
seem more of a problem today than they have been in the past.
There is a further paradox to be noted: arms sales continue to soar, even
as the incidence of warfare has actually dropped (notwithstanding the
areas of conflict noted above). In particular, large-scale warfare between
states – which has usually required heavy expenditure on armaments – is
non-existent in today’s world (Human Security Report 2009/2010).
186 M. HANSON

Nevertheless, and as Neil Cooper notes, this trend has not produced a fall
in the level of arms sales. Instead, ‘they represent features of an apparent
post-Cold War arms trade paradox, under which a series of factors that
might be expected to produce a decline in defence sales have actually been
accompanied’ by what he shows to be a ‘rise of 60% in the value of global
arms exports between 2000 and 2011’ (Cooper 2012).

The Limited Civilian Oversight and Control

of Weapons Programmes
A third factor noted here – and closely related to the two discussed above – is
that civilians have been largely excluded from decisions taken by
their governments about the acquisition of certain weapons as well as the
use of these weapons. In general, even in liberal democracies, there has been
relatively insufficient civilian oversight of military budgets and programmes.
As Thomas Nash (2015) has pointed out, ‘in comparison to standards in
other fields, such as the development and release of new pharmaceuticals or
most consumer goods, there’s virtually no public scrutiny of the pro-
cess of developing and fielding new weapons’. At the same time,
individuals and armaments companies benefit enormously from devel-
oping new weapons and fielding them to interested governments.
This lack of civilian oversight been especially apparent with regard to
nuclear weapons, where war planning and strategic thinking have typically
been driven by an elite group which has remained beyond the influence
and control of the broader population. While this is true in non-demo-
cratic states where political decisions are divorced from public involve-
ment, it is also entrenched in the nuclear weapons’ programmes of the
democratic nuclear weapon states, raising important questions about the
nature of citizen–state relations and the constitutional requirements of
participatory democracy. It is fair to say that in the Western democracies,
‘all but a small group of experts have been kept out of nuclear decision-
making, on the grounds of national security’ (Benedict 2011). Robert
Dahl (1985: 6–7) argued that when it comes to nuclear weapons, ‘we have
in fact turned over to a small group of people decisions of incalculable
importance to ourselves and mankind, and it is very far from clear how, if
at all, we could recapture a control that in fact we have never had’. The
way that initial decisions were taken by states to acquire nuclear weapons
has also been problematic. John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen (2010), for
instance, note that Britain’s choice to develop nuclear weapons in 1952
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 187

was made by ‘a small group of key cabinet members in private’ and that
subsequent British governments continue to take decisions this way. Even
if we allow for the fact that some secrecy might be necessary for security
purposes, it is hard to escape the conclusion that such processes are
designed chiefly to inhibit public scrutiny.
In terms of conventional weapons also, the development of ever-more
destructive and irrationally large arsenals continues, despite doubts about
their strategic usefulness and any logical requirements within contempor-
ary contexts. Again, it is worth considering Hedley Bull’s warnings
55 years ago, that militarization could ‘corrupt liberal and democratic
institutions’ and that the ‘presence of military men [sic], of military
power and the military ethic . . . stifles the prospects of parliamentary or
popular rule’ (Bull 1961: 4). Certainly, we have seen, especially since the
global financial crisis of 2007, that publics are asking their governments to
become more transparent and accountable for the money they spend on
armaments and the military more generally. This is not to say that the
‘guns versus hospitals’ argument is going to be won, and indeed it seems
to be military budgets that, for many states, are the hardest to reduce.

The Privileging of the Interests of the Great Powers over

the Security Interests of Other States
A final factor observed here which stands as an obstacle to the effective
regulation of weapons is the privileging of the interests of the large and
powerful states over the security concerns of the rest of the world. This has
been the case especially with nuclear weapons, the example par excellence of
how the great powers – the P5 states – arrogate to themselves the right to
keep their weapons while disregarding, for decades, the pleas of the vast
majority of states for a nuclear-weapon-free world. This continues to be the
source of much resentment and dissatisfaction as small- and middle-sized
states consider that their own security interests are being unheeded. There
are also practical consequences for these double standards: it becomes very
difficult for the international community to tell a state such as North Korea
or Iran that it must not develop nuclear weapons when the chief propo-
nents of the norm of non-proliferation are intent on retaining their own
weapons. The tacit acceptance of Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal, and
the US decision in 2005 to engage in nuclear trade with India, only serve to
reiterate to other states that global rules do not apply equally, and that the
powerful states apply weapons norms very selectively.
188 M. HANSON

These double standards have had and will continue to have serious
implications for global order and the forging of an effective global weap-
ons governance regime. Again, it is useful to refer to Hedley Bull here.9
For him, ‘the proper purpose of arms control is to advance objectives
endorsed by international society as a whole’ (Bull 1976: 201, emphasis
added) and he believed strongly that processes which only served to
reinforce great power preferences would ultimately not be sustainable.
The frustration at the nuclear weapon states’ intransigence spills over
into attempts to govern conventional weapons also. China, Russia, and
the United States continue to stay outside the Landmines and Cluster
Munitions Conventions, and China and Russia have refused to sign the
ATT.10 If weapons policies are seen as being wielded by the large powers
in line with only their geopolitical interests, then other agreements might
also unravel, as smaller and weaker states refuse to be bound by restrictions
seen as unfair and discriminatory.

CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES FOR POLICY

AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The spread of weapons, both conventional and of mass destruction, the

alarming rise in the global arms trade, and the shocking number of deaths
caused by small arms and light weapons have all created globalized risks
and threats which will require robust and effective global governance
mechanisms. We stand to gain considerable global, regional, and national
security benefits if we strengthen existing mechanisms and develop new
ones where needed, together with stringent monitoring and verification
regulations attached to these. In order to do so, however, there will need
to be some changes made to the existing practices noted above. In
particular, it will be necessary for the great powers, the nuclear weapon
states, and the major arms manufacturers to implement changes in their
behaviour within multilateral and regional settings. Four broad proposals
are noted here.
The first is to strengthen the ATT, by urging universal membership,
imposing ever-greater restrictions on what states can and cannot trade in
arms, enhancing monitoring capabilities, demanding greater accountabil-
ity from states who sell and buy armaments, and by publicising widely the
impact of weapons’ use on victims. Public awareness about the devastating
effects of armaments on ordinary people – remembering that most of the
victims of armed violence are civilians – is vital, as is the real need to
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 189

provide effective assistance to victims. At the moment, the ATT remains

relatively weak as various states apply their own interpretation of its
provisions to suit their geopolitical preferences and economic desires.
But the ATT is a good start and represents an important first step in
questioning what states have for long taken for granted, namely their
largely unrestricted sovereign right to manufacture and sell vast quantities
of arms, regardless of the destruction caused.
A second proposal is to legislate for greater civilian inclusion in defence
policy-making and for greater oversight of government arms acquisitions
and transfers. This will be almost impossible in states that are not democ-
racies, but that should not serve as an excuse to resist change in states
where there is a commitment to participatory democracy. Closely related to
this is the need to support the activities of civil society in arms control and
disarmament. The good news is that NGOs have been highly active in these
processes since the mid-1990s; they have been instrumental in achieving all
of the key treaties and conventions reached since 1997, and it seems that
they are now an unstoppable force in world politics. While this might
displease some governments and diplomats who prefer to retain their
control over security policy-making, an expanded involvement of civil
society actors should be welcomed and institutionalised into state practice.
A third proposal is to work actively at the domestic level to lessen the
emphasis on military force as a means of solving political problems, especially
in addressing terrorism. This will be difficult to do, but it must be attempted
if we wish to see an effective response to what has become a global problem
of some magnitude, and if we are to weaken the insidious connection
between weapons industries and perceptions of national security.
Fourth, and equally hard, we will need to persuade the great powers
to participate fully and on equal terms with other states in arms control and
disarmament practices. Given a new Trump Presidency, it is unlikely that
this will occur in the United States. The history of attempts to eliminate
nuclear weapons is discouraging, but whether it be nuclear weapons’ pos-
session, ratifying treaties, missile programmes, landmines, or cluster muni-
tions, it is important that global rules are applied fairly and consistently.
In conclusion, when considering where we are heading, we can take
some comfort from two key elements, both of which are relatively new
developments in the practice of international relations. The first is that
there is now a firm reorienting of ‘security’ considerations to encompass
human security and humanitarian obligations. There is a change in the way
that people and even governments now view certain kinds of weapons and
190 M. HANSON

their impact on processes of development and human rights. These consid-

erations have intruded into formal debates and diplomatic gatherings in a way
that has not been present before. The second element has been the rise of
NGO activity in an area of politics once considered ‘high politics’ – national
security – previously restricted to ruling elites. Since the mid-1990s, groups of
well-informed citizens have wielded considerable influence in the processes
of weapons control. These highly committed groups, often from the legal,
medical, and scientific communities, are utilising their professional and tech-
nical skills to articulate new directional paths for achieving policy change.
Both of these elements have meant that, in some cases at least, arms
control and disarmament are proceeding, even without the support or
participation of the great powers. No matter how much particular states
will seek to resist it, it is clear that combinations of certain states and NGO
groups are intent on building global prohibitionary regimes which promise
to embed humanitarianism firmly into these agreements. These elements
suggest that, as Keith Krause (2011) has noted, arms control has now
moved beyond what was primarily a sovereign conception, towards one
more closely linked to governmentality, a process which reaches deep into
the domestic affairs of states. We must be cautious not to expect too much
of these new processes too soon, but they represent our best hope for a
future where weapons and their use are effectively regulated and governed.

NOTES
1. Humanitarian concerns have informed approaches to weapons in the past:
early examples include the 1868 ‘Declaration of St Petersburg to the Effect
of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime’, and the 1925
Geneva Protocol, which stigmatised the use of chemical and biological
weapons in warfare. Yet the application of international humanitarian law
was widely ignored by many states for decades, and this has only been
pronounced in the more recent treaties mentioned above.
2. Attention to what are known as ‘inhumane’ conventional weapons, includ-
ing landmines, was evident from the late 1970s, and the United Nations
launched the 1980 ‘Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which
may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects’,
(commonly known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention). However, this
agreement has had only a limited effect, and the more recent conventions
and treaties have eclipsed it.
3. An excellent overview of the ATT is provided by the Arms Control
Association 2016.
10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 191

4. It must be noted that while destruction of Syrian chemical weapons is a

positive development, the deaths of up to 200,000 persons killed by con-
ventional weapons in the Syrian conflict have gone relatively unremarked.
5. The Landmine Monitor (2015) notes that there has been no ‘new use of
antipersonnel landmines by a State Party’ and that the government forces of
only three states continue to use landmines (Myanmar, Syria, and North
Korea) although non-state agents continue to use them in up to 10 countries.
6. The Cluster Munition Monitor (2015) records that 47 non-signatory states
continue to stockpile cluster munitions, that they have been used in seven
non-signatory states since the Convention entered into force in 2010 (in
Cambodia, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen), and
that ‘[s]ixteen countries continue to produce cluster munitions or reserve
the right to produce in the future, but only three of these states are known
to have used the weapon: Israel, Russia, and the United States’.
7. The illegal trade in weapons is also, of course, substantial, if difficult to
calculate.
8. The United States remains the largest spender on defence, with US$581
billion spent in 2014; by comparison, the United Kingdom spent US$61.8
billion, Australia spent US$22.5 billion, Canada spent US$15.9 billion, and
Austria spent US$3.3 billion (IISS 2015).
9. It was Bull’s initial work on arms control that led to his growing interest in
the wider questions of world order and international relations theory for
which he is most remembered. His observations about the inequalities
between states and the dominance of the great powers regarding nuclear
weaponry steered him towards questions of order and justice in international
relations.
10. President Obama has brought a previously reluctant United States into the ATT,
although US ratification is still a distant goal. Moreover, this was perhaps an
exception rather than the rule: Obama has found it very difficult to push for
change, and domestic politics within the United States together with the election
of Donald Trump to the Presidency bode ill for any real change on these issues.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acheson, R., Nash, T., & Noyes, R. (2014). ‘A treaty banning nuclear
weapons: developing a legal framework for the prohibition and elimination
of nuclear weapons.’ Reaching Critical Will. http://www.reachingcritical
will.org/images/documents/Publications/a-treaty-banning-nuclear-
weapons.pdf.
Ackerman, S. (2014). “41 Men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes –
the facts on the ground”, The Guardian, 24 November. http://www.theguar
dian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147.
192 M. HANSON

Amnesty International. (2003). Amnesty International, Oxfam, IANSA Control

Arms Campaign Media Briefing: Key Facts and Figures, 9 October. http://
web.archive.org/web/20040318193244/http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGPOL300182003.
Amnesty International. (2015). ‘Killer facts: The scale of the global arms trade’, 24
August. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/killer-facts-
the-scale-of-the-global-arms-trade/.
Annan, K. (2006). “Small arms, as deadly as WMD”, United Nations Small
Arms Conference, http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/back
grounder.pdf.
Arms Control Association. (2016). The Arms Trade Treaty at a glance. https://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty.
Benedict, K. (2011). “A democratic theory of disarmament”, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 19 November.
Bull, H. (1961). The control of the arms race: Disarmament and arms control in the
missile age. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Bull, H. (1976). Arms control and world order. International Security, 1(1), 3–36.
Byman, D. (2013). “Why drones work: The case for Washington’s weapon of
choice”, Foreign Affairs, July/August. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti
cles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-work.
Charbonneau, L. (2015). ‘UN panel urges increased use of drones in peacekeep-
ing missions.’ Reuters, February 23. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-
peacekeepers-drones-idUSKBN0LR24G20150223.
Cluster Munition Monitor (2015). http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/major-findings.aspx.
Cooper, N. (2012). “The Arms Trade Treaty in the context of post-Cold War
conventional arms trade regulation”, Campaign Against Arms Trade, 10 July.
https://www.caat.org.uk/issues/att/analysis.
Dahl, R. (1985). Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship.
Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.
Global Drones Watch. (2014). Factsheet. http://droneswatch.org/fact-
sheets-flyers/.
Grant, H. (2015). “UN delay could open door to robot wars, say experts”, The
Guardian, 15 October. http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/oct/
06/autonomous-weapons-un-delay-robot-wars.
Heyns, C. (2013). 2013. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Note by
the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly.https://www.justse
curity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/UN-Special-Rapporteur-
Extrajudicial-Christof-Heyns-Report-Drones.pdf.
Human Rights Watch. (n.d.) Killer Robots, https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/
killer-robots.
 10 GLOBAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL 193

Human Security Project. (2011), Human security report 2009/2010: The causes of
peace and the shrinking costs of war. New York/Oxford: OUP.
ICRC (international Committee of the Red Cross). (2013). The use of armed drones
must comply with laws. https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). (2015), The Military Balance,
London. https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/
the-military-balance-2015-5ea6.
Krause, K. (2011). Leashing the dogs of war: Arms control from sovereignty to
governmentality. Contemporary Security Policy, 32(1), 20–39.
Landmine Monitor. (2015) http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/
2015/landmine-monitor-2015/major-findings.aspx.
Nash, T. (2015), Virtually no public scrutiny: The need for stronger weapons reviews
globally, Article 36, 23 September. http://www.article36.org/weapons-
review/wr-interview/.
Shah, A. (2006), Small Arms—They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties, January 21.
Global Issues http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/small-arms-they-
cause-90-of-civilian-casualties.
Simpson, J., & Nielsen, J. (2010). The United Kingdom. In H. Born, B. Gill, &
H. Hänggi (Eds.), Governing the bomb: Civilian control and democratic
accountability of nuclear weapons. Oxford: OUP/SIPRI.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). (2014). The Financial
Value of the Global Arms Trade. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/
transfers/measuring/financial_values.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). (2015), “US Military
Spending Falls, Increases in Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia”, 30
April. http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/milex-april-2015.
Stavrianarkis, A., & Cooper, N. (2016), “Parliament urgently needs to keep tabs on
Britain’s arms exports”, The Conversation, 14 January. https://theconversation.
com/parliament-urgently-needs-to-keep-tabs-on-britains-arms-exports-52865.

Marianne Hanson is Associate Professor and Foundation Director, Rotary

Centre for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution, University of
Queensland, Australia. She has expertise in global security, international law, and
international institutions, with a specialisation in arms control and disarmament.
Her publications include, ‘The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role Before and
After the U.S. Call for Nuclear Zero’ in The Nonproliferation Review, v17, no1,
2010; ‘Arms Control’. In Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke and Jim George (Ed.),
An introduction to international relations, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming 2017, and a book, Humanitarianism and the Nuclear Weapons
Debate: Building a Global Prohibition Regime, forthcoming 2017.
 CHAPTER 11

Challenges Facing the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Tanya Ogilvie-White

Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity; a third world war, if

fought with nuclear weapons, would likely be the last major war humans
would ever fight (Robock et al. 2007a, b). The horrors of this scenario have
long been recognised by the international community and are starkly sym-
bolised by the doomsday clock, which has been ticking its way towards
midnight since its launch by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 1947. In
January 2015, the clock hands moved from four to three minutes to mid-
night, reflecting humanity’s failure to deal with the two most serious threats
to life on earth: nuclear weapons and climate change. For some, this has
brought back memories of the most dangerous days of the Cold War, leading
the Science and Security Board to implore world leaders to ‘act immediately’
to prevent global catastrophe. In January 2016, despite a groundbreaking
agreement to end the diplomatic stand-off over Iran’s nuclear activities, and
despite advances in international nuclear non-proliferation and security col-
laboration, the hands of the doomsday clock remained stuck at 11.57 p.m.
World leaders have spent decades trying to turn back the hands of
the doomsday clock, via numerous arms control, non-proliferation and
disarmament initiatives, some of which have resulted in new systems of

T. Ogilvie-White (*)
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
e-mail: tanya.ogilviewhite@gmail.com

© The Author(s) 2017 195

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_11
196 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

global governance, and unprecedented levels of international coopera-

tion. From the ever-expanding mandate of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), to the growing web of bilateral, plurilateral,
and multilateral initiatives, a truly global non-proliferation regime has
been built, setting out humanity’s shared responsibility to address
nuclear dangers. But despite important successes, the regime is riddled
with contradictions, which are rotting away its foundations, contra-
dictions that have been apparent since its inception. The Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in particular, is
facing an uncertain future, despite its reputation as one of the most
important treaties after the UN Charter, with a pivotal role in main-
taining international order.1 This chapter explores the challenges facing
the treaty, helping explain a troubling paradox: why a treaty considered
one of the most important and successful in history, with near universal
membership, is increasingly considered inadequate. It begins with a
brief overview of the underlying weaknesses in the treaty text, the
consequences of which are becoming more apparent with each passing
year. It then discusses contemporary NPT implementation problems,
and explains why some states are resisting efforts to overcome them.
Finally, it raises questions over the treaty’s future and offers proposals
for change. The central argument is that the NPT cannot be expected
to indefinitely withstand the strain that it is under: urgent steps are
needed to shore up the treaty, which will be more likely to succeed if
they emphasise humanity’s mutual vulnerability rather than the insecu-
rities states face relative to each other.

THE NPT’S PROBLEMATIC FOUNDATIONS

The NPT suffers from fundamental weaknesses that can be traced back to
the treaty’s long and difficult negotiations. While all diplomatic agree-
ments involve compromises, and the language of international law is
notoriously ambiguous, the NPT contains some unique characteristics
that led the non-proliferation regime to be built on shaky foundations.
The most important of these is the division of states parties into two types,
each with different rights and responsibilities: nuclear weapon states
(NWS, states that had conducted a nuclear test before 1 January 1967)
and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS, states that had not). While the
former were permitted to retain their nuclear weapons capabilities under
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 197

the terms of the treaty, the latter were prohibited from developing them,
thereby establishing two classes of state.2
This class system, members of which are sometimes referred to as the
‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ of the non-proliferation regime, was problematic
from the start. As an incentive to accept their differentiated legal status,
the NNWS received two key concessions that undermined the non-pro-
liferation role of the treaty. First, they were granted ‘inalienable’ rights to
acquire all types of peaceful nuclear technology (Article IV), as long as they
comply with their non-proliferation obligations. Second, NWS accepted
very weak language on treaty withdrawal, agreeing to a provision allowing
NNWS to give three months’ notice of withdrawal if ‘ . . . important
events . . . have jeopardised the supreme interests’ of the state concerned
(Article X). In itself, this concession was not surprising, given the fear
many states had about the threat posed by nuclear-armed adversaries, and
doubts about the long-term durability of their strategic alliances. They were
simply unwilling to permanently forgo the option to acquire their own
nuclear weapons. But the combination of a weak Article X, and in particular
its lack of strong penalties for withdrawal, plus the inalienable right under
the terms of the treaty to develop peaceful nuclear technology (much of
which is dual-use and could potentially be diverted to a military program)
was open to exploitation by cheats. This had the double effect of reducing
the sense of security that the treaty might otherwise have provided to states
wishing to permanently forgo the nuclear option, and increasing the pres-
sure on treaty verification.
In addition to these two concessions, two notable omissions from
the treaty text undermined the treaty’s security role and increased the
fundamental inequity that lies at its core. These omissions – the
absence of a schedule for nuclear disarmament, and the lack of firm
security assurances for most NNWS – create a sense of injustice and
discrimination among some states parties. Neither of these omissions
was a concern for the alliance partners of the United States and Soviet
Union, who were provided with nuclear guarantees as part of their
defence arrangements, but for members of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM)3 it was a serious issue (CSSS JMCNS NPT Briefing Book). They
argued that their own security would be unfairly compromised if the
treaty allowed the NWS to retain their nuclear weapons, and allowed a
select group of states to benefit from nuclear umbrellas, while the
remaining NNWS were left to fend for themselves. During negotia-
tions, negotiators from the NAM pushed for strong language on
198 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

disarmament priorities and legally binding commitments from the NWS

that they would not attack NNWS with nuclear weapons (which are
known as ‘negative security assurances’), and would come to their
assistance if they were attacked with nuclear weapons by third parties
(‘positive security assurances’). But their efforts were largely unsuccess-
ful. The NWS did commit to pursue ‘effective measures’ on nuclear
arms control and disarmament (Article VI), but disarmament priorities
were deliberately left opaque, and no timeline, however distant, was
provided. The NWS also refused to include language that would extend
either type of nuclear assurance to states other than their allies, leaving
two serious holes in the treaty text.4 These holes, which were arguably
inevitable in the context of Cold War superpower rivalry, dramatically
increased the significance of the treaty’s weak foundations.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Whether or not cheating and breakout remained a theoretical possibility
or became a reality depended to a large extent on how the treaty was
implemented; on the norms, institutions and arrangements that would be
created once it entered into force on 5 March 1970. If states were willing
to sign the treaty and invest in a strong regime and collaborate to the
extent necessary to clarify, maintain, adapt, and enforce it, the treaty’s
weak original framework would be stabilised in the same way that strong
ligaments, tendons, and muscles can compensate for skeletal deficiencies.
It was always a big ‘if’ because while negotiating and signing a treaty is
certainly not easy, creating, maintaining, and expanding the institutions of
global governance is a difficult and perpetual task.
Some of the challenges associated with NPT implementation stem from
differences in the way states parties perceive the relationship between its
three main pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses.
From the outset, the NWS and the majority of their allies regarded non-
proliferation as the short-term priority, with nuclear disarmament as a
longer-term objective that was largely dependent on creating robust and
universally applicable non-proliferation mechanisms. But other NNWS
(different NAM members at different times) have placed an equal or
greater emphasis on peaceful uses rights and disarmament obligations,
including the need to resolve the problem of holdouts (especially Israel’s
holdout status in the Middle East), and the importance of clarifying,
enforcing, and progressively strengthening the NPT disarmament pillar.
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 199

Scholars and practitioners often stress the need for compromise on both
sides, calling for balance in the way all three of the treaty’s main pillars are
implemented to encourage a sense of shared responsibility for the evolving
regime (Tokyo Forum 1999; Evans and Kawaguchi 2009).
Unfortunately, however, the history of NPT implementation from
1970 to the current day shows that compromises have been slow to
emerge and difficult to sustain, with the NWS making and then reneging
on pledges to strengthen the disarmament pillar, and NNWS making and
reneging on non-proliferation pledges. These dynamics are regularly on
display during the treaty’s review conferences (held every 5 years since
1975), during which compromise agreements have either been impossible
to achieve, or adopted and then only patchily followed through
(Dhanapala 2005; Evans et al. 2015). Table 11.1 provides an overview
of this problem, listing the main roadblocks that have prevented consensus

Table 11.1 Summary of NPT Review Conference Outcomes, 1975–2015

NPT Meeting Outcome Explanation

1975 RevCon Consensus final document NAM wanted to support NPT as the
agreed only treaty committing NWS to
negotiate on disarmament
1980 RevCon No consensus document North-South disagreements over the
wording of the CTBT
US-European disagreements over Carter
administration’s efforts to restrict
reprocessing and fast-breeder reactors
1985 RevCon Consensus final document Deep divisions over disarmament
handled via a procedural device
1990 RevCon No consensus document Divisions over disarmament between
NWS and NAM proved too difficult for
a procedural fix
1995 Review and Treaty indefinitely Three decision documents were
Extension extended. adopted, including yardsticks for
Conference Review process progress in disarmament, non-
strengthened (annual proliferation, and proliferation concerns
PrepComs would be held in the Middle East
for 3 years leading up to The end of Cold War had led to deep
each RevCon) bilateral nuclear reductions by US and
Russia
CTBT negotiations were underway in
Vienna

(continued )
200 T. OGILVIE-WHITE
Table 11.1 (continued)
NPT Meeting Outcome
2000 RevCon Final document and ‘13
Steps’ adopted, which set
out an expanded
disarmament action plan
and disarmament
principles, including an
unequivocal undertaking
by NWS to accomplish
the total elimination of
their nuclear arsenals,
leading to disarmament
2005 RevCon No consensus document
Agenda not even agreed
until day 14
2010 RevCon Consensus final document
and action plan
Conference president
developed new procedural
fix whereby only forward-
looking elements in the
final document need to be
agreed by consensus
2015 RevCon No consensus document
CTBT – comprehensive test ban treaty; FMCT – fissile material cut-off treaty; PrepCom – Preparatory
Committee; RevCon – Review Conference
Explanation
New Agenda Coalition (NAC) active in
building bridge between NWS and
NAM
NWS and EU states agreed on joint
documents on disarmament
Conference on disarmament was
stalemated over FMCT, so the RevCon
was the only game in town
1998 tests in India and Pakistan
increased nuclear fears
Iran filibustered over the agenda
Divisions within the NWS
US and France backtracked on 13 Steps
Egypt inflexible over the Middle East
WMD-free zone negotiations
NAM refused to agree to any document
that did not advance disarmament
beyond the 13 Steps
Obama administration took positive
approach to disarmament and NPT
diplomacy
Egypt kept Iran in line
Agenda satisfied most parties by
developing three equally balanced plans
of action for nuclear non-proliferation,
disarmament, and peaceful uses
Canada, the UK, and US rejected a
deadline (16 March 2016) for holding
a conference on a Middle East WMD-
free zone
A weak negotiating draft offered
minimal advancement on the
2010 action plan, with major gaps in
effective measures towards nuclear
disarmament, the humanitarian aspects
of nuclear weapons use, and reporting
by the NWS
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 201

being reached in four of the nine NPT Review Conferences that have
taken place from 1975 to 2015, and identifying major areas of backsliding
after consensus documents have been adopted. The issue at stake is not
simply that foot-dragging on disarmament by the NWS causes a reluctance
on the part of some NNWS to cooperate on non-proliferation due to a
deep sense of unfairness (although this frustration is frequently expressed
by political leaders and officials in national capitals as well as NPT forums).5
The problems are complicated and difficult to resolve, involving divisions
within and between the NWS and NNWS groupings, which are influenced
by a complex interplay of strategic, political, economic, and societal factors
that operate at sub-national, national, regional, and international levels.

EXPLAINING NON-PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE

To grasp the extent of NPT implementation challenges, and the linkages
between them, it helps to identify specific initiatives that have been launched
to compensate for the treaty’s basic weaknesses and omissions, and explore
the reasons for slow or patchy uptake or even outright rejection by states
parties. In the case of NNWS, there are some obvious ways in which they
could collaborate to dramatically strengthen the non-proliferation pillar of
the NPT, including by supporting the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel
cycle, and voluntarily introducing strengthened safeguards on their peaceful
nuclear activities (these are explained below). Yet both of these initiatives
face strong resistance from some quarters.
Multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e. taking the most
sensitive nuclear facilities out of national control and operating them
instead via collaborative regional or international arrangements) would
limit the number of states that enrich uranium and/or reprocess pluto-
nium – the materials needed for nuclear weapons.6 It would help reduce
the proliferation risks caused by nuclear latency (the supposedly inadver-
tent establishment of the basic capability to produce fissile material for
nuclear weapons, under an apparently peaceful nuclear program) and
nuclear hedging (the deliberate strategy to develop the option of relatively
rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous capability to
produce them within a time frame ranging from several weeks to a few
years). These risks, which are made more difficult to address due to the
language on alienable rights in Article IV, constantly undermine the
confidence and stability that the NPT is intended to promote by leaving
open the potential for virtual or actual nuclear arms races. Finding effective
202 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

ways to reduce these risks ought to be a priority for this reason alone, but
the fact that it is neither necessary nor cost-effective for most states to
develop their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities (unless they are
planning to operate twenty or more reactors) should double the incentive.
Despite this, even the most promising multilateral fuel cycle proposals
have been highly controversial and have gained limited support.
The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC)
is a case in point: it has only thirty-two fully signed up members, and
has attracted only one new member in the past 2 years.7 There are multiple
reasons for this slow uptake by some states and outright rejection by others.
The most commonly stated reason for not supporting the initiative is that it
represents a Western agenda of technology denial that will entrench existing
technology holders in a monopoly position. This criticism is difficult to
convincingly refute, given that about a third of IFNEC members
already have indigenous enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in
place and have no intention of giving them up (see footnote 7 and
Table 11.2). Other objections, which are not articulated as frequently
in public forums, include concerns that even if the IFNEC proposal
was universalised among NPT members, it would not address NWS/
NNWS inequities, the problem of the NPT holdouts, or latency
among existing nuclear technology possessors. It could thus backfire
on the most vulnerable members of the NPT by strengthening the
relative strategic and economic superiority of NWS, latency NNWS,
and NPT holdouts.
Opposition to strengthened safeguards is also multi-causal and deep-
rooted, although not as widespread or as easily justified. Strong safeguards
are necessary to help generate confidence that nuclear activities are peaceful
and are not part of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, and are there-
fore the most critical part of the NPT’s non-proliferation pillar. Despite
this, support for IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards in response to
lessons learned and technological advances has been patchy.8 The impor-
tance of this task has been clear since the entrenched positions of the NPT’s
original negotiators resulted in the treaty weaknesses described above, and
came into even sharper focus in 1991, when it was discovered that Iraq had
managed to hide a clandestine nuclear weapons program, despite its NNWS
status and despite IAEA monitoring of its nuclear activities. This, the first
clear case of non-compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations,
confirmed that the IAEA needed much more information about the nuclear
programs of states covered by its safeguards system, including expanded
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 203

Table 11.2 States with Demonstrated Enrichment and/or Reprocessing

Capability
State NPT Status Enrichment Reprocessing IFNEC
capability capability member

Argentina NNWS X – X
Australia NNWS X – X
Belgium NNWS – X –
Brazil NNWS X – –
China NWS X X X
France NWS X X X
Germany NNWS X X X
India Non-NPT state X X –
Iran NNWS X – –
Israel Non-NPT state X X –
Italy NNWS – X X
Japan NNWS X X X
Netherlands NNWS X – X
North Korea Withdrew from X X –
NPT in 2003
Pakistan Non-NPT state X X –
Russia NWS X X X
South Africa NNWS X – –
United Kingdom NWS X X X
United States NWS X X X

access for IAEA inspectors to sites where relevant activities take place.
Without this, illicit activities would continue to go undetected, and it
would be impossible to restore confidence in the NPT. Yet the strength-
ened safeguards that were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in
1997 in response to this situation (voluntary measures, known as additional
protocols (APs)) have been resisted by key NNWS. Moreover, IAEA efforts
to address suspicious nuclear activities and non-compliance by North Korea,
Iran, and Syria have not been universally supported, despite the absolute
necessity of dealing with violators promptly for the sake of the NPT’s
credibility.
Table 11.3 provides some insight into the extent and nature of AP
resistance, providing an overview of the nuclear status of countries that do
not have APs in force. The table needs to be read very carefully because it
includes states engaged in deliberate resistance, as well as those where uptake
has been slow because the states in question lack capacity to implement the
204 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

AP, and in any case have very limited nuclear infrastructure.9 The latter can
be identified by the absence of crosses in any of the five columns, whereas the
former are easily identified by a cross in the first column. Table 11.3 tells an
interesting story in this respect, listing five NNWS with significant nuclear

Table 11.3 Nuclear status of countries where AP is not in force

State Not signed Enrichment Nuclear Had nuclear Possess
AP capability energy weapons nuclear
ambitions ambitions weapons

Algeria X
Argentina X X X
Belarus X
Benin
Brazil X X X
Cameroon
Cabo Verde
Cote d’Ivoire
Egypt X X X
Guinea
Guinea-
Bissau
Honduras
**Iran X X
*Israel X X X
Kiribati
Lao X
Liechtenstein
Malaysia X
Myanmar X ?
*North X X X
Korea
*Pakistan X X X
Senegal X
Serbia X
Syria X X X
Thailand X
Timor-Leste
Tunisia X
Venezuela X X ?

*Denotes states that are not NPT members

** As of July 2015, Iran’s nuclear activities are being monitored under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), which came into force on 16 January 2016. Under the JCPOA, Iran will provisionally
apply the AP, as well as extra nuclear-related commitments, known as transparency measures
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 205

infrastructure or nuclear energy ambitions that have failed to even sign the
AP let alone bring it into force. As the table shows, four of these states
(Venezuela being the exception10) are known to have had nuclear weapons
ambitions in the past, could potentially develop them again, and more than
any other NNWS need to demonstrate a strong commitment to the NPT’s
non-proliferation pillar. This includes Brazil and Argentina, both having
enrichment capabilities and thus are in a position of nuclear latency; and
Egypt and Syria, who had nuclear weapons programs, and failed to disclose
significant nuclear activities to IAEA inspectors.11 This highlights the point
that while Iran’s nuclear activities have tended to dominate media headlines
and preoccupy non-proliferation experts in recent years, the Iran case repre-
sents only one of a number of cases of calculated and deliberate AP resistance
that have major implications for the NPT.
NNWS that have not signed the AP give a variety of reasons for their
actions: Brazil and Argentina both claim that their membership of the
Brazil-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material
(ABACC) puts them in a special position that makes an AP unnecessary,
whereas Egypt and Syria claim that the AP is part of a Western regime of
technology denial, which is based on double standards. There are other
reasons, too. Brazil and Argentina are unwilling to accept additional safe-
guards obligations until the NWS achieve more meaningful progress on
nuclear disarmament, and neither wants to take the plunge before its
neighbour (Rublee, 2012; Kassenova 2014). Egypt and Syria, on the
other hand, are believed to link the AP issue to Israel’s NPT holdout
status: for political and strategic reasons, the AP is unlikely to be palatable
to them until Israel commits to a Middle East WMD-free zone, abandons
its nuclear weapons program, and joins the NPT (see, for example,
Wikileaks Cable 06CAIRO1232_a, 2006).

DISARMAMENT RESISTANCE
Although there are serious problems with non-proliferation resistance,
implementing the NPT’s disarmament pillar is proving even more trou-
blesome and progress is currently grinding to a halt. A decline in trust and
rise in tensions between the NWS themselves is stalling disarmament
momentum to the extent that the era of post-Cold War bilateral and
unilateral cuts in the size of nuclear arsenals and role of nuclear weapons
appears to be over. Moreover, the optimism that accompanied the Obama
administration’s 2009 push for accelerated reductions and doctrinal
206 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

change has abruptly evaporated. The most visible cause of this change is
the decline of relations between the United States and Russia that
occurred as a result of Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, but the
roots of the problem are much deeper and wider, fed by uncertainties
over China’s rapid rise and militarisation; escalating and intractable ten-
sions in East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia; and a combination of
lawlessness and asymmetries in the development and deployment of new,
destructive, and disruptive technologies (Evans et al. 2015, pp. 19–78).
From an NPT perspective, the most disturbing feature of the rapid
decline in intra-NWS relations is the widening gap between NWS disarma-
ment obligations and actions, and the re-emergence of doctrinal deter-
rence debates last heard at the height of the Cold War. With all five NWS
modernising their nuclear arsenals (Kristensen 2014), nuclear weapons
being assigned new roles, and disarmament negotiations in virtually all
forums stalled, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that nuclear weapons are
being revalued despite the ‘unequivocal undertaking’ that the NWS
pledged at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The message this reversal sends out to
the NNWS is that nuclear weapons remain essential for preventing major
war, that the world is too dangerous for nuclear disarmament to progress
much beyond current limits, and that this is very unlikely to change for the
foreseeable future (Miasnikov et al. 2015). Unintentionally and very
dangerously, it also sends out the message that NPT obligations are not
high on the list of NWS priorities, and can and will be picked up or
dropped as they see fit.
The collapse of the NPT could too easily become an unintended
consequence of these developments, as divisions between and within
NWS and NNWS groupings could make it impossible to achieve the
unity of resolve needed to sustain the regime (Mecklin 2015). The 2015
NPT Review Conference was an out-and-out failure in this regard, as it
witnessed an intensification of the ‘blame game’: NWS subtly blaming
each other and overtly blaming NPT holdouts and NNWS engaged in
non-proliferation resistance for the NPT’s woes; NNWS both subtly and
overtly blaming each other, and loudly blaming the NPT holdouts and the
NWS engaged in disarmament resistance for the NPT’s problems. The
complex reality is that the responsibility for failed, slow, and stalled imple-
mentation of NPT commitments lies on all sides, because disarmament
and non-proliferation dynamics are linked in a perpetual action-reaction
cycle: a lack confidence in the effectiveness of global nuclear governance
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 207

reinforces the determination of NWS (and NPT holdouts) to retain their

nuclear weapons until the regime is strengthened, but the more nuclear
weapons possessors emphasise the strategic and political value of nuclear
weapons, the less likely it is that other states will be willing to permanently
close off their own options to pursue nuclear latency, hedging, or break-
out. Weaknesses in the NPT’s non-proliferation and disarmament pillars
are thus mutually destructive to the regime, as is the constant shifting of
blame and abdication of responsibility among the states parties guiltiest of
non-proliferation and disarmament resistance.

IS THERE ANY HOPE FOR THE NPT?

There is a danger that the challenges associated with trying to advance
disarmament and non-proliferation under such difficult conditions could
lead to defeatism, and to an unwillingness by the NWS and NNWS to invest
time and effort into the 2020 NPT review cycle. But there are two chinks of
light that prove positive change is possible and the immense diplomatic
effort to achieve it is worthwhile. The first is the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA), which came into force on 16 January 2016 following
many years of stop-start negotiations over Iran’s nuclear defiance, and offers
some hope of breaking part of the action-reaction cycle described above. If
the JCPOA is properly implemented, and if Iran agrees to increase the
transparency of its nuclear program over the longer term, it will show that
the NPT regime is robust enough to deal with cases of serious non-com-
pliance, and is able to restore confidence among NWS and NNWS in the
non-proliferation credentials of the most serious treaty violators.
The second chink of light is the evidence that the wider non-proliferation
regime is capable of adapting when the chips are down, offering lessons for
the NPT itself. The clearest case of this occurred in the 2000s, when the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the discovery of the A. Q. Khan black market
network drove a major expansion of the nuclear security (i.e. materials
security) elements of the non-proliferation regime. In a very short period
of time, great strides have been achieved via the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Nuclear
Security Summit process, which have overcome a great deal of initial
resistance and created new norms and expectations in counterterrorism
cooperation. The lesson to be drawn from this is that focusing on mutual
vulnerability rather than relative insecurity (i.e. the shared vulnerabilities
facing humanity rather than the insecurities that states face relative to each
208 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

other) can lead to collaborative approaches that help build the mechanisms
of global governance and overcome resistance to them. It would be helpful
to think about this in the NPT context, from the perspective of how intra-
NWS strategic dynamics and NWS/NNWS divisions could be tackled.
In terms of the immediate job of picking up the pieces from the disas-
trous 2015 NPT Review Conference, and devising a rescue strategy for the
2020 review cycle, NWS and NNWS have a huge task on their hands,
requiring them to revisit paths that have proved tricky to navigate in the
past, such as attempts to engage the NPT holdouts on arms control and
disarmament, and discussions on how, in tense strategic conditions, the
NWS and NNWS can demonstrate their good faith commitments to dis-
armament and non-proliferation.12 For their part, the NWS will need to
stretch beyond technical offerings, such as those being developed under the
US-launched International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament
Verification (IPNDV),13 which are important but tend to have little or no
representation from the global South and are perceived as being part of a
slow and incremental approach to disarmament that mainly serves the
interests of the United States and its allies (Rauf 2016). Important tasks
for NWS and NNWS alike include prioritising the entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), strengthening safeguards and
export controls, increasing transparency measures (including, among
NWS, outlining systems for de-escalation, and for preventing nuclear acci-
dents), launching a dialogue on possible doctrinal change, such as pledges
by nuclear-armed states not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (so-called
‘no-first-use’ doctrines), engaging constructively with the humanitarian
initiative,14 and pushing forward ideas for multilateral disarmament in the
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)15 (Evans, Ogilvie-White and
Thakur; Hanson and Nielsen 2015; Nielsen and Osztaskina 2015).
Engagement by all NPT states parties in these efforts is crucial, to ensure
that they are mutually reinforcing, and that the important strategic role of
the NPT continues to be recognised despite growing divisions and frustra-
tions, and demonstrate that all states recognise their shared responsibility to
manage and eventually eliminate nuclear risks.

CONCLUSION
Given the NPT’s underlying weaknesses, it is not surprising that it has often
failed to live up to expectations. In some respects, it is remarkable it has been
as successful as it has, with almost universal membership and only one
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 209

withdrawal in nearly 50 years of existence. But as time has past, technology

has progressed, and the world has become more globalised, the treaty’s
limitations have become more obvious. The defiant nuclear activities of
states outside the treaty have become more disruptive to the peace and
security of those inside, the strategic practices of the NWS and nuclear
umbrella states have been reinforced, and the illicit nuclear activities and
non-compliance of a handful of NNWS has had greater impact; this has
combined to perpetuate an action-reaction cycle of insecurity. Over the
years, attempts have been made to break this cycle, sometimes by members
of the NWS (the United States, in particular), and sometimes by coalitions of
states that have been determined to ensure that the bargain underpinning
the treaty does not fall apart. But there have always been problems of
resistance, much of it stemming from the treaty’s dual class system, and
driven by concerns about equity, dishonesty, cost/benefit calculations, and
by questions over the effectiveness and resilience of global institutions.
As we approach the NPT’s 50-year anniversary, efforts to strengthen
the treaty’s non-proliferation pillar continue to be rejected, stalled, or
unevenly implemented, while the prospects for advancing nuclear disar-
mament are narrowing, putting the future of the NPT in danger. The stark
reality is that the world has entered an era in which non-proliferation and
disarmament diplomacy has become more difficult, where uncertainties
over the impact of strategic power shifts and the proliferation of new
military technologies are exacerbating doubts over the NPT’s capacity to
provide security and stability, and where extraordinary efforts are needed
to prevent the hands of the doomsday clock drawing closer to midnight.
These efforts can be energised if states recognise both the need to shift
attention from relative insecurity to mutual vulnerability, and the impor-
tance of collaborating more effectively to develop the strong global
governance mechanisms required to address nuclear dangers.

NOTES
1. The origins of the NPT date back to the late 1950s and early 1960s, when
the spread of nuclear technology to additional states sparked fears of uncon-
trolled nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear holocaust. These fears
were made all the more compelling by advances in nuclear technology: the
capacity of thermonuclear weapons to dwarf the atomic devastation of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Against this backdrop, and following a string of
failed efforts to kick-start multilateral disarmament negotiations in the UN
210 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

General Assembly, in 1965 the United States and USSR threw their weight
behind a proposal (put forward by representatives of the global South)
calling for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to bring
about nuclear disarmament. That proposal became UN General Assembly
resolution 2028 (1965), which led to the formation of an eighteen-nation
committee tasked with negotiating a treaty text. The text that emerged from
these negotiations became the NPT. The treaty opened for signature on 1
July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970, when it had been
ratified by forty states. For an accurate account of the negotiations, see
‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968,’ United
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, http://legal.un.org/
avl/pdf/ha/tnpt/tnpt_ph_e.pdf.
2. This distinguishes the NPT from the other two legal frameworks that deal
with unconventional weapons: The Biological Weapons Convention, and
the Chemical Weapons Convention, both of which are single-class regimes,
with all states parties subject to the same rights and obligations.
3. The NAM was formed during the Cold War as an organization of countries
that did not want to formally align with the United States or the Soviet
Union. It comprises the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation issues, representing more than two-
thirds of NPT members.
4. This might have scuppered the treaty but for the fact that the NWS passed
Security Council Resolution 255 on 19 June 1968, pledging to uphold their
obligations under the UN Charter in the event of a nuclear attack on the
NNWS. The resolution represented a political commitment and was not
legally binding.
5. The relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament is sometimes
downplayed by scholars and practitioners (Grotto 2008; Ford 2010).
However, more nuanced discussions that examine direct and indirect lin-
kages conclude that although the relationship is sometimes exaggerated, it is
nonetheless significant (Knopf 2014).
6. This idea was first proposed in the 1940s, revisited in the 1970s, and
looked at again by the IAEA in the early 2000s. Other proposals that
also aim to prevent the misuse of nuclear programs for non-peaceful
purposes focus on efforts to minimise the production and use of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) by encouraging states to shut down HEU-
fuelled reactors and replace them with less proliferation-sensitive low-
enriched uranium (LEU) alternatives. For practical details of both types
of proposal, see Evans et al. 2015, pp. 234–236 (multinational control of
the fuel cycle) and pp. 197–207 and 230 (HEU minimization).
7. The basic idea behind IFNEC is that nuclear suppliers would commit to
provide nuclear consumers with long-term whole-of-life fuel service
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 211

assurances. Suppliers would provide fresh fuel and take back used fuel, or
otherwise assist with used fuel management. IFNEC members include:
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Estonia,
France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands,
Niger, Oman, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, Ukraine, UAE,
UK, and US. For further information, see the IFNEC website: http://
www.ifnec.org.
8. The IAEA is mandated to verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials
under Article III.
9. For example, there are twelve states in which IAEA comprehensive safe-
guards agreements are not in force, let alone the AP: Benin, Cabo Verde,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,
Micronesia, Sao Tome & Principe, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. None of
these states are of proliferation concern in terms of their potential breakout
intentions or capacity.
10. There have also been questions about the nuclear ambitions of Myanmar
and Venezuela, although both have very limited nuclear infrastructure.
Venezuela continues to resist signing the AP, but Myanmar recently signed
and has promised to bring it into force as soon as possible.
11. From 2004–2007, IAEA inspectors and third parties uncovered evidence
that Egyptian scientists had engaged in undeclared nuclear activities
(Goldschmidt 2009; Rublee 2009). Syria‘s illicit nuclear activities have
been more extensive. This, combined with the country’s failure to cooperate
with the IAEA in its investigations, led the Board of Governors to declare
Syria to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in 2011.
12. Proposals that were directed at the NWS during the 2015 NPT review cycle
could be revisited (see Evans et al. 2015), but new ideas are also needed. To
have any chance of success, disarmament/deterrence divides need to be
bridged (Ogilvie-White 2013; Nielsen and Osztaskina 2015).
13. The IPNDV, which was launched by the United States in December in
2014, brings together the United States, United Kingdom, France, and
more than twenty-five NNWS in a collaborative effort to understand the
technical problems of verifying nuclear disarmament. It builds on an earlier
UK-Norway initiative.
14. The humanitarian initiative, which was launched in 2013, brings together
states, NGOs, and civil society at a series of international conferences to
discuss the risks associated with nuclear weapons and the impact of their use.
The United States, United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan attended the
December 2014 conference in Vienna, and China sent an observer.
15. In 2015, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to convene an OEWG
to ‘substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and
212 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

norms that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world

without nuclear weapons’; and ‘other measures that could contribute to
taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations’ including
transparency measures, measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental
launch; and measures to increase awareness of the humanitarian consequences
that would result from any nuclear detonation (A/RES/70/33 2015).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
2015 NPT Review Conference Briefing Book. (2015). New York:Reaching Critical Will,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publi
cations/9716-2015-npt-briefing-book.
A/RES/70/33. (2015). UN General Assembly, New York, 7 December 2015,
CSSS JMCNS NPT briefing book. 2012 Edition. Part I.
Dhanapala, J. (2005). Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An insider’s account.
Geneva: UNIDIR 2005.
Evans, G., Ogilvie-White, T., & Thakur, R. (2015). Nuclear weapons: The state of
play 2015. Canberra: Australian National University 2015.
Evans, G., & Yuriko Kawaguchi, Y. (2009), Eliminating nuclear threats: A
practical agenda for global policymakers, Report of the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, available at:
http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/assets/downloads/ICNND_Report-
EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf.
Ford, C. (2010), “Disarmament Versus Nonproliferation? Hudson Institute, 28
October 2010, available at http://www.hudson.org/research/7472-disarma
ment-versus-nonproliferation.-
Goldschmidt, P. (2009). Exposing nuclear non-compliance. Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy, 51(1), 143–164.
Grotto, A. J. (2008), “What drives states to support new nonproliferation obliga-
tions? An empirical and theoretical exploration,” Discussion paper for the U.S.
Nuclear Policy Review Project, The Stanley Foundation, 31 July, available at:
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/GROTTO~1.pdf.
Hanson, M., & Nielsen, J. (2015), “Towards a brave new nuclear world?”
Sustainable Security, 6 May 2015, http://sustainablesecurity.org/2015/05/
06/2015-towards-a-brave-new-nuclear-world/.
Kassenova, T. (2014). Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An evolving identity.
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014.
Knopf, J. (2014). Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation: Examining the linkage
argument. In J. R. Fields (Ed.), State behaviour and the nuclear nonproliferation
regime (pp. 106–147). Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2014.
Knopf, J. W. ed. (2016). International cooperation on WMD nonproliferation.
Athens: The University of Georgia Press, Athens.
 11 CHALLENGES FACING THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 213

Kristensen, H. (2014) “Nuclear weapons modernization: A threat to the

NPT?” Arms Control Association, 1 May, Available at https://www.arms
control.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-
the-NPT.
Mecklin, J. (2015) “Disarm and modernize,” Foreign Policy, 24 March, Available
at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/24/disarm-and-modernize-nuclear-
weapons-warheads/.
Miasnikov, E., Kroenig, M., & Lu, Y. (2015), “Modernising nuclear weapons:
Whether and how,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/
modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881.
Nielsen, J., & Osztaskina, N. (2015), Options for Nuclear disarmament in a
climate of deterrence, Sustainable Security, 9 December, http://sustainablese
curity.org/2015/12/09/options-for-nuclear-disarmament-in-a-climate-of-
deterrence/.
Ogilvie-White, T. (2013), “Australia and the nonproliferation and disarmament
initiative: Difficult times for disarmament diplomacy,” ASPI Policy Analysis,
27 May, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/australia-and-the-non-prolifera
tion-and-disarmament-initiative-difficult-times-for-disarmament-diplomacy-by-
tanya-ogilvie-white.
Rauf, T. (2016) “Nuclear weapons: Transparency and risk reduction,”
Presentation to the Open-Ended Working Group, Geneva, February 2016,
available at: http://www.sipri.org/pdfs/OEWG-presentation-rauf.
Robock, A., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G. L., Toon, O. B., Bardeen, C., & Turco, R. P.
(2007a). Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts. Atmospheric
Chemistry and Physics, 7, 2003-2012:.
Robock, A., Oman, L., & Stenchikov, G. L. (2007b). Nuclear winter revisited
with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic
consequences. Journal of Geophysical Research – Atmospheres, 112(D13), 1–14.
Rost Rublee, M. (2009). Nonproliferation norms: Why states choose nuclear
restraint. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Rost Rublee, M. (2012). The nuclear threshold states. In T. Ogilvie-White &
D. Santoro (eds.), Slaying the nuclear dragon: Disarmament dynamics in the
twenty-first century. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.
Tokyo Forum (1999), Facing nuclear dangers: An action plan for the 21st
century, The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament, 25 July, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/dis
armament/forum/tokyo9907/.
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Available at http://
legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/tnpt/tnpt_ph_e.pdf.
Wikileaks (2006), “A/S Rademaker’s Bilateral Nonproliferation Discussions in
Egypt,” 28 February, Cable No. 06CAIRO1232_a, Available at: https://
www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06CAIRO1232_a.html.
214 T. OGILVIE-WHITE

Tanya Ogilvie-White is an independent scholar and former Research Director,

Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National
University with expertise across all aspects of nuclear disarmament, nonprolifera-
tion, and security. Recent publications include Preventing Nuclear Terrorism:
Australia’s Leadership Role (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014);
Australia and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative: Difficult Times
for Disarmament Diplomacy (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013); Slaying
the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century
(University of Georgia Press, 2012); and On Nuclear Deterrence: The
Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (IISS/Routledge, 2011, Adelphi Paper
reissue).
 CHAPTER 12

Restraint and Governance in Cyberspace

Balancing War and Justice Imperatives

Greg Austin

We can access cyberspace with a single click. We can connect with doctors
saving lives in Liberia as quickly as we can with terrorists at their training
camps in Syria, Afghanistan or the Americas. All the while, someone
somewhere is watching us, or at least recording every such connection
we make. Of special note, the new ‘big brother’ keeping his close eye on us
is more likely to be a corporation than a state. Understanding the implica-
tions for security of each single click is a complex, multi-layered, and novel
undertaking. Cyberspace has reduced if not obliterated pre-existing
boundaries between states, communities, corporations, and people when
it comes to their security. Cyber weapons have altered the balance between
costs and benefits of coercive or criminal behaviour at all levels of society.
Moral accountability for security at the keyboard has been transformed
by the speed, global reach, and surprising permanence of our electronic
footprints. In fact, our footprints in cyberspace have become like finger-
prints, with artificial intelligence now able to undertake forensic recon-
struction of electronic touches for purposes as diverse as bringing us to
court or to new levels of consumerism, or simply keeping a watchful eye
upon us lest we dare have radical thoughts. Military strategies have been

G. Austin (*)
University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia
e-mail: G.Austin@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 215

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_12
216 G. AUSTIN

equally transformed, with leading states now planning ‘global strike’ in

milliseconds, including against the control systems of nuclear missiles and,
if military necessity dictated it in wartime, even against civil aviation.
Other reference points for threats to and opportunities for security
arising from developments in cyber technologies are as numerous as they
are already challenging. These already include:

• China’s development of the biggest cyber-enabled political surveil-

lance system within one country ever seen in human history;
• The United States and allied creation of the biggest and most
capable cyber-enabled ‘national security’ surveillance and analytic
system in human history, a system with near global reach when
targeting is underway;
• The means for the WHO to monitor, track, and predict escalation
pathways of pandemic threats on a near to real-time basis;
• The means for climate scientists worldwide to collate, interpret,
and predict weather and climate outcomes from millions of years
ago and looking 100 years into the future;
• A voracious, near infinite, commercial appetite to know consumer
preferences based on analysing mass data accumulated through
tracking the most minute actions of individuals;
• The means for targeting individual people on the other side of
the world with a lethal attack and delivered in seconds, if not milli-
seconds, from the time of decision;
• The means for world-class surgeons in one country to monitor and
direct advanced surgery on patients in a hospital on the other side of
the globe.

All of this is occurring at the dawn of the cyber age. Looking ahead,
some of the world’s greatest minds fear the worst. Steven Hawking has
suggested to the BBC that ‘The development of full artificial intelligence
could spell the end of the human race’ (Cellan-Jones 2014). This view
was based on a well-developed position paper and a four-paragraph open
letter prepared by the Future of Life Institute and initially signed by
around 150 leading researchers from the world’s top universities, as well
as at least one leading light from Google (FLI 2015). The position paper
released in January 2015 placed considerable importance on the need for
ensuring ‘human-in-control’ verification systems of the most advanced
systems. This paper understated the dangers of advanced artificial
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 217

intelligence (AI) somewhat by use of the rubric ‘pitfalls’, which became

the lowest common denominator consensus term among the 150
signatories.
This chapter offers some insight into the revolutionary impacts of
advanced cyber technologies, otherwise known as information and com-
munications technologies (ICT), on global governance of security. The
chapter begins with an overview of the recent international history
of governance of security in cyberspace. This diplomatic history (a ‘five
minute thesis’) is very much about the full range of actors involved:
states, global corporate giants of the ICT sector, civil society, and indi-
vidual people. The subsequent section looks at the escalating balance
between war and justice impulses in security governance for cyberspace,
suggesting that the principle of restraint might be usefully applied to
the challenge. The chapter concludes with some reflections on ethical
approaches.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE

The evolution of norms for security in cyberspace developed quite slowly
through the 1990s. The United States and Russia moved as early as 1998
on a range of measures. These included bilateral cooperation on nuclear
missile security in connection with the Y2K problem, and some coopera-
tive efforts in respect of multilateral regimes for cyberspace, including
joint support of annual UN General Assembly resolutions that began in
1998 (Gady and Austin 2010). All UN members participated in the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a rolling UN conference that
began in 2002. States also participated in global initiatives as members
of the International Telecommunications Union through that first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century. Regional organisations, such as APEC,
began cooperating on cyber security as early as 2002 (Austin and
Cappon 2014: 13). In 2004, the UN convened its first group of govern-
mental experts looking at the international security aspects of ICTs. In
the middle of the decade, events began to move more quickly.
Table 12.1 lists a number of significant milestones between 2007 and
2014. This lays the ground for a deeper discussion of the sharp escalation
in intensity of diplomatic interaction and unilateral activity affecting
security in cyberspace that has occurred in 2015 and 2016 (Austin et al.
2015; Austin 2016; Osula and Röigas 2016).
218 G. AUSTIN

Table 12.1 Significant milestones driving cyber norm development 2007–2014

2007 Russia-based hackers launch crippling if temporary cyberattack on Estonia during
a political dispute
2008 Russia-based hackers launch a major disabling attack on Georgia in connection
with military conflict;
China blocks access to Facebook;
World Federation of Scientists calls for global action on cyber security
2009 USA and Russia agree to talks in UN Committee on Disarmament on cyberspace
issues;
SCO agrees treaty on cyber security, including measures to restrain cyber
weapons;
China and ASEAN sign framework agreement on cyber security emergency
response;
Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in USA says the country is aiming to use
cyberattack in ‘milliseconds’ to disrupt launch of enemy nuclear ballistic missiles;
US unofficial task force presents newly elected President Obama with a
comprehensive in-depth action plan for national cyber security (CSIS 2009);
Wide-ranging DDOS attacks 4–7 July on systems in South Korea and USA;
Cyberattack on Israel’s internet infrastructure during its Gaza invasion;
USA sets up Cyber Command, and subordinate single service military commands,
issues its first DoD cyber military strategy;
Iranian Cyber Army attacks Twitter;
China blocks access to Twitter
2010 US Secretary of State Clinton delivers aggressive agenda on internet freedom;
Wikileaks begins an 18-month release of US diplomatic cables, the biggest ever
leak of such documents in history;
US marine Bradley Manning leaks 500,000 documents detailing counter-insurgency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the biggest leak of such documents in history;
China issues its first White Paper on the Internet;
US cyberattack on Iran nuclear enrichment centrifuges revealed;
EastWest Institute launches worldwide cyber security initiative;
States agree new treaty on aircraft hijacking that includes references to the
criminalising of ‘technological’ attack on civil aviation in flight;
2011 Pentagon issues ‘DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace’;
Chinese PLA takes first decisive moves toward integrated network warfare;
UK launches London process on internet governance;
Russia, China and other SCO countries present code of conduct for cyberspace in
UN resolution;
USA accuses China, Russia, France and Israel of large scale cyber espionage for
commercial purposes;
Canadian defence agencies suffer major cyber espionage hack;
Sony Play Station systems hacked, compromising the personal data of 77 million
customers

(continued )
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 219

Table 12.1 (continued)

2012 Obama signs Top Secret Presidential Directive (PPD 20) on US Cyberspace
Operations;
Pentagon issues new Joint Operations manual on information operations;
Russian firm Kaspersky Lab reports wide-ranging espionage operation ‘Red
October’ against Russia, former Soviet republics and former Soviet-bloc countries;
Nuclear Safety Summit includes cyberattack in its list of concerns;
Russia tables draft Convention on Cyber Security
2013 Russia and USA agree to set up cyber hotline in the existing nuclear weapons risk
reduction center;
Pentagon issues new Joint Operations manual on cyberspace operations;
Obama mentions cyber threats to civil aviation, electric grid and financial systems
in State of the Union address;
NSA Contractor Edward Snowden reveals details of massive US government
surveillance on a global scale, implicating nine leading US ICT corporations;
ICIJ releases largest ever leaked database on offshore financial entities, with
political recriminations against some of the wealthiest business figures around
the world;
UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) agrees that existing international law
applies in cyberspace, especially the principle of state responsibility for actions in its
territory;
UN initiative on global privacy treaty in response to Snowden revelations
2014 USA brings unprecedented criminal actions against Chinese military personnel for
cyber espionage;
China announces its plan to become a ‘cyber power’;
Russia introduces cyber defence troops into its nuclear missile silos and mobile
nuclear missile teams, saying US strategy of prompt global strike (a cyber-enabled
strategy) is one of four military dangers facing the country;
South Korea announces cyber defence drills for its 23 nuclear power stations after
a specific threat and data theft;
UN General Assembly passes a resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age

The intensity of the arms racing in cyberspace and separate silent

wars between adversary pairs, alongside the development of new attack
methods by criminals, made 2015 a turning point year in the history of
cyberspace security.
In military strategy and planning, the United States and China took
new steps to graduate to full-scale cyber-enabled warfare, which will
have the effect of magnifying the political, economic and human security
impacts of the arms race in cyberspace. The US Department of Defence
issued its second military strategy (United States 2015a) and its Cyber
Command issued a vision document called ‘Beyond the Build’ (United
220 G. AUSTIN

States 2015b). The latter document foreshadowed the development of

‘cyber options’ for all phases of military operations. China issued a new
Military Strategy giving cyber warfare pride of place (China 2015). The
document said that ‘Outer space and cyber space have become new
commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties’. The
PLA also set up a new central command structure, called the Strategic
Support Force, which elevated the power and standing of cyber-related
forces in the PLA hierarchy, as part of radical shake-up of China’s military
institutions.
In diplomacy, the year saw new treaties or binding commitments
involving several leading states, as well as agreement in the UN
Group of Government Expert (GGE) on possible voluntary norms
for cyberspace. On 8 May, China and Russia concluded a formal
agreement with Russia not to interfere unlawfully in each other’s
information resources and networks (Russia 2015). In January,
China and Russia had participated in tabling a slightly revised draft
of the proposed code of conduct for cyberspace initially submitted to
the UN in 2011 (United Nations 2015a). The bilateral agreement
goes very close to constituting a formal military alliance in cyber-
space, since it lays out a mutual obligation of assistance in the event
of a wide range of cyberattacks. In early September 2015, in advance
of a state visit by President Xi Jinping to the United States, China
sent the Politburo member with responsibility for its non-military spy
agencies, Meng Jianzhu, to Washington for several days of official
discussions to try to dampen controversies within the United States
about the norms of cyber espionage (United States 2015c). The
Meng visit was highly productive, with the two countries agreeing
not to conduct commercial espionage against each other for the
benefit of their own companies and to set up a Cabinet-level working
group for problem solving on cyber security issues from a law enfor-
cement angle.
Just weeks earlier, the UN published the report of the fourth GGE
(United Nations 2015b). This document marked a new peak in inter-
governmental consensus on some important aspects of international
governance of security in cyberspace, including most importantly the
endorsement of a range of possible ‘voluntary, non-binding norms,
rules or principles’ for restraint in international cyber practices. It pro-
posed three potential ‘voluntary non-binding norms’ for state behaviour
in cyberspace:
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 221

• States should not attack each other’s critical infrastructure for the
purpose of damaging it
• States should not target each other’s cyber emergency response
systems
• States should assist in the investigation of cyberattacks and cyber-
crime launched from their territories when requested to do so by
other states.

In 2015, the UN also acted to protect citizens in cyberspace. On

26 March, its Human Rights Council affirmed the right to privacy and
set up the office of Special Rapporteur to monitor developments in this
area (United Nations 2015c). The resolution also affirmed the global and
open nature of the Internet.
As promising as these moves in the direction of restraint, war avoidance
and protection of citizens have been, they only begin to scratch the surface
of what is needed. We can agree with Meyer (2016: 158), that ‘there is an
evident direction on the part of states to maintain a peaceful character’ for
cyberspace and that states have shown ‘restraint regarding the introduc-
tion of weapons’. But there does not appear to be a matching commitment
among the major military powers of the world to a limit of military
sufficiency in cyberspace. There is little evidence of respect for the dangers
of the security dilemma (the concept that when a state strengthens its own
military power, such action can have the unintended effect of weakening
its security because it prompts military rivals to increase their capabilities).
In key democracies, such as the United States and the European Union,
government use of surveillance powers and corporate exploitation of client
data remain politically divisive issues.
The recent record of global governance for security in cyberspace
reveals deepening tensions on the more political aspects (such as war,
peace, privacy, censorship, surveillance) coupled with corresponding
improvements in collaboration on technical issues (such as internet man-
agement, international standards, global knowledge transfer). This is cap-
tured well by Nye (2014: 7) where he describes the existing ‘regime
complex’ governing norm development in cyberspace. Having sketched
a positive view of global governance for diverse technical aspects,
he observes (p. 15) that we are unlikely to see a ‘single overarching
regime for cyberspace any time soon’. He says there is a ‘good deal
of fragmentation’ and says it ‘is likely to persist’. He observed that
‘[d]ifferent sub-issues are likely to develop at different rates, with some
222 G. AUSTIN

progressing and some regressing in the dimensions of depth, breadth

and compliance’. Nye demonstrated this by identifying quite different
areas of norm development for cyber activities (such as war, espionage,
human rights, privacy, content control, and standards) and characterised
the current state of regime in these areas by four aspects (depth, breadth,
fabric, and compliance). He cites Keohane and Victor (2011: 8) describ-
ing the field of climate change policy development as ‘actually many
different cooperation problems, implying different tasks and structures’.
They concluded that collaboration outcomes in each problem would sit
variously on a scale of integration and fragmentation in large part
because of divergences in ‘power weighted’ interests, the potential for
gains or losses from linking sub-issues, and differences in how actors
managed uncertainty.
As Austin et al (2015: 6) point out, these perspectives ‘are helpful in
explaining the institutional reality’ and identifying ‘the nature of the
problem and problem-solving pathways’, but they ‘are rooted in a tradi-
tional framing of international relations that privileges not just hierarchy
but also states’. Nye does look at issues of privacy and censorship and
comments that regimes for their control present a mixed picture, but this
sort of assessment does not speak to the highly inflammatory character of
these questions both within and among states.
In spite of the semblance of order discerned by Nye and by Austin
et al, the global picture is one of intensifying political contest, com-
peting legal regimes, and even a growing sense of anarchy. Major
faultlines around security in cyberspace are either getting bigger or
simply not being addressed. This can be illustrated in several exam-
ples cited below.

Legal Harmonisation
On a panel of chief counsel of leading tech companies meeting in Palo
Alto in 2013, one of the participants observed, in the presence of this
author, that it is impossible for global corporations to comply simulta-
neously with the laws on privacy and national security of all jurisdictions in
which they operate. The companies are forced to know exactly where they
are breaking the laws (in which country) and to have risk management
strategies in place to respond. So too it seems, their views on ethics in
cyberspace are driven by protecting shareholder value, not by moral
obligation or reflection.
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 223

Patriotism
Previously a bedrock of national security, and already under threat because
of globalisation in all its forms, patriotism has been further redefined and
eroded in the cyber age. At the individual level, we see this in the conscious
decision of staff at Symantec Corporation to ignore their allegiance as US
citizens to interfere with and disclose a live intelligence operation by the
United States government in Operation Olympic Games – the deployment
of Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear centrifuges (Zetter 2011). The staff
involved decided that their first obligation as members of a global corpora-
tion supplying services to the security of customers was to that mission ahead
of supporting (by not disclosing) a cyberattack by the US government. At
the corporate level, after the leaks by Edward Snowden in June 2013, itself
an act that sought to refine patriotism in the information age, the leading
firms named by him, such as Cisco and Microsoft, as direct and knowing
participants in US espionage, have aggressively sought to distance themselves
from being seen as ‘patriotic’ American corporations. Their posture now is to
treat all government clients as equal in spite of their legal personality having
US nationality by dint of their incorporation in the United States.

Privacy
The privacy of all commercial transactions, no matter how big or how
small, if recorded by computer of any kind, is now under threat globally.
A hacker group released details of millions of customer of an infidelity
dating site, Ashley Maddison, because they claimed (somewhat per-
versely) the company had failed to honour its confidentiality and privacy
commitments to delete data of clients who ceased to subscribe. Previously
secret offshore banking arrangements have been disclosed en masse in a
number of incidents involving terabytes of information, the latest case
involving some 11 million documents from the Panamanian legal firm,
Mossack Fonseca.

Counter-Surveillance
Counter-surveillance action by citizens groups relying on advanced ICT
assets against state-authorised cyber repression has become commonplace.
There are community-based and university-based groups working inter-
nationally to expose censorship processes in countries like China and
224 G. AUSTIN

overreach by democratic governments of their surveillance powers in

countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
Thus, we may conclude that governance of security in cyberspace is
multi-layered, non-linear, fragmented, simultaneously global and loca-
lised, and as anarchic as it is institutionalised. The contest for governance
control at all levels is in full swing, with some signs of balance emerging,
however temporarily.

BALANCING WAR AND JUSTICE IMPULSES: THE MEDIATING

PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT
In this environment, what can we say about two divergent ethical tenden-
cies: one favouring what we may summarise as the war impulse (state
security) and another favouring the social justice impulse (advancement
of communities and individuals enjoying equitable access to advanced
information assets independently of state agents)?
Since the technologies are not neutral, but in fact present as many
serious drawbacks as they do positive gains, there has been a growing
realisation of the possible value of restraint in cyberspace. This is the idea
that instead of racing to the technological frontier and doing anything that
is possible through advanced cyber means, the security interests of many
actors are indeed better served by understanding how the technologies can
be regulated or restrained through mutual compromise. Moreover, most
states now accept in principle that economic development objectives
associated with cyberspace will be serious compromised if they or their
peers continue to exploit ICTs for maximalist national security goals.
The case for restraint as a core principle of security in the contemporary
era has been made well by Posen (2014a). He believes that the US
commitment to liberal hegemony as a means of organising national and
global security, through the Cold war and since, has failed to balance ends
and means: ‘the political ambitions that it serves have been greater than
national security required’ (Posen 2014b). He argues for a closer align-
ment of military and security policies with the actual threats in order to
avoid the negative effects of the overreaching. The Posen book, as inspira-
tional as it may be, is heavily grounded in the geopolitical realities beyond
(or before) cyberspace. But the principle of restraint is an enduring
reference point for organising international and national security. This
view, which has been the underpinning of international affairs for several
centuries, has been summarised recently by Henry Kissinger in a book
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 225

review: ‘Stable orders require elements of both power and morality. In a

world without equilibrium, the stronger will encounter no restraint, and
the weak will find no means of vindication’ (Kissinger 2011).
Deibert (2013) is one of the first scholars to give more than passing
attention to the principle of restraint in cyberspace. He writes: ‘Securing
cyberspace requires reinforcement of restraint on power, including checks
and balances on governments, law enforcement and intelligence agencies’.
The focus is largely on domestic applications of cyber power. In 2006,
a draft convention on cyberspace mentions the principle of restraint
(Brown 2006: 210) and a 2009 study by Rand on cyber war discusses in
brief the possible impacts of restraint on strategic cyber war (Libicki
2009:136–137). Through 2013, the EastWest Institute began to look
quite closely at how the Cold War concept of restraint, so prominent in
the Nixon-Brezhnev understandings of arms control and detente, might
be applied in cyberspace. In January 2014, in a preface to an EastWest
report, Mohamed El Baradei commended the ‘refreshing approach’ of the
Institute in recommending that states ‘begin to consider a measure of
restraint in the uses of cyber weaponry’ (Austin et al. 2014: 5).
In 2014, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, made a public
mention of the idea of restraint in a symbolically important place and at
symbolically important time. The place was the farewell party at the head-
quarters of NSA for its departing Director, General Keith Alexander, who
had overseen the agency’s seemingly unbridled mass surveillance opera-
tions revealed by Edward Snowden. The time was just prior to Hagel’s
departure for an official visit to China, which the United States had
accused of equally unrestrained espionage against it. Hagel declared that
the ‘DoD will maintain an approach of restraint to any cyber operations
outside of U.S. government networks. We are urging other nations to do
the same’ (Alexander 2014). It was exactly this sort of declaration of
restraint that helped to lay the ground for detente with the USSR decades
earlier. In 2015, a senior US State Department Official reported that the
Administration ‘has also been considering what voluntary measures of self-
restraint states should implement, since cyber tools can be used across the
spectrum of conflict, most notably below the threshold of the use of force’
(United States 2015d).
The challenge of reaching for and finding an approach to restraint
in cyberspace was not a simple one. A scholarly paper published in
2015 observed that international law ‘is not as well-equipped to deal
with the current situation of unacknowledged and unattributed State
226 G. AUSTIN

actions not amounting to a use of force or an armed attack in cyberspace’

(Walker 2015b: 94). The author noted that ‘there is growing evidence
that States are behaving as if there are few, if any, restraints in the conduct
of cyberspace activities’ (p. 97).
Vallor (2013b) warned that development of state capabilities for cyber
operations may lead to ‘a moral deskilling of the military profession,
potentially destabilizing traditional norms of military virtue and their
power to motivate ethical restraint in the conduct of war’. Looking for-
ward to the dangers of AI of the sort foreshadowed by Hawking, Vallor
observes ‘the inability of weaponized robots and drone aircraft to act with
the moral knowledge, restraint, compassion, discrimination, proportion-
ality and accountability demanded by modern laws of war’. He warns that
‘ethically constructive policies are unlikely to be pursued until and unless
military leaders, educators, officers and the designers of automated sys-
tems jointly acknowledge the importance of preserving in military practice
a developmental path for moral skills and virtues’, in which we can include,
as Vallor did in her article, the principle of restraint.
The emerging international prominence after 2013 of the idea of
restraint in military and security uses of cyberspace speaks to how unrest-
rained the environment had been prior to that time. In the military sphere,
this resulted in a race for the technological frontier in discrete technological
applications without a strong sense of how to build whole military forces
(combat units and strategies) prepared for cyber-enabled warfare. The
mentality led directly to the use of Stuxnet by the United States against
Iran, an unlawful act of sabotage by one state against another across state
borders. In internal security, it led to a maximalist interpretation of the
scope of national security needs and a minimalist interpretation of the rights
of citizens to privacy. Edward Snowden has argued that it was this tendency
in domestic surveillance inside the United States that led him in 2013 to
public disclosure of his trove of national security intelligence.
The use by the United States and the United Kingdom of advanced
ICTs to deliver drone strikes against terrorists could also reasonably be
seen as an evolution of the unrestrained tendency in security applications
of the most advanced cyber assets. Even though the technology for pre-
cision strike of such targets has existed for decades, the new drone tactics
are able to rely much more on real time intelligence of individual human
targets on the move than previously.
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 227

Military and internal security applications of cyber capabilities are not

all negative for the targeted groups. At the strategic level of warfare,
there is a new appreciation that sophisticated use of cyber assets against
the military command and control systems of an enemy have the poten-
tial to significantly reduce the scale of kinetic operations in warfare, and
thereby reduce the number of casualties. Advanced cyber espionage also
enables adversaries the sort of transparency that arms control advocates
have long argued is conducive to peace. More broadly, advanced cyber
capabilities foreshadow the use of more robots and fewer humans in
military tasks.
Meyer (2016) concluded that states are likely to follow a path of
restraint, or at least ‘put down some initial markers of restraint’ in
order ‘to reassure the civilian sector that the government will not
endanger this critical infrastructure through irresponsible action’. But
we must take note of one fact. On balance, the impulse to securitise
cyberspace, or more correctly to make it a source of insecurity at the
hands of state agencies, is by far the dominant reality among states the
world over. This was not necessarily an historical inevitability. In more
liberal states, this negative tendency has been advanced by the emer-
gence of trans-national terrorist threats. Governments felt obliged to
maximise exploitation of cyber surveillance because they found them-
selves lacking sufficient non-cyber means (in everyday politics and
diplomacy) to deal with the threat.
We can take note of three countervailing influences that act against the
negative security imperatives of states in cyber space:

• The power of corporate commercial interests, evidenced by a

Microsoft paper in 2015 on norms in cyberspace that called for
restraint by states in the securitisation of cyberspace (Microsoft
2015)
• Realisation that the cyberspace technologies and infrastructures are
so highly intermingled with those of other states, that sustained
destructive action against them by any state is severely deleterious
to that state’s interests
• A growing global constituency uniting civil society, some governments
and some corporations, against the excesses of state securitisation of
cyberspace.
228 G. AUSTIN

TOWARDS AN ETHICALLY-BASED CONCLUSION

As Nyman and Burke (2016) argue in an edited collection, Ethical Security
Studies, we should not talk about security (or insecurity) without recog-
nising the centrality of the ethical question of what is moral or good, even
if we have to remain pluralistic in engaging with such a question. All of the
questions posed by those scholars are instantly recognisable as key pro-
blems of security in cyberspace: Who or what is to be secured? What
influence is played by different ethical framings or ontologies? Which
actors can legitimately claim to be purveyors of security? How do we
judge what constitutes ethical behaviour?
We can probably agree with Bynum (1998) that the emergence of
modern ICT ‘makes possible – for the first time in history – a genuinely
global conversation about ethics and human values’, raising implications for
social policy and personal conduct, and therefore security, that we can only
begin to imagine. Even at the economic policy level, often seen as more
rational and less values-based (positivist), the ethical dimension is still none-
theless the underpinning. Breznitz (2007) found in a comparative study of
the IT industry in three countries that ethical choice was prominent in
industry policy. He concluded that a country’s choices for economic devel-
opment have always been and remain part of the ‘nation building project’
to preserve its independence and maximise its power. Its policy choices
‘reflect the ideals that their societies have of themselves and the role of the
state within this vision; each state’s interpretation of its fundamental security
threats, both internal and external; and their position in the international
system’. Breznitz argued for a view that explained both the state and its
politics ‘if we want to understand the outcomes’ in the ICT sector.
One view has it that the ethical values that might be relevant to an
information society are not even the same as existing schools of ethics.
Floridi and Sanders (2002) provide an overview of four possible ethical
approaches in the information age: the professional, the radical, the con-
servative and the innovative. The professional approach is one seated in the
ethical practices of daily life around the use of advanced ICT. The radical
approach would argue that that the information age presents moral phi-
losophy with ‘absolutely unique issues, in need of a unique approach’. The
conservative approach might posit that we simply need a’ particular
applied ethics, discussing new species of traditional moral issues’. The
fourth possibility would be the innovative approach – one that ‘can expand
the metaethical discourse with a substantially new perspective’. Floridi and
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 229

Sanders opt in favour of this last approach, concluding that the ethical
issues raised ‘are not uncontroversially unique’ but ‘are sufficiently novel
to render inadequate the adoption of standard macroethics’, such as
utilitarianism and duty-based concepts (deontology, based on the Greek
word for duty ‘deon’). They argue for an Information Ethics (IE) in which
the moral character of an action is evaluated according to its ‘contribution
to the growth of the infosphere’ or conversely, whether it ‘negatively
affects the whole infosphere’ (Floridi and Sanders 2002: 8). (Relying on
an analogy with the biosphere in which all living things are interconnected
in a global ecosystem, they imagine the infosphere as all information
objects interconnected in a global information ecosystem).
This framing may sound somewhat esoteric and abstract, but in looking
at global security governance we must proceed with at least some insight
from the philosophical sphere. The purpose here is to highlight one parti-
cular question. Is the advent of the information age fundamentally trans-
formative of the moral essence (normative and political foundations) of all
affected societies? The chapter assumes that the answer to this question is in
the affirmative. It proceeds on the assumption that the advent of the
information age has been, in the words of Floridi and Saunders ‘sufficiently
novel to render inadequate’ prior macro-ethics. The material facts of
economic and social organisation of the information age have the effect
therefore of forcing a transformation of all the old values regardless of the
wishes of those in positions of power, both internationally and domestically.
Those states and political actors most adept at exploiting new forms of
power created by the information age will prosper relative to those states
and actors less able to exploit them. This view represents a global con-
sensus of sorts represented by the convening by the UN of the WSIS in
2002, and its continuance as a standing mechanism of the UN.
The problem statement posed in this chapter cannot be meaningfully
equated with the dominant paradigm of the foreign policy of the govern-
ments of Western states for the information age: the protection of internet
freedom. This is indeed a foundation, and must be pursued, but the
governance challenges posed by war-related or surveillance activities, by
demands for social and economic justice and equitable access, and by
developments in technologies themselves are far more serious and intract-
able than freedom of the internet, by many orders of magnitude.
For now at least, the primary and most promising vector for positive
change on cyberspace security policy appears to be pursuit of mutual
restraint based on two foundation principles. First is the idea that the
230 G. AUSTIN

highest national security interests of all states and their citizens are best
served by organising for peaceful advance of economic and social interests,
both corporate and personal. Second is the idea that this reorientation to
peaceable state behaviour is enabled, even necessitated, far more by the
advent of the information age than ever before. But if Hawking is correct,
this is a window of opportunity that may not remain open indefinitely.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, D. (2014) ‘Hagel, ahead of China trip, urges military restraint in
cyberspace’, Reuters, 28 March, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-defense-cybersecurity-idUSBREA2R1ZH20140328.
Austin, G. (2014). Cyber policy in China. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Austin, G. (2016). International legal norms in cyberspace: Evolution of China’s
national security motivations. In A.-M. Osula & H. Rõigas (Eds.),
International cyber norms: Legal, policy & industry perspectives (pp. 172–201).
Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE Publications.
Austin, G., & Cappon, E. (2014). A measure of restraint in cyberspace: Reducing
risk to civilian nuclear assets. New York/Brussels/Moscow: EastWest Institute.
Austin, G., Cappon, E., McConnell, B., & Kostyuk, N. (2014). A measure of
restraint in cyberspace: Reducing risk to civilian nuclear assets (p. 26). New
York/Brussels/Moscow: EastWest Institute, 2014.
Austin, G., & Gady, F. (2012) ‘Cyber Detente between the United States and
China’, EastWest Institute, New York/Brussels/Moscow, co-authored with
Franz Stefan Gady, November 2012, 20 pp, http://www.eastwest.ngo/
idea/cyber-detente-between-united-states-and-china.
Austin, G., McConnell, B., & Neutze, J. (2015). Promoting international cyber
norms: A new advocay forum (p. 19). New York/Brussels/Moscow: EastWest
Institute, 2015.
Breznitz, D. (2007). Innovation and the State: Political choices and strategies
for growth in Israel, Taiwan and Ireland. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Brown, D. (2006). A Proposal for an international convention to regulate the use
of information systems in armed conflict. Harvard International Law Journal,
47((2006)): 179.
Bynum, T. (1998). Ethics in the information age. Web post. http://rccs.southernct.
edu/on-the-emerging-global-information-ethics/#ethics-in-the-information-age.
Accessed 3 May 2016.
Cellan-Jones, R. ‘Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end man-
kind’, BBC News, 2 December 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
30290540.
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 231

China (2015) ‘China’s Military Strategy’, Information Office of the State

Council, May 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/
26/c_134271001.htm.
Deibert, R. J. (2013), ‘Bounding cyber power: Escalation and restraint in global
cyberspace’, Internet Governance Papers, Center for International Governance
Innovation, Paper No. 6 — October 2013, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/no6_2.pdf.
Duquesnoy, P. (2007) ‘Ethics in the environment of the information society’,
Available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/25453/
11909027561Duquenoy-Penny.pdf/Duquenoy-Penny.pdf.
FLI (2015) Future of Life Institute, ‘Research priorities for robust and beneficial
artificial intelligence’, 12pp, Updated 23 January 2015, http://futureoflife.
org/data/documents/research_priorities.pdf.
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2002). Mapping the foundationalist debate in
computer ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(1), 1–9.
Gady, F., & Austin, G. (2010). Russia, the United States, and cyber diplomacy:
Opening the doors (pp. 20). EastWest Institute: New York/Brussels/
Moscow. http://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/russia-united-states-and-cyber-
diplomacy-opening-doors.
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011). The regime complex for climate change.
Perspectives on Politics, 9(issue 1), 7–23.
Kissinger, H. (2011) ‘Mr. X: A review of George F. Kennan: An American life by
John Lewis Gaddis’, The New York Times Book Review, 13 November 2011,
http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/nytbr111311.html.
Libicki, M. C. (2009). Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Meyer, P. (2016). Outer space and cyberspace: A tale of two security realms. In
A. M. Osula & H. Röigas (eds.), International cyber norms: Legal, policy &
industry perspectives, 2016 (pp. 155–169). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence.
Microsoft (2015). International cybersecurity norms reducing conflict in an
internet-dependent world. Redmond WA. https://blogs.microsoft.com/
microsoftsecure/2015/01/20/six-proposed-norms/.
Nye, J. S. (2014) ‘The Regime Complex for managing global cyber activities’,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, http://belfercenter.
hks.harvard.edu/files/global-cyber-final-web.pdf.
Nyman, J., & Burke, A. (2016). Ethical security studies: A new research agenda.
Routledge Critical Security Studies Series. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Osula, A. M., & Röigas, H. eds. (2016). International cyber norms: Legal, policy &
industry perspectives. Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence.
Posen, B. (2014a). Restraint: A new foundation for U.S. grand strategy. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
232 G. AUSTIN

Posen, B. (2014b) ‘A New U.S. Grand strategy’, Boston Review, 1 July 2014,
https://bostonreview.net/us/barry-r-posen-restraint-grand-strategy-united-
states.
Russia (2015) Order on the Signing on an Agreement between the Russian
Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field
of Securing International Information Security, Russian Government, (in
Russian), Moscow, 30 April 2015, http://pravo.gov.ru/laws/acts/34/
555656451088.html.
United Nations (2015a) Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, A/69/723, 13 January 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/
files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf.
United Nations (2015b) ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security’ (UN GGE 2015), A/70/174, 22 July 2015,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174.
United Nations (2015c) Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution on the right to
privacy in the digital age’, UN Doc A/HRC/28/L.27, 24 March 2015
United States (2015a) ‘DoD Cyber Strategy’, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/
2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_
web.pdf.
United States (2015b), ‘Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through
Cyberspace’, U.S. Department of Defense, Cyber Command, Washington,
DC, June 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_
cyber-strategy/docs/US-Cyber-Command-Commanders-Vision.pdf.
United States (2015c) ‘Readout of Senior Administration Officials’ Meeting with
Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the
Communist Party of China Meng Jianzhu’, White House, 12 September
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/12/read
out-senior-administration-officials-meeting-secretary-central.
United States (2015d), Testimony Before Policy Hearing Titled: ‘Cybersecurity:
Setting the Rules for Responsible Global Behavior’, Christopher Painter,
Coordinator for Cyber Issues, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity,
Washington, DC, 14 May 14, http://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/release
sandremarks/243801.htm.
Vallor, S. (2013b). The future of military virtue: Autonomous systems and the
moral deskilling of the military. In K. Podins, J. Stinissen, & M. Maybaum
(Eds.), 2013 5th International conference on cyber conflict. Tallinn: NATO
CCD COE Publications, 2013.
 12 RESTRAINT AND GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE 233

Walker, P. A. (2015b). Law of the horse to law of the submarine: The future of
state behavior in cyberspace. In M. Maybaum, A.-M. Osula, & L. Lindström
(Eds.), 2015 7th international conference on cyber conflict: Architectures in
cyberspace. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications.
Zetter, K. (2011) ‘How digital detectives deciphered Stuxnet, the most menacing
malware in history’, Wired Magazine, 7 November 2011, http://www.wired.
com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/.

Greg Austin is professor in the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the
University of New South Wales (Canberra) and concurrently serves as a
Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute (EWI) in New York. His books
include Cyber Policy in China (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), Power and Responsibility
in Chinese Foreign Policy (ANU E Press, 2014, second printing) co-edited with
Yongjin Zhang, Energy and Conflict Prevention (Madariaga European Foundation,
2010) co-edited with Marie Ange Schellekens Gaiffe, and Japan and Greater
China: Political Economy and Military Power in the Asian Century (Hurst 2001)
co-authored with Stuart Harris.
 CHAPTER 13

Pandemics and Dual-Use Research

Rita Parker

‘A plague on both your houses’.

William Shakespeare

Biological agents are not constrained by sovereign borders and can have a
devastating effect either in the form of an infectious disease pandemic or as
a result of scientific experimentation. This chapter analyses key issues and
problems associated with biological security issues and dual-use research
including governance arrangements to address those concerns.

PANDEMICS
Although a pandemic is determined by the spread of the disease rather the
number of deaths it causes, the mortality rates of global disease outbreaks
are noteworthy particularly because of the wider impact on civil society
and machinery of governance. For example, the first recorded outbreak of
bubonic plague in 541–542 AD in Constantinople and Egypt known as
the Plague of Justinian, resulted in approximately 50 to 60 % of the
population dying. ‘The plague acted as a stressor or a solvent on the
machinery of empire’ (Price-Smith 2009: 38), resulting in erosion of

R. Parker (*)
University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia
e-mail: R.Parker@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 235

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_13
236 R. PARKER

civil and state cohesion, prosperity and power. The 1918–1919 influenza
pandemic had a mortality rate of 2.5% of those infected and, at the time it
had the highest mortality rate since the fourteenth century plague
known as the ‘Black Death’. More recently, according to the World
Health Organization, almost 78 million people have been infected with
the HIV virus and about 39 million people have died of HIV. Globally,
35.0 million (33.2–37.2 million) people were living with HIV at the end
of 2013 (WHO 2016b). In 2005, avian influenza (H5N1) also known as
‘bird flu’ had a laboratory confirmed mortality rate of 60 % in those
infected with the disease (WHO 2016c). In 2012 the Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) was first identified and it has a mortality
rate of 36% in reported cases in twenty-six countries (WHO 2016d).
As noted above there are different types of infectious disease including
different forms of influenza that have resulted in pandemics. An influenza
pandemic occurs when key factors converge: an influenza virus emerges
with the ability to cause sustained transmission from human-to-human,
and there is very low, or no, immunity to the virus among most people.
Biological risks arising from disease can be developed as part of natural
processes or deliberately, and diseases can be spread unintentionally or
intentionally. In the interconnected world of today, a localised epidemic
can rapidly transform into a pandemic.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, cholera was prevalent through-
out Europe. This resulted in an early example of the way a health issue was
formally reframed within a politico-diplomatic context by actors outside the
health sector. The spread of infectious disease became the subject of inter-
national diplomacy and it was raised at the first International Sanitary
Conference in Paris in 1851 (Elbe 2010:163). In the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, the world experienced several infectious diseases
that have had the potential to, or did, spread sufficiently to become a
pandemic. In addition to health concerns, infectious diseases hold implica-
tions for human security as well as having several socio-economic implica-
tions that are not necessarily immediately evident, such as absenteeism, loss
of productivity, and increased levels of insecurity in civil society.
The mortality rates of pandemics across different demographics and
regions sometimes equate to those in war-zones, although the accuracy of
mortality data can inhibit appropriate policy responses. Estimating the
actual number of individual cases and deaths is challenging because, in
addition to laboratories stopping testing when overwhelmed, many people
do not seek medical care; secondly, only a small number of those who do
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 237

seek care are tested; and thirdly, more people who are hospitalised or die
of pandemic-related causes are tested and reported. But under-reporting
of hospitalisations and deaths occurs as well because they are not always
accurately attributed to an epidemic or pandemic. This has implications
for pandemic planners and implicitly means that any planning assumptions
need to be rigorously objective and equally, civil society needs to be
engaged as part of the planning process to ensure ongoing resilience in
adverse circumstances. Fundamental to the planning process are the
assumptions relating to the pandemic and the basis of those assumptions.
Flawed assumptions can have significant policy and resource implications
as well as potentially devastating effects on civil society. For example,
planning for an Ebola pandemic based on the 1918–1919 influenza pan-
demic with its mortality rate of 2.5% of those infected, would be grossly
inaccurate. Ebola has a mortality rate of approximately 50% of those
infected (World Health Organization 2016a).
Following the re-emergence of H5N1 in 2003 and the outbreak of
SARS in the same year, nation-states and relevant international institutions
have invested in pandemic preparedness. While the World Health
Organization has assisted with planning guidance, the ability of a state
to respond depends on the extent of health resources, their disease sur-
veillance capabilities, reporting system, health system surge capacity, and
access to health facilities.
From a global perspective, because of the transnational nature of pan-
demics, international cooperation and coordination are critical elements.
Consequently, the cross-border nature of pandemics has contributed to
greater cooperation and information sharing and these are reflected, to
some extent, in the 2007 International Health Regulations (Hagen
2013:165). The Regulations set out the obligations of member-states
and the WHO in responding to cross-border public health risks. The
IHR require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public
health events to the WHO. The regulations aim to prevent, protect
against, control and respond to the international spread of disease while
avoiding unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.
Under the IHR, States are required to notify the WHO of all events that
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern and to
respond to requests for verification of information regarding such events.
Secondly, States are required to notify and report events and other infor-
mation through their National IHR Focal Points to a regional WHO IHR
Contact Points Focal points and Contact points must be available on a
238 R. PARKER

24 hour-a-day basis, seven days a week. Thirdly, each State Party is

required to develop, strengthen and maintain core public health capacities
for surveillance and response by using existing national resources, such as
the national plans for influenza pandemic preparedness.
The ethical and governance issues associated with a pandemic are
equally complex. During a pandemic, few people’s lives would be
unchanged and many existing values would be challenged, such as free-
dom of movement, or the assumption that everyone would have equal
access to antivirals and health services. The WHO recognised the impor-
tance of addressing ethical issues as part of governance arrangements
related to a pandemic, and produced a series of discussion papers on key
issues associated with pandemic preparedness. Following consultation
with its 193 member-states, it subsequently produced public health
response guidance in 2008 (Gadd 2013:182). Consideration of ethical
issues may be further complicated if resources are limited. This may
influence the extent to which a nation-state imposes mandatory measures,
which would need to be monitored and enforced to be effective. The
allocation of scarce resources leading to benefits for some people over
others may conflict with expectations in civil society and generate further
levels of anxiety and insecurity. This could have wider implications such as
for the maintenance of law and order and general levels of safety in civil
society, which in turn affect the authority of a nation-state and its
governance.
Some nation-states, such as New Zealand, France, and Switzerland
have a national ethics committee that has examined pandemic influenza
as well as other problems. Yet many others do not, and they have not
engaged in community consultation or provided guidance regarding ethi-
cal values for a pandemic and how to make associated decisions.
Development of a social contract between governing institutions and
civil society about critical issues and the roles, responsibilities and expecta-
tions of all actors concerned needs to be developed. Such an arrangement
would go some way to mitigate insecurities and uncertainties associated
with a pandemic.

INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND CONFLICT

Biological security issues are not a twenty-first century phenomenon.
Infection disease has been associated with civil conflict and war over the
centuries and it has been used deliberately as a form of biological warfare
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 239

by state and non-state actors. In 1763 the British army deliberately gave
smallpox contaminated blankets to Native American Indians and in World
War One, packhorses used by the Allies were targeted by the German
military with disease-causing organisms to disrupt supply lines. At the time
the French signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol,1 they were also developing a
biological warfare program to complement the chemical weapons program
established in the First World War (Rosebury and Kabat 1947: 7–96).
Similarly, the former Soviet Union commenced its biological weapons
program in the 1920s although it too was a signatory to the 1925
Protocol.
In the Second World War, in addition to human biological experimen-
tation carried out in Nazi Germany, the United States launched its biolo-
gical warfare program to produce a number of biological agents such as
anthrax, botulism, and plague. In Britain, programs were underway to
develop anthrax spores and to develop a way to disseminate them when
delivered with a conventional bomb, and between 1936 and 1944
Hungary conducted an offensive biological weapons program (Faludi
1988: 67–72). Outside Europe, a major offensive biological warfare pro-
gram began in Japan and ran from 1931 to 1945. The Japanese tested
biological agents on humans as well as employing biological agents in
military field operations. In China, for example, artillery shells filled with
germs were used. The Japanese human experimentation was largely con-
ducted in China on Chinese prisoners of war. The Japanese developed
capabilities to produce kilogram quantities of bacteria for plague, anthrax,
typhoid, cholera, dysentery and other diseases (Dando 2006: 22–23). It is
estimated that about 600 people died each year as a direct result of
experimentation conducted by the Japanese Unit 731.
In the early 1980s the South African Defense Force is alleged to have
begun a small-scale biological weapons program, primarily investigating
B anthracis and V cholerae. The biological agents were allegedly used, but
details are not available. The program was closed in 1993 after diplomatic
interventions by the United States and the United Kingdom, coincident
with the demise of the apartheid regime (Leitenberg 2001).

DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN

Some research experiments involving infectious pathogens have inherent
dangers and are known as Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). All life
science techniques and discoveries might be inherently dual-use (Atlas
240 R. PARKER

2009: 293–301) and biological DURC is of particular interest because it

can have both beneficial and dangerous consequences. Almost all items
necessary to produce lethal biological agents are dual-use, meaning they
would be found legally in pharmaceutical laboratories or in biological
weapons facilities.
In 2003, a panel of life science experts within the US National
Academy of Sciences convened the Strategic Assessments Group.
An unclassified report summary by the Central Intelligence Agency
(Office of Transnational Issues 2003: 1) of the Panel’s findings states
in part, that, ‘the same science that may cure some of our worst
diseases could be used to create the world’s most frightening weap-
ons’. The report summary highlighted that the knowledge to develop
some bio-weapons already exists. The Panel cautioned that because the
processes, knowledge, techniques, and equipment for advanced bio-
agent development were dual-use, it would be ‘extremely difficult to
distinguish between legitimate biological research activities and pro-
duction of advanced bio-weapons agents’. On this point, there is little
difference between the two manufacturing processes until a decision is
made to produce a weapon rather than manufacture a vaccine
(Thompson 2006: 6–7).

Mousepox
The skills, knowledge, and technology to create new viruses, and therefore
potential bioweapons, are available in almost any biotechnology labora-
tory. A dangerous virus can be created, even unintentionally, as the
following example demonstrates.
An experiment in 2001 by Australian scientists inadvertently showed
that the virulence of the mousepox virus could be significantly enhanced
by the incorporation of a standard immuno-regulator2 gene. Although the
goal of the research was benign, the results held dual-use concerns and
implications for the development of future bio-weapons. In response to a
mouse plague, scientists set out to create a strain of mousepox virus that
would cause sterility in female mice. However, they accidently found a way
to genetically engineer the 100 % lethal mousepox virus, which is related
to smallpox and is highly contagious. Inadvertently, the researchers
genetically engineered a powerful virus which could kill mice that were
naturally resistant to, as well as mice that had been vaccinated against,
ordinary mousepox. Even those mice which had been vaccinated against
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 241

mousepox, fared badly with half dying immediately (Jackson et al. 2001:
1205–1210).
Until that time, biological weapons concerns had focused on the use of
existing pathogens. However, the mousepox study demonstrated that not
only was it possibly to develop a lethal virus, but it also indicated that the
necessary skills and capabilities were readily available. The scientists
involved in the study raised concerns and debated about making the
data public. The research was published in the Journal of Virology in
2001. This resulted in critics raising concerns that they had alerted
would-be terrorists to new ways of making biological weapons and had
provided them with explicit instructions (Selgelid and Weir 2010: 18).
This study highlighted a number of concerns which were revisited 10 years
later in the H5N1 experiments.

H5N1 Experimentation
The confluence of developments in biotechnology genetic engineering
and technologies has added a further level of complexity regarding the
governance and control mechanisms for the research and use of biological
agents in the twenty-first century. Given the prospect of dual-use and
progress in biotechnology, proliferation of biological weapons can be
achieved relatively easily – particularly if there is intent. Gene-designed
organisms can be used to produce potential bio-weapons. Concern about
the development and use of biological agents in the twenty-first century
has largely been focused on non-state actors. However, state funded
research continues to raise concerns not necessarily about the initial intent,
but of the potential for the research outcomes to be misappropriated,
misused, or exploited.
For example, in 2011, two separate international research studies were
funded by the US National Institute of Health to examine the mammalian
transmissibility of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1
viruses. While the gain-of-function3 research is typically defined more
broadly as a mutation that confers a new or enhanced activity to a protein,
for the purposes of the two research studies, it refers specifically to those
that increase the transmissibility, increase the pathogenicity, or alter the
host range of HPAI H5N1 viruses (National Institute of Health 2012).
Researchers at the University of Wisconsin in the United States and the
Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands based their study
around two questions regarding why the virus had not become a
242 R. PARKER

human-to-human spreadable virus; and whether it was an event which

could occur naturally.
In brief, they found that for it to become a human-to-human spread-
able virus five mutations or tiny changes were necessary, and at that stage
three changes had already been found in a single viral chain. They also
found there was no impediment to the changes occurring. The two groups
created mutant forms of H5N1 that could be transmitted between ferrets,
and viruses that are easily transmissible between ferrets are often also easily
transmissible between humans (Briseno and England 2013: 12–14).
While the research was assessed as having been conducted properly and
under the safest and most secure conditions (Fauci 2012: 1–2), the issue
that has been intensely debated is whether knowledge obtained from these
experiments could inadvertently affect public health in an adverse way.
There has been debate about whether the Precautionary Principle had
been the guiding principle. Scientists generally have argued that the benefits
of such experiments and the resulting knowledge outweigh the risks. This
has been countered by a number of professional and institutional actors
outside the scientific and health sectors who have expressed deep concern.
The public nature of the debate also generated unease and concern within
civil societies globally, and raised further concerns about accountability and
control mechanisms (Resnik 2013; Shamoo and Resnik 2009). By adopting
the Precautionary Principle, the burden of proof rests with the scientific
community to demonstrate that the research should be carried out and,
importantly, that it be undertaken in a responsible way. It also requires that
researchers consider the potential harms as well as the potential benefits of
undertaking the research. Such considerations may result in limiting the
proposed research to take account of ethical and professional values.
In the United States, the National Scientific Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) is responsible for advice, guidance, and leadership
regarding biosecurity oversight of dual-use research, defined as biological
research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a
biologic threat to public health and/or national security. However, the
NSABB does not have compliance powers. There is no international
governing body to monitor or to advise on such issues and there are no
overarching compliance requirements with the result that biological dual-
use research of concern continues with few constraints. For example, in
October 2013, Chinese scientists announced they had created new strains
of the influenza virus in a bid to develop vaccines. The announcement
generated international criticism including from former president of the
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 243

UK Royal Society, Lord May, who denounced the work of the team under
Professor Chen Hualan, Director of China’s National Avian Influenza
Reference Laboratory. While the research was reportedly conducted in a
laboratory with the second highest security level to prevent the virus
escaping containment, May is reported to have said: ‘The record of con-
tainment in labs like this is not reassuring. They are taking it upon
themselves to create human-to-human transmission of very dangerous
viruses. It’s appallingly irresponsible’ (Connor 2013).

INFECTIOUS DISEASES AS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, and toxins that have the poten-
tial to cause major public health impacts; cause widespread panic and/or
social disruption; are readily communicable, and have high mortality rates
(Chang and Blackmond Laskey 2008: 1–5). The US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has identified several categories of biolo-
gical agents that could be used to initiate a terrorist attack. The CDC lists
eighteen agents considered to be potential bio-terrorism threats with
anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia4 and viral haemorrhagic
fevers which have the highest potential for lethal impact (for example
Ebola and, Marburg) identified as ‘Category A’. The CDC notes that
these high-priority agents pose a risk to national security because they

• can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;

• result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public
health impact;
• might cause public panic and social disruption; and
• require special action for public health preparedness.

Delivery Systems
Both nation-states and non-state actors have an ongoing interest in the
development and use of biological agents and the use of infectious bacteria
as bio-weapons. The main past impediment has been effective delivery
systems, and the difference between the delivery requirements of non-state
actors and nation-states is worth noting (Ackerman and Moran 2006: 4).
To achieve the strategic effect of diminishing military capability on the
battlefield it would be necessary to have uniform, stable aerosol droplets
containing trichothecene mycotoxins.5 However, non-state actors may
244 R. PARKER

seek to cause fear and chaos in civil society and therefore would not
require such consistent delivery, and a less effective delivery of a less exotic
agent, such as ricin, might serve their purposes.
A decision to weaponise a biological agent means it needs to be pre-
pared in a form that can readily infect people and then be delivered
efficiently to its target. The choice of biological agent will influence the
delivery system. For example, a non-contagious disease like anthrax would
require a sophisticated delivery system to disperse the agent over a wide
area because every victim would have to come in contact with the agent.
However, the delivery system for a contagious disease, such as pneumonic
plague or smallpox, would not need to be highly sophisticated because it
would only be necessary to infect a small number of people. After that the
initial victims would themselves spread the disease to others. Highly
contagious and lethal pathogens can present an even greater danger than
nuclear weapons in that they are not limited to the geographical target
area, and can continue to spread indefinitely.
Based on past examples of the unsuccessful deployment of biological
weapons, there has been a view that there is relatively little future threat of
their use by non-state actors. However, the ability to obtain a pathogen,
weaponise the agent, and employ or disperse the weapon needs to be
considered in terms of capability and intent. As groups such as Al Qaeda,
Daesch, and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), and nation-states
gain capability, the overall level of risk and threat to nation-states and to
their civil societies increases. Relatively low barriers to entry combined
with the high impact potential of bio-weapons are important considera-
tions. Both chemical and biological weapons can be less expensive to
manufacture and require fewer infrastructures than nuclear weapons.
The availability of open-source information and material, developments
in biotechnology sciences, and inexpensive equipment, make the
production of bioweapons an attractive option for non-state actors, and
some nation-states (Office of Technology Assessment 1993: 38). The
Rajneeshee cult, which attempted to use salmonella to achieve a political
outcome in the US state of Oregon in 1984, obtained pathogens legally
from culture collections (Carus 1984: 118–135).
The release of harmful biological agents has the potential to cause
significant damage to civil society and the way it operates. Consequently,
it is imperative that a nation-state has appropriate preparatory and
response measures in place to ensure the resilience of civil society, and
that insecurities are minimised.
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 245

When looked at in a holistic systemic way these cases crystallise a number

of the issues associated with biological challenges including the potential
adverse use of biological agents and their effect on civil society. Clearly,
knowledge gained from the experiments is valuable and can be used to
inform future pandemic planning. However, the global research community
is no longer as tightly knit as it used to be, and access to research experi-
ments and studies is now more easily obtained and potentially can be used
for adverse effect. In a statement in 2011 before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Assistant Director, Weapons
of Mass Destruction Directorate Federal Bureau of Investigation, Vahid
Majidi reported that the FBI was concerned that many US biological and
medical laboratories were vulnerable to insiders based on several incidents
involving the illicit acquisition of bacterial and viral cultures. He further
reported that there had been numerous attempts to utilise biological toxins
to threaten, injure, or kill individuals. In addition the FBI was concerned
about the availability of those agents for potential criminal use and that the
biological threat is further increased with advances in technologies in the
biological sciences that have become more powerful, cheaper, and readily
available to much wider audiences (FBI 2011). A subsequent report by
UNICRI highlighted that research developments in this area could rekindle
military interest in biological weapons and potentially undermine existing
national and international oversight regimes (UNICRI 2012). Within this
context, relevant legislative and policy controls over such types of research
require consideration, such as appropriate security measures and personnel
screening at a local level and international controls over the shipment of
pathogenic (disease-causing) organisms.

CONTROL AND VERIFICATION MEASURES AS A FORM

OF RESILIENCE

In 1925, following World War One, nation-states developed a specific

international ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Nation-
states further strengthened this prohibition with agreement of the
Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 1993. Nonetheless, pathogens can be deployed against
military forces, and they can be used against civilians. This means that
pathogens themselves, as well as military threats, can be a core security
concern and undermine resilience of civil societies.
246 R. PARKER

The governing Convention for biological agents is the Convention on

the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
It was developed to establish a new instrument that would supplement the
1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
known as the Geneva Protocol. The Convention was opened for signature
in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Notwithstanding that previous
biological weapons had demonstrated their potential effectiveness, when
the Convention was negotiated in the 1970s there was a perception that
they had little military utility. The Convention in its title and in Article 1
does not explicitly prohibit the ‘use’ of biological weapons. However, the
final Declaration of the 1996 Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed that
although ‘use’ was not explicitly prohibited under Article 1 of the
Convention, it was still considered to be a violation of the Convention.
Compliance with the Convention is self-regulatory and there is the
possibility of investigation by the UN Security Council of alleged
breaches. All States Parties are expected to be in compliance with the
Convention as they are legally bound to implement it fully and compre-
hensively. However, as noted earlier in this Chapter, there has been
evidence that since the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
(BTWC) entered into force, some signatory nation-states have developed
biological weapons programs.
A key issue is the degree of transparency associated with research
activities in the biological sciences undertaken by a nation-state, industry,
or academia. Greater transparency would assist in ensuring appropriate
ethical and safety considerations, encourage best practice, mitigate against
ill-intentioned and nefarious activities, and any dual-use nature of research
activities (Walther and Whitby 2012). However, levels of transparency
vary between nation-states and within institutions, and this undermines
attempts to achieve common norms, partnerships and thus, international
security.
One of the major criticisms of the Convention is that it has no provi-
sions for verification or for monitoring compliance. After several review
meetings at which the persistently divergent views of States Parties hin-
dered progress, it was not until 2006 when the Sixth Review Conference
was reportedly successful in reviewing the Convention and adopting a final
document by consensus (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
2013). The States Parties adopted a plan for promoting universal
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 247

adherence, and decided to update and streamline the procedures for

submission and distribution of the Confidence-Building Measures.6
Nonetheless, there is still no verification regime, and compliance remains
self-regulatory.
In recognition of the limitations of formal institutions to achieve pro-
gress in this area, a group of non-governmental organisations concerned at
the failure of nation-states to fortify the norm against the weaponisation of
disease was established in 2003. The BioWeapons Prevention Project
(BWPP) is a global civil society activity that aims to strengthen the norm
against using disease as a weapon. The BWPP tracks governmental and
other behaviour that is pertinent to compliance with international treaties
and other agreements, especially those that outlaw hostile use of biotech-
nology. The project works to reduce the threat of bioweapons by mon-
itoring and reporting throughout the world. BWPP supports and is
supported by, a global network of members drawn from the Americas,
Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. While the work of this group and the
Australia Group are commendable they, like the Convention, lack the
ability to enforce compliance or to implement sanctions for non-compli-
ance. To some degree the NSABB in the United States provides a model
for other nation-states notwithstanding its lack of compliance powers.
However, globally there appears to be a lack of policy development and
an apparent lack or absence, of policy debate regarding oversight of dual-
use research.

CONCLUSION
The geopolitical environment of the twenty-first century has been chal-
lenged in an unprecedented way by a number of transnational security
issues including from biological sources which are evident at a nation-state
as well as at a global level. Nation-states have different levels of governance
arrangements, capacity, capability, and resources to deal with infectious
diseases as pandemics or dual-use research of concern which could be used
to create biological weapons. The way forward could include mechanisms
and strategies at a civil, national and global level addressing community
communication, ethical, policy, and definitional issues as set out briefly
below.
First, there is an unexplored opportunity for a nation-state to take the
initiative by beginning an incremental public conversation about the risks
associated with biological research and potential bioweapons threats. This
248 R. PARKER

could lead to the development of a social contract between governing

institutions and civil society. However, it is unclear whether nation-states
through their political elites and civil society are sufficiently robust to allow
public debate about the risks arising from biological challenges and poten-
tial threats to civil society, particularly regarding the tipping point of dual-
use research and potential bioweapons.
Development and implementation of such an engagement strategy
would require input from a spectrum of areas and disciplines. While such
an approach may be fraught with difficulties and obstacles, the initial stage
of the process would be to engage with representative individuals and
interest groups about the way decisions are made, and then to develop
strategies for wider engagement with civil society. Engagement directly
with civil society about issues such as the way decisions are made would
further provide an opportunity to raise and to address complex ethical
issues associated with response planning and implementation of decisions.
Secondly, consideration could be given to the establishment of
National Security Ethics Committees – drawing on models already estab-
lished and outlined earlier in New Zealand, France, and Switzerland – to
explore and to provide advice and guidance for the development of
relevant policies about biosecurity issues. Collaboration between such
Committees would assist in achieving global consistency. A global frame-
work would address the ethical issues associated with contemporary bio-
logical security concerns which do not appear to be considered in the
current policies of a number of nation-states.
Thirdly, biological research studies would benefit from the develop-
ment of a comprehensive policy framework which would include clear
guidance and make explicit the Precautionary Principle. Such a policy
framework would clarify the existing situation where issues of responsi-
bility rest primarily on the integrity and professional responsibility of
individuals, or their affiliated institution. Such a policy approach would
also contribute to greater resilience and the reduction of insecurity.
Another aspect of policy consideration concerns the challenges asso-
ciated with lower barriers of access to the information, materials, and
resources necessary for the development and production of bio-weapons
by non-state actors. Development of relevant policies and protocols with
input from the research community and the professional national security
sector could be a positive step towards limiting production. Signatory
Member States to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention could
take a more active role in establishing verification protocols. Those
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 249

Member States which also participate in the Australia Group could lever-
age their participation to achieve this goal. Biological concerns associated
with scientific developments and experiments such as synthetic biology,
dual-use research, and gain-of-function research have added a new level of
complexity and challenge for policymakers. While a number of nation-
states appear to be quite well prepared to deal with an epidemic or a
pandemic, many lack policy structures to deal with more complex aspects
of dual-use research. Individual nation-states could review their definitions
of biosecurity to reflect more accurately the complexities of biological
security challenges. The definition of biosecurity developed by the
Federation of American Scientists (Federation of American Scientists,
2012) provides an appropriate foundation. The FAS defines biosecurity as

any measure aimed at preventing the purposeful misuse of science. It includes

measures to prevent access to dangerous pathogens and toxins as well as raising
barriers to the production or use of bioweapons. Beside such typical security
measures, it includes basic awareness efforts that decrease the possibility of
people misusing science from within the academic research community.

While these proposed steps would not provide a perfect solution, they
would offer a positive and constructive way forward to reduce insecurity
and to enhance resilience within nation-states and globally.

NOTES
1. The 1925 Geneva Protocol refers to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Protocol prohibits the use of
chemical and biological weapons in war. The Protocol was drawn up and
signed at a conference which was held in Geneva under the auspices of the
League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925, and it entered into force on
8 February 1928.
2. Immuno-regulation is the control of specific immune responses and
interactions.
3. Gain-of-function research uses experiments to introduce or amplify a gene
product. This type of research is intended to increase the transmissibility,
host range, or virulence of pathogens.
4. Tularemia is a disease of animals and humans caused by the bacterium
Francisella tularensis. Rabbits, hares, and rodents are especially susceptible
250 R. PARKER

and often die in large numbers during outbreaks. Humans can be infected
and it can prove fatal.
5. The trichothecene mycotoxins are a group of toxins that occur as contami-
nants from mould or may occur naturally in foodstuffs or in livestock feeds.
6. Confidence-building measures were developed between military alliances
during the Cold War to avoid nuclear attacks by accident. They have
widened into other areas, military and non-military. The United Nations
Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) identifies CBMs in three cate-
gories: information exchange; observation and verification; and military
constraint.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, G. A., & Moran, K. S. (2006). Bioterrorism and threat assessment,
Report No. 22. Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
Atlas, R. (2009). Responsible conduct by life scientists in an age of terrorism.
Science and Engineering Ethics, 15, 293–301.
Briseno, M., & England, C. (2013). Science and security: The moratorium on
H5N1 ‘gain-of-function’ experiments. Public Interest Report, 66(1), 12–14.
Carus, W. S. (1984). The Rajneeshees. In J. B. Tucker (Ed.), Toxic terror: Assessing
terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons (pp. 118–135). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2010). Bioterrorism AGENTS/
DISEASES, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.
Chang, K., & Blackmond Laskey, K., (2008), SYST 798 Senior Research Project
Biological Senor Fusion. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.
Connor, S., (2013), Chinese scientists slammed for creating new ‘deadly’ influenza
strains, The Independent, May 3 2013.
Dando, M. (2006). Bioterror and Biowarfare (pp. 2223). Oxford: Oneworld
Publications.
Elbe, S. (2010). Pandemic Security. In J. P. Burgess (Ed.), The Routledge
Handbook of New Security Studies. New York: Routledge.
Faludi, G. (1988). Challenges of BW Control and Defense During Arms Reduction.
In E. Geissler, L. G. Gazso, & E. Buder (Eds.), Conversion of Former BTW
Facilities (pp. 67–72). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Fauci, A. S. (2012). Research on highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus: The
way forward. Journal of Microbiology, 3(5), 1–2.
FBI, (2011), Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC by Vahid Majidi, Assistant Director,
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Federal Bureau of Investigation, at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-and-the-anthrax-
attacks-protecting-against-biological-threats.
 13 PANDEMICS AND DUAL-USE RESEARCH 251

Federation of American Scientists (2012). FAS – Introduction – Module 1.0.

http://fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse/FAS/2_A.html.
Gadd, E. M. (2013). Ethical issues related to pandemic preparedness and
response. In J. Van-Tam & C. Sellwood (Eds.), Pandemic Influenza (Second
ed., pp. 181–188). Wallingford, Oxfordshire: CABI Modular Texts.
Hagen, D. (2013). Port health and international health regulations. In J. Van-
Tam & C. Sellwood (Eds.), PandemicIinfluenza (Second ed., pp. 164–172).
Wapling, Oxfordshire: CABI Modular Texts.
Jackson, R., Ramsay, A. J., Christensen, C. D., Beaton, S., Hall, D. F., &
Ramshaw, I. A. (2001). Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by aq recombi-
nant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolyic lymphocyte responses and over-
comes genetic resistance to mousepox. Journal of Virology, 75(3),
1205–1210.
Kaiser, J. (2014), ‘Researchers rail against moratorium on risky virus experiments’,
Science, at http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/10/researchers-rail-
against-moratorium-risky-virus-experiments.
Leitenberg, M. (2001). Working Paper: Biological Weapons in the 20th Century: A
Review and Analysis. Maryland: Center for International and Security Studies
at Maryland, University of Maryland.
National Institute of Health. (2012). A framework for guiding U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services funding decisions about research proposals with the
potential for generating highly pathogenic avian influenza h5n1 viruses that are
transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets. Bethesda, MD: National
Institute of Health.
Office of Technology Assessment (1993). Proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (OTA-ISC-559). Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
Office of Transnational Issues (2003). The darker bioweapons future, Report OTI
SF 2003-108, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency.
Price-Smith, A. T. (2009). Contagion and chaos. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Resnik, D. B. (2013, March–April). H5N1 avian flu research and the ethics of
knowledge. Hastings Center Reports, 43(2), 22–33.
Rosebury, T., & Kabat, E. A. (1947). Bacterial warfare. Journal of Immunology,
56, 7–96.
Selgelid, M. J., & Weir, L. (2010). The mousepox experience. European Molecular
Biology Organization Reports, 11(1), 18–24.
Shamoo, A. S., & Resnik, D. B. (2009). Responsible conduct of research (2nd edn.).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, C. M. (2006). The bioterrorism threat by non-state actors: Hype or
horror? Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
UNICRI (2012). Security implications of synthetic biology and nanobiotechnology: A
risk and response assessment of advances in biotechnology (Shortened Public
Version), Geneva: United Nations Crime and Justice Research Institute.
252 R. PARKER

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, (2013). The Biological Weapons
Convention (No. 2013). Vienna: United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs.
Walther, G., & Whitby, S., (2012). Bioweapons Monitor 2012. Bradford:
BioWeapons Prevention Project.
World Health Organization (2016a). Ebola Virus Disease, Fact sheet N°103,
Geneva.
WHO (2016b). Global Health Observatory data, HIV/AIDS, At http://www.
who.int/gho/hiv/en/.
WHO (2016c).H5N1 influenza, at http://www.who.int/influenza/human_ani
mal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/faqs/en/.
WHO (2016d). Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), at
http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/.

Rita Parker is Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales, Canberra,
Australia, and former Distinguished Fellow George Mason University, Virginia,
USA, and a senior international relations and security policy advisor to the
Australian Government. Her areas of expertise include resilience and nontradi-
tional challenges to security, including threats from non-state actors and from
non-human sources. Recent publications include ‘Food a Non-traditional
Challenge to Security’ in B. Mascitelli and B O’Mahoney (Eds), Good Food for
All: Developing knowledge relationships between China and Australia (2015);
‘Lessons on Resilience’, NFG Policy Paper Series, Freie Universität, Berlin, 11/
2015; ‘Transnational Security Threats and Non-traditional Security Challenges’ in
The Journal of Defence and Security (2013); ‘Managing for Resilience’ in Resilience
and Transformation (2010, Australia21 and CSIRO), co-author of ‘Energy and
Food Security’, Security Challenges (2014, Kokoda); co-author of ‘System-
Resilience Perspectives on Sustainability and Equity in Australia’ in Negotiating
Our Future: Living Scenarios for Australia to 2050 (2012, Australian Academy of
Science).
 CHAPTER 14

Advocating Global Health Security

Sara E. Davies

For the last two decades a strategy employed by health professionals, scien-
tists, and diplomats has been to play the ‘health security card’ to achieve
particular trade, diplomatic, strategic, and development goals (Elbe 2011).
The presumption has been that the securitisation of health will harness global
political leadership and resources. This marriage of health issues to security
logic has been met with a mix of applause, caution, and critique (Feldbaum et
al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen
2014). But the presumption has remained that, for the most part, the
marriage of health issues to security will ‘harness political leadership and
resources for various international health issues’ (Elbe 2011: 220).
In the last 15 years, there have been three United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolutions that have specifically referred to health
matters – S/Res/1308 (2000), S/Res/1983 (2011), both concerning
HIV/AIDs, and S/Res/2177 (2014) in response to the Ebola viral
disease outbreak in West Africa. In December 2012, the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution A/67/L.36, Global
Health and Foreign Policy, the fifth resolution on global health and
foreign policy resolution to pass in the UNGA since the adoption of the

S.E. Davies (*)

Griffith University, CGPP, Building N72, Nathan Campus, Brisbane, 4111,
Outside US and Canada, Australia
e-mail: sara.davies@griffith.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 253

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_14
254 S.E. DAVIES

first resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy in 2008 (A/63/33).

The UNGA also adopted resolution A/69/1 giving support to the
measures recommended by UN Secretary-General to contain the Ebola
outbreak (A/69/389 2014).
The decision of the UNSC to adopt three resolutions on health matters
in 15 years and the UNGA sessions on global health and foreign policy
have received mixed views. Some point to these events as illustration of the
weakness of the global health security narrative (Youde 2014). In parti-
cular, it has been noted that the Ebola outbreak in 2014 was initially met
with no international capacity outside of the World Health Organization
(WHO) to respond to this crisis. The creation of the UN Mission on
Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in September (2014) was the
first, and some argue should be the last, effort to respond to a viral
outbreak (Panel of independent experts 2015). Others contend that,
given that there is no procedure under the UN Charter for the General
Assembly or Security Council to examine health matters – let alone
develop a mission like UNMEER – broader UN engagement in health
beyond the WHO could point to the success of the global health diplo-
macy (McInnes 2015). The question is what does successful global health
diplomacy look like? Do we see in practice the securitisation of health as
essential to pursue international diplomatic engagement in global health?
There have been recent claims that the successful international
engagement in health initiatives such as the Global Fund for AIDS,
TB, and Malaria (Global Fund) and Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) have been achieved without asserting their necessity ‘primarily
on security considerations’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013: 16; see also
Sridhar 2012; Gagnon and Labonte 2011). However, the assumption
remains that linking health issues, specifically health emergencies and
infectious disease outbreaks to security discourse will create more oppor-
tunities for diplomatic cooperation and engagement (see Feldbaum et al.
2010; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). This chapter explores this argument
beginning with the period where the phrase ‘global health diplomacy’
and ‘global health governance’ began to gain usage in international
relations in the 1990s. In the first part of the chapter I briefly present
the conceptual history of health security and its relationship to ‘global
health diplomacy’. I explore the argument that the success of global
health diplomacy has come from the preponderant use of security lan-
guage, referents, and discourse (cf. Elbe 2011; Feldbaum et al. 2010;
Kickbusch et al. 2007; McInnes and Rushton 2013). In the second part
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 255

of the chapter I examine two cases, one where a type of security logic
was deliberately employed to frame the ‘health emergency’ (Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control or FCTC) and one where human
rights logic was initially deployed when advocating for its creation (the
Global Alliance for Vaccine Immunization or GAVI). I evaluate what
‘health security’ looks like in these global health initiatives and explore
the presumption that ‘security discourse’ must be present in comparing
these two major, successful global health initiatives.

HEALTH SECURITY
States have a history of formal international agreements addressing health
matters and health threats, particularly infectious diseases, from the
Decree of Quarantine in Ragusa-Dubrovnik in 1377 (Mackowiak and
Sehdev 2002) to the International Sanitary Conference in 1851 (Fidler
2003) and the revised International Health Regulations in 2007 (Davies
et al. 2015). However, the treatment of health as a ‘low politics’ priority at
the international level remained the case through most of the formative
years of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fidler
1999). This was in spite of its great strategic benefit for colonial era
expansion, winning wars and rapid industrialisation (Diamond 1997).
In contemporary politics, a range of actors – such as foreign governments,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pharmaceutical companies,
private donors, and international organisations – drive a variety of different
health agendas that influence priorities within individual states and affect the
resources that are available to individual health workers and opportunities
for patients (Youde 2012). Likewise, the post–Second World War Bretton
Woods system had a profound influence upon health-care policy and prac-
tice around the world, with key lending institutions like the World Bank
promoting particular health-care systems and policies in their lending pro-
grammes (Sridhar 2012). In this period, key discourses such as ‘Health for
All’, the Essential Medicines List, and Right to Health emerged in the
absence of linkage to security. These discourses brought in a range of actors
including international organisations, NGOs and transnational corporations
with the power to shape health opportunities and outcomes within and
amongst states (Gagnon and Labonté 2011). In the 1990s, however, for-
eign and defence ministries became increasingly interested in global health
policy – particularly infectious diseases – which would be referred to as
having a ‘securitising’ effect on health (McInnes and Lee 2006).
256 S.E. DAVIES

During the 1990s, key events combined with a paradigm shift in

International Relations (IR) and security studies (particularly in Western
developed countries with the end of the Cold War) (Paris 2001) to
connect security to health (Enemark 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008).
Acute awareness was growing amongst Western states that they were not
immune to health events such as infectious disease outbreaks. The out-
break and spread of HIV across developing and developed countries
during the 1980s; fear of biosecurity attacks with the breakdown of
security in laboratories across the former Soviet Union (Koblentz 2010);
sudden outbreak of the plague in India in 1995 and the arrival of West
Nile virus near New York City in 1999; and the return of ‘slow-burn’
diseases thought eradicated such as Tuberculosis (TB), measles and
meningitis in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (Price-
Smith 2002). As well, new strains of disease, such as haemorrhagic dengue
fever and drug-resistant malaria were on the rise due to significant climate
change impact in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Pacific (Kim and
Schneider 2013).
Andrew Price-Smith argues that prior to President Clinton’s appoint-
ment of the National Science Council on Emerging and Re-Emerging
Infectious Diseases in 1995, developed states had grown complacent to
the fact that ‘despite their enormous technological and economic power, it
is extremely unlikely that developed countries will be able to remain an
island of health in a global sea of disease’ (2002: 122). Clinton’s move
created a wave of interest in other developed countries, particularly the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all shifting to appreciate and
contextualise health threats in foreign policy terms (McInnes and Lee
2012: 32). Until then, on the rare occasion that health policy was dis-
cussed at the international level it was in relation to (mostly) infectious
disease outbreaks such as plague and cholera, or large-scale efforts such as
the mass immunisation programme led by WHO to eradicate smallpox.
During infectious disease outbreaks, emphasis had been squarely placed
on the responsibility of the host state and regardless of the capacity of its
public health system to effectively respond (Fidler 1999).
Meanwhile, the spread and scale of HIV/AIDS raised fears about its
potential to threaten state cohesion and national economies. There was a
particular focus on military forces being at risk of HIV infection, and the
political insecurity these infectious could bring in societies (Singer 2002;
Elbe 2006). The apparent potential for HIV/AIDS to cause state collapse
or serious disruption that could ricochet throughout neighbouring states
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 257

was considered a realistic scenario in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as some

parts of South and East Asia and the Pacific (Shisana et al. 2003; Ramiah
2006; Price-Smith et al. 2007). It was specific reference to the threat of
HIV/AIDs on peacekeepers that led to the first resolution on health,
Resolution 1308, being passed in the UN Security Council in 2000
(UNSC 2000).
In response to these developments, a host of analysts, including
Solomon Benatar (1998, 2002), Peter W. Singer (2002), Robert
Ostergard (2002), called for IR to engage with the economic, humanitar-
ian, political, and security ramifications of the AIDS epidemic. At the same
time, David Fidler and Andrew Price-Smith called for equal attention to
the economic, political, and social insecurity that stems from a range of
infectious diseases already prevalent in countries (Fidler 2003; Price-Smith
2002). Using quantitative analysis of the relationship between infectious
diseases and state capacity, Price-Smith claimed that ‘infectious disease
[already] constitutes a verifiable threat to national security and state
power’ (Price-Smith 2002: 19). Health security, Price-Smith (2002: 9)
argued, referred to the threat of the disease on particular populations as
well as the country’s economic and political stability becoming unsustain-
able as a result of a pathogen wiping out the core population base. While a
disease may have a different impact in different states:

[I]ncreasing levels of disease correlate with a decline in state capacity. As

state capacity declines and as pathogen-induced deprivation and increasing
demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant increase in the
incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. State failure fre-
quently produces chaos in affected regions as neighbouring states seal their
borders to prevent the massive influx of disease-infected refugee popula-
tions. Adjacent states may also seek to fill the power vacuum and may seize
valued territory from the collapsing state, prompting other proximate states
to do the same and so exacerbating regional security dilemmas. (Price-Smith
2002: 15)

In a similar vein, David Fidler’s seminal 1999 book International Law and
Infectious Diseases argued that with the increased risk of drug-resistant
microbes in the twenty first century, as identified by public health officials
(Institute of Medicine 1992; Heymann 1996), it will become important
to ‘understand the international politics of infectious disease control, or
microbialpolitik’ (Fidler 1999: 19). Microbialpolitik, argued Fidler, was
258 S.E. DAVIES

‘wrapped up not only in traditional concerns such as sovereignty and

power but also in the implementation of scientifically sound infectious
disease policies at the national and international levels’ (ibid.).
Both Fidler and Price-Smith argued that the risk of newly emerged
infectious diseases and drug-resistant infectious diseases required that all
governments engage with the problem as if they were threats to national
security. Likewise, Laurie Garrett argued in 2001 that ‘a sound public
health system, it seems, is vital to societal stability and, conversely, may
topple in the face of political or social stability or whim. Each affects the
other: widespread political disorder or anti-governmentalism may weaken
a public health system, and a crisis in the health of the citizens can bring
down a government’ (Garrett 2001: 5).
These ideas continued to influence the global politics of health into the
twenty-first century (Fidler 2009; Davies 2012). In a 2010 study on the
influence of global health on foreign policy, Feldbaum and his colleagues
found that most discussion and policy from diplomatic engagement
focused on the interplay of national interests and security, which meant
that most diplomacy focus and discussion was on the containment of
infectious diseases (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). At the time, WHO also
immersed itself in the health security argument:

Collaboration between Member States, especially between developed and

developing countries, to ensure the availability of technical and other
resources is a crucial factor not only in implementing the [International
Health] Regulations, but also in building and strengthening public health
capacity and the networks and systems that strengthen global public health
security will. (WHO 2007: 13)

Of course, health diplomacy refers to the pursuit of international health

cooperation on matters of concern to states (Kickbusch et al. 2007). It is
the amalgam of cooperation in areas where there is the possibility of
genuine technical cooperation for a diverse range of diseases (Youde
2012: 25). However, because health diplomacy involves the interplay of
national interests, power and diplomatic compromise, ‘state interests have
been critical to either the success or obstruction of such agreements . . . and
issues of national security remain atop the foreign-policy hierarchy’
(Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87).
The counter-narrative to the health security discourse described above
is that the securitisation of health promotes an instrumental pursuit of
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 259

health. To capture foreign policy interest and engagement, global health

discussions produce a ‘hierarchy of illnesses’ whereby some health issues
receive interest and resources whilst other equally deadly health matters do
not (Youde 2012: 160). Jeremy Shiffman’s (2006: 411–420) work on the
peaks and troughs of investment in global health initiatives has revealed
that despite disease burden to a population, some infectious diseases (i.e.
HIV/AIDS) consistently attract stronger short-term investment from
donor states – primarily those that are contagious or linked to the national
security interests of donor states. However, it would be a mistake to
assume that the threat of infectious disease alone encapsulated all diplo-
matic engagement with health issues at the turn of the twenty-first
century.
The rise of non-traditional security has also been attributed to the
increased influence of the introduction of different social science methods
and theories to International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009:
188). This has influenced research into the subject matter of security
studies and IR. If insecurity and grievances amongst the population played
a large part in the civil wars that gripped the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin
2003), engagement with health is not just a security concern for devel-
oped states but also for developing states. In other words, appreciations of
health security were not one-dimensional. It was possible to advocate for a
vision of health security that sought to protect individuals as much states.
Indeed, a human centred appreciation of security – coined ‘human secur-
ity’ by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Human Development Report (see MacFarlane and Khong 2006) – sought
to redefine the ‘traditional’ security with issues and concepts under the
umbrella term ‘non-traditional’ security, including health (Chalk 2006).
Thus, there does appear to be a significant relationship between inter-
national health events and the direction of research and policy engagement
(Davies 2012). In the last decade, events such as the United Nations
Security Resolution on HIV/AIDS (S/Res/1308) and SARS create an
explosion of IR engagement with global health governance, particularly in
the area of health security. This ‘phenomenon’ has been witnessed again
with the Ebola outbreak (Youde 2014). Amongst all these engagements,
two key approaches have emerged. First, those who accept the inevitability
of a ‘narrow’ approach to health and IR, focused on infectious diseases and
bioterrorism as security threats (Koblentz 2012). Alternatively, there are
those who articulate a broader vision related to development, state capa-
city, and cross-national health issues (Shiffman 2006; Nunes 2014;
260 S.E. DAVIES

Rushton and Williams 2012). One of the central claims of the former
approach is that health securitisation is an effective way of galvanising
diplomatic engagement amongst states and other actors, resulting in the
allocation of political will and material resources (Collier and Lakoff 2008;
Elbe 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2013).
In the next part of the chapter I examine this core assumption. In
particular, I explore whether the effectiveness of health initiatives is tied
to their securitisation, focusing on the examples of two major health
initiatives. I examine the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and the GAVI.
Interest in these two cases comes from exploring the above presumption
that security and health, particularly concerning infectious diseases, drives,
and delivers policy momentum. While there is debate about whether that
momentum translates into ‘real’ policy progress or whether it is mere
rhetoric deployed at particular crises/events with no lasting impact, there
is no debate that health security has dominated global health and foreign
policy discourse (Feldbaum et al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013).
Below, I briefly examine the dominance of health security in successful
global health initiatives – one where you would expect it to be deliberately
deployed (GAVI) and one where it was not (TFI). TFI and GAVI, I
contend, are interesting cases precisely because they confound the issue-
framing conventions about the relationship between health and security.

CONFOUNDING EXPECTATIONS
A global health initiative is defined in this chapter as ‘an emerging and
global trend in health. They are usually focused on state, international
organisation and public–private partnerships. Global initiatives typically
target specific diseases and are supposed to bring additional resources to
health efforts’ (WHO 2015).

Case Selection and Discourse Analysis

This section briefly compares two international health initiatives: the TFI
and GAVI. The TFI sought to reach an international agreement under
international law that countries would adopt to regulate the sale and
production of tobacco. This global health initiative was in aid of prevent-
ing the unchecked rise of tobacco related illnesses – non-communicable
diseases – including cancer (various), emphysema, heart disease, stroke,
and diabetes (to name a few). In the case of the TFI, and in light of the
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 261

literature discussion concerning health security above, it would be expected

that there was little to no presence of security discourse in the early days of
this initiative. It was (and is) about introducing tobacco control legislation,
addressing unregulated sale and distribution of tobacco to address preven-
table tobacco-related diseases in young populations in already over-bur-
dened public health-care systems (Roemer et al. 2005). In contrast, the
GAVI is a public and private partnership between states, international
organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and philanthropic donors that
sought cooperation amongst this diverse group of actors to manufacture,
purchase and deliver life-saving vaccines against deadly infectious diseases
in the most remote, dangerous and impoverished locations around the
world. GAVI is, ostensibly, the initiative where it would be expected to
see initial employment of ‘security’ rhetoric given it is addressing the
health insecurity of under five children in need of vaccination from,
mostly, contagious infectious diseases. In fact, the immediate previous
iteration of GAVI – the Child Vaccination Initiative – used security type
discourse such as ‘mission’, ‘operation’, and ‘threat’’ under the steerage
of a former US defence army medic (see Muraskin 2002).
These cases were also selected because they shared some important
features. Both the TFI and the GAVI are concerned with one specific
health concern – tobacco and immunisation; both were launched within a
similar time where health security discourse was gaining policy attention;
both initiatives required the involvement of multiple stakeholders, includ-
ing national governments, to enjoy success. The main difference, of inter-
est to this chapter, is that the association of security with the health issue
confound the type of cases analysed to date in the IR literature on global
health security. I reveal below that the non-communicable, ‘slow moving’
health threat engaged more securitised discourse than the high morbidity
communicable health threat.

Non-contagious securitised Contagious non-securitised

Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) Global Alliance for Vaccines and

– UN and select states, 1998 Immunization (GAVI)
– Non-communicable diseases from – UN and private partnership, 2001
tobacco use – Contagious childhood diseases

The comparison of the two cases was organised around a common

framework involving three steps.
262 S.E. DAVIES

First, understanding the rhetoric and concepts used to frame the initia-
tive. Each initiative has produced a significant volume of material outlining
its purpose, scope and mandate. For the purposes of this chapter, I focused
on the ‘founding’ document for each initiative. In the case of TFI, the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the World
Health Assembly in 2003, 8 years after the Convention was first proposed
in the 1995 World Health Assembly. The Framework Convention was the
outcome of the TFI and details ‘a regulatory strategy to address addictive
substances; in contrast to previous drug control treaties, the WHO
Framework Convention asserts the importance of demand reduction stra-
tegies as well as supply issues’ (WHO 2003). Included in the Framework
Convention document analysed is an Annex 2, which details the history of
drafting the Framework from 1995 to 2003. For GAVI, the document
analysed is the GAVI Meeting of the Proto-Board in Seattle, July 1999.
This document details GAVI’s terms of reference, mission, objectives,
functions, structure, milestones, and budget priorities.
An interest in the discourse used in the founding document of each
initiative is informed by the premise outlined in the above literature – to
what extent security frames were employed to justify, conceptualise, and
operationalise these two global health initiatives which remain, success-
fully, in place today.
Second, once accepting the premise that securitisation is deliberately
engaged the two documents were analysed to identify a set of ‘bench-
marks’ to guide its assessment of the extent to which a health initiative has
aligned with security. Both documents were examined in detail for the
presence of ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) – the initiative itself or actors
associated with the initiative identified an existential threat or risk and
speech acts that called for the adoption of extraordinary measures. Was the
initiative itself referred to as ‘security’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’. Who was the
‘referent object’ identified – the group threatened; who was the functional
actor capable of protecting the referent object from the identified threat
(Buzan et al. 1998: 26–39); and what was the ‘scale’ of securitisation
utitlised to emphasise the need for extraordinary measures (Buzan and
Weaver 2009).
Third, discourse analysis (Hansen 2012). In this case, the discourse
within the two documents were analysed using NVivo Software. For the
purposes of this chapter, I refer to three query searches conducted to
analyse the perspectives being presented in the two documents concerning
the threat the initiative is addressing, who the initiative is ‘protecting’ and
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 263

who is responsible for such protection. To facilitate answering these three

levels of inquiry, three query searches within NVivo of each document
were conducted: (1) word frequency analysis, (2) text search of ‘security’
terms and, and (3) text search of ‘other’ normative terms (development,
rights, economy). A word tree was then developed for the second and
third text searches with a ‘in context’ search up to ten surrounding words
(on either side) to enable understanding of the context and usage of the
key words, i.e. ‘threat’ or ‘poor’ being searched in the document. The
word frequency search assisted with identifying the primary actors dis-
cussed in the documents – i.e. who was identified as the referent actor
intended for that initiative versus the functional actor necessary to give
effect to the initiative.

Findings
Discourse analysis of the TFI and GAVI documents produced three key
findings. The first, unexpected, find was that the TFI initiative was
framed just as much in security terms as was GAVI. The number of
securitisation ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) searched and located in the
Framework Convention was practically the same at GAVI – 0.08% and
0.07%, respectively (speech act terms: secure, threat, risk, mission, extra-
ordinary, urgent). In both cases, the presence of security language was
less than 1% of each document. What was significant was that in the
search for ‘other’ normative terms (terms: responsible, rights, develop,
needs, poor) – the Framework Convention was comparatively high at
1.05%, and a similar search for GAVI came at 0.4% references. However,
given the Framework Convention is a legal document the presence of
‘right/rights’ partly accounts for high percentage compared to GAVI.
Contextual analysis of these terms reveals further detail in how the
documents framed the problem, the referent actor and the functional
actor (see Table 14.1).
In the Framework Convention – despite higher use of ‘other’ (non-
security) normative language than GAVI – there is a clear disposition
towards identifying the state as the ‘functional’ actor responsible for taking
measures necessary to protect the population from tobacco sale, use, and
morbidity. The Convention directly refers to populations at risk (women
and minors) and the need for member states to support civil society
capacity to inform and educate tobacco awareness in these populations.
Again, this is a legal instrument so the emphasis on member states is not
264 S.E. DAVIES

Table 14.1 Word tree results from ‘Security’ and ‘Other Normative’ word
searches in GAVI and TFI founding documents
Security terms Other normative terms

GAVI – Mission Responsible

Establishment – meet rights of the child – the Task force
Meeting
Secure Poor
– commitment from Board – priority population
– disease burden
Needs
– of the institution
Develop
– partnerships
– alliances
– the health sector
TFI – Framework Secure Rights
Convention – regime (for the – of people
Convention) and mandate – of sovereign to protect
– members states uphold and
investigate
Threat Need
– addictive – to prevent (addiction),
– mortality prioritise (control), and protect
– danger (population)
Extraordinary Development
– institutional cooperation – institutional
– civil capacity to implement
convention
Risks Responsibility
– the health of individuals – member states
– addictive substance
– public awareness
Secured Needs
– financial – individuals, particularly women
and children

surprising as they are the only signatories. However, even in ‘other

normative’ references to rights, responsibilities and need – primary empha-
sis remains on the state as the functional actor protects the population
at risk of addiction rather than alternative dominant frames such as the
right to health, the right to information. The Framework Convention
leans towards more ‘traditional’ security language in conceptualising the
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 265

state–individual relationship concerning tobacco control: risk and risk

mitigation; threat and protection.
In the case of GAVI, the 0.07% security references in contrast with
its 0.4% ‘other’ references hints at a different frame being brought to
this initiative. However, it is not particularly clear until, again, the
broader context of these terms is analysed. In the case of GAVI the
focus is overwhelming on the ‘mission’ of the alliance and ensuring
institutional clarity to support the primary focus – the right of the child
to immunisation. This is clearly stated as seen above, particularly in the
mission and responsibility statements (Table 14.1). The only time the
roles of functional actors are associated with either security or other
terms are in the context of securing commitment from actors (broad
range of board membership from states to international organisations,
pharmaceutical companies, and civil society), and development of
health sector capacity.
Despite GAVI addressing the containment of infectious disease, there
is no threat language present. Securitised speech acts are practically
absent – even when ‘security’ terms are located. The emphasis is over-
whelming on rights and alleviating deprivation. Both initiatives con-
found the expectations prior to analysis – the infectious disease focused
initiative is ‘under-securitised’ in comparison to the non-communicable
focused initiative.
Finally, hinted at above, the emphasis on primary actors in these two
documents revealed key similarities – both focus on the institutional
arrangements and the actors most closely associated with these arrange-
ments. In the case of GAVI the board (comprised of international
organisation, civil society, member states, pharmaceutical, and philan-
thropic members) is the primary functional actor; in the case of the TFI,
the actor that looms largest is the organisation (namely, WHO) followed
by signatory states to the Convention. Discussion about the population
who are to benefit and arguably be empowered from these initiatives, is
not discussed as much as the organisation and accordingly the imple-
mentation arrangements around the initiative itself. To some extent,
given the nature of these two documents, this is not surprising.
However, its presence in two documents for two very different initiatives
may reveal that the pathology of organisations rather than the framing of
an initiative requires further study when engaging with the comparative
success and failure of global health diplomacy (Barnett and Finnemore
2003; Hanrieder 2015).
266 S.E. DAVIES

CONCLUSION
What is the value of securitisation when it comes to building and sustain-
ing global political interest in health issues? Some contend that global
health security has not run its course and continues to have utility in
building state interest, particularly the resources of foreign affairs and
defence departments, to secure global health diplomacy objectives
(Kickbusch et al. 2007; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Elbe 2011). Others
contend it is a ‘smokescreen’ that captures short bursts of attention
that are episodic and may have immediate impact but no essential ‘follow
through’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013). In this chapter, I explored how
global health initiatives securitise and what becomes of them. I deliber-
ately chose two successful initiatives with the expectation that one had
securitised a conventional health issue – vaccine preventable infectious
diseases – and one had not – tobacco regulation. In examining the cases
of TFI and GAVI, I looked at their core document: their mission and
value statements reflected in, respectively, the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control and the first meeting documents of GAVI. Speech
acts, identified as the hallmark of securitising moves, were analysed in
both documents and contrasted with ‘non-securitisation’ or ‘other nor-
mative’ language.
The Framework Convention engaged in more securitising language or
‘speech acts’ compared to GAVI but both contained more references to
human rights and responsibilities discourse. In neither case did it appear as
if actors had taken a conscious decision to securitise the issue any more
than they chose to articulate the issue in terms of human rights obligations.
In the case of the Framework Convention where a focus on security was
expected and to a greater extent seen here was an equally strong presence
of human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ language. The security
discourse may have helped capture attention but it was not the only
discursive tool at play and neither did it obviously displace other discourses.
In the case of GAVI, the initiative identified its primary mission as fulfilling
the rights of the child; whereas for TFI, emphasis was member states
fulfilling their responsibility to address the threat of tobacco related illness
from tobacco usage. GAVI appears to have a single referent – the right of
the child to health via immunisation; while TFI related to a multitude of
actors. The operationalisation of the initiative(s) and their embeddedness
in global health architecture dominated the discussion far more than the
framing language. Framing language constituted a relatively small part
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 267

of the discourse compared to the consuming discussion of institutional

design. What this comparison of two global health initiatives reveals is that
whilst security discourse might help capture the attention of states, it has
not necessarily overtaken other policy frames such as human rights and
‘sovereignty as responsibility language’. Indeed, the key priority seems to
be not whether the international community should be engaged with these
issues, but the appropriate institutional design for initiatives to achieve
these health goals.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aginam, O. (2004). Between isolationism and mutual vulnerability: A south-north
perspective on global governance of epidemics in an age of globalization.
Temple Law Review, 77(3), 297–312.
Aldis, W. (2008). Health security as a public health concept: A critical analysis.
Health Policy and Planning, 23(6), 369–375.
Baringer, L., & Heitkamp, S. (2011). securitizing global health: a view from
maternal health. Global Health Governance, 4(2), published online http://
www.ghgj.org/Baringer&Heitkamp.pdf.
Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2003). Pathology of international organizations.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Benatar, S. R. (1998). Global disparities in health and human rights. American
Journal of Public Health, 88, 295–300.
Benatar, S. R. (2001). South Africa’s transition in a globalizing world: HIV/AIDS
as a window and as a mirror. International Affairs, 77(2), 347–375.
Benatar, S. R. (2002). The HIV/AIDS pandemic: A sign of instability in a
complex global system. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 27, 163–177.
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). The evolution of international security studies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, B., & Weaver, O. (2009). Macrosecuritisation and security constellations:
Reconsidering scale in securitisation theory. Review of International Studies,
35(2), 253–276.
Buzan, B., Weaver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for
analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Chalk, P. (2006). Disease and the complex processes of securitization in the Asia-
Pacific. In M. Caballero-Anthony, R. Emmers, & A. Acharya (eds.), Non-
Traditional security in Asia: Dilemmas in securitization. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Collier, S. J., & Lakoff, A. (2008). The Problem of securing health. In A. Lakoff &
S. J. Collier (eds.), Biosecurity interventions: Global health and security in
question. New York: Columbia University Press.
268 S.E. DAVIES

Compton, R. (2007). Dynamics of HIV/AIDS in China and India: Assessing

governmental response. In R. L. Ostergard Jr (ed.), HIV/AIDS and the Threat
to National and international security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Davies, S. E. (2010). What contribution can International Relations make to
the evolving global public health agenda? International Affairs, 86(5), 1167–1190.
Davies, S. E. (2012). Health among Nations: Is there a place for health in
international relations? International Political Sociology, 6(3), 316–320.
Davies, S. E., Kamradt-Scott, A., & Rushton, S. (2015). Disease diplomacy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, germs, and steel: The fates of human societies. New York:
Viking Press.
Elbe, S. (2006). Should HIV/AIDS Be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking
HIV/AIDS and security. International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 119–144.
Elbe, S. (2010). Haggling over viruses: The downside risks of securitizing infec-
tious disease. Health Policy and Planning, 25(6), 476–485.
Elbe, S. (2011). Should health professionals play the global health security card?
Lancet, 378(9787), 220–221.
Enemark, C. (2007). Disease and Security: Natural plagues and biological weapons
in East Asia. London: Routledge.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D.D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war.
American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90.
Feldbaum, H., Lee, K., & Michaud, J. (2010). Global health and foreign policy.
Epidemiologic Reviews, 32(1), 82–92.
Fidler, D. P. (1999). International Law and international diseases. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Fidler, D. P. (2003). Emerging trends in international law concerning global
infectious disease control. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 9(3), 285–290.
Fidler, D. P. (2009). After the revolution: Global health politics in a time of
economic crisis and threatening future trends. Global Health Governance,
2(2) 2009, 1–21.
Fidler, D. P. (2010). The challenges of global health governance. New York: Council
on Foreign Relations. Available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper4_GlobalHealth.pdf.
Fidler, D. P., & Gostin, L. O. (2008). Biosecurity in the global age: Biological
weapons, public health and the rule of law. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political
change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917.
Gagnon, M. L., & Labonté, R. (2011). human rights in global health diplomacy:
A critical assessment. Journal of Human Rights, 10(2), 189–213.
Garret, L. (1996). The return of infectious disease. Foreign Affairs, 75(1), 66–79.
Garrett, L. (2001). Betrayal of Trust: The collapse of global public health. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 269

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (1999) Meeting of the Proto-
Board, Seattle Washington, 12–13 July. On file with author.
Gregory D. Koblentz. (2010). Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological
Threats and Responses, International Security, 34(4), 96–132.
Grepin, K. A., Leach-Kemon, K., Schneider, M., & Sridhar, D. (2011). How to do
(or not to do): Tracking data on development assistance for health. Health
Policy & Planning, 26(7), 527–534.
Hafner, T., & Shiffman, J. (2013). The emergence of global attention to health
systems strengthening. Health Policy and Planning, 28(1), 41–50.
Hanrieder, T. (2015). The path dependent design of international organizations:
Federalism in the World Health Organization. European Journal of
International Relations, 21(1), 215–239.
Hanrieder, T., & Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2014). WHO decides on the exception?
Securitization and emergency governance in global health. Security Dialogue,
45, 331–348.
Hansen, L. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation: The normative-political in
the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. Review of
International Studies, 38(3), 525–546.
Heymann, D. L. (1996). Controlling epidemic diseases. World Health, 6, 9–10.
Hoffman, S. J. (2010). The evolution, etiology and eventualities of the global
health security regime. Health Policy and Planning, 25(6), 510–522.
Horton, R. (2012). GBD 2010: Understanding disease, injury, and risk. The
Lancet, 380(9859), 2053.
Institute of Medicine. (1992). Emerging Infections: Microbial threats to health in
the United States. Washington: National Academies Press.
Kickbusch, I., Novotny, T. E., Drager, N., Silberschmidt, G., & Alcazar, S.
(2007). Global health diplomacy: Training across disciplines. Bulletin of the
World Health Organisation, 85(12), 971–973.
Kim, Y., & Schneider, K. A. (2013). Evolution of drug resistance in Malaria
parasite populations. Nature Education Knowledge, 4(8), 6.
Koblentz, G. D. (2012). From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administra-
tion’s strategy for countering biological threats. International Affairs, 88:
131–148. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01061.x
Macfarlane, S. N., and Khong, Y. F. (2006). Human security and the UN:
A critical history. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Mackowiak, P. A., & Sehdev, P. S. (2002). The origin of quarantine. Clinical
Infectious Diseases, 35(9), 1071–1072.
McInnes, C., & Rushton, S. (2013). HIV/AIDS and securitization theory.
European Journal of International Relations, 19(1), 115–138.
McInnes, C. J. (2015). WHO’s next? Changing authority in global health govern-
ance after Ebola. International Affairs, 91(6), 1299–1316.
270 S.E. DAVIES

McInnes, C. J., & Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of
International Studies, 32(1), 5–23.
McInnes, C., & Lee, K. (2012). Global health and international relations.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Muraskin, W. A. (2002). The last years of the CVI and the Birth of the GAVI. In
M. Reich (Ed.), Public-private partnerships for public health. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Series on Population and International Health.
Nunes, J. (2014). Questioning health security: Insecurity and domination in world
politics. Review of International Studies, 40(5), 939–960.
Ostergard, R. L. (2002). Politics in the hot zone: AIDS and the threat to Africa’s
security. Third World Quarterly, 23(2), 333–350.
Panel of independent experts (2015) Final report of the Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel, July. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/ebola/ebola-panel-report/en/
Paris, R. (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? International
Security, 26(2), 87–102.
Pirages, D. (1997). Ecological theory and international relations. International
Journal of Global Legal Studies, 5, 53.
Price-Smith, A. (2009). Contagion and chaos: Disease, ecology and National
Security in the era of globalization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Price-Smith, A. T. (2001). Introduction. In A. T. Price-Smith (Ed.), Plagues and
politics: Infectious disease and international policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Price-Smith, A. T. (2002). The health of nations: Infectious disease, environmental
change, and their effects on national security and development. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Price-Smith, A. T., Tubin, M., & Ostergard, R. L. Jr (2007). The decay of state
capacity: HIV/AIDS and South Africa’s National Security. In R. L. Ostergard
Jr (ed.), HIV/AIDS and the threat to national and international security.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ramiah, I. (2006). Securitizing the AIDS Issue in Asia. In M. Caballero-Anthony &
A. Acharya (eds.), Non-Traditional security in Asia: Dilemmas in securitization.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Roemer, R., Taylor, A., & Lariviere, J. (2005). Origins of the WHO framework
convention on tobacco control. American Journal of Public Health, 95(6),
936–938. http://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2003.025908
Ruggie, J. G. (1998). What makes the world Hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and
the social constructivist challenge. International Organization, 52(4), 855–885.
Rushton, S., & Williams, O. D. (2012). Frames, paradigms and power: Global
health policy-making under neoliberalism. Global Society, 26(2), 147–167.
Shiffman, J. (2006). Donor funding priorities for communicable disease control in
the developing world. Health Policy and Planning, 21(6), 411–420.
 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 271

Shisana, O., Zungu-Dirwayi, N., & Shisana, W. (2003). AIDS: A threat to human
security. In L. Chen, J. Leaning, & V. Narasimhan (eds.), Global health
challenges for human Security. Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative, Asia
Center and Harvard University Press.
Singer, P. W. (2002). AIDS and International Security. Survival, 44(1),
145–158.
Sridhar, D. (2012). Who sets the global health research agenda: The challenge of
multi-bi financing. PLoS Medicine, 9(9), published online http://www.plosme
dicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001312.
United Nations General Assembly (2009) Global health and foreign policy,
A/63/33, 27 January. http://www.who.int/trade/events/UNGA_
RESOLUTION_GHFP_63_33.pdf
United Nations General Assembly (2012) Global health and foreign policy,
A/66/115, 24 February. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=A/RES/66/115
UN Security Council (2000). Resolution on the responsibility of the Security Council
in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and inter-
national peacekeeping operations. S/Res/1308, 17 July.
Walt, S. M. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. International Studies
Quarterly, 35(2), 211–239.
WHO (2003) Framework convention on tobacco control. Conference of the
Parties to the WHO FCTC. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
42811/1/9241591013.pdf
WHO. (2007). The world health report 2007: A safer future: Global public health
security in the 21st century. Geneva: World Health Organization.
World Health Organization (2015) Global health initiatives. Trade, foreign
policy, diplomacy and health http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/
story040/en/
Yach, D. (2005). Injecting greater urgency into global tobacco control. Tobacco
Control, 14(3), 145–148.
Youde, J. (2005). Enter the fourth Horseman: Health security and international
relations theory. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,
6(1), 193–208.
Youde, J. (2012). Global health governance. Cambridge: Polity.
Youde, J. (2014) The Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,
E-International Relations, 26 July. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/26/the-
ebola-outbreak-in-guinea-liberia-and-sierra-leone/

Sara E. Davies is Associate Professor of International Relations and Australian

Research Council Future Fellow at Griffith University, Australia. She is author of
“Disease Diplomacy” (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015) (with Adam
272 S.E. DAVIES

Kamrandt-Scott and Simon Rushton), “Global Politics of Health” (Cambridge:

Polity Press, 2010) and “Legitimising Rejection: International Refugee Law in
South East Asia” (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), and four edited books. She has
published a number of articles in internationally recognised journals such as
International Affairs, Security Dialogue, International Journal of Refugee Law,
International Relations of Asia Pacific and Australian Journal of International
Affairs. Sara is the founding co-editor of Global Responsibility to Protect.
 CHAPTER 15

The International Governance

of Forced Migration

Savitri Taylor

The international regime intended to cater for the protection needs

of forced migrants is the refugee regime. This chapter deals with the
set of treaties, declarations, resolutions, institutions, etc., which together
constitute the international refugee regime. As the first section explains,
there is not a single element of the regime that is truly worldwide in its
application let alone its implementation. Moreover, there is one respect in
which the regime is seriously underdeveloped and that is in its ability to
provide durable solutions for refugees. The second section of the chapter
demonstrates the weaknesses of the current architecture through a discus-
sion of the response to two forced migration crises which occurred in two
different regions of the world in 2015: Asia and Europe. The third section,
considers the way forward keeping in mind that the international refugee
regime does not exist in isolation but rather overlaps with other interna-
tional regimes.

This chapter was written while the author was an academic visitor at the
Melbourne Social Equity Institute, University of Melbourne. Its content was
current as at 28 September 2015.

S. Taylor (*)
La Trobe University Law School, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: S.Taylor@latrobe.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 273

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_15
274 S. TAYLOR

THE CURRENT GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE

International Architecture
Central to the international refugee regime are the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (1951) with 145 states parties and the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) with 146 states parties. Most of
the non-parties are concentrated in Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East.
The Refugee Convention article IA(2) (as modified by Refugee Protocol
article I(2)) defines a ‘refugee’ as any person who

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.

However, this already narrow definition is subject to exclusions covering

those who have nationality rights in a non-persecuting state (Art. 1E), fall
within the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (Art. 1D), are consid-
ered no longer to be in need of international protection (Art. 1C), or are
considered undeserving of international protection (Art. 1F).
States parties to the Refugee Convention (and Protocol) are prohibited
from sending a ‘refugee’ directly or indirectly to a place where they would
face a real chance of persecution unless limited national interest exceptions
can be invoked (Art. 33). States parties are also obliged to accord refugees
certain other rights relating to employment, welfare, and so on. However,
many of these other rights are stated in relative terms (e.g. equal to
nationals, equal to other aliens) and their applicability depends on the
refugee’s level of attachment to the state party (i.e. whether they are
‘lawfully in’ the state’s territory, ‘lawfully staying in’ the state’s territory
etc.). For example, Article 17(1) provides:

The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their

territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign
country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-
earning employment.
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 275

The other important element of the international refugee regime is the

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
UNHCR came into existence on 1 January 1951 (UN General Assembly
Resolution 319(IV), 3 December 1949). Its initial life span was 3 years
(Betts et al. 2012, p. 106). As things transpired, the UN General Assembly
kept extending the life of UNHCR usually for 5 years at a time, until it
finally resolved in 2003 that the Office would continue ‘until the
refugee problem is solved’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 58/153,
22 December 2003).
The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (1950) (UNHCR Statute) defines the category of people
falling within UNHCR’s mandate in roughly similar terms to
the Refugee Convention and Protocol. However, the UN General
Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council have kept extend-
ing UNHCR’s mandate through resolutions with the result that all
the following categories of people are now ‘persons of concern to
UNHCR’:

1. Refugees as defined in the UNHCR Statute, Refugee Convention, or

Refugee Protocol;
2. Any person ‘who is outside his/her country of origin or habitual
residence and is unable to return there because of serious and
indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting
from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public
order’ (UNHCR 2005, p. 61);
3. Asylum seekers, that is, individuals who are seeking international
protection (UNHCR 2005, p. 13);
4. Returnees, that is, ‘former refugees who return voluntarily to their
countries of origin’ (UNHCR 2005, p. 83);
5. Stateless persons as defined in the Convention relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons (1954); and
6. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as defined in the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement (1998).

At the end of 2014 there were 14.4 million refugees falling into categories
(1) and (2) and 1.8 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015c, p. 2) who
were registered with UNHCR worldwide.1 In addition, at the end of
2014, UNHCR had to contend with 126,823 returnees, 3.5 million
stateless people and 32,274,619 IDPs worldwide (UNHCR 2015c,
276 S. TAYLOR

p. 48). However, these last three categories of ‘persons of concern’ are

outside the scope of this chapter.
One of UNHCR’s functions is to supervise the implementation of
the Refugee Convention and Protocol (Refugee Convention Art. 35). The
UNHCR Statute (Art. 8a) anticipates UNHCR taking on this kind of
supervisory function and also sets out a long list of other ways in which
UNHCR is required to promote refugee protection. What was not
intended at the time its Statute was adopted was that UNHCR would
become an operational agency, but that is exactly what it has become as a
result of some states refusing to undertake any obligations to refugees and
many others shirking the obligations that they have undertaken. For
example, UNHCR now manages refugee camps, provides material assis-
tance to refugees, and even makes refugee status determinations in
countries that do not have a status determination procedure of their
own (Betts et al. 2012, pp. 85–86). Unfortunately, states have not been
prepared to provide UNHCR with the resources needed to do all that it is
expected to do. In 2014, UNHCR managed to raise only 55 per cent of
its needs-based budget for that year (UNHCR 2015d, p. 132).
What refugees need above all else is a durable solution to their plight.
The international community’s preferred durable solution is voluntary
repatriation. However, the kinds of circumstances that cause people to
flee their country of origin usually are not resolved within a reasonable
timeframe. What most refugees need in order to have fulfilling lives,
therefore, is integration into the national community of the country of
initial refuge or resettlement in a third country. Unfortunately, states are
zealous in their insistence that they have a sovereign right to determine for
themselves the circumstances in which individuals who are not citizens by
birth will be allowed to become part of their national community. As a
result, states have not been prepared to accept strong legal obligations to
provide durable solutions for refugees.2 The upshot is that many refugees
end up being consigned to a permanent state of limbo. UNHCR has made
various attempts to nudge states towards filling in the missing part of the
international refugee regime. Thus far, it has met with little success, largely
because it has not been able to find a way of overcoming a standoff
between developed and developing countries.
At the end of 2014, 86 per cent of the world’s refugees were hosted by
developing countries (UNHCR 2015c, p. 2). This is because the main
refugee source countries are in the developing world and most asylum
seekers are unwilling or unable to travel very far afield in their search for
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 277

protection. One of the factors impeding asylum seeker mobility is the

erection by developed countries of physical and other barriers to entry.
Host states in the developing world take the position that they cannot
reasonably be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of
providing refugees with immediate protection let alone durable solutions
simply because they happen to be geographically proximate to refugee
source countries. In taking this position they are able to rely on a great
many General Assembly resolutions and the like which emphasise the need
for equitable burden sharing by states in a spirit of international coopera-
tion and solidarity (Taylor 2013). The problem is that developed countries
have thus far done no more than pay lip service to the principle of
equitable burden sharing. The financial support they provide to develop-
ing countries both directly and through international organisations such as
UNHCR is inadequate; so too are the number of refugee resettlement
places they provide. Twenty-nine countries worldwide now have regular
resettlement programs and some others provide resettlement places on an
ad hoc basis (UNHCR 2015e). However, projected resettlement need
(estimated to be 1,150,000 places in 2016) vastly outstrips the total
number of resettlement places made available annually (UNHCR 2015e).

Regional Architecture
As well as the international architecture just canvassed, there also exists
regional architecture intended to cater for the protection needs of some
forced migrants. In Africa, 45 states have ratified the OAU Convention
governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa (1969) (OAU
Convention) which extends the definition of ‘refugee’ beyond the Refugee
Convention definition to cover also

every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign dom-

ination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole
of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality. (Art. 1(2))

As with the Refugee Convention definition, however, the extended OAU

Convention definition is subject to exclusions (Arts. I(3)–(5)).
The main obligation imposed by the OAU Convention is an obligation
of non-refoulement (Art. II(3)). States parties are also required to ‘use their
278 S. TAYLOR

best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive

refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-
founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin or nationality’ (Art. II(1)) but the reference to domestic legislation
hollows out what might otherwise have been characterised as a prima facie
right to asylum.
Finally, the OAU Convention provides (Art. II(4)):

Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to

refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States
and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of
African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures
to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.

This provision does not seem to have been much used, however, probably
because most states parties face similar resource constraints (Okello 2014).
In Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees adopted
at a meeting of experts in 1984 has been a very influential document.
Although the Cartagena Declaration has no claim to being an interna-
tional legal instrument, 14 countries in the region have passed domestic
legislation adopting its refugee definition (Harley 2014, p. 24), which
extends beyond the Refugee Convention definition to cover also ‘persons
who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have
been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal con-
flicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order’.
Further, in November 2004, 20 Latin American countries adopted the
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action to Strengthen International
Protection of Refugees in Latin America (MPA) which sets out a frame-
work for improving refugee protection in the region including through
the establishment of a Regional Solidarity Resettlement Programme.
Although the MPA is not legally binding, it is being implemented
(Harley 2014).
Unlike the two regions discussed thus far, the Asia Pacific has very little
by way of regional refugee protection architecture. In 2001, the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Organization3 adopted the final text of the
legally non-binding Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of
Refugees. The Bangkok Principles’ definition of ‘refugee’ (Art. I) is very
similar to the OAU Convention definition. As well as a non-refoulement
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 279

provision (Art. II), the Principles contain an asylum provision (Art. III)
similar to that in the OAU Convention. Unlike the OAU Convention,
the Principles also contain a provision specifying minimum standards of
treatment of refugees (Art. IV). Finally, the Principles contain elaborate
provisions dealing with international cooperation (Art. VIII) and burden
sharing (Art. X). The Bangkok Principles were adopted with the aim of
influencing state practice. However, they have had no impact on state
practice to date (Taylor 2015).
In 2011, the 45 Bali Process countries adopted the legally non-binding
Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF). Although primarily a frame-
work for border control cooperation, the RCF does provide (Bali Process
Co-Chairs’ 2011, para. 16):

ii. Where appropriate and possible, asylum seekers should have access to
consistent assessment processes, whether through a set of harmonised
arrangements or through the possible establishment of regional assessment
arrangements, which might include a centre or centres, taking into account
any existing sub-regional arrangements.
iii. Persons found to be refugees under those assessment processes should be
provided with a durable solution, including voluntary repatriation, reset-
tlement within and outside the region and, where appropriate, possible ‘in
country’ solutions.

However, operationalisation of the RCF is left to ‘interested States

entering into practical bilateral or other sub-regional arrangements’
(Bali Process Co-Chairs’ 2011, para. 17). Thus far, Australia has pur-
ported to operationalise the RCF by entering into bilateral political
arrangements to transfer unauthorised maritime arrivals to Nauru and
Papua New Guinea for asylum claim processing and to resettle individuals
recognised as refugees from Nauru to Cambodia. None of these arrange-
ments improve refugee protection in the Asia Pacific region; in fact, the
reverse is true (Taylor 2015).
At the other end of the spectrum from the Asia Pacific, the prize for
the most developed regional refugee protection architecture goes to
Europe. The Common European Asylum System is set out in EU legal
instruments which override national law, though it should be noted that
the implementation track record of EU countries in this area is ‘poor’
(European Commission 2015a). The Asylum Procedures Directive
and Reception Conditions Directive harmonise asylum procedures and
280 S. TAYLOR

reception conditions respectively across the EU (except Denmark, Ireland,

and the United Kingdom); while the Qualifications Directive harmonises
protection eligibility criteria across the same countries. The Qualifications
Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU) provides not only for the protection
of individuals who are refugees within the meaning of the Refugee
Convention but also for the grant of ‘subsidiary protection’ to those who
face ‘a real risk of suffering serious harm’ if repatriated, including ‘as a
result of indiscriminate violence arising in situations of international or
internal armed conflict’. Finally, as between EU countries and the asso-
ciated Schengen states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland),
the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013) allocates
responsibility for determining protection claims, usually to the country
regarded as responsible for a claimant’s entry into the EU/Schengen
zone. However, it also allows the country in which the protection claim
was actually lodged to consider the claim itself or to send the claimant to a
‘safe third country’ outside the EU.
One respect in which some of the regional architecture just described
improves on the international architecture is in imposing legal obligations
on participating states to protect some forced migrants who fall outside
the very narrow Refugee Convention definition of ‘refugee’. However,
even they exclude from their scope many people who could fairly be
described as ‘forced migrants’, for example, those who have been forced
to move across international borders by environmental catastrophes.
Disappointingly, the regional architecture is, for the most part, no better
than the international architecture in providing durable solutions for
forced migrants.

A BROKEN SYSTEM
Let us now consider by way of example how the current governance
architecture handled forced migration crises which unfolded in Asia and
Europe in 2015.
In Asia, a sharp increase in the number of Rohingya, Bangladeshis, and
others engaging in irregular movement across the Indian Ocean
(UNHCR 2015a) was accompanied by reports that Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand were ‘pushing back’ or ‘helping on’ these people from their
shores. Thousands were left stranded at sea for lack of willing rescuers. By
mid-year, the death toll for 2015 was an estimated 370 people (UNHCR
2015a).
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 281

On 20 May 2015, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia,

and Thailand (all non-parties to the Refugee Convention and Protocol) met
in Malaysia to discuss the problem of irregular migrants stranded at sea
and subsequently issued a joint statement setting out agreed upon
‘interim measures’ for dealing with it. Among other things, Indonesia
and Malaysia indicated that they would provide ‘temporary shelter’ to the
estimated 7,000 stranded people, but they made it clear that they
expected the ‘international community [to] take responsibility for the
repatriation of the irregular migrants to their countries of origin or reset-
tlement to third countries within a period of one year’ (‘Fighting human
trafficking’ 2015).
On 29 May 2015, representatives from UNHCR, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and senior officials from 17 regional coun-
tries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, partici-
pated in a Special Meeting on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean
convened by the Thai government. The meeting resulted in ‘proposals and
recommendations’ for protection of people stranded at sea; prevention of
irregular migration and the smuggling and trafficking of people; and
addressing root causes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 2015). It
is worth noting, however, that according to an Australian official present
at the meeting, ‘[a]ll those who mentioned long-term settlement did
so for the purposes of indicating that this was not a durable solution for
the Rohingya problem and that it would constitute a pull factor’
(Goledzinowski 2015).
Finally, on 2 July 2015, an Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime Concerning Irregular Movement of Persons in
Southeast Asia announced a plan of action which included the establish-
ment of a voluntary contribution fund through which ASEAN and other
states could share the cost of humanitarian relief for irregular migrants
rescued at sea (UNHCR 2015a). It is unclear what, if any, contributions
have been made to the ASEAN fund, but, on 28 August 2015, UNHCR
reported that it had managed to raise only 20 per cent of the US$13
million it required for its own response to the crisis (UNHCR 2015a).
Meanwhile, in another part of the world, the Syrian conflict had
resulted in 3.88 million Syrians becoming refugees by the end of 2014
(UNHCR 2015c, p. 3). Most of the Syrian refugees were hosted by
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. At the end of 2014, Turkey was hosting
1.59 million refugees, Lebanon was hosting 1.15 million and Jordan
282 S. TAYLOR

654,100 (UNHCR 2015c, p. 2). While other countries provided huma-

nitarian aid to these countries of first asylum directly and through inter-
national organisations such as UNHCR, they did not provide enough
(European Commission 2015a). Unable to survive in their countries
of first asylum, Syrians and others had no option but to keep moving in
search of adequate protection.
In 2015, over 300,000 Syrians and others had crossed the
Mediterranean into Europe by the end of August, already far exceeding
the number that had made the same irregular journey in 2014 (UNHCR
2015b). During the same period, about 2,500 people were estimated to
have died making the attempt (UNHCR 2015b). Most who survived were
intent on moving over land to western and northern Europe. Various
European countries responded by building border fences, leading The
Economist to observe that, the Schengen Agreement on free movement
notwithstanding, ‘Europe will soon have more physical barriers at its
national borders than it did during the Cold War’ (‘More neighbours
make more fences’ 2015).
By April 2015, the EU had come to the conclusion that it needed a
European Agenda on Migration to deal with the problem comprehen-
sively. The European Commission was tasked with developing such an
agenda and also with making proposals for its implementation. The
Agenda presented by the European Commission (2015b) on 13 May
2015 had four pillars: reducing incentives for irregular migration by
addressing root causes, combatting people smuggling and returning irre-
gular movers; securing external borders, including through providing
incentives for North African countries to disrupt irregular movement;
strengthening asylum policy; and a new legal migration policy. The
European Commission (2015a) also proposed a first package of imple-
menting measures on 27 May and a second package on 9 September 2015.
The most internally divisive pillar of the European Agenda on
Migration has been the asylum policy pillar. At present, the Dublin
Regulation effectively requires the EU states which happen to be at the
frontline of irregular movement to bear most of the burden of processing
the protection claims of irregular movers and providing protection where
necessary. The European Commission has proposed that the Dublin
Regulation be revised to include a permanent mechanism for the equitable
redistribution of asylum seekers across the EU. In the meantime, it has
managed to procure two Council of Europe decisions providing for
the redistribution of asylum seekers among members states pursuant to
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 283

Article 78(3) of the Treaty for the Function of the EU which enables the
Council to adopt provisional measures for the benefit of member states
‘confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow
of nationals of third countries’. The first Council decision, adopted on
14 September 2015, provides for the relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers
from Italy and Greece to other EU states with distribution on the basis of
optional commitments by those other states (European Commission
2015c). The second Council decision, adopted by majority vote on
22 September 2015, provides for the relocation of an additional
120,000 asylum seekers over 2 years from Greece, Italy, and potentially
other similarly burdened EU states, across the rest of the EU. Unlike the
first decision, the second decision allocates a specified number of asylum
seekers to each EU state according to a distribution formula that is not set
out in the decision itself (European Commission 2015c). The Czech
Republic, Hungary (which had earlier refused an offer to be a beneficiary
of the relocation scheme), Romania, and Slovakia voted against the deci-
sion but are legally bound to take the asylum seeker quotas allocated to
them. Conversely, Denmark and Ireland, which along with the United
Kingdom have a legal entitlement to opt out, have opted into the scheme,
and the associated Schengen states of Norway and Switzerland will
be participating voluntarily (European Commission 2015c). What has
become very clear, however, is that a permanent EU mechanism for
equitable redistribution of asylum seekers is a long way off being achieved.
In terms of forced migration governance architecture, the Asia Pacific
and Europe are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Most Asia Pacific
countries have remained outside the international refugee regime and
there is no regional regime of which to speak. By contrast all European
countries except Andorra, Moldova, and San Marino are part of the
international refugee regime and the EU also has the most strongly
legalised and institutionalised regime of all regional refugee regimes.
Despite these differences both regions responded in a similar way to the
forced migration crises with which they were faced in 2015. In both
regions, states responded unilaterally in the first instance before attempt-
ing to seek a multilateral solution. In both regions, a multilateral solution
was pursued primarily at a regional rather than an international level. This
is not to say that extra-regional actors were unconcerned about the crises
or that regional actors did not envisage extra-regional actors playing a role
in a solution. What is meant rather is that in each situation regional actors
were prepared to solve the region’s problem by pushing it off to another
284 S. TAYLOR

part of the world. Finally, and most significantly, at both the national and
the regional level the states concerned prioritised defending their borders
against unauthorised incursion (i.e. prioritised national security broadly
conceived) over addressing the humanitarian plight of those moving.

THE WAY FORWARD

Political science scholars who specialise in forced migration issues take the
view that those seeking a way forward first need to understand that
the international/regional refugee regime is not a standalone governance
regime. There are multiple other supranational governance arrangements in
other subject matter domains which overlap and interact with the refugee
regime. These overlapping regimes include development regimes, humani-
tarian regimes, human rights regimes, labour migration regimes, security
regimes, and travel regimes (Betts et al. 2012, pp. 126–27). The scholars to
whom reference has just been made also point out that while some of the
other regimes in this regime complex are complementary to the refugee
regime, others undermine it.
The supranational regimes which tend to undermine the refugee
regime the most are security regimes, including for present purposes two
Protocols to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime:
the Trafficking Protocol with 167 states parties and the Smuggling Protocol
with 141 states parties. Apart from requiring the domestic criminalisation
of trafficking and smuggling, the treaties require states to take measures to
enhance the integrity of travel documents and prevent their misuse,
strengthen border controls, and so on. The problem with these kinds of
measures is that they do not only impede trafficking and smuggling, they
impede all irregular movement across borders. In the present context, such
measures make it more difficult for asylum seekers to flee their countries of
origin with or without the assistance of people smugglers. It is true that
both Protocols include a clause specifying that

[n]othing in this Protocol shall affect the rights, obligations and responsi-
bilities of States and individuals under international law, including inter-
national humanitarian law and international human rights law and, in
particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement as
contained therein. (Trafficking Protocol Art. 14(1) and Smuggling Protocol
Art. 19(1))
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 285

However, this clause simply prevents states parties from using the
Protocols as an excuse for direct violations of their other international
law obligations. These two treaties are the tip of the iceberg. There are
various other agreements, institutions, and processes through which states
and other actors cooperate on security broadly defined in ways which
impact adversely on forced migrants.
The supranational regime with the most obvious potential to bolster
the refugee regime is the human rights regime. The International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families (1990) (Migrant Workers Convention), which is
a core treaty of the international human rights regime, has been ratified by
only 48 states, none of which are labour receiving countries, and it
expressly does not apply to ‘refugees’ in most instances. However, the
Migrant Workers Convention is really a distraction from the rights which
are owed to ‘everyone’ by the 164 states parties to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and 168 states
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966). In fact, most of the rights conferred on ‘refugees’ by the
Refugee Convention fall far short of the rights universally conferred by
the two main human rights treaties.4 It is true that these human rights
treaties do not impose an obligation on states to provide any refugee with
a durable solution in the sense of full membership of their national com-
munity. However, if states became serious about treating the rights they
do contain as human rights rather than citizens’ rights, refugees anywhere
could lead fully human lives free of fear and want. It then would not
matter nearly as much that the refugee regime has a missing part.
In relation to durable solutions, since 2007 UNHCR has been promot-
ing the idea of using labour migration/mobility schemes to supplement
the three – repatriation, local integration, and resettlement – on which it
has traditionally focused. However, it has emphasised that

[i]n order to function as an effective alternative solution, migration options

for persons with protection needs would normally allow for a stable and
secure period of residence in the host country, provide sufficient guarantees
against refoulement, deportation and expulsion, and offer the enjoyment of
a progressively wider range of rights. (UNHCR 2012, p 201)

Among other things therefore, UNHCR, in its pursuit of labour migration

opportunities for refugees, has worked in partnership with the International
286 S. TAYLOR

Labour Organization (ILO) and sought to make use of its labour standard
legal frameworks (UNHCR 2007, para. 68). The problem is that the two
ILO Conventions specifically dealing with labour migrants are poorly rati-
fied. The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97) (1949)
has only 49 states parties and Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions)
Convention (No. 143) (1975) has only 23 states parties.
As well as forging bilateral partnerships with relevant agencies working
in overlapping subject domains, UNHCR has been an active member of
the Global Migration Group (UNHCR 2007, para. 67). The Global
Migration Group was established by UN Secretary-General in early 2006
to coordination action on migration.5 It has grown from 10 agencies in
2006 to 18 agencies in 2015,6 but has not been as effective as it could be
in fostering coordinated migration governance at an international level.
This is because most of the agencies involved are really not very interested
in migration (Oberoi 2010, p. 250) and the remaining few have been
somewhat more focused on protecting their turf than on collaboration
(International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) 2010, p. 20).
Also in 2006, the UN General Assembly held a High-Level Dialogue on
International Migration and Development with the objective of identifying
ways and means of maximising the development benefits of international
migration and minimising its negative impacts (UNDESA 2015a). The
High-Level Dialogue was followed up by the establishment of the Global
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). The GFMD is an infor-
mal government-led annual dialogue process with the purpose of fostering
cooperation on migration and development (GFMD 2015a). While GFMD
sits outside the UN system, it has strong links to the system through the
participation of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on
International Migration and Development and the Global Migration
Group. Among other things, the Global Migration Group is supposed to
take follow-up action on recommendations made during the GFMD meet-
ings (GFMD 2015b). Despite the mechanisms just described, in the years
following the 2006 High-Level Dialogue, there was more talk about con-
structive international cooperation on migration than there was action on it.
In October 2013, the UN General Assembly held a second High-Level
Dialogue on International Migration and Development. The purpose of the
High-Level Dialogue was ‘to identify concrete measures to strengthen coher-
ence and cooperation at all levels, with a view to enhancing the benefits of
international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links
to development, while reducing its negative implications’ (UNDESA 2015b,
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 287

emphasis added). At the High-Level Dialogue, the UN Secretary-General

presented an eight-point agenda for action that included protecting the
human rights of all migrants, integrating migration into the post-2015 devel-
opment agenda, eliminating migrant exploitation, and enhancing migration
partnerships and cooperation. In addition, the UN General Assembly adopted
a Declaration (UN General Assembly Resolution 68/4, 3 October 2013) that
echoed much of the Secretary-General’s agenda for action.
The most significant occurrence since the second High-Level Dialogue
has been the inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development which was adopted at the UN Sustainable Development
Summit held in September 2015. One of the targets specified in relation to
goal 10 (reduce inequality within and among countries) of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) is ‘10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular, and
responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the
implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.’ In
elaboration, paragraph 29 of the 2030 Agenda document states:

We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and

sustainable development. We also recognize that international migration
is a multi-dimensional reality of major relevance for the development of
countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and
comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe,
orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the
humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and
of displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience
of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We
underline the right of migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and
recall that States must ensure that their returning nationals are duly received.

It remains to be seen whether states will back up with action the under-
taking that international migration cooperation will involve ‘full respect
for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of
migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons’.

CONCLUSION
The architecture currently in place for the governance of forced migration
is not merely incomplete but broken. However, it is not possible to
improve the way in which forced migration is governed by focusing
288 S. TAYLOR

exclusively or even primarily on the international/regional refugee regime.

At present, many forced migrants cross borders without authorisation,
often with the assistance of people smugglers, and for that reason fall
foul of the entrenched securitisation of national and regional border
control policies. In order to overcome the negative impacts of this secur-
itisation on forced migrants, it is necessary to think holistically.
Above all it is crucial to advocate for the better implementation of the
existing human rights regime and to insist on its status as a regime that
‘trumps’ all others (Shelton 2002, pp. 304–307), because achieving this
will largely obviate the need for reform of other specialised regimes.
However, the countries of the developing world need support to fulfil
the human rights of both their own citizens and the disproportionate
number of forced migrants they presently host. Implementation of the
2030 Agenda provides the best avenue for doing so. Although the
Millennium Development Goals have by no means been completely
achieved, the progress made gives hope that there will be similar political
commitment to achieving the SDGs in a spirit of solidarity which has
been sorely lacking in the context of the refugee regime. Eventually,
refugees and other forced migrants will not need to move as far beyond
their countries of first asylum as hitherto in order to find adequate
protection. In the meantime, states need to be reminded constantly
of target 10.7 of the SDGs. As long as there remain vast inequalities
between countries in the realisation of the full range of human rights,
there will be migratory pressure. These pressures have proven themselves
to exceed the capacity of states acting unilaterally or regionally simply to
exclude all those who seek to move. From both a state security and
human security perspective, therefore, the best choice that developed
states can make is to facilitate ‘safe, orderly and regular migration’,
including humanitarian migration, on a much larger scale than they
have done in the past.

NOTES
1. These statistics exclude the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with
UNRWA at the end of 2014 (UNHCR 2015c, p. 2).
2. The Refugee Convention provides (Art. 34):
‘The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 289

expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the

charges and costs of such proceedings.’
However, this gives rise to a fairly weak right (Hathaway 2005, pp. 163,
252) that cannot be characterised as a right to be granted durable asylum.
3. This is a body that advises its 47 member states on matters of international law.
4. This is not to say that the Refugee Convention is unimportant. The little that
it adds to the human rights treaties is indispensable because it is tailored to
meet the particular needs of refugees. For example, it obliges states parties
not to impose penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or
presence (Art. 31(1)).
5. It built on an existing interagency group called the Geneva Migration
Group.
6. The members are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN,
ILO, IOM, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, UN
Regional Commissions, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), United Nations Development
Program, United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
UN Women, UNHCR, United Nations Institute for Training and
Research, UNODC, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations
University, World Bank, and the World Health Organization (Global
Migration Group 2015).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bali Process Co-Chairs 2011, ‘Co-Chairs Statement’, Fourth Bali Regional
Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and
Related Transnational Crime, 29-30 March, viewed 23 September 2015,
http://www.baliprocess.net/files/110330_FINAL_Ministerial_Co-chairs%
20statement%20BRMC%20IV.doc.
Betts, A., Loescher, G., & Milner, J. (2012). The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR): The politics and practice of refugee protection (2nd edn).
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, 189 UNTS 137, opened for
signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, 360 UNTS 117, opened
for signature 28 September 1954, entered into force 6 June 1960
European Commission 2015a, ‘Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational,
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration’, Press
Releases, 23 September, viewed 24 September 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm.
290 S. TAYLOR

European Commission 2015b, Communication on the European Agenda on

Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May, viewed 25 September 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_
european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.
European Commission 2015c, ‘Refugee Crisis – Q&A on Emergency Relocation’,
Press Releases, 22 September, viewed 25 September 2015, http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressrelease_MEMO155698_en.htm.
‘Fighting human trafficking’ [reproduction of Joint statement of the Ministerial
Meeting on Irregular Movement of People in Southeast Asia] 2015, Bangkok
Post, 20 May, viewed 23 September 2015, Factiva database.
GFMD 2015a, The GFMD process, viewed 18 September 2015, http://www.
gfmd.org/process.
GFMD 2015b, Link with the United Nations, viewed 18 September 2015, http://
www.gfmd.org/process/united-nations.
Global Migration Group 2015, GMG members, viewed 18 September 2015,
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/gmg-members.
Goledzinowski, A. 2015, Testimony to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee, 3 June, viewed 23 September 2015, http://parlinfo.
aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22commit
tees%2Festimate%2Fd5d5653d-f088-43fc-9ca7-e66bca784ef3%2F0002%22.
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998, Addendum to Report of
the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998
Harley, T. (2014). Regional cooperation and refugee protection in Latin America:
A ‘South-South’ approach. International Journal of Refugee Law, 26(1), 22–47.
Hathaway, J. (2005). The rights of refugees under international law. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
ICMC 2010, Connecting the Dots: A fresh look at managing international migra-
tion, ICMC, Geneva.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, 2220 UNTS 3, opened for signature 18 December
1990, entered into force 1 July 2003
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171,
opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS
3, opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143) 1975, adopted
60th ILC session 24 Jun 1975, entered into force 9 December 1978
Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97) 1949, adopted 32nd
ILC session 01 Jul 1949, entered into force 22 January 1952
 15 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF FORCED MIGRATION 291

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 2015, ‘Summary special meeting on irregular

migration in the Indian Ocean 29 May 2015, Bangkok, Thailand’, Press Releases,
viewed 23 September 2015, http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/
14/56880-summary-special-meeting-on-irregular-migration-in.html.
‘More neighbours make more fences’ 2015, The Economist, 15 September, viewed
20 September 2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/
2015/09/daily-chart-10.
OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa 1969,
concluded 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974
Oberoi, P. (2010). Empowering migrants: Human security, human rights and
policy. In A. Edwards & C. Ferstman (eds.), Human security and non-citizens:
Law, policy and international affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Okello, J. O. M. (2014). The 1969 OAU Convention and the continuing chal-
lenge for the African Union. Forced Migration Review, 48, 70–73.
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 2000, 2241
UNTS 507, opened for signature 15 November 2000, entered into force
28 January 2004
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967, 606 UNTS 267, opened for
signature 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children 2000, 2237 UNTS 167, opened for signature 15 November
2000, entered into force 25 December 2003
Shelton, D. (2002). Hierarchy of norms and human rights: Of trumps and
winners. Saskatchewan Law Review, 65, 301–331.
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1950,
Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950
Taylor, S. (2013). Sharing responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees in
the Asia Pacific region. In S. Juss (ed.), The Ashgate research companion to
migration law, theory and policy. Abingdon, UK: Ashgate.
Taylor, S. 2015, Refugee protection in the Asia Pacific Region, Rights in Exile
Programme resource page, viewed 23 September 2015, http://www.refugee
legalaidinformation.org/refugee-protection-asia-pacific-region.
UNDESA 2015a, High-level dialogue on international migration and develop-
ment, viewed 18 September 2015, http://www.un.org/esa/population/
migration/hld/.
UNDESA 2015b, High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, viewed 18 September 2015, http://www.un.org/esa/popula
tion/meetings/HLD2013/mainhld2013.html.
UNHCR 2005. An introduction to international protection: Protecting persons of
concern to UNHCR, UNHCR, Geneva
292 S. TAYLOR

UNHCR 2007. Refugee protection and durable solutions in the context of interna-
tional migration (A discussion paper prepared for the High Commissioner’s
Dialogue on Protection Challenges), viewed 27 September 2015, http://
www.unhcr.org/4742a6b72.html.
UNHCR 2012, Refugee protection and mixed migration: The 10-point plan in
action, viewed 27 September 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/50ab86d09.html.
UNHCR 2015a, South-East Asia mixed maritime movement April – June
2015, 28 August, viewed 20 September 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/
554c6a746.html.
UNHCR 2015b, ‘Mediterranean Sea crossings exceed 300,000, including
200,000 to Greece’, Briefing Notes, 28 August, viewed 20 September 2015,
http://www.unhcr.org/55e033816.html.
UNHCR 2015c, Global trends: Forced displacement in 2014, UNHCR, Geneva
UNHCR 2015d, UNHCR global report 2014, UNHCR, Geneva.
UNHCR2015e, UNHCR projected global resettlement needs 2016, UNHCR,
Geneva.

Savitri Taylor is an associate professor at La Trobe University Law School,

Melbourne, Australia. She has expertise in refugee law and asylum policy at the
national, regional, and international levels. Her recent publications include
‘Australian Neo-Colonialism in the Pacific: Immigration Detention in Papua
New Guinea’ in Immigration Detention: The Migration of a Policy and its
Human Impact (2015, Routledge), ‘Civil Society and the Fight for Refugee
Rights in the Asia Pacific Region’ in Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons
in the Asia Pacific Region (2013, Ashgate), ‘Sharing Responsibility for Asylum
Seekers and Refugees in the Asia Pacific Region’ in The Ashgate Research
Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy (2013, Ashgate). She is Deputy
Editor of Global Change, Peace and Security.
 CHAPTER 16

Three Generations of International Human

Rights Governance

Morten B. Pedersen

With the deepening of the global security agenda over the past twenty
years or so to include threats not only to the state but also to individuals
and communities, international human rights have been elevated to a
security issue. Although the exact relationship between human rights
and human security is contested (Oberleitner 2005; Howard-Hassmann
2012), no person can meaningfully be said to be secure unless she or he
enjoys basic human rights both in principle and in practice.
The international human rights regime is significantly older than the
relatively recent human security agenda, tracing its institutional roots to
the 1945 UN Charter and subsequent elaboration of universal standards
and procedures of human rights through the International Bill of Rights and
associated mechanisms.1 However, the work on establishing effective inter-
national arrangements for protecting human rights remains unfinished and –
notwithstanding some excitement about the new norm of Responsibility to
Protect – the securitisation of human rights has done little to bring that
agenda forward. Thus, it is commonplace to point out that more than a half
century after the adoption of the first major international human rights

M.B. Pedersen (*)

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales,
Canberra, Australia
e-mail: m.pedersen@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 293

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_16
294 M.B. PEDERSEN

instrument – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the gap between

existing human rights norms and human rights practice remains large.
Serious human rights violations occur on a regular – and even routine –
basis in most parts of the world. According to the most recent annual report
by Amnesty International (2016), 122 governments torture or otherwise
ill-treat people, 62 lock-up prisoners of conscience, 113 arbitrarily restrict
freedom of expression and the press, and 55 per cent of all countries
conduct unfair trials – at least. More than 60 million people were displaced
from their homes in 2015, and countless more (billions) suffered extreme
socio-economic deprivations arising from poverty and state neglect.
Serious violations occur even in liberal democracies, most notable perhaps
in the (mis)treatment of migrants, refugees, and suspected terrorists.
However, the situation is particularly bad in a number of grossly repressive
states2 ‘where authoritarian rulers not only deny citizens any meaningful
say in government, but also terrorise and impoverish the general popula-
tion or significant subgroups’ (Pedersen and Kinley 2013). Although such
states have been the primary target of international human rights policy
from the outset, they have stubbornly – and mostly successfully – resisted
both internal and external efforts to change their behaviour.
The present chapter provides a critique of the international human rights
regime, with particular focus on the challenges presented by the most repres-
sive states. This includes a consciously critical ‘take’ on the efforts of the
international human rights movement to reinforce the first-generation multi-
lateral human rights treaty system (international law) with stronger, second-
generation bilateral enforcement mechanisms (international sanctions), which
I argue have not only proven largely ineffectual in many cases, but in fact may
also do more harm than good. By contrast, I find some grounds for optimism
in the growth of a third generation of human rights mechanisms that may
loosely be categorised as ‘principled engagement’ (Pedersen and Kinley 2013).
Although each of these generations has a useful place in the evolving interna-
tional human rights regime, the real work for human rights is done on the
ground through close engagement with repressors and the repressed.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
The post-Second World War era has seen impressive progress on institu-
tionalising international human rights norms through an ever-expanding
number of international treaties, state signatories, and multilateral over-
sight mechanisms, mostly linked to the United Nations system. States’
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 295

treaty commitments, however, appear to have relatively little impact on

their human rights practices, except in emerging democracies where
domestic civil society has both motive and means to push the government
to live up to its legal commitments (Simmons 2010; also Landmann 2001).
A major problem with international law is the absence of enforcement
mechanisms. Although the toughness of the oversight system varies sig-
nificantly across different areas of international human rights law, few of
the existing multilateral charter or treaty bodies have any real authority or
means of actually enforcing the law in sovereign states (nor is there any
prospect of this changing). The main exceptions are the European Court
of Human Rights, which only covers Europe, and the more recent
International Criminal Court whose mandate is limited to mass crimes.
Weak enforcement powers are a common feature of international law,
but as Hathaway (2001–2002: 1938) points out, ‘the major engines of
compliance that exist in other areas of international law are for the most
part absent in the area of human rights.’ Because the impact of human
rights violations is perceived to be largely internal to states, principles of
reciprocity do not apply. Nor do other states have strong incentives to
police non-compliance with international human rights laws.
The absence of international compliance mechanisms matters less
where domestic mechanisms exist for keeping governments to their legal
commitments. However, this presupposes the existence of strong civil
societies that are able to mobilise to hold state authorities accountable
whether through national courts, elections, parliaments, the media or
similar accountability mechanisms. In other words, it requires reasonably
strong liberal democratic institutions. Where such institutions are weak or
absent, governments can ignore the law without suffering significant con-
sequences. This is no trivial distinction since it means that international
human rights law generally fails to matter where it is most needed, in the
most repressive states (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007).
This is not so say that international human rights law is meaningless,
but only that something more is needed to help motivate repressive
governments to live up to their formal commitments.

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS3
The perceived toothlessness of the multilateral treaty system contributed
to the rise of the international human rights movement, which particularly
since the end of the Cold War has worked to develop means to enforce
296 M.B. PEDERSEN

international human rights law through coercive measures, much like

states enforce domestic laws within their own territory. This has been
done mainly through campaigns to ‘shame’ Western governments into
sanctioning rights-abusing regimes by exposing the gap between their
rhetorical commitments to promoting human rights internationally and
realities on the ground in repressive states.
At first glance, bilateral sanctions respond effectively to the short-
comings of the multilateral treaty system by giving ‘bite’ to international
human rights law. The theory is that bad rulers will cease their repressive
ways when the perceived costs of maintaining them surpass the perceived
benefits (or, failing that, will be removed by dissatisfied groups in their
own country and replaced by leaders willing to undertake the changes
demanded). Yet, faith in the civilising potential of coercive diplomacy is
on shaky ground both theoretically and empirically. Human rights sanc-
tions not only have clear limitations, but can also have serious perverse
effects.
The theory of sanctions is based on making it costlier for the target state
to maintain its offensive behaviour than to change it in accordance with
the sender’s demands. This strategic objective, however, is often under-
mined by the difficulty of ensuring policy consistency within as well as
coordination across senders. Because sanctions disrupt senders’ relations
with the target state, bilateral human rights policy along these lines
invariably becomes hostage to broader national security and economic
interests and therefore is pursued in a selective manner. The resulting
double standards leave the citizens of some states largely without interna-
tional protection and greatly weaken the perceived legitimacy of interven-
tions when they do take place. This problem is compounded by the
difficulty for the international community to agree on how to deal with
repressive regimes. With rare exceptions, Western governments have
found it impossible to gain the cooperation of non-Western governments
in imposing human rights sanctions. Since today’s most repressive states
are located in non-democratic regions and have other authoritarian states
as their neighbours and main allies and trading partners, it is therefore
often fairly easy for targets of sanctions to circumvent them and thus lower
the costs of non-compliance.
Even if senders succeed in imposing significant costs on the target
country, sanctions often fail to sway repressive rulers, for two reasons.
First, since authoritarian political power is typically accompanied by cen-
tralised economic control, leaders are able to divert the economic costs
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 297

imposed by sanctions away from themselves and their supporters and on to

politically weak groups (Nossal 1993). In fact, studies show that author-
itarian elites may be able to exploit economic scarcities in a restricted
economy to increase ‘rents’ and thus, paradoxically, actually benefit from
sanctions (Kaempfer et al. 2000; Lektzian and Souva 2007). Secondly,
the political economy of authoritarianism makes such regimes resistant
to the assumed destabilising effects of economic sanctions (Nossal 1999;
Cortright and Lopez 2000; Brooks 2002; Allen 2005).4 Unlike democratic
governments whose survival depends on providing public goods for the
general population, authoritarian regimes usually rest on a fairly narrow
support base, which can be bought off with private goods. The overall
economic welfare of society therefore matters little to political stability.
Many governments will make some concessions to try to undercut the
push for international sanctions, such as signing human rights treaties or
releasing individual political prisoners. However, any reforms undertaken
under duress are likely to be largely cosmetic. Governments that have not
internalised the underlying values – or do not at least see an intrinsic value
in reforms – but comply with international norms for purely instrumental
reasons are bound to ‘cheat’ or revert to their old ways as soon as the
pressure is released. Also, not all human rights violations are the result of
bad will; some governments simply do not have the capacity to protect or
fulfil human rights even if they wanted to. Respecting not only socio-
economic rights, but also many political and civil rights, requires both
stronger institutions and larger budgets than is available in many devel-
oping countries; and in weak states government authority and enforce-
ment capabilities is often insufficient to protect people against violations
by non-state actors. In such cases, sanctions are not just ineffective, but
simply misplaced (and may well make a bad situation worse).
Aside from their limitations, sanctions also often have a number of
perverse effects. Like most people, authoritarian leaders resent attempts
by others to limit their behavioural freedom.5 Threatening demands thus
tend to produce an opposite effect, prompting the target to resist for the
sake of resistance (or more precisely, to assert its freedom to choose).
Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as ‘reactance’ or ‘anti-conformity’
(Brehm and Brehm 1981). Rather than motivate repressive rulers to
reform, sanctions may actually cause ‘a further “hardening” of the regime
around core bases of support, a preoccupation with showing resolve, and a
declining willingness to make tradeoffs’ (Haggard and Noland 2011, p. x).
In extreme cases, this can take the form of a broader nationalistic backlash
298 M.B. PEDERSEN

against the foreign sender, causing domestic groups to rally around the
authoritarian leadership and actually strengthening the regime internally.6
In addition to such negative motivational reactions, outside pressure
often provokes defensive measures by the target government to shore up
regime stability that negatively affect human rights. This typically includes
measures to impede any further mobilisation of anti-regime forces, for
example, through a tightening of censorship or preemptive crackdowns on
signs of dissent, including increased use of extrajudicial arrests and torture.
Governments targeted by human rights sanctions also often take steps to
shield regime supporters from the adverse economic effects of sanctions –
or increase their rewards for loyal behaviour – by redistributing scarce state
resources away from general development and social services to private
consumption (Wood 2008).7 Preventive restrictions on international
exchanges, including foreign media and humanitarian agencies, can
exacerbate the situation by reducing the ability of external actors to help
the victims of human rights violations.
Sanctions also cause direct harm by denying the population the benefits of
normal trade, investments, aid, and other international exchanges. The
immediate loss of jobs or other income has at times seriously affected millions
of people (Pedersen 2008). Still, the most debilitating effects typically arise
over time as the cumulative effects of international isolation and bad govern-
ance insidiously erode target countries’ economic and social infrastructure,
causing long-term damage that can only be reversed with great difficulty and
at great expense (Bossoyt 2000; Gibbons 1999). Attempts by sanctioning
governments to alleviate such harm through increased humanitarian assis-
tance is a ‘fool’s errand’. Humanitarian assistance at best provides a Band-Aid
for selected groups (and not necessarily those hardest hit by sanctions).
Moreover, humanitarian actors are frequently caught between international
sanctions regulations, which complicate the deliverance of aid, and local
authorities who further restrict humanitarian space out of fear that foreign
aid organisations might engage in subversive political activities (Crisis Group
2008). As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995,
p. 16) concluded in his influential 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace
report, sanctions are ‘a blunt instrument that inflicts suffering on vulnerable
groups, complicates the work of humanitarian agencies, [and] causes long-
term damage to the productive capacity of target nations’.
The ultimate irony of human rights sanctions, though, is that they often
weaken the ability of pro-rights constituencies within the target country to
bring about change and protect the population. Once human rights become
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 299

associated with foreign demands and pressure, such values are (further)
delegitimised within the local context. This weakens moderates within the
regime who risk being dismissed as unnationalistic, casts suspicion about
opposition groups that come to be viewed as ‘fifth columnists’, and generally
makes it harder for domestic pro-rights constituencies to argue for change.
At the material level, increased repression and weakening of the socio-
economic basis of civil society also make it harder for opposition groups to
organise and mobilise against the authoritarian regime. Unlike more affluent
societies where economic stagnation may produce social unrest, in already
impoverished countries further scarcity is more likely to strengthen state
control as people become more dependent on the state for their survival
needs or simply no longer have the time and resources to engage in politics.
Over the past decade and a half, growing recognition of the political
limitations and humanitarian costs of comprehensive sanctions regimes
have seen both an intellectual and a practical shift towards the use of so-
called ‘smart’ or targeted sanctions. Theoretically, by targeting the inter-
ests of leaders of the offending states and their closest supporters rather
than the general economy, sanctions can be made more effective and
collateral damage can be minimised. Targeted sanctions, however, have
proven hard to implement effectively (Gordon 2011) and often cause little
more than nuisance to decision makers.8 In fact, the very concept of
targeted economic sanctions may be a misnomer in highly centralised
states since any reduction in available resources – no matter what its
cause – is bound to lead to a redistribution of the remainder based on
power as the authoritarian elite serves itself first and the people suffer.
The key to more effective sanctions may lie less in ‘targeting’ than in
‘bargaining’ and greater use of complementary policies. The effectiveness
of sanctions, Rose (2005, p. 472) argues, ‘comes not from [their] ability
to punish or coerce, or from the severity of the economic hardship and
social dislocation [they] may cause, but from [their] ability to encourage
bargaining with the expectation of reducing or ending conflicts’. Rather
than bludgeoning the target into compliance, the idea here is to use
sanctions to nudge it towards a mutually acceptable agreement. This
model reserves a role for sanctions in bringing about better human rights
outcomes, but requires a fundamentally different approach from the puni-
tive model favoured by the mainstream human rights movement.9 No
authoritarian leader can afford to be seen to back down to international
pressure. In order to avoid an impasse, senders must therefore be willing
to ‘temper their demands, either by offering face-saving outlets for the
300 M.B. PEDERSEN

target state, or, if necessary, by making concrete concessions in exchange

for compliance with a modified, but still meaningful, set of demands’
(Chaitkin 2009, p. 12). Also, research shows the importance to successful
bargaining of complementing threats with incentives (i.e. a ‘carrot and
stick approach’) (Cortright 2001; 1997). This may simply mean gradually
lifting sanctions in response to partial concessions. However, it can also
involve more ‘positive’ incentives such as security guarantees (e.g., amnes-
ties for past rights violations) or economic or other assistance, which
human rights advocates tend to decry. In the most difficult cases –
where targets are highly insular, or sender and target have a history of
hostility – it may be necessary to offer incentives without asking or
expecting any immediate concessions in return, but rather to establish
the basis for future ‘good faith’ negotiations. Like all other strategies,
bargaining needs to be context sensitive. However, any sender who
seeks agreement with the target rather than its defeat and surrender
must be prepared to engage, negotiate, and compromise. This is funda-
mentally at odds with the conventional use of human rights sanctions and
in fact has significant overlap with the concept of principled engagement,
which is discussed next.

PRINCIPLED ENGAGEMENT
Unlike the push for sanctions, which developed as a strategic response by
the international human rights movement to perceived weaknesses of the
existing human rights regime, the latest (third) generation of human
rights mechanisms has evolved more organically through the actions of a
diverse set of autonomous actors. As such, it may not at first glance appear
sufficiently similar or coherent to constitute a distinct strategy. However,
following Pedersen and Kinley (2013), it is possible to identify a group of
related approaches, which rejects isolation of repressive regimes in favour
of ‘principled engagement’.
While sanctions work by limiting international exchanges with the
target state, principled engagement seeks to harness such exchanges to
promote human rights. Eschewing condemnation in favour of critical
dialogue and cooperation with those responsible for human rights viola-
tions, senders in fact expand relations with the target state on human
rights issues. Rather than terminating foreign aid, they use it to support
human rights through training, technical assistance, or funding of pro-
gressive government programs; and rather than stopping trade and
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 301

investment, they try to regulate it to ensure that it benefits human rights

(typically through various forms of business ‘codes of conduct’).
Underlying all of these approaches is a shared commitment to move the
focus of the struggle for human rights from the lofty heights of interna-
tional diplomacy – whether of a persuasive or coercive nature – closer to
the lived reality of both those engaging in and suffering from abusive
practices. Typically, principled engagement is also more pragmatic than
earlier generations of human rights governance – instead of insisting on
compliance with absolute standards, the emphasis is on what is feasible
within the local context.
Moves in this direction are evident among actors that traditionally have
favoured legal or coercive approaches as seen, for example, in the increas-
ing popularity of bilateral human rights dialogues and the establishment of
field offices by the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human
Rights. However, the more important developments are happening in
fields not traditionally associated with human rights governance per se.
The rise of ‘rights-based’ approaches in the work of mainstream develop-
ment organisations is perhaps the most prominent example. Another is the
growth of initiatives falling broadly under the heading of corporate social
responsibility, which are seeking to mobilise the power of business behind
the human rights project.
Compared to international law and sanctions, we know relatively little
about the effect of principled engagement. Given the diversity of methods
that fall into this category, a range of interdisciplinary models and survey
methods would be required to overcome that lacuna. In the meantime,
however, there are several theoretical reasons why we may have some
general confidence in this approach. First, principled engagement provides
the most promising platform for building a truly global human rights
regime. As noted, international support for sanctions is inconsistent even
among Western governments committed to supporting human rights
(alongside other foreign policy objectives) and mostly lacking altogether
outside this club of liberal democracies. Principled engagement, however,
can be combined with normal political and economic engagement with
target states, thus carrying much lower opportunity costs. It is also less
threatening to traditional notions of state sovereignty and therefore more
likely to find support among the many states that remain sceptical about
emerging ideas of ‘conditional sovereignty’. This is particularly significant
in light of the seemingly inexorable decline in Western normative and
material power, which could ultimately defeat seventy years of efforts to
302 M.B. PEDERSEN

build a viable international human rights regime unless a new consensus

can be built with emerging non-Western powers based on a higher degree
of transnational dialogue and accommodation of different political and
cultural perspectives.
Second, principled engagement mobilises a greater variety of senders –
both state and non-state – with different comparative advantages. Unlike
sanctions, which tend to provide a meaningful role only for great powers
and neighbouring countries that have a high level of economic exchanges
with the target state, principled engagement can be used with equal – or
even greater – effect by smaller states, international organisations (IOs),
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational corporations
(TNCs). States with fewer global interests often have greater moral author-
ity and therefore greater persuasive power. IOs and NGOs have highly
specialised skills and a strong on-the-ground presence.10 TNCs often have
unique access to authoritarian elites, and as buyers and investors they also
have the ability to directly influence, for example, workers’ rights.
Importantly, since IOs, NGOs and TNCs are usually engaged in long-
term projects on the ground in the target country that have significant
benefits for local actors, they are well placed to build personal relationships
and trust with local authorities and communities alike, which increases their
potential influence in other areas such as human rights. Although some of
these international actors may be reluctant to become involved in human
rights issues, they have the potential to enhance external influence in multi-
ple, complementary ways. A greater number of senders also increases the
legitimacy of the whole human rights project.
Third, principled engagement offers a way around the all too common
kneejerk nationalistic dismissal by targets of international human rights
demands. By eschewing the use of overt, coercive power, it weakens the
spectre of neo-imperialism and helps move negotiations beyond the blus-
ter of public diplomacy. Once the ‘outer wall’ of political resistance is
breached, the challenges of securing reform become more practical in
character. Instead of national pride, the focus moves to more objective
interests. Repressive governments are probably no more likely to be
persuaded than coerced to concede power, but many human rights viola-
tions do not serve vital regime interests and are therefore open to negotia-
tion under the right circumstances. This is particularly the case if instead of
taking place among state leaders or diplomats, the negotiations can be
moved to a technical level and conducted by human rights professionals
on both sides.
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 303

Fourth, unlike the traditional single-track approaches, principled

engagement is a multifaceted strategy, which can more easily be tailored
to the complex causes of human rights violations and adjusted to changing
circumstances on the ground. By abandoning coercion and its close cousin
isolation, principled engagement opens for the use of a wide range of
influence mechanisms, including incentives, persuasion, acculturation, and
state capacity-building, as well as empowerment of local human rights
defenders and indeed the victims of rights violations themselves.
Importantly, this does not happen at the expense of external pressure for
change, which may well be needed; rather, such pressure is exerted in
other, arguably, more culturally and context-sensitive ways through inter-
personal relationship building, modelling of best practice and so on.
Doing things right, for example, puts pressure on local authorities to do
better and provides models for how to do so. For individuals and com-
munities, receiving help can be a novel and empowering experience, as
they come to realise that repression is not natural. Foreign aid projects can
also give recipients practical experience of organising to promote common
interests. The importance of this type of ‘modelling’ should not be under-
estimated, especially in closed societies where knowledge of different ways
of living and doing things is often limited.
Fifth, principled engagement is uniquely conducive to building
international–domestic partnerships for reform. Pro-rights constituen-
cies exist even in the most repressive states, yet have demonstrably been
unable to make sufficient progress on their own. At the same time,
international actors have limited direct influence on critical governance
processes. Principled engagement offers a solution to this conundrum
by facilitating direct linkages with soft-liners, technocrats, business
owners, and local communities, as well as traditional advocates of
human rights such as opposition parties and human rights defenders.
It may seem counterintuitive to work with people within repressive
regimes to promote human rights. Yet these are often the best placed
to make a difference. Soft-liners, if co-opted, can provide protection for
progressive programs, and technocrats often have a genuine commit-
ment to public service (or at least to doing their job the best they can).
Business owners will do what benefits their bottom line and may be
persuaded to pay higher salaries or improve working conditions in their
factories in order to attract responsible international buyers or inves-
tors. On the demand side, too, it behoves senders to look beyond their
traditional partners in the political opposition and Western-style
304 M.B. PEDERSEN

advocacy groups, which may in fact be less effective than mass-based

civil society organisations, such as the church, or informal groupings of
villagers that can push for human rights without threatening the power
of existing elites. By working with these domestic pro-rights constitu-
encies, international groups can actively support positive internal devel-
opments while at the same time pushing the boundaries of change.
This has the added advantage that change driven by domestic actors is
more sustainable.
Sixth, principled engagement can substitute, to a point, for national
human rights mechanisms. Although the aim of the international human
rights regime must be to generate domestic will and capacity to institutiona-
lise human rights in national law and practice, this is invariably a long-term
process, and in the meantime international actors can help protect and assist
local communities. By acting as witnesses to day-to-day abuses, foreign
organisations present on the ground in repressive states are often able to
dissuade local agents of the state from abusing their power (Duffield 2008).
Aid organisations can also help expand access for vulnerable groups to food,
health, and education, while companies can provide jobs and income.
In conclusion, principled engagement has the potential not only to
mobilise a broader front behind the human rights project than earlier
generations of human rights mechanisms, but also to penetrate much
deeper into the complex layers of causes and ‘causers’ of human rights
violations. The broad range and diversity of human rights, as well as the
variety of both state and non-state actors that may be implicated in their
violation, calls for discrete, targeted approaches to different types of
human rights violations, not broad-stroke solutions. At issue here are
not just the immediate causes of rights violations, but also the underlying
causes. Given the weak status of human rights norms in our target group,
reducing rights violations depends to a high degree on alleviating the
reasons why they take place in the first place. This is something neither
law nor sanctions can even begin to approach, and is perhaps where
principled engagement really comes into its own.

SOME CONCLUDING CLARIFICATIONS

International efforts to advance human rights in repressive states through
mechanisms borrowed from national practice (i.e. law and sanctions) are if
not futile then certainly unlikely to make a significant impact where it matters
most. By contrast, emerging methods of principled engagement better
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 305

adapted to the unique features of the international context where no sovereign

exists seem more likely to succeed. The argument here is not that principled
engagement should replace earlier generations of international human rights
mechanisms. International human rights law provides the crucial normative
scaffolding for all other forms of human rights promotion; and some
sanctions – or at least the threat of them – may well be required to ‘motivate’
authoritarian rulers to accommodate principled engagement. However, the
coalface of human rights work is on the ground, among the repressors and
the people they repress. This is messy and demanding work, which provides
none of the moral clarity that international law and sanctions may seem to
offer. Yet, promoting human rights is ultimately about culture change and
that is a long-term project with no genuine opportunities for shortcuts.
Critics may counter that engagement provides legitimacy for bad gov-
ernments and funds repression. But this is hardly unavoidable or at least
can be minimised through ‘principled’ practice. As former Australian
human rights commissioner Chris Sidoti (2013) argues, principled enga-
gers must avoid the temptation to sweep problems under the carpet to
protect their projects and incorporate criticism of human rights violations
where criticism is due (tempered only by the overriding need to avoid the
perverse effects associated with more hostile approaches and get the target
to actually change its behaviour). Similarly, any assistance provided under
a strategy of principled engagement must be subject to rigorous standards
of transparency and accountability. Although there can be no absolute
guarantee that no benefits are derived by a cunning government, it is
worth noting in this respect that many repressive states in fact seek to
restrict any foreign presence which they fear could destabilise the author-
itarian equilibrium. Such states do not perceive benefits from being
engaged, but rather must be persuaded or cajoled to open up.11
Whether engagement can produce major improvements in human rights
is perhaps more doubtful, at least in highly repressive contexts. However,
principled engagers are likely at least to be able to pick the ‘low-hanging
fruit’. If, in addition, they can substitute in some small way for the state’s
failure to protect and fulfil basic rights and thus help people stay alive, the
significance of their efforts should not be easily dismissed. Importantly,
small changes can help open for broader changes in the medium to longer
term. The potential benefits, for example, of expanding the horizons of
insular leaders and alleviating their siege mentality are many; in countries
suffering from armed conflict, a peace deal can dramatically change both the
immediate human rights situation and the longer term prospects for
306 M.B. PEDERSEN

demilitarisation and democratisation; and improved education has positive

ripple effects across the political and economic spheres. Even if principled
engagement does not produce immediate results, it at least provides a vehicle
for helping build the basis for quicker and more sustainable reform once the
domestic political situation allows it. Such small, incremental changes may
seem insignificant to activists fired up by moral indignation and committed
to ‘saving’ the victims of human rights violations. However, if law is largely
impotent and sanctions often harmful, policies of principled engagement
that produces even small or delayed benefits may still be the better option.
The reality is that, in some countries, there is only limited space for influen-
cing the human rights situation. In the most difficult contexts, the alternative
to incremental change will often be no change at all.
Principled engagement, I believe, is making a critical contribution to
the international human rights regime and could do much more. To
realise its full potential, however, it needs to be taken seriously as an
alternative, third-generation method of human rights governance and be
pursued in a more coherent and strategic manner than is currently the
case. This will require new thinking by governments, as well as key human
rights organisation, which set the tone for the work of other actors; and
academics can help pave the way by evaluating and modelling the diverse
projects already underway in this new space.

NOTES
1. The International Bill of Rights is made up of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948), as well as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (both 1966) and their optional protocols. The protections
laid out in these core instruments are further elaborated and expanded in a
number of later international treaties focussing on particular groups, such as
women and children, or particular actions, notably torture and enforced
disappearances.
2. For the purposes of the following policy analysis, I follow Pedersen and
Kinley 2013 in excluding crisis situations requiring immediate action to
stop, for example, a genocide, as well as failed states where the government
has little control over its territory. Such situations present a different set of
challenges, which are more usefully examined through the lenses of huma-
nitarian intervention, peace and state-building, than human rights per se.
The former also has its own system of international law.
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 307

3. The following evaluation of sanctions and principled engagement is based

on Pedersen 2013, but has been significantly revised and updated to fit the
present argument. The focus here is solely on the different influence meth-
ods, whereas the latter publication addressed also the different strategic
objectives underlying the two approaches.
4. Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010) modify this argument slightly, showing
that, among authoritarian regimes, personalist regimes are relatively more
susceptible to the loss of external revenue, while sanctions have little effect
on single-party and military regimes.
5. This is particularly evident in post-colonial states where the experience of
imperialism has bred xenophobic forms of nationalism, making resistance a
matter of personal face as well as national pride. In such contexts, no self-
respecting leader can be seen to give in to outside pressure. Indeed, con-
cessions might well undercut his or her personal authority and position of
power within the ruling elite.
6. This broader effect was first observed by Galtung (1967) in his seminal study
of Rhodesia in the 1960s and presents a particular risk in countries with a
high level of state control of the media, which can be used to ‘whip up’
nationalistic fervour and scapegoat the foreign threat for home-grown pro-
blems (Tannenbaum and Rose 2003).
7. For a more general account of the association between perceived threats and
increased state extraction of resources from society, see Lektzian and Prins
2008.
8. In a study of 11 UN sanctions regimes between 1990 and 1999, Cortright
and Lopez (2000) found that seven out of eight cases of smart sanctions had
little or no effect.
9. The punitive element of most human rights sanctions episodes is perhaps
most evident in the use of diplomatic sanctions or other strongly condem-
natory practices, which cut communication links and generate hostility
between the parties, thus making bargaining all but impossible. Typically,
the implicit or explicit goal of senders is to bring about wholesale regime
change; limited or partial progress on human rights is therefore rarely
considered sufficient. A telling exception from this rule was the efforts by
the International Labor Office in the 2000s to combat the widespread use of
forced labour in Myanmar, which used a bargaining model of sanctions and,
not incidentally, was highly successful (Horsey 2011).
10. Contrary to diplomats who tend to be generalists, people working for IOs
and NGOs are often experts in areas such as human rights law, mediation,
community development or malaria prevention.
11. As the project director for a recent study on North Korea concluded, ‘We in
the U.S. need to stop thinking of economic engagement as a carrot. It’s more
like some very bitter, foul-smelling medicine’ (Independent Task Force 2009).
308 M.B. PEDERSEN

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allen, S. H. (2005). The determinants of economic sanctions success and failure.
International Interactions, 31, 117–138.
Amnesty International. 2016. Annual Report 2015/2016. https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/research/2016/02/annual-report-201516/.
Bossoyt, M. 2000. The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment
of human rights, Report prepared for the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33.
Boutros-Ghali, B. 1995. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, A/50/60.
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom
and control. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Brooks, R. A. (2002). Sanctions and regime type: What works and when? Security
Studies, 11(4), 1–50.
Chaitkin, M. 2009. Negotiation and strategy: Understanding sanctions effective-
ness, Center on International Cooperation, New York University.
Cortright, D. (1997). Incentive strategies for preventing conflict. In D. Cortright
(ed.), The price of peace: Incentives and international conflict prevention
(pp. 275–280). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Cortright, D. (2001). Powers of persuasion: Sanctions and incentives in the
shaping of international society. International Studies, 38(2), 113–125.
Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strate-
gies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Crisis Group. 2008. Myanmar after Nargis: Time for normalising aid relations,
Asia Report No. 161.
Duffield, M. 2008. “On the Edge of ‘No Man’s Land’: Chronic Emergency
in Myanmar,” Working Paper No. 01-08, Centre for Governance and
International Affairs, University of Bristol.
Escriba-Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010). Dealing with Tyranny: International
Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers. International Studies
Quarterly, 54, 335–359.
Galtung, J. (1967). On the effect of international economic sanctions: With
examples from the case of Rhodesia. World Politics, 29(3), 378–416.
Gibbons, E. (1999). Sanctions in Haiti: Human rights and democracy under
assault. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Gordon, J. (2011). Smart sanctions revisited. Ethics & International Affairs,
25(3), 315–335.
Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2007). Justice Lost! The Failure of inter-
national human rights law to matter where needed most. Journal of Peace
Research, 44(4), 406–425.
Haggard, S., & Noland, M. 2011. “Engaging North Korea: The role of economic
statecraft”, East-West Center Policy Studies No. 59.
16 THREE GENERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 309

Hathaway, O. A. (2001–2002). Do human rights treaties make a difference? Yale

Law Journal, 111, 1935–2025.
Horsey, R. (2011). Ending forced labour in Myanmar: Engaging a Pariah regime.
London: Routledge.
Howard-Hassmann, R. E. (2012). Human Security: Undermining human rights?
Human Rights Quarterly, 34(1), 88–112.
Independent Task Force. 2009. North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic
Engagement, Report prepared for Asia Society Center on US–China
Relations and The University of California Institute on Global Conflict
and Cooperation.
Kaempfer, W. H., Lowenberg, A. D., & Mertens, W. (2000). International
economic sanctions against a dictator. Economics and Politics, 16, 29–51.
Landmann, T. 2001. “Measuring the international human rights regime”. Paper
prepared for the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, San Francisco, 30 August.
Lektzian, D., & Prins, B. C. (2008). Taming the Leviathan: Examining the impact
of external threat on state capacity. Journal of Peace Research, 45(5), 613–631.
Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2007). An institutional theory of sanctions onset and
success. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 848–871.
Nossal, K. R. (1993). The limits of linking aid and trade to human rights. In
M. Charlton & E. Riddle-Dixon (eds.), Cross-currents: International relations
in the post-cold war era. Toronto: Nelson Canada.
Nossal, K. R. (1999). Liberal-democratic regimes, international sanctions, and
global governance. In R. Varynen (Ed.), Globalization and global governance
(pp. 127–149). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Oberleitner, G. (2005). Porcupines in Love: The intricate convergence of human
rights and human security. Ehrlr, 6, 588–606.
Pedersen, M. B. (2008). Promoting human rights in Myanmar: A critique of
Western sanctions Policy. Denver: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pedersen, M. B. (2013). The theoretical case for principled engagement. In
M. B. Pedersen & D. Kinley (eds.), Principled engagement: Negotiating
human rights in repressive states (pp. 13–38). Farnham: Ashgate.
Pedersen, M. B., & Kinley, D. (2013). Introducing Principled Engagement. In
M. B. Pedersen & D. Kinley (Eds.), Principled Engagement: Negotiating
human rights in repressive states (pp. 1–12). Farnham: Ashgate.
Rose, E. A. (2005). From Punitive to a Bargaining Model of Sanctions: Lessons
from Iraq. International Studies Quarterly, 49, 459–479.
Sidoti, C. (2013). Ten Principles for Engagement. In M. B. Pedersen & D. Kinley
(eds.), Principled engagement: Negotiating human rights in repressive states
(pp. 39–56). Farnham: Ashgate.
Simmons, B. (2010). Treaty compliance and violation. Annual Review of Political
Science, 13, 273–296.
310 M.B. PEDERSEN

Tannenbaum, M., & Rose, W. 2003. “When and why economic sanctions
strengthen the target regime: A constructivist examination of the impact of
state control of the media in Serbia”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the International Studies Association-Northeast, Philadelphia, 6 November.
Wood, R. M. (2008). A hand upon the throat of the Nation: Economic sanctions
and state repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly, 52(3),
489–513.

Morten B. Pedersen is a Senior Lecturer, International and Political Studies

Program, UNSW Australia with particular expertise in Burmese politics, human rights,
and international statecraft. He is the coeditor of Principled Engagement: Negotiating
Human Rights in Repressive States (Ashgate, 2013), and author of “How to Promote
Human Rights in the World’s Most Repressive States: Lessons from Myanmar”,
Australian Journal of International Affairs (2013), and Promoting Human Rights
in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
 CHAPTER 17

The UN Security Council and the Problem

of Mass Atrocities
Towards a Grand Bargain

Alex J. Bellamy

Over the past two decades, there has been a significant shift in interna-
tional expectations with respect to how the UN Security Council ought to
respond to genocide and other atrocity crimes. Developments such as the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the ‘protection of civilians’ agenda, and
international criminal law have helped establish a new international regime
for human protection which demands timely and decisive action from the
Council in response to mass atrocities (Bellamy 2016). When the Council
fails, as it is widely judged to have done in Syria, it tends to find itself on
the receiving end of withering criticism, including from a large majority of
states in the UN General Assembly. Such failures have given rise to
renewed calls for restrictions to be placed on use of the veto powers by
the Council’s permanent five members. At the same time, however,
Council activism on Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and other cases has given rise
to renewed concerns about the potential ‘abuse’ of humanitarian justifica-
tions to cover self-interested military interventions by great powers.

A.J. Bellamy (*)

The University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
e-mail: a.bellamy@uq.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 311

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_17
312 A.J. BELLAMY

The 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, in particular, gave rise to new

demands for the Council to become more transparent, accountable,
and restricted in its decision-making – demands which seem to run coun-
ter to the demand for more timely and decisive action in response to
atrocity crimes.
Two trends seem to be at play here. First, the deepening international
consensus on R2P and the protection of civilians in armed conflict is
creating new expectations about what role the Security Council ought to
play in responding to atrocity crimes. Sentiments expressed in the General
Assembly (detailed in Bellamy 2015) demonstrate a very clear – if still
emerging – expectation that the Council has a responsibility to take
reasonable measures to protect populations from atrocity crimes.
Second, as the Council becomes more proactive, and especially as it
turns to the use of more robust measures to protect civilians from geno-
cide and atrocity crimes, demands for accountability – in particular, the
accountability of states acting on Council mandates to the Council itself –
are becoming more prevalent. These two, seemingly divergent, trends are
connected inasmuch as it seems clear that further deepening of consensus
on the use of force or other coercive means for protection purposes will
require steps to address questions of accountability. In short, increasing
expectations of Security Council activism in response to atrocities go hand
in hand with increased demands for accountability.
This chapter will suggest that the twin challenges could be met by com-
bining proposals for veto restraint with proposals for measures to improve the
Council’s accountability and transparency. It proceeds in three main parts.
First, it points to the increasing expectations surrounding the Security
Council’s role in responding to atrocity crimes. Second and third, it considers
the issues of veto restraint and accountability. The conclusion will argue that
although these two considerations have been treated as separate, they are
actually connected and that proponents of Council reform would do well to
bring these elements together into a ‘grand bargain’.

RISING EXPECTATIONS: R2P AS THE NORMATIVE STANDARD

R2P, which was described as an ‘emerging norm’ in 2001 (ICISS 2001),
has now become an established international norm. That is because there
are now ‘shared expectations’ within international society that (1) states
should protect their own populations, (2) that the international commu-
nity should act to protect populations when states are manifestly failing to
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 313

protect their own and (3) that failure to exercise this responsibility should
attract criticism. The combination of practice, in which measures have
been adopted in the hope of fulfilling R2P, and the ongoing consideration
of the norm in the UN General Assembly and Security Council have been
central to its emergence by helping establish precedents and shared expec-
tations which limit the decisions that can be legitimately taken in response
to genocide and mass atrocities, making it more difficult (but by no means
impossible) for those institutions charged with protection responsibilities,
most notably the UN Security Council, to avoid acting upon them alto-
gether (Doyle 2011: 82).
To what extent do states recognise a ‘right’ or a ‘duty’ to act on R2P?
The question of ‘rights’ is the more straightforward issue. In contrast to
earlier times, when the Security Council’s authority over ‘internal’ matters
was questions, no state now disputes the right of the UN Security Council
to adopt measures in respect to R2P or the right of individual states and
regional organisations to provide encouragement and assistance to states
on a consensual basis. Moreover, not even the much cautious Council
members, such as China and Russia, now openly question the appropri-
ateness of including R2P matters on the Council’s agenda. When justify-
ing their first Security Council vetoes on Syria in October 2011, Russia
argued that it undertook ‘intensive, constructive efforts to develop an
effective response on the part of the Council’ (including an earlier
Presidential statement), whilst China called for the Council to do more
to encourage domestic reform and indicated its support for an alternative
draft resolution focused on political dialogue. Neither questioned whether
it was legitimate for the Security Council to involve itself in Syria, despite
the fact that the situation was then still a largely domestic affair.
The associated question of whether there exists a ‘duty’ to protect other
populations is altogether more difficult to untangle. It is also an issue that
has animated moral philosophers (compare Pattison 2010; Roff Perkins
2013). Whilst the 2005 agreement on R2P did not extend international
society’s legal rights with respect to intervention and interference in the
domestic affairs of states, it did award special responsibilities to the UN
Security Council. These have made it more difficult for the Council to
justify complete inaction in the face of genocide and mass atrocities
(Chesterman 2011: 279). In paragraph 139 of the World Summit
Outcome Document, states acknowledged an international responsibility
to ‘use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United
314 A.J. BELLAMY

Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic

cleansing and crimes against humanity’. This responsibility should be
exercised ‘through the United Nations’ and specifically through
Chapters VI (peaceful measures), VII (enforcement measures) and VIII
(regional arrangements) of the UN Charter, awarding a special role to the
Security Council. Individual member states have begun to acknowledge
these responsibilities in their statements to the Council. On the occasion
of the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Lithuania told the
Security Council that ‘the international community has a duty and moral
responsibility to make sure that genocide and crimes against humanity have
no place in the twenty-first century’ (S.PV.7155, 16 April 2014, p. 19).
Chile made a similar call, noting: ‘We urge the Security Council, in particular
its permanent members, to shoulder that responsibility’ (S.PV.7155, 16
April 2014, p. 20). Chad, too, agued that ‘the Security Council should
react with urgency in the event of mass crimes based on its responsibility
to protect’ (S.PV.7155, 16 April 2014, p. 25). There are also signs that the
Council’s permanent members are beginning to recognise this responsibility
though they are unsurprisingly more cautious in their approach. The United
States, for example, has argued that ‘We have affirmed – all of us – the duty of
each Government to protect its citizens from mass atrocities. We have stated
our preparedness under the Charter of the United Nations to respond when
States require help in fulfilling that duty’ (S.PV.7155, 16 April 2014, p. 13).
Though stopping short of explicitly acknowledging a duty to protect, even
China has recognised that international society ought to take steps to pre-
vent genocide and mass atrocities, arguing that ‘the international commu-
nity should use dialogue, good offices and mediation, among other tools, to
promote the settlement of disputes and differences and contain the escala-
tion of conflict and halt genocide and other crimes against humanity at
source’ (S.PV.7155, 16 April 2014, p. 12, emphasis added).
Another key test is the extent to which clear compliance failures – in this
case failures to exercise the international R2P – attracts criticism. Because
norms set expectations of appropriate behaviour, it is somewhat easier to
see them at work when they are violated than when they are complied
with. If clear failures to comply with a norm do not elicit criticism from
within the relevant society, this is an obvious sign that the shared expecta-
tions related to it are non-existent, weak or else easily trumped by compet-
ing norms (Shannon 2000: 297). Conversely, criticism is a clear indication
that a society judges a course of action to be inappropriate because it does
not comply with its norms.
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 315

The most obvious failure to comply with international expectations

associated with R2P has been in Syria, where the Security Council has
been too weak and divided to lead a timely and decisive response. The UN
General Assembly responded to this ineffectualness by signalling its strong
disapproval of the Council’s actions and endorsing a more resolute
approach. Large majorities in the Assembly voted to recommend many
of the measures vetoed in the Security Council. On 26 February 2012, the
Assembly voted by 137 to 12 (with 17 abstentions) to condemn ‘wide-
spread and systematic human rights violations by the Syrian authorities’, to
call on all armed groups to end the violence, and to support the Arab
League peace initiative (A.66/L.36, 16 February 2012). Among the
supporters of that resolution were Brazil, India, South Africa and
Pakistan. In addition, the General Assembly expressly criticised the
Security Council’s handling of the crisis in Syria. On 3 August 2012, the
Assembly voted 132 to 12 for a resolution that ‘deplored’ the Council’s
failure to adopt effective measures to protect civilians (GA/11266, 3
August 2012). Brazil and South Africa were among the countries that
supported this resolution. More recently, the UN Human Rights
Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, led by Paulo Pinheiro, argued
that the Security Council ‘bears responsibility’ for allowing the continua-
tion of war crimes and crimes against humanity by all sides. The will-
ingness of the General Assembly and UN Secretariat to criticise the
Council offers clear evidence of shared expectations within international
society about the Security Council’s responsibility to do what it can to
protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities.
There are therefore strong grounds for concluding that over the past
few years, R2P has emerged as an international normative standard. This is
most obvious in the underlying changes to practice, whereby international
responses to genocide and mass atrocities have become more common and
more focused on protecting populations, but can also be seen in the
critical responses to failures to protect and in the emerging tendency of
states, including permanent members of the Security Council, to acknowl-
edge positive duties in this regard.

VETO RESTRAINT
The genesis of the R2P was in significant part a response to two sets of
perceived failings on the part of the UN Security Council in the 1990s.
There were failures of will exemplified by its decision to not authorise a
316 A.J. BELLAMY

decisive response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda or the robust enforce-

ment of its ‘safe areas’ policy in Bosnia the following year. There were also
failures of diplomacy, exemplified by the Council’s inability to reach
consensus on how to respond to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, a
failure that prompted some member states to take matters into their own
hands by forcibly intervening without the authorisation of the Security
Council – a violation of the UN Charter prompted by grave humanitarian
concern. It was these perceived failures that prompted then UN Secretary
General, Kofi Annan to use his 1999 address to the UN General Assembly
to challenge international society to find a better way of balancing huma-
nitarian responsibilities with the international rule of law. This was the
challenge taken up by the ICISS, which focused heavily on the work of the
Security Council in its 2001 report. It is unsurprising, therefore, that
although the UN membership chose to not adopt the Commission’s
key recommendations for the Security Council, paragraph 139 of the
2005 United Nations World Summit agreement identified the Council
as bearing special responsibilities for the protection of populations from
‘atrocity crimes’.
The adoption of R2P at the World Summit in 2005 reflected a growing
commitment to human protection on the part of the Council, already
evident in its adoption of the protection of civilians as a thematic agenda in
Resolution 1265 (2000) and in the creation of protection mandates for
peacekeeping operations, the first of which came in Sierra Leone in 2000.
Nevertheless, the Council was initially reluctant to embrace, let alone act
upon, the responsibilities laid out by R2P largely owing to fears on the
part of Russia, China, and some non-Western, non-permanent members
that the new concept masked an interventionist political agenda. Over
time, the Council has grown significantly more supportive of R2P and
comfortable with its use in both thematic and operational resolutions to
the point where the inclusion of R2P language in Council resolutions has
become almost habitual in situations characterised by the threat or com-
mission of atrocity crimes. But at crucial moments, its capacity to respond
effectively to atrocity crimes has been stymied by the use of the veto by one
or more of the five permanent members. Most obviously, a series of vetoes
by Russia and China blocked collective action on Syria, despite the conflict
that claimed quarter of a million lives. Syria stands as a stark reminder,
should one be needed, that the Council is a political body – one that is
subject to the competing interests, values, and power relations of its
member states (see Luck 2006). But it is from this very fact that the
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 317

Council derives both its unique authority and its unique capacity to
enforce its demands when common ground between its members can be
found. Indeed, the veto powers and flexibility bestowed upon the Council
by the Charter are among the principal reasons why the great powers
continue to recognise the Council’s authority and utility, and to work
through the Council when they can.
Nevertheless, the use of veto to block collective action in response to
atrocity crimes has emerged as the sharpest expression of the gap between
international expectations of the Council’s role and the practical reality.
For all that the Council has committed itself to R2P, its response to actual
crises remains dependent on the non-use of the veto. Unsurprisingly this
has given rise to calls for veto restraint. Such calls are hardly new. At the
UN’s founding conference, in San Francisco, Australia’s Doc Evett argued
vociferously against the veto but the great powers successfully countered
that there would be no agreement on a UN system of collective security
without such provisions. More recently, confronting threatened Russian
and Chinese vetoes on Kosovo in 1999, the French foreign minister
Hubert Vedrine suggested that the Council adopt a code of conduct
that would restrict the use of the veto in humanitarian crises. The idea
was also pushed by the United Kingdom, which warned that coalitions of
states would seek to act to protect populations from atrocities outside the
Council framework if the Council was blocked by what Tony Blair
described as ‘unreasonable vetoes’. This logic was indeed used by the
United Kingdom to justify intervention in Kosovo without a Council
mandate (see Morris and Wheeler 2007). Tellingly (and contra to much
commentary), it was not used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq – there,
the United States and United Kingdom argued that intervention was
legitimated by a long string of resolutions stemming back to the initial
authorisation to use force to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990.
Nonetheless, Iraq temporarily weakened global interest in the issue of
veto restraint, but the question came back to the fore in response to the
use of vetoes to block action on Syria.
The vetoes on Syria persuaded France, supported by Mexico, to articu-
late proposals for a new code of conduct – a voluntary agreement by UN
Security Council members that they would not use their vetoes in situa-
tions where the UN Secretary General advised that atrocity crimes were
being committed, where a majority (9) of Council members supported
action and where permanent members had no vital national interests at
stake. What France and Mexico envisaged was not a formal or binding code,
318 A.J. BELLAMY

much less a revision to the Charter, neither of which would stand much
chance of success, but rather a voluntary statement of principle that would
have the effect of increasing the political costs associated with casting a veto.
But there are some grounds for caution on this score – not only
because it is unlikely that the permanent members would accept con-
straints on their room for manoeuvre, but also because it is not entirely
clear that such constraints would be cost-free for international peace
and security. Although a veto is undoubtedly frustrating to those on
the receiving end, its omnipotence – and capacity to derail efforts to
stop atrocities across the board – is greatly exaggerated. It is much
more common for the Council to choose to not to respond to atrocities
in a timely and decisive way (because of national interests, a lack of will,
anticipated costs, or lack of a strategy) than it is for a willing and
capable Council majority to be blocked by veto. Moreover, consensus
in the Security Council is, and always has been, much more common.
Even today, when political relations between the West and Russia are
deeply fractured, consensus on responding to atrocity crimes is much
more common than the veto.
Although commentary on the gridlock in the Security Council over
Syria and projects a rightfully bleak picture, the council has achieved
noteworthy consensus on a range of other protection issues. Today, its
agenda includes:

• timely and decisive action (including the use of force) to protect

populations from atrocities and chronic instability in Cote d’Ivoire,
Libya, Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic);
• the use of force and other coercive measures to counter violent
extremists and terrorists (Islamic State);
• intervention brigades to restore order and protect civilians (in the
Democratic Republic of Congo);
• referring individuals and situations suspected of committing war
crimes and/or crimes against humanity to the International
Criminal Court (in cases such as Lord’s Resistance Army leader
Joseph Kony and Sudan’s Darfur region);
• delivering humanitarian aid without the consent of the host govern-
ment (Syria);
• implementing peace agreements (in Lebanon, Liberia, and Burundi)
and assisting fragile states (Haiti); and
• the disarmament of chemical weapons (Syria).
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 319

The Security Council has found sufficient unity to act on most of these
issues. By inhibiting action that does not enjoy the support of the great
powers, the veto allows the Council to set aside those issues on which it
cannot agree but to remain engaged on those others – the great majority
of cases – where they can. For these reasons, veto restraint proposals
should continue to focus on informal measures to raise the political costs
of casting a veto rather than the loftier goal of binding restrictions. Not
only would it be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the Council to
accept binding restrictions when looking at the Council’s role as a whole,
it is also not obvious that international peace and security is best served
overall by veto restraint. What is more, veto restraint speaks only to one of
the core problems identified above – that of Council inaction in the face of
atrocity crimes. By itself, it could actually exacerbate the other problems,
such as unaccountable military enforcement and regime change. Without
action there, those states that see the veto as an important check on
Western hegemony would be unlikely to accept even modest proposals
for voluntary and informal veto restraint. That is why proposals for veto
restraint must go hand in hand with proposals for greater accountability.

ACCOUNTABILITY
If the Security Council’s response to Syria can be characterised as ‘too
little, too late’ (as a result of a series of double vetoes), critics of the
NATO-led intervention in Libya might characterise that expedition as
‘too much, too soon’. Controversy surrounded the implementation of
Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011, stemming from the
widely held view that the actions of NATO and its allies went beyond – or
indeed violated – the resolution’s terms. Key in this regard were the
coalition’s apparently overt pursuit of regime change despite the absence
of a specific mandate to that effect (though the resolution did not prohibit
regime change and did permit ‘all necessary measures’), the supply of arms
to rebel groups potentially in contravention of the Council’s arms
embargo and NATO’s unwillingness to countenance a negotiated settle-
ment despite specific provisions to that effect in the resolution. These
concerns provoked sharp debates within the Council, leading many ana-
lysts to claim (despite a paucity of evidence to this effect, see Jones 2015)
that the fallout from Libya caused the Council’s deadlock on Syria.
One useful way of thinking about the lessons that need to be learnt about
the oversight of mandates to use force in order to protect populations in the
320 A.J. BELLAMY

wake of controversies over Libya – and Cote d’Ivoire – can be found in some
aspects of the concept of ‘responsibility while protecting’ championed by
Brazil. The concept was proposed first by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff
at the September 2011 plenary of the General Assembly. Towards the end of
2011, the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the UN circulated a note out-
lining the concept in more detail and co-hosted an informal dialogue in
February 2012. Although there was some initial scepticism among some
Western states, who saw the concept as an attempt to derail implementation
of R2P, the initiative was widely welcomed, including by the Secretary
General, for providing fresh ideas to stimulate discussion about how to
implement those most controversial aspects of R2P that relate to coercion
and the use of force. In relation to the issues of accountability mentioned
earlier, there are three particularly important elements of this concept:
decision-making criteria for the use of force, the provision of judicious
analysis to guide decision-making and the establishment of an accountability
mechanism to oversee the Council’s work.
Among other things, the Brazilian letter called for enhanced procedures
to ‘monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and
implemented to ensure “responsibility while protecting”’ and for the
Council to ensure ‘the accountability of those to whom authority is
granted to resort to force’. These are important considerations if the
Council is to continue to play an active role in the protection of popula-
tions from atrocity crimes. Security Council resolutions generally do have
reporting requirements, as indeed Resolution 1973 did, but there is
concern that these requirements are not sufficiently complied with. For
example, there was little transparency around the way in which NATO
reported its activities in Libya to the Secretary General during its campaign
over Libya and the contents of its reports. Moreover, when the Libyan
regime made entreaties about a negotiated ceasefire, NATO rejected those
pleas out of hand without first discussing the issue with the Council. This
raised concerns among some Council members that, in effect, NATO had
assumed control over all aspects of the international community’s response
to the crisis in Libya, denying the Council the primacy on the issue that it
is entitled to by virtue of the Charter.
Brazil’s letter calls for strengthened procedures to allow the Security
Council to hold states that act on its mandate to account flow directly
from the Libya experience. However, although there is clear merit in the
argument for stronger accountability, there are problems with Brazil’s
initial proposal for special mechanisms to govern R2P enforcement
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 321

operations. First, the UN Charter gives to the Security Council wide

flexibility in terms of the actions it can take in pursuit of its primary
responsibility for international peace and security and deliberately made
the Council self-regulating. This has allowed the Council to be innovative
when it needed to be and has helped the Council find consensus when that
has proven difficult. New mechanisms would require a change to the
Charter, which could have unintended negative consequences. For exam-
ple, it might weaken the Council’s capacity to respond to other threats to
international peace and security, make consensus-finding more difficult,
and encourage great powers to resolve security issues outside the frame-
work of the UN Charter. Second, the Council’s responsibility covers
international peace and security and not just R2P cases. It would make
no practical sense to have one set of rules for some Chapter VII resolutions
and another set for others. Third, in the past the UN has had bad
experience with excessive political interference in military matters. The
experience of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Bosnia is testament to what can happen when the Security Council tries
to micromanage military operations. Fourth, excessive political require-
ments might inhibit states from implementing Council mandates by push-
ing them to the view that they cannot translate a resolution into a viable
military strategy that they can sell to their publics. This would reduce
implementation of Council mandates, weakening the Council’s credibility
and legitimacy, and inhibiting protection.
These problems should not mean that nothing be done to improve
accountability. Clearly, the Council itself needs to engage in dialogue –
informally at first – about how to improve this accountability loop. Instead
of a new layer of procedural rules, the Security Council should make use of
the powers it already has by writing specific accountability measures into
its resolutions. The Council has already developed a strong repertoire of
accountability measures that might be appropriate. One way forward may
be to foster informal dialogue on the various accountability measures that
the Council already has at its disposal and to inform non-permanent
members especially about what these measures are and when they might
be employed. Such measures include:

• Sunset clauses – Authorisations could be time limited, forcing states

acting on mandates to return to the Council for a renewal. This is
standard practice for UN peacekeeping operations and helps build an
accountability loop.
322 A.J. BELLAMY

• Specific reporting requirements – The Council can, and does, require

reports from those acting on its mandates. In the case of Libya,
Resolution 1973 required that implementing states report their
activities to the Secretary General. In future, the Council might
also require that the Secretary General brief it on these reports or
demand that implementing states report directly to the Council.
• Specific limitations – The Council might specifically rule out certain
courses of action – for example, Resolution 1973 forbade the
deployment of ground troops as an occupying force in Libya.
• Direct action – The Council might directly mandate or require
diplomatic activity, the dispatch of envoys or acceptance of nego-
tiated agreements.
• Information gathering – To supplement or replace reporting from
implementing states, the Council might mandate its own fact-finding
mission to gather information about the implementation of its
mandates.

Pursuing this route to greater accountability would reduce the like-

lihood of unintended negative consequences, allow the tailoring of
accountability measures to individual circumstances, and make use of the
Security Council’s existing authority under the UN Charter. Interestingly,
in 2015, Brazilian diplomats intimated that their own thinking had
evolved along similar lines towards a focus on how the Council could
write its own accountability checks into mandates. Such guidance could be
provided to non-permanent members, so that they might propose the
inclusion of accountability measures in draft resolutions.

A GRAND BARGAIN?
The UN Security Council stands at a fork in the road: Should it continue
down the path of fulfilling its R2P populations from atrocity crimes or
pursue a more limited vision of international peace and security? Global
expectations stemming from a shared understanding that the Council has
a responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect populations
from atrocity crimes clearly suggest the former, and the Council tends to
be criticised sharply when it fails to protect. This, in turn, has given rise to
renewed calls for a code of conduct governing the (non)use of the veto in
situations involving the commission of atrocity crimes. But increasing
Council activism in the name of human protection inevitably involves
 17 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES 323

the more regular use of coercive measures – sometimes without the con-
sent of the host state. In recent years, the Council has broken new ground
in pursuing its protection responsibilities: For the first time, in 2011, it
authorised the use of force against a state (Libya) for protection purposes;
and in 2014, again for the first time, it authorised the delivery of huma-
nitarian aid across an international border without the consent of the
affected state. In taking these measures, the Council was acting upon
authority granted to it by the UN Charter in 1945. But this increasing
willingness to employ its supranational authority for protection purposes
has attracted concern and criticism – not least owing to long-standing fears
that powerful states might use that authority to legitimise the use of force
to advance their own interests. As such, most states are unlikely to accept
restrains on the veto for fear that this will weaken restraints on the inter-
national use of force more generally. It is for that reason that this chapter
suggests that, rather than being treated as solitudes, proposals for veto
restraint and enhanced accountability should go hand in hand.
If the Security Council is to fulfil its R2P, it stands to reason that it needs
to find ways of reaching consensus on these thorny issues. In the great
majority of cases, the Council succeeds on that score but – as Syria shows –
where it fails, the results can be catastrophic. A voluntary and informal
agreement on restraining the use of the veto might help to facilitate the
search for common ground by increasing the political costs of not doing so.
But in order to assuage fears that this might lead simply to an increase of
armed intervention globally – and not necessarily more humanitarian inter-
vention – the code of conduct on veto restraint should stipulate that resultant
resolutions ought to contain a series of accountability measures to ensure
that the Council itself – and not implementing states – remains in control of
the use of force that it authorises. Only by combining veto restraint with
measures to guard against the abuse or expansion of Council mandates can
international society balance the twin imperatives of doing more to protect
vulnerable populations without undermining some of the basic rules that are
fundamental to the maintenance of global order – and peace.

REFERENCES
Bellamy, A. J. (2015). The responsibility to protect turns ten. Ethics and
International Affairs, 29(2), 161–185.
Bellamy, A. J. (2016). The humanization of security? The emerging international
human protection regime. European Journal of Security, 1(1), 112–133.
324 A.J. BELLAMY

Chesterman, S. (2011). Leading from behind: The responsibility to protect, the

Obama doctrine, and humanitarian intervention after Libya. Ethics and
International Affairs, 25(2), 279–285.
Doyle, M. W. (2011). International ethics and the responsibility to protect.
International Studies Review, 13(1), 72–84.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (2001). The
responsibility to protect. Ottawa: IDRC.
Jones, B. (2015). The security council and the changing distribution of power. In
S. Von Einsiedel, D. M. Malone, & B. S. Ugarte (Eds.), The UN Security
Council in the 21st century (pp. 793–814). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Luck, E. C. (2006). The UN security council. London: Routledge.
Morris, J., & Wheeler, N. J. (2007). The security council’s crisis of legitimacy and
the use of force. International Politics, 44(2), 214–231.
Pattison, J. (2010). Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect:
Who should Intervene? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roff Perkins, H. (2013). Global justice and the responsibility to protect: A provi-
sional duty. London: Routledge.
Shannon, V. P. (2000). Norms are what states make of them: The political
psychology of norm violation. International Studies Quarterly, 44(2), 293–316.

Alex Bellamy is Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of
Queensland, Australia. He is also Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the
International Peace Institute, New York and Fellow of the Academy of Social
Sciences. He is also author of Responsibility to Protect: A Defence (Oxford
University Press, 2014) and Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of
Civilian Immunity (Oxford University Press, 2012), and co-editor of Providing
Peacekeepers (Oxford University Press, 2013).
 PART III

Reforming Global Institutions

 CHAPTER 18

The Future of National Security

and the Role of States

Allan Behm

National security as a central domain of public policy and the role of the state in
delivering public policy outcomes are together undergoing a profound trans-
formation. Globalisation in all its manifestations – the warming of the global
climate, the emergence of freewheeling and anomic global economic and
financial markets, terrorism as a global form of asymmetric warfare, civil wars,
and their consequent refugee flows – is creating a new and unfamiliar set of
security problems. Moreover, this new set of security problems is generating an
entirely new security landscape for which most nation states are ill prepared,
lacking as they do the basic policy tools to address unforeseen issues.
This emerging phenomenon has a number of elements. One of them is
the inadequacy of the analytical instruments available to policy makers.
Another is the cloistered and self-absorbed nature of the security policy
community, comfortably locked as it is behind the doors of security classi-
fication regimes and a general aversion to accountability. Yet another is the
inadequacy of most governments in looking beyond narrow sectional inter-
ests to address problems that face the international community as a
whole. And, of course, there is the manifest inability of most international
organisations as currently configured to transcend the narrow infighting

A. Behm (*)
Knowledge Pond, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
e-mail: allanjbehm@gmail.com

© The Author(s) 2017 327

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_18
328 A. BEHM

and atrophy into which the immediate post-World War 2 dispensation

has degenerated. The overwhelming fact is new problems demand new
solutions, and the international community has yet to devise ways of
achieving this.

THE SEDUCTIVE NATURE OF REALISM

Western writers and commentators on national security are curiously
homogeneous. They are mostly male, middle-aged academics with poli-
tical science or economics backgrounds, writing and talking to each other
within a closed system, using the same language and vocabulary unaffected
by philosophical, cultural, or linguistic variability. They generally support
the Realist Theory of international politics so brilliantly developed by
Hans Morgenthau over sixty years ago. The conceptual paradigm and its
supporting language and terminology is univocal, which means that terms
like power, sovereignty, security, state, morality, and law – to identify just
a few – have a constant meaning in the Western strategic discourse.
The Realist Theory is based on a set of intersecting propositions: the
belief that politics is governed by objective laws; that interest is defined in
terms of power (which, of course, is there to be manipulated, thereby
generating transformation); that political action has moral significance;
that there is no necessary correlation between the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with universal moral laws; and that the world of interna-
tional politics is autonomous and distinct. These propositions, however,
are founded on even more fundamental assumptions: that there are objec-
tive laws, that there are universal moral laws, and that international politics
is an autonomous and distinct domain (Morgenthau 1966). Increasingly,
these assumptions, and the propositions that they support, are contested,
not least of all by those who aspire to establish a new way of doing strategic
business – the governments of China and India.
They are also contested by the more heterodox strategic analyst, Robert
D. Kaplan. Writing in Stratfor, Kaplan described realism as a ‘way of
thinking, not a set of instructions as to what to think’ (Kaplan 2014).
Yet even Kaplan, who entertains a more acerbic and less optimistic view of
the world’s strategic future than most other commentators, does not avoid
the ‘either-or’ polarities that have come to define the analytical paradigm
on which so much of the work of Western strategic commentators is
based. Kaplan does, however, offer the more interesting insight that
realism ‘is imbued with a hard morality of best possible outcomes under
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 329

the circumstances rather than a soft morality of good intentions’ (Kaplan

2014). By redefining morality in international relations in terms of ‘ends’
rather than the more traditional ‘means’, Kaplan is actually redefining
realism as pragmatism. This rather turns Morgenthau on his head by
portraying strategic success in terms of a satisfactory outcome rather
than the application of objective laws. With characteristic insight, Philip
Bobbitt proposes an elegant means of resolving the tension between ends
and means as static and linear polarities by repositioning them as dynamic
coefficients having a much more fluid relationship where ends may
become means and vice versa (Bobbitt 2008).
The instinctive reaction of Western strategists, and the governments
they advise, is to reassert the dominance of Western conceptual models
and the strategic architectures they are designed to support. Defence
Colleges and Strategic Studies Institutes across the Western group of
like-minded countries invite promising young officers and students from
China and India to attend their courses, thereby educating them in the
principles of strategic analysis and at the same time attempting to shore up
Western strategic supremacy by defining both the strategic game and its
rules. This is what some Western governments like to call ‘soft power’ –
achieving dominance through persuasion rather than imposition. What
this approach actually achieves is to afford young strategists from the rising
centres of strategic power exactly the opportunity that is denied to young
Western strategists – the ability to understand how the ‘other side’ thinks.
In some respects, this analytical straightjacket was the result of the
expansion of Western strategic power, especially that of Great Britain,
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Along with the great
trading companies, Britain through its technology, civil administration,
and, of course, the Royal Navy, adopted a dominant position in Asia,
governing India as a Dominion and isolating China under its own sclerotic
imperial government.
As Niall Ferguson has pointed out, the decline of the British Empire
more or less coincided with the rise of American hegemony (Ferguson
2004). From the point of view of the Western community of nations,
this was no bad thing. As British treaties and alliances slowly morphed
into, or were overtaken by, US treaties and alliances, Western strategic
dominance was maintained. Whether through the North Atlantic
Treaty (1949), the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
the United States and Japan (1949), the ANZUS Treaty (1951), the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and
330 A. BEHM

the United States (1951), the Mutual Defence Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea (1953), and the Manila Pact
(1954), or through second-tier British agreements such as the Five
Power Defence Arrangements (1971), the Anglophone West has been
able to control the dynamics of global strategic power, more or less
unhindered, for the best part of seventy years. But, more than that, it
has been able to control the language and the logic of the global
strategic discourse.
It has become something of an axiom in contemporary political dis-
course that whoever controls the language controls the issue. This has
nowhere been more practised than in the controversies surrounding global
warming (‘climate change’ sounds much more neutral), global refugee
flows (‘queue jumpers’ sounds much more threatening), and terrorism
(‘criminal violence’ is far too commonplace). Language generates its own
policy logic. The world of political discourse is simply catching up with a
phenomenon that has distinguished the global strategic discourse since
World War 2.
But there are subtle early signs emerging that this situation is changing.
Language and meaning are now contestable. Two examples, each with
profound significance, suffice to illustrate this development: ‘security’ and
‘rule of law/rule by law’.

SECURITY
Whether it is in Canberra, London, Ottawa, or Washington, the symbols
of government preoccupation with security in the sense that has domi-
nated the second half of the twentieth century are only too visible:
bollards, CCTV, metal detectors, vehicle barriers, high fences, razor
wire, armed police officers, security patrols – all of them designed to instil
public confidence that government is addressing the threat of global
terrorism. The fact that most of these physical security measures focus
on the Australian and Canadian parliaments, the UK Houses of
Parliament, the Capitol in Washington, and government institutions dis-
plays a measure of introspection by governments and their advisors that
betrays a preoccupation with the threat of political violence directed
towards governments, government institutions, and the people who are
employed there. This narrow focus fails to come to terms with the fact that
government and institutional security is not synonymous with public
safety. It also fails to come to terms with the fact that terrorist events are
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 331

more likely to involve transport systems (London and Madrid), commer-

cial centres (the World Trade Centre), and spaces where the public may be
at risk (Martin Place in Sydney).
The difference between security and safety is most starkly demonstrated
in the United States, where, over the past decade, gun violence has killed
428 times more Americans than has terrorism. And even if that compar-
ison is extended to include the attack on the world Trade Centre (9/11),
the difference remains pronounced: for every American killed by terrorists
between 2001 and 2014, guns killed more than 127 (Ting 2015). The
United States, of course, represents a unique set of circumstances. But the
comparison in Australia is revealing nonetheless. Since 2002, 91
Australians have died in terrorist incidents – 88 in Bali and three in
Sydney (though whether the Martin Place siege was an act of terrorism
is yet to be determined by the Coroner). In the same period, gunmen have
killed over 3000 Australians (Alpers et al. 2015). This figure does not
include suicides.
When looked at through the lens of the myriad factors that might
threaten the physical well-being of a citizen – suicide, motor vehicle
accidents, homicide, diabetes, HIV, cancer, cardiovascular disease, obesity,
and diabetes – the risk of terrorism in Australia is insignificant (Michaelson
2010). Yet the focus on ‘security’ affords it a prominence out of all
proportion to the threat. Indeed, in many policy pronouncements by
Western governments, the term ‘security’ has itself become trivialised as
it morphs into a symptom of fear rather than a tool of strategic logic.
It is perhaps for this reason that the denotation and the connotation of
the term ‘security’ are broadening, taking on a multidimensional character
that has profound implications for the policy architectures that support
conventional approaches to ‘national security’, ‘state security’, and
‘national defence’ – preoccupied as they all are with the acquisition,
deployment, and use of armed force and military conflict. Whereas, in
the Realist dispensation, the focus of ‘security’ has been on the institutions
of government and the symbols of state power (as noted earlier, the major
physical and operational security enhancements around national parlia-
ments and military and paramilitary executive organisations), demographic
and societal changes are bringing new security issues to the table.
Increasingly, ‘security’ comprehends something more fundamental and
compelling than the ability of the state to protect its sovereignty against
threats from other states – important though that is to the safety of the
citizens. Security has as much to do with clean water, reliable food
332 A. BEHM

supplies, opportunities for children, freedom from ethnic or racial

violence, the ability to live a fulfilling life – in other words, individual
and community well-being. In some senses, this evolved concept of secur-
ity reflects a broad community wish to be free from threat – to be free from
military service than to be free because of it. More importantly, however, it
reflects the arrival of opportunity, prosperity, resilience, and well-being as
key policy imperatives (Behm 2009).
In the most fundamental sense, national security is an artefact of
national economic and political strength. Curiously, most formal expres-
sions of Western security policy, such as the US Quadrennial Defense
Review and the procession of Australian Defence White Papers, focus on
existing or emergent threats. But as these threats are identified and listed,
even the strategic experts are unable to establish a priority list. They rarely,
if ever, look to emerging strategic opportunities. The strategic canard
represented by the ‘Washington-Beijing’ dilemma – the inevitability of a
choice between the United States and China for long-term strategic
security – is derived from an exaggerated sense of threat.
Yet for the United States and its allies, the increasingly interconnected
global economy provides a significant opportunity to enhance national
security by encouraging all states to participate fully in a rules-based
international economic system. John F. Troxell makes an interesting
observation:

I contend that we could pursue a more focused national strategy and do a

better job of allocating resources if we focus on the opportunities as opposed
to [a] wide array of threats. The opportunity that beckons is the increasingly
interconnected global economy and the integral role played by the United
States in both its institutional design and future evolution. A functioning,
interconnected global economy will mitigate most, if not all, of the . . .
threats, whereas a fractured and disconnected global economy will exacer-
bate them. (Troxell 2015)

While there has been an incipient ‘paradigm shift’ in the global approach
to security, this movement is yet to be detected in Australian security
policy. Internationally, consideration of national security issues has
begun to include more basic concepts of values and rights – concepts
that have not replaced the need for states to be able to protect themselves
against aggression, but have rather expanded the basic connotation of
security to accommodate human security concerns. Security as a function
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 333

of the power of the state to protect itself has progressively expanded to

incorporate the basic need for personal and community well-being in a
world where threats from states are diminishing relatively while threats
from other sources are increasing. The growing literature dealing with
global warming and security offers a case in point (Behm 2009).
The national defence and security enterprise in all democratic societies
is grounded on the principle that the core duty of the state is to protect the
liberty of its citizens – the freedom that flows from the recognition that
each citizen has dignity and value. The state is the ultimate guardian of the
individual rights of its citizens, any attack on these rights being tanta-
mount to an attack on the state. And in the parlance of the West, these
rights are generally summed up in the phrase ‘rule of law’ – the equality of
every citizen before the law, the presumption of innocence until guilt is
proved, the separation of powers, the protection of the law against the
arbitrary exercise of power by the state, and the subordination of both the
government and the people to the law. In democratic societies, the entire
legitimacy of the national security effort depends on the individual dignity
and value of the citizens.

RULE OF LAW/RULE BY LAW

The same principle does not hold true, however, in non-democratic
societies. In authoritarian and totalitarian societies – whether communist,
despotic, or religious fundamentalist – the national security enterprise
draws its legitimacy from the protection of the state itself, which is
identified with the government rather than the people.
The governments of such societies claim to operate under the ‘rule of
law’. But the fact is, they do not. They may indeed ‘rule by law’ or ‘rule
according to law’, though more usually they rule by decree or by fiat.
China currently offers an interesting case in point. Since the ascension
of Xi Jinping as China’s President in 2013, China has seen an increasingly
virulent campaign against corruption extending not only to economic
malfeasance and graft, but also to activities deemed to be antisocial or
against the interests of the state. There have been extensive crackdowns on
human rights lawyers, for instance, as well as artists and writers. At the
same time, China has been representing its activities to the international
community as a significant reinforcement of the ‘rule of law’. This is a
significant misnomer, and one that the less critical analyst accepts at face
value to support the more comfortable view that the fundamental drivers
334 A. BEHM

of national defence and security policy, and the doctrinal foundations of

war fighting are the same for all nations. It is the same uncritical view
which asserts that international treaties have the same meaning and force
for all parties.
John Delury is quoted as saying that, because the Chinese language
does not employ prepositions, what is translated as ‘rule of law’ actually
means ‘law and order’ (Chin 2014). In Delury’s opinion, the mistransla-
tion is intentional, designed to lull Westerners into thinking that the
recent imposition of new legal practices in China is simply the application
of the rule of law to a market economy. In fact, it is not. Rather, law
reform in China, as The Wall Street Journal’s Josh Chin has pointed out, is
simply a cover for giving China’s courts independence from local govern-
ment while keeping them firmly in the cage of Communist party control
(Chin 2014).
As a one-party state, China does not practise any separation of powers
between the political and judicial arms of government. The courts are
subject to the direction of the governing party.
The difference between ‘rule of law’ and ‘rule by law’ generates an
interesting paradox: The philosophical and ethical foundations of the
world’s two most important twenty-first century states, China and the
United States, reflect entirely different conceptions of what the state is,
what affords government its legitimacy, and what constitutes the relation-
ship between the citizen and the state. The issue here is not that one is
right and the other wrong. The issue is that the United States and China
have entirely different philosophical and theoretical approaches to the
development of strategic policy, neither accommodating the other. And
as shall be seen later in this chapter, the difference between ‘rule of law’
and ‘rule by law’ has important implications for the way in which the
nation state evolves over time.
Historically, China has based its strategic calculus on the ‘zero sum
game’, where advance for one side demands retreat by the other, where
victory for one side means defeat for the other, and where a win for one
side involves a loss for the other. On the other hand, for the past half
century, US defence planners, consistent with US corporate practice, have
applied a ‘net value adding’ paradigm. Fundamental to US strategy is the
idea that victory is less about the destruction of the opponent than it is
about the resolution of the uncertainties that might generate armed con-
flict in the first place. Both sides thereby ‘win’, though in somewhat
different ways (Behm 2003).
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 335

This strategic paradigm clash is perhaps best illustrated in contemporary

circumstances by the emergent issues in the South China Sea, where China
is intent upon asserting its ‘sovereignty’ – despite the fact that its seabed
claims are contested by six of its neighbours – while the United States is
intent upon asserting universal freedom of navigation (especially that of its
own warships). This is no simple standoff (Stratfor 2015). What this issue
represents is a basic and potentially irreconcilable difference in approach,
reflecting policy antinomies with significant strategic consequences.
The United States and China will dominate the global strategic land-
scape for the rest of this century, and beyond. The lack of strategic
congruence between them has profound implications for the rest of the
global community, at once constraining the strategic options of the
states that constitute that community, while at the same time generating
strategic opportunity as the power balance between the behemoths con-
tinually adjusts. How states manage these constraints and opportunities
will depend on their ability to construct a contemporary security policy
framework and to reconcile the inconsistencies caused by the tension
between bilateral and multilateral approaches to protecting the national
interest. In other words, in an altogether new strategic environment,
states will need to reinvent themselves and devise new ways to meet new
problems. States will need to recalibrate their national security settings
while redefining their role in delivering national security and global
strategic stability.

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: RECALIBRATING

NATIONAL SECURITY SETTINGS
Many governments remain preoccupied with traditional national security
paradigms and the demands of national defence, often at the expense of
national security in the broader sense. The analytical and conceptual
paradigms that underpin much of what currently passes for national
security policy are dysfunctional and sclerotic where they are not comple-
tely outmoded. The current and prospective national canvas extends far
beyond traditional concerns about personal security from criminals and
terrorists and the security of the state against armed conflict. While the
potential for armed conflict between states remains a key consideration for
modern governments, the fact is that intrastate conflicts – civil wars – have
continued to engage the military systems of both the affected states and
336 A. BEHM

their neighbours. The massive refugee flows that affected Europe in the
(northern) summer and autumn of 2015 were testimony to the broader
impact that civil war in one region – in this case the Middle East – can have
on the political and social security of communities elsewhere.
As a result of demographic and social changes, Western democratic
societies are increasingly preoccupied with the demands of employment
and financial security, retirement security, the availability of high-quality
health services and broader issues of social security. While national defence
remains an important consideration, electorates are beginning to consider
non-traditional issues that may impact on their quality of life. Central among
these is the failure of neo-liberalism and the economics of globalisation to
safeguard the prosperity and aspirations of manual labourers and manufac-
turing workers in the advanced industrial economies as global enterprises
and investment institutions search for cheap labour and economies of scale.
If national security is essentially dependent on national economic strength,
any recalibration of national security settings needs to identify the constraints
on economic strength. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to deal
comprehensively with each of these constraints, it is at least worth noting the
range of issues that will increasingly engage national governments in the course
of this century. They include international criminal conspiracy, ranging from
drugs to human trafficking to financial manipulation; cyberattacks; terrorism,
especially the possible use of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruc-
tion; intrastate conflicts that generate massive refugee flows; the continued
erosion of the authority of the UN; and, of course, global warming which
already poses an existential threat to island states.
Global warming, of course, impacts on both the ability of states to
address the anthropogenic causation factors (the growing dependence on
the carbon cycle leading to significant warming of the oceans and melting
of the ice shelves) and the consequences (drought, high impact weather
events, and economic and social dislocation). It is, perhaps, the greatest
threat to stability and security in the twenty-first century.
The World Bank (World Bank 2013) and the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) have both drawn attention to the
impacts on human security – health and relocation – that may result
from global warming. In the absence of any reliable method of estimating
possible population movements, they do not posit any particular quantum
of people that may move within or across borders as a consequence of
climate change. Historical experience suggests, however, that climate
change and the attendant significant weather events have the potential to
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 337

generate millions of refugees as riverine deltas flood (as they have in

Bangladesh), salinity levels rise in low-lying agricultural areas (as they
have in the Mekong Delta), long droughts destroy crops (as they have in
large areas of Africa and the Middle East), and floods and cyclones destroy
densely populated urban areas. It also has the potential to obliterate small
states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Global warming and the resultant natural disasters, together with
the local conflicts that are also often caused by prolonged drought, will
generate significant population movements. The numbers of refugees
fleeing famine, war, and persecution will be multiplied by those who
are seeking long-term personal and family security – employment,
education, and opportunity. These are the so-called ‘economic refu-
gees’ whose plight may be less pressing but nonetheless as real as those
fleeing armed conflict. What this suggests is that the international legal
instruments (conventions, treaties, and agreements) currently available
to governments to assist them in determining the status of displaced
individuals and family groups are no longer fit for purpose. Emerging
as many of these legal instruments did from the calamity of World War
2, they are either too narrow in focus or completely tangential, leaving
displaced people in the no-man’s land of refugee camps and detention
centres. The international community needs to negotiate totally differ-
ent approaches to human displacement and its inevitable consequence
of political, economic, and social marginalisation.
But perhaps the greatest threat to global stability in the second half of
the twenty-first century is the convergence of substantial refugee flows
with what Thomas Piketty has described as the widening global inequality
in wealth. As he notes on the opening page of his monumental Capital in
the Twenty-First Century, ‘[W]hen the rate of return on capital exceeds the
rate of growth of output and income . . . capitalism automatically generates
arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the mer-
itocratic values on which democratic societies are based’ (Piketty 2014).
It is important to note that Piketty’s analysis is in no way deterministic –
inequality does not cause armed conflict. But armed conflict, particularly
on the global scale that distinguished the twentieth century, has an extra-
ordinary ability to even things out.

To a large extent, it was the chaos of war, with its attendant economic and
political shocks, that reduced inequality in the twentieth century. There was
no gradual consensual, conflict-free evolution towards greater equality. In
338 A. BEHM

the twentieth century it was war, and not harmonious democratic or eco-
nomic rationality, that erased the past and enabled society to begin anew
with a clean slate (Piketty 2014 p 275).

The combination of fundamental structural changes in the global balance

of power with the emergence of China and India as major strategic
entities, the mass movement of peoples as a result of global warming,
and the unpredictable consequences of inequality will generate pressures
that the global community has not experienced hitherto. But, as Piketty
notes, ‘socioeconomic inequalities . . . are always both causes and effects of
other developments in other spheres’ (Piketty 2014 p 274).
While the tools for limiting global warming are economic, those for
managing the consequences of global warming will inevitably involve
national military forces in both disaster relief and community safety
(Behm 2008). The employment of military forces in operations other
than war (OOTW) – peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assis-
tance, and disaster relief – have become a more or less permanent feature of
post-World War 2 military action. The extension of military operations into
law enforcement areas such as border operations, illegal fishing, and drug
importation prevention raises important questions about both the nature of
contemporary military power and the role of twenty-first century military
forces. And it certainly raises questions about the appropriate force structure
of military forces and the training of military personnel. In a throwback to
the days of gunboat diplomacy, China is already using its military forces to
inhabit the new islands it is creating in the South China Sea and to
substantiate its claims to the expansion of its potential natural resource
base. The economic role of military forces may be yet another dimension
that transcends the traditional place of military forces in the nation state.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF STATES

Philip Bobbitt has postulated that the nation state is undergoing a pro-
gressive transformation into what he has described as ‘the market state’ – a
state characterised by its dependence on the international capital markets
and on the modern multinational business network to create stability in
the world economy, in preference to management by national or transna-
tional political bodies (Bobbitt 2002).
In a world where the immediacy of communications facilitates immense
and largely unregulated capital flows, for instance, national budgets are
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 339

subject to external factors over which they have little control. But if
managing the national economy is one of the core responsibilities of
government (managing national defence being another), then constraints
on revenue necessarily impact on the ability of the state to deliver credible
defence systems. More importantly, constraints on national governments
impact on the ability of the state to deliver the security to the citizens –
security in terms of freedom from worry – that is measured by national
prosperity, community well-being, social inclusiveness, and amenity.
For this reason, global economic relationships are an increasingly important
dimension of national security. They are also a transformative factor influen-
cing both the nature and the power of the state in the twenty-first century. The
mobility of capital and skills, for instance, imposes altogether new demands on
national governments. In the developing world, the shift from an agricultural
economic base to an industrial economic base is as dependent on investment
and skills as is the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial base for the
developed economies. As less-advantaged and less-developed nations compete
with each other and with the more developed nations for capital and skills, they
will face a global investment market that places no premium on national
development, but rather follows profitability and investment security. At the
same time, they will see their most talented citizens similarly follow high
earnings and security by moving to more economically developed countries.
The consequence will be that those developing nations where corrup-
tion is rife, where transparency and accountability are largely absent, and
where national institutions are incapable of providing the security that
investors demand, will become failed states, generating both internal and
external security threats.
Nor will the international banking institutions of the twentieth century
be able to meet the demands of either failing developing economies or
failed developed economies. The World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and even the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank backed by China, will find themselves increasingly sub-
ject to the competition for funds that distinguishes the entire twenty-first
century investment market.
The competitive scenario is not significantly different for the developed
economies. Notwithstanding the comparatively greater robustness of their
national institutions, their economic pluralism, the greater transparency
and accountability of their governments, and the strength of their regula-
tors, the developed nations will also find themselves locked in a competi-
tion for both investment and skills. The mobility of both cash and skills
340 A. BEHM

will penalise states that lack vision and agility, at the same time rewarding
those states that can adapt to an increasingly deregulated international
financial system, increase productivity, foster innovation, and reorient
national policy settings towards the opportunities generated by global
capital rather than defending a status quo that has passed its use-by date.
This transformation of the nation state into the market state is already
underway. The traditional right of the national government to manage the
national economy through a mix of tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers,
foreign exchange controls, labour market controls, foreign ownership
rules, and taxation policies is slowly eroding. The old interstate contest
between protectionism and free trade has largely given way to a new
contest between capital flows, investment efficiencies, and market dom-
ination over which the nation state has diminishing influence. The under-
lying issue here is the inexorable rise of ‘the market’ as an alternative to
‘the polity’, with the market assuming rights that have traditionally been
the province of the polity, but none of the responsibilities. The market
thrives on a form of economic Darwinism, where only the fittest survive.
The market – amorphous and freewheeling – generates the very forces that
lead to the inequality of which Piketty writes. Corporate leaders who earn
incomes many manifolds greater than the workers they employ and the
shareholders who fund their corporations, who are able to avoid taxation
through complex artificial structures and whose corporate power can hold
governments in their thrall (News Corp, Apple, Google, Amazon and the
energy majors come readily to mind) are increasingly able to behave with
impunity. And international corporations are increasingly beyond the
reach of national governments, using their financial and market power to
frustrate legislative efforts to bring them to heel. Where the payment of
taxes, for instances, becomes increasingly optional, whether through ‘thin
capitalisation’, transfer pricing, or artificial lending regimes, individual
states seem increasingly powerless.
The past four decades have seen national governments increasingly held
hostage by ‘the market’, the demands of global capitalism trumping the
demands of ordinary citizens progressively to improve their lot. ‘Small
government’ has become a mantra, with bank profits and reduced com-
pany taxes enjoying higher government priority than the availability of
affordable housing, the broader provision of advanced medical services,
and improvement in the overall standard of living. The political contumely
that characterised the ‘Brexit’ debate in the United Kingdom, the popu-
lism and policy chaos that distinguished the US presidential campaign, the
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 341

emergence internationally of independents and splinter parties to chal-

lenge the traditional political domination of the major political parties – all
of these are symptoms of a fundamental malaise where the electorate has
lost confidence in government. And while the home of free enterprise
capitalism, the USA, displays some of the greatest economic and social
distortions that have accompanied the ascension of small government
(Gordon 2015), disparity and disadvantage are increasingly shared char-
acteristics of the Western democracies.
The solution lies in the hands of political leaders who are able to maintain
a dialogue with the electorate. Governments need to redefine themselves as
the protectors and managers of the contract between the government and
the governed that defines modern democracies. In a globalised world, the
nation state has to accord priority to the well-being of its citizens, even if
that constrains the freedoms of the international corporations that dictate
their terms to the market. The solution has to be nation states acting
in concert to sanction those states that create artificial tax havens, and to
impose international standards of economic behaviour on a phenomenon –
the market – that is currently out of control.
The recently negotiated Trans Pacific Partnership provides an interest-
ing example. The inclusion of an Investor-State Dispute Settlement provi-
sion would permit foreign investors to sue governments for losses due to
changes in regulatory frameworks, even where such changes are intro-
duced to protect public health, at-risk communities, or the environment.
In other words, investors would be able to sue governments for doing
what they are elected to do – work for the betterment of the community –
if investors were to suffer a consequential financial detriment.
As states evolve politically over the course of the twenty-first century, they
will need to find new ways of doing business, of organising themselves, of
cooperating to achieve mutually beneficial objectives, and of enhancing inter-
national organisations and institutions. Agility and adroitness, and the ability to
generate pragmatic interdependency, will become the hallmarks of the success-
ful twenty-first century state. Just as the European nation states have had to
find new ways of dealing with state indebtedness and refugee flows, so the
nations of the Asia-Pacific region will need to find new ways of dealing with
territorial disputes and the even more dramatic potential consequences of
global warming. The management of tens of millions of refugees, for instance,
will quickly exhaust the resources of any single state acting alone and in its own
interests, no matter how impermeable their border controls might be.
Concerted multilateral action will be the only way in which the nations of
342 A. BEHM

the Asia-Pacific region will be able to meet the multidimensional challenges

that China’s regional strategic pre-eminence, inequalities of wealth between
neighbouring states, potential refugee flows, and the impact of natural disasters
will conspire to create. And at the heart of concerted international action must
be the fundamental recognition that every human being enjoys the same basic
rights by virtue of their very humanity.
This insight is central to the restoration of “the rule of law” as the
cornerstone of the rules-based system without which the international
community will fail in its fundamental duty: the protection and advance-
ment of each individual person who constitutes the national communities
to which each of us belong. As was noted earlier in this chapter, how
individual states resolve the tension inherent in the ‘rule of law/rule by
law’ paradox will impact significantly on personal, communal, and national
security. For those societies where the value of the individual grounds the
political compact between the citizen and the government – generally the
democracies – the personal fulfilment of the people becomes the main goal
of government. For those where the survival of the state apparatus is the
central purpose of government – generally the autocracies – the individual
is but a pawn in the expression of state power.
The great powers will continue to try to stare each other down as they
jostle for dominance. For second and third tier states, long-term strategic
security will depend as much on their ability to create a robust rules-based
international system as on the strength of their alliances with the major
military powers. Bilateral alliances and multilateral arrangements are not
alternatives, of course. They are both operating environments where
national interests are promoted, protected, pursued, and defended.
Bilateral partnerships are under constant review, and the partners work
hard to ensure that they are contemporary and enduring. That is less true
of the multilateral institutions, where organisational change has been sclero-
tic, due as much to the organisational inertia as to the inability of the parties
to provide contemporary relevance. The UN and its agencies, for instance,
are in serious need of institutional modernisation to reflect the dynamics of
the twenty-first century as distinct from the dispensation of the immediate
post-World War 2 years. A UN Security Council without Germany and
India, for example, is considerably less relevant and agile than contemporary
and prospective circumstances demand. Similarly, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR – the UN refugee agency) is simply
unable to cope with the demands resulting from the present crisis in the
Middle East. It is on the verge of bankruptcy, and lacks the personnel and
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 343

materiel resources to meet the demand. Without a radical transformation,

both organisationally and financially, it will be unable to meet the prospec-
tive refugee demands that will inevitably result from global warming.
To paraphrase Thomas Piketty, the past has a habit of devouring the
future (Piketty 2014 p 571). Unless the nation states that constitute the
present global community are able to overcome the inertia that attends
weak leadership and the complacency that attends a lack of imagination
and vision, they will be unable to meet the strategic challenges that will
inevitably confront them. The security of their populations will be dimin-
ished accordingly. The security challenges of this century, whether they
are the consequences of global warming, mass displacement of peoples,
economic inequalities generated by a rampant and unaccountable form of
capitalism, or armed conflicts resulting from new forms of militarism,
nationalism, and ideological confrontation, can only be addressed by
nation states acting together to protect a common humanity. This is
what drives a rules-based international order.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alpers, P., Rossetti, A., & Wilson, M. (2015). “Guns in Australia: Total number of
gun deaths”, Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney:
GunPolicy.org, 5 October 2015 at http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/com
pareyears/10/total_number_of_gun_deaths. Accessed on 12 October 2015.
Behm, A. (2003). Australia’s strategic options in the US-China relationship. In
D. David Lovell (Ed.), Asia Pacific security: Policy challenges (pp. 47–60).
Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.
Behm, A. (2008). “Climate change and security: The test for Australia and Indonesia –
Involvement or indifference?”, conference paper, Nautilus Institute- RMIT
Workshop, 21 November 2008, Accessed on 16 October 2015 at http://nauti
lus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Allan-Behm-SR.pdf.
Behm, A. (2009). Security, prosperity and resilience. In S. Cork (Ed.), Brighter
prospects: Enhancing the resilience of Australia (pp. 67–71). Canberra: Australia 21.
Bobbitt, P. (2002). The shield of achilles (pp. 229). London: Penguin Books.
Bobbitt, P. (2008). Terror and consent (pp. 350–360). London: Allen Lane.
Chin, J. (2014). commenting on views by Professor John Delury (Yonsei
University) http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/20/rule-of-law-
or-rule-by-law-in-china-a-preposition-makes-all-the-difference/. Accessed on
11 August 2015.
Ferguson, N. (2004). Colossus: The rise and fall of the American Empire (pp. 9).
London: Allen Lane.
344 A. BEHM

Gordon, C. (2015). Growing apart: A political history of American inequality at

http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-
inequality/index, Accessed on 1 May 2016.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [C. B. Field, V. R. Barros,
D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee,
K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy,
S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, & L. L. White (Eds..)]. (Cambridge & NY:
Cambridge University Press) at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap12_FINAL.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2015.
Kaplan, R. (2014). “The realist creed”, Stratfor, 19 November 2014
Michaelson, C. (2010). Terrorism in Australia: An inflated threat. Security
Challenges, 6(2), 25.
Morgenthau, H. (1966). Politics among nations (pp. 4–14 4th edn.). New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Trans. Goldhammer, A.
Cambridge Mass & London: Harvard University Press.
Stratfor (2015). “The US and China face off over the South China Sea”, Stratfor,
27 October 2015 at https://www.stratfor.com/sample/image/us-and-china-
face-over-south-china-sea. Accessed on 28 October 2015.
Ting, I. (2015). “Guns killed 428 times more Americans than terrorism
over the past decade”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 2015
http://www.smh.com.au/world/guns-killed-428-times-more-americans-
than-terrorism-over-the-past-decade-20151002-gjzv6t.html. Accessed on
12 October 2015.
Troxell, J. F. (2015). “Economic power: Time to double down”, Strategic
Insights, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/arti
cles/Economic-Power-Time-To-Double-Down/2015/09/29. Accessed on
20 October 2015.
World Bank (2013). Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts,
and the Case for Resilience – A report for the World Bank by the Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics (Washington, DC:
World Bank) at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/07/17/090224b0828c0f20/1_0/
Rendered/PDF/Turn0down0the00lience000full0report.pdf. Accessed on 5
November 2015.

Allan Behm is a former senior strategic and security policy advisor and Chief of
Staff to the Australian Minister for Defence Materiel, Climate Change and
Industry (2009–2013). He has expertise in political and sovereign risk, strategic
 18 THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF STATES 345

planning and security management. Recent publications include No, Minister

(MUP, 2015), ‘Security, Prosperity and Resilience’, Brighter Prospects:
Enhancing the Resilience of Australia (Australia21 and CSIRO, 2009); ‘Climate
Change and Security: The Test for Australia and Indonesia – Involvement or
Indifference?’, APS Net Special Report (2009); ‘The Changing of the Guard’,
Security Solutions (2008); and Strategic Tides (Kokoda, 2007). He is a regular
contributor to The Strategist, the commentary site of the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, and is a frequent media commentator on defence and security
issues.
 CHAPTER 19

The United Nations and Global Security

Rita Parker and Anthony Burke

The United Nations plays a significant, but by no means dominant,

role in the global governance of security. It has been the major forum
for the negotiation and management of major treaty regimes, become
central to international law relevant to security (including international
criminal law), and promoted some normative and analytical innovation
(and change) in international security. Through various UN bodies –
especially the Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping –
it has taken on a direct operational and coordinating role in the
governance of international security, and played significant roles in the
support of more dispersed security governance regimes such as the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and those pertaining to small arms and chemical
and biological weapons. Its role and responses have ranged from being
important, valuable, and effective, to being irrelevant or highly
destructive.

R. Parker (*)
University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia
e-mail: R.Parker@adfa.edu.au

A. Burke
International and Political Studies, University of New South Wales, Canberra,
Australia
e-mail: a.burke@adfa.edu.au

© The Author(s) 2017 347

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1_19
348 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

This chapter critically surveys the evolving architecture of the UN

system as it pertains to global security, with a focus on the changing role
and focus of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the end
of the Cold War. It also makes a case for reform of the Security Council.
Particular consideration is given to the way the Security Council under-
stands its role and purpose in relation to global peace and security, and its
relationship with the General Assembly and other bodies.
Chapter VI of the UN Charter allows the General Assembly to
make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for
maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament,
and for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair
friendly relations among nations. The General Assembly can also dis-
cuss any question relating to international peace and security and make
recommendations, if the issue is not currently being discussed by the
Security Council. This points to a significant imbalance in power
between the General Assembly, representing international society as a
whole, and the Security Council, made up of five permanent members
(who possess a veto of all votes) and nine temporary ones. The
restriction makes sense if the Council is prosecuting its role effectively
and in good faith, but locks out the rest of the UN when it is failing to
do so. The Security Council is the only UN organ with coercive power
and authority, given that it is the body which can authorise the use of
force, raise peacekeepers, impose sanctions, and create international
criminal tribunals and make references to the International Criminal
Court (ICC). This power extends to normative innovation, where it
has occasionally played an encouraging role but more consistently a
conservative one. Normative innovation has more often been driven by
the General Assembly and the Secretariat, with the Sustainable
Development Goals the most recent case in point. Furthermore,
under Article 108 of the UN Charter, the permanent members of
the Security Council possess a veto on amendments to the Charter,
which must be passed with their support plus two-thirds of the General
Assembly; in short, just five states possess the power to enable or block
substantial reforms to the structure of the United Nations.
The determination of what constitutes a threat to peace and security falls
entirely on the UNSC under Article 39 of the UN Charter, which states
in part that the Council shall ‘determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations . . . ’. Within that very broad context, historically the
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 349

Council has focused narrowly on discrete military conflicts and crises. This is
supported by an examination of resolutions by the Security Council over the
20-year period between 1994 and 2014 which we conducted for this book.
That research reveals that the majority of resolutions have been in response
to country-specific issues that were mostly responding to some form of
conflict or crisis. However, as noted in 1992 by the President of the
Security Council, ‘The absence of war and military conflicts amongst
States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’ (S.C. Pres.
Statement 1992/23500, UN 31 January 1992).
The past approach of the Council has meant that it has given much less
attention to non-military and trans-boundary issues, although this has
changed slowly over time. This slowly changing role of the UNSC
is also borne out by the introduction of some non-conflict issues such as
climate change, which have drawn the attention of the Council but also
strong resistance by some members.

CLIMATE CHANGE
The examination of climate change is an illuminating example of the
changing (and obstructive) role of the Security Council. It demonstrates
the strong influence of vested interests in shaping the progress, or not, of
an issue and underscores the need for reform. It also highlights the
concerns about the use of veto by permanent members.
Overall, the UNSC has had a limited role in the relationship between
climate change and security. However, during the 2005 World Summit,
the Security Council passed Resolution 1625 (S/RES/1625 (2005),
which stressed in part: ‘ . . . the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict
prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict and political
and social crises in a comprehensive manner, including by sustainable
development . . . ’. This resolution was interpreted by some UN members
as an opportunity for the Council to take an active role on climate change
(e.g. the Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the
Security Council, UN S/2007/186 [5 April 2007]).
The UNSC subsequently held a debate in 2007 on climate security,
notwithstanding questions regarding whether the Security Council was
the proper forum to discuss the issue. The debate was deeply divided.
350 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

While the United States remained neutral on the topic, Russia and China
strongly opposed the Council’s consideration of climate change, arguing
that it had no role at all and that it was the responsibility of other UN
bodies. Reflecting the strong influence of their arguments, the President
issued a statement (UN S/PV.5663) to assure other UN bodies that the
Council would not undermine their roles in the area of climate change
stating in part, ‘We are not, in this debate, seeking to pre-empt
the authority of those institutions and processes where action is being
decided – the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and
its subsidiary bodies, the United Nations agencies, and, of course, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’. The threat
by Russia and China to use their power of veto required little explanation
on their part, and influenced the structure of the subsequent discussion so
that instead of a formal meeting it was discussed as an informal ‘Arria-
Formula’ meeting. Such informal gatherings do not constitute an activity
of the Council and are convened at the initiative of a member or members
of the Council. Participation in such meetings is for individual members
to decide and differ from the consultations of the whole of the Council
(UN 2002).
Russia and China remained opposed to Security Council considera-
tion of climate change in a second debate in 2011, and continued to use
the threat to use their power of veto. Nonetheless, the debate resulted
in a Presidential Statement on the topic which remains the only formal
outcome document from the Security Council on climate change to
date. The Statement noted in part that, ‘[T]he Security Council
expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change
may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international
peace and security’, and ‘ . . . expresses its concern that possible security
implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise
may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States’ (UN S/PRST/
2011/15).
As noted earlier, it is at the discretion of the Security Council under
Article 39 to determine whether an issue such as climate change represents a
threat to international peace and security, which then enables action. The
fact that there has been such slow progress on an international agreement to
reduce carbon emissions is a direct demonstration of vested interests, parti-
cularly of the permanent members of the Security Council, and major
corporate and allied fossil fuel interests. It is instructive that the 2007
Security Council debate was followed just 2 years later by the failure at
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 351

the UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen. It has also highlighted the limited

influence and ability of the General Assembly to persuade the Security
Council of the magnitude of this issue and of the imperative to take
constructive action. Despite the gravity of Earth System Scientists’ predic-
tions about biodiversity loss and multiple stresses on the biosphere (Steffen
et al. 2015), the Council has never passed a resolution pertaining to the
environment. This is all the more tragic given the hopes expressed in the
United Kingdom’s concept paper for the 2007 debate: that UN members
build a ‘sufficient, shared understanding’ of ‘the combination of risks that
climate change poses to international peace and security’. They had hoped
the meeting would determine ‘how the Security Council [could] play a part
in a more integrated approach to conflict prevention’, how ‘the interna-
tional community [could] prepare more effectively to support States or
regions at increased risk of instability because of climate-related factors’,
and what ‘role there [is] for the Secretariat to better inform the Security
Council and the wider United Nations membership of the risks that climate
change presents to security, and to promote a more coherent response to
reducing that risk across the United Nations family’ (UN S/2007/186, 5
April 2007). Nearly a decade later, these questions are just as compelling.

CONFLICT
Looking at the UN Charter more broadly, under Chapter VII the Council
may investigate issues that could pose a threat to international peace and
security in the future (Article 34), call for a peaceful settlement of a dispute
by arbitration (Article 33.2), and make recommendations to parties in a
dispute (Article 38). The impact of UNSC resolutions on the outcome of
conflict and crisis situations provides an insight into the role of the Council
regarding international security. Indeed, our analysis reveals that the UNSC
resolutions are primarily reactive in nature showing that global security
governance has not kept pace with the globalisation of insecurity. To
some extent this lag has been recognised. For example, at the opening of
the Summit meeting on 23 September 2010, the UN Secretary General,
Ban Ki Moon, noted that ‘The world needs the Security Council to uphold
its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security – fully,
fairly, without delay’. According to the Presidential Statement (SC/10036),
Council members reaffirmed their commitment to protect civilians in situa-
tions of armed conflict, to battle impunity for human rights crimes, and to
empower women and to strengthen national ownership of peace processes,
352 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

among other efforts. However, the Secretary General stressed that more
must be done in all areas, and that all available tools for peacemaking,
peacekeeping, and peace-building must be employed in an integrated fash-
ion, through a more flexible architecture of response. In particular, he noted
that the Council must maintain its long-term commitments to help people
resolve their conflicts, rather than serving as a Band-Aid to keep troubles in
check. The Secretary General’s words reflect that security is a systemic
global issue and one that cannot be viewed from a purely national perspec-
tive. By examining UNSC resolutions, this chapter considers conflict situa-
tions in Sudan, Libya, and Syria in the context of its interpretation of its
mandate under Article 39, and of the changing role of the Council vis-a-vis
other bodies including the International Court of Justice and the ICC.
In the 20-year period surveyed (1994–2014), there have been several
crisis situations that have drawn the attention of the Security Council.
For example, the multiple crises in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Somalia collectively generated
around 330 specific resolutions. However, Security Council resolutions
about the ongoing Syrian conflict and humanitarian crisis were notably
absent except for the 2012 nonbinding peace plan drafted by UN envoy
Kofi Annan and which China and Russia agreed to support only after it
had been significantly modified. Israel–Palestine – a conflict that has
triggered numerous intrastate and regional wars, tens of thousands of
refugees, new forms of radicalisation and terrorism, and high-level UN
and diplomatic investment – is a notable silence in the Security Council
record. Indeed the United States has used its veto 30 times to block
resolutions on the Palestinian question or Israeli military operations,
three times more than vetoes have been used (by the United States
and other P5 states) on other issues such as Southern Africa, Syria, or
Nicaragua (McLean 2014). This shows that considerable concern about
Palestine both in the General Assembly and the Security Council has
been met with an equally determined effort to stymie the efforts of
international society to affect events.
The lack of transparency of the decision-making process and proceed-
ings of the Council continues to be a major problem for the UN in regard
to its governance of international peace and security, notwithstanding
some attempts to reform the Council’s working methods. The introduc-
tion of new procedures in 2000 by the Security Council to keep non-
members of the Council better informed about the status of its delibera-
tions has not fully achieved its goal.
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 353

CRIME
The number of crisis situations raised within the Security Council led to
consideration of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. This
provides an insight into the changing role of the Council and its relationship
with other bodies such as the ICC and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). It also underscores the selective way in which the Security Council is
responsive to the international community and the responsibilities incum-
bent on states under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL).
Impunity, often enabled by great power protection and loopholes in
international law, casts a dark shadow here. In the wake of Israel’s wars
against Gaza, indiscriminate warfare against civilians in the final stage of
the Sri Lankan Civil War, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the conse-
quent US support for Shia death squads, Ramesh Thakur (2015) has
criticised the ICC for only issuing ‘nine indictments, all against
Africans’. He speculates that the impunity enjoyed by Sudanese
President Bashir – who has freely travelled abroad without arrest –
‘marks a growing rebellion against a normative enterprise of international
criminal justice being subverted into a political project by the previously
powerful West to maintain control over the rest’. In Thakur’s view, the
court is morally compromised because of a ‘de facto impunity of Western
leaders and generals for possible international criminal conduct’. He has
previously remarked on US double standards towards the ICJ: the United
States successfully referred Iran to the court over the hostage-taking in its
Tehran embassy but withdrew from ICJ jurisdiction when it received an
adverse decision about its support for the Nicaraguan Contras (Thakur
2006: 115). Some 65 countries have supported a call for the P5 not to use
the veto in mass atrocity situations, although this may not address the
problem of the lack of will of P5 members to indict their own nationals for
international crimes (GCR2P 2014). The potential inclusion of the crime
of aggression in the ICC Statute at the beginning of 2017 could also make
states liable for future violations of the UN Charter prohibition on the
cross-border use of force, but states have also created another zone of
impunity (the Article 98 Agreements pushed on allies by the US) by
encoding exceptions to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction that raise
barriers to prosecution and allow states to withdraw from jurisdiction
when it pertains to the crime of aggression (Coalition for the
International Criminal Court).
354 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

The ICC came into being when the Rome Statute was signed in
1998 and began operating in 2002. A key provision of the Rome Statute
(Article 11) is that only crimes committed after the entry into force of
the statute can fall under its jurisdiction. There are three ways the ICC
can investigate a situation. First, a state party of the Rome Statute can refer
a situation to the prosecutor. Since the ICC began operating, four states
parties to the Rome Statute – Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Central African Republic, and Mali – have referred situations
occurring on their territories to the Court. Secondly, the UNSC can
request an investigation of a situation in any member state of the UN.
This can occur even if the state to be investigated has not ratified the
Rome Statute because all member states of the UN are bound by UNSC
resolutions and the crimes covered by the statute are international cus-
tomary law. To date, the Security Council has made just two references,
namely, the situations in Darfur, Sudan, and Libya, accusing states that are
non-state parties to the Rome Statute. Thirdly, the Office of the
Prosecutor can initiate an investigation.
Despite its manifest importance, the Rome Statute has not been ratified
by all members – of the members of the United Nations, there are 124
state parties to the statute. Of the permanent UNSC members, only
France and United Kingdom are state parties. While the United States
and Russia are signatories to the Rome Statute, they have not ratified.
China is a non-signatory of the Rome Statute together with 43 other
members of the United Nations. Permanent members of the Council
have also used their power of veto raising concerns within the General
Assembly as well as more broadly in the international community.

Sudan
In 1989, General Omar Al-Bashir took control of Sudan by military coup,
which resulted in increased regional tensions in Sudan. He was appointed
President in 1993. In 1997, the United States began its program of
sanctions against Sudan imposing a comprehensive trade embargo and
blocking the assets of the Government of Sudan (US Executive Order
13067). In 2003, two Darfuri rebel movements – the Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – took up
arms against the Sudanese government. The National Islamic Front gov-
ernment of Sudan responded by allowing militias known as Janjaweed
together with Sudanese forces to attack hundreds of villages throughout
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 355

Darfur. This led to the systematic killings of non-Arab villagers in Darfur

while thousands of refugees fled to neighbouring Chad.
In July 2004, the US Congress passed a resolution labelling Darfur as
genocide. Subsequently, the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur was established by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in October
2004. The Commission reported in January 2005 that there was reason to
believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed
in Darfur and recommended that the situation be referred to the ICC.
Based on the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
violations of IHL and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60), and
determining that the situation in Sudan continued to constitute a threat
to international peace and security, the Security Council referred the
situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor (Resolution 1593 of 2005).
The resolution required Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in
Darfur to cooperate with the Court. It also invited the Court and the
African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the
work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of
conducting proceedings in the region. However, Sudan rejected the UN
resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur on the basis that
it would compromise its sovereignty. The senior UN official, Jan Pronk,
was expelled by the Sudanese Government.
The African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its
acronym UNAMID, was formally established by the Security Council in
July 2007 through the adoption of Resolution 1769. In 2008, The
UNHCR chief, John Holmes, advised that up to 300,000 people died
during the conflict in Darfur and 2.7 million were driven from their homes
(UNHCR 2009).
In 2009, Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, became the first sitting
president to be indicted by the ICC. According to the ICC records
(ICC-02/05–01/09), Al-Bashir allegedly is criminally responsible for
ten counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility under
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect co-perpetrator
including five counts of crimes against humanity: murder – Article 7(1)
(a); extermination – Article 7(1)(b); forcible transfer – Article 7(1)(d);
torture – Article 7(1)(f); and rape – Article 7(1)(g). Two counts of war
crimes: intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities – Article
8(2)(e)(i); and pillaging – Article 8(2)(e)(v). And three counts of geno-
cide: genocide by killing (Article 6-a), genocide by causing serious bodily
356 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

or mental harm (Article 6-b), and genocide by deliberately inflicting on

each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s
physical destruction (Article 6-c).
However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I dismissed the charges for
genocide on the basis that there was not sufficient evidence or reasonable
motive to believe that the Sudanese government acted with intention to
destroy, in part or completely, the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, in July 2009, the ICC Prosecutor appealed against
this decision because an arrest warrant for the charge of genocide had not
been issued and in February 2010, the appeals chamber re-sent the case
file to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I for it to reconsider the case and this
resulted in a second arrest warrant being issued. In the same year Al-Bashir
visited Kenya, a signatory of the Rome Statute but the Kenyan govern-
ment refused to enforce the warrant issued by the ICC for the arrest of Al-
Bashir. Subsequently in 2011 following the independence of South
Sudan, a Kenyan judge issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir should he
enter Kenya again.
In December 2014, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor called for the
UNSC to do all within its power to arrest Al-Bashir and bring him to
court. It also advised the UNSC that due to having limited resources and
having several cases open, the investigation into Al-Bashir was suspended
in order to give priority to other open cases. In effect, the ICC declared a
lack of support from the UNSC to investigate war crimes in Darfur. The
Office of the Prosecutor highlighted that the case against Al-Bashir would
remain suspended but could be given priority again at any time if there was
any change in circumstance. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I took the
opportunity to remind certain member states (Chad, Malawi, DRC, and
Sudan) of the Rome Statute and of their obligation to cooperate with the
ICC, and in particular of their obligation to arrest Al-Bashir and bring him
to court if he were to travel to their territory.
Nonetheless, Al-Bashir has continued to thwart the ICC and the UNSC.
Al-Bashir travelled to South Africa in June 2015 to attend an African Union
summit, and the ICC reminded the South African authorities of its obliga-
tion as a state party to the Rome Statute to cooperate with the ICC and
sought the arrest Al-Bashir to bring him to court. As a result, the South
African Supreme Court ordered his arrest and detention before being
transferred to the ICC. However, the South African government informed
the Supreme Court that Al-Bashir had already left the country to return to
Sudan. This directly violated the ruling of the court which aimed to stop
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 357

him from leaving the country. Interestingly, the Darfur Special Criminal
Court which was first set up by the Sudanese government in 2005 to
adjudicate cases of crimes in the Western region has to date failed to bring
charges against any Sudanese official (El Fasher 2016).

Libya
The second case of the situation in Libya again highlights the rhetoric
of the UNSC and associated actions. The period following the military
coup by Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 1969 was one of confrontation –
notably with Chad, the United States, and the United Kingdom – and
of economic and social dysfunction. A series of bombings attributed to
Libyan nationals – of a German nightclub in 1986, UTA Flight 772 in
1989, and PAN AM Flight 103 in 1993 – resulted in a number of
UNSC resolutions, such as S/Res 748 of 31 March 1992, imposing
arms and air embargo and a reduction of Libyan diplomatic personnel
serving abroad. That resolution also set up a Security Council sanctions
committee, and UNSC Resolution 883 of 11 November 1993 tigh-
tened sanctions on Libya. In that resolution, the Security Council,
among other items, approved the freezing of Libyan funds and financial
resources in other countries and banned the provision to Libya of
equipment for oil refining and transportation. Resolution 1192 of 27
August 1998 reaffirmed that the measures set forth in its Resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) remain in effect and binding on all mem-
ber states. In that context it reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution 883
(1993), and decided that the previously mentioned measures would be
suspended immediately if the Secretary General reported to the Council
that the two accused of bombing UTA Flight 772 arrived in the
Netherlands for the purpose of trial before the court, or appeared for
trial before an appropriate court in the United Kingdom or the United
States, and that the Libyan Government has satisfied the French judicial
authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA Flight 772. Resolution
1192 (1998) also expressed its intention to consider additional mea-
sures if the two accused had not arrived or appeared for trial promptly
in accordance with paragraph 8 of the resolution.
It was not until its 3992nd meeting on 8 April 1999 that the Security
Council adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/1999/10), in which it
noted that the conditions for suspending the wide range of aerial, arms, and
diplomatic measures against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had been fulfilled.
358 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

Notwithstanding this history of conflict and crisis, Libya was elected to

chair the United Nations Human Rights Commission in January 2003 by
secret ballot with thirty-three countries in favour, three opposed, and
seventeen abstentions. This form of election was a notable break from
almost 50 years of tradition in which chairpersons were elected by accla-
mation. Subsequently, Libya significantly increased its presence at the UN
by holding the presidency of the Security Council in January 2008 and in
March 2009. Although Libya did not feature directly again as the subject
of Security Council resolutions for some years, it continued to make its
presence felt with other UN organisations. In June 2010 the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees received a note from Libyan authorities order-
ing it to cease its work and leave the country (UNHCR 2010).
However, in 2011 UNSC Resolution 1970 referred the situation in Libya
to the ICC Prosecutor following a unanimous vote, stressing the need to
hold accountable those responsible for attacks on civilians. The referral by
the UNSC is notable because it occurred at the beginning of the conflict.
Part of that resolution again imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanc-
tions (assets freeze and travel ban) and established a sanctions committee. At
the time the Security Council welcomed the condemnation by the Arab
League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) of the serious violations of human rights and
IHL that were being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The UNSC
resolution was preceded by the UN Human Rights Council Resolution
A/HRC/S-15/2 of 25 February 2011, including the decision to dispatch
urgently an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate
all alleged violations of IHRL in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the
facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and
where possible, identify those responsible.
After conducting a preliminary examination of the situation, the ICC
Prosecutor concluded, in March 2011, that there was a reasonable basis to
believe that crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction have been committed in
Libya since 15 February 2011, and decided to open an investigation into
this situation. The ICC subsequently requested warrants of arrest against
three individuals – Muammar Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi,
and the Head of the Intelligence, Abdullah Al Sanousi – for crimes against
humanity (murder and persecution) committed in Libya. The ICC
Prosecutor undertook to investigate further allegations of mass rapes,
war crimes committed by different parties during the armed conflict, and
attacks against sub-Saharan Africans wrongly perceived to be mercenaries.
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 359

The latest update by the ICC was that the investigations in the situation in
Libya remain ongoing (ICC-PIDS-Q&A-LIB-00–002/11).
The subsequent death of Muammar Al-Gaddafi in 2011 resulted in
the ICC closing the case against him. Proceedings against Abdullah
Al-Sanousi before the ICC also came to an end on 24 July 2014 when
the Appeals Chamber confirmed the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber
declaring the case inadmissible before the ICC. Honorary chairman of the
Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation and acting as
the Libyan de facto Prime Minister, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, allegedly
remains criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrator for two counts
of crimes against humanity: murder, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a)
of the Statute; and Persecution, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(h) of
the Statute (ICC-01/11–01/11).
Turmoil and crisis continue with Libya’s second civil war beginning in
2014 and no clear governing body as four contenting groups seek to
control the country. Attempts by the United Nations, including the
Security Council to establish stable governance arrangements in Libya
have been futile.

Syria
The situation in Syria, with more than 200,000 dead and 10 million
refugees and displaced persons, is a transnationalised conflict and a stain
on the international community to rival its failures in Cambodia, Bosnia,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Rwanda. It remains far from resolved, notwith-
standing the Supervision Mission in Syria set up by the UNSC in April
2012 when it noted that ‘the cessation of armed violence in Syria was
clearly incomplete’ (S/Res 2043). The Mission was established to monitor
a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor
and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy’s six-point
plan (annexed to the Security Council Resolution 2042 [14 April 2012[)
to end the conflict. However, because the use of heavy weapons continued
and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides did not occur, the
mission was suspended just months later, in August 2012.
While the UN General Assembly is often seen as cumbersome, it can be
contrasted with the effectiveness of the UNSC regarding in that it has often
taken the initiative, rather than being reactive, on major conflict issues of
global significance. This is arguably true of Syria. In May 2013, the General
Assembly strongly condemned the Syrian government’s indiscriminate
360 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

violence against civilian populations and welcomed the establishment of

the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as
interlocutors needed for a political transition (A/RES/67/262 15 May
2013). The General Assembly further condemned human rights violations
in Syria and urged the Security Council to take measures to end violations
there. The General Assembly Resolution 2254 was drafted by Saudi Arabia
and it was passed by 127 votes in favour, 13 against, and 47 abstentions
(A/RES/68/182 18 December 2013). However, Resolution 2254 on 18
December 2015 was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political
solution to the Syrian crisis and which was adopted unanimously by the
Security Council. This was followed on 22 December 2015 when the
Security Council renewed the authorisation for cross-border aid delivery
until January 2017 and included language calling on member states to
prevent and suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of
Syria (S/RES/2258).
The year 2015 also saw two Syria-related resolutions relating to the
1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the first (S/Res 12066
September 2015) was to add one individual to its sanctions list for affilia-
tion with ISIS and the second (S/Res 12067 October 2015), listing of
four ISIS-affiliated individuals and one individual affiliated with Al-Nusra
Front. And there was a human rights resolution in 2015 (A/HRC/RES/
30/10 1 October 2015) condemning the violation of human rights in
Syria with twenty-nine votes in favour, six against (including Security
Council members Russia, China, and Venezuela), and twelve abstentions,
including Security Council member Nigeria. However, such resolutions
are distinctive primarily because of their relative infrequency, and the way
they underscore the lack of forward-looking decisions by the UNSC. The
stalemate in the Security Council has contributed to ongoing instability in
Syria and one of the largest humanitarian crises since the end of the World
War II.

WAYS FORWARD
It is widely accepted that the Security Council is in need of reform (Thakur
2006: Ch. 13; Zacher 2004; Zifcak 2009: Ch. 2; Bellamy this volume).
Indeed, the General Assembly at its seventieth meeting on 29 September
2015 (GA/11694) highlighted the need for reform of the UN generally
and, in particular, of the Council. Specific criticism of the veto was high-
lighted, such as in the case of Ukraine where the Russian Federation had
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 361

used its veto twice during the Security Council’s consideration. Petro
Poroshenko, President of Ukraine noted that the veto power should not
become an act of grace and pardon for a crime. President Dalia
Grybauskaitė of Lithuania, also addressing the use of the veto power in
the Council, commented, ‘If you close your eyes to crimes, they do not
disappear’ (GA/11694 2015).
Three key issues are at stake in discussions of Security Council reform:
the veto possessed by existing (and potential new) permanent members;
the expansion of Council membership, both of permanent and non-
permanent members; and its willingness both to more effectively prose-
cute its traditional mandate and to interpret its mandate more widely to
take in non-traditional and systemic security issues including environmen-
tal crisis and degradation. There are many competing proposals
for Council reform – some of which betray state self-interest – and the
Realpolitik of the UN Charter’s framing (which provides the P5 with an
ultimate veto over reform) must be acknowledged. However, if the
Security Council is to become a more effective and just mechanism for
the global governance of complex and systemic insecurities, discussions
about the nature and purpose of reform must be undertaken.

Interpreting Its Role in International Peace and Security

As noted earlier, under Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security
Council shall ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations . . . ’.
This provides for a very imprecise definition but also one which could
enable the Council to take a more broad and flexible interpretation of
challenges to international peace and security – including those that are
emerging and systemic, rather than waiting until they are a full crisis
situation. The Council could also be more proactive and effective in
dealing with its traditional mandate – that is, intrastate and interstate
conflict. It is true that the Charter does not require states to report to the
Council when they use force within their borders, but the Council could
demand more accountability and insist that states justify their actions,
observe international human rights and humanitarian law, and cooperate
with efforts to resolve such conflicts. This should include demands for
accountability from states that become involved in such conflicts through
local proxies. Historical conflicts in Cambodia, Afghanistan, East Timor,
and Angola are testament to the tragedy of the Council’s failure in this
362 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

regard, which is now being repeated in Palestine, Yemen, and Syria. The
Council should also begin to engage questions of arms racing and
strategic stability between major adversaries, and recognise that particu-
lar technological choices and unchecked security dilemmas are important
precursors to great power conflict especially with nuclear weapons.
Undoubtedly it is the P5’s possession of nuclear weapons and their
resentment of multilateral pressure which has prevented the Council
engaging in this area; however, numerous NPT review conferences
have called for nuclear states to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons
in their security policy and to adopt less dangerous and more reassuring
nuclear postures (Burke et al. 2014: 91–97; United Nations 2010: 21).
The removal of the veto would substantially free the Council’s member-
ship to engage these questions. Our call for the Council to broaden and
deepen its understanding of global insecurity is also reflected by impor-
tant statements that have emerged from the UN Secretariat and General
Assembly. Numerous major UN reports and meetings – the UN’s High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Kofi Annan’s Report to
the UN World Summit, In Larger Freedom, The 2005 World Summit
Outcome, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – have
urged that security be understood in a broad and holistic way and that
peace, security, human rights, and sustainable development are pro-
foundly interlinked. Yet the world waits for the Security Council to
absorb this message and act on it.

Membership and Representation

Non-permanent membership of the Security Council was expanded after
1966 from six to ten, resulting in fifteen total members (with a threshold
of nine and no P5 veto for a successful resolution). At this time, the
General Assembly also divided the non-permanent members on the basis
of five from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America and the Caribbean,
one from Eastern Europe, and two from the Western Europe and others
grouping (Zacher 2004: 213). Since the end of the Cold War vigorous
debate has resumed about the composition of the Council. The notion
of equitable representation on the Security Council, particularly expan-
sion of the permanent members, remains in deadlock with contested
proposals for new permanent members such as Brazil, Germany, India,
Japan, and dedicated African seats. For example, at the seventieth meet-
ing of the General Assembly noted above (GA/11693), a number of
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 363

members called for Africa to be represented in the Council’s permanent

and non-permanent membership, noting that much of the fifteen-mem-
ber body’s work focused on the African continent. There have also been
calls for religious representation. In 2005, Foreign Ministers of the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference urged a greater role for
Muslim countries in world affairs and called for permanent representa-
tion for the Islamic world on the UNSC (OIC 2005). More radical
proposals have called for major ecosystems – such as the Arctic and
Antarctic, the Amazon basin and Pacific Ocean – to have seats in the
General Assembly and other bodies (which could conceivably include
the Security Council) (Burke et al. 2016), but raise obvious complexities
as to what kind of polity would elect such representatives and to whom
they would be accountable.
One group of aspiring powers – Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India –
proposed to add ten new seats (four non-permanent and six permanent
including two set aside for Africa), but were countered by their geopolitical
rivals (the ‘uniting for consensus’ group that included Argentina, Mexico,
Pakistan, and South Korea) who opposed new permanent members and
proposed ten new 2-year non-permanent seats with provision for re-election
(Weiss 2009: 55–60). The Open-Ended Working Group on the Question
of Equitable Representation of and an Increase in the Membership of the
Security Council and Other Matters, which sat between 1994 and 1997,
produced a bewildering range of proposals, even as there was a general
international consensus that the membership should expand to around
twenty-five or twenty-six states (Zacher 2004: 214–5). However, we must
also question whether enhancing the size of membership or changing the
membership would be beneficial. While it might be more reflective of the
contemporary distribution of power, it may become as unrepresentative as
the current permanent membership, especially when dealing with issues that
touch on the interests of new members. In such a case, Security Council
reform could just see efforts at better global governance hampered by more
power politics rather than fulfilling the vision of the General Assembly in the
Sustainable Development Goals.
Nonetheless, the issue of permanency warrants critical attention. We
do not believe that the addition of new permanent members is advisable.
However renewed discussion of the former Secretary General’s proposal
to the 2005 World Summit (Model B), for the creation of ‘eight four-
year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and
non-renewable) seat’ (UN A/59/2005: 43), is warranted.
364 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

The Veto
The veto possessed by the permanent membership of the Security Council
is arguably one of its biggest flaws, and remains a lightning rod for conflict
and criticism. It has prevented the Council from engaging constructively
on numerous crucial and urgent issues, and has almost single-handedly led
to the current reform stalemate. The P5 guard the veto jealously; aspiring
permanent members covet the geopolitical clout and blocking power it
might give them; while their adversaries are resolutely opposed to the
extension of the veto to any new members. Many states, especially those
in the Non-Aligned Movement, wish the veto to be restricted to
Chapter VII (use of force) issues (which is similar to a position that had
wide support when the UN was formed in San Francisco in 1945) with the
hope that it can be eliminated completely sometime in the future. Further,
there are international divisions over whether the veto might remain with
the P5 and yet be denied to new permanent members (Zacher 2004: 216).
An alternative model would see increasing normative pressure on the P5 to
restrict their use of the veto to Chapter VII issues and to not use it at all
when dealing with mass atrocities. Even better, they would decline to use
the veto in any but the most extreme circumstances and let the two-thirds
majority weight of the Council define the agenda in more constructive
ways.

CONCLUSION
Many of the chapters in this book have directly engaged the role of the
United Nations in different aspects of global security: children and
conflict, climate change, gender, small arms and weapons of mass
destruction, and global health. We have chosen to focus here on the
power and role of the Security Council given its inordinate weight in the
system and its extremely chequered record. Experienced observers have
rightly stated that it ‘suffers from a quadruple legitimacy deficit: perfor-
mance, representational, procedural and accountability’ (Thakur 2006:
302). Numerous critical commentators, civil society, and the entire
membership of the United Nations have sent a clear message – most
recently in the proclamation of the Sustainable Development Goals in
the 2030 Agenda – that the planet faces a complex range of interlaced
threats and insecurities that require more relevant, representative, and
accountable institutions that are committed to human rights, peace, and
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 365

genuinely sustainable development that preserves the planet’s ecology

for future generations of humans, animals, and ecosystems. The mem-
bership of the United Nations has grown from the original 51 members
in 1945 to 193 now. The issues that faced the first meeting of the
Security Council in January 1946 are significantly different from those
it faces today and into the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burke, A. (2007). Beyond security, ethics and violence: War against the other.
London/New York: Routledge.
Burke, A., Fishel, S., Mitachell, A., Dalby, S., & Levine, D. (2016). Planet Politics:
A Manifesto from the End of IR. Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
44(3), 499–523. doi: 10.1177/0305829816636674.
Burke, A., Lee-Koo, K., & McDonald, M. (2014). Ethics and global security: A
cosmopolitan approach. London and New York: Routledge.
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘Delivering on the Promise of a
Fair, Effective and Independent Court: the Crime of Aggression’. http://
www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression. Accessed 24 May 2016.
Cortright, D., Lopez, G., & Gerber-Stellingwerf, L. (2007). Sanctions. In
T. H. Weiss & S. Daws (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on the United Nations.
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
EO 13067, (1997). US Executive Order 13067, Sudan Sanctions Program,
Department of the Treasury, Washington DC.
Fasher, E., (2016). ‘Darfur prosecutor accuses rebels of recruiting child soldiers’,
Sudan Tribune, 30 March at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?
article58475.
GCR2P, (2014). References on the need for veto restraint by the UN Security
Council in mass atrocity situations, http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/
veto-restraint-references.pdf.
ISW, Institute for the Study of War (2016). ‘Afghan Government’ at http://
www.understandingwar.org/afghan-government.
McLean, E. (2014). ‘Hard evidence: Who uses veto in the UN Security Council
Most – and for What?’, The Conversation, 1 August.
Nadin, P., (2014). ‘United Nations Security Council Reform’, http://ourworld.
unu.edu/en/united-nations-security-council-reform.
Newman, E. (2007). A Crisis of global institutions? Multilateralism and interna-
tional security. London and New York: Routledge.
OIC, (2005). ‘OIC wants permanent UNSC seat’ in The Nation on the web
https://web.archive.org/web/20051112150910/http://nation.com.pk/
daily/june-2005/29/index3.php. 29 June 2005.
366 R. PARKER AND A. BURKE

Price, R., & Zacher, M. Eds. (2004). The United Nations and global security. New
York/Houdmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Steffen, W., et al. (2015). Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a
changing planet. Science, 347(6223). doi: 10.1126/science.1259855.
Thakur, R. (2006). The United Nations, peace and security. Cambridge/New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Thakur, R. (2015). ‘Belling the International Criminal Court’, Australian
Outlook, 5 November.
UN (2002). ‘Background Note on the ‘Arria-Formula’ Meetings of the Security
Council Members’, Working Methods Handbook, Informal Non-Paper of
25 October 2002, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriafor
mula.shtml.
UNHCR, (2009). ‘Sudan’, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?
pass=52fc6fbd5&id=4a03e8f58.
UNHCR (2010). ‘UN refugee agency says being expelled from Libya’, http://
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=4c0f327a5.
United Nations (2004). ‘A more secure world: Our shared responsibility’, Report
of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, General Assembly
A/59/565 (New York: United Nations).
United Nations (2005). World Summit Outcome. General Assembly. 15
September. A/60/L.1
United Nations (2010). 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, NPT/
CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)*. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sym
bol=NPT/CONF.2010/50 (VOL.I).
Weiss, T. (2009). What’s Wrong with the United Nations and how to fix it.
Cambridge/New York: Polity.
Zacher, M. (2004). The conundrums of international power-sharing: The politics
of security council reform. In R. Price & M. Zacher (Eds.), The United Nations
and global security. New York/Houdmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zifcak, S. (2009). United Nations reform: Heading North or South? New York/
London: Routledge.

Rita Parker is Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales, Canberra,
former Distinguished Fellow at George Mason University, Virginia, and senior
international relations and security policy advisor to the Australian Government.
Her areas of expertise include resilience and nontraditional challenges to security,
including threats from non-state actors and from non-human sources. Recent
publications include: ‘Food a Non-traditional Challenge to Security’ in B.
Mascitelli & B O’Mahoney (Eds), Good Food for All: Developing knowledge rela-
tionships between China and Australia (2015); ‘Lessons on Resilience’, NFG Policy
 19 THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 367

Paper Series, Freie Universität, Berlin, 11/2015; ‘Transnational Security Threats

and Non-traditional Security Challenges’, The Journal of Defence and Security,
2013, ‘Managing for Resilience’ in Resilience and Transformation, (Australia21
and CSIRO, 2010), co-author ‘Energy and Food Security’, Security Challenges
(Kokoda 2014); and co-author ‘System-Resilience Perspectives on Sustainability
and Equity in Australia’ in Negotiating Our Future: Living Scenarios for Australia
to 2050 (Australian Academy of Science, 2012).

Anthony Burke is Professor of International and Political Studies, UNSW

Australia. He is coauthor (with Katrina Lee-Koo and Matt McDonald) of Ethics
and Global Security: A Cosmopolitan Approach (Routledge, 2014), author of Fear
of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Cambridge University Press, 2008),
Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against The Other (Routledge, 2007),
and Uranium (Polity Press, 2017). He is also co-editor (with Jonna Nyman) of
Ethical Security Studies (Routledge, 2016) and (with Matt McDonald) Critical
Security in the Asia-Pacific (Manchester University Press, 2007).
 INDEX

A Arms control
Actor Network Theory (ANT), 70, civilian oversight, 186–187
73, 77 current practices, 176–177
Additional protocols cyberspace, 225, 227
(APs), 203, 205 disarmament process, 176–178
Agenda 21, 107 global governance, 188–190,
Agenda 2030, 5, 13, 15, 287–288, 195–196
362, 364 main purpose, 184–186, 188
Al-Bashir, General Omar, 354–356 militarization of society, 184–186
Al-Nusra Front, 360 NGO’s role, 189–190
Al Qaeda, 244 nuclear, 198, 208
Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, 360 overview, 176–177
Algerian War, 35 powerful state’s role, 187–188
An Agenda for Action state sovereignty, 183–184
(climate change report), 124 success and controversies, 177–183
Annan, Kofi, 89, 178, 316, Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 14,
352, 355 177–180, 184, 188–189,
Anthropocene, 4, 34, 77, 86, 191n3, 191n10
103–105, 110, 113, 115, Artificial intelligence (AI), 216–217
131, 134 Asian Development
ANZUS Treaty (1951), 329 Bank, 339
Apocalyptical frame, climate Asian financial crisis 1997, 107
change, 130–133 Asian Infrastructure Investment
Apollo program, NASA, 106 Bank, 339
A. Q. Khan black market Association of South East Asian
network, 207 Nations (ASEAN), 8, 149,
Arab League peace 218, 281
initiative, 315 Australian Defence Force, 53

© The Author(s) 2017 369

A. Burke, R. Parker (eds.), Global Insecurity,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1
370 INDEX
B 211n14, 217, 227, 235–238,
Ban Ki-moon, 32
Bangkok Principles, 278–279
Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention (BTWC), 246
Biological weapons, 9, 84, 177,
190n1, 239–241, 243–247,
249n1, 336, 347
Biological Weapons Convention
1972, 177, 210n2, 245
Biosecurity, 93, 242, 248–249, 256
BioWeapons Prevention Project
(BWPP), 247
Brundtland Commission, 107
C US Department of Defense
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots
(NGO), 181
Channel Project, 159
Chemical weapons, 9, 84, 177, 179,
190n1, 191n4, 239, 244–245,
249n1, 318, 336, 347
Chernobyl nuclear
disaster, 106
Children
activism, 160, 164
conflict zones, 162–163,
167–168, 171
engagement in conflicts
and violence, 160–162
older, 164
political agency and, 168–171
radicalisation, examples, 169–170
UN’s governance
approach, 162–168
violence against, 162–165
youth versus, 167–168
Civil society organisations, 32, 36,
107, 141–142, 144, 148,
151–153, 170, 177, 189,
244–245, 247–248, 263, 265,
292, 295, 299, 304, 364
Climate change
apocalyptical frame, 130–133
in Asia-Pacific region, 57
global ecology, 104–106,
110–112, 114–116
global warming, 330, 336
health threats and, 256
human-induced, 83, 86–87, 90,
94–96
international response to, 24, 27,
30–32, 34, 37
intersecting frames, 128–130
militarisation of, 127–128 (see also
(DoD))
physical reality, 119–122
positive global responses, 134–135
post-human security, 66–67, 71
securitisation of, 1–2, 4, 6–8,
12, 14
security frame and framers, 122–126
think tanks, 124–126
United Nation’s efforts, 126–127,
349–351, 364
Clinton, Bill, 218, 256
Cluster Munitions Conventions, 177,
179–180, 188–189, 191n6
Cold War, 3, 8–9, 11, 23, 25–27,
34, 105–106, 118, 167,
176–177, 185–186, 198–199,
205–206, 224–225, 256, 282,
295, 348, 362
Collective security, 10–12, 87,
89–90, 93, 130, 317
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), 28, 199–200, 208
Conference on Disarmament
(CD), 28, 182

Conferences of the parties
(COPs), 104, 119
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
(CRSV), 151–152
Convention on Certain
Conventional
Weapons, 181–182, 190n2
Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
(CEDAW), 44
Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty1986, 177
Copenhagen Conference, 31,
126, 351
COP21 Conference, 32
Cyber warfare, 26, 220
Cyberspace
counter-surveillance, 223–224
ethics, 228–230
legal harmonisation, 222
patriotism, 223
principle of restraint, 224–227
privacy policy, 223
security norms, 217–222
D international architecture, 274–277
Daesch, 244
DeBrum, Tony, 119–120, 130
Declaration of the 1996
Treaty Review Conference, 246
Department of Peacekeeping,
141, 347
Disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR), 145
Drone warfare, 180–181, 185, 226
Dual Use Research of Concern
(DURC)
H5N1 experimentation, 241–242
mousepox virus, 240–241
INDEX 371
See also Pandemics
Dublin Regulation, 280–282
E
Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro
1992), 107
Ebola pandemic, 85, 237, 243,
253–254, 259
Ecopolitics, 113–115
Environmental crisis/issues, 66–68,
75–76, 93, 96, 361
F
Federation of American Scientists
(FAS), 249
Feminist political economy, 44–58
Fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT), 28, 182
Five Power Defence Arrangements
(1971), 330
Food supplies, 105, 114
Forced migration
in Asia, 280–282
in Europe, 282–284
protection needs, 273
regional architecture, 277–280
security regime, 284–287
Frank, Anne, 169
Future environments, 115–116
G
Gender equality, 52–53, 57,
147, 162
Gender-based violence, 46, 55,
143, 146, 178
genocide, Rwanda, 9, 314, 316
372 INDEX
Geopolitics, 1, 3, 25, 106,
111–115, 188–189, 224,
247, 363–364
Global Alliance for Vaccine
Immunization or GAVI, 255,
260–266
Global climate, 2, 6, 105–108
Global cooling, 2
Global ecology, 4, 14, 96, 103–116
contributors, 4, 14
governance regimes, 96
social nature, 103–116
Global Network of Women Peace
builders (GNWP) Localization
Program, 149
Global security governance
Agenda 21, 107
Agenda 2030, 5, 13, 15, 287–288,
362, 364
analysis, 2–13
children’s engagement, 159–172
climate change, 119–135
collective international efforts, 1, 11
cosmopolitan reforms, 83–97
ecology, 103–116
cyberspace and, 217–224
forced migration, 273–288
gender balance, 43–58
geopolitical ecology, 107, 110, 113
health security, 253–266
human rights governance, 293–303
inequalities, 89–90
international peace, 351
key issues, 6–10
military conflicts, 96
Non-Proliferation Treaty,
implementation, 195–209
Responsibility to Protect
(R2P), 30, 311–323
United Nations’ role, 347–363
UN structures, 3
See also National security
Global Summit to End Sexual
Violence in Conflict
(United Kingdom), 150
Global violence
feminist political economy
analysis, 48–51
gendered perspectives, 43–58
UN Women, Peace and Security
Agenda, 51–57
Globalisation
insecurity, 4–6, 23–26, 85–87
social nature, 108–110
violence, 48–57
Google, 216, 340
Governance
national security, 327–343
Western concepts, 29, 35, 69, 72,
159, 186, 202, 205, 229, 256,
296, 301–304, 319, 328–332,
334, 336, 341, 353
See also Global security governance
Greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, 6, 26, 30–32, 68,
105, 111, 115–116, 122,
125–126, 134
Grybauskaitė Dalia, 361
H
Hawa Bangura, Zainab, 150
Health research. Dual Use Research
of Concern (DURC)
Health security
discourse analysis, 260–263
Global Alliance for Vaccine
Immunization or GAVI, 255,
260–266
HIV/AIDS, 24, 56, 254,
256–257, 259
international agreements, 255–260
Precautionary Principle, health
research, 242

Tobacco Free Initiative
(TFI), 260–266
H5N1, 241–242
Highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI), 241
HIV/AIDS, 24, 56, 254,
256–257, 259
Holistic approach, 14–15, 35,
245, 288, 362
Human Rights Watch, 181
I International Organization
Inconvenient Truth (Gore), 123
Infectious diseases
as biological weapons, 243–245
conflicts, 238–239
Information and communications
technologies (ICT), 217, 219,
223–224, 226, 228
Insecurities
contemporary, 33–38
global, 4–6, 23–26
governance deficit, 26–33
moral and strategic
implications, 85–87
state-centric approaches, 26–27, 33
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), 30–31, 126, 336
Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs), 275
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), 29, 196, 202–203, 205,
210n6, 211n8–211n10, 211n11
International Criminal Court
(ICC), 6, 91–92, 96, 348,
352–356, 358–359
International Framework for Nuclear
Energy Cooperation
(IFNEC), 202–203, 210–211n7
International human rights
governance
INDEX 373
international law, 294–295
international sanctions, 295–300
principled engagement, 300–303
security agendas, 293–294
International Human Rights Law
(IHRL), 353, 358
International Humanitarian Law
(IHL), 355, 358
International Monetary
Fund, 339
International organisations
(IOs), 302, 307n10
for Standardization, 104
International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification
(IPNDV), 208, 211n13
International peace and security, 15,
44, 52–54, 139, 162, 318–319,
321–322, 348–352, 355, 361
International political economy
(IPE), 45
International refugee regime, 14,
273–276, 283
See also Forced migration
International Relations (IR), 45,
256–257, 259, 261
International security, 3, 6, 9–11,
27, 45, 89–90, 184, 217, 246,
347, 351
International Support Mission
to the Central African Republic
(MISCA), 145
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIS), 159, 244, 360
J
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), 207
Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), 354
374 INDEX
K cyber technologies, 216, 222–224,
Killer robots, 181–182
Kyoto Protocol, 30–32, 126
L 257–259
Landmines Convention, 9, 92, 177,
180, 188–190, 191n5
Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS), 181
Libya
crimes, 357–359
NATO-led intervention
(2011), 312
M (NAM), 9, 197, 364
Malala, Yousefzai, 159–161, 169
Manila Pact (1954), 330
Maurer, Peter, 32
Mexico, 28, 278, 317, 363
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS), 236
Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), 50, 254, 288
Mousepox virus, 240–241
Mutual Defence Treaty,
United States
Philippines 1951, 329–330
Republic of Korea 1953, 330
N Nuclear war, 2, 27, 84–86, 184
National Action Plans (NAPs), 140,
145, 147–149
National Scientific Advisory Board
for Biosecurity (NSABB),
242, 247
National security
climate change policy, 121–127,
129, 133
collective, 11–12
226, 230
forced migration, 284, 296
military response, 24, 26–27
public health and, 242–243, 248,
state’s role, 327–343
weapons proliferation, 175, 177,
186–190
Nationally determined
contributions (NDCs), 32
Neoliberalism, 6, 14, 35, 46–47, 49,
84, 107–108, 112–114
New START Treaty, 179
9/11 attacks, 11–12, 29, 35, 207, 331
Non-Aligned Movement
Non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS), 196–199, 201–209,
210n4, 211n13
North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 329
NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons), 3, 6,
96, 176, 179, 182
diplomatic efforts, 207–208
disarmament resistance, 205–207
fundamental weakness, 196–198
implementation
challenges, 198–201
opposition, 201–205
Review Conferences, 6, 28,
199–201, 206, 208
Nuclear weapon states
(NWS), 196–203, 205–209,
210n4, 211n12
Nuclear weapons, 2–3, 6, 8–9, 23,
25, 27–28, 34, 67, 94, 105,
176–177, 179, 182, 186–187,
189, 195–198, 200–202,
204–209, 244, 362
Nuclear winter, 2, 84, 106

O Proliferation Security Initiative
Obama, Barack, 120–121, 129,
191n10, 200, 205, 218–219
Only One Earth, 106
Open-Ended Working Group
(OEWG), 208
Operation Olympic Games, 220
Operative paragraphs (OPs), 143
Organisation of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), 358, 363
Ozone depletion, 106, 119
P Regional Action Plans (RAPs), 140,
Pandemics
Dual Use Research of Concern
(DURC), 239–240
impact on society, 235–238
infectious diseases, 238–239
Paris Agreement on climate
change, 6, 32, 95, 119–121,
123, 127
Patriotism, 38, 223
Peace-building, 2, 14, 34, 36, 43,
52, 54, 96, 140, 142, 144,
152, 167, 169–172, 352
Permanent membership, UN Security
Council, 362–364
See also Veto
P5, 90, 177, 187, 352–353,
361–362, 364
Poroshenko, Petro, 361
Post-human security
anthropocentrism, 73–78
critical approaches, 66–68
environmental politics, 65–66
exceptional characteristics, 68–73
Poverty, 3–5, 10, 12–13, 46,
84, 89, 95, 112, 126, 131,
183, 294
Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative
(United Kingdom), 150
INDEX 375
(PSI), 207
Pronk, Jan, 355
PSVI initiative, 150
Public–private partnerships, 50, 260
R
Refugees, 2, 7, 13, 33, 37, 84–85,
94, 124–126, 132, 273–281,
284–285, 287–288, 292, 294,
337, 341–342, 352, 355,
358–359
148–149
Regional Cooperation Framework
(RCF), 279
Register of Conventional
Arms, 178, 182
Resolution Watch project, 144
Responsibility to Protect
(R2P), 30, 311–323
Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 140
Rule by law, 330, 333–335, 342
Rule of law, 13, 145, 316, 330,
333–335, 342
S
Second Indochina War, 169
Second World War, 26, 33, 67, 84,
90, 169, 239, 255, 294
Security challenges, 34, 125,
249, 343
Security sector reform (SSR), 145
Security threat, 27, 33, 35,
114, 120–123, 126–128,
130, 132–134, 228, 252,
259, 339
Sexual exploitation and abuse
(SEA), 140, 144
376 INDEX
Sexual violence, 3, 14, 46–47, 51,
54–55, 140, 144–145,
150–151, 162
Sexualised and gender-based
violence (SGBV), 46,
51–56, 140
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), 8, 218
Sidoti, Chris, 305
Small arms and light weapons
(SALW), 143, 178
Snowden, Edward, 219, 223,
225–226
Sovereignty, 4, 11, 26, 51, 68,
183–184, 258, 266–267,
301, 328, 331, 335, 355
See also National security
Special Representative
of the Secretary General
on Sexual Violence in Conflict
(SRSG-SVC), 144
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on Sexual
Violence in Conflict, 140,
150–151
Stockholm UN conference, 106
Sudan
crimes, 354–357
Darfur genocide, 2, 67, 144,
318, 354–357
Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA), 354
Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), 5, 12, 44,
95, 97, 287–288, 348,
363–364
See also 2030 Agenda
Syria
all-female brigades, 159
crimes, 359–360
mass atrocities, 311
Security Council vetoes, 313, 315
T
Teenagers, 164, 169
Terrorism, 2, 12, 27–29, 37, 45,
83–85, 89, 93, 128, 134,
151, 167, 181, 185, 189,
207, 243, 259, 327, 330–331,
336, 352
Toronto Conference 1988, 30
Transnational corporations
(TNCs), 302
Treaty for the Function
of the EU, 283
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security (United States
and Japan), 329
U
UN Charter, 3–4, 9, 11, 27, 139,
196, 254, 293, 316, 321–323,
353, 361
Article 108, 348
Article 39, 348, 361
Article 51, 183
Chapters VI, 314, 348
Chapters VII, 314, 351
Chapters VIII, 314
UN Conference on Disarmament, 182
UN conference on Environment
and Development, 30
UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCC), 30,
104–105, 107, 120, 123,
132, 351
Agenda 21, 107
Copenhagen meeting, 31, 126
Paris Agreement 2015, 123
21st Conference of the Parties
(COPs), 119–120
UN General Assembly
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 29
cyberspace security, 217, 219

First Committee, 28
health policies, 253–254
international security
agenda, 89–90, 94
OEWG norms, 211–212n15
policy development for
children, 162
refugee regime, 275, 277, 286–287
relationship with UN Security
Council, 348, 350–352, 354,
359–360
reports and meetings, 362
resolution 2028
(1965), 209–210n1
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
agenda, 311–313,
315–316, 320
Sustainable Development
Goals, 363
UN Group of Government Expert
(GGE), 220
UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, 10
UN Human Rights Council, 315, 358
United Nations Assistant Mission
to Afghanistan, 164
United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child
(UNCRC), 165, 167
United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 29
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), 33,
275–277, 280–282, 285–286,
355, 358
UN Mission on Ebola Emergency
Response (UNMEER), 254
United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), 321
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA), 274
INDEX 377
UN resolutions
Resolution 319 IV (1949), 275
Resolution 255 (1968), 210n4
Resolution 748 (1992), 357
Resolution 883 (1993), 357
Resolution 1192 (1998), 357
Resolution 1265 (2000), 316
Resolution 1308 (2000), 257, 259
Resolution 1325 (2000), 43, 141
Resolution 1540 (2000), 207
Resolution 1593 (2005), 355
Resolution 1625 (2005), 349
Resolution 1769 (2008), 355
Resolution 1970 (2011), 358
Resolution 1973 (2011), 30,
319–320, 322
Resolution 2042 (2012), 359
Resolution 2122 (2013), 153
Resolution 2254 (2013), 360
See also UN Security Council
Resolutions
UN Security Council
criticism on veto, 260–261
key issues in reforms, 361–362
mass atrocities problems, 311–323
non-permanent
membership, 362–363
permanent membership, 362–363
role in international peace
and security, 361–364
women’s right issues, 141–143
UN Security Council Resolutions
UNSCR 1261 (1999), 163
UNSCR 1314 (2000), 163
UNSCR 1325 (2000), 43–44, 52,
139, 141–143, 145–149,
151–153
UNSCR 1379 (2001), 163
UNSCR 1460 (2003), 163
UNSCR 1539 (2004), 163
UNSCR 1540, 267
UNSCR 1612 (2005), 163
378 INDEX
UN Security Council Resolutions
(cont.)
UNSCR 1820 (2008), 139, 151
UNSCR 1882 (2009), 163
UNSCR 1888 (2009), 139, 151
UNSCR 1889 (2009), 139, 151
UNSCR 1960 (2010), 139, 151
UNSCR 1998 (2011), 163
UNSCR 2068 (2012), 163
UNSCR 2103, 140
UNSCR 2106 (2013), 139, 151
UNSCR 2122 (2013), 139–140,
151–152
UNSCR 2143 (2014), 163
UNSCR 2242 (2015), 139–140,
151–153
See also UN resolutions;
Women, Peace and Security
(WPS) agenda
United States
arms control, 183, 185,
187, 191n8
climate change policy, 124,
127, 133
cyberspace governance, 223–225
drone war fare, 180–181,
185, 226
health security, 240–241,
243–245, 261
nuclear policy, 208, 211–212n7
treaties and alliances, 329, 332, 334
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
or UAVS), 179
US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), 243
US Department of Defense
(DoD), 127, 218, 225
US Quadrennial Defense
Review, 332
UTA Flight 772 bombing, 357
V
Veto
criticism, 364
R2P implementation, 315–319
on Syria, 317
Vietnam War, 35
Violence
against children, 160–165
children’s engagement, 160–162
gender-based, 46, 55, 143,
146, 178
sexual, 3, 14, 46–47, 51,
54–55, 140, 144–145,
150–151, 162
sexualised and gender-based
violence (SGBV), 46,
51–56, 140
See also Global violence
Violent extremism, 151, 167
W
War on Terror, 180, 185
Weapons control, see Arms control
Weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), 2, 12, 14, 28, 89,
175, 177–179, 188, 245,
336, 364
West Nile virus, 256
Westphalian society, 4, 23
Whole of society approach, 13, 34,
36–38
Whole-of-governance
approach, 34, 36
Women, Peace and Security
(WPS) agenda
background, 141–143
four pillars of, 139
key priorities, 150–153

member state
responsibilities, 145–150
peace agreements, 139–153
peace and security governance, 14,
52, 139, 142,
144, 149–152
policy evaluation, 143–145
Security Council resolution, see
specific UNSCRs
on sexualised violence, 142, 144,
150–151
women’s leadership position, 140,
145, 149
WPS resolutions 2000–2015, 151
Working Group Two, 126
World Bank, 49, 161, 255, 336, 339
World Health Organization
(WHO), 216, 236–238, 254,
256, 258, 260, 262, 265
World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), 122
INDEX 379
World Summit 2005, 10, 12, 217,
313, 316, 349, 362–363
World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS), 217, 229
World War One, 239, 245
X
Xenophobia, 84, 307n5
Y
Youth
children versus, 167–168
UN Security Council definition, 167
Y2K problem, 217
Z
Zero sum game, 334