ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v.

COMELEC,
Topic: The Branches of Government – Congress
Atong Paglaum, Inc. petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
Ponente: J. Carpio
Legal Action: Special civil actions in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: C.J. Sereno

● Concurred on the procedural issue that a motion for reconsideration is not needed
before the COMELEC en banc can review decisions of the divisions. Dissented on the
substantive issue, arguing that the party-list system must be exclusive only to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors
● The party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice. In construing a Constitution, the
Court should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to
be prevented or remedied
● Given that our 1987 Constitution is anchored on the principle of social justice and
equality, it necessarily follows that the party-list system must be geared towards the
realization of such social justice in the political arena
● Dissented with respect to the second parameter (stating that national and regional
parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines), arguing that to attain social justice,
“marginalized and underrepresented” should qualify such parties to be able to qualify for
the party-list system. Also cited the policy declaration in Sec 2 of RA 7941 and the
doctrine that “when a law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation
that favors the underprivileged must be favored” (Perez-Rosario v CA). Finally the
Commission proceedings suggest that the party-list system is instituted as a
“countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties.”
● Likewise dissented with respect to the fourth parameter (stating specific sectors to
explain which are “marginalized and underrepresented” and which are “lacking in well-
defined political constituencies”), arguing that Sec 2 of RA 7941 makes both cumulative
requirements and not alternative, meaning a sectoral party must be both marginalized
and underrepresented and lacking in well-defined political constituencies. Also assailed
the enumeration of specific sectors, since it must be left to the COMELEC to determine
which sectors fit these requirements at any given time. Such concepts of marginalization
and under-representation, and lacking defined political constituencies are ever changing
concepts dependent on the times but constitute sufficient legislative standard to guid the
COMELEC in evaluating applications for candidacy.
● Agreed with the sixth parameter (stating that disqualification of a nominee does not
disqualify the party provided that at least one nominee remains qualified), and
proceeded to explain the procedure in filling up the House seats (a first round of seat
allocation for those parties who received 2% and above of the votes, then a second
round of seat allocation for the remainder)
● Said that only nine petitions should be remanded, those which were disqualified by
reason of failure to meet the standard of being a marginalized and underrepresented as
 appropriately rendered, and those which were disqualified by reason of the
disqualification of their nominees. There are no changes in other grounds
● No violation of Sec 3 Art 9C of the Consititution (requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC could decide on cases en banc). Such only
applies when COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers and not when exercising
administrative powers

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: J. Reyes

● Concurred with the decision on the procedural issue of whether the COMELEC en banc
could automatically review a decision of a division without the requisite motion for
reconsideration, but dissented on the substantive issue as regards the reasons for the
disqualifications
● Remand is also not necessary
On procedural aspects
● The COMELEC has general powers and specific powers under Sec 2(1) Art 9C. The
general grant of the power to enforce and administer all laws relating to conduct of an
election encapsulates all the other powers granted to the Commission
● Nature of COMELEC powers: administrative (enforcement and administration of election
laws), quasi-legislative (promulgation of rules and regulations to implement election
laws), quasi-judicial (power to resolve controversies arising in enforcement of election
laws and be sole judge of all contests relating to elections)
● The exercise of quasi-judicial power: must be exercised in division first, then motions for
reconsideration decided en banc
● However the registration of parties falls within the COMELEC's administrative powers
and not under its quasi-judicial powers, and may thus be acted upon directly by the
COMELEC en banc without need for motion for reconsideration, especially since the
COMELEC resolution specifically stated a suspension of such requirement
● Res judicata is not applicable, since there is no final judgment and the COMELEC
resolutions cannot be considered as adjudication on the merits of a controversy – there
are no rights and liabilities involved, only a recognition that a party possesses or does
not possess the necessary qualifications
● Procedural due process was observed. The requirement for this is that a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, embodied in the basic requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard
● The en banc’s later resolution to review the decisions of the COMELEC divisions cannot
disregard the proceedings that already ensued before the latter, especially since the en
banc merely decided on the evidence already submitted by the groups. Notice was also
properly served to the existing party-lists the issuance of the Order requiring them to
submit proof of their continuing compliance with the rules on party-list groups
● The observance of procedural due process is proved by the groups’ actual participation
in the hearings and their submission of evidence
On the substantive aspect
● The party-list system is a tool to achieve social justice. It is not simply a mechanism for
electoral reform but a means to promote the advancement of the underprivileged and
 allowing them an opportunity to grow so that they can become partners of the State in
pursuing greater causes
● The ideals of social justice is embedded in the 1987 Constitution, with the decision to
have a separate Article on social justice and human rights, also as evidenced in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
● The Constitutional provisions on the party-list system are not self-executing and RA
7941 is the implementing law
● Sec 2 of RA 7941 lays down the State policy on the party-list system, a reading of which
necessarily qualifies that the parties: (1) must consist of Filipinos belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; (2) lack well-defined political constituencies;
and (3) could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the State. The terms “marginalized and underrepresented” effectively limits
the party-list system to sectors which directly need support and representation
● The Ang Bagong Bayani decision expounds on this interpretation, that the limiting of the
system to the marginalized and excluding the political parties is aligned with the
mandate to reduce social, economic, and political inequalities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the
spirit of the law and the sacred intention to uphold social justice
● A mere association of individuals espousing shared beliefs and advocacies cannot
qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented sector. A sector is pertains to a
sociological, economic, or political subdivision of the society, while a group merely
consists of individuals who espouse a shared belief/advocacy, acting for such cause
● The party-list system is like a dormitory “open house,” the benefit of which is only for the
outsiders and not for the dormers who can already enter the dorm without any special
privilege
● That a party-list must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector is the only
filter preventing all other groups from joining the system. Opening it up to all groups will
create a dangerous precedent allowing the entrance of illegitimate organizations
● Further the nominees must either actually share the attribute or characteristic of the
sector he aims to represent, or be an advocate, one who is genuinely and actively
promoting the causes of the sector. They must be able to sufficiently prove this as well
● The COMELEC decisions to disqualify the party in cases where the some of the
nominee are disqualified is misplaced since it is not provided for in the grounds for
disqualification in Sec 6 of RA 7941. There must be a gross and willful disregard of the
law before this can be applied
● The requirement to provide a list of at least five nominees is also merely procedural. In
case of non-compliance the COMELEC may simply ask them to comply, or to regard it
as a waiver. The submission list does not guarantee that everyone listed is qualified, and
disqualification of the nominees should not automatically mean the disqualification of the
party-list group itself. The electorate votes for the group itself and not the individuals
behind it, and are mere expected agents of the group dependent on whether the group
will actually garner sufficient votes in the elections
● Remand should only be done on the petitions which grounds involves the new guidelines
on qualifications
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: J. Leonen
● Agreed with the ponencia in substance but dissented in finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC, voting to grant the petitions and nullify the
COMELEC resolution
● Political parties are disqualified only if they have candidates in the political districts. If
they have none, they can qualify for the party-list system and do not need to be
organized along sectoral lines
● RA 7941 is unconstitutional in requiring parties in the party-list system to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” there being no support for it in the plain text of the
Constitution (same basis as majority opinion, Art 6 Sec 5(1) stating that parties may be
national, regional, or sectoral, and Sec 5(2) reserving only half of the seats for identified
sectors and only for the first three consecutive terms after ratification)
● No clear majority supporting the ratio decidendi in the cases Ang Bagong Bayani (8
concur-7 dissent) and BANAT (6 concur with 2 only in the result-5 dissent), thus they are
only enough to sustain the ruling but not to establish doctrine
● The party-list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in the country,
whereby the voters choose based on the platform and principles first over the
personalities/nominees, as opposed to the current dominant system where the
personality appears to be the more significant consideration
● This reform in our political system is not only for the marginalized and underrepresented,
but for everyone
● Ang Bagong Bayani interpreted RA 7941 at par with the Constitution, which should not
be the case since the Constitution should come first, and the framework provided by the
Constitution through the necessary implications from the text of Sec 5 Art 6 bars the
Congress from enacting specific laws that will contradict such framework
● Held that there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC since the basis
they used to disqualify certain parties (“marginalized and underrepresented”) is so
ambiguous that there cannot be a consistent judicially discernible standard that can be
applied. The process was likened to a modern-day inquisition, with the COMELEC
declaring ex cathedra, without any standard, what these sectors were. In this, the
COMELEC substituted their judgment for the judgment of the electorate and acted
arbitrarily
● Also noted that the HRET must be the sole judge of all contests on elections...and the
qualifications of their members, instead of the COMELEC
● Recommended 15 parameters for the evaluation of party-list groups:
1. includes national, regional, and sector parties
2. no need to show that they represent the marginalized and underrepresented but
must show how their plans will impact on the marginalized and underrepresented
3. parties must not also be a participant in the election of representatives for legislative
districts
4. must have political platforms guided by a vision of society, an understanding of
history, a statement of their philosophies and how this translates into realistic political
platforms
5. parties (not only the nominees) must have concrete and verifiable track record of
political participation showing their translation of political platforms into action
6. must be organized solely for the purpose of participating in electoral exercises
7. must have existed for a considerable period (3 years) prior to registration, within
which they should be able to show concrete activities in line with their platform
8. must have such numbers in their actual membership roster so as to be able to mount
a credible campaign
9. a substantial number of members must have participated in the political activities of
the party
10. must have a governing structure democratically elected and not dominated by the
nominees
11. nominees must be selected through a transparent and democratic process
12. source of funding must be clear and should not point to a few dominant contributors
specifically of individuals with families that are or have participated in the elections
for representatives of legislative districts
13. must be able to win within the two elections subsequent to its registration
14. must not espouse violence
15. must not be a religious organization